Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1981

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1981

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J NU RY 1981 VOLUME 27 NUMBER 1rigadier General Richard D. Kenyon

Army Aviat ion OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters ,

Department of the Army

Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.CommanderU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Update , BG Richard D. Kenyon5 Aviation Training In The 1980s,LTC P) E.H. Grayson Jr.6 Going Home COL Edward E Waldron II10 Views From Readers11 Helicopter Icing Hazards, Arthur J. Negrette16 Stress Management For Aviators, MAJ P) Brian H.Che rmo l, M.D.18 Reporting Final20 Army Aviation Liaison Pilot Retires21 Reserve Component Evaluation, MAJ Bruce S. Beals24 Tw in Otter, Doug Girard27 Training Symposium And Pol icy Committee Meeting

Betty Goodson28 Electron ic Warfare, MAJ Cornel ius J . Westerhoff30 DES Report To The Field: For Best Results Be A TenWith The Dash 1032 Hangar Talk - AR 95-1 , CW2 Gary Weiland

37 OPMS Corner, LTC Joe D. Carothers38 PEARL S40 Cockpit Heat Stress In The AH-1G Cobra HelicopterCOL J.R. Gauld , M.D .; LTC H.D. Silsby, M.D. ; CPT G.Ramirez42 There I Was 1LT Wilfred F. Brown45 Threat: An Analysis Of The Soviet Helicopter Threat,CPT Thomas J. McNamaraInside Back Cover: ATC Action LineCover: This month the viation Digest introducesthe first of what will be a quarterly column fromBrigadier General Richard D. Kenyon ArmyAviation Officer at Headquarters DA

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page 4Richard K. Tierne

Editor

The mission of the U.S. rmy viation Digest USPS 41 3 5 0 IS to prOVideInformation of an operatIOnal . functional nature concerning safety and ai rcra ftacc ident preve ntio n. tra in ing . maintenance . operallons . research and development.aViation mediCine and other rela ted data .

ThiS publication has been approved by The Adjutant Ge neral , Headqua, teDepartment of the Army , 25 April 1980 , In accordance with Army Regulat310-1

The Digest IS an offiCial Department of the Army pe r iodical published monthlyunder the superviSion of the Commanding General. U.S Army Aviation CenterView s ex p ressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Ar mynor the U S Army A Viat IOn Center Photos are U.S Army unless otherwisespecified Use of the masculine pro nou n IS In tended to Include both gendersunless otherwise stated Matenal may be reprinted prOVided c redit S given to theDigest and to the author . unless otherWise Indicated

Articles , photos and items of Interest on Army AViation are Invited Directcommunication IS autho r ized to Edi to r, U.S. rmy viation Digest, PO Drawer

Active Army units receive distnb utlon under the PinPOint distribution systas outlined In AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and se nd directly to CDR. APublications Center , 2800 Eastern Boulevard , Baltimore , MD 21220 For achange In d istribution reqUirements , initiate a revised DA Form 12-5

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint dlstnbutlon also shousubmit DA Form 12-5 Othe r National Guard units should submit requests th routheir state adjutant general

Those not el ig ible for offiCial dlstnbution or who desire personal cop ies of tDigest can order the magazine from the Supenn tendent of Documents , UGovernment Prinllng Office , Wash ington , DC 20402 A nnual subscnptlon rat


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UPO T EBrigadier General Richard D KenyonArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the ArmyT

HIS IS THE first of what will be a quarterlyforum to provide information to Aviation Digestreaders and to respond to requests for informationor assistance pertaining to Army Aviation.The July 1979 issue ofA viation Digest describedthe various staffagencies atHead-

quarters,Department of theArmy, the people whowork various actionsand telephone numbers. Ina subsequent issue , I will update this. Meanwhile , figure 1shows points of contact forsome of the subject areas with which you may beconcerned.

Below are some news items which will be ofinterest to you:Aeromedical

eromedical Evacuation High Performance2

Hoist The new Western Gear High PerformancHoist provides a marked improvement in hoiperformance and has been certified for releasto active Army, Reserve and National Guarmedical aviation units. This new hoist provideadvanced state-of-the-art operational capabilitiemodular component design for easy componereplacement, and redundant safety featureContinuous duty cycle, increased cable speeand maintenance by unit personnel are additionadvantages of the new hoist. The first hoists werdelivered to the 34th Medical Detachment, FLewis, WA, and the 383d Medical DetachmenFt Wainwright, AK. The new equipment traininteam will complete the introduction of the nehoist to active Army medical units o30 January. The introduction

the new hoist to the NationGuard and Reserve will be completed this MarchDASG-HCO, LTC Tom Scofielu s Army National Guard ARNG)

Active Component and ARNG Attack HelicopteUnits Training Together o Improve ReadinessI n September 1979, the Aviation Requiremenfor the Combat Structure of the Army ARCSIII) conversion was completed in the ARNG. Asresult, attack helicopter assets of ARNG assauhelicopter companies were redistributed to formnine new attack helicopter units for a total of 1ARNG attack helicopter companies/troops. ARNGunits use the UH-1 C/M gunship with the M-2missile system to train for the attack role. Due tincreased emphasis to improve the combareadiness of the Reserve Component and befforts of the National Guard, the ARNG wintegrate 26 AH-1 S helicopters into its attac

US RMY VI TION DIGES


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OOCSOPS Aviation

A viation A wards

OOCSPERAR

AvionicsSimulators

ODCSOPS Aviation

Division

FIGURE 1

227 9666

225 9031

225 9571

225 556H227 5730225 44H6

fficeymbol

DAPE-MBADAMA WSA

DAMO TRI AVN

DAMO FDFDAMO ODRNGB-AVNNG8 AVN ArsenaL MONG8-AVN-LNG8-AVN-ONG8-AVN-SDAAR OTRDASG-HCO-ACDR, AeronauticalServices Office

MDMDl

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the end fiscal year

L SH U S FOR T PROGR MFOR RNG TT CK HELICOPTER UNITS

ACTIVECOMPONENTUNITInf Diy

2d Amd Diy4th Inf Diy

7th Inf

24th Inf

Ahn Diy

IOlst Abn Diy

Jd ACR

ARNG UNIT

for a C't V' \l ' \ l ' \ lr . . .the to ahelicopter force mid-1980s.NG8-AVN, Mr. Ries, AUTOVON 284-2244)United States Army Reserve USARl

various facets of theprogram will appear in future issue-1 , ... . ,. (DAAR-OTR, LTC ert Rice

ue stl()ns to the DAmostthe overa,. ...,., ' as a medium oAviation com

ARMY


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URINGTHE year therethrust in r e ( ) r i t : ~ n t i n gas been athe aviation program.Army commands have been chal-to orient aviation tra:lmmg

toward techniques and

threat in

aviation units ae:Slgnea

directed towardand away from routineAviation Administration

Recent aircrew ' ~ n ' ~ . ~ ' "manual revisions have oriented moreand more tasks and iterations toward

a C ( ~ O n l p l : l S h ] T I e l l t of tactical m i ~ s i c m s ,and additional revisions can bev h l _ > V ' ~ L , , ' u . The Directorate of Eval-

