Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1963

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1963

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Brig Gen John J . Tolson III

COMMANDANT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLBrig Gen Robert R. Williams

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCol Warre n R. Williams

EDITORIAL STAFF

Capt Richa rd C. AnglinFred M. MontgomeryRicha rd K. Tier neyWilliam H. SmithDiana G. Williams

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIV

Pier ce L Wigg inWilliam E. CarterJame s E. Coleman

RMY VI TION

1GESJune 1963 Volume 9 Number

CONTENTS

LETTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A YEAR ON THE ROAD , Lt Col J ohn C. Hugh es

OXyGEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .

CE RTAIN CARDINAL R ULES FOR SAFE AIR OPERATION S,Lt Co l Mich ae l F . Ho chella . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BE A PROFESSIONAL , Lt George H. Sea berg . . . . . . 1

F RAGILE , HANDLE WITH C ARE , J am es E. C olema n 1

TH E N A ND NOW , C apt D arr ell D . Jurling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A STRANGE TH I NG HAPPE NED . . . , C ap t Rob ert S. Borer . . . . . . . . 1

HOW TO GET MORE OUT OF THE MOHAWK , R alph Donn ell 2

DEAD RECKONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ID A , C ap t L ou is L M izell 2

THE HELICOPTER

TWX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CRASH SENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The mi ss ion of the U . S . ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Is t o prov id e Inform at i on ofoper at i on a l or functionl -l n a ture concerning s af et y a nd a ir cr af t acciden t pr even ti on , t r a ininm a in t en a nc e , operations r es ea rch and deve lopmen t, aviatio n m edicine , and o t he r r elate d dat

The DIGEST is an offici a l D ep a r t m e n t of t he Ar m y p er i od ica l publi sh ed m on t hl y undethe supervi s ion of the Commandan t , U . S . Army Avi a ti on School. View s e xpre ss ed hereia re no t n eces s arily th o se of D epa r t me n t of t h e Arm y or th e U . S . Army Avi at i on SchooPh o t os a r e U . S . Army un l ess o t h erwi se sp eci fi ed . M at e r ia l may be reprinted gi ving credto the DIGEST a nd t o t he a u th or unle ss ot herw is e ind icate d .

Artic les, ph o t os, a nd i te m s o f I n te re s t on Army Avi a t ion a re invited. D i rect c ommunict ion is a ut h or ize d to : Edit o in-Ch ie/ U . S . Army Avi at io n D ig e st For t Ru c ke r Alab ama.

U se of fund s for prin ti ng of this publication ha s b ee n approved by H ea dquartersDepartm en t of t he Army , 7 November 1961.

To be d is tr ibuted in accordance with requirement s st a t ed In DA Form 12.


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~ ~ ~

Sir:I have just finished reading , with dis

ma y , "Aerial Delivery of a Fire Bomb "in the March issue of the DIGEST.Surely the author can 't be serious aboutdelivering napalm with an OH-13. Tobe sure , his ingenuity , initiative andimagination are commendable. No onequestions the desirability of responsive ,timely , accurate delivery of napalm ,but not with an OH-13. Perhaps thismakes an impressive demonstration atFort Bragg , but I can assure you , fromexperience , that flying at 200 feet andat 70 knots over a known enemy strongpoint , against even poorly trained andhaphazardly armed insurgents , wouldresult in a far more dramatic conclusion to the demonstration.

I agree, as do all of the aviators inVietnam , that we must accept losses andthat we may be required to "make do "with antiquated or obsol escent equipment , but this is no reason to select theslowest and obviously least suitable aircraft in the inventory. To do so borderson the suicidal. Aggressiveness is a most

desirable trait , provided it is temperedwith an acute appraisal of what's possible and what 's not possible.

From a constructive standpoint , theproblem of timely re sponsive deliverystill exists . It is my opinion that consideration should be given to testing theMohawk as a suitable delivery vehicle .

BERTRAM G . LEACHCapt , TC93d Trans Co Lt Hel)APO 96 , San Francisco , Calif.

June 963

E

Sir:The article "Rescue Operation in

Iran ," in the March '63 issue, clearlypoints out the fact that "the left hand(in Army Aviation) often doesn 't knowwhat the right hand is doing ."

This is not intended to belittle theinitiative and hard work of the aviation personnel mentioned in the article ,but to bring to the attention of thoseconcerned and interested the followingfacts .

UH-1A helicopters in Alaska havebeen using fiberglas skis for snow landings since the summer of 1961. These

skis (see inclosed photo) were purchased by USARAL from a local manufacturer and were tested and approvedwithin this command . UH-ls withthese skis have flown during two Arcticwinter maneuvers and operated successfully on snow covered fields from sealevel up to 8,000+ feet-including numerous operations on and off glaciers.

The fiberglas skis remain on the aircraft for year around operations in thistheater. In addition to the skis' usefulness for snow operations , they haveproven to be highly advantageous in

summer missions on muskeg , swampand tundra. Here they provide addi-

E

tional flotation capability. Their valueis further enhanced by the fact thatthey prevent undue wear and tear onthe bottom of the metal skid.

Damage to the ski is easily repairable by any third echelon shop with afiberglas repair capability. The presence of a narrow steel strip on theunderside of each ski minimizes wearon the fiberglas. These strips also helpto keep the aircraft from "fish-tailing"when started on a smooth icy surface .

Characteristics of the ski include:Width - 12 inchesLength-12 feet

Thickness- a

inchWeight-45 pounds (per ski , including the hardware) or a totalof 90 lbs versus an approximate 150 lbs per set of"wooden planks " as mentioned in your article .

Perhaps "Robbing Peter to pay Paulisn't really such a bad idea when itcomes to the exchange of useful information in Army Aviation

M. M . JESSUPand

B W. MERRILL

Capts , TC80th Trans Co . ( LH)


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The most significant features of ROAD aviation are: more responsive aircraft for command and o n ~trol a major increase in tactical airmobility for troops and supplies the addition of an air cavalrytroop equipped with armed helicopters and a broader scope and increased effectiveness of battlefield

surveillance. Maj Gen Ralph E. Haines Jr. CG 1st Armored Division.

Year on the ROADLieutenant Colonel John C HughesA YEAR on the road is boundto make a traveler weary,but also much wiser.

This certainly holds true forthe Army s first ROAD (Reorganization Objectives, ArmyDivisions) aviation ba t t a l ionthe 501st which came into existence with the reactivation of the1st Armored Division in February 1962 at For t Hood, Texas.

During their first year wi hthe Army s original ROAD diVISIOn 1st Armored aviatorslogged some 16,000 flight hoursand developed dynamic new usage of three decisive tools :

aerial surveillance, air cavalry reconnaissance,

airmobility.These tools are under the im -mediate control of the ROADdivision commander and his major subordinates. By being available when needed, they greatlyenhance the combat and operational potential of the division.

