Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1985

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1985

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eHOP RTY O U S ARM t

LIBRARY USAARLFORT RUCKER.


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JANUARY 985 VOLUME 3 NUMBER 1

1 Commander's Farewell, MG Bobby J.Maddox

2 The AH64 and OT II, CPT Robert L Jr.13 U.S. Army Aviation Board Adds New

Dimension, CW3 Ray E. Stanton

17 Aviation Doctrine and Training Literature18 Back Pain in the Army Helicopter Pilot,

MAJ Dennis F. M.D.22 PEARL'S24 DES Report to the Field: Changes to

Instrument Flight Evaluations Why?25 Army Aviation Museum26 Converting the AH1 for the Air-to-Air Role,

CW3 Ron Moring

28 Why Air Assault at the U.S. Army AviationCenter, COL C. and CPT

Jeffrey J. Anderson31 Jump TOC for the Air Cavalry Squadron, CPT

Alan D. Swain and CPT Richard L Lucas36 AVLOG 84, CPTThomas W. and CPT

Joseph E. Faubion

44 Inst rument Corner: Holding Entries MadeSimple, CW4 Mike Harbin

Outside Back Cover: ATC Action Line:RPV Operations, Mr. Jesse M. Burch Jr.Cover: Related to the tactical lessons

learned during the AH64 OT II at Ft.Hunter-Liggett. Story begins on page 2.

The missio n the U.S. rmy Aviation Digest USPS 415350) is to provide inform ationof an operational, functional nature concerning salety and aircraft accident prevention,

page 13 page 25

Vl gHonorable John O. Marsh Jr.

Secretary of the Army

Major General Bobby J. MaddoxCommander, U.S. Army Aviation Center

Brigadier General P) Ellis D. ParkerAssistant Commandant

U.S. Army Aviation Center

Brigadier General Wayne C. KnudsonArmy Aviation Officer, ODCSOPS

Richard K. TierneyEditor

accordance with Army Regul ation 3101. Second-class postage paid atadditional mailing offices.

training, maintenance, ope,ranons, r esearch and development, Aviation medicine and other Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distributi on system as outlinedrelated data. in AR 310-2. Complete DA Form 125R and send directly to CDR, AG PutllicGlliO lS

The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly underthe supervision the commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expressed hereinare not necessarily those of the Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center.Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise specified. Use of the masculine isIntended to include both genders unless otherwise stated. Material may be reprintedprovided credit is given to the Digest and to the author unless otherwise indicated.

Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are

commu nicati on is authorized by Editor, U.S. rmy Aviation Digest P.O. DrawerP, Fort Rucker, Al36362-5000, or calling AUTOVON 558-6680, FTS 533-6680 or Commercial205255-6680. Manusc rip ts returned request.

This publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army, 6 January 1984,

2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any change in distributi on requirementsinitiate revised DA Form 125R.

National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpOint distr ibutio n also should submitDA Form 125R. Other National Guard units should submit requests throughadjutant general.

not eligible distribution or who desire personal copies of the Digecan order the magazine from the Superintendent

Office, Washington, DC 20402.Government

Annual subscription rates are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas. POSTMASTER:Send address changes to Superintendent Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, 20402.


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Major General Bobby J. MaddoxChief, Army Aviation Branch

Commander s Farewell

s OMMANDER of the Aviation Center, andfirst chief of the Aviation Branch, I have beenprivileged to be part of many exciti ng eventsconcerning the development and implementationof the Army Aviation Branch. Much has been saidabout these events in both the Aviation BranchUpdate letter and the viation Digest There ismuch more to be said and there are a great manytasks to be completed.

It has been my pleasure to help mold many ofthe projects concerning Aviation development.The viation Digest has served the Army Aviationcommunity well by bringing Aviation matters tothe forefront and highlighting doctrine, tactics,training and equipment.

Historic milestones and events have been identified, and met. Some of the highlights of thoseevents were: Operational testing for the ArmyHelicopter Improvement Program AHI P ; contract awards to qualify and integrate Air-to-AirStinger ATAS) on our scout aircraft; AH-64Apache production; the first Aviation AdvancedCourse and Aviation Basic Officer Course graduations; and the reorganization of the trainingelements at the Aviation Center to include thefirst all enlisted training department at the Aviation Center with a sergeant major as director.

J NU RY 1985

All of these events have been reported in theviation Digest as we have guided Army Aviation

through its embryonic stage. We see resultsbecause highly motivated professional soldiersand civi I ans loyally devoted their time and effortto inject innovative ideas into Branch implementation. They are the people we count on. As I leaveFt. Rucker, I can assure you that the teamassembled there is superb in every respect.

I challenge each of you involved with ArmyAviation to search out problems and offer solutions on the pages of the Aviation Digest I calioneveryone in the field to publish - to make asignificant professional contribution by writingsubstantive material which will help shape theAviation Branch of the future.

It is vital to your professional development, theBranch and the Army to keep continuoustechnical and tactical information flowing acrossthe pages of this magazine. It is our duty to continuously process this information for the benefitof those charged with the development andgrowth of the Army s newest and most potentially lethal combat arm.

I leave this command, comfortable with theknowledge that our Branch has measured up tothe Army of Excellence for which we are proud tobear the standard. Your untiring efforts anddedication have brought together the dreams ofso many who preceded us. Thank you for your innovative leadership, enthusiasm and plain oldhard work. You have brought Army Aviation intothe 21 st century. AIR ASSAULT.

1


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T C T I C L L E S S O N S L E R N E D

Cited as being the greatest training experience for combat preparation, the AH-64 AdvancedAttack Helicopter Operational Test II OT II)was conducted during the summer

of 1981 at Ft. Hunter-Liggett C using a standard threat scenario where the Threat forces wereattacking and the Blue forces were defending. Lessons learned during the

OTII willensure a better doctrine and hopefully lead to a raining program with real-timecasualty assessment exercises.

Captain Robert L. Johnson Jr.Ch ief Scout Attack Branch

U.S . Army Av ia ti on BoardFort R u cker AL


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DURING THE summer of1981, the most advancedattack helicopter in theworld, the AH64 Apache,

was pitted against an overwhelminy threat force in a freeplay exercise. The results led toaircraft modifications and doctrinal employment concepts

which one day may prove to bethe combat multiplier that willensure victory in any futureconflict.

The AH64 Advanced AttackHelicopter Operational Test II(OT II) was conducted at Ft.HunterLiggett, CA. This was afree play realtime casualty

AH64 Apache aircraft at holding

area (below) and returning to base aftercompleting mission (right)

during Operational Test II at Ft.

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. -... . ' l , -, " "

.- :. J .......

Hunter.Ligget, CA.

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assessment, forceonforce exercise. Threat forces consistedof a reinforced tank company ofT72 tanks (M60A1), BMPs(M113armored personnel carrierswith TOW , one to two SA8 airdefense artillery threat simulators(ADATS), one SA9 ADATS, twoZSU 234s (one ADATS and one

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ZSU 23A) and four SA7s (injeeps and M 113s). The Blue forceconsisted of one tank platoon(M60AI) and an AH64 platoonconsisting of three AH64s, twosurrogate scout airborne targetand fire control systems ATAFCS)and a battle captain in anOH58C Kiowa. The ATAFCS aircraft were AH1 R model Cobrasthat incorporated a target acquisition and designation systemsimi lar to the AH64.

The OT II was conducted us

ing a standard threat scenariowhere the Threat forces were attacking and the Blue forces weredefending. The range facilitiesand all equipment were fully instrumented and allowed for realtime casualty assessment. Eachengagement was monitored bycomputer facilities to determinewho the players were (i.e., AH64versus T72, etc.); what thecapabilities of the engagingweapon system were (i.e., AH64engaging by HELLFIRE missileat X range with X time offlight, etc.); if the correctparameters for launch, track andhit were met; and, finally todetermine if a kill occurred.

The following is a typicalengagement sequence: AnAH64 acquires a T72 and laserdesignates the target. The lasersensor on the T72 tells the computer that an AH64 laser is

paint ing the tank and thelength of time the AH64 s laserstays on target. The sensors onthe AH64 tell the computer theaircraft s location and if the aircraft has properly gone throughall procedures (switchology)necessary to launch a missile.They also tell the computerwhen the missile is launched.

As the computer gathers thisinformation, it determines if the

laser track from the AH64 to theT72 is long enough and accurateenough for a missile hit. If so, thecomputer analyzes the HELLFIREmissile characteristics (range,time of fire, mode of launch, etc.)to determine if it hit the targetand subsequently made a kill. Ifall the data indicates that theT72 has been destroyed, thecomputer will transmit amessage to the tank and aflashing light will illuminate onthe T72. The vehicle then stops,and a crewmember pops asmoke grenade.

All this takes place almost instantaneously so that the f low ofbattl e appears real time. Similar

engagements occur simultaneouslyall over the battlefield. It 'salmost like fight ing a real battle,but with lasers instead ofbullets. For those of us who participated in the AH64 OT II, thiswas the greatest training experience we could have receivedto prepare us for combat.

The OT lasted all summer, andwe tried to run up to three

t r ials a day, with each trial

lasting 30 minutes. Each beganwith an announcement from thetest officer to start trial andended when one side or theother became combat ineffective, the Threat forces securedtheir objective or when 30minutes had elapsed. The trialsvaried by the terrain that wasused and by certain distractors such as electronic warfareplayed in both day and nightscenarios.

