Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1990

7/28/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1990

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TaditiOnallY in aviation,high - performance, fixed-wingaircraft and pilots have been theattention-getters. Consider, forexample, the popularity of moviessuch as Top Gun and Iron Eagle,and aerobatic teams like the"Blue Angels" and "Thunderbirds." In many ways, it is truethat this type of flying demandsthe most of a pilot. Excellentvision and superior reflexes areessential in acquiring a lightningfast airborne target and maneuvering around it . Also, when"yanking and banking," themodem fixed-wing fighter pilot

Major John S. Crowley, M.D.

must strain constantly with hischest and abdominal muscles tokeep the blood from draining outof his head, thereby renderinghim unconscious. (See figure 1 onworkload and Gs.)New Army Aviation tacticsmay require the conduct of helicopter air combat maneuvering(ACM). While there are obviousdifferences between modernrotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft, the hazards are moresimilar than one might think.Helicopter ACM is conductedmuch closer to the ground thanfixed-wing ACM; reaction speed

Major Rhonda Cornum, M.D.

is critical in both types of flying.No longer are helicopters confined to the 1- to 2-G (gravity)environment. The AH-64 Apachehelicopter easily can subject thepilot to gravitational forces threeand one-half times greater thanthose normally experienced onthe ground.This article informs both pilotsand flight surgeons about someof the aeromedicalhazards of thisrelatively new flight envelope.These hazards will be discussedin three general categories-physiological, perceptual andbehavioral.

Captain Raul Marin, M.D.

AEROMEDICALASPECTS OFHELICOPTERAIR COMBAT2 JANUARYIFEBRUARY 1990


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FIGURE 1: The combination of high workload and repetitive low-level Gsmakes air combat the most demanding type of flying.

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

PHYSIOLOGICALFACTORSAlthough high-performance,fixed-wing aircraft can pullalmost three times the "Gs" ofmodem helicopters, the humanbody potentially can suffer illeffects well within the rotarywing ACM envelope as well. Let'sbegin with a definition: Acceleration is the rate of change invelocity and is measured in Gs.As an automobile speeds up ina curve, say from 20 to 30 milesper hour, the occupants expe

rience both a l inear (because theirspeed increases) and radial(because their direction changes)acceleration. The term "one G"refers to the speed at which aperson normally is attractedtoward the earth's surface bygravity. When the pilot is exposedto "three Gs," his weighthas beenincreased threefold. Thus, theforce applied to him is equal tothree times his body weight. Theway in which the human bodyresponds to a given G-forcedepends on several factors-thequickness with which the force isapplied, the direction of the forceand the intensity and duration ofthe force.The human body experiencesG forces in three main directions:up and down the spinal cord, thez axis; across the shoulders, they axis; and front and back

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AIR C O l - I B A T

PERCEPTUAL FACTORS

While some air combat engagements may involve only trackinga target from a stationary hover,others will require rapid changesin aircraft heading, attitude andaltitude to maintain contact withthe enemy aircraft. Althoughsome Army aircraft are equippedwith helmet-mounted sightingsystems, which allow off-axistarget acquisition, weapons systems generally require the pilotto physically align the aircraftwith the target. This greatly addsto pilot workload. Of course, allof the perceptual illusions andpitfalls that are important innormal aviation are still important in ACM; however, there aresome specific ways that helicopter ai r combat can affect thehuman sensory systems thatdeserve mention.Visual FactorsVisual acuity. One of the mostimportant tasks in air combat isthe visual identification andtracking of enemy aicraft. I t iscritical, therefore, that pilots havethe best possible visual acuity.The flight surgeon should beconsulted promptly i f an aviatoris having problems acquiring ortracking targets. Of course, aircrew requiring spectacles mustwear them when flying at anytime. In addition, some pilots willbenefit from special glasses prescribed for use at night only. Theflight surgeon will be happy todiscuss these options with theaircrewmember. The pilot with

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the better vision definitely has anadvantage in helicopter aircombat.Height illusions. An awarenessof altitude is critical in ACM, foraircraft often lose altitude whenperforming high-bank maneuvers. Different types of terraincan fool a pilot into thinking heis higher than he actually is.When flying over desert, snow orcalm seas, aircrewmembersshould be aware of the reducedvisual cues available for altitudedetermination. Continued crosscheck of instruments, particularly th e radar altimeter, isextremely important under theseconditions. A smoky and hazybattlefield will also create theillusion of exaggerated altitudebecause of the obscuration of theunderlying terrain. These illusions are particularly treacherousat night.Autokinetic illusion. I f a pilotin a darkened room fixates hiseyes on a static, soli tary light, thepoint of lightwill appear to move.This is a common visual illusionthat is not well understood, evento this day. In the air combatenvironment, it would be easy tomistake a distant stationary lightfor a moving aircraft. The autokinetic illusion can be reduced oreliminated by visual scanning;don't stare at the lights!Reversible perspective illusion.I t can be difficult to determine thedirection a distant aircraft ismoving (i.e., moving toward oraway from the observer). This is

an important sensory decisionsince it will obviously affect thechoice of air combat maneuver.Excellent visual acuity is veryimportant here; however, othercues can help: Monitor the relative size of the aircraft andcompare its positive relative tothe surrounding terrain. Probably most important, realize thata single quick glance should notdetennine your entire battle plan.Blind spot. When searching fora target, remember there areareas of the retina that arenonfunctional. The day blindspot, which is really present atnight as well, is located at thearea on the retina where the opticnerve exits the eyeball. Since itis off-axis, it is not usuallynoticed. However, i f a pilot isusing one eye to search for atarget (such as with a monocularsighting system or i f the canopyobstructs the view of one eye), theday blind spot may obscureimportant details in the peripheral vision. The night blind spotis centrally located because of thelack of night vision in the centralfovea of the retina. It is criticalto maintain a good scan to avoidthe effects of these holes in thevisual field (figure 6).Dip illusion. Several U.S. AirForce mishaps involving "controlled flight into the terrain"have been attributed to thisillusion, which generally occursduring loose formation flying.When following another aircraft,it is common practice for trail

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While we are in contact with the earth, the pull of gravity squeezespressure sensors in various portions of the body, thus telling us inwhich direction the earth lies. L ~~ ; ; ~ . : ~ , : l Seated at ~ / / ..-ground level : ) ~ ~

~ ? ~ Gravity plus\p centrifugalforceIn flight, however, G-forces combine with the pull of gravity to make theseat-of-the-pants sense completely unreliable as an attitude indicator.