ORG NIZ TION ND

TR INING

The only change in the ROADdivision s 103 TOE aircraftbreakdown during the first yearwas the deletion of two LOHsand the addition of two U -6s.The distribution of aircraft isshown in figures 1 and 2.

Over 700 men and officers inaviation MOSs provide the skillsfor the division's nine aviationunits:

2 line companies in the aviation battalion,

1 headquarters company inthe aviation battalion,

3 platoons, 1 in each of thebrigades,

an artillery aviation sectionin division artillery,

the air cavalry troop in therecon squadron,

1 aircraft maintenance company in the maintenancebattalion.

The original cadre of these aviation units came from the old501st Aviation Company, whichwas understrength in personneland equipment. Consequently, atremendous influx of aviationpersonnel occurred early in 1962to meet TOE requirements.

To facilitate reception, billeting, and training, all aviationunits were initially set up in onearea, providing centralized control over the assignment of arriving personnel.

When aviators report to a command only one assumption canbe safely made- tha t they canfly. In the 1st Armored, incoming aviators were screened andplaced into various categories.Then the difficult task of matching man to machine and machineto unit was made without depriving units of experienceneeded to meet mission requirements.

Transition courses were estab-

Col Hughes is commander ofthe 501st Aviation BattalionFort Hood Texas the firstROAD aviation battalion.

u. s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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lished to qualify incoming aviators in appropriate aircraft. Thistook up a great deal of time. Forexample, over 600 hours of aviator transition time was used inthe UH-1 course before supportcould be rendered the division.I t was also necessary to sendnewly rated aviators on ferrymissions so they could accumulate the 250 hours needed forpassenger carrying qualification.

Initially, aviators considerablyoutnumbered flyable aircraft.The division took advantage ofthis situation by sending selected

fixed-wing-only pilots to rotary wing school and OV 1 qualification courses.

The influx of aviators hit thedivision in the last half of the

division to resort to AR 95-63and allow aviators to maintaininstrument tickets only in caseswhere it was a requirement.

To prepare for the annualwrit, a training program, including all of the division s aviators,was designed to cover mandatory Army area subjects. Theprogram embraced some 7hours of classroom instructionand was offered twice weekly soall Category I, II, and III officerscould perform their primaryduties and still receive manda-

fiscal year when it was neces- tory training.

sary to meet annual minimums, Incoming CH-21 qualified waradminister the annual written rant officers were assigned to theexamination, and renew instru- airmobile company and air cavment tickets. The availability of aIry troop. Here again pilot tranonly two fixed wing aircraft sition was required and training(U-6s) made it necessary for the was emphasized. Aviators, espe-

Figure 1

~ c : : J 1 r d l G J ~ i = lH Q H Q 10lOH I8 w25 UH . I 6 UH . I 7 UH . I HQ & BAND

10 l OH 10 l O H

40 V . 1

1 2 DRONES

-a l OHJune 1963

SHADED UN I TS D ENOTE

ORGAN IC ARMY AIRCRAfT

I

9I UH . I

cially in the air cavalry troop,must receive specialized trainingin nap-of-the-earth flying, lowlevel navigation, gunnery, andhelicopter armament.

The problem of aviator assignments was satisfactorily resolved without depriving unitsof needed experience, but i t didrequire judicious and carefulplanning to keep officer transferswithin the command to a mini-

mum. The 81 and 83 functionsoverlap in this area and the im -portance of careful planning can-not be overemph si zed

The training requirement forenlisted men is an entirely differ-

Figure 2

48

49

OV l 4U 6 2

TOT L DIV IRCR FT 103

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ent story. As in any specialistbattalion, the skill level of required personnel varies greatlyand covers the wide spectrum ofspecialties which are not easilymastered in OJT (see fig. 3).

Incoming enlisted personnelwere evaluated in their particular MOSs to determine their potential, aptitude, and skill level.This job was monitored by the

. S l and S3, bu t implemented byeach unit t raining and maintenance officer. An excess of fixedwing mechanics and a seriousshortage of helicopter mechanicswere quickly discovered. Also, ahelicopter crewchief shortage

t* 12 k ..... 8100 12 wk.

t* 8 wk. ..... 62 4 . 10 8 wk.

best qualified sent to Mohawkschool. The remainder weregiven cross training for a 3-weekperiod. Mechanics showing themost apti tude in the cross-training period were sent to helicop

ter school, and some of those remained for further training asUH-1 mechanics. They were lostto the division for 10-20 weeks,but returned just in time to apply their skills in division exercises.

Despite numerous problemswhich demanded solutions, thedivision met its training and mission requirements. A t one pointspiri s were bolstered by the

10101 Ing lime 6 wk.

N O t 6 wk. 907.67

10101 Ing l ime 6 wk.

Sp t 6 wk. 907.10

t*5 wk. 67 1 10 t 3 wk. 671.20 16 wks

8wks670.10 . 19R 671.10 or 672.10 t 4 wk. 672.20 12 wk. 19R t 2 wk. 67 5 .20 '16 wk.

I *5 wk. 67 5 . 10 It*5 wks 675.30 *16 wk.t 13 wk. 671.40 or 672 .40

/t* 20 wk. 670.40 or 676.40

t19R t 6 wk. 679.40 ' 19 wk. 1 yr.

1 9R t* 6 wk. 679.50 *32 wk. 1 yr.*22 wk. 901.10 *22 wks

t28 wk. 901.20 *28 wks

10 wks 209.00 t* 12 wk. 209.10 *22 wk.

t 16 wk. 20 9 . 20 2 6 wks

8 wk. 105 .00 t* 16 wk. 105 .10 *24 wk.

t* 6 wk. 105.60 U w k .

t 550 3 wks 3 wk.

t 525 10 wk. ' 10 wks

8 wk. 8.40 t 1 0 wk. 843.10 ' 18 wk.

t* 23 wk. 401.30 31 wks

t 28 wk. 281.10 *28 wk.

t* 32 wks 284.10 *32 wk. SvcS HOOL

ALL TNG TIMES EXCLUSIVEt* 10 wks 156.10 10 wks OF BASIC TNG

133 .70 [ IJ G 2d 8 WKS BASIC AHJ

Figure 3, Aviation Battalion Spect r um Chart shows the manyspecialties required of enlisted personnel School training requiresseveral weeks

was compounded when UH-19and CH-34 helicopters were received. MOS 675.30 crewchiefswere needed for these aircraftbu t were not authorized in thedivision.

. The excess fixed wing mechanics were screened and the

4

heartening news that 100 criticalMOS t rained personnel wereearmarked for the 1st Armored.They arrived in March, but werenot quite what was expected.Fresh out of 8 weeks of basictraining, they had been givendirected MOSs. This only aggra-

vated the situation.The basic trainees were

formed into a special companyand relieved of all fatigue details. A battalion committee wasestablished and over a 3-week

period conducted courses covering all of the basic mandatorytraining subjects required byCONARC and Fourth Army.Upon completion of this compressed training the new arrivalswere farmed out to an appropriate staff section , company, orplatoon to receive OJT in theirpart icular MOS fields. As theseOJT personnel became proficientin their jobs they were sent to aservice school to receive im

portant technical and theoreticalbackground training. Only thendid they become really productive.

