Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1989

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MajorGeneral Ellis D. ParkerChief, Army Aviation Branch

and Civilian PilotsTogetherTHE ARMY as early as 1953, saw the needaugment their instructor pilot (IF) training forcecivilians. The U.S. Anny Aviation Center,Rucker, AL, currently trains more than 1,700

and 3,000 pilotsadvanced courses each year. To accomplish this1,042 +IPs and standardization IPs teachat Ft. Rucker. The Aviation Centerof civilian contractors,the Anny civilians (DACs) andIP work force.is 46 percent military, 42 percent

and 12 percent DACs. TheFt. Rucker totraining aviators under the newThe importance and responsibilities of civilians increased with the onset of multitrack. For

ning from civilian contract IPs.e majority receiving their own initial flight

P's flight time exceeds5,000 hours. Underthe civilian contractor no longeres primary training in the TH-55 Osage; butis taught in the UH-1 Huey.

ined its areasinstruction to include low-level navigationand advanced instruments academic,the UH-1. In addition, the contractor now

s the sole responsibility of teaching the rotaryqualification and instrument courses,

U-21 Ute IP course,d also OV-1 Mohawk qualification and IPThe multitrack program reemphasizes the

tly for the government instead of a contractor.vide one of the most important assets to

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

the Aviation Center's flight training program-continuity. Contractors and primary trainers maycome and go; Active Duty personnel willpermanently change stations, but the DACremains. They too are veteran aviators withthousands of hours of flight experience. Themajority either served or retired from activemilitary duty. DACs retain the knowledge of howthe training program can and does work. TheAnny all too often reinvents the wheel. The DACsinstitutional knowledge helps keep this to aminimum. Their constant number keeps IPturnover to a minimum and assists in thetransition of new military IPs.Throughout the scope of the Aviation Centerflight training program, DACs and military IPswork hand-in-hand. They teach all tactics andnight vision goggles training. The military IPsimpart to the student not only flying skills, butalso important lmowledge of current requirementsin the field. They can teach new officers what isexpected of them in their new units. By allowingmilitary IPs to rotate back to the field, units gainexperienced instructors. Ft. Rucker gains a freshperspective of unit requirements and a dynamicflow of ideas on how to improve the flight trainingprogram. Military IPs also serve as check pilotsfor courses taught by civilian contractors. Thisensures that training is taught to standardsrequired by the Anny and also provides inputdirectly back to the contractor.The Aviation Center's flight training programcould not exist without the excellent teamworkbetween civilian and military IPs. With civiliancontractors starting students off on the right foot,DACs providing continuity to tactics training, andmilitary IPs binding them together, we continueto turn out the finest helicopter pilots in the world.This winning team directly contributed to makingfiscal year 1988 the safest year in the history ofAnny Aviation. " ,

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The French Army AviatorPART 1

~Sergeant PilotsThe French SolutionLieutenant Colonel Terry L. Johnson

Editor's note: In 1986 the Army conducted a major enlisted aviator study (EAS) In response to a Vice Chief of Staff,Army tasking. The EAS conducted a close examination of British, German, Italian and French enlisted pilotprograms. Although many of the Allied programs had similarities to the warrant officer flight training (WOFT)program, none of the Allied programs trained their enlisted pilots to the extent that the WOFT does.

The WOFT program trains applicants as officers first (Warrant Officer Candidate School) and then as fullyinstrument rated, tactically prof icient, combat aviators. Warrant officer aviators perform as pilots In command, airmission commanders and combined arms officers on the battlefield. As a result of this concept and the Insignificantcost savings of an enlisted aviator program, the EAS recommended the Army not adopt such a program. The Armyleadership concurred with the EAS recommendation.

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This Is the first of a series of three articles onthe training and flying careers of French Armyaviators. Previous articles published In theAviation Digest are listed on page 9, the latestof which was written by LTC Paul Bonnet whileassigned as the French Liaison Officer to theU.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, havedescribed French Army Aviation history,organization, mission and equipment. Thisseries gives a glimpse behind the lines at therecruitment, Initial entry and subsequent

training of the French noncommissioned officerand officer aviator. The first article looks at thenoncommissioned officer pilots, where theycome from and their progression from flightschool through a typical career. The secondarticle will trace the officer's Initial training fromprecommlsslonlng to flight school and dutiesthrough the grade of captain. The last articlewill focus on captains, their preparation forcompany command and their duties In theaviation regiment.

A LOOK AT THEjunior aviator's experience is alook into the heart of FrenchAviation. In many ways, FrenchAnny aviators themselves differfrom their American counter-parts mainly in language anduniform. Aviation mystiqueseems to know no internationalboundaries. Yet, whatever theparallels on an individual level,the differences in French andU.S. Anny Aviation are signifi-cant. It behooves both of ourannies to study those differencesand to increase our commonground.

be reduced significantly by arti-cles alone, but 24 hours afterWarsaw Pact forces have massedon the Czechoslovakian and EastGerman borders for an attackinto NATO countries is too late

Any conflict in Europe inevit-ably will draw French and NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) allies into the crisis. Howwell can we expect to worktogether given the language andemployment barriers? Unfortu-nately, not very well at this pointin time in Anny Aviation. Notonly are there language, equip-ment and training differencesthat would undermine interoper-ability, but there is a major gapin simply knowing and under-standing each other's capabilitiesand procedures. Neither that gapnor the hardware differences will

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

FIGURE 1: Map of France showing the basic school In Dax In the southwest of thecountry, and the advanced school at Le Luc In the southeast

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make a night forced march on thebeaches of the nearby AtlanticOcean. They must execute a landnavigation problem at the end ofthe march. Physical training isdone individually though theyhave to complete the Frenchphysical fitness test annually.3After the Theory Phase, thenext 18 weeks are spent in the6 phases of basic flight training.Training starts in the Alouette IT,a venerable old turbine-poweredmachine that resembles the OR-13 Sioux. Figure 2 shows thephases and the number of flighthours associated with each.The phases are not necessarilysequenced as shown in the table.Note, for example, the unique

mountain training phase, conducted at Saillagouse in theFrench Pyrenees. Sections arecycled through the center one ata time, and base there with theirinstructor pilots (IPs) for 2 weeksof mountain flight instruction.For more than 10 years the WestGerman and British annies alsohave used this facility for mountain flight instruction. Aftercompletion of these basic flightphases, though flight school isnot yet over, the students are

awarded a military helicopterpilot certificate and wings.The final phase at Dax is atransition into the Gazelle SA-341, a machine similar in size tothe OR-58 Kiowa. This phaselasts 3 weeks with 13 flight hours.At this time the officers andNCOs leave Dax. They generallyreport to their units for as muchas 2 months to perform copilotduties while await ing class datesfor combat qualification, thesecond part of flight school.

The test consist.!! of an aerobic pretest on an exercycle followed by five other event.!!. The event.!! are thel()()..meter swim with 10 meters Wlderwater (Wltimed), an 8-km (5-mile) rW 1 in combat boot.!! (50-minutemaximum), a 5-meter rope climb using anna only or 7.5 meters with hands and legs (Wltimed) , and a"Cooper Test," a 12-minute rW 1 for distance ( , ~ m e t e r or 13/ 4-mile minimum). Th e event.!! are not sequential,nor necessarily on the same day.

FIGURE 3: The NCO professional development program Is two-tracked and progressive, with the breaks representing time In units.GAZ341

GAZ 341 GAZ341

GAZELLEALOUETTE II 341

3W 7W

AL II PUMA SA 330 PUMA SA330 20 Ius PUMA4W 18W 3W 4WN RANS PICASSAULT 0 &OPNL &IFRTILITY

TRACK E I NSTR QUALcourses 2hrsat Dax 55 hours 55 hours11 indicatesbreaks 2W 11 W 9W 1W

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The French SolutionAdvanced Flight TrainingCombat Pilot Qualification.Based on the needs of the service,standing at Dax and the individual's preferences, NCOs areplaced into one of two tracks forcombat qualification at the Ecoled'Application de l'AviationLegere de l'Armee de Terre. The"Advanced Combat AviationTraining Center" (not a literaltranslation) is located in Provence in the southwest of Franceat a place called Le Cannet desMaures near the small town ofLe Luc. This school has most ofthe advanced training courses forofficers and NCOs with theexception of IP qualification, andsome instrument training, bothaccomplished at Dax. Figure 3shows the entire NCO trainingprogram, and may be useful tofollow the rest of the article.The scout cannon track beginswith 3 weeks and 18 flight hoursin the combat pilot course. Academics and flight training focus

on the threat, target recognition,tactical flight maneuvers andterrain flight. The French werepioneers in nap-of-the-earth(NOE) flight, and this course isparticularly demanding. Completion marks the end of flight schoolin this track, and the NCOs rejointheir units for up to a year ofconfidence-building and flightexperience.The assault utility track beginswith terrain flight and NOEqualification in the Alouette II inorder to save the more expensivePuma hours. Following those 2weeks, the NCOs begin the 11-week Puma transition and operational instrument qualification,all at Le Luc. While an oldermachine, the SA-330 is still acomplex aircraft. I t is twinengined with retractable wheeledlanding gear, and a full instrument console that includes aDoppler and automatic pilotsystem. This represents a bigchange to the students and

Pilots cannot see outside when looking through a blue-tinted visor with the amber plastic liner for Instrument training.