The doctrine and employmentconcepts that we initiallydeveloped before the OT, weremodified and improved as wegained experience. Although theOT participants in the AH64 pia

toon were highly experienced,many problems initially developedin tact ical ly employing theAH64 platoon. At first, the taskoverload inside the cockpit ofboth AH64 and surrogate scoutaircraft often produced less thandesirable results.

Operating in a high threat airdefense radar environmentproved to be most difficult .Despite their vast experience,

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few of the pilots had ever workedagainst an ADATS before, anddefinitely not against the full array of threat air defense artillery(ADA) radar systems at the sametime. It was not unt il we learnedhow to function in this kind of

environment that employmentconcepts were refined and properly used. It is these employmentconcepts and tactical lessonslearned during the aT that Idiscuss below in three parts: first,tactical lessons leamed during theaT; second, premission planningand battle organization; and third,actual mission employment. Theseemployment concepts are theclosest thing to battle tested thatone can get without firing a liveround in combat. With the fieldingof the AH-64, now is an opportunetime to reflect on the employmentconcepts and lessons leamed duroing the AH64 aT II. Furthermore,these lessons learned mightenhance new concepts currentlyunder consideration.

TACTICALLESSONS LEARNED

DURING THE AH64 OT IIBefore discussing the employ

ment concepts and premissionplanning, it is important to lookat the tactical lessons learned tounderstand why the AH64 wasemployed in the manner thatevolved during the latter portionof the aT.

Organization for Satt/e. During the OT, only three AH64 prototype aircraft were available.Therefore, we organized into twosections, each consisting of anAH64 and a scout. If the thirdAH64 was available for the trial,it was assigned to one of the sec-tions and used as the primary aircralt to service ground laseridentification and designatorG LI0) calls for fire. The battle

JAN UARY 1985

captain flew in an OH58C. Thiswas primarily because no othersurrogate scouts existed andbecause we found it was an ade-quate aerial platform for the mis-sion of the batt le captain.

The battle captain cannot

simultaneously function as bothbattle captain and as one of thesection scouts. This is becauseof the sophistication of thevarious visionics, increasedworkload as a result of thetechnological equipment on theaircraft, and the complexity ofthe interaction between thescout and AH64. The complexityof the responsibilities of the battie captain and the section scoutwill become clearer throughoutthe article.

The battle captain needed amiminum of one very high fre-quency (VHF), one ultrahighfrequency UHF and two frequency modulated (FM) radios on hisaircraft to maintain communica-tion between both sections a{ldall supporting ground units,GLlO, artillery, ground commander, etc. With the extendedranges and separations in which

the AH64 platoon worked, intercommunications between air-cralt and between sectionsbecame extremely difficult attimes. This was because of thepoor ability of the current radiosto operate over extendeddistances in nap ofthe earth environment Intercommunica-tions between air and groundunits also proved to be very dif-ficul t. The battle captain had tocontinually move about the bat-

tlefield to establish and maintaincommunication with all of theseelements. He had to pass perti-nent information about Threatactions from one section to theother because the radios wereinadequate for both sections tohearthe initial spot report to thebattle captain.

The batt le captain also had toact as the intermediary in

transmitting request forH ELLFI RE missile engagementsbetween the GLID and the thirdAH64. Whenever pOSSible, thethird AH64 was used to servicethese requests from the G LID.However, it was the battle cap-

tain s responsibility to knowwhere the G LID was, the generallocation of the target the GLIDwanted to engage, and whetheror not an AH64 was available tomeet the launch constraints ofthe missile. Too many missileswere lost init ially by allowing theAH64 to communicate directlywith the G LIO. The communications problems were such thatby allowing the AH64 to communicate direct ly with the GLlO,it effectively took that AH64 outof the platoon as a maneuvermember.

With a platoon conSisting offive AH64s and three scouts, anorganization consisting of a sec-tion with one scout and threeAH64s and a second sectionhaving one scout and twoAH64s would be best. The battlecaptain must have his own aircraf t. The third AH64 in the f irst

section should be maneuveredso that normally it is centrallylocated to more readily meetGllO missions which mightarise. Missile launch constraintsbetween the GLiO and the targetbeing designated and the location of the G LI0 with respect tothe AH64 are the driving factorshere.

Scouts and Remote HELLFIREEngagements Since the surrogate scouts participating inthe aT had laser designationcapabili ty as well as onboard visionics that were somewhatcompatible to the AH64s', thecapability for remote HELLFIREmissile launches existed.Remote shots are importantbecause they allow a highervolume of fire, permit thegreatest possible use of themaximum eltective range of the

5


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missile allow the AH64 to reo

main masked while firingmissiles and provide the opportunity to effect a continuousvolume of fire on the threatforces by having the AH64 firefor a remote designator while theother aircraft is relocating.

FIGURE 1: Calls for fire.

However the ini tial tendencyfor the scouts during the OT wasto concentrate more on being

ki l ler scouts than on accomplishing the traditionalscout functions. AdditionalIy the remote shot is difficult to

accomplish. t requires goodcommunication between theAH64 and the scout; requiresthe scout pilot to ensure that hislaser designation is within theconstraints of the H ELLFI REmissile on the AH64; mandates

an extremely good target handoff procedure over the radio toensure that the scout's laser ispainting the target for a sufficient amount of t ime for theHELLFIRE missile to lockonand impact the target; and ex-

poses the unmasked scout foran extensive period. Themethods developed for thevarious calls for fire are in figure1 Few remote shots were suc-cessful during the OT and all surrogate scout losses (kills by

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Threat forces) occurred whilescouts attempted remote shots.Therefore, because of the abovementioned problems, theautonomous direct shot by theAH6 (in other words, selfdesignation) was by far the mosteffective means of engagingtargets during the OT II.

Scouts should attempt remoteshots only when targets ofopportunity arise, during initialengagements when AH64s areoutside the maximum effectiverange for (autonomous) directshots, or during situations whena maximum volume of fire iswanted on targets, such as atank battalion that is caught in

the open. Thescout's

roleis

critical in the section. The killing should be left to the mostefficient killing machine, whichis the AH64.

There were times during theOT that scouts became so involved in trying to be killerscouts that they lost contactwith sections of the Threatforces. Many times the volumeand effectiveness of fire wasdecreased because the scouts

were trying to fire remote shotsat targets that would have beenmore efficiently serviced by anAH64 firing direct. This was ahard lesson to learn, and itwasn t until the latter part of theOT that a proper balancebetween remote shots for thescouts and direct shots byAH64s was struck.

Battle Positions. A number ofthings were learned aboutfighting and selecting a goodbattle position. All the factors inselecting a battle position asstated in the field manuals arevalid, but a few need elaboration.Background is critical. A battleposition which has a backgroundmakes detection of an aircraft byboth optical and electronicmeans extremely difficult-asopposed to an aircraft beingskylined when unmasking. This

JANUARY 1985

applies regardless of range tothe target. If the battle positionand back .ground are in theshade the detectability of an unmasked aircraft is furtherdecreased making it almost impossible to see. This is the bestcombination that an aircraft canfind (background and shade).

The battle position has to haveintervisibility with the variousengagement areas. Given theranges at which the AH64s wereengaging and the terrain inwhich the fighting was occurring(Ft. HunterLiggett was hilly andcluttered with trees), altitude iscritical in gaining intervisibility.The greater the altitude of thebattle position, the easier to acquire and track a target with thevisionics onboard the aircraft.The lower the altitude, the closerthe pilot had to get to the targetto engage it .

Remember that when fi ring aTOW missile you can continue totrack a moving target in a cluttered wooded environment aslong as the missile hasn'tentered the woods. Also, if thetarget is moving in and outof

folds in the earth, you can stilltrack the TOW missile to whereyou expect the target toreappear.

With a HELLFIRE missile,things are different. Once themissile is launched, it guides onthe laser energy painted on thetarget. If the target is movingthrough a cluttered, wooded environment, the laser beam maybe deflected by the clutte r andsend false signals to the missileabout the target s location. If thetarget moves into a fold in theearth while you re tracking it,and you don t shi ft to some typeof solid ground target to get aconstant laser return, you runthe risk of losing the missile.Therefore, altitude is critical inselecting battle positions tomaintain your standoff rangeand intervisibility with the target.

Another key to selecting agood battle pOSition is to findone that has a portion of the terrain which masks you from thethreat ADA radar (primarilySA8/ZSU 234). USing certainportions of the terrain a largeboulder, rocky knob, etc.) tomask your aircraft signatureprevents the threat radar fromlocking on you even though it

knows you re in that area. Untilwe learned how to use the terrainin this manner-to prevent radarlockon during the OT w e werenot an effective fighting force. Itseemed that every time we stuckour heads up to take a look, wewere being searched, acquiredand lockedon in a matter ofseconds. If a threat radar systemcan prevent you from engagingthe threat forces simply by usingits radar systems (without having to fire a shot), it has fulfilledits mission and prevented youfrom completing yours. Once welearned how to use our APR39sand to properly select the terrainfrom which to unmask, webecame extremely effective.

To prevent the ADA radar lock

on, we began adjusting many ofour techniques. Often thescouts would run decoy missions. They would positionthemselves away from theAH64, beyond range of the ZSU234, in a shaded battle positionto prevent visual acquisition anduse the APR39s to tell us wherethe radar systems were comingfrom. We would then occupythe radar systems by allowingthem to acquire and sometimeslockon (immediately breakinglock) to fix the attention of theradar operators on the scouts.This afforded the AH64s anunhindered opportunity toengage the Threat forces.

