Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1988

8/22/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1988

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PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN1-88-3 MARCH 1988

1 Air Combat Operations, MG Ellis D. Parker2 Threat: Soviet Helicopter Air-To-Air, Mr. Edward J.Bavaro8 Human Error-Major Cause of Army AviationAccidents13 Aviat ion Personnel Notes: Air Traffic ControlConsolidation; Aviation Regimental System;Aviation Warrant Officers page 8 page 1414 AH-64, A Total System for Battle, Mr. Wendell W.

RESCUEhivers and Mr. Jeffrey W. Van Rope27 Aviation is Inherently Dangerous, SGT Frederic T.

Lyons and PV1 Michael Porter28 DES Report to the Field: Aviation Standardizationand Training Seminars, CPT Thomas M. 8agot30 PEARL'S32 Rescue, Ms. Becky Gloriod34 Airspace Confl ict, LTC Brian A. Dean37 Views From Readers

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38 Human Factors and Essentials of Desert and JungleSurvival, MAJ Kevin T. Mason, M.D.Inside Back Cover: Tower Talk, Mr. Frank Dennis

Major General Ellis D. ParkerCommander, U.S. Army Aviation Center

Back Cover: ATC Action Line: FLIP Improvements, Mr.Forrest H. HelfenbergerPatricia S. Kitchell

EditorBy order of the Secretary of the Army:

Cover: Fielding of the Hokem, the Soviets' newestdefense helicopter, presents Army Aviation with yetanother challenge. Have we lost in our quest to rule theair-to-air battle? This month's lead article, beginning onpage 2, answers this question and addresses somestartling issues about the' Soviet Helicopter Air-to-Air."

Carl E. VuonoGeneral, U.S. ArmyChief of StaffOfficial:

R. L. DilworthBrigadier General, U.S. ArmyThe Adjutant General

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest professional bulletin (USPS 415350)is to provide information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety andaircraft accident prevention, air traffic control, training and doctrine, maintenance, operations, research and development, aviation medicine and other related data. Information contained in this bulletin does not change or supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

The Digest is an official Department of the Army professional bulletin publishedmonthly under the supervision of the commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center. Viewsexpressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army nor the U.S.Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise specified. Use of themasculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless otherwise stated. Materialmay be reprinted provided credit is given to the Aviation Digest and to the author unlessotherwise indicated.

Articles, photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorized by writing Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Box 699, Fort

Rucker, AL 363625042, or by calling either AUTOVON 5583178 or Commercial2052553178. Manuscripts returned only upon request.

Second class postage paid at Daleville, AL, and additional mailing offices.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as out

lined in AR 310-2. Complete DA Form 125R and send directly to CDR, AG Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any change indistribution requirements, initiate revised DA Form 125A.

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution should submitDA Form 125A. Other National Guard units submit requests through their state adjutant general.

Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the Digescan order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.


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Major General Ellis D. ParkerChief, Army Aviation Branch

Air Combat OperationsTH E REALIZATION of Air Land Battle doctrine will

depend greatly upon preserving the maneuver rights ofthebattlefield' s vertical dimension. We realize this as does theThreat. As a consequence the U.S. Army Aviation Center,in concert with the combined arms team, is working todevelop the Army's air combat initiative. The groundworkwe laid is beginning to pay dividends.

We've recently released for worldwide staffing the newField Manual 1-107, "Air Combat Operations," whichaligns our air-to-air tactics, techniques and procedureswith the combined arms team, the forward area air defensesystem initiative and AirLand Battle doctrine. This newpublication is the result of lessons learned from theArmy's air-to-air combat test, phase I (ATAC I) as wellas studies conducted by other North Atlantic TreatyOrganization countries in a joint effort to doctrinally address the Threat.

What is professed in our doctrine must be practiced.Realistic training is an absolute requirement if we're tobe successful in air combat operations. This is progressing now, as we are forwarding an air combat exportabletraining package (ETP) to the field through the auspicesof the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization. Firststop will be U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) based units,followed quickly by continental United States organizations, then U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard organizations. The goal is to train and qitalify instructor pilotsat corps and division levels to permit each organizationto train and qualify its aviators consistent with specificmission requirements and resource availability.

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To support aviation's air combat training requirementas well as that of other members of the combined armsteam, we've recently requested from Army leadership permission to form several opposing forces helicopter detachments. Ou r goal is to provide the Army combat training centers with a realistic helicopter threat force to fosteran awareness of and to facilitate means of killing threathelicopters.

Air combat materiel initiatives are progressing, asevidenced by the planned fielding late next year of theair-to-air Stinger (ATAS) on the OH-58C Kiowa in attack helicopter units in USAREUR. We're also completing the testing and validation of an improved 20 mmcannon fire control and ammunition that will enhance ourability to conduct close-in engagements. Last, we're inconcert with the Air Defense Branch in establishing themeans of providing the air battle picture to every ATASequipped helicopter on the battlefield.

With the good news also comes some bad, and that involves the slippage of ATAC II to fiscal year 1989.Because of a number of concerns, we've decided to delayit to provide the most realistic test environment possible.We are absolutely convinced that ATAC II will have thesame effect on Army Aviation for air combat that theAnsbach tests of the 1970s had in regard to antiarmoroperations.

Air combat operations are no longer fiction and words;they are now a reality. The Aviation Center is workingto ensure the means and doctrine are in place to providethe Army a credible air combat capability. p-- ,

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Illustration courtesy of Department of Defense.

2 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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MARCH 1988

SoyietHelicopter

HE SOVIETS, in the near fu-ture, will be fielding the Hokum heli-copter. When the Hokum does appear ,the Soviets will have scooped the Westby fielding a helicopter that will givethem a significant rotary wing superi-ority capability. This is not to say thatthe Soviets have seized the lead interms of helicopter superiority. It doesindicate, however, an initiative that isuncharacteristic for them. We gener-ally think of them as great imitators.We think of them as masters of the re-verse engineering method of militaryhardware development. Why then are

Mr. Edward J. BavaroThreat DivisionDirectorate of Combat Developments

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL


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Soviet HelicopterAir-to-Airthe Soviets going to be the first to fielda dedicated counterair helicopter?

LessonsLearned

he October 1973 Mideast War orYom Kippur War (YKW) , as it sooften is referred to, pitted the IsraeliDefense Forces against the combinedmight of the Syrians and Egyptians,who initiated the hostilities. That short,intense conflict, provided us all a preview of what a mid- to high-intensitywar would be like.The Soviet-equipped and Soviettrained Syrian and Egyptian forces,among other things, provided us avivid picture of what the high-threat airdefense (AD) environment could looklike. These forces demonstrated thetype of sophisticated AD system thatNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) forces could face elsewhereon an even grander scale. As far as thehelicopter is concerned, the YKWrevealed several facts about combathelicopters with varying implicationsaround the world.Many countries have tinkered withhelicopter military applications forsome time. However, the effort hasbeen more pronounced and with moredirection since the YKW. In that war,helicopters flew a variety of missionand proved not to be the death trapsmany detractors claimed. Helicoptershave been used in air assault, electronicmonitoring and detection, jamming,medical evacuation, radio-relay, trooptransport, supply and other missions.The greatest revelation of the war,in terms of helicopters, was thathelicopters can do valuable jobs andperform vital functions on the modernbattlefield. How they are employedand the techniques for survivability arewhat make the difference. A good example of how not to employ helicoptersoccurred in the Middle East when oneof the contending factions in a battleattempted an aerial resupply mission.Six helicopters were flying at altitude,in formation, were shot down, in for-

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mation, and burned on the ground, information.For the U. S. Army components thatwere then Army Aviation, the YKWmade us refocus our thinking from thecomplacent smugness and self-satisfaction of our Vietnam experience tothe high-intensity conflict. Instead ofthe ongoing rehashing and reheraldingof our exploits during those Republicof South Vietnam years, seeminglyovernight we became concerned withaviation roles in combined arms operations in a high-threat environment.Army aviators have always knownthey could make a valuable contribution on the modern battlefield. Furthermore, the process of reaffirmation inthe days after the YKW, beside purging ourselves of the Vietnam malaise,gave us a golden opportunity to convert the naysayers to Army Aviation.The most attractive part of sellingArmy Aviation was the antiarmor capability of the attack helicopter. Theopportunities for antiarmor attack helicopters, in such a target-rich environment of a future European or MiddleEast battlefield, were obvious and fartoo attractive to let pass. Not manycountries have let the opportunity pass.Most countries today feature the attackhelicopter in their military arsenals, theSoviet Union included.A significant advantage of the aerialdelivery of antitank guided missile isthat the target presents a greater silhouette from the air than it does fromground level. This is true even if theaircraft is only hovering at tree-toplevel. More important, helicopters canengage tanks from a variety of aspectsand angles while outside the range ofthe tanks' guns. Those advantages,combined with the inherent speed andresponse of helicopters, equate to aflexible and excellent combat multiplier of a kind otherwise unavailableto the ground commander.During those soul-searching daysright after the YKW, a perceptive fewarticulated the likely possibility ofhelicopters confronting helicopters onthe battlefield. These few did so, notingthe proximate employment ofhelicopters by both the Israelis and the Arabs.

But the subject of helicopters in air-toair (ATA) engagements was an extremely sensitive subject, in the least,the discussion of which was "discouraged." Worse yet was the rekindlingof the old "white scarf yndrome" thatlong had plagued Army aviators-theview by the leg Army that aviators area bunch of fru trated fighter pilots.(Heck, next thing ya know, these guysare gonna want their own branch of theArmy.) So, the issue of helicopterATAwas tabled as far as Army A viation was concerned. Others, however,were not similarly inhibited-others,such as the U .S. Marine Corps and theSoviet Union.

