Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1959

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UGUST 959

omplete In This Issue THE STORY OF CR



United tatu l l ~ m f

VI TION DIGEST

E D I T O R I A L S TA F FC A P T J O S E P H H P O O L E

W I L L I A M E VA N C E

F R E D M M O N T G O M E R Y

SABER IN THE SKYWilliam E . Va n ce

F U T U RE

RTICLES

Capt J ame M . Ro ck w ell , Inf

A U G U S T 9 S 9

V O L U M E 5

N U M B E R 8

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I F L EW FOR AERIAL COMBAT RE ONNAISA N E . 10W O H arold D. W ilcox en, T C

A ERIAL COMBAT RE CONNAISSAN CE COMPA NYDO CTRINE AND TA CTI CS 12Maj or Karl S. P a tt on , Art y

A RMY AVIATIO N AND TH E A IRBORNE 14Capt Jo h n H. Ri ch a rd son, A r ty

F LYABLE AND FIREABL E .

SURVIVAL - A GUN AND A MA CHE T EFred M. Mo n t g omer y

DO YOU KNOW YOUR AIR CRAFT?Maj Clifford S. Athe y

THE NEXT DECADE IN ARMY AVIATIONBrig Gen Richard D. Me y er, USA

DEP RTMENTS

PUZZLER

MEMO FROM FLIGHT SU RGEON

CRASH SENSE .

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22

2 4

27

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31

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U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL

Brig Gen E rn est F. Ea s t erbrookCommandant

Col Delk M. OdenAssistant Commandant

HOOL STAFF

Col Robert H . Sc hulzDi? ect01 of I nstnwtion

Col Edward N. D ahlstromScc1 eta1 Y

Lt Col RoBie M. HarrisonAviation Medical Advisor

Lt Col James L. TownsendCO, USAAVNS Regiment

Lt Col John W . OswaltCombat Development Office

DE P A RTME TS

Lt Col Ritc h ie GarrisonTactics

Lt Col Raymond E. J oh nsonRota1 Y Wing

Lt 1 Harry J. KernMaintenance

Lt Col Melvin C. MonroeFixed Wing

Lt Col Thomas J . SabistonPublications andN on Resident I nstruction

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGE 1 IS

an official publication of the Depar tmen t ofthe Army puulished monthly under the

upervision of the COlllmandant, U. . ArmyA\ ia tion choo .

The lI1isSlOlI of the U S R ~ l YAVIATION DICE 1 i to provide illformation ofan operational or fUllctional na ture concern ·Illg safely and ai rcraf t accident prevention,tra ining, maintenance, operations, researehand development, aviation medicine andother re la ted da tao

Manuscript.s, photographs, and other illus ·

t rat ions per t a in ing to the above subjects ofi n t e re t to personnel concerned with ArmyAviation are invited. Di r ect COlllmunicationi authorized to: Edito r -in ·Chief U SARMY AVIATION DIGEST, U. S. ArmyAviation chool, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Unles otherwise indicated, material inthe . . ARMY AVIATION DICE T maybe rep r in t ed provided cred i t i given to t he

. . ARMY AVIATIO DICE T and tothe au tho r .

' rhe p r in t i ng of this publication has beenapproved by the Director of the Bureau ofthe Budget, 22 December 1 9 5 .

Views exp r esse d in this magazine are notnecessar ily those of t he Depar tmen t of theArmy o r of the U. S. Army Aviation School.

nle s specified otherwise . all photogra pllsare U. . Army.

Dis t r i bu t ion :To be d i s t r i bu t ed in ac('orelnn('e with

requirements tnteel in DA Form 12.



IN TH SKYWilliam E ance

A GENERAL ELECTRIC en-gineer, Thurlow Turtle

Mayhood, looked up from hisdesk a t Burlington, Vermont,one day to see a stocky, crewcut bird colonel. The colonelwanted GE to build a rocket kitfor a helicopter. He had nomoney, only a drawing on apaper napkin. There was nomarket for such a kit, he admitted. N one had ever beenbuilt before. In fact, an Armyfield study had said tha t heli-copters cannot serve as a wea-pons platform. They're toounstable. But after talkingto Col Jay D. Vanderpool, GE'sJack Harding and Turtle agreedto do it. The Colonel has tha tkind of persuasion. He's alivetoday, partly because of it.

This story had its beginninga t the Officers' Club, Fort Rucker, Alabama in June 1956. Thedilettantes had long since departed and the stalwarts hadcovered the field of Army A viation except for one fascinatingfacet: active participation inthe shooting aspects of combatby Army flight personnel.When this area was reached,Brig Gen Carl 1 Hutton said

to Col Vanderpool, I 'd like youto take on a special proj ec t ,Colonel.

Although not an Army Avia-tor, the Colonel thinks and talkslike one. He has said, The flying machine hasn't been exploited as a groun warfare vehicle. Necessary emphasis onbombing and intercept dictateddevelopment a t d d s with

ground use.Col Vanderpool has servedwith guerilla forces in thePhilippines and in Korea. Sta-tioned at Schofield Barracks,Hawaii, in 1941 when the Jilpanese attacked, he was a t thetime an artillery staff officer.During the next few years hesaw action under Admiral Hal-sey and General MacArthur,and participated in battles inthe Central and South Solomons, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, and the Philippines.

He was engaged in guerillaoperations with the Philippineforces from late 1944 until theliberation of Manila in 1945.Performing intelligence workfrom 1946 to 1950, he was as -signed to a guerilla unit duringthe Korean conflict and worked

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AUGUST 1959

behind the North Korean lines.At the time he began work onthe armed aircraft and otherexperimental projects, he commanded the 337th Field Artillery.

This background eminentlyqualified him to head a projectto explore the possibilities ofarming helicopters for combat.Before the night was out, incharacteristic manner he hadbegun the planning that wasto take him into ordnance andaircraft factories across thenation.

SUPPORTIN FIRE

By coincidence a t this timea similar project involvingfixed wing aircraft had stalledout in the vast spaces betweenFort Rucker and the War Roomof the Pentagon. This was dueprimarily to the fact tha t somecircles feared encroachment

Sioux ready for the wa rpath

upon the mission of the AirForce. In this respect I pointout that AR 95-100 clearly precludes the Army providingaircraft for interdiction of thebattlefield or close combat support. The current armed heli-

copter concept does not envision fighter/bomber attack missions but is concerned primarilywith providing supporting andsuppressive fires of a defensivenature.

First helicopter kit made y G

This need for suppressivefire was recognized by theArmy and the concept was acceptable a t all levels to include

the lieutenants who would flythe missions. I t was the opinion of these flying officers tha tno one has any business on thebattlefield unless he is ready -and able - to fight. Being ablemeant being armed.

The L-4s and L-5s of W orIdWar II were not armed or armored but frequently an enthusiastic aviator would makea pass with a hand grenade, orwhatever else he might have athand, including a .45 pistol. Noconfirmed record exists of anyhits being scored by such methods but the spirit for fight wasthere. Only the equipment waslacking.

For several y e r s n o w

Army Aviators have been toying with the idea of arming ouraircraft for special missions,



Ma UL General Hamilton H.Howze wrote in the September1957 issue of the ARMY AVIATION DIGEST. During thepeak of World War II, a fewone-feather I n d i a n s were

dreaming of 'L-fighters' to keepthe enemy observation aircrafton the ground. During the Korean campaign, the Communists were launching their a ttacks spearheaded by one tothree tanks, which made i trough on our doughboys.

E RLY EXPERI ENCE

As reports of these disagreeable practices reached theArtillery Center and the ArmyA viation School (then the AirTraining Department of theArtillery School), e e l e yBrown and a few others startedexperimenting with 2.5-inchrockets, bazookas, and 75-mmrecoilless rifles mounted on theL-19 as a tank killer. A gunnery sight was mounted jus tunder the liquid compass, andin no time at all the aviators

developed an accuracy with the2.5-inch rockets tha t comparedfavorably with other antitankweapons.

Six-inch rockets were alsofired from the L-19 with success. Tactics envisioned werefor the pilot of the L-19, afterspotting the tank, to descendto contour level until about1,000 yards away from thetank, climb sharply until the

target was again in view, ripplesix to eight rockets into i t anddisappear again behind thetrees or hills. But the KoreanWar ended before the ideacould be sold to approving authority.

The tests were dropped until1954 when i t was revived atFort Rucker under the title ofABLE BUSTER. When this

SABER IN THE SKY

A concept ccept ble t all levels

project also went under, General Hutton called on ColonelVanderpool to survey the useof helicopters in combat.

The Marine Corps, earlier,had conducted a few tests butno reports w e r e available.About the only paper extantwas an AAF Board Proj ecttha t stated: The helicopteris too unstable to bear consideration as a suitable weaponsplatform.

General Hutton did not thinkso and neither did Colonel Vanderpool and the project burgeoned under the Colonel s aggressive leadership.

HOW MUCH PUNISHMENT

His first act was to tour thecountry, asking airframe manufacturers how much punishment a helicopter airframecould take. He got more thansimple answers; he encouragedthe aircraft engineers to givean opinion, and by the end ofhis tour he had a fairly good

idea of the toughness of themachine.

The next assault was on ordnance plants. Although allkinds of armament that couldbe used on helicopters weresought, the lack of any such

equipment was disappointing.He finally made his way to General Electric's Burlington plantand engineer Turtle Mayhood, who agreed to produce akit from the Colonel s drawing.I t was delivered in threemonths.

L M ITED SSETS

Back a t Fort Rucker, the sit

uation was assessed: a fewhelicopters, no guns, no rockets, no gunsights. A big assetwas a group of young, able, anddedicated junior officers, alleager to prove their opinionthat helicopters could be a potent force on any kind of battlefield.

In Operation Sagebrush theidea known as SKY CA V shook

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AUGUST 1959

some observers to the toes oftheir combat boots and raiseda hue and cry tha t finallyreached the Office of the Sec-retary of Defense. Sky Cav acatchy word with mass appealbecame an image with manyfaces. The U. S. Army Avia-tion School concept is a provision of a completely airmobile air-mounted, fast-moving hard-hitting, flexible meansof cavalry a t an acceleratedrate on the battlefield of tomorrow.

GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS

A need for such a unit hadbeen recognized for some time.The eager young aviators weresure Army Aviation could provide such a force with a capability limited only by the imagination. A wide area existed

between imagination and hardproven concepts and the Colo-nel and his eager beavers gotdown to business.

The hardware carne painfullyslow after many scroungingtrips. The pilots of the AerialCombat Reconnaissance Unit,as i t carne to be known flewtheir Beaver out to Air ForceDepots, Navy Supply Dumps,

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and wherever the relics of warwere held for survey. Back theycarne with bombsights, machineguns, and pieces of oldscrap iron tha t could be machined down to make a kit, anysort of ki t tha t would hold amachinegun or rocket launcherto a skid or fuselage.

OF USER M KE

Capt Harold Hennington andCapt Charles Jones became ex-pert machinists. They forgedthe weapons of war for a heli-copter on a lathe set up by akindly technician who showedthem how to operate it. Theyworked days, and around theclock trying to beat deadlinesand cutoff dates. Captain S. E.Ballantyne and the enlisted men

Left: 3 each 2 inch foldingfin rockets on the Chickasawor

Below: Eight 80mm Oerli-kons on call 24 hours withthe Shawnee

worked with him. Capt JamesMontgomery was the chief testpilot for all early models.

Sometimes in the early hoursof the morning, Colonel Vanderpool would appear in the armament shop bearing hamburgersand coffee. Removing his coatthe Colonel would roll up hissleeves and turn to with a willassisting where he could.

TROUBLE RE S

There carne a day when thefirst unit was mounted on aSioux. I t was flown to therange and test fired and theplastic bubble burst into athousand fragments. CaptainHennington brushed off thepieces of plexiglass but evenbefore he was finished the



trouble shooters were pryinginto the reasons.

I t was the rivets, the Colonel explained. The plasticbubble was in direct contactwith the rivets, and vibration

set up by the machineguncaused the bubble to break. Wesoft-mounted them and solvedthe problem.

We never did solve the problem of the trees breakingthem, Captain Ballantyne observed. I t developed that thetests had included using treesas screening cover for helicopters. Soft-mounted bubbleswere no answer to this. Theyjust don't chop trees downvery well. They did, however,chop down small pine trees veryeffectively.