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accounts for the long transition.The Puma student is only qualified in operational instrumentsat this point. However, unlike inthe Gazelle track, the Pumastudents stay at Le Luc withoutgoing to a unit until after operational instruments, and graduation from flight school.Summary of Flight SchoolScout/attack track studentsgraduate with up to 7% monthsin school, and 128 to 138 flighthours (not counting time flown inunits while waiting for courses).Puma assault/utility track students are in school 9% months,including operational instruments, and accumulate about 187flight hours and 20 instrumentsimulator hours. None of the newpilots are night vision goggles(NVG) qualified. That, andfurther qualifications will comelater.First AssignmentWhether in a scout, Cannon orPuma unit, the main objective ofthe next 3 to 4 years is to buildflight time and experience. TheFrench officers generally agreethat NCOs learn to fly andhandle the aircraft well duringthis period, but have limitednavigation and mission skills.

Gazelle firing HOT missile

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The NCO is supervised closelyduring ~ experienc&buildingperiod by more senior NCOs, thelieutenants and unit commanders. While the NCO aviator doesnot receive preferential treatmentover other NCOs, demonstratedskill and reputation in the smallAnny Aviation family does notgo unnoticed. NCO aviators doperform additional duties inunits, and serve in leadershippositions, but their primaryesponsibility is to fly."Graduate" Flight TrainingOperational instruments. Afterabout a year in a unit, scout andCannon pilots return to Dax fortheir operational instrumentcourse. This course resembles theold U.S. Anny "tactical instruent ticket" of the sixties andearly seventies. The Gazelle is noty instrumented for instrument(IFR) and the pilotsare not expected to enter instrument flight intentionally. Cons&quently, in ~ track, the NCOeceives 31 hours of basic instruent instruction including nonrolled radar and frequencyodulated homing approaches.Flight with an amber plasticcockpit shield limits vision outide of the aircraft for the pilothen wearing a blue-coloredin the down position.

NCOs in track return to theirnits.Cannon Course. Those pilotsassigned to support and protectroops (Gazelle 341 with sid&20 millimeter cannon)Le Luc to qualify

and functioning of the 20and240 live rounds during the 2-Pilot in Command Course.oth Gazelle and Puma tracks

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

have pilot in command (PC)courses. This course, which hasno U.S. equivalent, is normallya prerequisite for HOT missile orIFR qualification. NCOs not onlyhave to have a minimum of 1,000hours, but they also have to berecommended for the training bythe chain of command. Selecteesreturn to the Advanced School atLe Luc where they are given aprecourse evaluation. About 20percent fail the in-flight andclassroom evaluation and aresent back to their units to buildmore time and remedy theirdeficiencies.Gazelle track pilots are givena grueling load of navigationmissions. They are assigned aswingmen in a two-aircraft patrolin which they are required toexecute the orders of the patrolleader in the other machine.Exercises proceed from simpleroute reconnaissance to progressively more complex missions.An IP (an officer or another NCO)acts as the copilot in the rightseat, and tries to let the studentrun the mission as much aspossible.

For many of the students, it isthe first time that they have hadto navigate, operate all the radios,and decide where to go with theirmachine all at the same time.That may be hard to understandin a 1,OOO-hour pilot, but remember that they are only requiredto pilot the machine during theirfirst assignment. Classes aresmall-10 to 14, and grading istough. Failures of the 6-week, 65-flight-hour course are rare, butthose that do occur are for failure to master crew coordination,or terrain association andnavigation.Academics refresh the studentson Army Aviation organization,other Anny branches, Dopplernavigation, tactics and thethreat, but most of the time onthe ground is spent planning themissions. In this respect, the

French excel in attention todetail. The PC-candidate mustlargely commit the map andmission to memory. The instructors often take the map awayfrom the student that relies tooheavily on it in flight. Exercisesare tailored, to the degree possible, to the student's unit.The PC course is headed by amajor, with 1 captain, 2 lieutenants-former NCOs-and 12senior NCO IPs as instructors.Each has from 3,000 to 7,000flight hours. They also teach thecombat pilot or NOE course soall have literally memorized the5,OOO-squar&kilometer trainingarea and could give their locationto within 100 meters almostwithout looking at a map.Puma pilots go through essentially the same PC training,oriented on the transport mission.Because of that, there is som&what less emphasis on the painstaking navigation of the Gazellecourse. Puma PC candidates onlyfly 55 hours in the aircraft, butthey spend 9 weeks in thePC course. The extra time isdevoted to completing full IFRqualification.In terms of standardization,the French have achieved a coreof proven NCO pilots in command, trained to their unit'sspecific mission. With 10 timesthe number of pilots and aircraft,and given the diversity of ourmissions and units, a similarprogram has been determined tobe impractical in our Anny. Thereis no empirical data showing adirect relationship between thiscourse and accident or incidentrate reduction, though it can beinferred to have had a positiveimpact, and this course is awinner, with or without thestatistics.Other graduate trainingincludes the following: Missile Course. PCs assignedto attack helicopter troops mustqualify on the HOT missile sys-

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The French Solutiontern (similar to the TOW, butreaching its maximum range of4,000 meters in 17 seconds). Thisis accomplished in a 4-weekperiod in which they fire morethan 500 simulated missiles, bothin flight and on the ground, andone live HOT missile. Though thesystem is fired by the PC in theleft seat, a certain number of nonPCs are also missile-qualified,giving units a reserve of qualifiedfirers

NVG Course. Only about 20percent of the French pilots areNVG trained, partly due to shortages of the goggles. Priority isto the 4th Airmobile Division ofthe French Rapid DeploymentForce. The 20-hour qualificationlasts 4 weeks. They use thirdgeneration goggles similar to theANVIS (aviator night visionimaging system).

Instructor Pilot Course. Asmall number of outstanding

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NCO pilots are selected for IPqualification. The 3-month courseis at Dax and is followed byassignment as IPs in the schoolto build experience before beingsent to be unit IPs. (Note thatofficers also attend this qualification course, primarily to serve inthe school system as IPs.)

Team Commander Course.An even smaller number ofhighly experienced NCOs areselected by their commanders tobe "team commanders" or patrolleaders, normally a lieutenant'sjob. This course, taught at Le Luc,is an abbreviated version of thelieutenant's basic course. Theseselect few NCOs commandpatrols of two or more aircraft intheir units. Remarkably, some

NCOs are able to achieve all ofthis in less than their initial 10-year obligation.Career PatternsExcepting the returns to school,NCOs move relatively infrequently. With few exceptions,they stay in the same track andspend 5 or more years in the sameregiment. Overseas assignmentsare popular, but few in number.4The usual maximum overseastour is 2 years. Retirement ispossible at 15 years of service forNCOs.

Promotion. The NCO corps inAnny Aviation is young, with theaverage age well under 30. Thereis fairly rapid promotion throughthe grade of E7 using a system

4 The French Army has aviation units in their former colonies and poeae88ions (OVerBeaIl departments) inthe South Pacific, South America and Africa. Most " o v ~ ' assignments are in Djibouti or Chad inAfrica.

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and seniority similar toIf there is a fly in theit is the very quality ofin French Anny Aviike this peakin responsibility and varietyy. Some are content to remaint that peak, but many yearn for

offic-but the opportunities areand the competition is

Retention. What lies beyondsly, some of the NCOs leave the

10 years. This is am for the French Annythe appeal of civilianThat isthe longcommitment.Incentives to stay in abound.the French Anny, pay andkeyed to grade and

flight, hazardous duty, foreignand even for the numberchildren!5Retirement. Based on a pointas years of overseasand the number of flightSufficient points can bepay at

0 percent of active duty pay.55 years old.This article has only brieflyand careersas

nd the officers are interesting,t beyond the scope of the series.ench solution to providingnumbers of trainedat the lowest cost iswarrant officers or more com-is athe system to ensureand standardizationandit seems to

ABOUT THEAUTHORLieutenant Colonel

Terry L Johnson Is aSenior Anny Aviator whowas assigned as the U.S.Anny Training andDoctrine Command andFl Rucker Liaison Officerto French Anny Aviationwhen this series waswritten. He Is rated inAlouette II and Gazellehelicopters and wears theFrench Anny AviatorWings. His previousassignments includeVIetnam, Alaska andtactics instructor at theUnited States Mili taryAcademy. He is a graduateof the U.S. AnnyCommand & General StaffCollege and has a master'sdegree In sociology. He IspresenUy assigned to the11th Aviation Brigade inGennany.

NCOs themselves set high standards and tolerate coasters poorly.The French sergeant pilot stemsfrom a long tradition in theFrench Army dating back toWorld War I. They are professionals, a critical complement to theofficer corps and key players onthe Army Aviation team.The next article addresses thecommissioned officer's initialtraining and service, and the

Previous Aviation Digestarticles on FrenchAnny Aviation:o "French TurbinePowered Helicopters,"May 1959.o "French Army Aviation,"May 1960.o "Aviation in the FrenchArmy," September 1972.o "French Airmobility,"March 1975.o "French Army Aviation,"December 1978.o "Aviation in the FrenchArmy," August 1980.o "From Balloon to BlackHawk," June 1981 (Frenchexpeditionary force).o "French Army Aviation:The 4th Air AssaultDivision," October 1985.

final article treats the training ofcompany commanders. Each ofthese levels offers somethingunique, something the U.S. Annymay profit from by examiningmore closely. For the NCOs,perhaps the PC course stands outthe most. Certain aspects of thelieutenant's course and the captain's precommand course shouldbe equally thought-provoking.Stay tuned! Air Assault! -.= ,

Like many modem countries, France's birth rate ha s slowed to the point that the govenunent has ha dto create inoentives to have children. Benefits like reduced fares and ticket prices and salary supplementsare given to large families. The "ideal" is to have three children.