The Writingon the Wall

uring the 1960 ,the Soviets exhibited a growing interest in helicopters. That was no secret. They closelymonitored the various nations of thewest, especially our activities in Vietnam, using the helicopter more andmore in military roles. During the early1960s, the Soviets perceived that helicopters were too vulnerable to operatenear the forward line of own troops(FLOT) exposed to hostile fire. Helicopters were fine for rear area logistical support, in other words shufflingpeople and supplies. The arming of theMi-4 Hound and later the Mi-8 HipC/E and their employment in heliborneoperation and air assaults seemed alogical progression in the militaryadaptation of the helicopter. But theSoviets were going to go further withhelicopters by including helicopters inA T A roles. The signs were there forus to read, literally. We should havepaid greater heed to Soviet militarywritings, particularly to our old friendColonel Belov-the leading Soviethelicopter theoretician. We have sincecome to learn that not all Soviet writingis a product of "DEZINFORMATSIY A," a program of calculated disinformation (curve balls).As an obscure colonel, Belov wrotean article in the official military publication, Red Star, in December 1970,

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Soviet W I i c o ~ A i r - t o - A i rnew Hind-D, an excellent close air support (CAS) platform, might not havebeen exposed as an unsatisfactory ATAplatform at that time. But as the magnitude of the counterair requirementbecame clearer and, quite possiblywith the realization that the Hind, lacking any agility, was not adequate as anA T A aircraft, the most famous andcited COL Belov article appeared.

In 1979, COL Belov's "How toFight Helicopters" article appeared inthe Soviet Military Review. In this article, he contended" . . . helicopters a repractically invulnerable to ground antiaircraft weapons . . . therefore, it hasbecome vital to get a weapon whichcould compete with the helicopter inrespect to combat power, tactical possibilities, etc. Logic and historical experience suggest that such a weapon isthe helicopter itself. "

He then reviewed the two viewpointson developing combat helicoptersgeneral purpose versus special purpose. COL Belov, who just a few yearsearlier favored the general purpose approach, now spoke the case for the special purpose aircraft. He envisioned aone-man combat helicopter, a lightweight, high-speed aircraft with goodmaneuverability, armed with cannonand AT A guided missiles. The specialpurpose aircraft would open up vastpossibilities for achieving optimal armament systems. It would allow development of the most effective tactics.

The next year COL Belov was promoted to major general (equivalent toou r one-star rank). The 1985 issue ofSoviet Military Power states on page65 that, "the new Hokum helicopterwill give the Soviets a significant rotarywing air superiority capability. Thissystem has no Western counterpart."It says much for the Soviets' regard forthe tank and their desire to protect tanksthat the unique special purpose approach was chosen for the counterairaircraft. So, while MG Belov hadreally caught the eye of the Sovietmovers and shakers, he had not convinced them that the tank was obsoleteand a modern day dinosaur. But then,it is doubtful that he ever truly believedthat either.

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Does being the first to field a dedicated counterair helicopter (the Hokum)indicate the Soviets have taken the lead in terms of rotary wing superioritycapability?

____ i\ir-1ro-i\irY n an earlier Aviation Digest article (November 1984), the Sovietswere discussed as being one ofthe last(of the major powers) to field a dedicated attack helicopter. But when theydid, with the appearance of the Hind'D in 1976, they scored an impressivehit. The Hind-D was by far the best at-tack helicopter in the world at that time.Nowadays, it is popular to refer to theHind in such terms that it appears asa lumbering Clydesdale in comparisonto the sleek stallions like the Apache ,Agusta, BO-105 and other emergingattack helicopters .The degree of derision to the Hindapparently is proportional to its ATAunsuitability. In terms of its ATA application, the Hind is castigated mainly for its lack of agility. What we losesight of is the fact that the Hind was intended for CAS to ground forces-ahelicopter platform of searing firepower and durability that can work ef-

fectively in a combined arms role withtroops. With more than a ton of armorplate protection and its versatility anddependability , the Soviets have developed great affection for the Hind. Theyhave come to refer to it (and attackhelicopters in general) as a "flyingtank. "Because of the Hind , helicoptershave virtually replaced fixed wing inproviding CAS to Soviet groundforces. Helicopters have proven effective, reliable, and more responsive.They have done so because of forwardbasing, compared to fixed wing, andby being added as organic assets of thedivisions. They have the ability tooperate in marginal weather (weatherthat would deny the ground commander 2AS from fixed wing aircraft). Helicopter pilots have demonstrated anenhanced capability to more rapidlyand correctly evaluate battlefield conditions.

There has been much written andsaid by both sides-NATO and Soviet



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Bloc-on future helicopter confrontations. With the Soviets advancing onthe materiel end of the issue, with thedevelopment of the Hokum, one canpresume something is being done onthe human end by practicing ATA intraining. Army Aviation is often accused of going overboard on possibleSoviet ATA training.On the other hand, how much ATAtraining are our attack helicopter aircrews practicing? You may be surprised at what you discover. What mustbe remembered is that the newer generation of Soviet helicopters will notbe similarly handicapped for the AT Arole, as is the Hind. I fSoviet crews arepracticing AT A maneuvering at all today, just think how proficient they willbe flying Hokums or Havoks for thatmatter. They will know the necessarymaneuvers. With these newer aircraft,instead of the lumbering Hind, theywill have the right tools to do the job.Is the United States losing groundhere? Could it be that the initiative andcommitment for counterair helicoptersare shifting eastward? As indicated inthe 1985 and 1986 issues of Soviet Mil-itary Power, the Hokum will give theSoviets a significant air superiority inrotary wing capability, meaning thatinitially they will have a distinct advantage in helicopter-to-helicopter confrontations.

The light helicopter family, if andwhen it arrives, will have been designed to include the AT A requirement. Until then, the United States willhave to adapt its current inventory tomeet the AT A requirement by applying some add-on capability. The question is whether our reputed advantagein helicopter technology , includingsubsystem technology, will provide usthe fix so that parity or better accruesto our aircrews.The issue of AT A superiority is notan insignificant consideration. In ourapproach to combined arms operations, the attack helicopter as a participant is a vital factor, especially in itsanti armor function. The dilutation ofthat function, by any means, wouldhave grave consequences for any forceoperating against a superior adversary

MARCH 1988

having tank-heavy forces. There aremany potential means of reducing theeffectiveness of attack helicopters.Helicopters, particularly dedicatedhelicopters (like M G Belov' s "fighterhelicopter' '), show promise for achieving the greatest success. The fighterhelicopter poses a different challengefrom most other threats to attack helicopters. Attack helicopters capitalizeon their speed and maneuverability toachieve engagement range and line-ofsight (LOS) with potential targets; likewise, the fighter helicopter in AT A operations. The other ai r defense threatto our attack helicopters cannot always maneuver far and/or fast enoughto achieve a targeting solution forengagement (range or LOS or both).The exception to this is artillery, whichdoes not necessarily need LOS and canfire over-the-horizon. Thus, with theexception of the fighter helicopter,threat systems must be given LOS andrange by the intended target helicopter. Therefore, it appears that MGBelov was correct when he said helicopters are the best means of combating helicopters.The Soviets will field Hokum andHavoc, each having a designed capability, in some degree, for the AT Arole and each being piloted by aircrewswho have been rehearsing to perfectthe techniques for counterair engagements. The challenge is clear. Our attack helicopters will have to contendwith an added dimension to the ADthteat.A forward air controller (FAC)

is assigned to ground force regiments.Among his various tasks, an importantone is the directing of attacking aircraftto their targets. The FAC in his vehicle has the communications to requestand/or direct air assets. The increasing numbers of Soviet combat helicopters deployed enable them to play agreater role in support of ground forces, freeing fixed wing aircraft for othermissions. Similar to the manner inwhich fixed wing aircraft were used,the counterair helicopters' availability would be either as preplanned or oncall assets. In conducting the counterairmission, these aircraft would not stray

far over the FLOT, thereby gainingsome protection from their own ADsystems.Counterair helicopters will be a factor in the full spectrum of combatthe close-in battle, the deep battle andthe rear battle.LTC Charles B. Cook in "An Assessment of the Soviet Combat Helicopter Threat, " an article he authoredwhile attending the U.S. Commandand General Staff College in June1982, stated that the Soviets were producing 15 Hind-E per month. I f thatproduction rate applies to the Havocand Hokum when they are fielded, thenit will be some time before they areavailable in the kind of numbers theSoviets would like.As scarce but valued assets, the

counterair aircraft will be used judiciously-employed more in reaction tomeasured threats. The numbers forsome time will simply not support theSoviet's urge to employ these assetsin proactive missions. That rare circumstance of proactive use of Hokumaircraft will be the result of a wellconsidered decision in which they haveweighed the potential gains and foundthat the gains far surpass the potentiallosses.In conclusion, the Soviets are not

smarter than we are in addressing theAT A requirement. They simply havea greater need to preclude our helicopters from operating effectively in antiarmor roles against their forces. Theyhave done their homework and determined that the helicopter threat to theirscheme of operations, which dependsgreatly on fast-moving tanks, is so significant extraordinary measures areneeded. The Soviet's challenge is tomaintain the viability of the tank-toprotect the tank enough so that it cancontinue its traditional and exalted rolewith their ground forces. Army A viation's challenge is to maintain the viability of the attack helicopter, protecting its importance to combined armsoperations. Our country has been successful in meeting these impedimentsand the challenges that keep arising,and in turning them into opportunities tobe used to our advantage. ::z:= ,;.

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u.s. ARMY SAFETY CENTER

HUMANERRORMajor Cause of Army Aviation Accidents

THE ACCIDENT was caused by human error.Many times , even in accidents where materiel failure orenvironmental conditions are listed as causes , we findhuman error also was involved.