I do not recommend thistechnique unless the scoutcrews are thoroughly familiarwith the use of their APR39s, thecapabilities and limitations of


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threat radar systems, and theyare thoroughly knowledgeable inusing the terrain to select battlepositions. As a point of interest,no casualties were taken whileusing this decoy technique.

Flank shots are invaluable. Icannot say enough about this. Itis to your advantage to select abattle position that will permitflank shots into your engagement area. Also, if you find agood battle position which

allows you to engage the threatwithout being acquired, youshould continue to use that position until you are forced torelocate: This was a very interesting development thatcame out of the OT. Every oncein a while we ran across a perfectbattle position which affordedthe desirable characteristicsmentioned. We found it better to

stay in such a battle position andfire 8 to 10 missiles instead ofrelocating 5 to 6 times and fir ingthe same number of missiles.This causes a lot of heartburnwith book tacticians, whoteach staying in a battle positiononly long enough to fire onemissile (sometimes two). I agreethat for TOW missile engagements that is true. However,when fighting with AH64s firingHELLFIRE missiles, and given abattle position with the characteristics mentioned Le., withshade, background, altitude,allowing flank shots and lateralunmasking), and when the position is in excess o 3 km from the

Threat forces, firing 8 to 10missiles is more expedient, efficient, and creates a more accurate and higher volume of fire.

During the OT it was notunusual for the AH64s to havefired all 16 missiles before leaving the second battle position.Here's why: In the time it takesfor an AH1 Cobra to engage twotargets at 3 km from a battle

position, an AH64 can engageeight targets. In a targetrich environment the rapid fire capabilityof the AH-64 permits a more effective employment if the aircraft remains in a good battleposition than if it continues torelocate when it is not necessary. Iyou add the ripple fire capabili tyof the AH-64 (when the AH-64gunner is launching a missile fora remote designator for everymissile fired for himself) to thesame scenario, you find theAH-64 might possibly launch all16 missiles and destroy 16targets in the time it takes a TOWCobra to destroy two targets.

Specific Engagement Areas

When selecting engagementareas during premission planning ensure that these areas arespecific and not just big gooseeggs on your maps. The AH-64can program the Target Acquisition and DeSignation SystemTAOS) to reflect the grid coor

dinates of the center of mass ofeach engagement area you use.This aids in rapid acquisition forthe AH64s when they're moving.The TAOS can be prepointedso when the AH64 unmasks, theTAOS is looking right at theengagement area. Also, themore specif ic your engagementareas are, the easier it is to passthreat movements and locationsto all members of the team.

When selecting an engagement area, choose an area thatmaximizes your aircraft capabilities. It is better to engage thethreat in a specific area whichallows you standoff, intervisibility, etc., even if these specificengagement areas are separatedby several kilometers. If you tryto fight the AH64 throughoutthe entire terrain on a continuous basis you negate manyof the favorable characteristicsof the system. The AH-64s willbeforced to get closer to the threatto engage them, creating situations where the AH-64s will be

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selectively and individuallyengaging targets instead ofengaging many targets with amassive volume of fire. It is inthese situations (betweenengagement areas) where thescouts are more efficient. Thescouts, with their smaller profiles and mast mounted Sights,can engage selected targets ofopportunity while maintainingcontact with the Threat forces,using remote shots. This allowsthe AH64s to position themselves for a massive firepowerrelease as the Threat forcesmove into the engagement area.

Night Fighting and a Compatible Scout Aircraft. Another factwhich became obvious duringthe OT was the night fightingcapability of the AH64. Groundforces have a tendency to bunchup when moving or attacking atnight. They also tend to moveacross more open areas whichenables them to better seewhere they are going. Thesefacts tend to make the AH64 extremely effective in that it canquickly move about the battlefield using the Pilot Night Vi

sion System (PNVS) and canengage targets with the forwardlooking infrared radar (FLIR)system. Without a doubt theAH64 is the finest night fight ingaircraft in the world. However,one fact that came out of the OTloud and clear is that a scout aircraft with compatible visionics(both day and night) is essential.When these two aircraft areemployed together the synergisticeffect on the battle is remarkable.To employ the AH64 without acompatible scout implies usingonly half of the system scapabilities. Employing theAH64 with the OH58C meansthe same thing. The OH58Cdoes not have the visionics or adesignation capability , and it isslow and unmaneuverable. Tosend the AH64 out with this aircraft, particularly at night, is to

JANUARY 1985

virtually put a leash on theAH64. It can be compared tosending out a scout onhorseback in front of an armorbattalion of M1 tanks. The bottom line is that if you want tomaximize the effectiveness ofthe AH64, and get the high killratios that are expected, theAH64 must be employed with acompatible scout aircraft.

Although many more lessonswere learned, those mentionedabove impacted directly in theevolution of the employmentconcepts used during the latterstages of the OT. Because of thecomplexity of the fire controlsystem of the AH64, thoroughpremission planning is essential.

PREMISSIONPLANNING

Probably the most importantingredient to successful employment of the AH64 is premissionplanning. A complete missionbrief is always important;however, there are some uniqueitems of information which mustbe given to the crews of the

AH64 platoon to maximize theirefficiency . Since a large volumeof information needs to becopied down and later made accessible to the crew, it becomesapparent that some means has to

RONT

Ca l i Lase r~ d r ( s s ~ VHf Ul l f

_ A _ 1 _ 1_ 1B _ / _ 1 _ /_

_ / _ / _ /

- ,J - / - 1- 1 E _ / _ 1_ 1_ _

- / - / - 1 -___ / _ / _ /

H _ 1 _ / _ /

3 'T EARP1 5min TOSS l l T l m ~ _ 20min f u e lQ 1m.. o

t V ~ L F__

be developed to ensure thatcrews get the proper information, copy all per tinent items andhave access to it quickly oncethey are in the cockpit. This wasaccomplished by two things:

A standard miss ion brief inthe company tactical standingoperating procedure was usedby the battle captain whenbriefing.

An information sheet thesize of your kneeboard which leftblanks for all required information to be copied down.

Figure 2 is a copy of the sheetused during OT II. This sheet wasacetate covered so that all the information could be markeddown with a water soluble penand quickly erased for the nextmission. This sheet and its interaction with premission planning was invaluable.

Note that the front side of theinformation sheet is divided intocolumns. The first column is forcall signs to be used during themission. The second column isthe storage address in the firecontrol computer (FCC) in whichthe laser code (column 3 is

assigned to that aircraft. Column4 contains the primary radio freequencies that particular aircraftwill be using.Each scout andAH6 aircraf t must have apredetermined laser code and

FIGURE2: Pilot kneeboardinformationsheet.

BACK

LiJN5 fCC

T1

T2

T)

T4

I;

T6

T7

TB

T9

T10

9


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Brevity Codes Meanings

1. Set (NC) Set in initia l position2. Dead Bug (NC) Malfuncti on A/C3. Standby (NC) Self -explanatory4. Abort (NC) Self-ex planatory5. ZSU 23-4 8 ~ (NC) ZSU point at 2856. SA-8 265 (NC) SA-8 point at 2657. SA6 245 (NC) SA-6 point at 2458. No Joy C) No targets in the

engagement area9. Game Time C) Start problem play

10. Playboy C) ECCM Fox

M

Victor

HF

Uniform

HF11 . Joker C) Return to FARP12 . Bingo C) 50% HELLFIRE ammo

remaining/20 minutesfuel on station

13 . Burnout C) 0% HELLFIRE ammoremaining/10 minutesfuel on station

14 . Wait C) Sel f-exp lanato ry15. Sparkle C) Signal for GUO to

designate

FIGURE 3: Brevity code words.

address) prior to beginning themission If AH64 #2 of Section 1is assigned laser code 1141 andstores that laser code in address(C), then everyone in the platoonknows what code AH64 #2 isworking for direct, autonomousengagements. If the scout forSection 1 is assigned a lasercode in address A, then all aircraft know what code scout 1 isworking for remote shots and forlaser range finding. Notice thatthe call for fire for a remote shotis simply, A64 (AH64) this is012 (Set), REO OVER -(REO isthe engagement area). Thismeans that the AH64 will launcha HELLFIRE missile with the

scout's (012) laser code programed into the missile, towardengagement area Red. Consequently, when the missile islaunched, it will begin searchingfor the laser spot beingdesignated by the scout (012)and home in on that particularlaser frequency.

By assigning each aircraft alaser code and address, any air(NC) Code words do not change

C) Code words change daily craft can communicate with anyFIGURE 4: Electronic warfare operations procedures.

CONCEPTION:1) Primary consideration is to get the AH-84 into

the engagement area as soon as possible to maintaina high volume of fire.

2) It is imperative that the AH-84 pilot gain andmaintain intervisibility with his assigned scout.

3) The scout's job is to get the AH-84 into theengagement area so that it can engage autonomously .

4) Worst case, the AH-84 pilot acquires theengagement area as soon as possible to continue thebattle if he has lost visibility with his scout or thescout is rendered ineffective.

TECHNIQUES:1) Radios:

a) Attempts to work through jamming onassigned frequency;

b) Calls battle captain on unaffected radiofrequency:

Foxi.e. PLAYBOY -

FM

Victor

VHF

Uniform

UHFc) Battle captain calls Execute PLAYBOY

FM, that is the time to switch to alternate frequency .

d) If all three radios on both primary and a lter

nate frequencies are jammed, then and only then, the

team will go to the use of SAM cards.