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Mr. Edward J. BavaroThreat Division

Directorate of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, AL

Soviet Air Defense"War is a science, a series of mathematical problems,to be solved through proper integration andcoordination of men and weapons in time and space."

T E AIRCRAFT best exemplifies th einfluence of science on the art of warfare. Noweapon system has had such a broad anddramatic irnpact on military thinking. Theimpact of the aircraft on tactics and doctrinecontinues today in the form of the helicopter.Aircraft have mandated the formation ofspecial branches of military organizations todefend against the aerial threat-requirementthat is exacerbated greatly by the modernattack helicopter.

The Soviets have a great appreciation for ai rdefense (AD) and view it as an essentialsegment of their combined arms force. AirDefense of Ground Forces was formed as aseparate branch of the Soviet Army in the1950s. Air Defense must protect ground forceseffectively from enemy tactical air elements,both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, thatwill constitute the major initial obstacle to theiroffensive operations. Development of Soviet airdefense is the product of the constant competition of offensive air weapons an d tacticsversus AD weapons and command control ofthe AD network. In World War II, Soviet ai r

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GeorgiZhukov(1894-1974)

defense consisted of antiaircraft artillery andfighter aircraft, providing a combination ofpoint and zone defense that was not especiallyefficient.In the postwar period, new fast-moving je taircraft flying at high altitude and the potentialthreat of nuclear attack by strategic bombersspurred Soviet developmental efforts towardmore capable AD systems. The advent of thesurface-to-air missile (SAM) reduced the importance of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) in the late1950s and early 1960s. The U.S. Air Forceground support role was practically nonexisten t in the postwar period, which reduced theSoviet emphasis of AAA in favor of SAMsystems against high-altitude threats. Indeed,U.S. close ai r support (CAS) to ground forceswas remote. I t was so remote that, during th eU.S. bui ldup of forces in the Republic of SouthVietnam in 1965, the U.S. Air Force, lackingan adequate ground support aircraft, acquiredNavy AI-Es, those marvelous Skyraiders, andpressed them into CAS roles. To support anddirect the CAS aircraft, the U.S. Air Forceprocured 0-1 Bird Dogs for their forward air

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controllers. With no ai r threat to speak of andlimited AAA threats, the AI-E, an outstandingaircraft by any yardstick, was a remarkableaircraft for ground support in terms of durability, firepower and loiter capability . The onlything lacking was a committed and rehearsedapplication of CAS, which required the Armyand Air Force to develop that requisite partnership on the job as it were. On a highintensity battlefield, that may have proved amuch more difficult proposition.

Back in the late 1950s, the Soviets werebeginning to field SAMs and more capablefighter interceptor aircraft. These increasingimprovements were underscored strongly inMay 1960 with the downing of the AmericanU-2 aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers.Up to that time, some of our high-flying aircraftoperated with a degree of imperviousness anddisdain for the Soviet ai r defenses. Westernexperts had to reassess the survivability ofaircraft employing high-altitude tacticsagainst Soviet ai r defenses of obvious anddemonstrated improvement. This reassessmentled to the adoption of low-level penetrationattack tactics. Low-level tactics opened the doorfor the reemergence of the AAA weapons,bringing them back into prominence and theirultimate partnership with the expanding arrayof SAM systems. The burgeoning use ofhelicopters in combat roles by the United Statesand France may have played a small part inthe regeneration of AAA guns.

The Syrians and Egyptians were equippedwith a good deal of Soviet hardware during theMideast War of 1973. One piece of Soviethardware that grabbed our attention was theZSU-23-4 (Zenitnaya SamokhodnayaUstanovka-self-propelled antiaircraft (SP AA)gun), which proved to be an effective AD systemagainst low-flying aircraft. Supposedly, itaccounted for 30 of the nearly 80 aircraft theIsraelis lost in the first few days of the YomKippur War. The ZSU-23-4 is the best AAAweapon system available today-at least untilits replacement, the SPAA gun 2S6 shows up.And according to Department of Defense's 1988issue of Soviet Military Power, t.he 2S6 isalready beginning to replace the ZSU-23-4 atthe regimental level of some first-line divisions.The ZSU-23-4 (with it s excellent gun dish radar)

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

2$6 self-propelled antiaircraft gun (formerly M1986).

consists offour 23 mm cannons) SovietMilitaryPower (describes the 2S6 as mounting twinrapid-firing 30 mm guns), which are mountedon a chassis similar to the PT-76 light tank.The system uses radar and optical sights, andan analog computer target lead. Today theZSU-23-4 or 2S6 is found in every regimentalantiaircraft battery of Soviet motorized rifleand tank regiments as a platoon containingfour systems. Under the Soviet concept oftactical ai r defense, the combination of AAAand SAM systems is organized to assure thatattacks by enemy aircraft from any directionand any altitude are repelled. Their system oftactical air defense has evolved because of therequirement to protect their mobile formations.Thus, most Soviet AD systems are vehicularmounted, often on tracked vehicles (such as theZSUs mentioned above) so that a mobileumbrella of protection exists for their fastmoving tank and motorized rifle units-apattern demonstrated in a somewhat downscaled fashion during the Yom Kippur War.Mobility is an essential feature of Soviet ADsystems. Even relatively static systems suchas the old SA-2 could be packed up and relocatedin a short time. The more modern tactical ADsystems are all invariably highly mobile.

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Four Principles of Air DefenseThe Soviet Army subscribes to four principles of ai r defense: mobility, mass, mix andintegration.

As indicated above AD mobility is criticalto the Soviet style of combat operations. TheAD units must keep up with the ground forces.Soviet tactics aim at conducting offensivecombat operations at a high tempo. Once theypenetrate the initial crust of main enemydefenses, the rate of advance is expected to pickup. The overall rate of advance, over time,should exceed 50 kilometers (km) per day.Mass never has been a Soviet weakness. The

Soviets employ more numbers of AD systemsin a typical division than any other army inthe world. Air defense systems proliferatethroughout the Soviet division and aredeployed down to battalion level. Besides theorganic divisional AD systems, key divisionsoften are augmented with additional AD assets.The aggregate number of AD systems from thefront-level SAM brigades down to the shoulderfired SA-7s at battalion level reflects the Sovietconcept of mass.

The principle of mix may be the best attributeof the Soviet scheme of ai r defense. The arrayof AD systems is quite diverse in terms of range,guidance, lethality and performance. TheSAMs employ various guidance techniquessuch as infrared homing, semiactive radarhoming an d command guided homing; haveeffective ranges from 3.5 km up to 100 km; andmove at speeds ranging from 400 meters persecond to Mach 4. Interspersed with thesemissiles that extend from the front level downto battalion level are various AAA such as ZPU-4, S-60, ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 and 2S6. Add to theseconventional AD weapons the possible role thatartillery could play in ai r defense-as well assmall arms and the automatic weapons, mainguns and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs)on fighting vehicles, fixed-wing and rotarywing operating air-to-air and emerging andprojected weapons such as laser systems-andthe mix could not be more thorough.

Regarding integration, the Soviets considerthis principle absolutely vital to the effectiveness of the AD effort of protection for their

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maneuver elements. All AD systems are treatedas an integral component of their combinedarms and are well-accounted for in the planningstage of operations. Air defense is perceivedas a single system composed of a varietyof parts ra ther than as a series of separate, distinct entities that do not relate toeach other or to the conduct of the groundbattle. In their view the course and outcomeof combined arms combat, as a whole, dependsgreatly on the effectiveness of AD combat.

An importan aspect of the AD effort is thesurveillance and early warning element. Greatimportance is placed on ai r defense surveillance. I t is considered the key to the overalleffectiveness of the AD effort. The complexityof modern ai r defenses and the increasingstealth of aircraft require the earliest information and warning on impending ai r threats.

Air defense commanders at front and armylevel are responsible for coordinating the ai rdefense efforts with the maneuver units theysupport. The divisional ai r defense commandercontrols the division air defense assets and isresponsible for deploying the AAA, SAMs andradars. Priority of areas to be defended will beestablished. Procedures for the coordinationbetween AD and maneuver units will bearranged. At the front and army level, highestpriority will be accorded to nuclear-capableweapons, headquarters, assembly areas, important chokepoints and logistics areas.

The AD commanders will locate area defenseassets, accordingly, to best protect thosepotential targets on that priority. They generally will have centralized control of the ADassets including the SAM brigades and fightersupport. Early warning information is passedfrom front level or army level AD headquartersdown to division AD commanders. The Sovietsuse electronic and electro-optical means andvisual observation to conduct ai r surveillance.Whenever possible, preliminary target data ispassed down from higher-level radar units toAD commanders and their firing batteries. Thisreduces the vulnerability of forward batteryradars and radar-directed guns and missilelaunchers to electronic countermeasure.

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SA-6 Gainful missile system.

Soviet AD Systems ReviewA review of the Soviet ai r defense systemswill show how they virtually saturate thebattlefield, producing a battlefield that fairlybristles with a variety and large numbers ofguns and missiles.