In fiscal year (FY) 1986, Army Aviation had its safestyear ever with a Class A accident rate of2.04 per 100,000



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flying hours. The momentum carried over into FY 1987when we had the lowest number of Class A-C aviationaccidents in 10 years and the third best Class A rate inhistory-2.22 per 100,000 flying hours. The credit forthat belongs to the aviation family-commanders, safetyofficers, operations officers, aviators, maintenance, andall ground support personnel and safety specialists.

From FY 1982 through FY 1986, human error was acause in 81 to 91 percent of the Class A aviation accidents.In FY 1987 we experienced the lowest percentage, 78 percent, in the past 6 years.

When we look at human-error involvement in aviationaccidents, we must be careful not to think solely in termsof aircrewmembers. No doubt a mistake made in thecockpit can have immediate and disastrous results, buthuman error goes far beyond the aircraft crew. Humanerror can and does occur in the design of equipment, from

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a lack of training or supervision, during maintenance, andat the highest levels of planning and operation. The resultis the same regardless of where the error takes place:injured or dead soldiers and damaged or destroyedequipment.

Although pilot error was definitely a cause in most ofthe following accidents, other human errors also contributed to what happened.

Equipment limitationsAfter conducting night vision goggles (NVG) proficiency and qualification training, two UH-60 Black Hawksjoined up for the flight back to the airfield. The instructor pilot (IP) of the lead aircraft asked the crew of thesecond aircraft to assume the lead to give the pilot of thelead aircraft some training in formation flying. The crewof the second aircraft agreed, but as they attempted to passthe lead aircraft on the right side, their aircraft driftedto the left and collided with the lead aircraft. When theIP of the lead aircraft saw the other Black Hawk driftingtoward him, he turned left in a futile attempt to avoid thecollision. He was able to autorotate his damaged aircraftto the ground, but the other aircraft began breaking upin the air and crashed, killing all three crewmembers.

The human error that caused this accident occurred inthe cockpit when the crew of the second aircraft failedto recognize their aircraft was drifting toward the leadaircraft. The following factors may have contributed tothe pilot's and IP's inability to detect that the helicopterwas drifting:

The low NVG experience level of the crew, whichmay have resulted in their being less alert than they shouldhave been.

The relaxed mood of the crew as they were headinghome with the airfield in sight. The IP's burden of personal problems that may haveoccupied his thoughts. The IP's overconfidence in the pilot's flying abilities,

which may have caused him not to monitor the pilot asclosely as he should have.In addition to the pilot error, however, other factorscontributed to what happened. One of them was equipment limitations associated with the AN/PVS-5 NVG,coupled with the obstructions to vision and noncompatible NVG lighting in the UH-60. Also involved wereinadequate written procedures for NVG multiship operations addressing lead changes, minimum crew requirements, separation distances, appropriate NVG formationsand which crewmembers should be "goggled up."

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Training

HUMANERROR

continued

When aviators are assigned missions for which they lackproper training, a human-error accident may result, butthe error isn't limited to the pilots. Since 1981, 58 accidents in which inadequate unit training was a cause havecost the Army $30.5 million in money alone.During a service mission from a desert field site, anOH-58 Kiowa pilot took off over the highest obstacle andfailed to maintain a constant angle of climb. The helicopterhad reached 30 knots and was turning right when its mainrotor struck an aluminum antenna support pole about36 feet above the ground. The aircraft picked up the1/2-inch nylon ropes that had been supporting the pole,and the ropes became entangled in the flight controls. Thisrestricted the pilot's control inputs, and the aircraft beganan uncommanded right descending tum. It struck theground, rolled over and came to rest on its right side.Neither crewmember was injured.The pilot was not following prescribed procedures whenhe initiated a takeoff over the highest obstacle and terrain; and when he failed to maintain a constant angle of

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climb until the aircraft was clear of the antenna, he wasnot following instructions in the aircrew training manual(ATM). The pilot's choice of takeoff direction resultedfrom extreme apprehension about loss of tail rotor effectiveness (L TE). He estimated the wind direction at 160degrees, at 10 to 12 knots, and decided his takeoff direction would have to be 160 degrees because of the dangerof loss of LTE. His concern over LTE caused him notto give proper attention to other factors that determinetakeoff direction. His apprehension resulted from lack oftraining in the capabilities of the OH-58. The unit hadnot had an OH-58 IP assigned for 13 months, and duringthis time the problem of LTE had been much publicized.Because discussions in the unit about LTE were not supervised by a knowledgeable IP, confusion and misunderstanding resulted.

The pilot also failed to brief his copilot and coordinatecrew duties, with the exception of asking the copilot tomonitor the engine instruments during takeoff. I f he hadcommunicated his intentions to the copilot, the copilotcould have assisted in maintaining terrain and obstacleclearance, and the accident might have been preventedin spite of the pilot 's decision to take off over the highestobstacle. The aircraft had sufficient power to completethe takeoff if it had been executed as stipulated in theATM.The pilot had been flying out of the same field site asa single pilot for the 3 days preceding the accident. Thiscould have contributed to his overconfidence and failureto properly use his copilot.

MaintenanceA human error made in the maintenance shop or on theflight line can cause an aircraft to crash just as surely asan error made in the cockpit.The crew of a UH -60 had made several uneventfulflights while practicing slingload operations. The aircraftwas on short final to pick up a load when the master caution light came on and the chip detector light flickered.The pilot in command (PIC) recycled the main modulechip detector circuit breaker, and the lights went out. Thecopilot continued the approach, stabilizing the aircraft ina hover about 5 feet above the slingload. Without anywarning, the aircraft began a rapid spin to the right. Thecopilot attempted to stop the spin by applying full left antitorque pedal, but the aircraft continued to spin. The riggers were perched on top of the slingload, and the pilotincreased altitude to about 40 feet to avoid hitting them.The aircraft spun around about four times as it movedto the rear of the slingload, and the pilots realized they



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had lost tail rotor control. The PIC, who was in the leftseat, tried to place the power control levers in the fuelcutoff position to stop the spin, but the aircraft was spinning so rapidly that the centrifugal force made it hard forhim to reach the levers. He managed to cut No.1 engineoff, but before he could do the same on No.2, the aircraft hit the ground left-side-low, missing the riggers onthe slingload. The crew and passenger were able to leavethe aircraft under their own power.

The tail rotor gearbox seizure was caused by excessiveheat produced by lack of lubrication. Following replacement of an input seal, which required the gearbox to bedrained, the gearbox had not been refilled with oil. Themechanic who drained the gearbox had not recorded whathe had done. The technical inspector didn't do an adequate inspection after the input seal was replaced, and theaircraft was released. The aircrew checked the gearboxsight gauge, but they were on the ground, 12 feet fromthe gauge. The sight gauge was stained with oil, and itlooked like it was full. It wasn't-it was empty.

OperationsThe following accident was caused by a pilot conduct

ing a flight in a mountainous area although he was notqualified for such a mode of flight. But someone else couldhave prevented the flight-the operations officer.

The crew of the UH-IH Huey was conducting orientation rides for a group of cadets. They made a stop at apoint 7,200 feet mean sea level (MSL), and the pilot performed an out-of-ground-effect (OGE) hover before continuing to a base camp at 9,050 feet. After conductingseveral low-level flights, the aircraft took off with sevenpeople onboard for a short nap-of-the-earth flight. ThePIC picked the aircraft up to a 5-foot hover for a powercheck, which required about 35 pounds of torque. Thatwas actually the maximum power available for the UH-lin this mountainous area, but neither the PIC nor thecopilot knew that. The aircraft turned east over about 150meters of open terrain before reaching the tree line at theedge of a forest. It continued on for about 250 metersabove the trees and up a small draw, then the PIC slowedthe aircraft to demonstrate an unmasking and remaskingmaneuver. During remasking, the aircraft descended toabout 20 feet above the trees and began an uncommandedright yaw. The low revolutions per minute (rpm) warning light and audio came on, and engine noise decreased.The PIC called out "engine failure" as he followed theright turn with cyclic and leveled the aircraft. The copilot moved the governor switch to the emergency position, but there was no response from the engine. The air-

MARCH 1988

craft rotated about 360 degrees to the right in a levelattitude. The PIC applied full collective to decrease rotorrpm before the aircraft entered the trees. The helicopter

,crashed through the trees and struck the ground in a noselow attitude. The tail of the helicopter caught and hungon a tree as the aircraft came to rest at the bottom of asmall draw. No one was seriously injured.The PIC made an improper decision to conduct theflight because he was overconfident in his abilities andin the aircraft's capabilities to operate in the high-altitudeenvironment. He was relying on past mountain flyingexperience during a previous assignment in an area upto 6,000 feet MSL. The unit to which he was currentlyassigned did not have a mountain support mission, andthe PICs were not evaluated in performance of mountainflight operations or in the planning for such flight. Nothaving been qualified or mountain oriented in his currentflying area, the PIC lacked an appreciation for the increased criticality of performance planning for operatingin elevations at the 9,OOO-foot level, which always significantly affects UH-l performance. As a result, whileattempting an OGE maneuver at high-density altitudeunder high-pressure-altitude conditions, he lost control ofthe aircraft and crashed.

The operations officer improperly approved the mission because of overconfidence in the PIC. He was onfull PIC orders, had previously been a UH-IH IP and wasreputed to have performed well above average on allprevious evaluation rides. Knowing all this, the operations officer felt no need to question the route of flight,destination, capabilities and qualifications before approving the mission.