FIGURE 9: Proprioceptive illusions of flight.

FIGURE 10: Pilot fixation on target is probably the most deadly hazard tohelicopter air combat.

A.RMY AVIATION DIGEST

BEHAVIORALFACTORS

Target FixationProbably the most deadly perceptual hazard in rotary-wing ai rcombat is target fixation orfascination. This occurs whenaircrewmembers ignore orientation cues and focus their attentionexclusively on the target. A pilotmay become so intent on pursuing an opponent that he losesawareness of the horizon andaltitude. In helicopter ACM, thereis little margin for error. Maintainsituational awareness!WorkloadToday's modem combat helicopters require more and morebrainpower of the pilot. Duringair combat, it is easy to become

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task saturated, particularly whenthe battle isn't going well.Imagine trying to assess damageto the helicopter systems, thecopilot and yourself simultaneously-all while maintainingvisual contact with the enemy aswell as the ground.Crew Endurance

I t is well recognized that perfonnance is degraded by fatigue,and ai r combat is very tiringindeed. Many helicopter pilotsreport that the combination ofhigh workload and repetitive low-level Gs make ACM the mostdemanding type of flying. Current recommendations from theU.S. Anny Aviation Center, Ft.Rucker, AL, specify that a crewfatigue factor of 2.0 should beused in computing flight timerestrictions.EgoIn the past, Anny aviatorsusually have been matchedagainst either stationary targetsor moving targets controlled bynonaviators. All of this changeswith the arrival of air combattraining. Pilots will practice andcompete against their peersand then analyze their mistakesin excruciating detail during anafterbrief. This type of flyingtempts the naturally competitiveaviator to go beyond what isprudent and safe to accomplishthe mission-in this case, to killthe other aircraft. Commandersmust ensure that a healthy andsafe training environment ismaintained; this must be constantly stressed to pilots. (Incurrent ai r combat training, themaneuver limitations are 30degrees pitch-up, 30 degrees pitchdown and a 60-degree angle ofbank.) While nobody wants todiscourage competitiveness,

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A I R ~ C O M B A Taggressiveness or a healthy aviator ego, remember that theprobable kill of an impact withthe ground is 100 percent, muchworse than any opponent anaviator will ever face.Cockpit CoordinationStudies have shown that amajority of problems with aircrew performance are due tobreakdowns in crew coordination, not to a lack of technicalknowledge and skill. In the aircombat environment, this will beparticularly important. Pilots willbe shifting their attention rapidlyin and out of the cockpit, withlittle margin for error. Crewsshould understand their cockpitcommunication responsibilitiesbefore th e mission. Severalinstructional packages are in use,both in military and civilianaviation, that can help pilotsimprove their cockpit coordination; this instruction should bea part of air combat training.

CONCLUSIONAlthough the role of helicopterai r combat in Army tactics isproblematic, certainly at leastsome, and probably many,rotary-wing pilots will be takingadvantage of the increased agility and maneuverability affordedby today's high-performancehelicopters. I t is essential thatthese rotary pilots understand thepotential hazards of this mode offlight.Commanders, flight surgeons,standardization personnel andinstructor pilots should ensurethat adequate safety measuresare taken during ai r combattraining. They also should ensurethat pilots performing helicopterACM are aware of the physiologyof G forces, and the perceptualand behavioral pitfalls of thistype of flying. .-=r

ABOUT THE AUTHORSMajor John S. Crowley obtained his M. D. degree in 1982 from the University ofMissouri at Kansas City. After a 3-year tour as brigade flight surgeon in the 3dArmored Division, Federal Republic of Germany, Major Crowley completed theU. S. Air Force residency in aerospace medicine. He is currently the humanfactors consultant, Systems Engineering Division, at the U. S. Army SafetyCenter, Ft. Rucker, AL.Major Rhonda Cornum is the acting chief of the Crew Life Support Branch at theU.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Ft. Rucker, AL. She received her B.S. degree in 1975; her Ph.D. degree in 1978 from Cornell University, Ithaca NY;and her M. D. degree from the Uniformed Services University of the HealthSciences, Bethesda, MD, in 1986. Major Cornum recently completed a uccessfultour as the chief of Aviation Medicine at the U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, Ft.Rucker.Captain Raul Marin is currently a flight surgeon assigned to the Apache TrainingBrigade, Ft. Hood, TX. He holds a B. A. degree from Gettysburg College,GettYSburg, PA, and received his M. D. degree from the University of Puerto Ricoin 1987. He was awarded Army Flight Surgeon wings in 1988.



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EXTENDEDOPERATIONS ANDJUDGMENT:A HUMAN-SYSTEMDESIGN CHAIJAENGE

Dr. Robert P. MahanAssistant Professor, Human Factors Engineering

Department of PsychologyThe University of GeorgiaAthens, GA

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

THE NEED FOR including human engineering in the development of military systems hasalways been intuitive and a part of major systemsacquisition. Further, the U.S. General AccountingOffice continues to promote the growth of humanengineer ing efforts in the military. However, earliersystem complexities and operational requirementswere well bounded, which meant that systemdesigners could rely on the adaptive and accommodative capacities of the soldier.

Presently, operational requirements and technological potential have been growing exponentially.In the context of current and evolving systemacquisition practices, those who buy militarysystems must be aware ofand sensitive to the needsand expectations of the soldier. This awarenessand sensitivity can be realized only through anunderstanding of system deficiencies directlyrelated to the limitations in human-system design.Intelligent systemsClearly, technological innovation is changingthe way the military services conduct business.

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Tactical systems are becoming much moresophisticated in many ways, including- Flexibility in addressing a more variable

threat spectrum. Detecting and classifying potential threats atgreater distances. Capability to deliver a greater ordnancepayload with high precision.Much of this sophistication lies in the system's

ability to preprocess large amounts of the availabletactical data and then present summary informa-tion to the soldier for action.

Futuristic combat systems are likely to exploitand integrate into final tactical solutions theinformation about the soldier's experience, trainingand ability for abstract and judgmental reasoning.These futuristic systems will elicit and use theinformation from the decision maker as a resourceto complement machine solutions to tacticalproblems.