BATTALIONHEADQUARTERS

MOTORIZEDRIFLE

COMPANY

MOTORIZEDRIFLE

BATTALION

OTHERBATTALIONELEMENTS

BATTALION

ANTI AIRCRAFTPLATOON

9 SA 7 143 BMP BTR

The lowest level of organic AD weapooccurs at the battalion level. The antiaircraplatoons in each BMP BTR-equipped battalihave the SA-7/14 SAM, a man:portable,shoulder-fired, low altitude infrared missilewith a high-explosive warhead and passiveinfrared homing guidance.

nsft

on

Each motorized rifle battalion has 9 SA-7/14s located in the air defense platoon. Thereare no organic ai r defense weapons currentlyin Soviet tank battalions. A typical Sovietmotorized rifle division will have more than 120SA-7/14s while tank divisions will haveupwards of 93 units.


REGIMENTAt the regimental level, there is an air defense

battery that contains a platoon of four selfpropelled ZSU-23-4/ 2S6 and a platoon of fourSA-9/ 13 SAM TEL systems. The ZSUs normally operate in pairs, or sections, with thepairs generally in mutually supporting rangeof each other. A pair may be located from 150to 250 meters apart to provide enough latitudefor engaging aircraft and yet maintain theirintegrity as a section.

The ZSU pairs/ sections are kept within 1,500meters of each other. The SA-9 carries fourcannisterized infrared SAMs, mounted on amodified amphibious armored reconnaissancevehicle-the BRDM-2, a wheeled vehicle.

The SA-13 carries four improved infraredSAMs, mounted on a modified MT-LB trackedamphibious vehicle. The SA-9/ 13s normally aresituated between the first and second echelonsof the regiments. They are employed usuallyas a group and, combined with the ZSUs, cover

ANT IT ANK MOTORIZED RIFLEPLATOON REGIMENT OR

TANK REGIMENT

TANTIAIRCRAFTMISSILE AND

ARTILLERY BATTERY

BATTERY SA-9/13 ZSU -23-4 MAINTEN"NCE

HEADQUARTERS PLATOON OR 2S6 SECTIONPLATOON

4 TEL 4 ZSU-23-4/2S6

TRANSPORT ATlONSECTION

the dead space of the divisional SAMs' protective umbrella.Each regimental headquarters, both motorized rifle and tank regiments, have three SA-

7/14s for local air defense. Each division willhave 16 ZSU-23-4/ 2S6 and 16 SA-9/13s .

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SURFACE-TO -AIRMISSILE SA -6 8

REGIMENTAL

HEADOUARTERS

TARGET

ACOUISITIONBATTERY

MOTOR

TRANSPORTCOMPANY

DIVISION

REGIMENT

Each Soviet division has an air defenseregiment composed of five batteries of SA-6/8s, each having 4 TEL/TELAR (transportererector launcher/transporter erector launcherand radar) as well as 21 SA-7/14s. The SA-6is mounted on a modified PT-76 tank chassis,which is not amphibious, while the SA-8 is atotally self-contained SAM system (missilesand radar) mounted on a wheeled amphibiousvehicle. The SA-6 ha s no onboard radar an dmust receive radar information from th ebatteries' off-line radars mounted on separatetracked vehicles. The regiments LONG TRACKsurveillance radar provides early warningtargeting alerts for the SA-6 TELs. Each SA-6 battery, however, has it s own STRAIGHTFLUSH radar, which provides target acquisition data (shorter range than the regiments'LONG TRACK) an d handles target trackingan d illumination for the battery. The nonamphibious feature of the SA-6 system can be areal disadvantage in a European battlefieldsetting because of the many rivers that haveto be negotiated.The SA-8, on the other hand, has theadvantage of being amphibious and capableof autonomous operation not requiring anumbilical connection to off-line radar andcarrying a full missile reload internally; adisadvantage is the missile has only about halfthe range of the SA-6's Gainful missile. TheSA-II began to appear in some SAM regimentsalongside the SA-6s. The tracked SA-lIs maybe th e replacement for the SA-6; they have alittle more range than the SA-6 but, moreimportant, each SA-II has an onboard radar

14

MISSILE

TECHNICALBATTERY

MAINTENANCE

COMPANY

MISSILEFIRING

BATTERY

TEU TELAR per BATTERY

that allows th e SA-II TELAR to operateautonomously if necessary. This capability willafford the SA-II equipped batteries greaterautonomy and mobility. The SAM regiment's21 SA-7/14s provide local protection for theSAMs. Each of the five missile firing batterieshas three SA-7/14 launchers for this localprotection with three launchers located at theregimental headquarters an d three launchersin the missile technical battery.

SA-8~ I . u .- ~A-7/14 ~

Mobility is anessential feature ofSoviet air defense.

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SURFACE-TO-AIRMISSILE 5A"112

BRIGAOE BRIGAOE SURFACE-TO-AIR TECHNICAL

HEAOaUARTERS MISSILE SUPPORT ANOBATTALION SERVICES

ISURFACE-TO-AIR

MISSILEBATTERY 3 LAUNCHERS BATTERY(27 TEL TOTAL)

II

ARMY/FRONTAt each army and front, there is a SAMbrigade containing three battalions of SA-4 orSA-12 (nine TELs per battalion). The SA-4 is


a two-stage, medium- to high-altitude SAM. TheSA-4 has an excellent range of between 80 to100 km but is not effective against aircraftemploying good, low-altitude flight technique.Special electronic mission aircraft operating atmission altitudes are the Army aircraft mostat risk to this missile system. Missile guidanceof the SA-4 is by radio-command with semiautomatic homing similar to the SA-6 except theillumination radar does no t employ continuouswavemode radar.

The SA-12 is the replacement for the SA-4SAM system. It is credited with a range of 100km and an improved minimum engagementaltitude. It may have a phased-array radarcapable of handling multiple targets. SomeAAA guns are often placed with these SAMbatteries for local protection.

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)1 100+ km

~

~0 D O~ 0aD D~ ~ ~ D D 0Cl ~~ ~ ~ D~ Cl

Cl~ 0~

,&1 D

Sample layout of the air defense assetso f a Soviet combined arms army. 6 ZSU-23-4j2S6 64SA-9/13 64SA-6/B BO

0 SA-4/12 27*Oue to the vast number of SA-7/14/16 Sthey are not shown. * SA-7/14/16 453+TOTAL SYSTEMS 688+

T e Soviets have assembled an air defensesystem that is second to none. The basicstructure, composed of a series of SAMs andAAA guns, provides excellent coverage for theirground forces. The layering of these AD assetsseeks to erect successive barriers to ingressingair threats. The intent is to be able to engagethese air threats early and often until they aredefeated, and hopefully before they have beenable to get to their objective. There are gapsin this AD umbrella-it's inevitable that therewould be. You cannot cover every angle andaspect of ground forces with dedicated ADweapons. The organic AD weapons are arrayed

16

Legend and recap ofai r defense assets

and located to compliment each other and tooptimize the overall coverage. New systemssuch as laser weapons, they hope, will reducethose gaps and add a different dimension tothe protection effort and place stress on NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airthreats, requiring them to go to furtherextremes to protect their aircrews and aircraft.Apart from the organic AD weapons, theSoviets have increased the stakes air threatsmust contend with by applying other weaponsno t dedicated to ai r defense for use in combat-ing aircraft. Artillery is one that can beparticularly effective if the Soviets can be given

APRIL 1989


19/52

reasonable targeting information. Artilleryrepresents a true, over-the-horizon threat tohelicopters that could well frustrate and limitattacking helicopters from closing with Sovietground force objectives. This possibility willpush aircrew mission planning to even greaterdetail and flexibility, and will most certainlyinvolve more coordination and cooperationfrom friendly elements in suppression, coverand deception.

Small arms and ATGMs are significantthreats because the helicopter is, in essence, aground combat vehicle target-like an infantrycombat vehicle or tank-only with greateragility. The lethality of many of the automaticguns/cannons, main guns and ATGMs is suchthat attack helicopters cannot just be concernedwith conventional AD weapons. The mostinteresting and, quite probably, the mostdangerous development in th e Soviet airdefense effort would be the use of counterairheli-copters. Counterair helicopters, operatingin the same realm as attack helicopters, canconstitute the greatest impediment to NATOhelicopter combat operations. When our helicopters use agility and nap-of-the-earth techniques to deny most air defense systems fromachieving targeting solutions, the counterairhelicopter is not similarly frustrated. I t can

SA-9/13 TEL


maneuver swiftly to acquire the line-of-sightand range it needs for engagement. And if thatcounterair helicopter is an aircraft designedand built for the counterair role, then itssuperiority of performance makes that type ofthreat have special significance.The ai r defense package that the Soviets havedeveloped and continually perfected is nohaphazard affair. It is a well-conceived defensethat commands respect but, as is so often th ecase, does have it s flaws. Capitalizing on theseflaws and maximizing the opportunity theypresent continues to be the premise upon whichNATO antiarmor helicopter operations isbased. ~

REFERENCESDA Field Manual 100-2-1, The Soviet ArmyOperations andTactlcs.DA Field Manual 100-2-3,The Soviet ArmyTroops, Organization and Equipment.Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, DavidC. Isby. DOD-Soviet Military Power 1988.

SA-13 TEL

17

).....

Iu(.)

Q1')Iu'0>-.,1::J8ti8''iiNen>-.acf..


20/52

18

WINNINGWITHCOPPERHEADMajor Rodney O. Luce

Copperhead, a cannon launched guided projectile, closes Inand scores a direct hit on an M48 tank. Fired from a conventional155 mm artillery piece, this "bullet with a brain" homes In onreflected energy from laser-deslgnated targets.