Although he was the mission approving authority, hedid not request additional information on the exact location of the training area because of his overconfidenceand trust in the PIC. The PIC was fully aware that thetraining area where the base camp was 'located was in amountainous region, but he did not request a "mountainflight. " He only asked if the training area was an approvedflying area. The operations officer told him that if thetraining area was within the boundaries of the militaryreservation, it was an approved area. The fact was, whilethe training area was located on land leased by the government, it was outside the military reservation boundaries.

The operations officer assumed that the training areabeing discussed was one that he knew to be located onthe cantonment area. He based his decision to approvethe flight on this assumption. He also knew the unit didnot presently have, nor had they recently had, a mountain flying mission. There were no pilots qualified formountain flying, and the unit IP was not current. This

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continued

may explain why he did not consider the area under discussion being in a mountainous area.

Command/supervisionBy not acting decisively when faced with minor vari

ences in policy, commanders and supervisors in effect promote deviations in practice that eventually become "unwritten policy" or "the way we do it here." In somecases, deviations in practice are even encouraged by commanders and supervisors for the sake of mission accomplishment. Soon the approval to "do it this time" in orderto get the mission accomplished, or whatever pressureseems important at the moment, becomes standard practice. Allowed to do it once, the individual figures it mustbe all right to do it again in other areas. In short, wereward the individual for being able to get the job done,and no one questions procedures.

For instance, a helicopter participating in a field training exercise encountered marginal weather. The pilotdecided to try to make it over a ridgeline into a valley.The aircraft hit trees on a slope and crashed.

The aviators in the unit had been operating in similarweather conditions for some time and, on numerous occa-

12

sions, would search around until finding a hole throughthe weather to complete their missions. Each time anaviator stretched performance to the limits or deviatedslightly from regulatory requirements and was not admonished for his actions, the resultant degradation to command safety emphasis was compounded. The result wasthat such practices became commonplace, and the accolades for such a high degree of mission accomplishmentovershadowed the unsafe manner in which many missionswere accomplished.

What have we learned?Human-error accidents are nothing new. Since World

War IT, the search for higher performance military equipment has led to greater sophistication of Anny equipmentsystems. That isn't going to change. Faced with potential enemies with overpowering odds in manpower, wehave got to have equipment that can do the job and doit better. That means we have to concentrate on the otherpart of the problem: the human in the human-error accident.

Experience has shown that when the Army's top leadership and its commanders at every level are personallyinvolved in safety, and make it a part of their units' everyday operations, accident rates fall. This is the reasonLieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, director of theArmy Staff, has designated 1988 as the year of the"Leaders' Crusade Against Human-Error Accidents." Itworked with accident rates-and it will work with humanerror accidents. The Leaders' Crusade is designed to increase commanders' involvement in reducing human-erroraccidents and to provide them with the already-existingprevention tools they need to get the job done. The goalis to reduce human-error accidents and make 1988 theArmy's safest year yet. ~



15/48

AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES

Air Traffic Control (ATe) ConsolidationThe consolidation of MOS 93H ATC tower operator and 93]

ATC radar controller as 93C ATC operator is now in full swing.Training for the new MOS is through a correspondence coursetransitional program, with a completion date of April 1989 forActive Duty personnel and April 1990 for those in Reserve Components. Soldiers not required to take this qualification trainingare those who have been awarded MOS 93H or 93] and in thegradeof SFC(P) or above; controllers who are dual-rated (towerand radar); controllers enrolled in a cross-training program thatwill result in a dual-rating (tower and radar); and controllers whohave completed AIT for former A TC MOS 93B or 93K. The consolidation means greater efficiency in manpower use, which iswelcomed news considering the shortage of controllers in theArmy today. To further relieve the shortage, there has been anincreaseof student input to 659 in fiscal year (FY) 1988 for 93C,compared to more than 500 last FY for 93H and J. For additionalinformation on this topic, contact Mr. Jim Jones, Army ATC Activity, Ft. Rucker, AL; AUTOVON 558-5340 or Commercial205-255-5340.

Aviation Regimental SystemAt the recent regimental activation ceremonies held at Ft.

Rucker , AL , Major General Ellis D. Parker , Aviation Branchchief, made some comments of particular note. MG Parker captured the essence of the regimental system's impact on the Aviation Branch when he stated the following:

" In 1981 , the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the concept of the U.S. Army Regimental System. This concept wasenvisioned as a means of providing each soldier with continuous identification with a single regiment and a personnelsystem that would include the probability of soldiers servingrecurring assignments with his or her regiment.

" The regimental affiliation program enhances the combateffectiveness of our aviation units through a framework thatprovides the opportunity for recurring assignments within thesame regiment. These regimental assignments help developa sense of belonging , as well as a sense of commitment andloyalty to Army Aviation and the mission of our ArmedForces. The pride we have always had in ourselves as aviatorsnow is manifested within the traditions of the regiments andtheir history .

MARCH 1988

"The regiment is a personal commitment to the affiliatedsoldier and his family. Through the midst of turbulence thatis the nature of our commitment to the Army, our familieswill become more closely tied to each other due to the renewalof old acquaintances within their spouse's regiments. It isthrough the regiment program that we will strengthen our prideof belonging and our unit's esprit."

The implementation of the Aviation Regimental System is onschedule, with 26 of the 32 designated aviation regiments alreadyactivated. Included in that total number are 3 cavalry regiments,21 tables of organization and equipment aviation regiments, and8 tables of distribution and allowances training regiments-7 atFt. Rucker and 1 at Ft. Eustis, VA. Aviation soldiers have begunto affiliate with the regiment of their choice as their respectivemilitary personnel offices receive official implementation instructions. Regiments chosen must have documented positions forsoldiers' primary MOS and special qualifications identifiers!additional skill identifiers. Regimental affiliation will become aprimary consideration for assignments.Aviation Warrant OfficersThe future of aviation warrant officers continues to look bright.Accessions are on the rise to meet the increase in warrant officer requirements, with new training courses forthcoming. TheAviation Senior Warrant Officer Training Course comes onlinethis October (1988), replacing the present Aviation Warrant Officer Advanced Course . About May 1988, the Master WarrantOfficer Course (MWOC) will start , which is branch immaterialtraining that replaces the current Warrant Officer Senior Course.The first MWOC attendees are senior CW4s selected by theDecember 1987 Master Warrant Officer (MWO) Selection Boardto fill MWO positions. All these plans have one purpose-toensure the professional development of aviation warrant officers.

At the grass roots of the Army's warrant officer force is theWarrant Officer Entry Course (WOEC), for which changes arealso scheduled. The WOEC for Active Components will be consolidated at Ft. Rucker by August 1988, replacing the coursesnow at Ft. Sill , OK, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. AReserve Component WOEC at Ft. McCoy , WI, will continueto operate. Ft. Sill's WOEC is scheduled for deactivation in April1988 and Aberdeen's in July 1988. Then, in August, our WOECwill be redesignated as the Warrant Officer Candidate Schoolwith the possibility of having a senior CW4 as commander.

13


16/48

14

Mr. Wendell W. ShiversMr. Jeffrey W. Van Rope

This article is the ninth in a series on the AH-64A Apache aircraft and weapons systems. Thesystems addressed include the target acquisitionand designation sight and the pilot night vision sensor. The information contained here shouldfamiliarize the reader with the AH-64A; however,it must not be used to operate or maintain theaircraft.



17/48

Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (TAOS) System

TADS capabilitiesThe capabilities of the TAOS arelisted as: Automatic and manual tracking ,using the forward looking infrared(FLIR) sensor (four fields of view) inday, night and adverse weather con-ditions. Automatic and manual tracking byday, using the day television (DTV)(three fields of view) or the direct viewoptics (DVO) (two fields of view). Automatic tracking oflaser desig-nated targets , designated by an exter-nal designator (ground laser locatordesignator , scout). Designation of targets, using cod-ed laser energy. Accurate ranging of targets, usinglaser energy. Backup night vision sensor , usingthe FLIR (in case the PNVS fails) for

the pilot or copilot gunner (CPG) .The TADS system componentlocationsThe component parts of the TAOSsystem and their locations (figure I) arediscussed below.

The TADS turret assembly is a rotat-ing turret assembly mounted on the air-craft interface assembly (AlA) that isattached to the nose of the helicopter.Two electronic units, the TAOSelectronics unit (TEU) and laser elec-tronics unit (LEU) , are both located inthe left forward avionics bay (FAB).An optical relay tube (ORT) is tubemounted to the back side of the AlAthat extends upward into the CPG'screwstation .The TADS power supply (TPS) pro-vides power to the TAOS system lo-cated in the left F AB.

MARCH 1988

~ ' i ) & t l r t i i M ' 4 ] ; " t ' r I ! .

TAOSTURRETASSEMBLY

TEU

FIGURE 1: TAOS system component locations.

AZIMUTHGIMBALASSEMBLY

DSA

FIGURE 2: Major TAOS components.

Major T ADS componentsMajor assemblies making up thecomponent parts of TADS (figure 2) are:

TAOS turret assembly contains thenight sensor assembly (NSA). theazimuth gimbal assembly and theday sensor assembly (DSA) .

The aircraft interface assembly thatsupports the TAOS and pilot night vi-sion sensor (PNVS) turrets. It contains

15


18/48

electronic components and electricalwiring and hardware for electrical in-terface between the T ADS/PNVS andthe helicopter.The TADS turret assembly that con-tains the day sensor assembly (DSA),azimuth gimbal assembly and night

NSA

.NIGHTSENS ORSHROUD

LT

sensor assembly (NSA). It providesazimuth and elevation positioning ofthe TADS turret.The day sensor assembly that con-tains DVO, DTV camera, laser spottracker (LST) and the laser rangefinder/designator (LRF D). It is used for

TV SENSOR

LT (L RF 0 )

DAY SENSORSUBASSEMBLY

TAOS ELECTRONICS

DAY SENSORSHROUD

FIGURE 3: Major TAOS turret assembly components.