Facing the fact that helicopters are not optimum in performance, reliability, or easeof maintenance, the team thatcame to be known for a time as

Vanderpool's Fools adaptedarmament equipment t fit thevehicle, using existing weaponsdesigned for ground troops orsister services. Sighting andalignment of weapons was relatively primitive. A gunsightwas once improvised by tapinga cross of bandaids on a Siouxbubble. Again a helicopterpilot, firing a machinegun andgetting a bullseye, took a wadof gum from his mouth andthumbed it onto the bubble toscore more hits. After anotherforay with the Beaver to a

Naval station, a higher performance fixed wing gunsightwas used. Later, more refinedoptical reflecting gunsightswere tested and are now standard. Remote controlled servoshave proved quite feasible.

The work went apace with adedication not often found inthe field. Weapons mountedand tested included .30 and .50

loseup of EH 34 o cover showing imposing firepower potential

caliber machineguns and rock- Chickasaw and 132 1.5-inchets varying in size from the NAKA rockets for the H-251.5-inch NAKA to the 5-inch to a combination of machineHV AR. The standard arma- guns and eight 80-mm or fourment package on the reconnais- teen 2.75-inch rockets for thesance helicopter varied from Shawnee. At present thesetwo .50s and six 2.75-inch rock- armaments have offered noets t four .30s and six to sure-kill antitank capability,twelve 2.75-inch rockets. The primarily because of inaccularger helicopters, whose pri- racy. Helicopter fire is moremary mission is the provision accurate from forward flightof suppressive fires, w e r e than from hover, as small dearmed in varying stages of fire- flections in the attitude of the

power, from thirty 2-inch fold- aircraft at hover will causeing-fin aerial rockets for the wide dispersion of rounds fired.

AERIAL COMB T RECON COEXPERIMENTAL)

RE ON TROOPS WPNS

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SUPPLY

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AUGUST 1959

Also, the rockets are more accurate when launched into aslipstream in forward flight.The firepower is adequate, however, for antipersonnel suppressive tactics.

These discoveries were notmade without incident. CaptJ. D. Roberts can lay claim tobeing the first rocket-poweredhelicopter pilot. His claim became valid when his rockets onthe Sioux fired then hung upin the firing kit. He was started on a fast ride straight forouter space until the wholeworks exploded. The Captainlanded without incident.

The same officer, firing machineguns mounted on theSioux, sustained minor legwounds when the helicopterdoors flew open and deflectedbullets into the cockpit. Undaunted, the team dismissedthe dangers and became extracareful. No major accidentswere suffered during the testing done day and night.

All this and more was uncovered by the group in theirrace against time, in a rolecomplicated by lack of fundsand equipment. What theylacked in these respects theymade up in 18-hour days. Whenthe work a t the lathe with themachineguns and rockets anda t the controls of the aircraftwas finished, they carried onover coffee cups, making diagrams on paper napkins, andtalking out the problems. Car

ried away with the enthusiasmof the moment, they would often rush back to the armamentshop and work around theclock, proving or disprovingsome point in question. This ishow the hardware and its usewere developed by the AerialCombat Reconnaissance unit.

There was a need for hastein perfecting this entirely new

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concept, because an expandingvacuum existed in the vastarea termed mobility.

As potential enemy bombers flew higher and faster, ourfighters were developed for

greater speeds and altitudes,Colonel Vanderpool points out.As fighters improved, bomb

ers were driven further aloftand to greater speeds. Eachadvancement our Air Forcemakes separates it further inspeed and distance from theArmy. The necessary differences in missions of the AirForce and Army have left apartial vacuum between groundand the fringes of outer space.

CR UILDING BLOCK

This area was covered in thestudy developed by Vanderpool and his Fools, · using theAerial Combat ReconnaissanceCompany as a basic buildingblock. All agencies contactedin coordination prior to submission of the ACR concept toCONARC have indicated general concurrence and providedappraisals tha t resulted in improvement.

In the capable hands of adedicated group of Army Aviators, a new concept of warfarewas evolved using experimentalcraft. The helicopter, of aerialobservation and tactical transport fame, took on a new lethalsting. The day of the demonstrations was near.

This was a day of discoveryfor general officers and high

level civilians from the Pentagon. Time after time, underthe critical observation of

VIPs, the platoon of 12armed helicopters flew the terrain around small hills, throughdraws and trees, to unloosetheir suppressive fire and todisgorge combat-ready troops.

The idea of the new capabili ty caught the imagination of

the planners and leaders andthe word went out. Such outstanding officers as Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, Lt Gen JamesM Gavin, and L t Gen C D.Eddleman have seen the Armed

Helicopter Demonstration andhave commented favorably.ACR proposes a completely

air-mobile combined-arms unitincorporating as major elements an aerial combat reconnaissance group and a conventional infantry battle group.

t is intended that this unit becapable of performing all theconventional missions of cavalry with an air-to-ground and aground-to-ground fighting capability. All unit personnel andequipment will be air carried,to include administrative support. The U. S. Army AviationSchool feels tha t a test organization of this type should beactivated by the Army following completion of proposedtesting of the Aerial CombatReconnaissance Company.

Said the late Brig Gen Bogardus S. Cairns, The ArmyAviation Center can man andeq uip ow an Aerial CombatReconnaissance Unit to fight inan engagement and fulfill thetraditional missions of thecavalry.

Now there's a new kind offighting from helicopters beingtaught a t the U. S. Army Aviation School. I t has been a longtime coming. In the beginningit had to fight for its very ex

istence against the traditionalideas of warfare and a few nonbelievers. Once it got rolling,i t came roaring into the thinking of every Army man fromWest Point to the Far East.There isn't an idea in the Armytoday tha t isn't influenced byit. Aerial Combat Reconnaissance is here to stay. t is aSaber in the Sky.



T H ARMY REORGANIZA-TION ACT OF 1950 abol-

ished the Cavalry and createdin its place the Armor branch,

sometimes called a continuation of Cavalry. Thus, theUnited States Army officiallyrecognized a fact which hadexisted for 50 years, i.e. thehorse had been outmoded onthe battlefield.

For all practical purposes,the Cavalry era ended with ourIndian Wars. Certainly Caval-ry was used in minor roles

Captain ames M. Rockwell Inf

through World War I but thetermination of the Indian Warsmarked its end as a decisivebranch. The United States

Army was slow to recognizethe eclipse of Cavalry and evenslower to admit it. The primaryreason for this was empiricism.The dictionary describes em-piricism as the doctrine tha tall knowledge is derived fromexperience. Empiricism is thebasis of evolution used by allarmed forces.

Experience had shown that

the Cavalry had a role to perform, a very important role.This was: To furnish full terrestrial information of the ene-

my while screening the move-ments of its own Army; to pur-

Captain Rockwell is a Project Offi-cer in the Combat Development Of-fice of the U S. Army Aviat ionSchool. Commissioned in 1951, hegraduated ft om jump school in 1952and served with the 40th Division inKorea in 1952 and 1953. He gradu-ated from fixed wing school in 1955and helicopt e school in 1957.

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he smallest will be extremely versatile

sue and demoralize a defeatedenemy; a t all times to threatenand intercept his communications (lines of supply and command) ; in battle to strike suddenly and swiftly at weakenedpoints, turn exposed flanks or

force or exploit a penetrationor breakthrough. (Encyclopedia Brittanica) Experiencehad also shown that a speeddifferential was necessary inorder to successfully accomplish this role. For over 2,500years the horse was the vehiclewhich produced the necessaryspeed differential.

The advance of tracked vehicles offered promise after

World War I, but sufficient experience did not exist as a basisto retire the horse and rely entirely on tracked vehicles.Therefore, the horse remainedon active duty.

The German Army was thefirst to exploit the full potentialof the tank. By the end ofWorld War II, the tank hadproved its usefulness, to vary-

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ing degrees of efficiency, in thetraditional cavalry role. In addition, tank teams comprisedstrong striking forces in themselves. Consequently, the horsecould be officially retired, usingthe doctrine of empiricism as

a sound basis.EMPLOYMENT OFFERE

Thus we see that from 1890until 1939 there was a vacuumin our Army, indeed, in everywestern army. This vacuumwas created when the Cavalrywas rendered obsolete. TheCavalry role was there, but asuitable vehicle to produce thespeed differential was lacking

- cross-country speed differential. During World War IIthe vacuum was adequatelyfilled by armor teamed withconventional type aircraft.

The helicopter became apractical reality during WorldWar II, but its worth and versatility went unproved until theKorean conflict. Since that timea new and radically different

concept of employment hasbeen investigated - A e r i ICombat Reconnaissance. Whatinitially appeared extremelyimpractical is now proving tobe altogether feasible.

ACR is here to stay. t hasthe capability of assuming thetraditional cavalry roles andperforming them better thanLee or Napoleon could havedreamed possible. This is primarily so because ' we are nowoperating in three dimensionsand have a versatile vehiclewhich possesses an ever-greaterspeed differential and unlimitedcross-country mobility.

CRYST L G ZING

N ow will give some of mypersonal ideas about the futureof Aerial Combat Reconnaissance within the next 10 to 15years.

First, believe there will bea major breakthrough in thefield of VTOL aircraft. Thisshould come within the nextfive years and will make ourpresent helicopter seem like a

model A. The future VTOLaircraft will have little or noresemblance to current VTOLaircraft and will be free ofmany rotary wing limitations,such as low speed and highcomplexity. The general configuration may well be that ofa flying saucer. Whateverthe configuration, such craftwill be aerial vehicles, andrefer to them as such.

F MILY TYPE

A variety of vehicles, all having the same basic configuration and using the same typepowerplant, will evolve. Thesmallest will be powered by asingle gas turbine, the largerby multiple engines, all fueledby low-grade oil which has beenonly strained and thinned.



A family of vehicles havingthree or more members will benecessary in order to economically and efficiently accomplishthe ever-increasing types ofmissions. All vehicles will havea true all-weather capability.By this I mean that they willbe capable of operating a t treetop level under all conditions ofvisibility.

VERS TILITY NECESS RY

The smallest member of thefamily will be extremely versatile. I t will be capable of carrying between one and five passengers. Although i t will havethe capability of making nearvertical takeoffs and landings,i t will cruise at speeds greaterthan those characteristic offighter aircraft of the WorldWar II period. I t will have acruising time of about threehours . I t may o r may not bearmed depending on its mission. When armed i t will have

rapid-fire cannons, machineguns, rockets and missiles. I twill also have the capability ofdelivering an atomic punch. Asan armed vehicle i t will be useful in fire support and fire suppression, armed reconnaissance,and as an anti-vehicle vehicle.In this last role, it will be usedto destroy any vehicle, groundor air supported. Unarmed, itmay be utilized as an OP, CP,trainer, or for electronic surveillance, c o m m n d liaison,utility, and target acquisition.

The medium vehicle will becapable of speeds somewhatslower than the reconnaissancevehicle and will have a cruisingrange of three hours. Normally,it will be capable of mountingsuppressive fire kits. It will becapable of carrying 12 comba -

equipped troops internally oran external load of up to fivetons. This will be the organicmeans of tactically transporting troops and equipment forcombat units.

The heavy vehicle will havea speed comparable to the medium vehicle and a three-hourcruising range. As with themedium-sized vehicle i t normally will not be armed but will becapable of mounting suppressive fire kits. Capable of lifting40 combat-equipped troops internally, or a 10-ton externalload, i t will be used for thetactical transport of troops and

equipment and will be organicto corps or army.

CR POTENT TOOL

The battlefield of the future'will have no clearly definedlines because units will be sowidely dispersed. Such dispersal will result in decentralization of command. The massing

of troops on a future battlefield will be nothing less thancatastrophic unless a relativelysimple but foolproof means isdevised to preclude the lightning-like destruction of theforce by mass destruction weapons. One of the primary meansto accomplish this will be by theeffective employment of ourAerial Combat Reconnaissanceunit. I t must be capable of observing every movement of the

enemy, as well as screening ourown movements.

To accomplish this, relativelysmall teams of company sizewill be employed. Each teamwill be responsible for maintaining constant surveillanceover a certain area. These areaswill extend as deep as 200 - 300miles toward the enemy rear.

FUTURE

Larger teams may be formedto dominate large areas of terrain for days or even weeks ata time. They would move aboutquickly, frequently destroyingenemy installations and personnel by organic means or bydirecting short- and mediumrange ballistic and guided missiles. Another capability wouldbe the laying of minefields andemplacing atomic demolitions.

The future of Aerial CombatReconnaissance is unlimited.Individuals of great vision anddaring have already pioneeredthe field in their model A's.We must now plan for the full

est exploitationof

this newsaber in case of future need.I believe the main limiting factor will not be the state of aircraft development, but ratherour own lack of imaginationand resourcefulness.