10

2) SAM Cards :

a) The battle position occupied by the AH-84

pilot will designate the engagement area into which

he should orient his fire.

b) Gaining intervisibility with assigned scout

by:

1. HSS/IHAOSS

2. TAOS PrePoint

3. Naked Eye

SAM CARDS SIGNALS:

[Zla) Scout will remote the firstI missile, after missile launch the

~ AH-84 goes autonomous .

b) This enables the scout to get the AH-84 into thedesired engagement area .

c) If the scout shows the remote card again , thatwill terminate that engagement.

The AH64 will goautonomousimmediately

r: :JMo, to EA (A.dl

other aircraft for a remoteHELLFIRE engagement and allparties involved know whichlaser code to use. This precludesany lost missiles because of improper or incorrect laser codeuse. This also aids in remoteHELLFIRE engagements using aGLiO.

When establishing initial contact with the GLlO, the battlecaptain verifies the laser codethe GLiO will be working in support of the AH64 platoon. Thebattle captain also tells the GLiOthe storage address in the FCCsof the AH64s in which his codeis located. Therefore, when a

GLIO shot is called for, the in

itial call for fire to the AH64 fromthe battle captain is, A64 this is011, REO H (Hotel) , OVER. Inthis case the AH64 will launch aHELLFIRE missile with the

Hotel address and laser codeprogramed into the missile. Thisprocedure of assigning specificaddresses and codes facili tatesthe organization and control ofmissile engagements andsimplifies the calls for fire.

DM o t o E A (Blue)

Mo, to EA _ _M O ' t o E A _

PROCEDURES:

a) The AH-84 pilot acknowledges the assigned

card by turning on his WHITE strobe light for 10seconds and the scout takes the appropriate action .If the scout does not acknowledge, the AH-64 willthen go autonomous .

b) Cards 3-6 are used for movement. Cards 12 areused for execution once in position .

c) On a remote shot once the scout p ilot sees theacknowledgement from the AH64, he turns backtoward the engagement area, unmasks anddesignates his target. The AH-64 fires on the scout'sunmaSk, then spot tracks to acquire the specific sector of the engagement area.

d) Log books held up to the window meansBURNOUT-return to the FARP.

U.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/48

As you can imagine, remoteHELLFIRE engagements requireextensive use of the radio;therefore, it is essential thateach section have a primary freequency on which to conduct internal section calls for fire. Ouring the OT, the FM radio wasusually used as the platoon freequency; the VHF, for one of thesection s primary frequencies,and the UHF, for the other section s primary working frequency.

Below these columns on theinformation card are the primaryand alternate frequencies for theplatoon. At the bottom of thecard are the brevity codes. Ouring OT IIsome code words werenever changed and some werechanged daily. Figure 3 lis ts thebrevity codes used during OT II.The brevity code is importantbecause it decreases the use ofthe radios. It also expedites procedures such as operations in anelectronic warfare EW)(i.e., jamming) environment. See figure 4for EW procedures.

The SAM (sendamessage)cards used in figure 4 are simpleand can be seen in all of the

AH64 s sighting systems, including FLIR, out to 2 km.On the back side of the infor

mation card are columns forwriting down the coordinates forthe onboard Laser DopplerNavigation System LONS) andfor those coordinates to bestored in the FCC, which requireeightdigit coordinates andelevation of that coordinate.

Hopefully, this article shedssome light on the AH64 uniquetype information that needs tobe provided during the missionbrief and the premission planning stages of an operation. Using the background informationdiscussed before in the lessonslearned and premission planningsections of the article, let sbriefly look at tactical employment procedures during a defensive operation.

JANUARY 1985

TACTICALEMPLOYMENT

DURINGDEFENSIVE

OPERATIONSThe mission brief is con

ducted at the assembly area.From the information providedin the mission brief, the AH64/scout crews program their onboard equipment FCC, Doppler,laser codes, etc.). Following thisprograming, the crews conduct afunctional systems check, including boresighting theirrespective systems, Doppler,commo checks, etc. Once allsystems are programed and

checked out, the aircraft is flownto the holding area. Upon arrivalat the holding area, the AH64susually shut the engines downand run on their internal APU(auxiliary power unit) to savefuel. The scouts and battle captain depart the holding area andmove forward to establish contact with the ground commander, with G LI0 and reconthe battle positions, etc. The battie captain receives a situationupdate from the ground commander and makes contact withthe GLID to inform him whichlaser code/address he is to work.

As the Threat forces approachthe selected engagement area,the AH64s are brought forward.The AH64s should select initialbattle positions at a distancesuch that the Threat forces enterthe engagement area in thevicinity of the maximum effective range for direct fire (seefigure 5). The scouts shouldselect initial positions that willallow them to cover the areawhich extends from the limit ofthe AH64 s direct fire range tothe maximum effective range ofthe missile. Keep in mind thefact that the scout who isdesignating the target must bewithin a range to the targetwhich does not exceed the max

imum effective range for directfire for the scout s laser (figure 6,page 12). This allows the scoutsto begin engagement using themaximum effective range of themissile while the AH64s aremasked and while the Threatforces are outside the maximumeffective range for direct shotsby the AH64s. The scoutsshould select priority targets toengage, i.e., ADA, command andcontrol, tanks. This is done in anattempt to strip the attackingThreat forces of their ADA support ZSU 234, SA8, etc.) anddisrupt their command andcontrol.

As the Threat forces move intothe engagement

areawithin

direct fire range of the AH64s,the scouts designate the AH64to begin autonomous engagements. By using the pre pointedTAOS on the aircraft, the gunnerof the AH64 should be lookingdirectly into the center mass of

Scout slaser .designation

OHELLFIREindirect firerange

autonomousdirec t f i re range

FIGURES

11


14/48

the engagement area as he unmasks. If for some reason theAH-64 crew is unable to acquirethe Threat forces, the scout canlaser designate the threat targetand allow the AH-64 TAOS tolaser spot track to the target

the scout is designating. Thescouts relocate and providelocal security for the AH-64 aswell as continue with the othertraditional scout functions.

As the Threat forces move towhere the AH-64s are within

direct fire range of theZSU 23-4

the AH-64s relocate to engagethe threat from the next battleposition. If the next suitableengagement area is severalkilometers away, the AH-64sshould relocate and prepare forthat engagement. Since thescouts are maintaining contact,they continue to engage targetsof opportunity with remote shotsfrom the AH-64s. This ensures

FIGURE 6

2

that a continual attrition of theThreat forces is occurring.However, the scouts should onlyengage targets that allow cleanshots. They should not wastemissiles trying to hit a targetwhose engagement is questionable. If the scouts cannot hitthe target between engagementareas because of the terrain, theAH-64s will get the targets asthey move into the next engagement area (figure 7). As theThreat forces move into the nextengagement area, the AH-64 sbegin direct fi re engagements.

Relief on stations should becoordinated so as not to interrupt the flow of battle. I believe

that relief on stations will needto be conducted more frequentlybecause of the ability to rapidlyengage targets and expendmissiles. The more frequent therelief on station , the greater thepressure that is placed on theforward arming and refuelingpoint (FARP) for reloading theaircraf t and getting them turnedaround and back in the battle.The number of armament people

in the FARP must be closelyscrutinized to ensure that thereare enough to facilitate rapidreloading of aircraft.

I have discussed the lessonslearned during the AH-64 OT II inthe tactical employment of theAH-64. I also discussed howthese lessons contributed to theevolution of the employmentdoctrine used during the latterstages of the OT. These concepts were successful; however,a great deal of that success canbe attributed to the experiencegained from the real-timecasualty assessment trials conducted during the OT. The bestequipment and doctrine in the

world are only as good as thepeople who use them. Hopefully,these lessons learned will leadto not only a better employmentdoctrine, but also to a comprehensive training programwith real-time casualty assessment exercises using threatradar systems. If this occurs, thenew concepts under consideration today might prof it from theexperiences of the past.


15/48

u s Army

viationBoard

dds NewDimensionThe Army s newest simulato r, the2840 AH64A Combat Mission

Simulator(CMS), will be used totrain AH64 aviators in comb atskills. Capable of flying virt ually allmodes of terrain flight in variousweather conditions the AH64ACMS will allow you to perform amultitude of simulated combatprocedures, all in airconditionedcomfort.

CW3 Ray E StantonChief, Simulation BranchU S Army Aviation Board

Fort Rucker , AL

TH SIMULATION BRANCHis the newest addition to the UnitedStates Army Aviation Board at Ft.Rucker, AL. The job of our branchis to test flight simulators, to ensurethat you, the users of these devices,are receiving the best possible equipment that technology can provide.Now, when you have a complaint,you know at whom to point yourfinger.

When w test a device, a trainingconcept or an improved software

JAN UARY 1985

Helmet Mounted Visual System is just one test being conducted by theS imulation Branch . Photo courtesy of McDonald Douglas ElectronicsCorporation .

package, our prime consideration isthe aviator who will be required touse it at the organizational level.Since flight simulators have not beenaround as long as the aircraft theyrepresent, tha t's no t an easy job. Thetechnology which has caused theevolution of flight simulation to thecurrent state of the art has grownfaster than the general aviator sknowledge of electronics, computerscience, fluid mechanics, dynamics,methods of visual scene representation, audio cuing, motion replication and system management. Consequently, our knowledge of flightsimulators is continually expanding.