During the first year on theROAD, the division sent 51 enlisted men to the 670.0 AircraftMaintenance Course (Entry) ;55 to the 675.1 Single Rotor Observation Helicopter Maintenance Course; and 15 to the675.2 Single Rotor Turbine Utility Helicopter MaintenanceCourse. On-post courses wereused to the maximum to ease thet raining load for small groups ,such as petroleum handlers, firefighters, and projectionists.

IRCR FT PRO UREM ENT

Since the 1st Armored wasforming the first ROAD division,

t enjoyed a relatively high priority on equipment. FourthArmy, and for that matter theentire CONUS east of the Rockies, was searched, and fromevery nook and cranny aircraftbegan filtering toward the division. In February 1962, theaircraft inventory was two Beavers, six Chickasaws, sevenSioux, and six Bird Dogs. By 1July the battalion had received27 aircraft and the division 42. InDecember the battalion hit its

U. S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


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peak with 38 while the divisionhad 92 with attachments.

Aircraft pickup was routinewith one exception. t seems thatreceiving an unexpected windfall of 19 UH-1s from the Bellplant should have been nosweat. But the division had onlythree aviators qualified in theIroquois and none of these werecurrent.

After several hurried phonecalls a few TWX messages, andthe horrible thought that the aircraft might be diverted to another unit, TMC waived thecurrency requirement for thefirst 10 helicopters. With thatconcession aircraft pickup wentsmoothly, and the transition program was stepped up with assistance from Fourth Army.

After three months on theROAD, the various aviation elements were formed into separateaviation units; their aircraft fol-lowed them in 30 days. Normalaviation support for commandand liaison was performed forthe 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and those necessary VIP

flights. In April the division'saviation elements and, in particular, the airmobile companybegan supporting CONUS. Because of these missions, the airmobile company was unable tot rain as a unit for any lengthyperiod (see fig. 4). A similarsituation existed in the dronesection of the Aviation BattalionGeneral Support Company.

STR C MO ILITY

After division exercises in August and September, emphasiswas placed on the large scaleCORE SHIELD maneuver. Thiswas replaced by the dest,brigade sized THREE PAIRS.The latter was interrupted bythe STRAC mobility exercisewhich took the 1st Armored Division to Fort Stewart, Ga., andother areas in the Southeast.

June 1963

V I T I O N B TT LION

FLYING TIME

3 Feb 62-31 Dec 62Transition Training 1525STRAC Ferry Time 880

Operational Fl igh t s -F t Hood 4877Flight Missions other than F t Hood 1175

Total 845 7

igure

With its efforts in maintenancedirected toward THREE PAIRS,the division was caught by themobility exercise with a considerable number of aircraft approaching periodic inspections.

Drastic steps were taken toget the aircraft in sha pe forferry flights to Fort Stewart. Acompromise of 200 hours oneach aircraft was accepted forcomponent change items such asgenerators, gear boxes, and thelike. This task was assumedby the supporting Transportation Aircraft Service Division(TASD). With its more ex

perienced personnel, T ASD ac-cepted all aircraft and had themready to meet the deadline. Thisfreed the aviation elements forpreparation of their ground vehicles and personal equipment.

An aviation task force wasorganized containing aircraft forartillery observation, platoonsized airmobile operations, command and liaison an airmobilecommand post, and an air cavalry troop. A viators were as

signed to the task force on thebasis of experience and aircraftqualification. Aircraft resourceswithin the division were expanded to 90 percent of TOE andit became necessary to request aminimum of 15 aviators fromFour th Army.

Routes to Fort Stewart, refueling stops medical evacuation,overnight quarters, and availability of maintenance support en

route were just a few of theplanning considerations of thedivision aviation officer his assistant, the battalion executiveofficer the S3 and the S1. Thesefive officers represent the minimum number required to plan amovement of all division aircraftand are a necessary augmentation to the G2 / G3 plans section.Planning was hampered to someextent by high security classifi-cation; consequently, dissemination of vital flight information tothe individual aviator had to bewithheld. As i t turned out, thissaved the S2 a lot of debriefingsessions.

No consideration was given toany mode of movement for aircraft other than ferry flight. Aircraft accident prevention teamswere spaced throughou thevarious flights. Multiple routeswere selected to preclude longrefueling stops and overtaxingRON billet facilities. The thirdechelon maintenance capabilitywas transported by train, alongwith other elements of the aviation battalion.

Individual and unit trainingwas emphasized at For t Stewart,and a considerable amount oftime was spent on helicopterarmament, maintenance (aircraft and vehicular), first aid,survival training, arms qualification, and chemical training.

This mobility exercise placeda real demand on the 1st Armored Division's aviation units.

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eN INTEL , ,SNS

DIV INT l N T RTT

UHF

F M

- - - V H . TElEPHONE

- ) - - ) - - T E l E P H O N E

FM

~ c o ~ RTT

- - - - - VHF . ,ol o phono~ U H

X X T e l o p h o n o

Figure s 5 and 6 show communications systems used with battal ion intelligence missions and battalion

But it also gave Army Aviationa chance to prove that it can

cut the mustard under pressure in a ROAD division.

INTELLIGEN E

The aviation battalion S2 haone of the most challenging assignments in the division. Bysupervising the division s principal intelligence gatheringagency, he is , in effect, an extension of the G2. The S2's choiceof proper vehicles to accomplisha given intelligence rruSSl nranges from drones to Mohawksto helicopters. He habituallymust seek ways to shorten theintelligence chain and to give thecommander valid and accuratereports on enemy locations. His

success depends upon his initiative and imagination. The average time for a photo missionfrom time of receipt to a developed print in the hands of theG2 has been 1 hour and 45minutes.

The establishment of a di-vision FM intelligence net hasmaterially assisted our intelligence effort, .since i t allows inflight spot reports to be receivedinstantaneously by all major

6

operations missions.

commands and the G2. These reports are verified by spot photography and photo interpreterflash reports.

Operational missions are givendirectly to the battalion S3 orforwarded through the ArmyAviation element. Any brigade

aviation officer may enter thebattalion FM or VHF commandnet at will and request assistance. f he is planning an airlift,a liaison officer (LO) is dispatched to assist him and thebrigade commander in this planning. The LO returns to b r iefthe battalion commander and S3,who in turn notifies the assistantdivision aviation officer in theDivision Tactical OperationsCenter. This system has provedmost satisfactory and responsive.

LOGISTI S

A unique feature about theROAD division is the functionalization of supply and maintenance. All repair of equipmentand repair parts supply (exceptfor medical items) are consolidated in the supply and transportation battalion. The activities of these two battalions , alongwith those of the medical battal-

ion are coordinated by the division Administrative SupportOperations Center (ADSOC)the logistical control agency ofthe division support command.The support command has responsibility for all logistical support within the division . This has

taken the implementing and operating functions from the G4and left him in his primary roleof staff planner.