Organic me ns of transport

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FLEW FOR

ERI L COMB T RECONN ISS NCE

Warrant Officer Harold D Wilcoxen T

L A ST SUMMER I FLEW withthe Aerial Combat Recon

na i ss ance Unit. I shall alwaysremember it as my first unusualexperience in Army Aviation.

I was out of rotary wingschool only a month when I wasselected to fly in a demonstra-tion for the West Point cadets(Class of '59) who were comingto the Aviation Center for anintroduction to Army Aviation.

I had seen the demonstra-tion as a student, and I had alsoflown copilot in a Chickasaw onprevious demonstrations. I always marveled at how thepilots maneuvered the Siouxaround; i t looked like a lot offun. My previous experiencewas 200 hours of flight aroundthe idiot circle. This lookedlike an opportunity to get outand really let off some steam.

I was assigned to a Siouxwhich was equipped with fourrockets and four 30-calibermachineguns. There were threeflights of four Sioux each in theACR Company. I was assignedto Red flight.

The show also had one Chick

asaw, one Raven, four Shaw-nees, and a company of Choctaws.

During the following week, Ibegan to find out a lot of thingsI had never even thought aboutbefore. Our flying was strictlytreetop level and fast. t re -quired a great deal of precision,as each part was perfectlytimed to keep i t well organized,

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to control all aircraft positionsto prevent collisions on enter-ing the area, which would beunder artillery fire during theshow. This meant tha t alltransmissions must be shortand no idle chatter, as the ent ire production was radio controlled.

With the aircraft armed i twas jus t heavy enough tha t youknew i t was loaded. I had flownloads before, but not under fieldconditions. This was my firstencounter with downwind take-offs in a semiloaded condition,as we were required to take offin whatever direction we weregoing next due to time and ter-rain. After I had settled backto the ground on one takeoff Isaw tha t I would have to usemore planning and judgmentthan I had used previously I trequired a lot of thinking, plan-ning, and then some. Normalflight in this demonstrationwith the Sioux required about29 manifold pressure . Theonly time I pulled under 25was on the ground.

The wind entered into thepicture more than anything

else. We had to land at certainpositions during different partsof the show. In a crosswind i tmeant careful piloting becausein some areas we had to hoverat 35 feet to clear the trees tofire.

Another big factor, rpm, re-quired a lot of concentration,too. I was skeptical about over-reving, since i t had been drilled

into me a t school not to overrev.I t didn't take me long to findout tha t if I wanted to hover atthose altitudes with the load Ihad, I was going to have to over-rev. I usually broke ground at3400 and by the time I stoppedclimbing to fire I would be a t3100. After a few seconds of

firing I would s tar t to descendfrom loss of rpm. I t wouldusually be a t 2700 then. Onstraight and level flying overthe trees I usually ran a t 3200,because if the occasion calledfor power to climb I had it.

The gunsights were mounteddirectly in front of the pilot onthe left side of the radio console. I f adjusted right i t wasvery accurate. The trigger was

on the front of the cyclic stickand the control box mounted onthe floor between your feet,which would let you fire yourrockets or guns either auto-matically or semiautomatically.There wasn't too much recoil.The noise was worse. Therockets went so fast you couldhardly tell you had fired them;but the firing guns dulled yoursenses because of the violentnoise they made.

I don't recall looking at theairspeed very much. We usual-ly flew as fast as we could and

CWO Wilco xe n graduat ed fromh e licopt er school in May 1957. He i san instr u ctor in th e Choctaw H-34)Branch, D epartm en t of Rotary WingT1 a ining, USAA VNS, Fort R u ck er,Alabama. H e has logg ed mo re than1, 300 flight ho u rs.



as fast as the ship would go.Our groundspeed was the mostimportant, except for takeoffand approaches. Each approachwas usually a flare beforereaching an open area and dropping i t down to the ground.Each takeoff was just a matterof pulling full power and hoping to hit translational liftr ight away.

The aircraft held up surprisingly well despite the hard workrequired of it. Only minorthings went wrong, such as instruments, grease boots androtor blade dents.

One of the major points ofsafety was to refrain from hurrying too much. The overallsafety was well taken care ofby your higher personnel, suchas the direction the aircraftwould approach with the armament (away from the stands

p L O T JOE DOAKES filed aninstrument flight plan from

Cairns AAF to Tallahasseewith Cairns AAF as an alternate. He flew to Tallahasseeand, after executing his secondmissed approach and followingall clearances and regulationsproperly, requested a clearanceto Cairns AAF as an alternate.

He requested, Route V-7 toDothan direct to Cairns AAF;altitude 3,000', true airspeed120 knots, 3 hours fuel aboard.Tallahassee radio accepted hisrequest and advised him tostand by.

The pilot received the following clearance: ATC clearsArmy 12345 to Cairns AAF via

and direction of fire with respect to civilian property). Thesmall points were the pilots'responsibility. An incident inthe case of one pilot in a hurryto leave illustrates this. As soon

as he was gassed he took offwithout checking the fuel tank.The serviceman hadn't put thecap on tightly; i t jarred looseon takeoff and gas started spilling out over the exhaust stacks.An alert wingman saw thesmoke and radioed the pilot before the aircraft caught fire.

Another important point wasreloading. This was usuallydone in a hurry, and the pilotshad to help make sure i t was

done correctly. Also he had toget out of the ship after eachphase of firing to manuallyclear each gun and rocket. I twould have been easy to landon an uneven spot and jump

V -7 Dothan, direct Cairnscruise 3,000'.

The pilot proceeded en routevia V 7 maintaining 3,000'.After passing Dothan and making a position report to Dothan,he contacted Cairns approachcontrol and reported leaving3,000', reported initial, and thenon final, contacted the towerfor clearance to land.

The pilot made an error inone of the following:

(a) He should have maintained 3,000' until overthe Cairns facility before starting his descent.

(b) He did not need clearance from the tower forlanding s h e w s

I FLEW FOR ACR

out to clear the weapon, or forget to loosen a control, or notput on your safety belt gettingback in. I was always following Red Leader who was experienced in doing this type of

flying, and I had to hustle tokeep up with him. When hehad his weapons clear and wasready to go, I was supposedto be ready also.

The demonstration is a terrific firepower display on thepart of the helicopters, showingthey are capable of doing almost anything.

After a week of rehearsingwas over and the show wasdone, I was glad to have beenincluded in i t ; i t gave me an opportunity to gain a wealth ofknowledge. This, plus the experience and self-confidence inflying the helicopter, has beenof enormous value.

cleared to the airfield inhis initial clearance.

(c) He did not request FlightService be notified of hischange i n destinationwhen proceeding to analternate.

D (d) He did not need to report to Dothan overtheir facility as he wason a cruise clearance.

D (e) He should have made only one missed approachbefore requesting clearance to an alternate,even though he wascleared for the secondapproach.

The recommended solution tothe PUZZLER may be found onpage 26.



Aerial C )mh /t f ecohh /iss /nce omp /ny

DO TRINE liND TII TI SMajor Karl S Patton Arty

A STUDY of the earliest records of warfareindicates that reconnaissance tactics and

missions have changed very little over the centuries. Basic principles are as important nowas ever. The principle of basing the missionon the capability of personnel and equipmentis also as old as recorded history, but so muchhas been done to improve equipment that i tmerits additional comment.

Biblical history tells us that Noah sent outa dove from the ark with the mission of findingland. He was using the best available means.We are further told that this method, afterseveral negative reports, resulted in material intelligence - in the form of an oliveleaf. The book of Genesis places this eventaround 5,000 years ago. The reconnaissancemethods we will have 5,000 years from nowcannot accurately be predicted; however, i t is

apparent that electronic equipment- will be usedin ever-increasing amounts. But until suchequipment replaces visual expedients, the U. S.Army is continuing development of Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Companies. This conceptgives promise of being one of the most efficientmeans the present-day commander has for obtaining overall battlefield intelligence.

Again going back into history for incidentsto illustrate a point, the Great Wall of Chinawas built to protect the Chinese from theTartars of the North. Now, obviously, a wallthat long cannot be adequately defended, andpresumably it was not built with that idea inmind. I t was built to stop, or a t least retard,hostile cavalry. The Tartars could not conceiveof fighting a war without cavalry. Therefore,the Chinese were safe from a major invasionuntil Genghis Khan bribed his way through

M a j o r P a tto n is Ch ie f of th e Doct r i n e Division ,Comba t D eve lopm en t Off i ce, USAA VNS Fort Ruck erAlab am a . H e i s xe d wi n g q u alifi ed, ins t ru m en t r at eda nd has logg ed ap p r oxi mat e ly 3 3 00 ho ur s.

12

a gate in the wall in the 12th Century, avoidinga direct attack on the wall, as Hitler by anend run avoided a direct attack on France'sMaginot Line in the 20th Century.

Anyone proposing construction of such abarrier against modern war machinery in thisatomic age would be ridiculed. Certain typesof barriers do have value for varying degreesof protection against hostile ground forces.These are useless against aerial forces such asthe Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Companies.This unit recognizes no barrier except weather,and even this is being constantly lowered bycontinuous improvement of navigational facilities.

The purpose here is to draw attention to twofacts: the necessity for reconnaissance and theimportance of aerial cavalry - and to presentcurrently taught concepts of employment of

Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Companies.Visualizing the classical role of cavalry to

be reconnaissance and exploitation, aerial combat reconnaissance was developed to greatlyincrease the Army's capability in this field.Depending on maneuverability for protection,rather than massive armor, Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Companies are provided threebasic elements: a reconnaissance and surveillance element capable of reconnoitering, in amatter of hours, large areas that would takedays for ground patrols; a troop force that canmove rapidly to vantage points without regardfor barriers that would seriously hamper earthbound forces; and a heavy weapons elementto provide artillery - antitank backUp. Theseelements are armed with machineguns androckets.

These three elements are based on the doctrinal and organizational concepts proposed bythe United States Army Aviation School. Proposed doctrinal concept provides for use ofarmed Army helicopters in support, since mo-



bility and firepower are essential to successfuloffensive operations.

The three elements mentioned follow boththis concept and proposed organizational concepts which provide rapid reconnaissance, intelligence collection, a considerable mobility

differential over ground elements, immediatefirepower, and airmobile infantry troops in thebattle area.

With these capabilities, the following missions are then suitable for assignment to AerialCombat Reconnaissance elements in support ofa division in the attack: reconnaissance by fire,airlift of patrols to make detailed ground reconnaissance for those missions requiring dismounted observers, collection of battlefield intelligence, exploitation of atomic fires, actionas covering force in attack or in retrograde

movements, seizure of critical terrain features,flank guard action, and counter-reconnaissanceon wide frontages.

This listing cannot be construed as the onlymissions Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Companies can be assigned. Like all other tools ofcombat, the only limiting factor is the imagination of the commander, within the capability ofman and his equipment.

Back to history for a moment: On the daybefore the Battle of Waterloo, Wellington issupposed to have told Uxbridge that he had noidea how he would fight the battle the nextday. After all, Napoleon would attack first andhad not advised Wellington as to how he woulddo it; consequently, the battle would be foughtas the situation dictated.

This episode demonstrates Wellington's recognition of the need for flexibility, which iscertainly far more important on the atomicbattlefield than it could ever have been in early19th Century combat . If there is a more flexible fighting force than an Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company this writer has yet tohear of it. For those who would disparage this

flexibility on the ground that aircraft are toovulnerable to small arms, the answer at thistime is that experiments are being conductedon a priority basis to determine j ust how vulnerable is a target that is bobbing up and downand firing machineguns and rockets in opposition. Available experience to date, that of

ACR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

the French use of helicopters in Algeria, seemsto indicate that this vulnerability is not nearlyso formidable a restriction as was once believed.

Nevertheless i t is a consideration and sincea direct hit in a vulnerable spot, such as a burstof fire through the cockpit of the aircraft, may

cost the commander a squad of infantry, combattactics are in a continuous state of review andtest to develop better methods of employment.Current thinking has these aerial vehicles usingmountains and hills much like the Navy usesislands to keep in the radar blind zone untilthe last possible moment. Many faults of terrain that are deadly to ground forces may beused as defiladed routes of approach by AerialCombat Reconnaissance elements. Wide, deepdraws and narrow valleys are ideal for this typeof approach. Even when a narrow valley leadsright to an enemy strong point, the elementscan approach from a course parallel to thevalley until time to launch their attack.