Stal1dard.izaticm U SAviationhas been tasked to examine fro,. , ,. , .in more detail than ever beforeunit evaluations and deter-mine whether units have trained tothe tacticalmissions can

ontinued o 345


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Sven UH-1 helicopters had initiallycomprised the flight . Now onlyfour remained in the field andthese sat idle along a mountain road.Eighty pounds offuel rested inthe bellyof one aircraft; 110 in another; 170 inthe third; and 90 in the fourth. It wouldbe 6 hours before a refueling truckwould wind its way up the mountainroad to reach and service all fourhelicopters. Meanwhile the aircrewsmunched on cold rations and plannedtheir return flight home as they milled

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about in the near-freezing weather.But even on the groundcoordination among the crews was noteasy. Two of the aircraft were situatedon the mountain at a level above acloud layer that was rapidlythickening and two were nestled onthe terrain below it . Tired cold andhungry the crewmen waited for thefuel that would start them on their wayto the warmth and comfort of homeunmindful of the drama that was aboutto unfold - a drama that began long

before their unscheduled landing alongthe isolated mountain road.he missionThe seven UH-1 crews wereassigned a VFR training mission thatrequired them to conduct a flight to alanding zone where they were toextract troops and transport them toanother LZ.Because some of the pilots in theunit had limited experience in UH-1 sthe crews were carefully selected. The

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who wasIP in the unit was

' ' ' 'C ' l rt r , , , , rI as the PIC of one aircraft.officer was PIC of a second

IP was the PIC ofUH-l, with the air mission

asthe seventh Crews of thehellicclDtlers consisted ofof the . ' , ',. ,.,,...,

in the unit. These were foraccording to their. ,,,, level.

At oh dark hours on theof the flight, the AMChis senior I P the ~ c c ' n r , n e > i h j i l i tthe for the entirea weather briefing for

the mission was planned forof one and one-half hoursroute. However, the filed

en route to be 2with to be conducted at an

of feet. Weatheras0 scattered, overcast, visibili ty

with smoke andof 800 brokenand smoke.The terrain over which the mission

to be flown was mountainous,in elevation from 1,200 feetmore than 4,800 feet. the for

At this point, another complicationarose. ThepilotofUptight 2 announcedhe had a low fuel As thecontinued, it became obviousthat there was no broken cloud inthe vicinity of the airfield and thedecision was made to proceed towardthe mountaintops and find a suitablesite for 2.

At this time, the pilot of Uptight 3elected to continue to the VOR andmake an instrument approach onceclearance was obtained. Two otherswent with him. Flight lead remainedwith the to help locate a place forthe other helicopters to land. Justbefore they reached the mountains,thepilotofalso had a low warningHowever, he stated that he anopen area in and was descendingthrough a hole in the clouds to landbeside a dirt road.Meanwhile, the pilo t of Uptight 2 wason short final to a landing site abovethe cloud layer while fl ight lead, whohad also a low fuel warningwas a above thecloud layer to a dirt road in theof 2.The pilot of 7 thenproceeded through a hole in the cloud

layer and landed near 4.this time, his low fuel lightwas also illuminated.The Hueys had been a tota l of2 hours when the first low fuel warningcame on and a total of 2 hoursand 15 minutes when they landed.tim for decision

Now, with all helicopters and crewson the it was time foradditional planning and moredecisions. Three aircraft hadI r H .... nll ,tO:::'ri the flight back to homeby an IFR clearance and

an IMC descent. Of the fourrnrn n,r,,., on the mountain, two werelocated at a level above the cloud layerand two were below it. All were intact.All crews were safe. One of the firstthat had to be done was to getfuel. The AMC walked to a civilianresidence and used the torequest a fuel truck service the fouraircraft. In the meantime, radiocontact was made with the PIC of thethird who had landed withtwo others at their home station, andthe locations of the four aircraft whichwere in the boonies were to him.would be about an hour and 45minutes before the fuel truck couldreach the site of the two helicopters

on the lower level ofthemountain, and it wouldanother 4 hours for it to reach andrefuel the two helicopters on the upperlevel. Meanwhile, the aircrews waitedin weather with only coldrations to satisfy their hunger pangs.They also faced the ofto themountain if weather conditionscontinued to deteriorate.The weather in the vicinity of the

two aircraf t situated on the upper levelof the mountain was already IMC andwas worse.Instrument takeoffs would have to beSince thecurrent, and his instrument card wasthe AMC placeswith him. This action paired theindividual with an IP aboard one of thehelicopters situated on the lower levelof the mountain where weatherconditions were VFR. In turn, theAMC assumed the duties of copilotaboard the helicopter piloted by theassistant operations officer who was

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he accident described here is a classicexample of lack of professionalismalso the unit's senior IP.The assistant operations officer thenwent to the proposed takeoff area ofthe second helicopter and determinedthat a normal ITO would clear allobstacles with no problem. Thenearest visible obst ruction along theintended flight path was a high ridgethat the assistant operations officerestimated to be 2 miles away. Afterthis determination, he returned to hisown helicopter and discusseddeparture plans with the AMC.The two helicopters located belowthem had been in radio contact withthe flight service station, filed theirflight plan, and taken off under VMCfor the flight home.