SCENARIO: You're looking across the for-ward line of own troops (FLaT). On the horizon7 kilometers (km) to your front, fire balls beginto appear. Through your binoculars, you see enemyarmored vehicles burst into flame. What hashappened? First-round effects such as these mightwell have been caused by M712 Copperheadcannon-launched, guided projectile rounds.The Copperhead system greatly increases theArmy's ability to destroy specific targets atextended ranges. Used with other munitions,Copperhead can disrupt enemy attacks atdistances beyond th e enemy's direct firecapabilities. It has great potential for today'sbattlefield.Unfortunately, some myths cloud theemployment of Copperhead munitions. Let's putthese myths to rest before proceeding.

APRIL 1989


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MYTH ONE:You can't fire anything else whilefiring Copperhead because it ties upthe communication nets and thefiring battery.

Copperhead missions do not tie up the communication nets any more than conventional firemissions. Once the observer coordinates forCopperhead priority and oncall targets, hecontinues with regular mission processing until atarget appears. Then the observer sends a"quickfire" message to get Copperhead on the way.Copperhead communications procedures follow thesame process as the other priority, oncall andtarget-of opportunity missions. A priority messagegoes to the very top of the inputqueue in the batterycomputer system. With the command, the systemtakes less than 45 seconds to fire the round.Copperhead missions do not tie up the firingunits. Firing Copperhead is a two-gun mission.Each mission includes rounds for two to six targetelements. Since only two howitzers from a firingunit process a specific Copperhead mission, theremaining howitzers can continue to fire othermissions at the same time. Each battery/platoonfire direction center (FDC), with the fire supportofficers (FSOs) and observers, can fire up to twopriority-target and three conventional missionssimultaneously.

MYTH T W O :The forward observer's/fire supportteam's direction to the target mustbe the same as the howitzer'sdirection to the target to be able todesignate for Copperhead.

For Copperhead to acquire enough reflected laserenergy to lock onto the target, the observer-to-targetdirection only needs to be within 45 degrees of thehowitzer's direction to the target. With the target3,000 meters from the FLOT, an observer can beanywhere along a 5-km arc on the FLOT and stilleffectively engage the target with his laser.


MYTH THREE:Copperhead requires special logis-tical support.

Copperhead actually conserves basic loads ofammunition. Because it's an accurate point-targetweapon, Copperhead requires one-twentieth of thetransportation needed for conventional artillerymunitions to produce the same results. There areno special transport considerations.

MYTH FOUR:Copperhead is dead; it has nofunding.

Copperhead received $117 million in 1988 for useduring the next few years. These funds are to finishproduction, make it more lethal and extend itsrange. Copperhead II is already under contract toimprove the seeker and has been authorized anadditional $10 million for development in 1989.like many other systems, funding for Copperheadfaced reduction during the budget cuts. All majorproduction lines for Copperhead still are open.There are 17,300 Copperhead rounds in the Annyinventory today, with 8,400 more rounds Inproduction. Copperhead is alive and well!!

MYTH FIVE:Copperhead command, control andcommunications (C3) are too com-plex to make Copperhead work onthe battlefield.

Copperhead fire mission planning and executionuse the same field artillery used by C3 withconventional munitions. Commander's guidance,adequate battlefield coverage and ammunitionallocation for Copperhead are command decisionsthat are made for all types of fire missions. Thecommander's guidance controls Copperhead fires.

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COPPERHEADCopperhead employment and C3considerationsshould be refined within the task forceibrigade firesupport element to maximize its contribution to

the fight and to integrate fully its effects with themaneuver commander's intent. Copperhead, usedwell-forward of the FLOT, particularly againstenemy reconnaissance vehicles, greatly increasesthe lethality of our fires, and eliminates thedisclosure of maneuver direct fire weapon positions.Copperhead fire planning requires fa r fewerplanned aimpoints because of the area coverageof the weapon. Both the artillery and maneuvercommanders should consider Copperhead as adecisive weapon for early use in the battle. Apriority-target mission takes about 45 seconds plustime- of-flight to impact on the target. The observerrequires a trigger point to have the round arriveat the aimpoint the same instant the target getsthere. If the selected target moves out of sight, orout of the footprint during this time, the laseroperator can shift to another target at any timeup to the last 4 seconds of the mission.

The fire planning necessary for a Copperheadtarget is nearly the same as the planning for aconventional target. Drawing the footprint andobtaining the time-of-flight are quick, easy tasks.In the end, the three or four priority Copperheadtargets greatly reduce the number of conventionalmissions required and blind the enemy bysurgically eliminating his reconnaissance elementsor high-value command and control vehicles.

DoctrineCopperhead's strength lies in its ability to hi tselected, high-value point targets far forward ofthe FLOT. This weapon system does not have thevisible signature associated with maneuver directfire weapons. Knowing this, Copperhead has greatpotential for its use during the initial phase of thebattle. Commanders should consider the use ofCopperhead fires, before maneuver direct fireweapons, to surgically remove those enemyvehicles that have the most influence in their plan.We want to remove reconnaissance vehicleswithout exposing our tanks and direct fire weaponsat the start of the battle. We can do this withCopperhead at longer ranges. Then, as theyappear, we should remove the vehicles andpersonnel that make a significant difference early

20

in the battle. Examples are enemy reconnaissancevehicles, air defense weapons systems, maneuvercommand vehicles, radars and radio directionfinder systems. This action will blind the enemyand cause him to deploy early, helping to exposehis main thrust or plan. As a result, maneuverunits should have .more preparation time to defeatthe enemy.

The Copperhead fire mission systemThe Copperhead system is simple. One observerlocates a target, calls for a Copperhead and lasesthe target until it disappears in flame. The basicdifference between Copperhead and regularartillery mission processing is the requirement tolase the target. The strengths of the system are- I t has a high hi t probability on point targets,moving or stationary, at longer ranges than thatof current direct fire weapon systems. It is highly lethal at all ranges. It can fire against an array of targets withinthe same target area by using several rounds. The lasers do not have the pronounced firingsignature of the antitank guided missile. Target engagement with Copperhead conserves the basic loads of direct and indirect fire

weapons.The weaknesses of the systen are- Obscurants such as fog and clouds degradethe capability of the Copperhead to receive andtrack on the laser signals. Its responsiveness depends on the traininglevel of the units. The laser designators are vulnerable tosuppressive fires. The system depends on timely two-waycommunication between the observerand the FDC. The observer's ability to track the target limitsthe effectiveness of the target engagement.These weaknesses are minimized by conductingperiodic training to high performance standards.We will now look at the technical elements ofa Copperhead mission. What are some of theCopperhead lasing systems?The ground/vehicular laser locator designator

(GIVILD) and the mast-mounted sight (MMS)systems are only a part of the family of lasersfor laser-guided munitions in today's battlefieldarsenal. These lasers provide the FDC extremely

APRIL 1989


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A mockup of the XM-712 Copperhead cannon launched guided projectile showingthe inner components.

accurate target location for both conventional andCopperhead missions. The aerial fire supportofficer (AFSO) with MMS in an OH-58D Kiowahelicopter can lase for both Copperhead andHElLFIRE missiles. FSOs, AFSOs and combatobservation lasing teams with GIVLLD normallylase the targets for the maneuver units. Air Forcepilots with a Pave Penny (laser designatorweapons system) also have the capability to lasefor Copperhead.

The engagement range of the lasers varies withthe situation. The artillery observer can lase astationary target at 5,000 meters. When mountedon a fire support vehicle, the forward observer (FO)can lase moving targets accurately out to 4,000meters. For ground-mounted operations, theaccuracy is beyond 3,000 meters. The AFSO cantrack and kill targets beyond 7,000 meters fromhis OH-58D. The laser produces no visiblesignature from the observer's position. This useof Copperhead to start the battle at these rangesgreatly enhances survivability

What are the targets?A Copperhead target is a single target defeatedby one round. Since each artillery unit's basic load


normally contains a limited number of Copperheadrounds, the commander's criteria should indicatethe targets that influence the battle. These targetsinclude enemy artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles, air defense weapon systems,obstacle breaching vehicles, maneuver commandvehicles, radars and radar direction finder systems.

Who processes the call for fire?Only 155 mm howitzer units can fire Copperheadrounds. The firing unit FDC receives the call fora Copperhead mission. The FDC computes andsends the firing data to the personnel on thehowitzers. Normally, the FDC reports "ready" tothe observer. Upon the observer's order to fire, thefirst howitzer fires and the FDC reports "shot" tothe observer. The observer lases the last 20 secondsof the round's flight to the target. These are notcomplicated procedures, but frequent training isrequired to remain proficient and responsive.