POL

Shortly after its activation , thebattalion's aircraft inventory included five types. This represented the total division inven-tory, since other aviation unitshad not yet been officiallyformed from the nucleus being

trained in the aviation battalion.Three grades of fuel were required for these five types of aircraft. The receipt of the first Mohawk added JP-4. The divisionthen had less than half of itsTOE gas tankers, and a total offour were available for aviationfuels . Fortunately the 1st Armored was never called upon tooperate with this POL nightmareunder field conditions. The de-

ontinued on page 4

R M Y A I TIO DIGES T


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O XYGEN, the stuff which allows us to loose the surlybonds of earth , is a boon to thehigh-flying pilot and crew. It canalso be an insidious HAZARD.

Without proper care and handling, oxygen system s installedfor safety can bite back withsu dden viciousne ss .

Recentl y two mechanic s wereinjured by an explo s ion whichoccurred during the rechargin gof a small portable oxygen cylinder .

When the gauge indicatedFull , one of the mechanics

closed the valve on the controlpanel and began to disconnect

the charging line at the cylinder. There was a fla sh , followedby an explosion. The clothe s ofone of the men we r e set on fire ,and the other mechanic was al soinjured.

Inve s tigation revealed that theoperation was carried out slowly . The ON / OFF valve s werecorrectly closed , but pre ssure inthe chargin g line s wa s not reduced to zero before the cylin

der was disconnected.There is one inviolate rule:OXYGEN SH O ULD BE HANDLED ONLY BY QUALIFIEDPERSONNEL. And even theseneed to train, retrain , and constantly remind themselve s of thesafety precautions to be observed.

Th e se simple safety precautions are violated again andagain:

Keep all power from electri-

n e 1963

calor electronic equipment whenthe ogygen system is open orleaking . When filling oxygen cylinders or working on oxygenlines (color coded green) , makesure the aircraft is electrostatically grounded and that thecylinder is grounded to the aircraft.

Pure ox yg en will support combustion in oil s or petroleum ba elubricant s. Keep system s clinically clean of oil , grease , dirt ,and dust. In s tall dust caps , plug s,and covers on equipment whennot using it. Oil in the wrong

place can cause an explosion.Dirt and dust ca n , too; or theycan plug the system.

Recently, a civil aircraft captain lit a cigarette while wearingan oxygen mask around hisneck. The oxygen system wasnot being used. Shortly thereafter , the mask burst intoflames, burning the pilot's neckand two fingers as he pulled themask off. The flight engineersnuffed out the flames. A n analysis of the incident indicatedthat when checking the oxygenequipment before departure, the

OXYG N CONTRO L C ON S O LE 1I

SYSTE M SHUT O fFIPUSSU RE REGUL ATOR

I

SYSTE M PRESSUU G AUGE U GUL A TOR G AUGE

OXYG EN SU PP LY CYLIN ER

_ HIGH P RESS URE OXYG EN

_ LO w PRESSURE USE AB LE O XYGENCO NTINUOUS FLO W CO UPLI NG

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captain probably did not completely turn off the emergencyvalve. The presence of an ex cessive amount of oxygen together with an accumulation offacial oils on the mask causedthe fire when the cigarette waslit.

Similar incidents have occurred when pure oxygen hascontacted such apparently harmless things as lip salves or lubricants.

Masks should be periodicallywashed with soap and water.Tools used by oxygen handlersmust be degreased. Clothes wornduring system maintenance and

recharging should be absolutelyf r ee of grease and oils.

Handle cy inders and valvescareful ly-a broken valve canbecome a rocket. Open and closevalves slowly, by hand only. f

the valve cannot be closed byhand, return the cylinder for repair or replacement. Be sure thecylinder is firmly supported before you open or close a valve.

Safety regulations during servICIng of the oxygen systemshould be as rigid as those applied to refueling aircraft. Fireextinguishers should be at hand;smoking or open flames shouldbe prohibited within 50 feet ofthe aircraft.

Maintenance personnel accus

tomed to the high pressure 1800psi) oxygen systems on OV-1,

U-8, U-9 and CV-2 aircraftshould be especially cautiouswhen recharging unfamiliar transient aircraft.

Aircraft have been destroyedby having high pressure oxygen

put into low pressure 50-90or 400 psi) systems. Never filla low pressure system withoutusing a pressure limiting regulator.

Properly handled and maintained, oxygen systems and recharging equipment are troublefree and dependable.

A functioning oxygen systemstands between the pilot andhypoxia. It is common sense life

insurance to t reat i t with re -spect.

The Digest omes To YouDirectly rom The Printer

From the number of lettersreceived by the DIGEST, it isevident that some units are notgetting "the word" about thepinpoint distribution system outlined in Section III, Chapter 3,AR 310-1, dated 20 March 1962.

Starting with the July issuethe DIGEST will be mailed directly to units from the printer.The magazine will no longer besent to local AG publicationsofficers for further distri bu ionto units. Some publicationsstockrooms are still consolidating all requests from units intheir distribution system. This isnot correct.

Following guidelines in DACircular 310-57, individual unitssubmit their requests directly

8

to CO, AG Publications Center,2800 Eastern Blvd., Baltimore,Md., and they will receive the

I G E S T directly from the

printer (not through a publications stockroom).

How do you know if your unitwill get the magazine regularly

and without interruption? ve r y

unit that wants to get the magazine or has been getting it mustsubmit a request for initial distribution or for continued distribution. The form for all to use

is DA Form 12-4.f you have any doubts, check

the AR and DA circular citedabove and the back page of theMay DIGEST.

Once your unit has submitted

a request for the DIGEST tothe AG Publications Center inBaltimore, i t will be given anaccount number Any time youwish to change the number ofcopies your unit receives, useDA Form 12-4 and refer to theaccount number assigned yourunit.

This new pinpoint distributionsystem is another improvementthe Army is using to help everyone get pertinent valuable information on Army Aviationwith a minimum of delay.

Check AR 310-1, DA Circular 310-57, DA Form 12-4, theaddress of Publications Center,Baltimore, Md., and GOODLUCK

U. S RMY VI TIO D GEST


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ertain ardinal Rules or

Safe ir OperationsLieutenant olonel ichael F HochellaR ULES ARE BASIC to every operation-whether i tbe a game such as football, anacrobatic stunt, or the seriousbusiness of flying. Some rulesare set forth in official regulations, as the NCAA rule bookor ARs; others, sometimes justas important, are unwrit tenrules accepted by the individuals involved. These are myseven cardinal rules for safe airoperation.