Now it was time for their departure,which would be difficult at best. Theweather was obscured and theestimated visibility was 1/16 of a mile.The AMC turned to his IP and askedhim what type of flight plan he shouldfile. The response was to file VFR for aflight of two. At 1430 the flight planwas opened and the assistantoperations officer informed the PIC ofthe second aircraft that they weredeparting .nstrument takeoffs

During the ITO, the AMC, who wasat the controls, narrowly avoidedstriking a tree that neither pilot hadpreviously noted. Aside from this neartree strike, the takeoff was uneventful.The helicopter remained in the cloudsfor about 3 to 45 seconds beforebreaking out . The pilots thencontinued their climb until thehelicopter reached an altitude ofapproximately 7,500 feet. At this time,the I P informed the pilot of thehelicopter still on the ground that thetops were 5,000 feet.The pilot's response was that healso was going to perform an ITO on anorthwesterly heading. When 5minutes had passed and the secondhelicopter did not appear, the AMCbegan a radio search on thefrequencies the flight had been using.He never got a response.Assuming that the PIC of the

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second aircraft may have had somekind of malfunction that required himto shut it down, they waited.However, after no attempt was madeto contact them by means of a survivalradio, they descended below the cloudlayer and made a quick search of thearea but could find no evidence of thehelicopter. At 1510, the AMCtransmitted the message that one oftheir helicopters was missing andpresumed down.

he searchA hurried ground and air search wasmade, but no sign of the aircraft could

be found. Finally, at 1800 hours, thesearch was suspended for the night.Military personnel as well as civiliangroups familiar with the area were thenassembled and organized for thesearch that would resume the nextmorning.At 0530 the next day, ground partiesbegan a search of their assigned areas.At 0800 weather permittedsupplementing their efforts withaviation support. At about 1000, aprobable impact point was located. At1020, approximately 21 hours after theaircraft had embarked on its ITO,searchers transmitted the messagethat they had found the crash site . and all crewmembers were dead.

he errorsThe events that set the stage for thiscrash can basically be summarizedunder two headings- inadequate

flight planning and crew andsupervisory error.Four of the seven aircraft had tomake precautionary landings becauseof low fuel. This indicates inadequateflight planning before and during theinitia l mission.The hours of waiting innear-freezing temperatures for the fueltruck to arrive and service thehelicopters, the availability of only coldrations to eat, and the prospect ofhaving to spend the night on themountain produced apsychophysiological moodget-homeitis) that adversely affectedthe decisions of all personnel involved.

Following are some of the existingconditions that influenced the initialplanning:The AMC had limited aviationexperience. Initially, he hadplanned to fly the mission at 11 knotsairspeed for the best fuel range. Andmost of the flight was planned usingstraight line routes. However, theAMC failed to update the planningfollowing the current weather forecasbefore takeoff. Consequently, thereported overcast condition did notpermit the shorter straight line routebecause of the high terrain, and theflight had to be made at an airspeed of9 knots. This prematurely depletedtheir fuel supply.

After determining the fuel supplywas not sufficient for them to maketheir destination, the flight attemptedto go straight line. When a suckerhole in the overcast was noted, theflight proceeded VFR on top. Then,when low fuel warning lights began tocome on, the pilots headed for amountain that protruded through theovercast. If destination weather hadbeen checked before going VFR ontop, the AMC would have been awareof the overcast. Had the aircraftremained below the overcast, thepilots could have found a moresuitable landing site and departedunder VMC after the aircraft wererefueled .Further, following servicing of theaircraft, the AMC allowed his IP andthe pilot of the aircraft that crashed tooperate their aircraft in violation of AR95-1. Again, the AMC's judgment wasinfluenced by his limited aviationexperience. In addition, the problemsencountered earlier in the missionaffected his self-confidence.Consequently, he allowed himself torely heavily on the judgment of his I Pwho was the assistant operationsofficer and the senior and mostexperienced IP in the unit.The assistant operations officermade the decision that both aircraftwould make a takeoff in IMCon a VFR flight plan in violation of AR95-1. He did not file an IFR flight plan

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because he did not believe a clearancewould be and wouldnot be able to take off until theirnn':l:ltu-.nc: were VFR. This meant thathave to remain therenUiPrn,lnt,t if the weather did not clear.

After the initial decision thatboth aircraft would make an ITO, heassisted the of the ill-fatedh e l j c o i P t E ~ r in his ITO andindicated confidence in his toIn these actions, heviolated AR 95-1 to insurestandard takeoff minimums existed atthe time of He used invalid

r r m : i J U l J g t : j ~ U distances innptprrni,nin,n min imums by itwhen the actual weather at hislocation was an indefinite obscurationwith less than nnp-j:>lnlnTrl-ITIIIPvisibility.The pilo t involved in the crashsimilarly violated of AR 95-1

~ t t p r r l n t i i n n an ITO under theju(1grnerlt wasa number of factors

' I I f < peer pressure to make theITO, confidence of the I P in histo the takeoff, and a desireto get home.In ~ t t p r r ' n t i i n nperformance errors. He attempted theITO from a pinnacle, and he madethe takeoff from a hover to keepthe tail rotor clear of the small treesaround the takeoff site.Further, he selected a hp,::'filnnnorthwest which was the diflectiontheof him. Theestimated by the assistant operationsofficer to be 2 miles away wasseven-tenths of a mile away, with anintermediate at a lower levelaway.

takeoff, he failed to establisha climb. Instead, he allowed thehelicopter to descend ~ n l " l r n i y i n n ~ t p l v300 feet. The then crashed intohe was one of the more

ones available for the initial mission,his experience was limited. Hehad accumulated a total of less than500 hours of prior to this mission.His copilot was even less experienced,less than 200 hours of

time, less than 15 of which wereaccumulated after he had rnrnr,lpi'ofischool.Yet, his lack of pvr,prionr'o

the PIC attempted the ITO from theleft seat of the aircraft, eventhe primarylocated on the side. Further,was well aware that he lackedITOs and had riit Fi lhl

Professionalism- or thelack of i tnumber of aircraft ; : : : I 1 , : ( ~ i r t j ~ n t ~accidents such as the onedescribed here, could be n ~ C : \ l a n 1 - c l r lwhat's commonly called

p r l o f t s ~ . i o n a l i s l m . Every pilot knowsthis the word nrr,to''''C:'''' In ItC:n Iappears with constant insafety pubs.. you hear the wordand over at safety rnpptu Inc

to demonstrateall they do.demonstrated real-world situations?As far as this accident is concerned, aat what is not(,p,'t nl in order. Professionalismin the cockpit is NOT:

Violating Filing a VFR f l ight in IMC. Making UTOs from a hoverfrom the left seat. Running out of fuel on ascheduled mission.

.. Failing to assign the mostexperienced crews to the mostcritical missions. Continuing to try to salvage abad situation caused baddecisions.