In a troop-carrying and surveillance role, theaerial vehicles again provide invaluable support.These two missions are combined in certainoperations, such as rapid massing for an attack, then dispersing again. t immediatelybecomes apparent that rapid mobility is anecessity when the importance of timing andthe distances involved in operations in atomicwarfare are considered. Positioning is no lessimportant than timing. The advantages of be

ing able to place troops on any desired sitearound the perimeter of an objective, to includeeither side of a barrier, natural or otherwise,is well recognized. Since this positioning andtiming cannot be effected without knowledgeof where and when, reconnaissance is required;and any extensive unoccupied areas, both forward of the battle position and within the battle area, must be kept under constant surveillance to give early warning of enemy movement.With earlier warning, counteractions, such asroad blocks and reduction or bypassing of hostile positions, can be more effectively carried

out.As the Chinese militarist, Sun Tzu, wrote in

500 B. C. The way to avoid what is strong isto strike what is weak, and Aerial CombatReconnaissance Companies can stand ready andable to assist the commander in outmaneuvering numerically superior forces.

3



HISTORY HAS A WAY ofpointing out obvious mis

takes and subjecting t debatemistakes that are not so obvious. Looking back over thespan of 14 years with 20-20hindsight and reviewing thefacts of an operation can cause

14

one to wonder why such and sowas not done, why they didn tdo it this way or that, and whatif. Reflections of this natureby military men can be highlyrewarding in new and revealingglimpses of changing tactics.

What if Field Marshal Mont-

gomery had available in 1944helicopters as we may soonhave them. The problems ofresupply, evacuation of casualties, reinforcements, travers-ing inaccessible terrain, andmobility n t e battlefieldwould have been much easier.If ACR Aerial Combat Reconnaissance) c o m p a n i e s a n dtransporta ion t r a n s p 0 r tgroups had been available, asuccessful outcome of OPER-ATION MARKET-GARDEN inHolland during World War IIis in the realm of possibility.

THE PL N

OPERATION M R K E T-GARDEN, conceived and executed by Field Marshal Montgomery, was planned in three



R M Y V I T I O NTs - ? - e - - · - · - · - · - · - · - ~ ' : 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 - -

~ q

\1

phases: the airborne landingsto be made simultaneously on17 September 1944 in the vicinity of Arnhem, Nijmegen andEindhoven; the link-up to beeffected by the Second ArmyXXX Corps making the penetration, by driving north froma line along the Meuse-EscautCanal to link up with the 101st82nd and 1st in that order;and from this salient to driveclear to the Zuider Zee therebyachieving all obj ectives.

The First Allied AirborneArmy was composed of theAmerican 82nd and 101st Air-

A R M Y AVIATION AND THEAIRBORNE was suggested by ColDaniel H. Heyne former Chief ofStaff U S. Army Aviation Centerand written by Capt John H. Richard-son Assistant Secretary USAA VNS.Captain Richardson is a dual quali-fied Army Aviator.

aptain John H. Richardson Arty

borne Divisions the 1st Airborne Division British), and aPolish Brigade. The missionof OPERATION MARKETGARDEN was to land deep inGerman-held Holland - just asthe German paratroops haddone some four years e r l i e r -

and drive a wedge from Belgium to the Zuider Zee. Thereby they would outflank theWest Wall provide a base fromwhich to attack the vital Ruhrarea, and cut off the German

troops in the north of Holland.WH T MIGHT H VE

H PPENED

The skies over Holland darken as 1 500 troop transports,500 troop-carrying gliders andmore than 1 200 fighter escortsmake their way to the dropzones. German garrisons, complacent with the front so re-

mote are startled by the sightof 20 000 parachutists descending intO the heart of the German-dominated Dutch homeland. Armed helicopters arrivesimultaneously. The British 1stDivision lands 6 miles west ofArnhem. Organiza ion O f theairhead is begun immediatelyas the 11th ACR Company assists with suppressive fires.

WH T H PPENED

The British 1st Airborne

landed as planned 6 miles westof Arnhem. This was subsequently acknowledged as a tactical error. With the Britishlanding so far from the objective the shocked German garrisons had time to regroup.Unfortunately, the G e r m n

general responsible for the defense of Holland Field MarshalModel was in the Arnhem area.

15



rea o violent action

V tilizing his knowledge of air-

borne tactics, he was able torally the disorganized Germansinto a strong defensive force.

In the outstanding independent Parachute Battalionof the war (Gavin s AIRBORNE WARFARE, p 120),Lt Col J. D Frost's 2nd Para-chute Battalion made its waynorth along the N eder Rij n tothe obj ective : the ArnhemHighway bridge. Frost's leading unit, Company A, was ableto reach the north end of thebridge just as a party of SStroops reached the south end.Six hours had been required tocover the 6 miles from the dropzone. Joined at the north endby fragments of the battalion,Frost was cut off from the re -mainder of the division. Withless than 600 men, Frost heldthe north end of the bridge for3 days, preventing its use by

the Germans. The division,meanwhile, was becoming heavily engaged in its attempt t

maintain the airhead.

WH T MIGHT H VEH PPENED

Elements of the 1st Trans-portation Transport Group ar -rive minutes after the drop,unload lA-ton trucks, gassed

l6

and ready for use, supplies and

antitank weapons. The 2ndParachute Battalion, under L tCol J. D Frost, was predesignated to move by helicopterfrom the drop zone to the objective of the Arnhem bridge.As soon as loads are dropped,light cargo companies embarkthe 2nd Bn and rendezvouswith the reconnaissance platoonof the ACR Company for theassault on the bridges.

Frost directs Company C tothe railroad bridge and companies A and B to the highwaybridge. Just as the heliborneforces r e c h the railroadbridge, it is blown by the Germans. Following the prear-ranged plan, Company C diverts in midair to assist in thecapture of the highway bridge.Making a frontal assault, hiding behind buildings and treeslining the river, the ACRs fan

out from both ends of thebridge, forcing the defendersto keep down. A safe landingis made, and the 2nd Bn goesabout the task of securing thebridgehead.

Delivery of Frost's Bn takes6 minutes from takeoff in thedivision d r 0 p zone to thebridge; 10 minutes to debark,and the transports are on the

way back for the remainder ofthe brigade. Something like 30minutes has transpired sincethe Bn dropped.

The defenders, now underthe personal command of Field

Marshal Model, began to rally.Tanks and SP guns in the vicinity are ordered forward.Anticipating this, the secondl ift brings forward antitankweapons and ammunition in addition to two more companiesof para roopers. Following thecapture and security of thebridgehead, t h e transportsready for the return trip byloading early casualties.

WH T RE LLY H PPENED

To the south the Americanswere enjoying more success.One battalion of Gavin s 82ndAirborne captured the vitalMaas bridge within an hour.Before dark, the route intoNijmegen was secured by capturing one of the bridges overthe Maas-Waal Canal, and establishing a cordon across theneck of the rivers along theGrosbeck Ridge. Having secured this airhead, Gavin sentthe only Bn he could spare totest the defense of the massivebridge that spans the Waal inthe vicinity of Nijmegen. ThisBn was stopped some 400 yardsshort by the Germans, who hadthrown a strong protective cordon across the south end ofthe bridge.


To the South, the American82nd lands in the vicinity ofNijmegen, seizing the bridgeover the Maas-Waal Canal atHeuman and the vital Gravebridge by mid-afternoon. Oneregiment captures the town ofGrosbeck, and the route intoNijmegen is completed. While



~ . . . . . . . . . _ _ _

this action is taking place , thelast objective, the Nijmegenbridge, is assaulted by the 12thACR Company. t consist s of12 reconnaissance type helicopters, armed with .50 cal MGsand

2.36-inch rockets; 4utility

helicopters, bearing aerial rockets and bazookas; and 4 lightcargo troop transport helicopters, carrying a platoon of heavily armed infantry. The ACRCompany sweeps down theriver. The infantry elements,supported by suppressive firefrom the helicopters, drive thesmall German garrison fromtheir position.


South of the Maas, the 101st,under Taylor, landed and seizedthe four nearby bridges withlittle opposition. The southern-most objective, the bridge overthe Wilhelmina Canal at Zon,was demolished just as the

t t a c k i n g parachutists approached.

While this action was takingplace in the north, GeneralHarrocks XXX Corps madefinal preparations to attack at1435 on the 17th. The highwayto Eindhoven, leading northinto Holland, was heavily defended. Harrocks anticipatedonly a defensive crust and thena free road to Taylor s 101st.Link-up was made as plannedon the afternoon of the 18th.A delay of 12 hours was required to rebuild the blown

bridge a t Zon.This delay was sorely felt inArnhem. Weather delayed thesecond lift by 5 hours. Unaware of the delay, GeneralUrquhart, commander of theBritish 1st, led a furious battleto maintain the airhead, losingthe better part of two battal-ions in the action. On D plus 2(19 Sep) major elements of

uppressive fire ids attacking troops

the third lift could not leavethe ground. The Polish Brigade,scheduled to land very near theArnhem bridge, was held onthe ground. Of the total number of aircraft able to leavethe ground, less than halfcould find the drop zone. DZs,planned prior to D day, werestill in enemy hands; and ofthe 1431 t o n s of suppliesdropped that day, i t was estimated that less than 200 tonswere recovered. The remainderfell into enemy hands.

D plus 3 was a total hold.On D plus 4 although the air-craft were able to leave theground, less than half arrivedto give any relief to the beleaguered 1st. On D plus 5 theEngland-based s h i p s weregrounded again; by the 7th daythe situation at Arnhem wasbeyond redemption by airborneforces.

WH T MIGHT H VE

H PPENED

Landing between Eindhovenn d Grave, Taylor s 101st

seized four bridges with littleopposition. Within a few hoursthe 502nd Regiment took thevillage of St Oedenrode, theDommel River bridge, and ahighway bridge near Best. Asthe 506th worked south, the

21st ACR Company crossed itsstart point near the XXX Corpsfront line, some 25 miles to thesouth. German defenders ofthe Wilhelmina Canal bridgeweaken under the devastatingcross fire of the ACR Companyand the 506th, but succeed inblowing up two of the bridgeRbefore they can be captured.The third, the bridge at Zon,falls to the 506th.

Harrocks XXX Corps a ttacks at 1435 on the 17th. Making a narrow armored penetra-

tion along the Eindhoven highway, its flanks are given additional strength by choppersfrom the reconnaissance platoon of the 10th ACR Company.Flying just above the tree tops,wooded areas and farm housesare searched out by th e ' highlymobile reconnaissance helicopters. Transmitting warnings ofenemy action to the armoredcolumn provides speedy intelli

genceto supporting infantry

and artillery.


The 1st Division was whit-tled down slowly. By the 21st,the 3,500 survivors (of over10,000 troops landed) had beencompressed into an area of1,000 by 2,000 yards. Severalattempts t give relief resulted



Firepower nd mobility win fire fights

in failure. The situation appeared hopeless. During thenight of 25-26 September theevacuation of the remnants wasbegun. Wounded were left behind to give an appearance ofcontinuing defense. At dawnthe evacuation was stopped bythe G e r m a n machinegunssweeping the river. By then2,163 men of the 1st hadreached the safety of the southbank. Of the 10,000 landed,only these few were rescued.

Capture of the Nijmegen

bridge by the 82nd had takenthree days. By making a daylight assault across the 400-yard river, a concerted attackfrom both north and south hadsucceeded i n wresting t h e

prized bridge from the Germans. Simultaneously, the valiant defenders of the Arnhembridge were being driven fromtheir last strongholds by theGermans. At nearly the sametime that the first British tankwas crO ssing the Nijmegenbridge going north, the firstGerman tank was crossing theArnhem bridge going south.

During the night of the 20ththe Germans made good use ofthe bridge; and before the Allied column could resume theattack, the Germans had effectively blocked the path. After

18

the withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Arnhem area,there were seven months ofbitter struggle before Britishtroops once again entered Arnhem.


D plus 2 dawns with a dark,low-overcast sky. Preplannedresupply missions appear impossible from fog-bound England. Aware of the need forsupplies, HQ signals the XXXCorps to star t resupply by helicopter immediately. Loadingplans, approach routes, andcheck-point lists are put intoeffect. Supplies, packaged andarranged prior to D Day, areloaded into aircraft of threetransporta ion t r a n s p 0 r tgroups, the force from threefield armies. Pilo ts receive lastminute briefings, make finalload checks, and over 1,200 tO ns

of supplies are on the way. The

longest flight is to the 1st Division a t Arnhem, 65 air miles,well within the capability ofthe transport choppers andfixed wing aircraft.