Why do we use two howitzers forCopperhead missions?A Copperhead round can be prepared and firedin 1 minute. With two hwitzers firing a mission,

21


24/52

COPPERHEAD

the rounds can be fired at 3D-second intervals,which increases mission responsiveness.How does Copperhead affect company/teamoperations?Planning. Copperhead targets are an integralpart of the companyIteam artillery fire plan. TheFSO estimates the target locations by using theintelligence preparation of the battlefield processand the maneuver commander's guidance. Aspecific Copperhead target location must meet twocriteria: The observer must be able to see theproposed location, and the observer must orientwithin 45 degrees of the firing unit's line of fire.Based on this target location, the observer willidentify the trigger point. The purpose for this pointis to compensate for the movement of the targetvehicle while the cannon crewmen prepare and firethe round. Once the enemy vehicle reaches thispoint, the observer orders the round fired.Coordination. Copperhead targets are a part ofthe regular fire plan. The plan goes through normalfire planning channels. The direct support artillerybattalion will assign the targets from all thebrigade's observers to specific firing units.Quickfire channels will be established to associatespecific observers with their firing units. Thisprocedure expedites the order to fire and providesfor more responsive fires.Execution. A preplanned oncall or priorityCopperhead mission normally requires from 1 to2 minutes from the observer's command to fire untiltarget impact. A Copperhead target-of-opportunitymission requires more time to prepare. Copperheadmissions can engage up to six target elements inthe target area at the time of the mission. TheFO will start the mission when enough elementsappear at the trigger point to meet the commander's guidance. The FDC receives the command tofire and transmits it to the guns. For a prioritymission, the guns are always laid on the firingdata. The round waits on the loading tray whenthe gun isn't on another mission. The observerbegins to lase the target after he receives the "shot"message from the FDC and counts down to 20seconds or when he receives the "designate"

22

command, whichever occurs first. He tracks thetarget until the round impacts. Unless otherwisecancelled, the howitzers will fire the subsequentrounds at 30-second intervals. The observercontinues to lase and shift from one target to thenext until all rounds impact.The mission closely follows the procedures usedfor conventional missions. Because of the capabilities of he round, Copperhead is an ideal weaponsystem for outnumbered units on the battlefield.

ConclusionCopperhead's abilities allow key target hitswithout exposing frontline troops. When usedduring the initial phase of the battle, Copperhead

can surgically remove those enemy vehicles criticalto the threat battle plan: the reconnaissancevehicles, obstacle breaching vehicles, ZSU-23-4 selfpropelled antiaircraft vehicles, maneuver command vehicles, radars and radio direction findersystems.Copperhead is an effective weapon. I t gives themaneuver commander greater flexibility andfirepower against moving targets at ranges beyondthe capabilities of his direct-fire weapon systems.When integrated into the fire plan, Copperheadgreatly increases the survivability of direct fireweapons during the opening moments of the mainbattle. It also conserves the basic load of ammunition for both the maneuver and field artilleryunits. In summary, commanders should plan for_Copperhead's use to help win the close fight. ~

ABOUT THE AUTHORMajor Rodney O. Luce is a small group Instructor,

Reid ArtIllery Advanced Course, F'leld ArtIllery School,Fl Sill, OK. He Is a graduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College, Fl Leavenworth, KS, and holdsa master's degree from Central WashingtonUniversity. Major Luce has had several Lance andcannon assignments.

APRIL 1989


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RSI Report Mr. Rush Wicker *_Aircraft Battle Damage Repair andCOlDbatMaintenance RequirelDentsUp To the Year 2005

AVIAT ION EQUIPMENT used to fightthe battle during the year 2005 will be much moreadvanced than what is available today. Inanticipation of fielding equipment with greatercapabilities, the American, British, Canadian andAustralian (ABCA) armies have developed aconcept for aircraft battle damage repair (BDR)and combat maintenance requirements up to theyear 2005. The concept identifies the ABCA armies'proposal for doctrine and equipment. The acceptance of the concept is beginning to generate newideas and will contribute to achieving moreeffective aviation forces through standardizationand interoperability programs.The purpose for printing this concept is toprovide for maintenance personnel a vision of thefuture as to how their replacements will performBDR and combat maintenance in the year 2005.General. During intense combat, the capabilities of maintenance organizations will be limited.Consequently, comprehensive and highly disciplined preventive maintenance checks and serviceprograms are essential before, as well as after,

ability will be essential. This availability can beachieved only by reducing or deferring thosemaintenance actions that have minimal impacton aircraft safety and mission accomplishment.This situation will be aggravated during surgecombat conditions because of the increasedcomponent failures caused by higher stress levelsand equipment use rates.Assessment of Combat Damage. This is theprocess of evaluating the extent of damagesustained and determining the best possible repairprocedure within the constraints imposed by time,manpower, materiel and operational requirements.Triage, a battlefield medical concept, most closelydescribes the battle damage assessment process.This is simply determining which aircraft can flyas is, which can be returned to full or partialmission capable conditions using quick-fix repairmethods, and which cannot be repaired in timeto affect the outcome of the battle. Necessity, asdetermined by the intensity of the combatenvironment, will dictate when quick-fix repairmethods will be applied and which damaged

aircraft will be repaired. I f anaircraft cannot be repaired insufficient time, and the battlefield situation warrants, thataircraft may become a partssource for repairing less severelydamaged aircraft or it could bedestroyed. The assessment ofdamage to each aircraft is thekey to any BDR capability atall maintenance levels. Accord

employment. Recovery fromBDR and combat maintenanceapplication between surges orafter final cessation probablywill require extensive planningand dedication of maintenanceresources accompanied by areduction in operational activityrates. During the first days ofcombat or heavy surge conditions, maximum aircraft avail- AUSTRALIAu.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 23


26/52

RSI Reportingly, assessors play a crucial role in the speedwith which damaged aircraft can be regeneratedfor wartime flying hour requirements.Deferment. Deferment involves scheduled andunscheduled maintenance and battle damage.Basically, except for necessary lubrication,servicing and preoperational checks, scheduledmaintenance may be deferred. Unscheduledmaintenance, such as the repair of systems andsubsystems that have adequate redundancy or arenot critical to mission accomplishment, may bedeferred i f safety of flight is not significantlydegraded. Requirements must be examined todetermine i f relaxed criteria for repair and aircraftperformance can be accepted. Typically, thenumber of broken strands that may result inreplacement of a flight control cable in peacetimemight be increased significantly during combat.Unacceptable leak rates of hydraulic systems andlubrication oil consumption rates for engines andgearboxes during peacetime may be fully acceptable (as opposed to component replacement)during combat. Battle damage and other operational damage will be assessed, and a determination will be made to repair or defer. Repair ofdamage to noncritical structures or to criticalstructures having adequate reserve s trength maybe deferred unless aerodynamic degradation isunacceptable. The impact of disrupted wiring andloss of system integration on the combat effectiveness of the total weapons system will increase asaircraft become more sophisticated and must becarefully considered by the commander whenelecting to defer corrective maintenance.Repair of Battle Damage. The primarypurpose of BDR is to restore sufficient strengthand serviceability to the aircraft to permit it tofly additional operational missions, or to permitat least partial mission capability, in time tocontribute to the outcome of the ongoing battle.A secondary objective is toenable those aircraft damagedbeyond uni t repair capability atthe field site to make a one-timeflight to a repair facility. Quickfix BDR involves simple repairtechniques that eliminate mostof the material fatigue-conscious methods used inpeacetime. Rapid repairs couldbe performed on most types of

damage; however, emphasis should be placed onrepair of damage expected from nonexplosiverounds where the damage is insufficient to causeloss of the aircraft, but sufficient to requirecorrective maintenance before another mission.These repairs would be characterized by the use of quick-fixtechniques, high speed tools, off-the-shelfstandard hardware items(not necessarily aircraft related)and lack of cosmetic criteria.Procedures and techniques wouldbe developed to return the maximum number of aircraft to servicein as little time as possible with. he goal of completing most repairsin less than 4 hours elapsed time GR(U.S. R&D objective). The actual repair time willdepend on the battlefield situation, but theunderlying objective is to do the most completerepair possible in the time available.Cannibalization of Critical Components.Cannibalization can provide the large volume ofrepair parts that will be required to support thehigher flying hour rates. I t is feasible, at intensewartime rates of consumption, that spares maybe depleted in the first few days of the battle. Inconjunction with the assessment procedure oftriage discussed earlier, aircraft which cannot berepaired in the time available may be lost orabandoned. Therefore, serviceable components,including complete systems, should be removedand used to return other aircraft to a missioncapable condition. When the batt le has been won,those aircraft which have been extensively strippedfor cannibalization can be recovered and repaired.BDR Teams. Aircraft maintenance officers andmaintenance technicians will be trained to act as"damage assessors" capable of making independent, diagnostic judgments and maintenance

decisions at the remote battle

CANADA

field locations where aircraftmight be forced to land. Theassessor will make use ofappropriate symbols and de-scriptors to identify the type andsequence of repairs to guidemaintenance personnel. Maximum use will be made of symbols and descriptors establishedby other Department of Defense

24 APRIL 1989


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agencies and the ABCA annies. This practice willensure a high degree of exchange and use ofpersonnel from ABCA forces, i f required. Otherhighly experienced maintenance personnel withspecial training in BDR techniques will be

members of BDR teams. Trainingwill encompass a high degree ofcross training, to make maximumuse of the BDR kit and techniques.Teams will be kept highly mobileand self-sufficient by using thetools and supplies in the kit, andby cannibalizing other aircraft.BDR procedures will be integratedinto maintenance and aircrewtraining programs as they aredeveloped. Instruction should be

continuously updated to ensure a smooth andeffective transition to BDR techniques, i f required,at the onset of hostilities.Categories of Combat Maintenance. BDRmaintenance actions will be categorized into oneof the following: Unconditional defer: continue unlimitedcombat operations; cosmetic repair only. Conditional defer:with mission limitations but retention ofcrashworthiness/ survivability features.

no mission limitations but loss of crashworthiness/ survivability features. Repair: permit unlimited combat operationsfor limited amount of flight hours. Scrap/cannibalize: aircraft unrepairablewithin time and support limits.Serviceability standards are categorized asfollows: Nonessential-defer indefinitely. Mission deferrable-can be deferred for a. imited number of hours. Essential-must be performed before flight.Given the limited aviation resources of theABCA forces, every effort to keep aircraft in service

must be made. This means that the annies mustdevelop and implement the policies, procedures andequipment for BDR combat maintenance. Thenations must work to develop quadripartitestandardization agreements in the following areas: Inspection equipment to be used to evaluatethe extent of repair based upon establishedserviceability criteria for maximum wear anddamage.U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

BDR and combat maintenance manuals. BDR and combat maintenance kits for usein inspection, assessment and repaIr of aircraft. Materials for use in repair of aircraftcomponents. Nuclear, biological, chemical survivabilitybuilt into kit and components. High survivability aircraft designs thatprovide quick repair/ replacement of components Standardized BDR and combat maintenancetraining/ cross training programs. Personnel training to use state-of-the-artmaterials for the conduct of repair and mainte

nance operations. Establish priority for cannibalization ofcomponents from aircraft that are not repairable.