Once the four were onthe the PIC of the ill-fatedhelicopter should have been replacedby a pilot more experienced ininstrument Replacement crewscould have been to thedowned helicopters by the fuel truck.The AMC was probably reluctant toreplace the PIC simply because he wasthe pilot in command.However, would have been betterto run the risk of the PIC'sby r a r , l , , ~ i n nhimself.qualified for the first mission - thetroop lift - once the weredown the he was

not the best for the ITOback home. Itwas now a new mission.Just as to a bad

preventable.The accident described here is aclassic of lack

Accidents this nature areespecially deplorable because they arepreventable, and the nl tl 'C nTI\'O

In addition, individualcrewmember the personalresponsibility to resistto

P S \ V c t 1 O ~ ) h , ' s l ( ) l o i g l c a l states such asnot_hnrv'PI1rlc and peer pressurelead to errors in II 1('lnnnpr1t

Well puteach individual involved,dead crew. What pr()fessiionJElIdecisions would


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VIEWS ROM RE DERS

Editor:A article n the viation Digest

noted that the Beavers

CommanderBerlin Aviation DetachmentBerlinAPO New

Editor:The comments of CW Roland W

the ofto the editor

issue the Aviation Digestwere read with considerableWhile do ot CW2

and retain


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rthurJ. NegretteCOPYRIGHT 198All rights reserved

hADITIONALLYhave addressed the

This article is a complete update of the one thatappeared previously in the October issueof the A viation Digest Though aresimilarities it offers an expanded discussion onin-flight icing hazards icing forecasts andengine failure related to in-flight ice

characterized oneffect on h A I r > n . n t < ~ r """prt,,,,,.r.,.' ,,,,,,, and that n

H Z RDS OF IN FLIGHT ICINGThe risks associated with flight in su bzero n r P ' I _tation or moisture have been known since

reduces thrust and lift and increasesall to the detriment of an performance.

even more v ' V u f J . , , , n ~of attack pv , tP t , p r lPp ' r lblades in normal t r \ t H ~ l r r lcharacteristics of the n e l l c o l D t c ~ r


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HELI OPTER ICING H Z RDScombined with other not so obvious characteristicssuch as differing surface the blades'n


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minutes after ice wasaircraft.

' ' r o l r .... t annunciatorfailure in the

n .. ~ r , t l n r r a false sense offailure may be

due to accumulation of

screens installed s ~ v i - r c > c n AI r\r, 1 \ (1 1 ',,'>,should make every IJ'-',J,H'U' combi-nation of inl t < ' r oY ' nn , - ,e

METEOROLOGIC L CONDITIONSCONDUCIVE TO ICING


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HELICOPTER ICING H Z RDS

LOUD TYPES

encounter in cumulusless

is nn.nc1.rI ' , , . . .. ,hlu

.. ' ' r rn rime n stratiform clouds isdismissed with little concern of

a condition cand ,,,,,,,,ir.r. because of the extensive horizontal nature of

'LlU.c . The accumulation of substantialv,, '.HLJ '1;:. from n them is

and

FRONT L SYSTEMS

UIIUU' , the front into the subfreez-often found when the


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FIGURE : Warm Frontin the clouds above the warm front s surfaceis characteristic of found in stratiform and strato-cumulus clouds and consists of rime or mixedrime and clear ice.

Cold Fronts Cold-front normally occurs in anarea and suc:ceedlmg the front 2),

and aircraft areFIGURE : old Front

to encounter the most intensiveImme;dHltely above the frontal zone.clear

at the

GEOGR PHIC L CONSIDER TIONSFFECTING IRCR FT ICING

Aircraft is more and severe overmountainous or terrain than over low or flat

causeswhich

movement of a its compan-ion turbulence and across a mountain range,combines the frontal lift with the u o s l ~ o ecurrents of the mountains tohazardous environment for

occursthe theabove mountains and can extendmuch higher when cumuliform clouds have de veloDed.As the size of water r1r r \n l j -C '

an factor in , - , v . v L 1Sand extent of encounteredtend to be cumulus than stratusthey also in any cloudsthat form over open water or air.

ICING FOREC STS

enn1l1 1 gV used

rotorautorotation became necessary.

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Fort Rucker AL

STRESSM N GEMENTVI TORS

II IIIIII' HE ARMY AND Federal Aviation Adminito the

are consideredclass or 3eX lmilnatlo:n. The use of tran-

substances can causeoeoell0(mc:e and may lead to a desire for n l r rp S l C P namounts. It alsothan rI""'('T"P":l


19/52

utoor self hypnosis simil r to rel x tionbut c n be


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G

FROM FORT RU KER

thethe U SThe standards we ofthe United States are also the standards we shouldhold forthe men women offerto defend our he said.he must be used nv,' \I- : l. ,nto Soldiers the vital need forism and

THE STRICTEST INTEGRITY. The Major of theArmy, William A Connelly, speaks to Bogardusptel', Association of the U.S. Army, Ft. Rucker,ecember meeting

l

needs theirr < _HL - veteran added that

rn. . - ' \ rn , , - , the serviceyour supe-

Guard hasunder one commandincludes more thanaviators.

RMY


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NEW FLIGHT SURGEONS. Graduates of the Army AviationMedicine Basic Class who completed the 10-week flightsurgeon program in November at Ft. Rucker, Al, are, fromleft, Captains JamesH. Kaye, Harrol L. Cranford and AnthonyR Piacentile; lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Kennell; CaptainsWilliam D. Davis III and lewis H. Westmoreland III; Second

About members of his command wereinvolved in B ht Star whichAmerican O ; l a l l e r s and Airmen into desertwith their

isCourse Changes. _= c:>,rmade to theTraffic Control Coursethe tactical blockfrom 12 to 43 hours. The course will remain 6weeks and 4 in with the addit ion totactics principally a reduction inthe FAA block.altered so that Reserve

and service obligat ionto 12 months.The are effective with the classthis month.ROM ST. LOUISSafer Fuel Cells A $2.35 million Black Hawkhel

,,,,,,,',..,1 t,,


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ARA VIATION

I.IAISONP tOT

R ETIREST H I ~ M O N T H I Sretirement time forA v l a t i o h ~ s , l st two lia son


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N

Bruce S BealsCommand and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth. KS

MY

TTMCONUSFORSCOMFTX

NBC

Ne PT

GLOSS RYannualaircrewcontinental StatesU.S. Army ForcesCommand

chemicalNOE nap of the earthRC Reserve ComponentSOP operating


24/52

unit evaluator

U.S. ARMY

cOlmu iete roh L ofof

and to prepare themto


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oug GirardPublic Affairs Off iceAberdeen Proving Ground M 0IT'S EARLY MORNING in small Alaskan Eskimolocated on the inland of theSea. While most of the are H'- :A.U ' l l ) : : ,out to fish five men armedof

sections of coastal shore where seektraces left boats.

This scene is a stateknown as America's Last Frontier.

five with more thanare members of the Alaska National

five Eskimo scout battalions locatedfor the surveil-lance of a vast4

the area andin the world where

forward of activeforces.