Rule No. 1 RESPECT AIRCRAFT DISCREPANCIES

Anyone who flys knows thatthere are red lines everywhereyou look in an aircraft. The mostimportant are those showingoperating limits on the instrument panel. Heed them well Apilot who allows rotor rpm toexceed the rpm limits in autorotation should not be, as i twere, cussed and discussed,PROVIDED the overspeed andlength of time are reported inwri ing in the aircraft forms

Otherwise, you see, the nextpilot of that aircraft may not bearound to answer for his (?)errors. The same example ispainfully true for hard landings.

Enter aircraft discrepancies tobe as required

f you are on the other (maintenance) side of the fence, causethem to be corrected and removed as required

June 1963

Rule No. II. MANAGE AIRCRAFT FUEL AND OILSERVICING WITH ACCURACY, AND INFINITE DETAIL

Every aircraft that you fly willburn fuel and oil. An oversimplified statement? Perhapsnot. An observation airplane hasa ten-quart oil capacity. f theengine burns three quarts of oilan hour, can this airplane complete a 4-hour mission withoutservicing: Simply no; of coursenot.

Equipment log book forms2408-12 and -13 require that certain entries e made by the pilotin command. THESE ARE FOROFFICIAL RECORDS Specificentries are required each timeaviation fuel or oil are addedor emptied. Your professionalaircraft maintenance brotherneeds to know rates of consumption in order to be his brother'skeeper. Each pilot has the personal responsibility to check,

maintain and make record offuel and oil quantities in hisaircraft.

Rule No. III. ENSURE THATMISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT IS IN OPERATION

Every Army aircraft musthave air-ground radio equipment on every mission. Aviationelectronics (avionics) equipment must then be considered

essential to all missions.You plan a flight (VFR) into

visual meteorological conditions(VMC). The best laid plans of

mice can, as i t were, come altogether unglued. At . he point ofno return between here andOutsville you discover yourselfin the middle of something verymuch akin to thick chicken soup. .What does A, for Able, do now?First of all, climb; do not de-scend Climb out of trouble, likeclouds with rocks in them andmake a 180 But is this thetime to .discover that the VORand ADF equipment doesn't op

erate? Again, a simple no.The sample problem n the

preceding paragraph can well beapplied to all mission essentialequipment, such as bomb racks,weapons, side looking airborneradar, etc, etc, and the pilot

MISSION E S S E N T I LEQUIPMENT, MEE-soundslike me Of this equipment, thebrain and nervous system arethe most essential. Pilots shouldbe tiger-like officers to lead andcommand but the key to successis RELAXED VIGILANCE: .

Relaxed in mind, body andspirit.

Vigilant in respecting certaindangers and hazards.

Lt Col Hochella is presentlyassigned as Air field Commander,Libby Army Airfield, U S. ArmyElectronic Proving Ground, FortHuachuca, Ariz.

9


12/52

e a

rofessional

Lieutenant eorge H Seaberg

N FEBRUARY of this year Iwas piloting a CH-21, hauling

several passengers from HancheyField at Fort Rucker. Towardthe end of the flight I noticed aslightly overboosted engine. Normal maximum for a CH-21 overboost 'at 2500 rpm is 46.5 inchesmanifold pressure. The helicopter read 47 inches at 2500 rpmfor 5 seconds.

At the end of the flight the

necessary inspections were performed by the maintenance personnel, and the aircraft was testflown for 15 minutes. The CH-21was then released for flight.

An instructor pilot and histransition student took the nextflight. Before flying the ship theIP examined the records andnoticed the written up overboost.Even though the helicopter had

Lt George H. Seaberg is as-

signed to the Chinook SectionDept of Maintenance USA-AVNS

f all of MEE is operatingproperly, mission success is allbut guaranteed.

Rule No. IV. RECOGNIZETHE HAZARDS OF TAKEOFFAND LANDING OPERATIONS

Pilots in the U. S. militarysystem are exposed to excellenttraining. They are most alertduring takeoff and landing. Theinstructor pilot represents thekey to the go/no go door of aircraft qualification, and his experience is sound.

However, a large number ofaircraft accidents still happenduring takeoff and landing. Nochecklist can replace the judg-

1

been cleared for flight, the IPdid not feel completely at ease.So, during the flight he was evenmore aware of possible forcedlanding areas than usual.

The new crew had been flyingabout 30 minutes when, on atakeoff, they noticed a series ofrapid backfires from the engineand a loss of rpm. The IP tookthe controls and entered autorotation. Because he had beenmade aware of an overboostedengine, he was prepared to execute a forced landing into acleared area. The engine hadfailed at about 100 feet above theground.

This i n i d e ~ tcost 11,000 forreplacement of the blades. Without a written entry in the -13 theaircraft could have been a total

loss. f the failure had occurredat night, two lives could havebeen lost. f an overboosted en-

ment and ability of the pilot, butwhat happens when judgmentand ability are clouded?

Let's make an assumption forpurposes of examination: a sanepilot, Lieutenant Floof, is alertand knows his aircraft, but twice

successively abor t s -a takeoff,and then on his next flightknocks the gear off. Why?

Assumptions worth considering:

TAKEOFF

HazardDistraction, worry

Solution

Many people / things cause dis-

gine is written up, the aircraft isgrounded for night or IFR flightsfor 10 hours according to FortRucker policy.

Frankly, I did not think an engine overboosted once or twice,as was this case, could cause anengine to fail. My former beliefswere quickly shattered by thisexperience-unless this same engine had been overboosted beforeand the responsible pilots hadbeen so thoughtless, and supposedly embarrassed, as to forget to write down these mistakes.

The person with the professional attitude realizes that i t ispossible to damage an aircraftwith no visible evidence 6f thedamage; that these unseen damages must be noted on the aircraft history; and that by being

forgetful he can kill someone,perhaps a good friend.

traction and worry; some may bevalid, some not properly to beconsidered. Sweep away the

clouds and change the attitude. Be a lover, not a fighter,when in the pilot's seat.

HazardFatigue

Solution

LANDING

Proper rest every night. Perkup, get on your toes whenplanning and executing landingoperations.

While a large transport orbomber may take off and landonce in ten hours, our aircraft

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


13/52

may perform ten such operationswithin one hour, and not alwayson a wide, "l-o-o-ong," smoothrunway. We must be aware ofthe hazards involved. A coupleof the more important hazards

are cited in the example. Inventory and avoid all of them.

Rule No. V. USE CONSTANTCROSS-CHECK OF FLIGHTAND POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS

Keep your head out of and inthe cockpit. When on the gauges,cross-check external features ofthe aircraft, such as icing andlighting. When the sky is blueyonder, keep yourself clear ofother air traffic, but remember,all instruments on the panel, allswitches, rheostats, and dials arethere for good reason. Read thefine print (RTFP) properly andoften. Oil pressure reading consistently normal on cross-checkis one thing. To find that it hassuddenly dropped or that i t isfluctuating rapidly on the highside may indicate trouble. Discover it early and your problems

may only be little ones.Rule No. VI. ALWAYS KEEP

A FORCED LANDING SITEPLAN IN MIND

I think it logical having covered Rule No. V that we discussprocedures in case of engine failure. We always want the crewback at home base, and if practical we want the equipmentback. You are out of your element in the air; you may beforced to land now Keep theaircraft under control a t alltimes.