The weather is ideal for helicopter operations l o w ceilings, moderate temperatures,and a slight breeze. Flying a ttreetop level and navigating bycheck points determined prior

to D Day, the 1st transportgroup made the flight to Arnhem in one hour. Little groundfire is encountered, since flightpaths center over the marshyareas. German defenses are

grouped about communicationsand road networks. Althoughplanned drop zones are stillheld by the enemy, no suppliesare lost as the transports landsquarely within the perimeter.Pathfinders, sent in ahead ofthe transports, direct each waveto the desired area. Suppliesare carried forward to thefighting units themselves; fewif any additional troops arecalled back to recover the supplies. Casualties of two daysof close combat are loaded forthe return trip. Turn-aroundtime: 3 hours


1. About eight tanks lyingabout in sub-unit areas; veryuntidy but not otherwise causing us any trouble.

2. Now using as many German weapons as we have British. MGs most effective whenaiming toward Germany.

3. Dutch people grand butDutch tobacco rather stringy.

4. Great beard growing competition on in our unit, but notime to check up on winner.

5. Have to release birds owing to shortage of food andwater.

This message, sent by the

last carrier pigeon broughtfrom England, is symbolic ofthe steadfast endurance andabiding cO urage O f the gallantdefenders of Arnhem. Withoutrelief, out-numbered, heavilyout-gunned, the 1st was forcedto withdraw the night of the25th.

The withdrawal of the British 1st Airborne Division from



the Arnhem area brought toan end the last major airborneoperation of World War II.Although valuable ground hadbeen gained and the over-allposition of the Allies had been

improved, the major objectiveswere not accomplished.


D plus 3, the England-basedaircraft are completely grounded. The Polish Brigade, scheduled to land very near the Arnhem Bridge, is unable to leavethe ground. Urgent messages,delivered by helicopter sincethe communications failure,urge immediate assistance forthe British at the bridge. Oneinfantry battalion from theAmerican 43rd Division is rap-idly outfitted to reinforce thevital bridgehead. Training heliborne forces is but a matter ofhours; no special equipment orconditioning is necessary, andunit integrity is maintainedduring the landing. Engage-ment of the enemy is possible

immediately after landing.Airborne forces are especial

ly vulnerable to armor, and allavailable tanks and SP weapons are thrown against thetroops in Arnhem. Utilizingthe light cargo helicopters ofthe transport group, a 105 mmbattalion is lifted to the Arn-hem area. With two helicopters per howitzer section, threecompanies of light transport

and one company of mediumtransport helicopte rs m a k ethe lift in one flight. All available space is used for additionalammunition. The use of artil-lery spells the weary para-troops and affords that forcenecessary to effect the link-Upwith division main.

The Guards armored divisionmoves a t top speed, exploiting

upplies are th bloodstream of battle

the route laid open by the air-borne attack. By D plus 5 linkup with the British 1st is madeand the route to the Zuider Zeeis wide open.

CONCLUSION

Had this operation been asdaring in tactical execution asit was in strategic concept, i tmight have been a completetriumph. Many facets of theoperation went amiss, communications failed, weatherclosed in, time and distancefrom objectives made swiftcapture impessible, but the primary hindrance w s t h e

weather. A continuous flow ofsupplies n d reinforcementswere required to maintain thevast operation of the ground,but weather, both in Englandat the air bases and in Holland,dealt the crucial blows.

Yes, had i t happened this waythe end of the war may havecome considerably sooner, andtens of thousands of Alliedlives might have been saved.Shortening of the war was jus tthe thought in Montgomery'splan.

Tactics have varied withevery new development, every

new idea. Often the change intactical execution is so slightthat realization of the changeescapes the mind. Occasionallythe advent of a new weaponsuch as the nuclear bomb (orthe bow and arrow or gunpowder in their day brings sweeping changes to tactical planning. History has provided uswith a tactical example to showwhat one weapon of todaycould have done for an operation of the past.

Objectives were lost for thesake of a few minutes traveltime; mobility was hamperedfor lack of a suitable vehicle.Untenable terrain and weatherprevented timely resupply andreinforcement; the absence ofartillery support made thetroops particularly vulnerableto armor. ACRs and transporthelicopters would have solvedmany of these problems.

Only a few of the limitlessuses for the helicopter has beenapplied here. The uses and capabilities of the helicopter arebound only by the imaginationof the commander; and thecommander must rely on theArmy Aviator for i ~ sourceof information - you

19



The Horse Cavalry Is Gone

ut the pirit Survives

FLY BLE and

FIRE BLESOME OF OUR LEADING

Army Aviators have vigor

ously advocated a type ofmaintenance that originatedwith the cavalryman who caredfor his own horse. f an aviator and his crew chief live withan airplane , they should knowi t better than a crew assignedrandomly. The argument forthe aviator, crew chief, and aircraft to be a tightly knit unitis sound.

There's a solid basis for promoting a program for maintaining Army aircraft in amanner demanded of the oldtime horse soldier. I t followsthe traditional Army systemin all the combat arms of caringfor equipment.

John C Cremony in his bookLIFE AMONG THE APACHEStells about the care a trustyhorse received after a particularly hard and dangerousjourney from Socorro t Dona

Ana, New Mexico in the 1850s.The distance traveled measured125 miles but the last 70 mileswere a t a dead run, escaping thesavage Apache. Cremony safely reached his destination a tmidnight. So soon as I arrived, I rubbed my horse downdry with good, soft straw. Thisoperation required about twohours. I then washed him all

20

over with strong whisky andwater, and again rubbed him

dry. This was followed bytaking off his shoes and givinghim about two quarts of whiskyand water as a draught. Hiswhole body and limbs were thenswathed in blankets , a mess ofcut hay, sprinkled with waterand mixed with a couple ofpounds of raw steak (cut insmall pieces) was given him toeat, and a deep bed of clean,dry straw prepared for him tosink into. These duties keptme up until five o'clock a.m.,when I refreshed my inner manwith a wholesome toddy ands u g h t repose. Cremonysought his bed some five hoursafter arriving, those five hourshaving been used to care forhis horse. He notes later thatthe animal suffered no ill effects and on many a subsequent occasion he served mewith equal zeal and capability.

RMY SYSTEM

Cremony's type of maintenance of his horse is the kindthat appeals to Army Aviationpersonnel for their aircraft.It's the Army system of maintaining all types of equipmentand is based on two importantpremises: the individual's responsibility and his sense of

pride and ownership. The taskcommander and his crew keep

their tank in excellent condition, not only because responsibility is clearly defined butbecause all are proud to have asmooth-working and efficientpiece of equipment.

Fixed assignment of crews,including flight personnel, t

each aircraft and the assumption of basic maintenance responsibility by each aircraftcommander is the only solutionto combat utilization of theArmy flying machine.

83 5TH CONCEPT

This is the concept of maintenance adopted by the 8305thAerial Combat ReconnaissanceCompany * (Experimental) atFort Rucker, Alabama, insofaras is possible. Because of thenature of the company's mission, it is policy to cross-trainall pilots in all aircraft andweapon systems; so it is notalways possible for the samepilot to fly the same helicopter.The requirement to performseveral shoots at once prohibits one-pilot control of acertain helicopter. Because ofthe demands on enlisted me-

O ri g in ally activated as 92ndA er i al Combat R econnaissanc e Unit

E x p er i m ental)



chanics for KP, guard, andother duties, they sometimesmust leave their assigned helicopter in other hands. But asfar as is possible, Cremony'stype of maintenance is followed

by the 38 assigned helicoptermechanics. These mechanicswork on armament, too.

The 8305 ACR Co a part ofthe 2nd BG, 31st Infantry, has26 helicopters assigned: 15EH-13 Sioux, 1 EH-13-Hmodel, 4 EH-19 Chickasaw, 4EH-34 Choctaw, and 2 EH-21Sha wnee. These aircraft, armedto the hilt with rockets andmachineguns, are used in amanner more akin to combatthan those of any other unit inthe Army. These are the machines used in the firepowerdemonstrations at Fort Ruckerand other i n s t a a t i o n sthroughout the country. Theyalso playa part as the precisionflight team, or Square DanceTeam, for airshows and airpower demonstrations.

V IL BILITY HIGH

The company may be calledon at a day's notice to put on ashoot, as the demonstrations

are called. This calls for a highavailability rate, and no showhas ever been postponed forlack of aircraft. No spares arecarried on the TD. In fact,there is no TD; this is an experimental company feeling itsway, under close scrutiny ofthe entire high command, inthe manner of equipment andemployment of it.

The helicopters are used tothe maximum. Added weightof armament and ammunitionmakes maximum power necessary for taking off and landing,particularly in summer heatand humidity. This practice ofmaximum performance has notcreated any unusual maintenance problems. In fact, the

experiments conducted a t FortRucker indicate that helicopters can take even more punishment than the most avidmanufacturer's representativeclaimed.

ACRCo

flight and maintenance personnel do not keepregular office hours. They maybe called upon to perform ademonstration a t the InfantryCenter one day and the following week appear at the ArmorCenter. After these shoots theyreturn home to take care of thered-lined conditions; no onerests until the machines areflyable - and fireable. Theyconsider maintenance and armament as one. If the machinecan't fire, it's of no tacticalvalue; normally it is administratively g r 0 u n d e d unt il itagain functions as a weaponsplatform.

The postflight shows particular attention being paid thetail rotor system. Shell casingsfrom machinegun and rocketblowback sometimes damagetail rotor blades. Very little

damage occurs to the bubble,although some have crackedunder concussion of machinegun and rocket fire. On occasion the ADF cover has received damage from rocketblowback, and the Grimes anticollision has received light damage. Spot painting and workto stop corrosion accounts formore time than in conventionalmaintenance.

COMB T TYP FLYINGWith the type of flying being

done, a t treetop level, give ortake six inches, as one ACRCo aviator said, there's noavoiding some damage. Therate of blade cap damage ishigh, due to the necessity forgoing into confined areas at ahigh rate of speed and descentand hovering in confined areas

FLYABLE AND FIREABLE

and then rising to let loose ablast of suppressive fire.

In spite of this rigorous use,the operating cost of the Siouxused in demonstrations and experiments is lower than those

in which instruction is givenby the U. S. Army AviationSchool. High flight hours account for this. As with all aircraft, high utilization meanslower cost.

When there's no shoot, theunit tests experimental equipment and even builds its ownkits. They test present equipment and armament items forvaried civilian companies. Theyare now testing and developinghydraulic chargers for recharging mach i n egu ns , includingNATO M-60 7.62 machinegun.Weapons s y s t e m s of localmanufacture are continuallyexplored. We can make ourown kit for about $200, onearmament officer said, thatwould cost us $10,000 at amanufacturer's plant.

Also being evaluated is ahelmet-mounted reflex sight

system for firing machinegunsand rockets. This experimentalsight system gives the pilot acomplete target sight pictureregardless of the location of hishead. Normal sights requirethe pilot to restrict his headmovements to a minimum. Every little thing like this helpsan aviator to fire when he'sflying.

The maintenance personnellike their job in ACR Company.They like the newness and theexciting feeling of things happening. That's why they worklonger and harder to keep thehelicopters flyable - and fireable. They baby their sensitiveflying gun platforms, just asCremony cared for his h o r s -

that very personal attentionthat makes the machine servewith equal zeal and capability.

2



SURVIVAL A un and Machete

I ARMY AVIATORS couldpredict the time, place, and

date of their next smashup, thematter of survival would be ofless consequence. But the factremains that the pilot of anyaircraft would be wise to thinkabout survival techniques andwhat procedures he would follow should an emergency land

ing be made.While on duty a t most sta-tions in the United States, itis possible that a crack up wouldoccur within close proximity towell traveled highways andairlanes. But what about dutyin the states on the eastwardslopes of the Rocky Mountainswhere so much of the terrainis extremely rugged or barren?Or duty in Korea, Alaska, thePhilippines, North Africa, orMalaya? Would the same sur-vival techniques be applicablein polar regions as in the j ungle? Suppose you were forceddown in a Central Americanjungle and had to hack yourway out? Would you have thevaguest idea of what to do?How to do it? When to do i t?Which direction to take? Wouldyou have the tools necessary tohelp you get out?

Shortly after noon one day,an Army Aviator took off froman airstrip near an extinct volcano in a Central Americancountry. With him was a passenger whose job was to verifyname data in the vicinity of atidal estuary some 15 miles tothe east. A normal takeoff inthe Raven was made, and nodifficulties were noticed for a

red M Montgomery

quarter of an hour or so. Thenthe aircraft began to graduallylose power and rpm due to afaulty carburetor. The pilotdecreased pitch and increasedthrottle setting, but the rpmstill dropped. At about 350 to400 feet he turned on the aux-iliary fuel pump. Feverishly,he worked the throttle, checked

his fuel shutoff valves for correct setting and the mixturecontrol for fuel rich, and verified that the carburetor airtemperature was i n t egreen."