To the scout battalions in their mission ofwatching and the state which at the DiomedeStrait within miles of

the has twothe Alaska ARNG.

can moveVULIJ J.:lL.:l. sometimes

Since there is athan miles of state-maintained

are dueweather and terrain COJ1101110nS

ARMY A VIAT ON


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28/52

officer of the Alaska Guard.Toronto and to the APG for the

ceremony of aircraft and conductliaison visit the ARNG Aviation Division.

JohnPVfpnCH ,plu m listed some of the missions the

are used for in state: With a

moved to 6. 6airlifted for inoculations and treatment.L - _H.-HLlVl1, nine United States senators on

n terms of ImnSl:IC 3.1 ~ ' I n , n r , .. -hauled concrete,( ' I , o - Ip \ { - . ( ' I and dried fish.

,-. .. ,,, . h,. , t mission' - ' 1 \ ~ ' - " ' ' ' , which certain times of the

the cash money vV

are also available for search andrescue. are doors whichcan double as chutes from which can berir('\nr\pd if the is hazardous.

The call to arms among the Alaskan EskimoWorld War II a well-traveled man

name of Muktuk Marston the AlaskaTerritorial Guard and made useEskimos from on the western Mr. Marstoncame Alaska after many years in Canadaand wound up in the United Stateswar. He wasof Alaska and was aSS,IQrledn .hl of JalJaIleS;ein the Aleutian Chain.

After the war, the ~ k i m o volunteersto be reinstated 1949. this time

of the Alaska National Guard.With a units in ~ ~ c , - , ~them above the Arcticviable defensive force in theTo an idea of much

disbanded.members

TW N OTT R

ARMY


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Betty GoodsonStaff Writer

TR INING SYMPOSIUM ndPOLI Y COMMITTE MEETINGFIFTY-TWO ISSUES, ranging from the procurement of quick inventory toolboxes tothe question whether the Annual Written Examination should be continued, were consideredat the Army Aviation Training Symposium and Policy Committee Meeting held 1..h ............. h 5 December, at Ft. Rucker, AL.

Representatives from Army commands and Department of the Army staff officesattended the joint conference and were welcomed to the Army Aviation Center by itscommanding general, Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.

Major General James C. Smith, director of training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Operat ions and Plans, Washington, DC was keynote speaker for the training symposium.Brigadier Genera l Richard D. Kenyon, deputy director of requirements and Army Aviationofficer, ODCSOPS, made the opening address for the policy committee.The importance of aviation training to the Army, and the necessity for the Army's

l e ~ e r s to recognize and determine the direction its aviation force must take if thatimportance is to be fully realized, was emphasized by MG Smith.Our basic philosophy mustbe that we train today to fight tomorrow's war; anything elseis wasting everyone's time. We have to train up to the capabilities of the equipment wehave in our hands, and we have to focus our training to support the ground commander 24hours a day.More emphasis must be placed by commanders on individual training. Units can betactically proficient only when well-trained individuals are available to form the crews,

teams, etc., which fight the battles.Following the two-star general's address, the 70 attendees were briefed on varioussubjects. Included were the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade Division 86, the Aviation Centertraining analysis and assistance team, safety, the flight hour program, warrant officerselection and retention, tactical instruments in combat and tactical training.Those briefings served to introduce the symposium's issues which were then studiedby four groups, and their recommended solutions were presented in the closing session.Most of the topics dealt with in the training symposium flowed into the itinerary of thepolicy committee meeting which began at noon Wednesday.In its opening period, BG Kenyon reminded those voting on policy recommendations oftheir responsibility to help Army Aviation fulfill its round-the-clock support mission throughthe efficient management of its resources.We must work to maintain the people we have in aviation today through reducing theattrition, and we must consider the pay-off of doliars when looking at major programs ofproduct improvement.

If we executed all the programs we would like in order to effect needed improvementsin Army Aviation, it would require $10 billion. We can't do that, of course, so we have to beselective as we consider policy decisions.The policy committee concluded its work early Friday afternoon. A more in-depthreport of coverage given to issues in the joint conference will be presented in a later issueof the rmyAviation Digest

7


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time my

of most field commanders asattempt to all theballs. Some of the ,, ,,,,, ,,,,1'

cross country formationon our civilian CBsall contribute to make electronicwarfare the same as lost communi-cations. What Avia-tion when ourto air communication vanishes?How will we in a forcedradio silence environment? Theanswers to those and many otherrelated were theof a very extensive electronics war

Major Cornelius J WesterhoffTroop 0 4th Cavalry

inactive electronic interference

tical maneuversdetermined scenarios.ized data was collected which ac-

revealed the effectson the

nrn.nO,[ o and timea result of j U I U H l l H , i : .cations interference.

,

ARMY


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same'- ' '- ', '"1.,,-1'-.' '- ' ' ' which mask you fromwill mask you from the

It Use U Your Radios. The vari-

become morebroad-band IU l 1 U l l 1 l 1 ] ; : , .

It Use Your Standing OperatingProcedure (SOP). An SOP is

collect dustIm;oectc)r GeneraL f it

will beis

v\.lU ,,I1'l=: radio t.ransmissions.know what the outof the habit of the

reduce that SOPU I Q U U ] ; : v a U I v size. Eliminate in-

strument in a tacticalSOP. Throw out the details oncare, etc. Make SOP work

Switch Frequencies.is new heresize that this takes aspare you havein your Communications-Electronics

Instructions are nice tobut almost anyone can

tales of

switch becamesuccessful at Ft. Irwin; unfortunateyou won't have a few trial-and

error at the crucialmoment. One unit at Ft. Irwin

it on their nets. The Air Forcea called chattermark wherethe station switches to a series of

u\. L ,, . when a

t r e l q w ~ n c l e s c n work and workbut it, more than any other tech

r ~ [ ~ ~ ~ carefuldetailed instructions and intensive

make it your

t Liaison Officer iLO). It is un-that the most

able and secure means ofcommunication will the LO.Select and train your LO Ft.Irwin that the LO is

of the most ' 1 'Y\ , r ; , ' t r , , . t ......".'r

dedicate an LO and aircraftaround-the-clock to this mission.

ernember The usethe enemy is intended toconfuse and but

' ' ' ' l i J ' - ' ' v ' V U tomunications. f you start PI '''' '''MOelectronic interference you can bealmost certain that some offensiveaction will follow and soon.Jammers expose themselves to ourdirection and do not

to remain in oosltlon very

is' ' ' ' ~ ' / ' ' ' ' ' of electronic warfare and

the mostinsidious. Direction 'UIU', ,

are also effectiveEW.

must reduceon our radios. We have to reduce

The time toour communication needs..... I


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inside the aircraft.rom the Dash

1CelJted the V V I . V U l l U '

our fixed Uf11nr r l t i

with retractable under-\1l l,rY l Y ln horn. The T

this WARNING:

obstacle clearance climb

aviator cited in the


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Hangar Talk is the first in a series of quizzes the AulationDlgestwill be carrying. Each quiz will contain sever l questionsb sed on a publication pplic ble to Army Aviation. Theanswers are t the bottom of the page.did not do so well, perhaps you should get out the publicationand look it over.