If this article has generated an interest and you wish tocomment on the subject, please forward your comments tothe following address:

CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ-CDC-C (Mr. Rush Wicker)Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5191

UNITED STATES25


28/52

PEARI!SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival LowdownDear PEARL'S:I am told that individuals who operateindustriol-style sewing machines 1TUl8t besigned off as "operator qualified." Sinceaviation life support equipment(ALSE) shopshave these types of sewing machines, whatis the Army's standpoint on this? Is therea current courseArmywide?How should thistype o f training be recorded? My facility islocated on an Air National Guard base. I usethe industriol sewing machines in the paraclude s/wp almost every day. The chiefsupervisor commented that al l individualswho use these sewing machines 1TUl8t beoperator qualified.Although not an absolute requirement, I believeit would behoove us to ensure that the operatorshould certainly be qualified. On-the-job trainingis sufficient for this training. Perhaps as anoperator moves from station to station, he or shecould be required to demonstrate proficiency again.The only official sewing machine training courseis the quartermaster parachute rigger traininglocated at Ft. Lee, VA. Please note that TrainingManual 55-1500-204-25/1, General Aircraft Maintenance, covers the inspection and repair criteriafor restraint equipment. Course No. C3AZR-42753000 taught at Chanute Air Force Base,Chanute, IL, would be justified for the type workyou would be performing.

Since I have been involved in ArmyAviation, there has been much heated debatei f an ALSE career military occupationalspecialty (MOS) is needed. Since ALSEtechnicians are kept in the shop and do notget out much, any information pertaining to"our" program is filtered down. Updates thatwe see in the Aviation Digest and Flightfaxstill state that studies are ongoing. Onecurrent rwnor is that the study was completed and the ALSE field will not be madeinto a career MOS and will simply stay anadditional duty. I f this is so, ALSE technicians wiu still be kept out in left field. The

26

amount of manhours required to work witha unit's ALSE will not afford quality timefor the technician to accomplish th e neededtasks in his or her primary MOS and workin the ALSE shop. I f there are any currentdevelopmentson theALSEMOS, I would liketo hear about them.The latest information on the Army MOS forALSE is that the study was completed; however,there is much "red tape" to go through to get itfinally approved and established. I still feelstrongly that the MOS is needed and we have muchsupport for it, but apparently other factors mustbe considered before we will get the ALSE MOS.Don't think for a minute that we have forgottenthe critical need for the MOS; we are well awareof the need and its importance to ALSE personnel.Keep the faith and hopefully somedaywe will havethe ALSE MOS.

During anA viation Resource ManagementSurvey inspection, a comment was madeabout th e ALSE standing operating procedure (SOP) our facility was using. The SOPwas simply a rewrite o f what Army Regulation (AR) 95-1 and AR 95-3 were stating,not a directive on how to run the shop froma day-to-day basis. As I was not the authorof he original SOP, I was in total agreementon what the SOP should state. I f any ALSEshops feel they have an outstanding SOP tocover day-to-day ALSE operations, I wouldlike to solicit a copy they could provide mefo r ideas.We are in need of a good SOP. We had a goodone contained in Training Circular (TC) 1-62,Aviation Life Support Equipment, that we foundto be the minimal desired. Should anyone havea need for a copy of this short, but sweet, SOPI am sure we can help you. Write PEARL'S andask for the TC 1-62 SOP. Other good SOPs havebeen written and could be made available.We thank SGT Douglas W. Penovich, Aviation ILARNG, IL,AUTO VON 724-9009 for the questions on ALSE.

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Where to Store ALSEWhat causes the scuff marks and the wear and

tear on ALSE? You know what I mean-thegouged helmet, the frays and scuff marks on thevest, the dents on the flares, etc. Chief WarrantOfficer Chuck Gibson has often said, "ALSE isthe last thing the aircrewmember takes along withhim, and the first thing that comes off before therotor is stopped." An exact correlation existsbetween flight time a crewmember has logged andhow much time his personal ALSE was in use.So why does the aircrewmember look so grandsparkling sunglasses, nonregulation mustache,smile and spitshine boots, and his ALSE is lookinglike it barely survived a limited nuclear war?Well...enough said, right?

Out-of-sight and out-of-mind, so the saying goes.ALSE can be found in many places: under desks(covered with scuff marks); in car trunks, with alight oil coating; in bottoms of wall lockers; andother places you cannot believe. Even the so calledhelmet bag, generally confused with a kit bag, isa major offender. Inside the hehnet bag, you willfind flight publications for the entire region, akneeboard, extra flashlight batteries and anemergency box of C rations. All of this abuse maycause the failure of ALSE, which may be neededwhen you least expect it. What is the solution?Why not an ALSE storage locker where ALSE canbe issued on a mission basis. Then ALSE can bereturned to the ALSE shop when the mission hasbeen completed. Certainly you have ideas that wecould probably use. Send them along; I am surethey would make interesting reading and whoknows, they undoubtedly would be handy. By nowyou are probably ready to tell me to join the AirForce. No not really, the problem is not insurmountable. Remember, the Air Force has been at it muchlonger than we have and, yes, we are makinginroads. The main thing is that we must work atit i f we are to succeed. (Thanks to CWO ChuckGibson, formerly the U.S. Army, Europe ALSErepresentative.)The Importance of AviationLife Support EquipmentThe importance of trained ALSE personnel canbest be brought out and is emphasized by the

Flightfax article, "Let the System Function,"Volume 15, No.4, 15 October 1986. "Hidden" onthe continuing back page is the frighteningstatement: "Attempts to inflate the liferaft wereunsuccessful. After it was unfolded and examined,they found the lanyard to the compressed airbottle was missing and one of the two hosesfrom the compressed air bottle to the raftwas disconnected." So, do we need trained ALSEpersonnel? I'll let you answer that question. Notonly do we need trained ALSE personnel, we needproper training in the use of the equipment.

What a day! First, the aircraft goes for a swim.Was the "May Day" transmitted? Was it received?How long will the aircraft float? When will helparrive?Yes, three aircrew personnel are alive afterditching their aircraft. But why was the liferaftput on board the aircraft in an unserviceablecondition? Was it to satisfy a regulation that

mandated a liferaft must be on board the aircraftbecause of possible imminent overwater flight, orperhaps because the regulation was misinterpreted? Perhaps the liferaft had never beeninspected, because there were no trained ALSEpersonnel in the unit. Nobody bothered to checkthe serviceable tag, or perhaps d idn't care enoughto put the effort into taking the actions called for.Perhaps the aircraft accident investigation teamreport will clarify and identify the true problem.The bottom line is that the commander isresponsible. We owe it to the commander to keephim in the know. So why not train for thatsituation? You can never get to the point whereyou are overtrained. The importance of trainedALSE personnel can never be underestimated.We CareThe we care information format was designedand implemented by the ALSE organization withthe AASF No.1 Long Island MacArthur Airport,Ronkonkoma, NY. I t is designed to provideinformation to aircrew personnel and aviation unitpersonnel. This is but one of the many things thatis happening out in the "real world" of ALSE. AskMr. Pete Cario, aviation life support system chief,for his handouts on ALSE. He is truly dedicatedto the ALSE system.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear. write PEARL 5. AMC Product ManClgement Office, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd . St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 27


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SYJllptoms of Simulator SicknessCaptain James E. Hancock, M.D.Chief, Review and DispositionsU.S. Army Aeromedical ActivityFort Rucker, AL

SIMULATOR SICKNESS is defined as aconstellation of symptoms that result fromexposure to motion or aspects of a movingenvironment as they pertain to the flight simulator.This entity was first described by Havron andButler in 1957 in U.S. Navy 2-FH-2 helicoptersimulators. However, more definitive research was

absent until the 1970s. Since that time all serviceshave actively researched this problem, and theArmy and Navy currently maintain a databaseto relate symptoms to specific equipment features.Simulator sickness is not a small problem,especially in light of the new combat missionsimulator (video coupled) systems, and has farreaching effects. I t has been estimated that 29percent of aviators will have significant symptoms,and 1 percent will become incapacitated as a resultof simulator training. Symptoms seem to manifestequally in student and rated aviators. Althoughmost resolve their symptoms within 1 hour, 12percent will experience problems 6 to 12 hours out.I t is these symptoms that are most concerning toaviation safety.