Current systems are now freeing the soldier frommany of the manual control tasks once central totheir operation, such as targeting. They haveinstead replaced these tasks with those that puta high premium on the cognitive abilities of thesoldier. Intelligent systems are requiring moreintelligent soldiers. It is likely that the judgmentand decision making skills of the future soldierwill become more critical than ever.Human limitations-fatigueand performance

Realistic scenarios often will necessitate thatoperators perform their duties for extended periodsor in sustained operational settings. From a designperspective, this translates into need for flexiblesystems that adjust to a variety of tactical problemconfigurations. I t also means that the systems needto accommodate to changes in the physiologicaland psychological state of the operator as well.

Research has clearly demonstrated that anoperator's ability to perform tasks over time variesconsiderably. As tasks become more complex anddifficult to perform, the effects of time engaged inperforming the tasks become more profound.

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The early Walter Reed Army Institute ofResearch studies showed that, as subjects becomefatigued or sleepy, the rate at which they performtasks becomes greatly reduced. This observationled to the formation of the "lapse hypothesis,"which argued that when subjects become fatigued,a kind of mental lapse would overcome them. Thislapse would force them to stop performing a taskuntil the lapse had passed. This hypothesis, in part,explains why missed signal detections occur morefrequently in surveillance and other vigilance tasksthe longer an operator has been on duty.

In these early Walter Reed studies, researchersexamined the effects of fatigue on primarilyanalytical kinds of tasks: these tasks could becharacterized as having either right or wronganswers.

For example, the mental addition of a set ofnumbers yields one and only one correct answer.No matter how close a person is to the right answer,it is still not correct. The characteristic of havinga very precise and absolute task solution under-scores the deterministic nature of such tasks. (Forexample, 2 and 2 always equals 4 and nothingelse.) The manifestation of fatigue in tasks, likemental addition, was a significant reduction in therate at which the tasks were performed. In otherwords, fatigue caused the people to slow downduring the performance of these tasks to maintaintask accuracy.

On the other hand, tasks that require usingprobabilistic information (inference tasks) appearto generate a different response profile as a resultof fatigue. These tasks most closely resemble the



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process of making judgments in operationalsituations that are often ill-defined and uncertain.This class of task is nondeterministic in nature,having a range of acceptable problem solutions,some better than others.Preliminary findings from decision researchindicate that subjects performing probabilistictasks during extended operations-

Do rwt reduce the rate in which they performthe tasks when fatigued.

Become less and less accurate over time. Believe after testing they performed tasks verywell.These findings bring up some interesting and

difficult issues for design engineers. I t may be true,indeed, that judgment and decision makingbehaviors significantly change as a function oftime-on-task an d that these skills are becomingcritical to optimal system performance. I f so, thedesigner must understand their dynamics.

In addition, assessing operator fatigue duringthe performance of judgment and decision makingtasks may prove difficult. Operators do not appearsimply to become slower at performing such taskswhen fatigued, even though their performancedeteriorates over time.Future implications

One may argue that tactical systems arebecoming easier to operate from a manual-controlviewpoint. On the other hand, it is clear that thesesame systems are becoming more difficult tooperate from a cognitive-control viewpoint. I t islikely that the soldier's skills at being a "goodjudge" or "good decision maker" will mean theability to make sense out of an uncertain, highrisk, rapidly evolving tactical scenario. This taskwill be made easier through the interaction with"intelligent" systems that can assist in interpretingthe operational environment.

I t is crucial that system designers recognize thatthe cognitive abilities of the soldier vary over time.Designing a system with the ideal soldier in mindmay doom the system in application, because asoldier's critical performance occurs during

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

combat. An ideal soldier is one who is well rested,alert, in perfect health and is maintaining aconstant level of performance. During combat, thesoldier is not well rested, encounters many formsof stress, and is possibly injured. His performanceis changing as a function of these and otherdimensions.

Combat system design is a critical task thatrequires careful an d deliberate assessments of thetotal environment. Complete machine solutions tovery difficult tactical problems are unlikely.Therefore, the soldier's experience, judgment andcapacity for integrating diverse informationalelements will be necessary. Both extended operations and highly advanced combat systems meanthat new and challenging problems face designengineers and human factors professionals. ~

REFERENCESMahan, R.P. The effects of extended opera

tions on multicue inferential judgment. Proceed-ings on the 5th International Symposium onAviation Psychology, April 1989.

MIL-STD-1472C. Military Standard: HumanEngineering Design Criteria for Military Systems,Equipment and Facilities (rev. eel.), Washington,DC, Department of Defense, September 1983.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Effectivenessof U.S. Forces can be increased throughimproved weapon system design (pSAD-81-17),1981.

Vassilion, Y. (Ed.). Human Factors and Interac-tive Computer Systems. Norwood, N.J.: AblexPublishing Corporation, 1984.

Williams, H.L., Lubin, A., Goodnow, J.J.,"Impaired Performance with Acute Sleep Loss,"Psychological Monographs, 484, pp. 1-26, 1959.

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DIOPTER FOCUSADJUSTMENT OFAPACHE IHADSS

Mr. Isaac BeharMr. Clarence E. Rash

Sensory Research DivisionU.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory

Fort Rucker, AL

TH E U.S. ARMY Aeromedical Research Laboratory(USAARL), Ft . Rucker, AL,recently conducted an anonymous questionnaire survey of 58Ft. Rucker AH 64 Apache instructor pilots. Many of the pilotsregistered at least one visualcomplaint (visual discomfort,headache, blurred vision or disorientation) occurring at leastoccasionally while flying or afterflying the Apache. Many of theircomments indicated that symptoms occurred during long flightsand/ or flying with out-of-focusdisplay symbology.

Since we suspected thatApache aviators might be usingan improper procedure for focusing the helmet-mounted display(HMD) using the dioptric adjustment, as a second part of ourstudy we went to the flight lineand measured the HMD dioptricsettings that 20 Apache pilotsmade using whatever proceduresthey normally use before departure. The results confirmed ourinitial suspicions. The desiredfocus setting should have been 0or, at most, a low amount ofnegative dioptric power. However, we found that the range ofpilot dioptric settings was 0 to-5.25 with a mean of -2.28. Thepositive focusing effort (accommodation) by the eyes to offsetthese relatively large negativeHMD dioptric settings is likely amajor source for headaches and

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visual discomfort during andafter long flights. When we demonstrated the proper HMD focusadjustment technique to threepilots and had them repeat theprocedure, the repeat focus settings for all three were betweeno and -1 diopter. The focusingprocedures that our aviatorsapparently had been instructed touse were in error, because theyforced the pilot to use excessivelevels of eye accommodativeeffort to overcome the negativeHMD setting.