This rapid growth within the industry has caused the Army toreassess the purpose of flightsimulators. Think back to your days

of flight school. Do you remember adevice called the "Blue Canoe"? Or,maybe, the instrument training youreceived in the 2B24 Huey instrument procedure trainer? I t was really great when we finally had asimulator that had a cockpit whichlooked and responded like that ofthe UH-l Huey helicopter. All thegauges worked like the real thingThe radios really could be tuned andthe same emergency conditionswhich could occur in the aircraftcould be duplicated and actually experienced in the simulator while yousat in air-conditioned comfort. Sure,the simulator d idn't really fly like thereal aircraft, and one of the older,more experienced aviators once toldyou that some of the emergencysetups weren't the way he had ex-

13


16/48

14

View of copilot/gunner s station (above)of AH64 eMS 2840.

View of pilot s station (next page) ofAH64 eMS 2840.

View of instructor/operator s station (left)of AH64 eMS 2840 Note simplicity of

control arrangement and added monitors.

Photos courtesy of Link light Simulation DivisionSinger Company .

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


17/48

perienced the real thing. But it surebeat having to go out and try to flyhood or challenge actual instrument

meteorological conditions to meetminimums.Thanks to the breakthrough of

microcircuitry and the overall progress made in simulation design, wenow have a simulator tha t will allowyou to start; run-up; hover orground taxi; takeoff; land; fireweapon systems; practice chemical,biological and radiological procedures; electronic countermeasures;and engage a host of threat vehiclesand aircraft. t will fly all modes ofterra in flight in day or night lightingconditions and in virtually any typeof weather (sorry, they haven tfigured out how to simulateprecipitation yet), while usingvarious types of sensors or night vi-sion goggles and much, much more.And you can still do all this in airconditioned comfort

One such simulator is the 2B40AH-64A Combat Mission Simulator

JANUARY 985

or better known as the CMS. t iscurrently in the plant at Link FlightSimulation Division, Singer Com

pany, Binghamton, NY, and is thelatest in the Army's family of flightsimulators. The simulator will beused at the Aviation Center at Ft.Rucker to train AH-64 Apacheaviators in combat skills. For 15hours of simulator time, each crewof two students will be subjected tothe most challenging environmentever created for the training ofaviators. The types of missionswhich the newly qualified AH-64aviators will be expected to accomplish once they arrive at theirunits will be covered in 1 flightperiods.

But this isn t all. Technologydoesn't s tand still. New methods ofdisplaying the visual scene are evolving. In the not too distant future,you will have a full 360-degree fieldof view in both the horizontal andvertical plane. Perhaps you'd like animprovement in depth perception,

texturing of objects within a scene,or actual terrain representation ofany locale in the world. All are beingdeveloped by industry, and thesedevelopments will improve therealism and training effectiveness offuture simulators. With such growth

in the industry, how does the Armyeffectively use this equipment? Whatis the most cost effective mix ofsimulator and aircraft hours? Are wenow capable of overloading the student or the instructor? What will bethe reliability, availability and maintainability for these devices?

At present the Simulation Branchhas 12 tests scheduled to addressquestions such as these. The first testscheduled concerns the HelmetMounted Visual System (HMVS).This particular test is being done toassess the utility of a new method ofdisplaying the simulated visualscene. All of the present Army visualsystems use a television screen fromwhich an image is collimated andreflected to present the visual scenein front ofthe cockpit window structure. The result is a fairly goodrepresentation of the outside worldas viewed from the pilot s seat.HMVS brings the visual display tothe student's eye. Mounted to thehelmet are two small cathode raytubes which are also collimated andreflected to bring the image aroundand in front of both eyes in much thesame way that the Pilot Night VisionSensor (PNVS) is displayed to thepilot of the AH-64A. We will be examining the overall suitability of thismethod of scene display. Maybesomeday it will be the method usedon our next generation of simulators.

The next test concerns the AH-64

CMS. This is a three-phase effortwhich begins with an in-plantevaluation of the simulator. Ourfirst look will be to verify that thesimulator meets the requirements ofthe Aviation Center and if we noteany problems to document and havethem corrected before the device isdelivered to Ft. Rucker. Bear inmind, however, that we are not thefirst to examine the CM S . The

5


18/48

manufacturer will have alreadydemonstrated through testing thatthe device will function as advertised.Also, the Government, through theoffice of the PM-TRADE (ProgramManager for Training Devices), willhave had the Aviation Development

Test Activity test the simulator to ensure that it is in accordance with thedesign specifications. We then examine the CMS to make certain thatit will do the job the Aviation Centerhad in mind.

Next, we again test the device afterit is installed and ready for use totrain at Ft Rucker. At this stage, ourpurpose is to assist the AviationCenter to best use what it has boughtto train Apache pilots. Finally, wewill test the simulator at a ForcesCommand installation to determinehow it can best be used to maintainindividual aviator and aircrew proficiency in the Apache.

Remember, simulators cannot beused to replace flight hours. Theycan only be employed to augmentflight hours by providing a higherquality of training relative to thetasks for which the device is bestsuited. Some tasks are best trained insimulators; others, in aircraft. This

same theme carries over to the AH-lCobra and CH 47 Chinook simulators.Both of these simulators are beingupgraded at existing facilities orplanned to be newly installed at

other installations. The problemwith these two simulators (as with allsimulators) is that the individualneeds of the aviator to train bymeans of a simulator vary while theregulatory requirements do not (20hours per annual period, etc.). This

seems to be a very poor method ofmanagement of the Army sresources. Precepts are changing andwe hope to help by better defininghow the use of simulators can be improved. Cost effectiveness and maximized training effectiveness do gohand-in-hand, particularly when thecommander is given the latitude tocustomize each aviator s trainingprogram to that person s individualneeds.

Other questions which we will address in the near future include thefollowing:

Which gunnery tasks are besttrained in the simulator and whichare best trained in the aircraft?

How much training does it takefor an attack pilot to really peak hisperformance?

How much trainmg time does ittake to sustain him at that peak?

What is realistically affordableto the Army when considering peak

performance and cost?These issues will be addressed duringa training effectiveness analysisplanned for the AH-IS (MC) FlightWeapons Simulator (FWS).

Pilots and copilots station visible on 2840 AH64) CombatMission Simulators at the manufacturer.

6

There is also a possibility that wemay be permitted to assist the Aviation Center in the use of its newly updated AH-IS (MC) FWS. You mayrecall that the current AviatorQualification Course program of instruc tion (POI) only uses the device

for 3 hours of gunnery tasks. Theupdated simulator should allow theincorporation of better combat skillsand emergency procedures into thePOI for the AH-l aviator. Hopefully, abetter trained course graduate will bethe result.

The remaining tests are notscheduled for several years. They include the Operational Test II for thescout and attack team simulator, theSEMA (special electronic missionaircraft) simulator (the first missionoriented fixed wing simulator theArmy has tried to purchase, and onethat is badly needed), and a traineraircraf t laser for the AH-64.

So there you are. That is what wewill be doing for the next 4 years inoperational testing of flightsimulators. But there is so much thatneeds to be done and we need yourhelp. f you have a need, whether it isrelated to concepts, doctrine, training or materiel, and which you feel

would improve the system, let usknow. The Simulation Branch willdo everything in its power to ensurethat you receive the best simulatorspossible.

The Aviation Board is yourrepresentative for the test andevaluation of Aviation related items.Without feedback from the field wecan only guess what you want. Themajority of us are active dutymilitary with extensive TOE (table oforganization and equipment) experience . We have been where youare and will rejoin you again onceour tours at Ft. Rucker are completed . We do understand. Call orwrite us and let us know what youthink. f you would like to hearmore about what is currently in thetesting cycle or what we do, tell usthat too.

u s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/48

VI TION

D O T R I N E S

T R I N I N G

rI OCTRINAL publications are key to thedevelopment and integration of the Army AviationBranch. To keep pace with new forces des ign andchanged battlefield doctrine, new Aviation doctrinal manuals continue to emerge. The goal of theU.S. Army Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, is toget the most current doctrine to the field as expeditiouslyas possible. To accomplish this goal,field ci rculars are being used to the maximum extent possible, and the Aviation Center has beenconverting to state-of-the-art, ,computer-basedprint technology (Project UPDATE).

The Aviation Center is the first to publish fieldmanuals under Project UPDATE. The reader opinion cards indicate these new UPDATE publications are indeed the right stuff. Your concernsabout the durability of the paper caused The Adjutant General's Office to upgrade the quality of thepaper for future UPDATE publications. Take thetime to fill out and submit your reader opinioncard; it's your vote-use it.

Seven doctrinal field circulars (FCs) areschedu ed for production prior to July 1985. TheseFCs will serve three purposes:

To provide the most current doctrine that willbe used as an interim measure until the fieldmanual is produced.

To be used as coordinating drafts forthe fieldmanuals.

To serve as a vehicle to validate doctrine andtraining practices.

Ft. Rucker will stock limited quantities of allproponent field circulars. If your unit is in need ofa field circular, submit your request through command channels to: Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, ATTN: ATZQ-SS-TS

Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5000.

DON'T SHOOTSeveral sharp-eyed soldiers have written in

about the error in the August 1984 edition of FM1-402 , the Aviator's Recognition Manual. For

those of you that haven't picked up on it, disregardthe illustration on the bottom of pa.ge 3-45 . The

photo in orre tly depicts an allied M-901 , ImprovedTow Vehicle as a Warsaw Pact SA-13.