Were you ever called upon toexecute a forced landing successfully without a good landingarea in sight? Paul Mantz, aproperly daring and famousAmerican pilot, put it this way:

Why fly over terrain a mountain goat can't negotiate, when afew minutes diversion from your

lun 963

flight path will provide betterforced landing terrain.

Review all aircraft emergencyprocedures, even the seldomthought of or used variety, suchas fire in flight. Pilot dry-run

time in the cockpit is invaluableon this last score. When youknow and practice proper emergency procedures and techniquesyou will be more inclined to usethem when required.

Of course, things are differentwhen night falls. Unless youhave a definite landing area insight and range, hit the silk. Inhelicopters, become expert in themanipulation of landing andsearch lights; having picked aspot, autorotate to touchdown asclose to zero groundspeed as thesituation allows.

Rule No. VII. PLAN AHEADOF EACH MISSION

Have you noticed the beautyof flight planning data organization on Aircraft Clearance form,DD Form 175? For example:

Point of DepartureWhere do I start?

Base Name of DestinationWhere am I going?

Mileage, NauticalHow far is it?

Estimated Time of DepartureWhen do I leave?

Estimated Time En RouteHow long a mission?

Transmitting FrequenciesWith whom do I communi

cate?Pilot's Last Name

The man in command of themachine.

Fuel on BoardWill I make it?

May we pause here to notethat the time-distance formulawas applied early in the flightplan. Time equals distance divided by rate. Too basic, yousay? Then why do we all tooregularly and frequently missestimated times of departure and

estimated times en route or estimated times of arrival? Thereare some good reasons whyArmy aircraft missions get delayed beyond ETDs and pilotsmiss ETEs and ETAs. There are

more good reasons why theyshouldn't. Paramount on thisside of the fence is our Department of Army assigned mission:immediate r spons to the needsof command

Army Aviators should be expected to meet ETDs within plusor minus 5 minutes. ETAs shouldbe met within plus or minus 15minutes. Towers and FAA FlightService will honor the usual re

quests for en route changes offlight plan. When working withFSS, pilots should record thename of the station, time andinitials of the operator.

As another point in planningand making mission success easyto attain, all Army aircraft missions should be directive in nature. To further mission orientation, all aviators should bedesignated to remain currentonly in certain available fixedan d / or rotary wing aircraft asappropriate. It is only logicalin command planning to consider the consequences of oneaviator retaining currency in fivefixed wing and four rotary wingaircraft during a n y o n e periodof time.

I will close this seventh rulewith the shopworn but still verytrue six P's: Proper Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance.

These then are my rules.Others may be as important toyou. As a minimum, however,these should be your rules, notsingly but applied simultaneously. Like a house made ofplaying cards, total success depends upon each individualmember. Remove one memberand the entire structure willcollapse. Let's have no collapsein your individual operation.


14/52


15/52

a fragile vase gets tender loving carebut wh t about our aviators

LIGHT AIRCRAFT overshot the runway during

landing and came to a stop in adrainage ditch. Witnesses rushedto the scene and found the aircraft intact, bu t the pilot wasslumped across the instrumentpanel-dead. A week later at another airfield an aircraft was de

molished during a crash landing.Spectators were amazed whenthe pilot emerged from the tangled wreckage and walked awaywith minor abrasions.

How do we explain these twoextremes in injuries? Why didthe pilot die in the least damagedaircraft? Why did the pilot survive in the demolished aircraft?We have all heard such remarksas , It was just a freak accident,

or, I guess it wasn't his time togo "

AvSER s U IQUE ROLE

Despite such popular beliefs itis not always fate that determines whether a pilot will liveor die. More often it 's aircraftdesign. This is the premise ofAviation Safety Engineering andResearch (AvSER), Phoenix ,

June 963

James E Coleman

Ariz., a division of Flight SafetyFoundation.

AvSER's role in aviation safetyis unique. Their primary interestis not what caused the r s h -but what caused injury anddeath as a result of the crash.They strive to find out wh tequipment in the aircraft failed,

where i t failed, and why i t failed.Recommendations are then madeto manufacturers and militaryusers to prevent such failures.The intent is to save l ives-possibly yours.

Aside from crash injury investigations of civil and militaryaircraft accidents , AvSER gathers research data by deliberatelycrashing test aircraft. Some havebeen dropped from cranes speeding down the runway to simulatecrash conditions.

On e ' CH-21 operated by remote control was carefully flowninto the runway at a prearrangedspeed and angle. Special dummies were instrumented andseated in various locations ondifferent type seat structures.There were also two dummyl i t ter patients aboard. Six highspeed cameras and extensiveinstrumentation recorded what

happened during the crash sequence.

By determining what happensto materials and human bodiesduring crash impacts, AvSER isable to recommend improvements in design, restraint systems, and materials.

Discovering that castings hold

ing certain aircraft seats werebrittle and subject to breakingaway at impact, AvSER replacedthe castings with simple metalstraps and found that the strapsstretched slightly during impact,but held instead o breaking tthe same force.

Not as simple as they mayseem, seat structures require awhole series of considerations.First, the seat belt and shoulderstraps attached to the seat mustbe strong enough to resist breaking during a crash. Second, thestraps must be properly securedto the seat, which in turn mustbe properly secured to the floor,which must be properly anchored to the fuselage. This concept goes back to the old sayingthat a chain is no stronger thanits weakest link. f the seat ripsfrom the floor, or i the floorcomes loose from the aircraft

3


16/52

The pilot died in this harmless looking early vintage rmy aircrCLft Cause of death was the pilot shead striking the 4-inch windshield when the gear collapsed during landing roll.

structure, the seat and shoulderharness are not much help.AvSER recommends, where pos-sible, fastening of restraint devices directly to the basic struc

ture of the aircraft. This wouldeliminate the problem of undulyheavy seat structure.

It is interesting to note thatthe first known seat belt reportedly used was in an Army aircraft in 1910, after Lt BenjaminD. Foulois nearly fell out ofArmy flying machine N o 1When he landed, he rigged up abelt to hold him to the seat "during all conditions of flight. Asaviation experience grew, it waslearned that occupant restraintalso played an important role ininjury prevention.

Hugh De Haven, founder ofA vSER, became keenly interested in injury causation aftersurvIvIng a midair collision.When he left the hospital, DeHaven took a desk job which included handling paperwork related to aircraft accidents. Hedetected two interesting trends:

4

(1) a highly localized pattern ofinjuries similar to his own, and(2) the degree of damage to theaircraft did not necessarily dic-tate how severe the injury would

be. People were killed in relatively undamaged aircraft, whileothers survived accidents inwhich planes were virtually destroyed.