Ideally, no accommodativeeffort should be induced, whichis the same condition as when the


eyes are viewing distant objects.This is accomplished by initiallysetting the diopter ring to the fullplus position. Unfortunately,there are no markings on theHMD to indicate this position.Therefore, to adjust the HMD tofull plus, turn the ring, with theintegrated helmet and displaysight subsystem as worn, fullycounterclockwise (cathode raytube (CRT) backed all the wayout). The imagery will appearblurred. Then turn the ring slowlyclockwise until the raster lines(gray scaly center line) firstappear in sharp focus and stop.Further clockwise rotation will

not improve sharpness and willstimulate your eyes.It is also important to have thecorrect mental set. Do not assumethat, since the CRT face is closeto the eyes, you have to focus intothe HMD to see it clearly. Toassist in having the image inclear focus when the eyes arerelaxed for infinite focus, look outthe windscreen at the most dis

tant object available when making the diopter adjustment.Again, the proper adjustmentprocedure is to rotate the ring intoplus power (counterclockwise),reduce the power until you firstobtain a clear image, and stop.Do not rotate the ring further asthis will almost always leave theHMD adjustment in a positionthat will stimulate your ownaccommodation away from therelaxed distance focus.

I f you are an Apache pilot, youcan help us determine whetherthese suggestions are helpful.Compare your visual comfortwhen the diopter focus adjustments were made as describedabove versus with the methodyou had previously used. You canprovide feedback to us atU S ~ L by calling Dr. IsaacBehar or Mr. Clarence E. Rashat AUTOVON 558-6813/ 6814.Incidentally, in a third part of ourstudy, we gave 10 high-timeApache pilots a thorough visualfunction evaluation. All camethrough with flying colors.

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Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Staff Officer Course (MSOC) a

~ E PURPOSE ofMANPRINT trainingis to prepare military and civilian personnel tointegrate manpower, personnel, training, humanfactors engineering, health hazards and systemsafety considerations throughout the materieldevelopment and acquisition process. The 3-weekMSOC course is directed toward action officers.The I-week MSTC course is directed towardindividuals who manage the acquisition process.Participants are recruited from the U.S. ArmyMateriel Command (AMC) and the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),other services and industry.

The MSOC is designed for Active Army officers(01 through 04), warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (E7 through E9), civilians (GS-07through GS-13) and industry representatives.Typical attendees are assigned, or on orders, to

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a combat development, training development,materiel development, Department of the ArmyStaff materiel acquisition staff officer position, orindustrial assignment in a MANPRINT functionalarea.

The MSOC training schedule atFt. Belvoir, VA, for FY 1990

22 Jan 90 - 9 Feb 905 Mar 90 - 23 Mar 902 Apr 90 - 20 Apr 9030 Apr 90 -1 8 May 904 Jun 90 - 22 Jun 909 Jul 90 - 27 Jul 90

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TRAININGCOURSES

Senior Training Course (MSTC) have openings

The MSTC is designed for TRADOCIAMCsenior leadership general officer (GO) / seniorexecutive service (SES) positions, senior managersof industry, Active Army officers (04 through 06)and civilians (GS-13 through GM-15) assigned toa combat development, training development ormateriel development position.

The MSTC is hosted by a TRADOC or AMCcommand. The first day of the course is attendedby TRADOC / AMC senior leaders (GO / SES) andtheir primary staff. The host commander andTRADOC IAMC counterpart commander areleading the system workshop. They are emphasizing MANPRINT implementation, using actualsystem development, materiel change and procurement examples for an ongoing or recentlycompleted acquisition program at the proponentagency or school (host command).


The MSTC training schedule for FY 19909 -1 1 Jan 90 Ft. Belvoir, VA

12 -1 6 Feb 90 Ft. Leonard Wood, MO19 - 23 Mar 90 Picatinny Arsenal, NJ16 - 20 Apr 90 Ft. Huachuca, AZ14 - 1 8 May 90 Ft. Monmouth, NJ18 - 22 Jun 90 Ft. Lee, VA23 - 27 Jul90 Natick, MA

For additional information, write U.S. ArmySoldier Support Center, National Capital Region,200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332; or callCaptain John M. Lucas, chief of the MANPRINTTraining Office at AUTOVON 221-2098 orCommercial 202-325-2098. t ~ "

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PEARI.!SPersonal EquipmentAnd Rescue/survival Lowdovvn

Wearing Walk-Around Restraint HarnessesOnly two walk-around safety harnesses are

approved for use in Army aircraft: HarnessAssembly, Aircraft Safety Personnel Restraining,national stock number (NSN) 1680-00-169-0656,part number 168O-EG-033; and the Safety VestAssembly, Hoist Operator, NSN 1680-00-982-9973,part number 214-070-321-101 or AL 1010-I.

The Harness Assembly, known as the gunner'srestraint or monkey harness, ha s parachuteharness-type construction with no incorporatedmesh vest. It has two shoulder straps that connectto the center of the waist strap by a parachuteejector snap. I t also has two leg straps that connectto the waist strap with parachute ejector snaps.

The Safety Vest Assembly has the full uppertorso mesh vest with four front strap-and-snapclosures. I t also has two leg straps with adjustablebuckles.

In 1987, the Safety Vest Assembly was mistak-enly procured by using an unapproved configuration according to part number AMTC-SV-101that used the original NSN 1680-00-982-9973,reference aviation life support equipment message87-10. The user can identify this unapprovedversion of the hois t operator's vest. I t has a reduced

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amount of mesh vest material and only one front(chest) closure located low on the torso when closed.Because of the low mounting of the single frontstrap, part number SV-101, the user can fall outof this harness when leaning or bending. Restraintharness users should ensure they do not use theSV-101 part number.Aircrew personnel must ensure they wear therestraint harness with the correct NSN and partnumber and that the vest fits properly. They mustwear harnesses over all flight clothing/survivalvests and armor. Wearing these harnesses underthis equipment may impede or prevent safe egressfrom aircraft.Users must attaGh the restraint harness pigtailto an aircraft tie-down fitting. This fitting mustsupport the aircrewmember's weight plus anygravity (G) forces acting upon the aircraft in flightor during an accident. This of course can be almostimpossible to f i g u r ~ out. No one can predetermineG forces before an accident and aircrews do notexceed the aircraft operational limitations. Therefore, a good rule of thumb: any tie-down fittingwith a rating of 1,000 pounds in all directionsnormally will be adequate to provide safe restraint