JANUARY 1985

Soon to be published:

FM ' .lQ 4 > FM 1-102, ArmyFOfwrc d Arm ing

andR f ~ l n gP O t n ~

Aviation in an NBCEnvironment," andFM 1104 "ForwardArming and Refuel-ing Points," expected to be publishedby the end of June1985 as UPDATE

publications_FM 1140, Attack Helicopte r Gunnery,"

is scheduled for publication as a fieldcircular in March 1985.

> FM 1-300, Flight Operations andAirfield Management," is under revisionand a coordinating draft is expected inMarch 1985. An addUional chapter isplanned to address nonaviator flightrecords_

A series of manuals that address the employment

of Aviation units:

> FM 1111,Combat Aviation

Brigade," FM 1112,Attack Helicopter

Battalion," andFM 1113, CombatAviation Battalionand CombatAviation Battalion(GS)," areschedu led to beproduced as fieldcirculars by the end of March 1985.

> FM 1114, "Regimental CombatAviation Squadron," is slated forcirculation as a field circular with a coverdate of January 1985.

> FM 1116, Air Cavalry Troop," shouldbe available as a field circular by the endof June 1985.

7


20/48

ack Pain

in the ArmyHelicopter

P I t ~ ~

0u s. HMYSAmy INTIH

Major Dennis F Shanahan M.D. SFSlight Surgeon U.S. Army Safety Center

Fort Rucker Alabama

aviators, 72.8 percent reported having experienced one or moreepisodes of back discomfort whileflying helicopters over the preceding2 years. There was a wide variation

in reported frequency of symptoms(fig. 1). This variation may be explained by the fact that data showthere is a minimum duration ex-

I

II

posure to helicopter flight beforeback pain is experienced. For thesubjects surveyed the average exposure time before onset of pain was88 minutes. Since many helicopter

missions do not exceed thisminimum threshold, pilots will notnecessarily suffer back discomforton every flight. There is also some in-

E ARLY IN THE history ofhelicopter flight, it becameapparent that helicopterflightcrews complained of aremarkably high incidence of back

pain compared to their fixed wingcounterparts. Over the past 25 years,the high incidence of back pain inhelicopter flightcrews has beendocumented in numerous reports.Most of these studies have reportedprevalence rates in excess of 50 percent and many have reportedprevalences exceeding 75 percent;apparently depending on the groupstudied. Based on this data, it hasbecome clear that there are certainfactors unique to helicopter flightoperations that induce a high rate ofback pa in in crewmembers. This article discusses the typical pain syndrome reported by helicoptercrewmembers, factors influencingthis condition, and possible causesof the back pain reported. Recommendations for prevention andtrea tment are also discussed.Incidence and symptoms

5 ~ - - - - -

In a survey of 802 U S Army

18

c

45

40

35

30

3 25GIa. 20

15

10


21/48

dication that the difficulty and intensity of the mission influence theonset of symptoms.

In the U.S. Army survey, 70 percent of the respondents reported thatthey most frequently experiencedpain in the lower back and 16.6 per

cent complained most frequently ofpain in their buttocks. Relatively fewaviators reported symptoms in otherregions of the back or neck andradiation into the lower extremities israre. Once pain begins it may continue to increase in intensitythroughout the flight or it may reacha certain intensity and then remainstable. Changing positions or relinquishing the controls does not relievethe pain. These aviators did notnotice relief until the flight was over.Some aviators reported that they candelay the onset of discomfort byplacing a rolled-up jacket or inflatable cushion in the small of theirbacks to provide lumbar support.

Aviators participating in theArmy survey were asked to rate theintensity of the discomfort they experienced. The intensity of thereported pain can be generallyclassified as mild to moderate.Although the reported intensity of

the pain was not severe, it wassignificant enough that 28.4 percentof the aviators admitted to rushingthrough missions because of backpain and 7.5 stated that they hadrefused missions because of it. It isclear that back pain is a significantproblem for Army helicopter pilotsand that it has an adverse effect onoperat ional readiness of aircrews.

A majority of Army aviatorssurveyed reported that their symptoms began to improve immediatelyafte r the flight was terminated, and53 percent stated that they were completely painfree within 12 hours.However, 14.5 percent reportedtheir symptoms persisted for longerthan 48 hours, and 8 percent saidtheir symptoms may last longer than4 days. I t may be possible to separatethe afflicted crewmembers into twogroups-those with transient symptoms less than 24 hours) and those

J N UARY 985

with persistent symptoms morethan 48 hours). Further study willhave to be done before it can bedetermined whether the aviatorswith persistent symptoms progressedto their present state as the result ofrepeated exposure to helicopter

flight and if the transient group islikely to progress to a similar statewith continued exposure.Causes

Although the lifetime incidence oflow back pain in industrializedsocieties has been reported to be be-tween 6 and 8 percent, prevalencerates rarely exceed 35 percent. Clearly, the 73 percent prevalencereported by U.S. Army pilotsrepresents a dramatic departurefrom the general population. Mostnonaviators report experiencingacute intermittent episodes of backpain. The length of time the symptoms last varies and years may go bywhen they have no episodes of pain.The activity or event that triggers anew episode frequently cannot beidentified or anticipated. The backpain reported by Army aviatorsshows a rather clear pattern of onsetand symptoms. It is evident thatthere is some factor or combination

of factors associated with helicopterflight that produce a high prevalenceof back pain that is rather predictable in character.

The two factors most widely im-plicated in the causes of back pain inhelicopter crewmembers are poorposture and exposure to vibration.Posture as a contributing factor hasbeen established but there is still considerable controversy concerning therole of vibration in the problem.Posture

The posture that helicopter pilotsmust assume to fly is considerablydifferent from that required to flyfixed wing aircraft. Helicopters require simultaneous input from allfour extremities in order to maintainfull control over the aircraft, and thetypes of missions flown seldomallow for relaxation from the controls. Furthermore, the seat and control configuration in most heli-

copters forces the pilot to assume anasymmetrical posture. It has beenwell documented that this controlconfiguration forces pilots to bendforward in their seats and lean slightlyto the left. This position does notpermit relaxation of the spinal mus

culature andis

a major source ofdiscomfort for helicopter pilots.It is reasonable to conclude from

available data that the posture thathelicopter pilots are obliged to maintain for extended periods is a majorcausal factor in the high prevalenceof back pain noted in this population. Fur thermore, the rapid resolution of symptoms for the majori ty ofafflicted pilots upon termination ofthe provoking flight, suggests thattheir symptoms are related to musclespasm or other transient mechanicalfactors rather than permanentpathological conditions.Vibration

It remains uncertain what thepathological effects of chronic, intermittent exposure to vibration ofthe frequency and amplitude experienced in Army aircraft may beover the short and long term.

Researchers have recently reportedthe results of a preliminary studythat may help shed some light on therelationship of helicopter-similarvibration to the production of theacute back symptoms that helicopterpilots describe. In this study 11 pilotswho reported that they usually experience back discomfort within 2hours of flight in a UH-IH wereplaced in a UH-IH seat and controlsimulator that was mounted to athree-axis vibration table fig. 2).The cyclic control of the simulatorwas wired so as to act as the control

for a television computer game. Thesubjects wore standard U.S. Armyflight clothing including flighthelmet, and they also used standardrestraint equipment. They were instructed to position themselves asthey would in an actual helicopterand to keep all extremities on thecontrols at all times except that theywere allowed to remove their lefthands from the collective for brief

9


22/48

FIGURE 2: Right side view of pilotin UU-IU mock-up.

intervals as in actua l flight.Each pilot was subjected to two

2-hour test per iods -one with

simulated helicopter vibrationand

one without. During the test period,the subject played computer gamesto keep himself occupied at roughlythe same concentration level aswould be required to fly a helicopter.Pilots verbally reported t he onset ofback discomfort, and the time intothe test was noted. At the completionof the test, each aviator answered abrief questionnaire relating to thenature of his symptoms. Pain intensity was subjectively measured by a

visual analog scale.The experimental conditions pro

duced back pain in all subjectswhich they described as identical tothe pain they typically experiencewhile flying helicopters. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the time of onset or the intensity of pain for the vibration andno vibration test conditions. Theauthors concluded that vibration appeared to play little if any role in theacute symptoms these subjects experienced. Of course, this work isonly preliminary and will requirefurther validation, but the conclusions have definite implications forprevention of this ailment.Prevention and treatment

As has been discussed theprimary causal factor in the acuteback symptoms that most helicopterpilots report is probably posture.These symptoms mayor may not be

20

aggravated by the addition of lowfrequency vibration in t he range ofthe resonant frequency of the spinalsystem. Therefore, the key to reducing the incidence of the acute ailmentis to improve the seat and controlconfiguration in helicopters to allow

crewmembers to maintain betterposture.

To build a cockpit that will permitthe recommended postural relationships for all aviators will require asubstantial departure from currentdesign standards. The gunner / copilot position in the AH-lCobra helicopter comes close toachieving the type of support neededfig. 3). The AH-l has side-mounted

controls for the cyclic and collectivewhich allow the gunner/copilot tooperate the helicopter without bending forward or laterally fig. 4). Hemay lean back against the back ofthe seat and his forearms are wellsupported on foam pads. The controls are operated by pressure fromthe hands , wrists and forearms.