. 120 DEG

FIGURE 4: TAOS gimbal limits.

16

MAXIMUM SLEW RATEFUR WFOV = 0 DEG / SEC

SENSOR FIELD OFREGARD BOX

direct viewing, day TV viewing andlaser tracking, designation andrange finding .The azimuth gimbal assembly thatcontains par t of the DVO optical pathand mechanical azimuth and elevationdrive equipment. It mechanically posi-tions the T ADS turret in response toline of sight (LOS) commands (outerservo loop).The night sensor assembly that con-tains the FLIR sensor. Used for nighttarget acquisition/tracking, it is avail-able as a backup for the PNVS.

Major TADS turret assemblycomponentsThe major T ADS turret assemblycomponents (figure 3) are:The day sensor shroud that is the air-tight and waterproof cover for com-ponents in the DSA. This window pro-vides the optical, laser and television(TV) viewing port.The IV sensor (EO-MUX) that pro-vides conversion of near infrared (IR)energy to a video signal, which is rout-ed through the TEU and symbol gen-erator for display.The laser tracker (LT) that detectsand locks on to correctly coded laserenergy, providing signals that drive theT ADS turret to track the laser spot.

The TADS electronics that processesthe gyro and resolver information forpositioning the T ADS turret (innerservo loop).The laser transceiver unit (LTU) thatworks in conjunction with the LEU andprovides laser designation and/or rang-ing of targets. It is also referred to asthe LRF/D.The night sensor shroud that is theairtight and waterproof cover for com-ponents in the NSA. The germanium

window provides viewing port for theFLIR.The night sensor assembly (NSA) thatprovides T ADS FLIR viewing.The day sensor subassembly (DSS)that contains casting and optics less as-sociated line replaceable units (LR Us).It provides support and mounting in-terface for the TV sensor, the lasertracker and the laser transceiver unit.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/48

VIEWROTATED 90 DVOBRSITADJUST '"

VIEWI l - - - _ ~ ROTATED1800

~ WBOTTOM VIEW

VIEWROTATED 90

FIGURE 5: Optical relay tube controls.

Both DSA and NSA windows haveanti-icing capabilities.

T ADS gimbal limitsThe TADS gimbal limits (figure 4)are discussed below.The T ADS is capable of slewing 120 degrees in azimuth and plus 30minus 60 degrees in elevation ordepression. The TADS gimbal limitsare represented by the sensor field ofregard symbology in the high-actiondisplay. The message' LIMITS" willbe displayed in the helmet and displaysight status when the T ADS is at a gimbal limit. The maximum slew rate ofthe T ADS is achieved in the FLIR widefield of view (WFOV), 60 degrees persecond. Slew rates are correspondinglyslower as the FOV narrows within asensor.

Optical relay tube (ORT) controlsThe ORT controls (figure 5), both

MARCH 1988

left handgrip and right handgrip, aredescribed as:Left handgrip:

The linear motion compensator(LMC) (momentary ON/OFF)control automatically compensatesfor aircraft (a/c) and/or targetmotion. The image auto tracker (fAT)offset (OFS) (momentary ON/OFF)control enables offset tracking/designation when IAT is engaged. The update/stores (UPDT/ST)(momentary center OFF) controlrapidly stores target locations in the

fire control computer (FCC) orupdate of the a/c present positionusing FCC data. The sensor select (discrete)(FUR/IV/DVO) control is used toselect anyone of the three sensors. The weapons action switch(WAS) (discrete) (RKT/GUN/MSL)is used to select (action) the weaponto be fired.

The field of view (FOV)(N M/W Z) (momentary centerOFF) control is used to select thesensor FOV. The fAT MAN (momentaryON/OFF) control allows manual orautomatic tracking of a target. The weapons trigger(momentary) control is used to firethe selected weapon.

Right handgrip: The heads down display (HDD)(momentary ON/OFF) control isused to select the heads out display(HOD) or HDD video presentation. The video recorder (VfD RCD)(momentary ON/OFF) control isused to start/stop recording of theT ADS video when the videorecorder is in the record mode. The fAT polarity (discrete)(WHT/BLK) switch is used to selectpolarity of IAT . The laser track (LT) (discrete)(AUTO/OFF/MAN) switch is used

17


20/48

~ .fti.Ig."itjiW'#!;,,e.t.nwNONOPE RA T ION : J lFUNCTIONS._---

~ - - - - - ~I VIEWING TRACKING ""-L-A-SE-R-I.RA-N-G-'N-G-' II 11 OF 31 11 OF 31 AND DESIGNATING DIRECT V IEW MANUAL IALSO USED FOR IOPTICS IMAGE NAVIGATIONALI DA Y TV AUTOMATIC I NIGHT Fl iR LASER UPDATE l OPERATIONALL.:____________ ~ O ~ ~NOTE NIGHT FUR WILL NO T BE OPERATIONAL IF THE TAOS SWITCH IS IN THE FUR OFF POSITION

FIGURE 6: TAOS prinCiples of operation.

STRS[ L Evu'@

OOWN

800376-21 A

F IRE CONTROL

VID SEL.

F IRE CONTROL

.. .. l WSl"., ~ @O< ' j)OH'"

, " ' ' ' o ~ r T - \ '"m"""o ~ ~ O ~ C . " ' S' 'S ::.0 ' ,"" ' "" .....l A C . " ~ A V~ ..." ". mOO . @ 8

>E',- 5 T5" " ----,.,\T W Ci( " . .. ..055

0 " 0" 0"

CPG FIRE CONTROL PANELFl IR \110 ~ ... BAT M A ~ : 'l ID ~@@r@@@

PILOT FIRE CONTROL PANELFIGURE 7: Boresight controls .

18

to select laser tracker operationalmodes. The MAN TRK switch is used tomanually control the movement ofthe T ADS with the force controller. The SLA VE (momentaryON/OFF) switch is used toenable/disable the TADS slaving or

cueing functions. The forward looking infraredpolarity (PLRT) (momentaryON/OFF) switch is used to changethe polarity of FLIR presentation. The laser trigger (momentary)switch is used to fire the T ADSlaser.The ORT also has bore sight controlsand ORT display adjustment panel con-trols (face of ORT) for T ADS display

adjustment.

COLLECTIVE STICKSWITCH BOX



21/48

T ADS principles of operationalfunctionsThe T ADS principles of operationalfunctions (figure 6) are: Tracking (manual andautomatic) functions are used tosearch for and detect, acquire,identify and track a target. Trackingcan be accomplished manually, IA Tor LT.

Viewing of targets can be by DVO(2 FOV), DTV (3 FOV) or FLIR(4 FOV). Laser ranging and designationfunctions use laser energy to rangeand/ or designate a target. The laseralso may be used to store targetlocations or update the presentposition of aircraft.

T ADS principles of nonoperationalfunctionsThe T ADS principles of nonopera-tional functions (figure 6) are: The environmental control is anonoperational, automatic function

of the environmental control system(ECS) that keeps the system fromgetting too hot or too cold. The fault detection/locationsystem (FD/LS) operatesautomatically (continuous monitor)or can be initiated by the CPGthrough the data entry keyboard(DEK) (maintenance). The deicing function is selectedwhen required by the CPG T ADSor PNVS. The boresight function can beperformed on the ground or whilethe aircraft is airborne.

T ADS switch functionsHow the T ADS switch functionswork (figure 7) is explained in the fol-lowing paragraphs: T ADS is enabled by placing theT ADS switch to FLIR 0 FF or T ADSposition. The T ADS operation is se-lected by the SIGHT SELECT switch.The T ADS is the commanding LOS.In this position, the T ADS may bemanually controlled by the MAN TKRthumbforce controller or slaved to the

MARCH 1988

LOS selected on the ACQ SEL switch. When the T ADS is slaved bydepressing the SLAVE pushbutton, itwill slave to the LOS selected on theACQ SEL switch (valid LOS) or tofixed forward (invalid LOS). A message in. the alphanumericdisplay (AND) sight status will indicateeither slaved to a valid LOS, or will in-dicate the LOS is invalid.Helmet mounted display target ac-quisition and designation sight (HMDTADS)The integrated helmet and displaysight system (IHADSS) is the com-manding LOS. In this position, theT ADS may be manually controlled bythe MAN TKR thumb force controlleror slaved to the CPG's IHADSS LOS.When the T ADS is being manuallycontrolled, the cued LOS dot will in-dicate the LOS of the T ADS.When the T ADS is slaved by de-pressing the SLAVE pushbutton, itwill slave to the CPG's IHADSS LOS(valid LOS) or fixed forward (invalidLOS).

FU R FOVGATESr IL ...

FU R WFOV (1X)

FU R r

FU R NFOV (18X)

The ACQ SEL switch now will en-able the CPG to select a LOS for cue-ing. When the TADS is slaved, cue-ing will be provided to cue the CPG tothe LOS selected by the ACQ SELswitch (LOS valid) or to fixed forward(LOS invalid).Night vision sensor (NVS)The IHADSS is the commandingLOS. In this position, the T ADS maybe used as an NVS, and all TADS con-trols except FLIR and video adjust-ments are disabled. The T ADS opera-tion depends on the pilot's SIGHT SELand NVS switches, the CPG's collec-tive stick NVS switch and the PLT/GND ORIDE switch.The T ADS FLIR is enabled whenthe TADS/FLIR OFF/OFF switch isin the TADS position. In the FLIROFF position, all functions exceptFLIR are enabled.The FLIR converts IR energy to avideo signal and routes this signalthrough the T ADS TEU and symbolgenerator for display. The T ADS TEUprovides a direct video to the indirect

FU R,. ,L.