The current most widely accepted theoryregarding simulator sickness is the perceptualconflict theory. This theory is based on the splitsecond delay and variance between simulatorflight control and actual flight. This entity should,therefore, be perceived as a normal reaction to analtered situation to which the body must adapt.The perceptual-conflict theory is supported by thefact that beginning and experienced aviatorsdevelop symptoms at similar rates. Other factorsthat contribute to individual susceptibility include

28

sleep deprivation, upper respiratory tract infection,vestibular related disease, and environmental andemotional stress. Susceptibility also seems to berelated directly to the duration of the simulatorflight.

f-1_IGHr.!: " " \ U l _ A 1 - 0 1 ~1 I ():;.,

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Eye strain Blurred vision

Feelings of wannth Pallor Sweating

Headache Fullness of head

Drowsiness Fatigue

The symptoms of simulator sickness are broadand varied. These symptoms can be divided intothree groups: visual, vestibular and vagal. A listof the common symptoms are blurred vision,dizziness, confusion, pallor, drowsiness, sweating,headache, fatigue, stomach distress, nausea andvomiting. Other residual symptoms that may occurhours after simulation include sudden compellingflashback, disorientation, spinning sensation,visual illusion and lost equilibrium. As mentionedabove, these symptoms are highly individualized.Because these symptoms can cause seriousperformance degradation and limit trainingeffectiveness, early detection is most important.The Army has established several guidelines toreduce the problem with simulator sickness, andearly detection and reporting of symptoms arenecessary. If symptoms develop, that personshould be removed immediately from the simulator, and should not return for 12 hours. Whenstarting training, pilots should be allowed a periodof adaptation beginning with short flights withgentle maneuvers. Simulator flight should notexceed 2 hours. Because of the incidence of residualsymptoms, aviators should refrain from actual

Leaning and staggering Dizziness Confusion Disorientation Vertigo

Depression Apathy

Difficulty focusing eyes Stomach distress Vomiting Nausea

flight for a minimum of 6, preferably 12, hoursafter simulator training. All aviators shouldmaintain optimum health and fitness to reduceindividual susceptibility. During simulator flight,when possible, abrupt maneuvers and visual freezeor slew should be avoided.Treatment of simulator sickness is mainlypreventative. Pilot education is important. Theacute treatment is largely symptomatic, andpharmacologic therapy can be useful. Chronictherapy should not include drug therapy, butshould rely on physiologic adaptation. Keep inmind this is a normal response.

In summary, simulator sickness is a form ofmotion sickness unique to the flight simulator thatha s far-reaching aeromedical and aviation concerns. With the rapidly advancing technology oftoday's aircraft, increasing simulator training willbe required to master flying duties. During a timeof budget constraint, the simulator will become anincreasing part of flight training. I t is theresponsibility of all aviators to participate ineducational efforts to ensure the optimum gainfrom the simulator experience, as well as maintainaviation safety.

The Aviation Medicine Report s a monthly reporl from the Aviation Medicine Consultan t of TSG. Please forward subject mat ter of currentaeromedical imporlance for editorial consideration to U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, ATTN: HSXY-ADJ. Ft. Rucker. AL 36362-5333.



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ATe Focusus.Army AirTraffic Control Activity

Airborne Air Traffic ControlFirst Lieutenant Marybel Huston Johnson2d Platoon, B Company1/58th Aviation RegimentFort Bragg, NC

JUNE 1985 was part of one of the hottestsummers of my life. I was attending airborneschool at Ft. Benning, GA. I did more pushupsthose 3 weeks than I could ever do again.Completing airborne school was a rite of passage,a challenge to overcome. I never dreamed I waslearning a skill that would later become a majorpart of my job.Upon my commission, I attended flight schoolat Ft. Rucker, AL. I always wanted to be an aviator.I looked forward to using my newly acquired skillsin an aviation unit, leading other aviators.After completing flight school, I was supposedto be assigned to an aviation unit at Ft. Bragg,NC. However, when I reported to the officermanagement section, the Armor Branch majoracross the desk from me said, "You'll be going tothe 58th ATC Battalion."ATC? I quessed he meant air traffic control, butI wasn't 100 percent sure. "Certainly there's beena mistake. I'm an aviator. Within the last year,I've been trained to fly. I don't know anythingabout ATC," I told him. But there had been nomistake. I reported to my new battalion and wasassigned as platoon leader for the 1st Platoon, BCompany, l / 58th Aviation Regiment (ATC) , Ft.Bragg, and my adventure began.

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The 1st Platoon is an airborne platoon. Ourmission is to support the 82d Airborne Division,Ft. Bragg, in airfield seizures and other emergencydeployments. We accomplished our mission withthe help of a couple of PRC-77s, ANITRN 30 VIbeacons and an AN TSQ 97 portable control tower.With all equipment and personnel airbornequalified, we were fully capable of supporting anysize assault element. We had assumed thepathfinder's mission and could be deployedanytime, anywhere.When I was assigned to the platoon, I hadn'tjumped since attending airborne school 3 yearsearlier. My initial jump was scheduled for 0130hours. Our "night" jumps at airborne school wereanytime after sunset. I was nervous about jumping.I didn't feel confident that jump refresher had"refreshed" me. We practiced parachute landingfalls, but the whole airborne sequence from initialmanifest to descentand assembly could really onlybe "refreshed" through experience.We began initial manifest at 1900 hours. Mysoldiers made sure my equipment was properlyrigged and that I was squared away. I wasmanifested second on the left door. The numberone jumper in front of me was StaffSergeant (SSG)Martin who was a master blaster.

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I was given a band that my soldiers hadinscribed with numerous phrases and drawingsdesigned to warn other parachutists of myinexperience and impending danger. After prejumptraining, we moved to Pope Air Force Base, NC.We practiced actions on the aircraft in a C130Hercules mockup and then were issued parachutes.By this time, I was really excited. My adrenalinwas pumping and I was ready. The hour-long waitwhile wearing parachutes seemed like onlymoments. I must have asked SSG Martin athousand questions and rehearsed the rules of theair numerous times before we boarded the plane.While an Air Force aircraft took us on nap-of-theearth flight to the drop zone, most of the othersoldiers slept. I was too anxious. I rehearsed overand over in my head what I was supposed to do.During the plane ride I thought back to June 1985when I never expected to jump again. Here I was20 minutes until the green light, waiting to stepout into complete darkness, combat equipped. Irealized then that I was more than an aviator:I was an airborne soldier.The 1st Platoon is the only tactical airborneplatoon in the Army. I t is made up of 12 of themost motivated and dedicated soldiers in the Army.Many have served in the 82d Airborne Divisionas infantrymen during previous assignments. In

addition, they have all completed the ATC courseat Ft. Rucker. These professional soldiers canaccomplish any mission as evidenced by theirservice in Grenada, South America and within thecontinental United States, supporting the 82dAirborne Division. Twice their accomplishmentshave been recognized by being named U.S. ArmyForces Command Platoon of the Year.As the airborne platoon leader, my first priorityis to my platoon. My second priority is flying,although I maintain the same minimums andproficiency as platoon leaders in aviation units.As a 2LT in an aviation unit, I would more thanlikely be a platoon member with no real functionor responsibility. As an ATC platoon leader, I amholding a captain's position and leading soldiers.When I was commissioned, I knew that I wouldnot be just an aviator. I was aware that myresponsibilities would encompass many administrative duties. However, I never realized theopportunities available to aviators unrelated toperforming pilot duties. Being in ATC has enabledme to wear many hats: tactical platoon leader,airborne liaison officer and pilot. Initially, I feltthat I needed to be in an aviation unit. However,now that I have worked airborne tactical ATC,I know the challenge and excitement of workingwith outstanding soldiers.

Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control toCommander, USAAVNC, A TTN: A TZQ-A TC-MO, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5265.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY 88 (through 29 Februaryl 8 663,590 1.21 10 $17.4FY 89 (through 28 February) 12 602,194* 2.22 11 $31.8

estlmated



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VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor:In the November 1988 issue of

Aviation Digest in "Views FromReaders," CPr John H. Gerken, NewYork Army National Guard, wrote toyou concerning the "DUSTOFF" callsign used by aeromedical evacuationunits in Vietnam. You indicated thatyou would query the readingaudience for replies.A book entitled DUSTOFF: ArmyAeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam,published by the Center of MilitaryHistory, U.S. Army, Washington,DC, in 1982 and authored by thenCPr Peter G. Dorland and JamesNanney may well provide th enecessary information. The commander of the 57th MedicalDetachment at the time was MAJLloyd E. Spencer. MAJ Spencerchose the "call word" DUSTOFFfrom a Navy Signal OperationsInstructions book. According to theauthors, the Navy controlled callwords for operations in RVN at thetime.

Th e following paragraphs arequoted from the book stating how thecall word DUSTOFF was adopted:

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"For the past year the 57thhad worked without a tacticalcall sign, simply using, Army , and the tail numberof the aircraft. For example, ifa pilot were flying a helicopterwith the serial number 62-12345, his call sign would be'Army 12345.' The 57th communicated internally on any

vacant frequency it could find.Major Spencer decided thatthis slapdash system had togo. In Saigon he visited NavySupport Activity, which controlled all the call words inSouth Vietnam. He received aSignal Operations Instructions book that listed all theunused call words. Most, like'Bandit: were more suitablefor assault units than formedical evacuation units. Butone entry, 'Dust Off,'epitomized the 57th's medicalevacuation missions. Since thecountryside then was dry anddusty, helicopter pickups inthe fields often blew dust, dirt,blankets, and shelter halvesall over the men on theground. By adopting 'DustOff,' Spencer found for Armyaeromedical evacuation inVietnam a name that lastedthe rest of the war."

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Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1989

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