Short of redesign of the helicoptercockpit, what can be done to preventback pain in helicopter aircrews?

Researchers have stressed goodphysical condition and spinalstrengthening exercises. They alsorecommend screening of aviators topreclude entry of those individualswith spinal anomalies who are atgreater risk of developing problems

when exposed to helicopter flight.Measures that crewmembers may

take to delay or prevent the onset ofback pain symptoms, or to lessentheir severity, include:

Placing a firm cushion in thelumbar region to provide support tothe back. This does not mean that itreplaces the requirement for crashworthiness construction of theseats.) Care must be taken to ensurethat the cushion does not blowout ofthe aircraft and hit the tail rotorcontrols, etc.

Walking for short distances orperforming simple flexion and extension exercises during breaks between flights.

Waiting in the aircraft or sittingduring short stops should bediscouraged. There may be some advantage also to limiting the time onthe controls by alternating with the

FIGURE 3: Pilot in gunner/copilot position of AU-IS Cobra.Arms are supported by rests and back is supported byseat back.

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/48

copilot in 15- to 30-minute intervalsrather than by alternating pilotingduties by flight leg.

Aircrewmembers who are severelyafflicted with back pain should beremoved from flight duties as long asthey continue to have symptoms and

flight surgeons need to ensure thatthey are not placed at desk jobs during their recovery. In most cases, thiswill require hospitalization orsuspension from all duties.

When symptom-free, the pati entshould be returned to non flyingduties for a period while maintaininga program of physical therapy. f nosymptoms recur, the aviator may bereturned to flying duties and instructed to follow the recommendations for prevention of back paindiscussed above. Permanent suspension from flying duties should beconsidered if a severe and persistentrelapse of symptoms is subsequentlyexperienced.

Major Dennis F. Shanahan,M.D., Senior Flight Surgeon,graduated from Middlebury Collegein Vermont in 1971 with a B.A.degree in chemistry. He received hisM.D. from Washington Universityin 1976.

Major Shanahan served his internship in general surgery at TripIerArmy Medical Center in Hawaii andcompleted 1 Y years of a generalsurgery residency there in 1978.

From 1979 to 1983 he was Chief,Crew Injury and EpidemiologyGroup, U.S. Army AeromedicalResearch Laboratory, Fort Rucker,AL. In July of 983 he was assignedas Flight Surgeon, U.S. Army Safety Center. During these assignmentshe has conducted extensive researchinto the mechanisms of injury inhelicopter crashes through field investigation and laboratory ex-

J NU RY 985

FIGURE 4: Gunner/copilot position in AU-IS Cobra helicopter. Noteside-mounted position of cyclic (right) and collective (left)controls.

About the Author

periments. He has been instrumentalin the development of new aviationhelmet standards and in seeking improved crashworthiness for Armyhelicopters. Major Shanahan is considered an authority on crash injuryand has taught extensively, both inthe United States and abroad. He isthe author of numerous scientificpublications.

Major Shanahan is a graduate ofthe U.S. Navy Basic Flight Surgeons

Course and the U.S. Army BasicFlight Surgeons Course. He has alsocompleted the Crash Survival Investigators Course and the AdvancedCrash Survival Investigators Coursewhere he now serves as an instructor.

Major Shanahan has more than2100 hours of flight time and heholds commercial pilot, CFI, instrument and multiengine ratings. Hehas been awarded the U.S. Army

Meritorious Service Medal and theU.S. Navy Surgeon General sAward.

2


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Will ie Maude Leake

PEARL:SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue survival Lowdown

photo by Reflections Studio

Rescue Seat, Forest PenetrationEffective immediately, all unserviceable rescue seats,

forest penetration, NSN 4240-00-199-7353, are to bereturned by the users to Lexington Blue Grass DepotActivity (RIC BL6), Lexington, KY 40511, for repair orcondemnation. Disposal is not permitted below depotlevel. Point of contact is Virginia Farwig, HQ,AVSCOM, AMSAV-SAIA, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd.,St. Louis, MO 63120-1798, AUTOVON 693-3809 orCommercial (314) 263-3809.

Foliage Penetrat ing Flares (KIT)(NSN 1370-00-490-7362 L119)

It has come to our attention that some substitutionshave been made when ordering the foliage penetrat ingflare kit. The kit NSN as above is the only signal flare kitauthorized for Army use in the S R U 2 1 / P andOV-l /RV-1 survival vests. When ordering this item youshould use the no substitution Code 11 2B or 2 J. SeeAR 725-50 for the code that best suits your purposes. SC8465-90-CL-P02 dated July 1978 is the supply catalogcovering the vest. It gives only one stock number forsubject kit and no other is authorized.

Address Listing for QDRs and RODsI refer you to the August 1984 PEARL'S article, sub

ject as above. Because of the ongoing reorganizationsand redesignation of names and office symbols the addresses for Quality Deficiency Reports (QDRs) andReports of Discrepancy (RODs) are shown at right.

If you have a questio n abou t personal equipment or rescue/survival gear write PEARL AMC Project Officer ATTN: AMCPOALSE; 4300 oodfellow Blvd. St. Louis MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-1218/9 or Commercial 314-263-1218/9.

22 u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Restraint Equipment

0 Ejection Seats

Oxygen Equipment

CommanderHQ,AVSCOMATTN: AMSAV-MPSD4300 Goodfellow BlvdSt. Louis, M063120-1798

Survival Kits/Vests

SPH4 Helmet

Emergency Parachutes and Accessories

Flotation Equipment

Flight Clothing Aircrew Boots

Chemical Clothing and Accessories

CommanderHQ, TROSCOMATTN: AMSTR-QPF4300 Goodfellow BlvdSt. Louis, MO 63120-1798

M24 Protective Mask

CommanderAMCCOM R)ATTN: AMSMC-QAW-PRock Island, IL61299-6000

Pyrotechnics

Foliage Penetrating Flares

Smoke Flares

Survival Weapons Ammunition

CommanderAMCCOM R)ATTN: AMSMC-QADRock Island, I L 61299-6000

o Night Vision Goggles/EquipmentCommanderNight Vision and Electro Optics LaboratoriesATTN: DELND-PA-ILSFt. Belvoir, VA 22060-5677

JANUARY 1985

o AN/PRC90 Survival Radioo RT1 0 Survival Radioo T8-24 Radio Tester and Other Radio Testerso Radio Inspection Equipment

CommanderCommunications Electronics CommandATTN: AMSEL-ME-MQFt. Monmouth, NJ 07703-5017

o AH64 HelmetProg ram ManagerAdvanced Attack Hel icopterATTN: AMCPM-AH64-SE4300 Goodfellow BlvdSt. Louis, MO 63120-1798

I nformation copies of QDRs and RODs should befurnished to:

AMC Project Officer for ALSEATTN: AMCPO-ALSE

4300 Goodfellow BlvdSt. Louis, M063120-1798

AUTOVON 693-1218FTS 273-1218

CommanderU S Army Aviation Center

ATTN: ATZQ-D-MSFt. Rucker, AL 36362-5000

AUTOVON 558-5272FTS 533-5272

CommandantU S Army Transportation and Aviation

Logistics SchoolsATTN: ATSQ-TDS-M ALSE)

Ft. Eustis , VA 23604-5361AUTOVON 927-2475

CommanderU S Army Safety Center

ATTN: PESC-PRFt. Rucker, AL 36362-5000

AUTOVON 558 2947/3759/6510FTS 533 2947/3759/6510

23


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U S ARMY

s irectorate of Evaluation StandardizationREPORT T THE FIEL . AVIATION

STANOARDIZATION

Changes to Instrument l i g h~ v l u t i o n sWhy

DEPARTMENT of the Army (DA) Form 954, 1 Similarly, AH-l Cobra, UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47October 1960, was the Army standard instrument card Chinook and OH-6 Osage aviators also must beand was in the possession of most aviators a few years evaluated in the aircraft when a compatible SFTS is notago. Aviators with 50 hours weather time could put a available.green special instrument card (DA Form 954-1) in their How is an instrument flight examiner to administerbillfolds and carry it around for years just waiting for an instrument flight eval uation in an OH-58 on federalsomeone to challenge the number 1 instrument airways and execute a very high frequency omnidirec-qualification entry on a flight plan. Some helicopter tional range or an instrument landing system approac h?drivers had pink tactical instrument cards that proved He or she doesn't because it is not required. Paragraphthey had flown a TH-13T Sioux while attending initial 3-30b, AR 95-1, tells us that, The evaluation will be

entry training at Ft. Rucker, AL. In the mid-1970 s Anny conducted per the appropriate ATM, meaning that aRegulation (AR) 95-63, U.S. Anny Aviation Standard- minimum of two approaches are required. This can beization and Instrument Program, was revised to accomplished in an OH-58 by flying nondirectionalelimina te all instrument cards. All of these are collec- radio beacon (NDB) and precision approach radartors' items now because someone finally realized that (PAR). A variety of facilities can be used for NDB ap-they served no practical purpose. proaches to include tactical beacons and commercial