FUR MFOV (S .7X)

FU R

FU R ZFOV (36X)

19


22/48

view display/heads down display(IVD/HDD) electronics unit, for display on the HDD or HOD if the symbol generator fails.

Operation ofTADS FLIR and PNVSFLIR is very similar. The detectorcooler unit is interchangeable betweenthe two FLIRs. The PNVS FLIR has

~ I l U l l i i i j i l , : l i I i I ' t ! d ! .FUR FOV GATES TV

r ~ - , . '~ .JFU R NFOV (18X) OT V WFOV (18X)

OT V NFOV (63X) OT V lFOV (126X)

FIGURE 9: Day television capabilities.

OVO

OTV WFOV (laX)

OVO WFOV (J .5X)

OVO NFOV (laX)

FIGURE 10: Direct view optics capabilities.

20

only one FOV and no optics, while theT ADS FLIR has an afocal assemblyand three FOVs, plus a zoom FOV.The day TV (DTV) converts near IRenergy to a video signal and routes thissignal through the T ADS TEU andsymbol generator for display.The DVO is an optical path throughthe TADS to the ORT. The ORT selects either the DVO or the indirectview video (lDV), as selected by theCPG, for presentation in the headsdown mode.An IA T works with both the FLIRand DTV to lock onto and track a contrast. When locked on, the IAT drivesthe turret through the T ADS servosystem. I f DVO is selected, IAT willtrack using DTV.An LT can be employed to search forand lock onto laser energy of the prop

er code. Once locked on, the LT willdrive the T ADS through the servosystem.The L TU, in conjunction with theLEU (or LRF/D), is used for two purposes: to determine range to an objectand to designate an object for terminalguidance of laser-seeking ordnance.Range data are sent through the firecontrol system for display and tracking computations.

T ADS forward looking infrared(FLIR) capabilitiesT ADS FLIR (figure 8, page 19) hasfour FOVs. They are as follows: Wide (W) 50.0 degrees Medium (M) 10.0 degrees Narrow (N) 3. 1 degrees Zoom (Z) 1.6 degreesThe W, M and N FOV s are true optical FOVs using mirrors and lenses.

The ZFOV is actually a 50-percentelectronic underscan of the NFOVvideo. When underscanning theNFOV, some resolution is lost.The FOV gates indicate the area thatwill be displayed in the narrower FOV.No gates are in the ZFO VThe message "FLIR" will be displayed in the upper left portion of thedisplay to indicate that the FLIR is theselected sensor.



23/48

Day television capabilitiesThe T ADS DTV (figure 9) has threeFOVs. They are as follows: Wide (W) 4.0 degrees Narrow (N) 0. 9 degree Zoom (Z) 0.45 degreeThe message "TV" will be displayed in the upper left portion of thedisplay to indicate that the DTV is theselected sensor.

Direct view optics capabilitiesThe DVO (figure 10) has two FOVs.They are as follows: Wide (W) 18.0 degrees Narrow (N) 4. 0 degreesThe message "DVO" will be displayed on the HOD and helmet displayunit (HDU) when the direct view optics DVO is selected. DTV video ALSOwill be displayed on the HOD and

HMD when DVO is selected. I f theCPG uses the IAT when DTV is selected, the IAT will use the TV video.

Image autotracker (lA T)The IAT (figure 11) is an area

balanced contrast tracker. It will digitize the input video and track (lock-on)the center of the contrast under theLOS reticle when the IAT MAN pushbutton is depressed.When engaged, the tracking gatesexpand from the center of the displayand attempt to "capture" the target, orcontrast. While the IAT is attemptingto lock-on, the MAN TKR force controller is enabled.Once the IAT locks-on to the contrast, the manual tracker is disabled.

At this time, the IAT will control theT ADS LOS through the T ADS servosystem. When the IAT is tracking, themessage "IAT TRACKING" will bedisplayed in the AND tracker status.Manual tracking proceduresInitial T ADS may be accomplishedby slaving the T ADS to ei ther theCPG's IHADSS LOS or to a LOS/position as defined on the ACQ SELswitch.

MARCH 1988

To slave the T ADS to the IHADSSLOS, the CPG positions the SIGHTSEL switch to the HMD/TADS position and momentarily presses theSLAVE pushbutton on the right handgrip. The IHADSS remains the sightfor weapons pointing/target engagement.

To slave the T ADS to an acquisitionsource, the CPG positions the SIGHTSEL switch to the T ADS position, selects the acquisition source on the ACQSEL switch and momentarily pressesthe SLAVE pushbutton on the righthandgrip.When the T ADS is slaved as definedabove, the MAN TKR controller is disabled. To unslave the TADS, the CPGagain momentarily depresses theSLAVE pushbutton. The TADS willunslave and inertially stabilize at thelast commanded position. The MAN

- ---.-1,. . _ W I ,., _ .CPG FCP

=- ---.aD .. .,,.. ..... f.' ..... .CPG FCP

TKR controller will be enabled.Image autotracking proceduresThe CPG tracking workload can befurther reduced and tracking accuracyincreased by use of the IAT (figure 11).The IAT polarity switch is on theright handgrip and enables the CP G toselect white (W B), black (B/W) orautomatic (AUTO).To engage the IAT while trackingthe target, the CPG momentarily press.es the IAT/MAN pushbutton on his left

handgrip. This disables the MAN TKRcontroller.Once the IAT locks-on tl).e target, thetracking gates will remain stationaryaround the area of highest contrast.The message 'IAT TRACKING' willbe displayed in the AND tracker status.I f the target moves behind anobscuration, the IAT will continue tocoast in the same direction at the same

IAT TRACKINGIAT BREAK LOCKIAT FAILED~ IATW/BIAT B/W " . : IAT AUTOAND ES~

CPG DISPLAY

~ JUL ;J~ IAT OFFSETAND MES;SAGES

CPG DISPLAY

FIGURE 12: Image autotracker offset tracking.

21


24/48

rate for 0.6 second before it will breaklock.The IAT may also break-lock if thetarget gets too big in the selected FOV.The IAT may break-lock under certainconditions when sensors or FOVs arechanged.To disengage IA T, the CPG againpresses the IA T/MAN pushbutton.The IA T messages and tracking gateswill go blank and the MAN TKR controller will again be enabled.IAT offset tracking proceduresWhile image auto tracking a target,the CPG may desire to offset the target(figure 12). He may want to: Track the first target and engagethe second target. This will enable himto rapidly reacquire the first target. Designate an object close to thetarget, denying the target time to detectthat it is being designated.To offset track, the CPG momentarily depresses the IAT OFS pushbuttonon his left handgrip. The following willoccur when this is done: The MAN TKR controller will beenabled, and the CPG may move the

LOS reticle to another object. Tracking gates will remain lockedon to the first target. During offset tracking, "IAT

OFFSET" will be displayed in theAND tracker status section.To disengage offset tracking, the

CPG presses the IAT OFS pushbuttona second time.Lnser tracking proceduresTo enable the LT, the SIGHT SELswitch must be in the T ADS or HMDT ADS position, the T ADS not slavedto either IHADSS LOS or to an ACQSEL switch function and the T ADSIA T not selected.The'-ST has two operational searchmodes, manual and automatic. Thesemodes are discussed in the following

paragraphs: When the CPG positions the LTswitch in the MAN position, the T ADSwill respond to MAN TKR controllerinputs. The message " LST SEARCH"will be displayed in the AND. If he switch is placed in the AUTOposition, the MAN TKR controller willbe disabled. The signal processor will

drive the T ADS in a four-box searchpattern centered about the point ofengagement. The messages "LSTAUTO SEARCH" and the LT codewill be displayed in the AND.To select the operational code for theLT, the CPG uses the LST indexer onthe fire control panel (FCP), setting itto the index (A-H) representative of thecode storage location within the buscontroller.

Laser rangefinder designator(LRF/D)The LRF/D provides coded pulsedlaser energy for designating targets andrange-to-target data for the fire controlsystem. The LRF/D generates the laserenergy of a specific code on command.Reflected laser energy is used togenerate range-to-target data.To range an object, the laser triggeris pulled to the first dent. The laser firesthree laser pulses; then it stops firing.The calculated range is then displayed,and will increase/decrease at the rate thehelicopter was moving when the range

(@) DATA ENTRY ~O ilS ~ DATA ENTRY ~ TIl liT0 1150G51215172 A+I IZI~ , , ~ o " , 1 1150G52735111 A+ . . . .'"@.'"T BY TGTOFF SP ' TIME: MM:MM:SSI'f'OS: lUi CHi 5liil UZl

2 10 DATASTBY TGT

PAGE 1OFF SP ' TliliT

fFll: ~ AlT: +AAAA "':22.12 _.MIDHlf U . _ HlfT ~ ~ 3 10 DA TA9] 4 1150G51123117 A- IlllHlfT 5 10 DATAf c ~ ~ f J l-'- I J L -J l!_J [EJJ [!] ~ PAGE 2 TIl G Tfll ~ ~ m Jj rnJ rn [!] 1150G53204117 A+1177 10 OA TA8 10 OA TArfuul' f F v w ~ n SI'II:Cl1 MY: E113 .1 DEli~ ~ ~ l ' lJ GND CDiVERG: Ell.4I DEliIri:JI\I ~ MEADllIi 1llA1it. 011.1 DEli~ ~ l!= ~,

~ ffi [G] PAGE 3~ rn I l n l I 10 OAT A ""IPiel00 ( PAGE 4

FIGURE 13: Waypoint/targeting procedures 1. FIGURE 14: Waypoint/targeting procedures 2.