R 95 1Fort Rucker AL

1 When is oxygen rYI ,nM t - ' ,r r r l . r . I < : : lassociated with ensemble.

4 For

erature indexb All aircraft crewmembers should

goal that all ~ O l a l l e r sn H - n ~ i h l l . h nnOr'.:lTO in the chemical

nr("\1"OI'"'1"I\/O ensemble for sixThis standard must be meton a dirty battlefield.

XM33 NBC MaskA new NBC mask has been

r p n l ~ f ' p the M17 and M17Al fieldaircrew the M25Al tank

purpose mask. The mask, C n ( ~ m l C a H ) ] I O l ( ) g l l c a l ,mUllti[mrom;e XM30 (the aviation version is the L ' L L h J ~ ' I .molded ebstomar with annpt'lntlpr, :)1 seal and a lens bonded

Iac:eOlece. A loose is fora p l p l H ~ a t l l o n where a chest-mounted canisterThe new mask is to nr,-"llflp

ttTH'''1''n.',,,''',,, op1eratlonal cat=,abllhtH3s and reduced 10g;lStlCalfor wear under a wide range ofand ' ~ ~ r r ~ D , n ~ a r ~ ~ r l ~t n . r ~ c r p conditions. The

and

1982 and a nrn" p f T p C 1 initialin 1983.Scale Calibration Interval

Deficiency Reporting

The ELT QuestionWe have received a number of ,nn ,,',o c l l 1 ~ Pthese devices in their aircraft. this office feelthat there is an need for ELTs in allaircraft due to the "TD"''''''l1 nthe immediate location of adeath to .n r ,o C1 llrr'rpu dpass,engelrscould be caused lossexposure. Until DA comes out with a definitive I J ,- , , , 'LU - 'Uthis overall the units with ELTs theiraircraft should be those in two locations mentionedabove. . , .


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KP THE TSTRESSIN THE AH lG COBR HELICOPTER

The problem of heat stress dealt with in this article also holds true for the AH-1S and T W Cobra operating under similar conditions of maximum grossweight high ambient temperature and low relative h l lm in i tColonel J.R. Gauld M.D. Lieutenant Colonel H.D. Silsby M.D. Captain G. Ramirez

Environmental Sciencehief, Preventive Medicine Activity Flight SurgeonThe authors were assigned to the William Beaumont rmy Medical Center, EI Paso, TX, when this articl e was writtenC CKPlT HEAT stress has

desertand brush with a base of aboutsea level MSL). In the summer*The WBGT index is computed from readings of (1 a stationarywet bulb thermometer exposed to the sun, a black globethermometer similarly exposed, and 3) a dry bulb thermometershielded from the direct rays of the sun. The WBGT index is

4

environmental controlwhen the exhaust

d e ~ a T e ~ s Celsius 1,crewmembers cannot activate system h p o , , ,y . . , , , ;,.,PIT,..,,'''',, Celsius as the environmentalwill add about the EGT. The AH-l G also

the best means of evaluating heat stress potential. At a WBGTindex of 82 degrees Fahrenheit, discretion is r ' ,.. ,.',.... .onriorithe planning of heavy exercises for troops.


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THERE WAS 'aft. This resulted in pinning his thighbetween the cyclic and the left seat sbottom frame. Now we were halfway down the slope in a IS-degreenose-down attitude. Bob forced thegrenade through the door (it fellharmlessly in a ditch), but as helurched outward to clear the grenadepast the skids he thrust down withhis left hand to maintain his balance.His hand sought out the nearestconvenient grip- the collective pitchcontrol-which he bottomed out.

There I was, 40 knots and increasing, full down pitch, a cockpit halffilled with green smoke and controlsthat I could not move. Only byshifting my grip on the collective tothe control head and taking advan-

tage of the increased leverage andexerting enough rear pressure onthe cyclic to bruise Bob s leg wasthe helicopter leveled and enoughcollective pitch applied to cushionour 20-knot plus run-on landing tothe plowed field. f it weren t forthe German farmer s fastidious plowing, this unusual approach wouldhave terminated considerably lesssuccessfully than it did.

I learned a valuable lesson thehard way and not without some lossof my feeling of well-being. Theoperator s manual for the OH-S8Acautions against-leaving the controlsn the left hand station when carryingnonrated passengers. f I had evaluated the necessity of leaving the

controls in against the hazards thatcould occur, and if we had notallowed a training environment,albeit realistic in nearly every sense,to impair sound judgment and safepractices, this whole episode neednever have taken place.

In the future I will evaluate eachmission carefully to determine whether or not left side controls (cyclicand collective) are needed. I willonly use smoke grenades if the crewdoors are removed and all involvedare thoroughly briefed about theiroperation and inherent hazards intheir misuse. I hope that othersbenefit from knowing this happenedand will not have the xperin e 0learn as I did. {

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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aptain ThomasJ McNamaraFt. Huachuca Z

Ju st as tank s ha ve always bee n th e mos t ef fec t ive wea po n aga inst tank s he lico pters ar e the mos tefficac io us mean s o f fighting he lico pt ers . Use o f helicopters by bo th warring sides wi ll inevita bl y lead toc las hes be tween them. Like tank ba ttl es o f the pas t wa rs a future wa r between we ll-eq uipped arm ies isbo und to invo lve he lico pt e r bat tles.