Some other words, rules and procedures no longer ex- radio stations. The approach procedure used also mayist for the same reason. For example, instrument re - be for an airfield in a completely different part of thequalification, reestablishment, expiration and world and at altitudes that aid in reducing traffic and

examination do not appear in AR 95-1. noise problems around airports. A talk down PAR,When AR 95-1 was undergoing revision in 1982, an conducted by the examiner, may be the answer to a pro-

attempt was made to apply the same rules to instrument blem of nonavailability of a fixed ground controlled ap-flight evaluations. After all, both evaluations are parts proach (GCA) facility or air traffic congestion. Condi-of the same annual aviator proficiency and readiness tions and standards remain the same per task numbertest (AAPART). Aviator contact qualification had 1082 of the appropriate ATM.no expiration, nor were the words requalification or What about en route navigation and Federal Aviation

reestablishment ever applied to the st8.ndardization Administration (FAA) voice procedures for evaluationsflight evaluation. Once an aviator is qualified in an air- in OH-58 and AH-l helicopters? Consider this. Thesecraft he/she is always qualified; not always proficient , two helicopters have no role to play in an FAA instru-but always qualified. Similarly, once instrument ment environment and will only fly instrumentqualified an aviator is always qualified. The AAPART meteorological condition in an absolute emergency.verifies proficiency. This change in the regulation, Therefore, the evaluation shoul d be in the environmentfollowed by revisions to aircrew training manuals in which the emergency is most likely to occur, for ex-(A TMs), s imply means that an a viator must be ample, en route tracking to an NDB using only the voiceevaluated at least once annually on his/her ability to procedures necessary to return the aircraft safely toperform contact and instrument tasks specified in visual meteorologica l conditions.ATMs. No cards, tickets, certificates or other awards This does ot mean that an aviator is no longer re-are issued to the aviator attesting to the successful com- quired to be trained in the other instrument flight pro-pletion of evaluations. Entries on training and flight cedures. Continuation training in other proceduresrecords are made to serve that purpose. should be accomplished in the SFTS. After all, AR 95 1

Change 2, AR 95-1, restricted the use of noncom- only changed the evaluation requirements not the man-patible synthetic flight training systems (SFTS) for in- datory SFTS requirements. In the case of an OH-58, orstrument flight evaluations. This change was made in an other aircraft that have no compatible simulatoreffort to ensure that aviators have the ability to safely fly avail able, hood time flown may be applied to up to 50their primary aircraft in an instrument environment. t percent of the mandatory SFTS requirements.means that an aviator whose primary aircraft is the The emphasis of the current instrument training andOH-58 Kiowa cannot be evaluated in an SFTS. evaluation program is to improve each aviator S ability

4 u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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to fly his/her primary aircraft in instrument conditionsin their normal operating environment as safely aspossible. To accomplish this instrument flight evalua-tion procedures th at have long been oriented toward theFAA must be reoriented to accommodate the real world

in which Army tactical aircraft are flown. Instrumentflight examiners and instructor pilots must place greateremphasis on instrument flight in the environment wherethe preponderance of the unit s helicopter operationsoccur. b

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention

on an area of major importance . Write to us at: Commander ,U.S . Army Av iation Center , ATTN: ATZQ-ES , Ft. Rucker , AL

36362 -5000; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 , FTS 533 3504 or

Commercial 205-255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. RuckerHotline , AUTOVON 558 B487 or 205 255 6487 and leave a message.

JAN UARY 1985

G O A L -$2,500 ,000

JANUARY 1 9 8 4 -$1,475,000

cash and pledges~ ~ Aviatio 1USEUM

This is a series about the Army Aviation Museum Foundation funddrive. Currently, plans call for building a modern complex to house

your Army Aviation Museum. Since last month $2,500 in donationshave been received. However, we still have a ways to go, as the

barometer above shows. f you would like to help bui ld the ArmyAviation Museum s new home, you are invited to send a tax

deductible contribution to: The Army Aviation Museum Foundation,Box H, FL Rucker, AL 363625000. f you desire additional information

call Mr. Ed Brown at (205) 5982508.

A Look at What s In Your MuseumThe H-13, sometimes referred to as Angel of Mercy, was first

flown in Korea at Ascom City in the winter of 1950. Usedprimarily for medical evacuations, observation and utility duty, the H-13 performed extensively in Korea and in 1951established a Korean medical evacuation record while flyingwith the 2d Helicopter Detachment. Continuing its recordbreaking history, in 1952 the H-13 also set a new record for

evacuating casualties from the Chorwan Area for an observation type helicopter. In 1962, the designation of OH-13 wasadopted to signify observation

type. The H-13B presently onisplay was transferred from

the Army Aviation School to .the Museum in 1958 and is the 1. - '-r,--:-,- " . )32d model delivered from the ' : ;contract of 65 ordered.

5


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Converting the AH1 for theAir fo Air Role

CW Ron Moring8th Aviation Battalion

APO New York

U R I N G THE Vietnam War. the Soviets tookquite an interest in u.s. helicopter operations. Sincethat time, they have been ambitiously developing theirown helicopters. It seems that their prima ry goal s tocounteract our helicopter anti armor mission.

Rather than develop another aircraft to defeat the

Soviet helicopter threa t, I suggest the modification of anon-the-shelf airframe for the air-to-air role. Thatsystem s the AH-l Cobra, which I feel would be a formidable opponent for any Soviet helicopter.

6

The info rma tion in th is article represents th opinion of the author anddoe s not necessarily r e flect any current or planned policie s of the

Departmen t of Defense or any of its agenc ies

lou, blade 'y,lem

single

Stinger capable2 75 inch rocket pods

rive Train Modifications

repositionedseat

The T53-L-703 engine s a sufficient powerplant in itspresent state. Its primary limit s the power that the

transmission can handle. Strengthening the transmission, however, would be quite costly and lead to required strengthening of the tail rotor gear boxes and airframe. Since the engine s sufficient and the transmission s the limitation, trimming the aircraft's weight(which would happen with removal of the TOW missilesystem and copilot) would be a much easier solution.

Another good modification would be a mechanicalenvironmental control system (ECS). This would greatly reduce the engine s operating temperature duringECS use and it would afford the pilot more of theengine s power in extreme temperature conditions.

Rotor System ModificationsThe Cobra's tail rotor system s well proven and quite

dependable. t s quite sufficient without improvement .The main rotor system, however, s unacceptable for anair-to-air role.

Bell Helicopter Textron has designed a new fourblade system which s a good alternative and s about 46pounds lighter. Additionally, the system has a highermaximum thrust and s negative G-capable.

u s ARMY AVIATION IGEST


29/48

These modifications would mean a faster aircraftwith a greater rate of climb. Additionally, the aircraftwould be able to turn in a much smaller radius. All ofthese qualities are required in the air- to-air role.

Airframe ModificationsThe Cobra airframe s a good size and shape for the

air-to-air role. The tailboom should be left intact withthe exception of possibly converting the flush rivets.This would reduce the drag ratio to some degree.

The main fuselage s also acceptable in the presentform. The wings, however, should be cleaned up toreduce drag.

The forward portion of the aircraft would require thegreatest modification. The front seat position would beremoved and the pilot station moved about 1 foot forward to improve the rea rward field of view. Due to anenhanced avionics capability this would not overburdenthe pilot. Additional ly, the canopy should be reverted tothe old bubble type, possibly wider, to afford bettervisibility. The nose section would be changed to the oldG model type with the removal of the telescopic sightunit (TSU).

ArmamentThe armament system of the AH-l has been specialized

for the antiarmor role. In its present state, the Cobra sa potent day antia rmor weapon. Before employment inthe air-to-air role, however, there are several modifications that should be made.

The 20 mm s a well-proven system. For it to be usefulin an air-to-air role, the rate of fire needs to be increasedfrom 750 rounds per minute to 1,500 rounds per min ute.This increased rate of fire s required to put sufficientrounds on an airborne target; it could be establishedeasily with a more powerful gundrive motor-say thatof the Vulcan system. The gun would be able to withstand this rate of fire without substantial reduction inthe life of the barrel. The helmet sight system allows thepilot to position the gun 110 degrees either side of centerand should be retained. This would allow the pilot tofire fixed forward using the heads-up display and to alsomaneuver the gun for a close in, off center shot.Moreover, a fire control computer for this system wouldbe a good addition.

JANUARY 985

Although the helmet sight system should be retained,the TOW missile system and TSU are useless in an airto-air role and should be removed. This would result ina weight savings of about 450 pounds.

The TOW system would be replaced by the Stingerair-to-air missile system. The black boxes could beplaced in the copilot's section so that the center ofgravity wouldn't be greatly affected and the components would be cooled by the present copilot ECSducting. Additionally, the removal of the TSU would becompensated for by the removal of the TOW systemblack boxes and counterbalance weights from the tailboom.

The Stinger missiles themselves could be placed inmodified seven-shot pods and used in conjunction withthe 2.75 inch rocket system. The inboard stores couldthen be removed or possibly used for jet tisonable external fuel stores. This externa l fuel system would requireonly minimal modification because of the room left byremoving the hydraulic lines used in conjunction withthe TOW missile system.

Employment

The completed system could be used in numbers oftwo per scout/attack team to provide air security. Thiswould allow the scouts to better per form their mission.The air-to-air Cobra also would be a superior air assaultescort because its increased speed would enable it tokeep up with the UH-60 Black Hawk. Furthermore, itwould have an increased station time in both rolesbecause of its ability to take off fully loaded nd fueled.

ConclusionThis article represents concepts that I have considered

for some time. t seems more feasible to convert an onthe-shelf system than to develop new systems or to taxan already overloaded scout. Regardless, one of thesealternatives should be chosen and acted upon to counterthe Soviet helicopter-to-helicopter threat.

For more information see FM 1-107Air-to-Air Combat.

27

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