His observations led to the belief that crash forces reachingthe pilot were influenced or gov-erned by the characteristics ofthe aircraft.

He studied the ability of wings,landing gear, and other structures to absorb energy. Whywouldn't an intensive study ofaccidents reveal the nature oflifesaving characteristics whichcould be built into future planes?

Even though no one gave serious thought to his idea, DeHaven continued to plug away.He was fascinated by reports ofpeople falling from great heightsand sustaining little or no injury.Why couldn't these experiencesbe applied in some way to crash

injury research? He investigateda six-story fall made by a womanin a suicide attempt. This womanjumped from an apartment housewindow and landed in a flower

bed. As the crowd rushed for-ward to view her remains, sheraised herself on one elbow andsaid dejectedly, "Six floors andnot even hurt "

De Haven figured the gravityincrease in this fall was approximately 140 g His investigationrevealed that the subject fellinto the soft, loamy flower bedwith her weight distributedevenly across her back, leavingapproximately a 4-inch indentation in the soft dirt. f she hadstruck concrete, she would havedied instantly . This followed another old saying, "It 's not thefall that kills you, it's the suddenstop.

De Haven's data on a numberof such free falls by humans whosurvived was in sharp contrastto some aircraft accident victimswho succumbed to forces of con-siderably lower magnitude.

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


17/52

Two walked away from this demolished OH 13 after i t struck a wire and plummeted into plowedfield. oth occupants were wearing seat belts and harnesses. Their only injuries were shoulder

harness burns and minor cuts and bruises of the legs.

Though now retired, DeHaven's early work was recognized and is paying dividendsthrough the A vSER group atPhoenix. Their research over theyears has been made available tomanufacturers. The picture hasbecome brighter in recent yearsas these manufacturers have begun to realize that inadequatesafety equipment is hardly better than none at all.

But there is still a great needfor education of the public to theadvantages of safety engineeringin aircraft. f all of AvSER's recommendations made to date

were incorporated in aircraft, anestimated 4 percent of the fatalities in so-called survivablecrashes could be avoided.

A vSER offers a two-weekscrash injury investigation courseto selected Army and civilianaviation personnel. The word

crashworthiness becomes a byword to students during thiscourse. Crashworthiness is described as the capacity of anaircraft structure to serve as aprotective container during potentially survivable impact conditions.

What good is a seat in an air-

craft, an A vSER instructor asksif i t breaks away from an intactfloor during a crash? There aremany examples where crewmembers and passengers havebeen hurled forward during acrash, still strapped to their seats.

A vSER compares the aircraftpassenger to a fragile vase. Whenyou pack a vase for shipment,you surround i t with insulatingor shock absorbent material andplace it in a sturdy box to ensureits safe arrival. AvSER believesthis same theory applies to the

packaging of occupants in anaircraft.

Visual rror in Rain

N ADDITION to poor visibility when flying in rain, there

is a refraction error in vision.Two reasons for this refractionerror exist: the reduced transparency of the rain-coveredwindshield, which causes the eyeto indicate a horizon below the

une 963

true horizon; and the shape andpattern of the ripples formed onthe windshield, which cause objects to appear lower. Either orboth of the above can cause anerror in angle of approximately5. Thus, an object one-half mileahead of the aircraft could ap-

pear to be 200 feet lower than i treally is. This theoretical possibility could become a hazardduring a circling approach or onfinal approach to landing. twould be interesting to knowwhether any Army Aviatorshave experienced such difficulty.

5


18/52

aptain Darrell D Jurling

Aviators will not wearspurs while flying . . .

T HIS HUMOROUS quotefrom regulations for aviatorspublished in 1920 is not quite sofunny i y ~ consider the situation as it existed in those days.Most aviators had just graduatedfrom the cavalry and were reluctant to discard their spurs.But after a few accidents causedby the wearing of spurs in thecockpit, the rule was made.

In January 1920, some 75 regu-

lations for aviators were published, entitled General Rule sto be Followed at All U. S. Flying Fields. Today most of themsound strange and unnecessary,but they were published as a result of experience factors muchthe same as regulations are today.

The curious thing about theseold rules is that some of themare timeless and apply today asmuch as they did 43 years ago.Let's look at just a few and compare them with recent accidents /

incidents that could have beenavoided i these old rules hadbeen followed.

Don t take the machine intothe air unless you are sure it willfly.

The pilot of an 0-1 attemptedto apply full power after dropping a message. The enginefailed to respond properly andthe aircraft struck several trees.

Later investigation revealed thatthe pilot, as well as most of theother pilots and crew membersat the field, knew this particularairplane was not functioningproperly. None of them, however, had written it up on aircraft form 7801-13.

In taking off look at theground and the air.

An 0-1 struck a haystack during takeoff. The pilot stated hedidn't see the haystack until i twas too late.

ever get out of a machinewith the mot or running until thepilot relieving you can reach theengine controls.

A CH-34 lifted off from its padwhen the pilot climbed into thecockpit from the passenger compartment. The engine was running at the time and the rotorblade was engaged. The pilot sclothing caught the pitch stick ,

causing the aircraft to lift off.Pilots should carry handker-chiefs in a handy position towipe off goggles.

On a dark night, two 0-ls werebeing readied for a radio relaymission. One was accidentally

Capt Jurling was a student atthe University of Southern Cali-fornia Safety Course when hewrote the manuscript on whichthis article is based.

u. s RMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/52

taxied in o the rear of the otheron the runway. An investigationdiscovered that moisture condensation on the inside of thewindshield prevented the pilot

ofthe rear aircraft from seeing

the other.In case of engine failure on

takeoff land straight ahead regardless of obstacles.

Immediately after takeoff an0-1 engine failed. To the frontwas approximately 500 feet ofrunway plus 1,000 feet of sodoverrun. Instead of landingstraight ahead, the pilot electedto make a 180 and land downwind. Result: major damage toaircraft.

Learn to gauge altitude especially on landing.

U -1A landed hard, bucklingfuselage and damaging tail wheelbracket.

f you see another machinenear you, get out of its way.

While practicing touch and golandings a U -6 crashed into treesduring an attempt to miss another aircraft at the far end ofthe strip.

Never run motor so the blastwill blow on other machines.

A CH-37 A hovered overparked 0-1s and downwashbuckled the wings.

Before you begin a landingglide see that no machines areunder you.

OH-13H crashed during approach to road. Vehicle moved

into road as aircraft approachedtouchdown point. Pilot overflewintended touchdown to avoid vehicle, and main rotor bladesstruck tree.

Hedge-hopping will not be tolerated.UH-19D struck cactus plant

with right front landing gearduring attempted climb oversmall ridge. Result: incidentaldamage to landing gear.

If flying against the wind, andyou wish to turn and fly with thewind, don t make a sharp turnnear the ground. You mightcrash.

UH-19 turned downwind, losttranslational lift, hit on rightmain gear, then crashed on itsside.