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to aircrewmembers. There is, however, a "catch-22." Therefore, aircrews must know their aircraftoperator's manual cargo tie-down data.Figure 6-11 in the UH-1HIV operator's manualshows all floor tie-down fittings are good for 1,250pounds vertical, but only 500 pounds in otherdirections. Therefore, UH 1 Huey floor tie-downfittings are not acceptable for harness use. Onecould use more than one pigtail, but this impedesegress by giving the user one more item to unlatchbefore set free. On the other hand, bulkhead tiedown fittings in the UH 1 are acceptable forrestraint harness use. It cannot be overemphasized

that soldiers know the tie-down fitting data for theiraircraft.The other important safety item on the restraintharness is to ensure the pigtail snap hook has thesafety pin installed according to Technical Manual55-1500-204-25 / 1, General Aircraft MaintenanceManual, paragraph 1-154D(2d), and figures 1-13,1-14 and 1-15, pages 1-60 and 1-62 in change 37.This is the snap hook that attaches to the tie-downfitting.Point of contact is Mr. Jim Dittmer, AMCPMALSE, AUTOVON 693-3573, or Commercial 314-263-3573. ~

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL'S AMC Product Management Office, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in mill ions)

FY 89 (through 31 January) 9 474,705 1.90 9 $36.0

FY 90 (through 31 January) 11 475,008* 2.32 11 $50.1"estimated

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 19


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A".IATION M.E.DICIH.E. REPORT"ItOffice of the AViation Medicine Consultant

Where Have All the Flight Surgeons Gone?As the course director for the Army Flight Surgeon Primary Course at Ft.

Rucker, AL, since April 1987, I have noted an alarming trend in ArmyAviation medicine. The following article examines the effect of the loss ofindividual flight training upon the numbers and quality of flight surgeonsbeing produced.

Captain J. ScottWalton, M.D.Course Director, Army Flight Surgeon Primary CourseU.S. Army Aeromedical CenterFort Rucker, AL

CAREER MANAGERS at the U.S. Total ArmyPersonnel Command have a difficult task to recruitand retain physicians. Reasons for poor physicianrecruitment and retention are many: noncompetitive salary, inadequate administrative support,inadequate nursing support and slow careerprogression.

Flight surgeons have been the exception. In therecent past, there were as many flight surgeonsas the Army Medical Depar tment would allow, andthe Anny Flight Surgeon Primary Course (AFSPC)had many more applicants than training positions.

Today the situation has changed. Applicationsfor the AFSPC are at the lowest point since 1983.For the first t ime ever, y ~ u n g physicians are beingforced to become flight surgeons! Individual unitaviators and commanders will soon see involun-

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The opinions expressed in this article are those ofthe author and do not necessarily reflect the views

of any Department of Defense agency.

tary flight surgeons at the unit level. Aviationmedicine was once a popular primary carespecialty; now the Army cannot recruit enoughphysicians to fill an AFSPC class. What could havecaused such a significant shift in motivation?LOSS OF FUGHT TRAINING!To understand the devastating effect the lossof flight training has had on aviation medicine,consider the following scenario. You are asuccessful doctor practicing in your hometown.Being a patriot, you are also the doctor for thelocal Army National Guard unit. In consideringwhether or not to attend the AFSPC, you will weighseveral factors: What will attendance cost me? The AFSPCweeks. Absence from my practice for 6 weeks

result in about $16,500 in lost income



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(according to the American Medical Association'sbook, Physician Marketplace Statistics, 1988). I willalso lose income from patients who will switchphysicians in my absence; office staff who mustbe paid despite my absence; and the expendituresoffice and equipment that accrue whether I amthere or not. Do I want to sustain such financiallosses? No!

Will the AFSPC enhance my military career?Perhaps. Will the AFSPC improve my civilian practice?No. Do I want to be separated from my family

and friends for 6 weeks? No! How about my yearly vacation? I probablywon't be able to afford one after 6 weeks at Ft.Rucker. Will my family appreciate no vacation thisyear? No!

The "No's" obviously are overwhelming.I f an additional consideration is: Do I want to

learn to fly an Anny helicopter? The response:ABSOLUTELY!

The active duty physician has reasons not tobecome a flight surgeon as compelling as thoseof the Reserve Component doctor just mentioned.One of the biggest negative considerations is anI8-month commitment incurred by course attendance. Again, the additional incentive of learningto fly an Army helicopter seems to make all adverseconsiderations fade into insignificance.

When budget cutters eliminated the flighttraining portion of the AFSPC, they neverimagined the severe consequences that AnnyAviation is now encountering. In the most recentAFSPC, there were four physicians who did notwant to become flight surgeons. These doctorsagreed to attend the AFSPC only after beingthreatened with an assignment more undesirablethan that of a flight surgeon.

The flight surgeon's job is a demanding one.Many nonclinical, yet essential, activities must

often be completed during off-duty time: flight linehazard inspections; in-flight observation ofaircrewmembers; review of the medical portion ofthe preaccident plan; knowing contingency plans;and participation in unit physical training andsocial functions.

The conscripted flight surgeon may avoid anyactivity that must be done outside of routine dutyhours and do only what is strictly required. Howmany aircraft and aircrewmembers' lives must belost before the budget cutters realize the falseeconomy of eliminating flight training from theAFSPC?

The elimination of flight training has not onlyaffected recruitment of physicians into thespecialty of aviation medicine; the loss of thattraining has also degraded the quality of theaverage course graduate. Consider the type flightsurgeon you want making aeromedical decisionsabout your flying career. The AFSPC student nowexperiences aviation from a passenger's perspective. Even an experienced passenger has littleappreciation for the complex tasks that an aviatorperforms to complete a mission safely. Do you wanta passenger making decisions regarding yourfitness to fly? With elimination of individual flighttraining from the AFSPC, aeromedical decisionsare now made by passenger flight surgeons.

Flight training for flight surgeon students isabsolutely essential to ensure that Anny Aviationmedicine attracts the brightest and the bestphysicians that the Anny has to offer. For ourflight surgeons to make sound aeromedicaldecisions, they need flight familiarization tra ining,which will give each an aviator's perspective ofaircraft operations. A passenger's perspective isinadequate and invites faulty aeromedical decisionmaking. Anny Aviation will experience a steadydecline in the quality of the "typical" flight surgeonuntil an incentive and training vehicle equal toindividual flight training is returned to the AFSPC.