COL M elov

n nalysis f TheHELICOPTER THRE T

In preparing this articlf , many sources were consulted including releasesfrom the Soviet press. The readershould understand that the Sovietsoften release Hdisinformation" toconfuse Western observers. TheSoviet tactics discussed in this articlemay be examples of such disinformation. In the absence of conflictingfacts , however, U.S. Soldiers shouldat least consider the Soviet-statedemployment techniques.Aviation Digest thanks Military Intelligencefor permission to reprint this article

JAN UARY 1981

T HE ABOVE QUOTE by one of the most respectedaviation authorities in the Soviet Un ion illustratesthe growing Soviet awareness of eventual he licoptercombat T he Soviet concern seems we ll foun ded.T he United States Army with the bulk of America nhe licop ter assets now fie lds about 8000 helicopters;the Soviet Union exclusive of Warsaw Pact assetsabout 3 460. Sheer numbers high mob il ity battlefieldlocation and combat missions sure ly d ictate eventualenco un te rs.How will the U.S. crew fare agai nst the Soviets?Ea ch enco unter will be different ; each encounter wi llbe unpredictab le; and many e nco un te rs will becha racterized by lethal violence. Th e Ame rican crewca n increase its longevity in susta ined operations byacquiring as much information as possible on thethreat. This article will supply some of that informationby describing an d analyzing the threat and whenappro priate comparing th e threat with its U.S.co unterpart Areas of foc us will be personnel taskorganization equipment and tactical employment

45


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Helicopter Threat continued)Prior to examining the Soviet pilot, one must viewtwentieth century Soviet society. The Russian people,

particularly since the early 1930s, have generouslyrewarded scientific and technical achievement. Abetter society through science seems to be a Sovietaxiom. To this end, the government has providedexcellent aeronautical training for all interestedyoungsters. A youth attracted to an aviation careermay very well initiate his specialized training in hisearly teens.As the youth progresses into secondary or technicalschool he is required to complete military preinduct iontraining. This training, similar to our voluntary juniorReserve Officer Training Corps ROTC ), consists of140 hours of military training conducted over a periodof /2 to 2 school years.

The course of instruction, given concurrently withregular scholastic or technical courses, is partiallycomprised of general military subjects. However , asmuch as 25 percent of the training may be technicallyoriented. This technical training will be directly relatedto a military specialty, such as aviation. The program,entitled DOSAAF (The All Union Voluntary Societyfor Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy),provides the Air Force with a pool of politicallyindoctrinated, scientifically knowledgeable candidatesfor flight training.

When the aspirant has graduated from secondaryschool he may apply for formal inservice militaryflight training. Applicants for flight training aresubjected to intensive aptitUde, psychological andphysiological testing. In addition, they must pass acompetitive general subjects written examination withan emphasis on aerodynamics. Of course all candidatesmust pass a thorough KGB background investigationwhich closely scrutinizes the political reliability of theapplicant and his family. The men finally selected forformal training are considered the best of the genera-tion.

Training the Soviet pilot is expensive and timeconsuming. Little is written in the current Sovietpress relating to actual VVS Soviet Air Force) initialhelicopter training. However, it is known that VVSinitial training typically is conducted over a 2 to 3year period. t includes subjects such as aerodynamics,aircraft construction, maintenance, communication,navigation , gunnery, engineering and tactics.

Although the school is at least twice as long as U.Sinitial training, the actual flight training is probablysimilar to that of NATO countries. The first year atthe VVS flight academy is devoted to general militarysu bjects, as might be found in the U.S. Army branchofficer basic courses. Furthermore, this initial period maycontain an advanced aircraft qualification phase a

46

phase that the U.S. Army considers graduate leveltraining). From this training the new pilot is ready tojoin his organization and pursue his career as a ratedpilot.

The Soviets have organized their com bat rotorcraftinto independent helicopter regiments. Th ese regiments usually number two to three per Tactical AirArmy (T AA). Currently there are 16 T AAs. Four arelocated in Eastern Europe. The remaining 12 arelocated in each of the military districts in the USSR.

The helicopter regiments are designated as eitherassault or transport. The assault regiment, the mostlikely to be encountered by U.S. troops , providesforward area services to the Soviet ground units. Thisassault regiment is usually composed of five squadrons:three attack squadrons and two transport squadronsEighteen aircraft are found in the attack squadron; 15aircraft in the transport squadron. One must keep inmind, however, thCl.t when dealing with the T AA andits subordinate units no absolute organization exists.The organization is structurally fluid and is tailoredto meet specific needs.All aircraft working in the T AA are VVS assetsemployed in a direct support role. This integratedrole with a su bordinate helicopter command relationship is consistent with Soviet doctrine of combinedarms operations. This task organization is structuredto take full advantage of the helicopter s mobility andspeed to achieve the ground comma nder s objective.

To achieve success, the Soviets have not only aviable organizational framework , but an abundanceof outstanding helicopters. Two helicopters whichU.S. forces are most likely to encounter on the modernbattlefield are the Mi-24 attack helicopter (NATOcode name: HIND) and the Mi-8 troop transporthelicopter (NATO code name: HIP). Both of thesecraft are excellently engineered, constructed andequipped for their respective roles.

The HIND, introduced in 1971, is generally considered one of the most sophisticated helicoptergunships in the world. Latest reports indicate that itmay have a radar directed four barrel 12.7 mm Gatlingtype machinegun , a fo rward looking infrared scannerfor target detection, a low-light level TV , eletrothermaldeicing devices for main and tail rotor blades, and abulletproof wind screen.

The HIND combines the firepower of conventionalgunships and the lifting capability of modern trooptransports. It is expected , however , to be usedexclusively in the gunship role.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Augmenting the HIND is the principal assaulttransport helicopter, the HIP. The backbone of theair assault, the HIP can carry 28 combat equippedtroops plus a crew of 3 Th e HIP can also deliver selfsupporting rocket fire for disembarking troops. HIPsar e usually escorted to the assault location by HINDS.The following graphical excerpt from the December1979 issue of r orce magazine further illustratesthe characteristics of both the HIND and the HIP.

HIND ND HIP COMP RISONManufac turer Mil Mi l MilName/ Designation HI P/ Mi8 HIND A/ Mi24 HN D D

Da te in Service 1967 1971No . of Eng ines 2 2

Weight Kg )Empty 7,261 N/ AGross 12, 1 ,Range Km ) 48 5Crew + Pa x 3 28 4 + 8Primary Roles GP, Assau lt Armed Assau lt AttackArm ame nt 4 Bo mbs or 12 7 mm MG 4 Barrel4 Rocket Pods 4 Swatter 23 mm Cannon ,or Sagger 128 57 mm 4 Py lons for

Rockets 57 mm Rockets

Although these systems are formidable, they canbe defeated. The HIND, with .its fu lly articulatedrotor system , may be less maneuverable than initiallybelieved. Its unique profile and size present an easilyrecognized, significant target. The onboard antitankguided weapon ATGW) must be visually tracked tothe target. During the time from missile launch totarget hit , a maximum of 27 seconds, the helicoptermust remain unmasked, unable to use the terrain forconcealment. The aircraft is obviously vulnerable toenemy antiaircraft fire during this critical time.