There was not enough altitude for an air start. With rpmdown to about 2,800, the pilotstarted an autorotation. A fullflare landing to zero groundspeed was made at about 25feet over the only availablelanding spot, a stretch of man-groves. As he gently maneu-vered the Raven down to hisselected site, he kept the air-craft level; directional controlwas maintained and a veryeasy touchdown was made ontop of the springy, interlacedmangroves - 12 feet above theground

Neither man was injured,and they had no trouble gettingclear of the aircraft. Once onthe ground, however, survivaldid not seem so inevitable. Yet,they did not consider theirplight desperate, even thoughthey were about 100 milesfrom the duty station; weredown in a little traveled,sparsely settled area; had noradio contact with the outsideworld; and were certain that

no one had seen them go down.Two factors that play big

parts in successful survivalstories are familiarization ofthe territory within the flier sduty station and equipmentuseful in case of a forced landing. Fortunately, the pilot hadbecome familiar with the topographic and hydrographic fea

tures of the operations area.These two men had exemplifiedunusual foresight in providinga machete and loaded pistol forthis trip, and it was these twoitems that helped them get outof a t ight spot with minimumdelay.

After getting out of the air-craft, the first thing the mendid was take stock of their sur-roundings. There was no panic,

just discomfort in the hot,sticky, steaming air. Fortu-nately, i t was not the timeof the year for the heavy almost-daily rain. Their greatestdanger was the fas t rising 12to 14 foot tides which wouldmake traveling through themangrove swamp slow and dangerous. Even though they wereonly 15 minutes by air fromthe landing strip, they decidedthat their best course wouldbe in the opposite direction, toward the estuary. The tide wasbeginning to rise as they tuckedtheir trouser legs into theirsocks and shoes to protectthemselves from ticks andsnagging branches. Then, withthe 2,776-foot-high volcano directly behind them for refer-ence, they started hackingtheir way eastward. I t was not



easy, and they made many anunnecessary stroke before theycaught on to the trick of strok-ing upward to cut the bushesand creepers.

Almost silently they moved

through the mangrove swamp.Only the swish-swish of theirlegs moving through the kneedeep water and the ka-nip-nipof the machete blade was heard.There was no talking. Theyhad to preserve their strengthfor the machete. About 30 minutes after starting throughthe tortuous swamp, theypaused and fired their pistolthree times in slow, regularblasts. The sounds echoedthrough the still undergrowth.They listened intently, hopingfor some answer. Nothing. Therising tide was now swirlingabove their knees. They musthurry on.

The two men moved cautiously through the water, notalways taking the straightestcourse, but avoiding obstaclesthat would hinder their pace.Alternately swinging the ma-

chete and leading the way, eachsoon developed a "jungle eye,"the method of disregarding thetrees and bushes directly infront of them and focusing theeyes beyond the immediatefront - in a way, lookingthrough the underbrush ratherthan looking at it.

By turning their shoulders,shifting their hips, bendingtheir bodies, and shorteningand lengthening their strides,they found that walking wasless tiring. Periodically theyrested and listened for thesound of help coming. Aboutone and a half hours after firing the first signal from theirpistol, they stopped and re-peated i t - three shots in slow,

hey le rned how close to dis ster they h d been

regular blasts. This time thesignal was answered by a yellfrom someone out in the estuary. They could not see theirrescuer, but sighs of relief escaped their lips. They an -swered with a series of howlsand rapidly moved toward thevoice. In another 15 minutes

they caught sight of an old fisherman rowing a boat towardthem. Their story would havea happy ending.

They learned from the fisherman how close to disasterthey had been. He had beenfishing all day in the flats;when the tides had begun torise, had hauled in his nets andstarted across the bay to hishome. He had been almost half-way across when he heard thefirst three shots He paused tolisten for another signal. Thenhe recalled that three shotsmeant someone needed help. Bythe time he had rowed backtoward the mangroves andpicked up the fliers, the tidewater was almost up to their

hips. Within another twohours he would have been outof earshot of their signal. Whenthe pilot returned to his Ravenat low tide the following day,high tide water marks were inthe cockpit floor

Admi tedly, i t is easier tosurvive when there is more

than one person to share thehardships. But don't forgetthat these two men would haveshared compounded hardshipsif the pilot had not known theterrain in which he operated,and if they had not had theforesight to put the macheteand loaded pistol in the aircraft.Certainly, these are not itemsof equipment normally found ina Raven, or in any Army air-

craft for tha t matter. Train-ing and experience are invaluable aids to survival. Thesemen are no doubt wiser afterthis episode; their experienceshould help every Army A viator to be more conscious ofsurvival procedures and knowledge.

3



O YOU

is simply applied to preventthe parts from loosening dur-ing operation? If so, why thesafety?

Why do the tech orders re -quire you to be careful not toleave tool marks on parts or the

structure? Why should you becareful not to have a burredthread or rounded bolt head?Why should you not walk onthe wing with hobnailed shoes?Is i t just because the scratchesare so unsightly?

Wha do the performancecharts in the 1 mean? Howmuch do they tell us? What isthe TAPS (turbulent air penetration speed) for your air-craft? How and why is thisthe established TAPS? If youdon't know, i t just might some-

Know Your Aircraft

H O W MUCH do you knowabout the aircraft you fly?

That's a silly question? Ev -eryone knows that you receiveda private license in 1940 andyou finished Army flight train-ing in 1944. Since then you'vecompleted helicopter and instrument flight training. As amatter of fact, we could spendthe next five minutes enumer-ating your many excellentqualifications. Still I ask, Howmuch do you know about theaircraft you fly?

Are you ever guilty of say-ing, What do you mean that 'sonly a 3 1/ 2 g aircraft? Why

4

Major Clifford S Athey

only yesterday I pulled over4 g's and it's not hurt a bit.Or, What do you mean, 1000lb cargo capacity? Why if youcan close the doors on the load,that monster will fly.

We could go on and on stating

all these little gems that areuttered every day out back ofthe hangar by the old pros,but do you honestly know thetruth?

For instance, do you knowwhat is meant by and whymany fittings, attachments,nuts, and bolts are assembledwith a specified amount of

torque ? Is it true that torque

day mean taps to you, your pas-sengers, and your aircraft.

Is wingtip vortex of any interest to you? Sure, I know theusual answer: Don't get behind the big boys because theWTV will t ry to put you onyour back. Is it true thatknowledge of wingtip vortexand downwash can actually aidin extending the range of an

Major A they is the assistant avia-tion officer, 18th Airborne Corps.He is a Senior Army Aviator quali-fied in both fixed and rotary wingaircraft and has flown mo re than3 000 hours. He is a graduate of theArmy Aviation Safety Course, Uni-ve rsity of Southern California.



aircraft? Does this have anyrelation to why an aircrafttends to pitch up on takeoff andnose down on landing?

HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW

BOUT THE IRCR FT

YOU FLY

Answers to all of the abovequestiDns, plus many more, areobtainable at the AviationSafety Course Dffered by theUniversity of Southern California. This information may alsobe obtained in almost any aeronautical engineering course.But how many Army Aviatorsare aeronautical engineers, andhow many can get quotas to

the Safety Course? The answer is, Not many. So

You ask, If this is so allfired important, and I don't already know it, why wasn't Igiven this information at theAviation School? They taughtme what I know about aeronautics, and I figure I don'tneed to know anything theydidn't teach. Besides, youhaven't even checked my answers to your questions. True,and I am not accusing you ofnot knowing. However, let 'sface it, very few of us do knowthese facts; we just think wedo.

How about sticking with mea little bit longer? Let's get ashort answer to each of theaforementioned questions jus tto check our knowledge.

WH T IS G

Basically, g isthe

forceof

gravity acting on any object,whether i t be 1 g for a manstanding on the ground or manyg's as a result of aircraft pullup, banking, acceleration or deceleration.

Most Army aircraft are designed to specifications tha t require them to withstand a minimum of 2 g's at maximum

DO YOU KNOW YOUR AIRCRAFT?

gross weight Let's say an aircraft is designed for a maximum gross of 4,820 pounds.Next we pull 3 1 2 g's on this airplane. That means the wingsmust be able to hold up a total(limit load factor) of 16,870pounds. Therefore, if we pull4 g s, the wings are required tohold up a resultant weight of19,280 pounds. Think they'llstay on the beast? They might,but we surely didn't increasethe life of the aircraft any.

Now, we ll take the same aircraft and leave Dff some of thepassengers and cargo, say about1,000 pounds worth. This time,in order to reach tha t designlimit of 16,870 pounds, we canactually pull 4.2 g s. Simplearithmetic, even though thepilot feels as if his teeth are going to fall out. The wings don'tcare how many g's you pull,provided the ultimate weightthey have to hold up is withintheir design capabi litie s. Conversely, if you take off with agross weight of 5,620 pound s ,stay below 3 g's Dr you may end

up with more dihedral than youreally need.

TORQUE

I 'm not going into the scientific, mathematical proof of thisfield; so you ll jus t have to believe that i t is true, or go getan engineer to spend a day ortwo explaining. Suffice it tosay that, if a part-member-boltwhich operates under a tensionor compression load is preloaded (torqued) to the proportional limit of the material,there will be no fatigue of thepar t during Dperation if theloads are no more than the preload. Too little torque is jus t asbad as too much. Too little torque will allow the Dperatingloads to exceed the preload andcause fatigue, w h e r e a s too

much torque will, by itself,damage the part.

STRESS CONCENTR TIONS

Have you ever heard of stressconcentrations? They are evenharder to understand than torque, but are so important to allof us. W h t are they?Scratches, nicks, dents, shoulders, bolt and rivet holes, burrs,etc. They cause trouble in anystructural member. Structuralmembers? Wing spars, enginemounts, landing gear, skin(monocoque construction), anypart which is going to carry aload. Any deformation, including rus t and corrosion, whichchanges the design constructionweakens tha t part.

IRPL NE PERFORM NCECH RTS

There are many performancecharts in the back of every -1.They give us the best cruise airspeed for different weights andaltitudes, takeoff and landinginformation, turbulent air penetration speed, and many other

bits of information.Let's take this TAPS. What

should we know about i t?Should we slow down fromcruise or speed up, and why?I t is normally computed formaximum gross and is tha tspeed at which either a verticalgust or the pilDt pulling on thecontrols can result in the limitload factor (maximum allowedg) jus t at a stall. Below thisspeed, the aircraft will stall outtoo soon; above this speed, youcan pull the wings Dff or atleast bend them pretty badly.Still satisfied with your hangar established turbulent airpenetra ion speed?

WINGTIP VORTEX

We should all be familiarwith the phenomenon of wing-

25



AUGUST 1959

tip vortex. t doesn't pay to getb e h i n d another aircraft ,especially the big boys. We canput the vortex tha t our own aircraft generates to work for us.Every helicopter pilot has heardof "ground cushion" which ismerely wingtip vortex. Everyairfoil (in flight) has an area oflower pressure on top from tha ton bottom. I t seems there is alaw somewhere tha t says ineffect, "a fluid tends to flowfrom a higher pressure to alower pressure," or "if there isa difference of pressure withina volume of a fluid, i t tends toequalize these pressures." Sincethe pressure on top of the wing

is less than the pressure on bottom, we have an unstable condition which the air tries tocorrect. I t does this by flowingin a circular pattern from thebottom of the wing out aroundthe tip to the top of the wing.At approximately one chordwidth behind the wing and ata downward angle (dependentupon several other factors) the

On the basis of the factual

information contained in thePUZZLER on page 11, the recommended solutions are as follows:

The correct solution is c.Choice a. The term "cruise"

in the clearance authorized thepilot to depart 3,000' a t his discretion without further clearance from ATC. Reference:TM 11-2557, page 10, Air Traf-

6

velocity of this air is twicewhat i t was a t the wing. Thatgives us a pretty powerful forceof air. Thus, with a helicopterwe hover in "ground effect.This ground effect is strongestwithin a vertical distance ofapproximately half the "wingspan."

N ow we get to the question,"How can this help me in fixedwing aircraft?" To answer thiswe must realize tha t there isquite a bit of induced drag attached to wingtip vortex.Therefore, if we can eliminatethe vortex we can either flyforward faster or use less pow

er. Do you think either ofthese last two "aids" would improve cruise speed or range?How do we take advantage ofthis fact? Fly closer to theground The best height issomewhere between a verticaldistance of one-half the wingspan down to jus t before rolling the wheels.

I am most definitely not ad -

fic Control section.