The Aviation Medicine Report is a bimonth ly report from the Aviation Medicine Consultant of TSG. Please forward subject matter of currentaeromedical importance for editorial consideration to U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, ATTN: HSXY-ADJ, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5333.

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 21


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AVIATION LOGISTICSu.s. Army Aviation Logistics School

Come Now, A ProductiveField Training Exercise?Sergeant First Class John M. GibsonChief, Shared Training Field ExerciseDepartment of Advanced Aviation Logistics TrainingU.S. Army Aviation Logistics SchoolFort Eustis, VA

ACCORDING TO Field Manual 25-100, Training TheForce, a field training exercise is a high-cost, highoverhead exercise conducted under simulated combatconditions in the field. Senior noncommissioned officers(NCOs) from the U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School(USAALS) Ft. Eustis, VA, met in May 1988 to discussthis premise an d speculate on beneficial alternatives.What ifUSAALS could develop a shared training fieldexercise? I t would provide leadership positions for theAviat ion Logistics Advanced Noncommissioned OfficerCourse (ANCOC)/ Basic Noncommissioned OfficerCourse (BNCOC) student. The exercise would alsoprovide opportunity for the Career Management Field67 advanced individual training (AIT) students. Thenthey could actually erect tents, operate field stoves, usecamouflage netting systems and run a wire communications network.

The ANCOC/ BNCOC students occupy company-levelleadership positions from first sergeant through shopchief/ team leader. They also supervise the setup of thecompany area by the AIT students.What if this shared-training field exercise provided

the AIT students the opportunity to perform actualmaintenance on category A and category B aircraft?This would reinforce the military occupational specialty(MOS) skills learned in the school. What i f it alsoprovided the instructors with a vehicle to evaluatestudent ability? What if it at the same time instilled

22

self-confidence in the soldier and upgraded the qualityof the training aircraft in the school?The USAALS shared training field exercises, implemented in October 1988, made all this possible. Theexercises commenced with a scenario that encompassedMOS reinforcement training, creature comfort an d fieldsurvival. The aviation unit maintenance scenario began

in January 1989. AIT students performing aviationmaintenance is premised on them receiving mostacademic instruction before the exercise. Also, they canperform aviation maintenance during the exercise aswell as when they arrive at the receiving unit.

The AIT students, supervised by ANCOC/ BNCOCstudents and subject matter experts, have successfullycompleted 5,313 man-hours of aviation unit leveloverflow maintenance on trainer aircraft. Had thisoverflow maintenance gone to the contractor, it wouldhave cost USAALS an additional $154,135 during fiscalyear 1989.Exercise topics to better prepare students to functionin a field environment are as follows: field safety;survival in a nuclear, biological an d chemical environment; aircraft maintenance in a field environment (doit safer, accurately and cleaner); setup of the generalpurpose medium tent; operation of field stoves (potbellyand Yukon); area or equipment camouflage; an d use offield phones.

Plans for the USAALS shared training field exerciseinclude upgrading the field site an d equipment toaviation intermediate maintenance standards. Plansalso include developing and implementing a battledamage assessment reaction course. This course willchallenge the NCO student to find and assess the statusof a downed aircraft, then assemble a multiskill levelteam and take corrective action. Also under review isthe incorporation of students from the aviation officercourses on Ft. Eustis into the scenario.

The bottom line: today's aviation maintenance AITsoldier receives superior training at a lower cost. ~JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1990


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~DIRECTORATE FOR MAINTENANCE U ~

u.s. Army Aviation Systems Command - - -. . . . , ; ~ i i i i i i i i i i i i i i o _ _ ...

A Drama Needing A Happy EndingMr. Fred KerseyDirectorate for MaintenanceU.S. Army Aviation Systems CommandSt. Louis, MO

A LONE U.S. ARMY helicopter on a cargomission encountered engine trouble and crashedin a remote outside continental United States(OCONUS) location at 1737 hours on 10 January1987. Only a few injuries and no fatalities occurred.The aircraft, however, was severely damaged andcould not be flown. The operating unit retrievedthe aircraft back to the host base. Two years later,however, the unit rotated back to its parentorganization in CONUS leaving the aircraftbehind.A dilemma, yes! Why after 2 years was thedamaged aircraft still there? What should havehappened? What is needed for the future? Fromour vantage point at the National MaintenancePoint, this dilemma is a too frequent and commonoccurrence-and an unnecessary one.

My organization is the Depot OperationsDivision in the Directorate for Maintenance at theAviation Systems Command (AVSCOM). Thedivision is tasked to plan, fund, arrange for andoversee the depot-level overhaul and repair ofAnnyaircraft to include crash-damaged aircraft. In pastyears, the repair of crash-damaged aircraft, such

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

How do we prevent neglected, damaged aircraft?

as the UH-l Huey, did not present the criticalproblem as it does today. Parts were plentiful andcomparatively easy to fix. The Corpus Christi

23


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A VSCOM, continued

Army Depot (CCAD), TX, could repair theseaircraft by using basically 1950s technology. Also,the Anny had enough aircraft to replace those lostto the operating unit. These basic steps show howto fix crash-damaged aircraft: Predict annually how many crash-damagedaircraft to repair within a year. Include necessary funding to repair the aircraft in the Command Operating Budget of

AVSCOM. Remember that CCAD can normally meetthe needs of repair and overhaul. CCADincludes these requirements in its annualrepair programs. Begin aircraft repair as funds become available and depot schedules permit.

Seldom was there a need to establish an alternateplan for an Anny or commercial facility to do therepair. Today, the picture has changed and hereare a few reasons why:

Highly complex aircraft resulting from technological advancements in aircraft designand performance.

Increased costs for repair and overhaul of aircraft and their complex systems.