In comparison , the United States has recentlyintroduced two new helicopters, the UH-60 BlackHawk and the AH-64 advanced attack helicopter(AAH ). These new helicopters should be a vastimprovement over the current systems. As MajorGeneral Edward M Browne states in a recent interview,The AAH has greater firepower and standoff, has anight and adverse weather capability, is more survivable,

more reliable and more maintainable.A new ATGW system to be mounted on the AAHis probably the most important attack helicopterimprovement. The AH-64 will be equipped with afire and forget type missile. This will allow the crewto mask behind protective terrain immediately afterfiring the missile. The missile will then home onto thetarget by using laser designation.

JANUARY 1981

With the integration of the UH-60 and AH-64 intothe helicopter fleet, the United States should achieveequipment parity on any battlefield. The critical factorat that time will be proper use and employment offorces.

The Russians closely observed American helicoptertactics and vulnerabilities during the Vietnam era.Soviet air tacticians have efficient ly adapted lessonslearned to modern battlefield dynamics. The Sovietsmay now be considered world authorities in effectivehelicopter employment.

The majority of helicopters observed on the battlefield will most likely be engaged in either of twomissions: heliborne assault or antiarmor operations.The heliborne assault would typically involve theseizure of a specific objective. The objective wouldusually be a pinpoint target such as a river crossingsite or mountain pass. It would be located 20 to 30miles ahead of an advancing force. The heliborneforce may be supported by artillery, attack helicopters

or fighter cover. The force could quickly fly to theobjective, disembark and secure it in a matter ofminutes. A contingent of 20 to 30 HIPs, supplementedwith a smaller force of heavy lift helicopters, couldmove an entire motorized rifle ba ttalion.

The other primary mission would be antiarmoroperations. In that arena, the HIND is the undisputedleader in airborne warfare. Wherever opposingNATO/ Warsaw Pact tanks gather , HINDs will surelybe present. This means that an American crew insupport of a NATO task force can clearly expect toencounter HINDs. Due to the substantial threat posedby U.S. helicopters , the American crew should expectengagement by the HIND.Specifically, the HINDs will be operating in nap-ofthe-earth (NOE) flight , deployed in pairs and positionedwell forward in the main battle area. When thusdeployed, the aircraft also will be within range ofsupporting ground based air defense systems.

The HIND's weapons systems could attack anotherhelicopter as easily as an armored vehicle. Obviouslyit is a formidable enemy. However, a Soviet writerdescribing training in a Turkestan helicopter gunshipsquadron recently revealed possible tactical weaknesses.The author describes the helicopter's performing divingtype firing, as opposed to hover fire. This divingtechnique, long ago eliminated from U.S. tactics,exposes the aircraft to hostile fire for unnecessarilylong periods of time.

The rationale for this technique may be the relativescarcity of antiaircraft weapons in opposing units.The maneuver provides a very lucrative target foropposing helicopter crews. Maneuverability, battlefield

47


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Helicopter Threat continued)observation and weapons selection change are severelylimited in the dive. f the Soviets pursue this divingtactic, the U.S. crew could take advantage of vulnerabilities presented.

In the same article, Major Belyayev mentionedengagement of targets at minimum range. While thismight show pilot bravado and increase weaponseffectiveness, the advantage of such close maneuveringis doubtful. By maneuvering to minimum range , theSoviet crew exposes themselves to hostile counterfirefor a longer period of time. In contrast , U.S. tacticsemphasize target engagement at maximum range inorder to maximize number of engagements, achievesurprise and increase survivability.Conclusion

Asher Lee, writing in 1959, stated , The Soviet

ax tables

\defense authorities are readily aware of the importanceof tactical mobility in the atomic age. Apart fromrecent increased emphasis on armored forces, helicopters will assume more and more a large-scale rolein achieving this mobility. His words were prophetic.Today the Soviet helicopter force was achievedworldwide recognition as a potent attack threat.

The American airman , however, should not beinordinately alarmed. Soviet and American helicopterpilots are probably comparable. The equipment usedby the USSR and U.S. is roughly equivalent. TheSoviet and NATO organizations are equally viable.Russian tactical employment, while impressive, displaysweaknesses. Collectively, these comparisons indicatethat the Soviets can be defeated in the inevitablehelicopter to helicopter battle.

I MUsr~ ~ T H ~RIGHT

Be sure to use the correct tax table when figuring your Federal incometax this year. Remember accurate taxpayers get their refunds sooner.A public service message from the Internal Revenue Service .

8 U.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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US rmyCommunicationsCommandATe CTIONLINE

VISU L PPRO CHESSPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS of the Controllers' Manual,7110.65B, and the Airman's Information Manual (AIM)appear to give contradictory information on requirements necessary for visual approaches . Paragraph430d of th e Controllers' Manual states that an aircraftmust not only have reported the preceding aircraft insight and be instructed to follow it before being clearedfor a visual approach , but also must have the airportin sight. The AIM , paragraph 383a, states the aircraftmust have the airport in sight r the identified precedingaircraft in sight before the clearance is issued.

Both manuals are correct. The AIM describes thevisual approach procedures associated with a radarenvironment, as prescribed for controllers in 711O.65B,paragraph 796. Paragraph 430 addresses nonradarfaci lities and nonapproach control towers. In October

1977, the 7110.65 was changed to expand the authorityof nonapproach control towers to include clearingmore than one aircraft for a visual approach, providedthe succeeding aircraft had both the destination airportand the preceding aircraft in sight. The AIM does notaddress the difference between radar and nonradarvisual approach procedures because the operationaldifferences as perceived by the pilot are so insignificantthat the additional discussion of controller requirementswould add little to a pilot's understandin g of the airtraffic control system and would probably create moreconfusion than it would cure. In any case, the 7110.65procedures are binding on the controllers, while theAIM is directed toward pilots and is strictly advisoryin nature.

HOW TO GET A SUSPENSIONTHE FOLLOWING IS an extract from the FederalAviation Administration Briefs of 20 October 1980:

The agency has suspended the airman certificateof a helicopter pilot for operating a chopper nearDenver's Mile High Stadium just before the kickoff ofthe Broncos/ Chargers football game. The pilot, whowas on an aerial photography mission for a local TV

station. reportedly flew as low as 100 feet and passed'ithin 100 feel of the stadium. He also flew below theminimum speed necessary for a safe autorotativelanding in the event of engine failure. The pilot canappeal the Um-day suspension to the National Trans-portation Safety Board .

Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:Director

USAATCA Aeronautical Services OfficeCameron StationAlexandria VA 223 4


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