Choice b.Cruise clearance

todestination airfield does notconstitute landing authority ata controlled airfield. References: ANC Manual, pages 37-38; TM 11-2557, Air TrafficControl, page 10, para 21.

Choice c. This is the correctsolution. The pilot did not request Flight Service be notifiedof his change in destination.

vocating we always fly closeto the ground. First, there arewires, trees, and other obstacles in the way. Second, regulations restrict this type offlying. t jus t happens to begood information to have "incase." t will also help if youare ever making an overwaterflight and need every drop ofgas to reach your destination.

t has not been my intentionto give you a course in aeronautical engineering. Neitherhave I intended to criticize anyone. Rather my desire has beento help prevent a state of complacency as the result of think

ing,"I

need know only whatthey teach a t the school.

I do believe tha t the mattershould be looked into. Possiblya few hours of instruction added to the course of instructiona t the Army Aviation Schoolto include basic aircraft structures, metal properties, andmore basic aerodynamics wouldbe helpful.

Choice d. This is not a truestatement as all points namedin an instrument clearance aremandatory reporting points.Reference: TM 11-2557.

Choice e. This is a falsestatement. The pilot in command has the option of attempting more than one approach if he so desires, as longas he does not violate regulations and A TC proced ures.



THE NEXT DEC DE

In rmy viationBrigadier General Richard D Meyer, USA

T H PRIME MISSION of theArmed Service s , and of the

Army as a member, is to deteraggression. A time-te s ted deterrent is strength.

Since World War II, therehave been numerous limitedwars. These have ranged fromactions in Greece and Malayato the conflict in Korea. Thereis no reason to believe s uchwars will not continue. Now,though, with each new one wehave a dread fear. Ve mustassume tha t every action contains the seed of an atomic war.Therefore, within the framework of our national objective s,we must strive to end an y conflict quickly.

Thus, the Army, acting withthe Navy and the Air Force,must have the posture and abili ty to:

be a deterrent in a cold war,win a limited war quickly, andbe ready for a general war.

This calls for an Army tha t

can place military force whereit is needed, when i t is needed.This calls for mobility. Battlefield or tactical mobility callsfor Army Aviation.

Army aircraft will be foundonly within the battle area. Ineffect, they will be using anddistributing retail some of themen and equipment tha t theNavy and Air Force will be

transporting whole sale. Wholesale transport is strategic mobility.

Besides mobility, Army aircraft will be used for observation.

In the ob servation role, youcan expect to see the vehicle sfunctioning a s all- s eeing ey esregardless of weather or terrain. They will be surveyingthe batt le area for informationabout the enemy. They will beobservation platform s for missile and artillery unit s . Th e y

of limited usefulness to tacticalcommanders because of thetime and facilities needed toprocess the film. However , inthe next decade s Army youwill find mobile field laboratories where film will be automatically developed in multipleprints. Within minutes, thesewill be distributed to the officers requesting them.

Airborne lightweight television equipment will be used forgeneral battlefield surveillance.However, because of lighting

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Gcne1' o,l M eye 'r is t h e D epu t y Ch ie f ofT'rans p or ta t ion f or A vi atio n . H e holds a

ac h elo'r o f Science d eg ree fr om th e U . S .Milita r y A cademy an d a Mast e'r of S cien cedeg1 'ee /,rom t h e Univer si t y of Ca l i fo r n ia.H e i s a l s a gr a du a t e of t h e N a tion al Wa? Co ll eg e , G ener al M eywr is an in s t ru m en tr'a t ed A rm y A vi ato 'r .

will serve as probes for detec ting radiation fields or ga s .

For their work, the vehicleswill be carrying sen sory devices designed specifically forArmy ta sks. Such device s willinclude aerial camera s , television, radar , and infrared. Let stake these one by one.

Aerial photograph y h a s bean

conditions and camouflaging activities of the enemy, we cannot expect tha t TV will be ableto pinpoint specific targets. Forthis function, we shall be relying on airborne radar and infrared equipment.

N ow radar is able to fingera metallic obj ect in the skyeasily enough. But when i t

2 7



AUGUST 1959

tries to pick up a similar obj ecton earth, it 's a different story.There is so much ground clutte r - manmade and tha t of nature. Therefore, we shall beusing radars employing moving

target indica ors. These willbe able to spot objects traveling across the ground and canbe used to make radar maps inall kinds of weather. We hopethat this technique will giveus a greatly increased surveillance capability.

As you know infrared devices detect radiations lying inthe region jus t beyond the visible l ight spectrum. The intensity of these radiations depends in par t on the temperatures of the objects being observed. Those hot targetssuch as vehicles with temperatures higher than the earth 'swill be easily seen.

In the long run, we hope toachieve a high resolution mapmaking capability using infrared.

The observation methods outlined will be used with othertechniques to give field commanders t h e ever-changingbattle scene. Thus, motion pictures will be replacing the snapshot.

All along we have been assuming a marriage of the operations of the combat intelligence functions in the Army.This is exactly the way i tshould be. Although each function will retain its identity, the

two will be working almost asa unit. The fleeting nature ofmany targets calls for a quickinterchange of data - and foraction.

Action calls for mobility. Ifthe wish could accomplish thedeed this would be the typemobility needed in the battlefields of the future. I t meansbringing troops and supplies

8

where they are needed whenthey are needed. t means removing casualties from thecombat zone the instant theybecome casualties.

The vehicles best able to ful

fill the Army's mission willhave to fly close to the nap ofthe earth. This is not only fortheir own protection but alsoto avoid intruding into a skyalready filled with bullets missiles and jets. The Army haslittle need or desire for thatcrowded airspace. If it werepractical, ground soldiers wouldlike to be able to fly with onefoot on the earth.

Here are some of the thingswe hope air vehicles will do toadd to our battlefield mobility:

Serve as command vehicles.I never met a field officer yetwho didn't want to assess thebattle situation for h i m s e l fand this despite our host ofelectronic eyes. This is admirable because eyes and a brainwork best when they are together.

Lift heavy loads. When theArmy moves by sea the Navytakes our troops and suppliesto the shoreline of a theaterof war. t is then the Army'sresponsibility to unload thevessels. This takes time, especially in unimproved ports.Therefore, we hope to developaerial vehicles able to lift about20 tons of cargo. \Vhat theycould save in manhours at theshoreline could win us a victory

at the battlefield.Flying cranes have other

strong mobility uses. Theycould help repair breaks in surface lines of supply. They couldexpedite movements of largeequipment over difficult terrain. They could lay railroadtrack. They could carry in theirclaws the structures for 30- and4·0-foot bridges. For the ar-

mored divisions they couldtransport volumes of fuel tothe forward combat areas.

Another mobility concept isthat of the Air Mobile TaskForce. Today our airborne di

visions are strategically mobileand tactically immobile. Fortomorrow, we have to add tactical mobility. To do this, wemust let flying machines takeover many of the functions andyes replace many of the current surface vehicles in the battle area. This means giving anew dimension to the Army, avertical one.

The Air Mobile Task Force

might be traveling in aerialjeeps or in other types ofground / air vehicles. h e ywould probably be armed withmachineguns and rockets.

Their bases might be anywhere. They could use theirmobility to be in several different places in a short span oftime thereby multiplying theireffectiveness. They could moveto and over the operationalarea, 0 v e r c o m i n g enemystrengths and exploiting enemyweaknesses. In other types ofcombat they could be aerialshock troops reinforcing thoseon the ground.

In a typical Air Mobile Task

umber priority







W H AT DOES THE annualphysical examination mean

to YOU? Is i t a necessary eviltha t confronts you as something tha t has to be suffered,like the annual written examinat ion; or do you take it cheerfully, realizing tha t i t is partof a maintenance programaimed a t keeping you physicallyfit for flying duty?

Periodic inspection (examination) of aircraft is recognized as an important aspectof a program devised to ensuretha t flying equipment is capableof performing i ts missions. t

is a t least of equal importanceto ensure tha t YOU the operator of this equipment, are insuch physical condition tha tyou too are capable of performing your missions.

The annual physical examination of pilots is a very impor tant par t of the Army A viation program. One of its functions is to help you maintaingood health and ensure yoursat isfactory physical status.The value of this procedure willbe proportional to the thoroughness of the examiner, thecooperation of the examinee,and the proper recording offindings.

The following items are probably minimum procedures forthe annual physical examination:

1. notation of age, height,and weight;

2. dental check;3. eye examination;4. ear, nose and th roat ex

amination;5. blood pressure and pulse

determinations;6. heart and lung e x m i n ~

tion, including chest Xray ;

7. electrocardiogram w h e nindicated (required on initial examination for flying

training and on personnelover 40 years of age) ;

8. urinalysis;9. rectal examination and

prostate examination after age 40 and / or when indicated by symptoms;

10. interview of the examineeconcerning the incidenceof any illness or inj urysuffered since his lastevaluation;

11. review of history, clinicaland laboratory findings bythe examining physicianand discussion.WH T IT REVE LS

Age, height, and w e i g h t -Correlation of these factors hassignificance from two principalstandpoints. A recent monograph from the Surgeon General 's Office on Army medicalstatistics concerned with biometric studies on U .S . ArmyOfficers states, Those individ

uals who were overweight af ter30 years of age had a muchgrea er disease expectancy thanthose of average or less thana v e r a g e weight - excessweight results in physical impairment and shortening oflife. Weight control is important to maintenance of physicalfitness.

On the other side of theledger, any significant unexplained progressive loss ofweight may be indicative of aserious health problem whichwill require further investigation.

Dental check will revealtooth decay, tumors an d / ordiseases of the gums or mouthcavity.

Eye examination - i n c evision is the most important

sense used by the flier the importance of this procedure isobvious.

Examination of ears, nose,and throat is done to ensure individual capability to hear adequately and tha t there is noimpediment to clearing the earsas necessitated by changes inbarometric pressure associatedwith altitude variations inflight.

Blood pressure and pulseevaluations may reveal the firstevidence of heart and kidneydisease, and to some extent theefficiency of your circulatorysystem.

Heart and lung examinationmay produce clues to diseaseconditions requiring fur ther investigation by laboratory methods. Chest X rays may reveallung diseases such as tuberculosis and tumors, or changes inheart size or shape indicative

of hear t disease.An electrocardiogram may

provide a clue to some cardiacabnormality and indicate a needfor fur ther investigation orobservation.

Urinalysis may reveal somecases of early or mild diabetesand some types of kidney disease.

Rectal examination will reveal hemorrhoids or anal fissures. Palpation of the prosta te gland will reveal abnormalities of size consistency, andshape which indicate infection,overgrowth of the gland, orearly malignancy.

Detection of other disorderswill depend largely upon thefrankness and honesty of theexaminee during the interview.Many disorders can be detect-

3



AUGUST 1959

ed if the physician is alertedby the examinee. Converselymany things may be concealedif the individual sits silentlythinking, I f the Doc can't findit i t can't be very bad, or if

the interview is hastily done oromitted.

Review of history and findings by the flight surgeon isthe basis upon which he assures you of your continuedgood condition or makes recommendations for changes inyour activities.

WH T IT OES NOT REVE L

Without full cooperation of

the examinee the annual examination may fail to accomplishone of the principal reasons forits being done: namely to ensure your good health and theprolongation of your flying career. Except for some of thedisorders mentioned, i t is not ofgreat predictive value.

Chest X rays may not revealearly cases of lung disease unless special techniques are requested on the basis of symptoms reported. A normal electrocardiogram does not ensurethat the examinee may notdrop dead with a heart attacka day or week later. Many diseases of the digestive systemand of metabolism may bemissed unless symptoms are revealed. In brief, symptomsmay e the clues which lead todiscovery of disease.

WH T YOU C N O

Your active cooperation is essential in the interview. Hereyou should freely discuss anypersistent or unusual symptoms which you have experienced. Here, too is your opportunity to obtain advice onyour personal medical problems.

In these interviews you may

32

hesitate for fear of being considered a hypochondriac. I t hasbeen said that everyone has afew pains most of the time,particularly in muscles andjoints. Usually these are below

the level of consciousness butif one dwells upon the pains hecan possibly raise them to alevel where a great deal of discomfort is experienced. Obviously i t is not desirable to record classify and recite everyache and pain noted.