24

Reductions in our organic depot maintenancecapability and capacity due to economicalfactors and availability of technical repairdata.Army DepotVersus Commercial RepairDespite these realities, the repair of crashdamaged aircraft is a top priority. When theorganic depot cannot absorb the total repair andmaintenance requirement, the division looks tocompetent commercial facilities to accomplishsome of the work. The frequent lack of technicaldata on newer aircraft caused the division tobecome dependent on sole-source contracts of theoriginal manufacturer for certain repair work.Today, under the Competition In Contracting Actof 1984, the division has goals to increase thenumber of programs designated for open or limitedcompetition. Otherwise, it must completely justifya sole-source contract.One accomplishment under this goal was therecent competitive breakout award of a 3-yearminimum/ maximum contract to cover the UH-60Black Hawk helicopter. This award is expected tobe a clear-cut advantage toward timely support ofcrash-damaged helicopters. Also, AVSCOMexpects bids for a major UH 1 helicopter retirementcontract soon. This contract will eventually allowfor more space at CCAD for repair of newer CH-47 Chinook, AH-64 Apache and UH 60 helicopters.The Depot Operations Division is committed togive crash-damaged aircraft the advantages ofimproved organic depot effectiveness. The divisionalso has goals for expanded competitive contracting. To achieve this expanded competition, thedivision works with engineering, product assurance and technical publication elements ofA VSCOM. These efforts also help to prepare theorganic depot for new and technically advancedwork.The Neglected Aircraft

What should have been done to take care of theaircraft and why wasn't it done? For reasonsunknown, the unit or its parent organization didnot or was unable to follow published guidelinesin obtaining disposition instructions for damaged



27/68

aircraft. Soldiers should have prepared an Estimated Cost of Damage (ECOD) Report, using aDA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection andMaintenance Worksheet. They submit this formaccording to Technical Bulletin 43-0002-3, Main-tenance Expenditure Limits for Army AircraftThe ECOD was 2 years overdue. In this instance,the ECOD did not arrive in the Depot OperationsDivision until the summer of 1989, more than 2years after the accident. Normally, the ECOD isprepared and submitted immediately after accidentinvestigation is completed. The Depot OperationsDivision is not equipped, however, to handle allthe details in this regard for the unit or itssupporting elements. I t will, nevertheless, doeverything it can to help, but first it needs to knowthe problem!Paramount to this problem is the need to preventfurther deterioration of the aircraft through delaysin handling of the aircraft. In the case of thisforgotten aircraft, the Depot Operations Divisionpromptly acted with the A VSCOM TransportationOffice, the owning unit and the host basecommander for two items: first, the immediateshipment of the aircraft back to CONUS; andsecond, the inspection evaluation and a costestimate of repair at a contractor's facility.

The division assumes that the operating unitwith minimal staffing was unable to complete theECOD. Additionally, the hectic nature of thepending transfer caused the delay in reporting ofthe damaged aircraft. Also, the division a ttemptsto convey the critical need for_early notificationof crash-damaged aircraft directly to field units andthrough the AVSCOM Logistics AssistanceRepresentatives (LARs). This allows the divisionto provide optimum response once the final ECODis received from the field. In extreme emergencies,the division considers providing onsite assistance.This helps accomplish ECODs and providesimmediate disposition instructions.How To Obtain AssistanceECOD preparation is necessary for reportingdamaged aircraft beyond the repair capability ofthe aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) or supporting aviation intermediate maintenance/ aviation


classification and repair activity depot maintenance unit. The user should notify the LAR orA VSCOM for help. I f necessary, depot maintenance personnel will help prepare the ECOD. Writeto the Commander, AVSCOM, ATTN: AMSAVMDP, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798; or call AUTOVON 693-3116, or Commercial314-263-3116. The crash-damage program does no tyet have, and may never have, a happy ending,but it improves each day. Through AVSCOM'scommitment and partnership with the field, it willimprove the crash-damage program.

The chief of Depot Operations Division sums itup this way: "In the world of maintenance, fromA VUM to depot level, perfection is an elusive thing,never quite achieved. Therefore, we must work todo a little better each day." ~

FOR YOUR INFORMATIONPlease print the telephone number

change for the Aviation SystemsCommand Feedback Center, St.Louis, MO. AUTOVON 693-1758 orCommercial 314-263-1758.

The Aircrew Training Manual(ATM) Section at Aviation TrainingBrigade, Ft. Rucker, AL, has a 24-hour hotline to receive questions onA TM issues. An answering machinewill record calls after duty hours. Thenumber is AUTOVON 558-ATMI.POC CPT Robertson, chief, ATMSection.

Corpus Christi Army Depot,Corpus Christi, TX, began a 4-day, 10-hour workweek on 14January 1990. The normal dutyhours are 0700 to 1730 (Mondaythrough Thursday) CentralStandard Time.All major maintenance andsupply functions will be closed onFriday.We strongly urge customerunits have their transient crewsarrive at the depot on Mondaysto begin their inventories andinspections before the aircraf t arein / out processed.

25


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Employment of

Captain Richard D. Koethe3-115 Field Artillery

U.S. Army National GuardMemphis, TN

The opinions expressed in this articleare the author's and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the U.S. Army

Aviation Center nor the Departmentof the Army.

COPPERHEAD a c t i c a . 1Scenario"The Soviet tanks and BMPs filled the landscape like an avalanche. The enemy [NATO forces] was

somewhere at hand but not to be seen. The British tanks were there all right, firing not directly from theflank but far back, in well-chosen positions behind low crests in undulating ground.

"Now the enemy's antitank helicopter gunships were coming in with their deadly guided weapons. Thesewould zoom down, attacking the ZSU-23 air defense guns and missile launchers, and then withdraw toopen the way into the defense for the fixed wing American A-10 Thunderbolts storming in with tremendousweapon fire, their swift and thunderous onslaught on tanks and BTRs followed up again by the helicopterantitank gunships. Armored vehicles in some numbers, whether tanks or BTR, fell victim to these attacks,but attacking aircraft suffered too. No sortie withdrew without explosions in the air and flaming wreckageleft on the ground."1

26 JANUARY FEBRUARY 1990


29/68

THE SITUATION describedis a fictitious one. The problemthat vividly presents itself is thesame as in any combat situation:how to maximize the destructionof enemy forces while reducing tothe lowest extent possible lossesto friendly forces and, finally,accomplish the assigned mission.Under the most ideal and optimistic force ratios that may occur,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces will be heavily outnumbered on the ground,face an opponent with numerousai r defense weapons and beforced to maximize in every waypossible all fire support means.The introduction of the aviation brigade into the division, andmore specifically the attack helicopter battalion, has given anenormous increase in firepower tothe maneuver commander. A keyquestion arises, Jww can the fieldartillery best support maneuver?In the context of providing supporting fires for a commanderfacing large numbers of enemyarmored forces, one importantconsideration must be how todefeat the significant quantitiesof enemy air defense weapons tomaximize the effectiveness ofboth attack helicopter and fixedwing air assets.The following is a discussionon one possible employmenttechnique in a tactical environment by incorporating existingorganizations and weapons systems in a specific manner.Organization and EquipmentThe concept being proposedwill not require additional equipment or personnel to implement.Rather, the intent is to focusemployment of all existingorganizations and equipment toaccomplish a specific goa l -1. General Sir John Hackett, The Third World