22 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


25/48

was calculated for about 7 seconds afterthe laser stops firing.To designate a target, the laser trigger is pulled and held in the second detent. The LRF/D will then continuously fire the laser on the code selected bythe LRF D laser code indexer until thetrigger is released.Way point targeting procedure 1Waypointltargeting data are input using both the target (TGT) and SPI positions on the data entry keyboard (DEK)rotary switch (figure 13). The data entered under SPI are displayed as a menuwith two pages.To input data, input the first characterof the desired parameter. (The curserwill jump to the first digit position ofthe data.) Then input the full data. Oncompletion, the data will be automatically entered, and the curser will returnto the home position.

TIME:

The TIME display functions onlywhen the FCC is controlling the bus;the backup bus controller (BBC) doesnot have the TIME function in its soft-ware.The TIME display will increment

SPH:For the spheroid, use the same codesas are used by the doppler.

GRID CONVERG:

For grid convergence, use E for eastand W for west. Data may be obtainedfrom G through M angle diagram onUniversal Traverse Mercator (UTM)maps.HEADING (MAG) :

The magnetic heading of the helicopter in degrees and tenths of a degree.This heading is entered only if theHARS has tumbled in flight and, during its align cycle, one wishes to servothe gyro compass platform.Waypoint targeting procedure 2Up to 10 sets of coordinate data maybe stored in the FCC at any time. Twomethods can be used to store the coordinate data. These are by using D EKor the STORE position of the UPDTST switch on the optical relay tube lefthandgrip (ORT LHG) (figure 14).

Data entered under TGT on the DEKrotary switch are displayed as fourpages of coordinate data.The various pages may be scrolledfor display by use of the DEK SPACEkey.

Way point targeting storingproceduresDuring a mission, targets of opportunity may be encountered. The CPGmay desire to store the location of thesetargets for later engagement or for reporting to higher headquarters or otherairborne elements. Since these sightings may be rapid and for short periodsof time, using a map to pinpoint theircoordinates would not be very effective.U sing the T ADS, the helicopter cancalculate these target locations basedon its present position. To store data,proceed as follows (figure 15): . Select the storage location by using the TGT/NAV indexer. Enter the range to the targetlwaypoint.

from whatever time value is entered. ~he TIME display will function as a24 - , ~ ... ' l I I I ! g l l l ! l l l . ) ~ ? .. . : 1 ~ " I ! l l ! i . , i ~ i . : : , ~ # ~ . t ~ ; , ..t".i!l!'''i'.W!llhour clock if present time is entered,with an accuracy of 1 second whilerunning.

PPOS:The PPOS data are used only for theinitial alignment of the heading and altitude reference set (HARS) while thehelicopter is on the ground, and mustbe entered before HARS alignment.

ALT:

Altitude above mean sea level (MSL)will be entered while the aircraft is onthe ground. The FCC will compute thecorresponding altimeter setting.HG:

I f an error exists between the dynamic altitude display and the barometric altitude, the altimeter settingshould be entered.

MARCH 1988

IHADSS

DRT

TGT/NAV

TGT/NAV INDEXERCPG FCP

FIGURE 15: WaYPoint/targeting storing procedures 2.

23


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Enter the manual range by usingthe DEK with the selector switch inrange (RNG) position.

Automatically calculate using theselected LOS. For laser range, place the LOS

reticle on the target/waypoint and firethe laser.Place the LOS reticle of he selectedsight on the target/waypoint and momen-

tarily position theUPDT/ST switch onthe ORT left handgrip to the ST posi-tion. The FCC will calculate coord i-nates and store them in the selectedlocation.

The coordinates may be recalled byplacing the DEK selec tor switch in theTGT position and scrolling the menuuntil the desired position is displayed.

SIGHT SELECT ACQ SEL_OAOS HMOTAOS H"'5

...Sr7'\ Sl so." O ~ G H S

TGT HAY

Way point target ing slavingproceduresOnce waypoint/targeting data havebeen stored, sightline cueing or TADS

slaving to the stored coordinates can beaccomplished as follows (figure 16): Position the SIGHT SEL switch tothe TADS position. Position the ACQ SE L switch to

either the TGT or navigation (NAV)position.

Select stored coordinates to beslaved to, using theTGT/NAV index-er . The cued LOS dot will indicateLOS to coordinate data.

Press the SLAVE pushbutton onthe ORT right handgrip. The TADSLOS reticle will be on the coordinates

if they are within the TADS gimballimits.

Way point target cueing proceduresWaypoint target cueing procedures

are accomplished as follows (figure16): Position the SIGHT SEL switch inany position except TADS or infrared

imaging seeker (IRIS). Position the ACQ SE L switch tothe TGT or NAV position. Select stored coordinates to be

cued to using the TGT/NAV indexer. Press the ORT right handgripSLAVE pushbutton. Cueing symbology

will be displayed to cue the CPG' s LOSto the coordinate sightline

I.- -ISIGHT SELECT ACQ SELH.OADS HMO

l AOS NVS

.,.Sr7'\ .,,'SOO" O ~ G H S

TOT NAV

SLAVE CUEFIGURE 16: Waypoint targeting-cueing.

24 u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Pilot Night Vision Sensor (PNVS) SystemThe PNV S provides the pilot (orCPG) with a high-resolution FLIRvideo presentation. This allows for

nap-of-the-earth (NOE) pilotage and/or weapons sighting during night operations and adverse weather conditions.Major PNVS componentsThe PNVS is composed of thefollowing component assemblies(figure 17): The PNVS stabilized turret assem-bly is mounted on the aircraft interfaceassembly above the TADS turret assembly.

The azimuth gimbal assembly ismounted to the top of the aircraft interface assembly below the PNVSstabilized turret. The PNVS electronic control as-sembly is mounted within the aircraft

AZIMUTHGIMBALASSEMBLY

FIGURE 17: Major PNVS components.

MARCH 1988

interface assembly. The PNVS electronic unit (PEU)is located in the right FAB.

PNVS capabilitiesThe capabilities of the PNVS (figure18) are as follows (TEU control): Azimuth range: 90 degrees Elevation range: +20 -45 degrees Field of viewvertical: 30 degreeshorizontal: 40 degrees Maximum slew rate: 120

degrees/secondWhen the TEU is detected as NOGO by the FD/LS, the azimuth rangeis reduced to 75 degrees, as the pilotnight vision sensor electric unit PEUis driving the turret.

PNVS controlsThe PNVS is turned on by placingthe PNVS switch in the PNVS position

(figure 19). This will enable the PNVSand start the IR detector cool-downprocess. The cool-down process shouldnot exceed 15 minutes. Until the detectors are sufficiently cooled for optimum performance, the message"PNVS NOT . . . COOLED" will bedisplayed.To select the PNVS as a sensor, thepilot places his SIGl:IT SEL switch inthe NVS position and his collectiveNVS switch in the PNVS position.With the SIGHT SEL switch in theNVS position, positioning the ACQSEL switch to the NVS FXD positionwill cause the PNVS to slave to thefixed forward position and display themessage "FORWARD. "

STABILIZEDTURRETASSEMBLY FOV 30 DEG VERTICALLY

40 DEG HORIZONTALLY -90 0MAX SLEW RATE 120 D E G / S ~ C:- _ . . -750

/ "-...+ 90 0 "+75f

PNVS ELECTRONIC UNIT 45DEG

FIGURE 18: PNVS capabilities .

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I f he PNV S is enabled and the pilotis not using it , the CPG may controlthe PNVS by positioning his SIGHTSEL switch to the NVS position and hiscollective NVS switch to the PNVSposition. I f he pilot is controlling thePNVS, the CPG may override thepilot's control of the PNVS and slaveit to his IHADSS LOS by placing thePLT/GND ORIDE switch to theORIDE position with his SIGHT SELswitch in the PNVS. When the CPGis controlling the PNVS, he may adjust gain and level using his ORTGAIN and L VL controls.

Mr. Jeffrey W. Van Rope hasbeen responsible for thedesign, development andpresentation of aircrewtraining programs for the AH-64A. Since joining McDonnelDouglas Helicopter Companyin 1979, Mr. Van Rope hastraveled worldwide,developing and presenting AH-64A staff and aviator coursesto U.S. and North AtlanticTreaty Organization aviatorsand soldiers.He has more than 21 years'experience in Army Aviation,with more than 2,500 hours inrotary wing aircraft, and is amaintenance test pilot.

Mr. Wendell W. Shivers isresponsible for manpowerpersonnel integrationimplementation for the AH-64and LHX programs. Sincejoining McDonnell DouglasHelicopter Company in 1983,he has held positions inApache aircrew training, LHXintegrated logistics supportprojects and U.S. MilitaryMarketing.Mr. Shivers has more than 10years' experience in ArmyAviation.he article has addressed capabilitiesand characteristics of the AH-64AApache weapons system in the subsystems ofTADS and PNVS. The nextarticle in the Apache series will addressthe external stores system and the aerialrocket control system. f About The Authors

CPGs FIRE CONTROL PANEL ""e

PILOTs FIRE COITROL PAIELFIGURE 19: PNVS controls.

26

FIRE CONTROL

....1'11'\\.",..f . O ~ G H I

TGT .. to"TGT /NAV

~

PILOT. CPGsCOLLECTIVE



29/48

Recently one of our students in the 67H10 OV-1airplane repairer course committed a safety violation in

the hangar. Since this and all aviation-relatedcourses stress safety, the soldie r was required to write

this essay to make him think more about safety.rhe essay "hits home" to all aviation maintenance trades.It also may give a iators something to think about the

IS

InherentlyDangerousSGT Frederic T. LyonsPV1 Michael Porter

Department of Observation Systems TrainingU.S. Army Aviation Logistics School

Fort Eustis, VA

W 'VEALL HEARD that quote before, even non-aviation types. We can see the slogan hanging in just aboutevery hangar that the Army owns. It is true of the jobs allofus in aviation have, whether we are stationed in the con-

MARCH 1988

tinental United States, Germany or Korea, or work witha commercial airline or the space shuttle. I f t flies , it demands an extra effort of safety because, if it is not safe,money, time, effort and lives are lost.