On the other hand many indications of really serious disease may be fairly easily recognized. A discussion of all pos

sible symptoms would fill volumes but here are a few important ones every one of whichat one time or another has beenoverlooked neglected or concealed. Report such things as:

1. Any blood discharged fromthe body in stools urine, orsputum.

2 Any dizziness or loss ofconsciousness.

3. Any unexplained changein weight. Everyone shouldcheck his weight periodically.A n unexplained progressiveloss of weight may be indicative of serious disease and isas worthy of consideration asis any other persistent symptom. I f you are overweight thisis the time to request adviceon bringing your weight backto normal and maintaining it.Self-imposed crash programdiets are to be condemned. Themanagement of weight reduction is a medical problem ofinterest to your flight surgeon,and he may well be able to helpyou over the rough spots toreach the desired goal.

4 Any changes in sleepinghabits such as insomnia frequent or disturbing dreams, or

the requirement for additionalpillows for comfort.

5 Unexplained weakness orfatigue. This does not apply tothe deskbound individual whoonce a year goes on a hunting

trip and finds himself exhausted from walking a few hundredyards across the hills. Such aperson should improve his condition by some form of regularexercise.

6 n y persistent, unexplained headache or neck stiffness.

7 Persistent cough. Heavysmokers often have a chroniccough particularly noticeable

in the morning. If you are inthis category you probablysmoke too much. Smokerscough may conceal the presence of serious lung disease. Ifyou don't propose to cut downon your smoking you shouldat least be alert to any changein the cough associated withpain and an occasional checkof your sputum for the presence of blood.

8. Pain or difficulty associated with normal body functionssuch as swallowing urination,or bowel movements.

9 Persistent unexplainedindigestion or recurrent ab

dominal pains.10. Unusual shortness of

breath, and chest pain if severeor if i t radiates into either arm.

11. Any mass or lump n anylocation. Women are currentlybeing instructed in the matterof self-examination of thebreasts. Occasional self-examination of the testicles is probably of equal importance to

males.12. Any sore anywhere,

which does not heal.13. Any other symptom

which has caused you seriousconcern.



~ ~ I R DD O G G R O U N DL 0 0 P S ? Get off my

back I'm sick of hearing andreading about them. I startedhearing about ground loopsway back before I got to SanMarcos and they've been bending my ear about ground loopsever since. There's nothingnew you can tell me "

Mister, you are so rightYou're tired of hearing aboutground loops and we're tired ofwriting about ground loops.More has been written about

this one subject than any othersingle phase of operations inArmy Aviation.

Remember the Bird DogClassics? First, there was theknight who bounced his craftand forgot that the spur isquicker than the rein. Thencame Sir Normal who made aperfect landing and began filling out his Form 1 during thelanding roll. N ext , was SirHeffie Foote, who trod mightilyon brakes and toes. After this,came the knight who slew his

direction for the port wind andall directional control was lostto him. Finally, there was SirStauling Bhounce who rearedhis nose heavenward, thinkingto climb above the barrier.

These five classics pretty wellcovered the range of causes forBird Dog ground loops.

How have all the thousandsof written and spoken wordsaffected the problem? Search-ing the records, we find that9 Bird Dog ground-loop accidents were recorded for 1958.During the first three monthsof 1959, 17 similar accidentshave entered the record book.Too many words? t would appear that not half enough hasbeen said

SOMEBODY GOOFED

We all know tha t when aground loop happens, somebodygoofed. Whether the man whomade the airplane, the mechan-ic who looks after it, the instructor who trains the pilot,the supervisor who commandsthe pilot, or the pilot himself,somebody goofed t then re -

mains to search our ground-loop accidents and find whogoofed and, more important,why.

DESIGN

A great deal of suspicion exists about the L-19 aircraft. t

has been intimated by manythat the ground loop was designed into this aircraft. Atfirst glance the number ofthese accidents would lead you

to believe that this is the case.Yet, hundreds and hundreds ofArmy Aviators have flown andare flying the L-19 daily withno problems involving directional control. In any event, i f

design is a cause factor, theonly successful solution is anew aircraft. Although produc-tion has stopped, i t appears theArmy will be flying Bird Dogs

33



AUGUST 1959

for some time to come. Sincethis is the case, successful solution of the ground-loop problem must come from othersources.

MAINTENANCE?

The mechanic can be quicklyeliminated as a major causefactor for ground-loop accidents. A study of 86 groundloop accidents tha t occurredduring 1957 showed tha t lessthan 1 percent were caused bymaintenance factors.

PILOT?

Let 's be honest Let's admittha t the great majority ofground loops happen becausethe pilot goofs. BUT, let 's notadopt a pious attitude and stophere: let's dig further and findout why these pilots goofed.

Was it because of training?5 February 1959 - An Army

Aviator, who had graduatedthe p r e v i 0 u s September,ground-looped during landing.This aviator's statement reads:"As the ground loop began, Iknew tha t the application ofpower for a go-around wouldonly tighten the loop; therefore, no power was applied.After applying full left rudderwith not the slightest effect onthe ground loop, I realized thatany attempt by me to straighten the aircraft would probablyresult in a worse ground loop.Therefore, no brakes were applied and my hands and feetwere removed from the controls. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the proper technique once the groundloop is in progress."

A similar accident occurred25 February 1959. Examination of DA Forms 759 for thesetwo aviators reveals a str ikingsimilarity. o t h graduatedfrom fixed wing training during

34

September 1958. One had atotal of 261 flying hours; theother had 267 flying hours.Both went through instrumenttraining after graduation. During the more than 4 months between graduation and groundloop, one had flown the L--19 for61/ 2 hours; the other had flownthe L--19 for 6 hours. Can youexpect the newly graduatedaviator to maintain L--19 proficiency while flying other typesof aircraft over a long periodof t ime? From these and similar accidents, the answer mustbe an emphatic NO

SOLUTION?

This phase of the groundloop problem suggests its ownsolution. Either the newlygraduated aviator should bescheduled for continued L-19flying while he is undergoinginstrument training, or heshould be given a period oftraining before he is consideredproficient following a layoff ofthis type. Maintenance of proficiency, then, is one positive

approach to the ground-loopproblem. This applies not onlyto the newly graduated aviator, but to Army Aviators inall positions. Any art or skill islost to some degree without

constantpractice.

BUDDY

Some days i t would pay tohave "stood" in bed. Sometimes you can't even t rus t yourbest friend .

The Beaver pilot was on acourier flight. He landed at another base, completed his business and made ready to depart.He performed his preflight,climbed aboard and watched amember of the alert crew driveout in a jeep to stand fire guard.The ground crewman parkedhis jeep, walked around theright side of the aircraft withthe fire extinguisher and returned the pilot's call: "Clear "

The pilot started the engine,waved to the crewman and began to taxi forward. The aircraft rolled forward approximately 3 feet and the wheel

The alert crew is sometimes not alert



Paperwork while t xiing

suddenly jammed i n t thepilot's stomach. This actionwas accompanied by a loudcrunch.

The pilot shut down his en

gine, got out and found the lefthorizontal stabilizer and elevator jammed against the side ofthe jeep.

Did we say alert crew?

YOU ET YOUR LIFE

Professional gamblers areseldom known to place a betunless the odds are in theirfavor. . These men know theodds for every type of gamb-ling from rolling bones to rac-ing horses. They don't alwayswin, but then they're onlygambling for money.

An H 2 1 aviator filed a VFRflight plan with a direct routethrough a mountain pass. TheFlight Service weather fore-caster advised disapproval ofthe plan, since a portion of theroute weather was below mini-mums for VFR flying. The avi-ator then filed for a circular

route to avoid the weather andthis plan was accepted.

At midmorning, the Shawneetook off. Aboard were an a viator, a copilot, and two passen-gers.

The aviator disregarded thecircular route filed for and setcourse for the mountain passon a direct route to destination.As the Shawnee approachedthe pass, the weather forecast-er was proved correct; weatherconditions were below VFRminimums. The aviator lost

ground contact and the air-craft crashed and burned.

This gamble cost four livesand 250,000. What were theodds?

Weather - against.Advice - against.Instrument rating - none.What motivation could p03-

sibly tempt an aviator to gam-ble against these odds? Onlythe aviator knows, and this onewon't be telling. There was noemergency, either operationalor private, to den1and tha t thisflight be made through IFRconditions. t can only be as -sumed that the aviator had become so familiar with thisroute that he believed the oddsin his favor despite all evidenceto the contrary.

Are you a gambler?

BUT D E R

"But, dear, I was sure it wasin reverse " So said the little

woman, trying to explain to herapoplectic spouse why theirnew convertible had crashedthrough the garage wall.

Thinking is a procedurewhich must precede action.Knowledge is a characteristicwhich must accompany action.Obviously, the little woman had

This g mble cost lives

35



AUGUST 1959

The cure is to stay away from huge aircraft

u s d neither thought n o r

knowledge.And then there was the

Army Aviator who thought hehad enough clearance to taxi aBeaver past the control tower.In fact, he was so sure of itthat he was busily replacing achart in the map compartmentwhile taxiing. I t must begranted tha t a control tower is

a small object which can easilybe overlooked by even the mostcautious. Besides, they had nobusiness building a controltower in a location where i t canreach out and grab your wingtip.

The apoplectic husband wasfortunate. Cost of repairs toconvertible and garage can bemade up by returning the newmink stole. Uncle will have toshell out $1,800 to repair theBeaver.

THAR SHE LOWS

Politicians and women's socials are not the only means ofproducing

stronghot

aircur

rents. We've all read and heardmany times about the dangersto be found in front of and behind j e t aircraft. Sometimes,we forget tha t danger lurks inthe wake of any large aircraft.

The oil filler cap must be checked for security

A Bird Dog aviator taxiedout and parked approximately80 yards behind a Constellation.When the Connie began its pretakeoff runup, the Bird Dogpromptly flipped into the air

and came to rest on the rightwing, right wheel, and enginecowling.

Small aircraft cannot be controlled in turbulence createdby large four-engine aircraft.

The cure? AbstinenceOIL CAP

One of the items most forcefully impressed on young BirdDog aviators is tha t the oilfiller cap must be checked forsecurity prior to flight. Theyoung aviator learns tha t if thecap should come off duringflight, the oil will siphon out,Without oil, he knows he'llsoon be flying a glider.

The Bird Dog was on a crosscountry flight and the pilotwatched his oil pressure dropto zero. As he turned towardthe nearest airport, he watchedcylinder head and oil temperatures. Shortly after, the air

craf t shuddered and the enginestopped completely. The cockpit began to fill with smoke andthe aviator started a turn toward the nearest open area.The aircraft landed in a plowedfield, struck a fence and cameto res t inverted.

The extra few seconds required to open the cowling andvisually check oil cap securityis money in the bank, in th i scase, worth $5,500

BIRD DOG STATISTICS

1958 - 91 Ground-LoopAccidents1959 (1st 3 Months) - 17Ground-Loop Accidents1960 ?



ARMY FAA COOPERA 10

Currently enrolled in the helicopter instru-

ment course at the U. S. Army Aviation Schoolare Jerry W. Davidson and Jack Wilburn air-craft te t pilot from the Federal AviationAgency.

Mr. Davidson explained that they are takingthe pecial training to gain firsthand experi-ence in the flight characteri tics techniquesand operations of helicopters flying under in-

trument conditions.

At present there are no commercial helicopters certified to ly on instruments but twohelicopter manufacturer have requested ap-

proval for in trument flying certificates from

FAA.Since only proposed instrument regulationexist today the knowledge gained at FortRucker will enable Mr. Davidson and Mr. Wilburn to formulate FAA instrument flying regu-lations tha t will become standard for all rotarycr a f t : helicopters rotodynes ducted fans convertiplanes etc. These new regulations houldbe completed and approved during FY 1960.

Mr. Davidson is a brigadier general in theAir Force Reserve and is rotary wing and je tqualified. He is shown with instrument in truc-tor Mr. John Hickey.



rmy Sponsored Test ed In irst light

Firs t vertical tak off and landing with mid-airtransit ion to horizontal high speed flight i made by

U. S. Army s new VTOL aircraft , (Doak 16) Army

VZ-4DA, over Edward Air Force Base, alifornia.Ducted fan rotating on the wingtip point t ra ight up

to l ift the Doak 16 vertically like a helicopter (photo

1. 2 3). Then test pilot J arne B. Reichert wivel the

duct and the novel craf t moves into forward flight likea conventional airplane (photo 4 5 6 7). To land,

ventional runningand

short takeoffsand

landing(STOL) in order to carry even greater payload and

more fuel. Shown in large photo with duct at 45 ° theaircraf t i slowing down to hover tat ionary a t 3 00 0feet over de ert , then return to normal flight.

Thi has been done successfully a t pre ure al t i tud

of 6 000 5 000 4 000 and 3 000 feet.

Remaining in horizontal att i tude a t all t ime , the

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Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1959

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