War: The Un told Story. New Yorlc, MacMillan,1982, p. 139.


destruction of the enemy's ai rdefense artillery (ADA) weapons.The key players in this scenarioare- Ground brigade commanderand his subordinate battalioncommanders. Attack helicopter battalioncommander. 155 mm direct support (DS)battalion. Brigade and battalion firesupport officers (FSOs). Fire support teams. Air liaison officers. Joint ai r attack team (JAAT)composed o f--Attack helicopter company(AH-64 Apache or AH-l Cobrawith its aeroscouts).-Air Force close air support(CAS) aircraft.-Artillery fire support (fromDS battalion to the groundbrigade).The only assumptions made forpurposes of this discussion are asfollows: existing fire supportchannels have been establishedand are being used; fire support

FIGURE 1: Ground unit command net.

GROUNDCOMMANDER

(FSO)(AHLO)

personnel are present; attackhelicopter and fixed-wing airsupport assets are available, andcoordination between fieldartillery and aviation assets hasbeen and will continue to beaccomplished; plus limited quantities of the M712 Copperheadcannon-launched, guided projectile are onhand. The idea proposed is not new in terms ofdoctrine, but the intent is toemphasize the capability of allelements working in unison fora specific objective. In short,employ Copperhead againstenemy ADA weapons to maximize the effectiveness of bothArmy and Air Force assets beingemployed in the battlefield airinterdiction modes.CommunicationsTwo primary communicationsnets mustbe in place and operational-a ground unit command netand a JAAT/CAS command net,both of which are frequency modulated (FM). The ground writ command net is depicted in figure 1.

SECTION

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,COPPERHEAD

ATTACK HELICOPTERCOMPANYCOMMANDER

ATTACKHELICOPTERSECTION

FM - PRIMARYUHF - ALTERNATEVHF - ALTERNATE

FIGURE 2: JAAT/CAS command net.

Through this net, the groundmaneuver commander is capableofboth command and control (C2)for all the important players thatwill be required to make theconcept work. In particular, theattack helicopter battalion cancoordinate effectively with theFSO located with the maneuvercommander or with the aviationbrigade.With the JAAT/ CAS com-mand net depicted in figure 2, theattack helicopter battalion iscapable of coordinating theactions of the various fire supportand aircraft that are available.Field Manual (FM) 1-112, AttackHelicopter Battalion, stipulatesthat it would be preferable i fArmy very high frequency (VHF)is used; however, any Armyfrequency band can be employedi f VHF is not present.2The question may arise, whybother to address the issue? The

28

ATTACKHELICOPTER

SECT ION

A-10

UHF

answer is, simply because exist-ing publications in fire supportinadequately address the subject.FM 6-20, Fire Support in theAirLand Battle, talks about bothArmy aircraft and JAATs. Onattack helicopters, the discussioncenters on their capabilities andlimitations.3 The FM touches onuse of responsive fires to supporttheir use as follows:"The commander must provideresponsive fire support (fromavailable air, ground, and sea resources) that protects and ensuresfreedom of maneuver with theenemy in deep, close, and rearoperations. 4When attack helicopters areemployed, continuous coordi-nation is required. Concerning C2for JAAT operations, FM 6-20merely states:"Upon receipt of a JAAT mis-sion, the aviation commanderassumes responsibility for the

U.S. Brigade-Level Task Forceo Two mechanized infantry

battalions (task organized) .o One armor battalion (task

organized).D One 155 mm self-propelled

artillery battalion (direct support) .o One engineer company (direct

support).

Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisiono Three motorized rifle regiments

equipped with 1 BMP (infantrycombat vehicle) and 2 BTRs(armored transporters) .

DOne T-80 tank regiment.o One artillery regiment.o One antiaircraft regiment equipped

with 16 ZSU-23-4s (Sovietantiaircraft self-propelled gunmounts) and 20 SA-6 GainfulSAMs.

FIGURE 3: A typical array of U.S. andSoviet forces.

coordination and execution of theJAAT operations. He should bekeenly aware of the ground andair tactical plan."5ExecutionThe following is a straight-forward scenario of how Copper-head could be used to support amaneuver commander in a com-bat situation. Once again, theconcept is predicated on the factthat all fire support coordinationagencies are in place and opera-tional. The force array (figure 3)is typical of what may be facedby NATO forces in a defensiveposture.As the Soviet motorized rifledivision enters the zone of thedefending brigade-level task



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force, forward observers locatedin the forward positions of themaneuver elements begin attriting enemy air defense systems,primarily ZSU-23-4s (Sovietantiaircraft self-propelled gunmounts) and accompanyingsurface-to-air (SAM) missiles(figure 4).

The most significant drawbackto the use of Copperhead is thefact that the projectile and laserdesignation system is rangedependent in terms of acquiringand tracking a target. As such,it is critical that these targets bepreplanned to the maximumextent possible to determine thebest firing positions for the batteries and locations for th eobservers.With the advent of both theAH-64 and OH-58D Kiowa helicopters and the increased lasingcapabilities of both systems (insome cases up to 200 percent morethan ground las ing systems), thisdisadvantage is negated to alarge degree. After ADA weaponshave been destroyed, brigade andbattalion FSOs, working in conjunction with the JAAT, willfocus attention on the armor ormotorized rifle elements of theSoviet first echelon.When considering the application of Copperhead against aspecific target-type, in this caseADA weapons, the principle oftarget value analysis and targetpriority must be applied. In thisparticular case, ADA weaponshave been determined by themaneuver commander, in coordination with the fire supportcoordinator at the appropriatelevel, to be "priority targets." Therationale for this is that, with oneCopperhead round, it is possiblefor an observer to take out onetank or one mobile ADA weaponthat would pose a significantthreat to low-flying (and relatively vulnerable) aircraft and


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Army Aviation Digest - Jan 1990

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