Safety in aviation is the first thing ever taught and considered by any aviation vocationalist. The thought of falling helplessly in a piece of machinery does not do a lotfor our egos or pride, not to mention the safety record.Therefore, some of the most stringent regulations and standards ever imposed on an industry are in aviation.

Let's consider hangar and flight line safety. It is a truefact that, when a pilot straps into an aircraft, he is placinghis life in the hands of the mechanic who makes sure theaircraft is safe to fly and the technical inspector whodoublechecks the mechanic's work. (Two pair ofeyes arealways better than one.)

We, as aviation maintenance personnel, must take ourjobs seriously. We are responsible for the lives of otherhuman beings and our own. To be responsible for a mishapthat takes the life of another person would be very hardto live with indeed

One of the most important ways to avoid this is to beaware of what's going on around us at all times. This isno easy task. As we get familiar with something, we doit without really thinking. Something simple like taking ashower, something we do every day. We get in and outof the shower and never really think about the dangers involved like slipping and falling or getting soap in our eyes.We would sound pretty stupid if we reminded everyoneof these dangers every time we saw them getting ready totake a shower.

There are many maintenance tasks we probably coulddo with our eyes closed, but do we really think about whatwe are doing and what the final outcome would be if wedon't follow written procedures 100 percent or dedicateourselves to the task at hand.

We are all human, and it is a proven fact that humansmake mistakes . That is why we have written proceduresto tell us how to do the job and technical inspectors to checkour work. Pilots are required to perform preflight inspections to ensure mistakes are discovered before they becomecatastrophies.

Enough can never be said about aviation safety. But, ifwe all commit ourselves to 100 percent dedication to ourwork, we will all be happy and secure, knowing that theaircraft we launch daily will return safely because "avia-tion is inherently dangerous." 9sr ,

27


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us ...~ ~ ~ ~ ~Directorate ofEvaluation/Standardization ~REPORT TO THE FIELD AVIATIONSTANDAlDIlATlON

AVIATION STANDARDIZATIONAND TRAINING SEMINARSCaptain Thomas M. BagotDirectorate of Evaluation/StandardizationU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

SINCE JULY 1983, the Directorate of Evaluation andStandardization (DES) has been conducting Aviation Standardization and Training Seminars (ASTS). During thistimeframe, the ASTS team has visited virtually every AnnyAviation unit in the world. The team has surfaced and resolved many issues that were brought to its attention bythe participating unit. Until recently, there was no way ofanswering similar questions raised by other units beforethe ASTS team assistance visit. However, now this problem has been eliminated through the Aviation Digest.Periodically, new issues selected from recent ASTS visitswill be addressed in the DES Report to the Field. This willenhance the information exchange between the AviationCenter and the field. The DES staff is here to serve ArmyA viation and you, the Army aviator.

Because of severe budget cuts, the ASTS teams cannotvisit units as frequently as in the past. For this reason, written correspondence addressing unit questions or problemsis encouraged. I fyou have any questions about these issuesand their responses, or if you have issues or questions forwhich you need answers, please contact the EvaluationDivision of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, ATTN: ATZQ-ESE, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5216,or call AUTOVON 558-469116571.

28

Does Ft. Eustis, VA, have a mobile training team thatprovides instruction on corrosion control?

The Department of Aviation Trades Training (DA TT)instructs an 18-hour block of instruction (311-138-18) incorrosion control during the 68G 10 course. This is not amobile training team, per se, for corrosion control. TheDATT may send its corrosion control instructors to unitswhen requested and paid for by the unit, and when studentload permits. Requests should be directed to: Commandant, USAALS, ATIN: ATSQ-TD, Ft. Eustis, VA 23604.

Numerous questions and comments have surfaced con-cerning the aerial observer course. What is its intent? Wasit to assist the pilot in cockpit tasks and to fly in an emer-gency situation? Task conditions and standardsfor hover-ing are more stringent for the aerial observer than theyare fo r the pilot. Are these standards too stringent fo r itsintent?

The intent of task 0047, Perform Emergency AircraftHandling, in the Enlisted Aerial9bserver Course (EAOC)Flight Training Guide (FTG), July 1987, is to ensure thatthe observer can take control of an aircraft if a pilot becomesincapacitated and cannot perform aircraft handling.



31/48

Task 0047.8 in the EAOC FTG requires the aerial observer to maintain hover altitude plus or minus 2 feet andaircraft heading at plus or minus 20 degrees.

The Initial Entry Rotary Wing OR-58 Kiowa TransitionFTG, July 1987, requires the pilot to maintain hover altitude of 3 feet or as directed plus or minus 1 foot and aircraft heading at plus or minus 10 degrees.The FTGs reflect that the task conditions and standardsfor hovering are not as stringent for the aerial observer asthey are for the pilot.

How will students be selected or specific aircraft withinthe new multitrack program?

The Army Research Institute and the Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine are jointly conducting a study to determine an algorithm to select students for each aircraftin the multitrack program. Specific guidance from the A viation Branch Chief provides each aircraft track with a proportionate share of the "top-of-the-class" students. It isrecognized and accepted by Army Aviation leadership thatwe must avoid the creation of a "fourth-class aviator."

The only impact of the multitrack implementation onUR-l Ruey pilots will be an increase of total UH-l flight

i

hours. Instead oftrain ing in the TR-55 Osage as they currently do, they will be training in the UH-l during that phaseof flight school that should, upon completion of flightschool, give them more time and experience in the UR-l.The selection of which aviators go into a particular track(AH-l Cobni, UR-l, etc.) during flight school will bebased on criteria that will be determined from the ongoingmultitrack algorithm study.

In Army Regulation (AR) 95-1, "General Provisionsand Flight Regulation, " December1986, the system fo ridentifying changes is confusing. It is often difficult todetermine i f a horizontal line goes through or under aword. Can a system be designed with diagonal hash marksor shading to clarify a change?

In June 1987, a recommendation to change the currentmethod of identifying changes was disapproved by the U. S.Army Publications and Printing Agency. Future changeswill be developed on a computer at Ft. Rucker and can becontrolled to the extent that' line-throughs" and' underlines" will not appear on more than one line of text in anyone paragraph. The upcoming revision of AR 95-1 willhave no line-throughs or underlines. - = - = ~

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander, U.S . ArmyAviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000;or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or Commercial 205-255-3504. After dutyhours call Ft. Rucker Hotline, AUTOVON 558-6487 or Commercial 205-255-6487 and leave a message.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY87 (through 28 February) 12 632,592 1.90 17 $34.2FY88 (through 29 February) 7 692,136* 1.01 10 $17.2

"estimated

MARCH 1988 29


32/48

PEARL!SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival LowdovvnEgress Procedures

I f an aircraft accident occurs, certain steps ' must befollowed to minimize injury and increase chances for a successful rescue. The following outline, based on the UH-1Huey, is a guide to assist crewmembers when an aircraftaccident happens.1. After an emergency landing becomes imminent, the fol

lowing must be accomplished (figure 1) to increasechances for survival:a. Place both feet firmly on the floor.b. In a forward facing seat, place your head between

your knees and interlock your arms under yourthighs.

c. In a rear facing seat, remain in the upright positionfirmly braced against the back of the seat.

d. Remain in this position until the aircraft has stopped.

forward facing seat rear facing seatFIGURE 1: Proper positions for a forced landing.

2. Post crash evacuation of personnel:a. Remain inside the aircraft until it has come to a com

plete stop (to include the rotors with the exceptionof a fire).

b. Before exiting the aircraft, evaluate the aircraft's surroundings for:(1) Position of aircraft in reference to attitude.(2) Position of aircraft on the terrain.(3) Condition of the aircraft.(4) Main fuel and battery off.

c. Exiting the aircraft (figure 2):

30

(1) I fcargo doors are closed, pull handle on windowand pull window inward.

1. Four first aid kits (two on lef t side not shown).2. Two crew door ettison handles (one on left sidenot shown).3. 9ne fire extinguisher (may be in eitherlocation).4. Two cabin door window emergency releasehandles (one on left side not shown).5. Two green houses above pilot's seats (only oneshown).

FIGURE 2: Emergency exits and equipmenton the UH1 H helicopter.

(2) I f unable, exit from either pilot or copilot door.(3) I f still unable, exit through green house above

pilots' seats.d. After exiting the aircraft, go to the 12:00 positiona'safe distance from the aircraft and wait for others.I f unable to position yourself at the 12:00 positionbecause of obstructions, proceed to the 3:00 position.I f still unable, proceed to the 6:00 or 9:00 position.



33/48

(NOTE: Every attempt should be made to evacuatethe injured from the aircraft after you are safe.)

e. I fmore than one person has successfully escaped theaircraft, the highest ranking survivor will take chargeand organize the situation to:(1) Administer first aid.

(a) I f here is no possibility of the aircraft catching on fire, the injured individuals should notbe moved because of the possibility of further injuring the individuals.

(b) I f here is a fire hazard, attempt to evacuatethe injured person as quickly and carefully aspossible. Check for degree of injury beforemoving (if time permits).

(2) Build shelters.(3) Radio for assistance.

f. Do not leave the crash site unless positive contact hasbeen made with a house, highway with traffic or individuals.

u.s. Army Aviation Digest PEARL'S ArticlesThe PEARL'S articles that are in each issue of the Army

Aviation Digest can be a source of valuable information.Keeping this information handy can be a distinct benefitto you as the users. Typical is the following question werecently receiv

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