Don t attempt to force ma-chine onto ground with morethan flying speed. The result isbouncing and ricocheting.

U -6 landed long, skipped andbounced, and went off left sideof runway, striking main rotorblade of parked UH-19.

-.:=:--- -


20/52

A STR NGE THING HAPPENEDN I HE W Y TO SPAI N

The following story is based onevents which actually happened.The locale is Stuttgart AAF andvarious other points on the conti-nent of Europe. The cast is com-posed of members of an ArmyAviation detachment. The moralof this story-well you decide.

A telephone rings. From theconversation which follows i tappears that the aviation detachment has been assigned a missionto t ransport an officer to Spain ina U -6A for an investigation. Twointrepid aviators volunteer. Theoperations officer is overwhelmedby their devotion to duty. (Afterail five days TDY to Spain withper diem is no picnic.)

The flight is planned, necessary equipment is gathered, andmaintenance is advised to havethe aircraft completely refueled,with tiptanks and ready for an0900 takeoff. Then the intrepidaviators retire to brush up ontheir high school Spanish.

N ext morning, in the busyweather station, the two aviatorsexperience much difficulty infinding a refueling stop and analternate airport for this stop. t

18

C ap t a in Ro b rt S Borer

appears that Mother Nature hasplayed a cruel trick. Most of thecontinent is covered by an inversion which is keeping lowceilings and visibilities over almost all available airfields.Above 3 500 feet one can see100 miles. Finally, an airfield isselected which is forecast to bedown to minimums (the bestthey could do) and an alternateis picked which stretches thefuel to the allowable limit (onceagain, the best they could do) .

Later, on the flight line, theaviators are busy preflightingthe aircraft, checking to see if allnecessary equipment is aboard,and questioning the crewchief toascertain tha t the ship has beencompletely refueled.

Were the tiptanks filled? thecrewchief is asked. Yes sir, isthe reply. The main tanks arechecked visually, and fuel isdrained from the sumps of thetiptanks. Since fuel comes out ofthe t iptank sumps, there is noquestion in the minds of theaviators tha t they are full.(After all how many of us ask

for a ladder to personally inspectthe tiptanks when our weatherbriefing void time is expiring

and we are told by the crewchiefthat he was there when the tankswere filled?) Also, the maintenance NCO states that he wasthere when they were filledeven though i t was late n theevening when the ship returnedfrom a flight. The NCO remindsthe pilots that the front fuelgauge is inoperative.

After receiving their IFRclearance, the pilots take off intoa gloomy overcast tha t can onlybe appreciated by persons whohave flown in Europe. At precisely the altitude that theweather people had predicted,they break out into blinding sunshine with visibility unlimited.Without a front fuel gauge torely on, the aviators had to es

tablish an alternate method todetermine when to t ransfer fuelfrom the tiptanks. t was decidedthat they would fly for one hour,then transfer for 15 minutes,then fly for another hour, thentransfer for 2 minutes, then flyusing the remainder of the rear

Capt Bor.er is assigned assafety officer to the 505th SignalGroup Stuttgart Germany.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/52

tank center tank and finallyfront tank if necessary.

The first hour goes by; thefuel transfer is accomplished,and flight is continued on thefront tank. Checkpoints fly byas only they do in a Beaver. Theaviators are awed by the magnif-icent scene before them a solidblanket of white below, brokenonly by the far-off Alps protrud-ing above the seemingly unend-ing clouds. Talk is exchangedabout the possibilities of theforthcoming few days.

Suddenly after approximately2 hours of flying, the enginequits The friendly banter in the

cockpit stops.The engine was restarted by

shifting fuel tanks and cruisingaltitude was regained. Then themental cogs began to turn. Wasthere enough fuel? To reach therefueling stop, yes. To reachthe refueling stop and then tothe alternate no. Their reason-ing indicated that no fuel hadbeen derived from the tips andnone could be expected. Weatherwas checked a t the refuelingstop, by asking ATC. Onceagain, the judgment of the

June 1963

weather people was right. Thefield was indeed down to mini-mums for the Beaver. With no-where else to go, flight was con-tinued to the refueling airfield.N ever has an approach chartbeen studied so hard as that oneduring the next few minutes.The approach was successfullymade and this story has a happyending. The tiptanks were visu-ally examined after landing andwere bone dry WHAT HAP-PENED?

The remainder of the trip wasuneventful that is if you areused to flying IFR in Spain. Nohabla espanol. The tiptanks func-

tioned normally throughout therest of the trip.

Needless to say, upon return-ing to home station questionswere asked. The persons whobefore the flight started were soadament about the tiptanks be -ing full, were still sure that theypersonally were there when theywere filled. Then events beganto unfold. The aircraft had re -turned just at dark the eveningbefore the flight. The aircraftwas refueled. Then the crew-chief went to the movie. After

the movie the aircraft wasmoved into the hangar. Theflight which had returned latehad been a long one and tiptankshad been used.

By now you are probably be-ginning to form some conclusionsas to what happened. This iswhat we think might have hap-pened:

On the long flight the day be -fore, on which tiptanks wereused after the final sequence ofdraining the tiptanks the fuel ex -change handle was left on BOTH.This was overlooked by thecrewchief before refueling. Re -fueling was accomplished. Per-

sonnel departed to the movie.The fuel in the tiptanks drainedby way of the overflow, onto theground. Because of the dark andthe time already elapsed whenthe aircraft was later moved intothe hangar the evidence of thedrained fuel was unnoticed.Enough fuel remained in the tip-tanks to provide a small reser-voir, so when the sumps weredrained the following morningfuel came out. This is our consensus.

What do you think happened?. .....

9


22/52

Here 's a few Mohawk operational tips from a pilot who has beenwith the aircraft since its first flight in 1959. They are offered tosave you some learn-the-hard-way experience and to increase yourunderstanding of the ship. The more you learn about the why's andwherefore's of the Mohawk, the more professional you'll b e - a n d

who doesn't want to be an Ole Pro ?

D URING MY associationwith the Mohawk programI have developed several tech-

niques of operation that seem tohave merit in getting more out of

the Mohawk.

Let s take first things first andget our little jewel cranked up

and ready to move.

Being an internal combustion

engine, i t requires rotation, fuel,and fire to function.

Before giving it any of these,let s see that everything possibles turned OFF to make it easier

on the battery. Get everythingpossible done before turning onthe battery. This would includefuel ON, throttle IDLE, engine

master switches ON, etc.When finally ready, turn ON

the battery and crank the starter.

Wait until 9-10 percent rpm isattained and then hit the zippo.Do this intermittently and stop

as soon as a positive rise in EGT(Exhaust Gas Temperature) isnoted. [Starting procedures varyslightly with engine model.]

How to et More

20 U. s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

Although several gaugesshould be checked during thestart, the primary object of yourattention should be the EGT. Inthe case of a hot start, remember, there is one and only oneway to positively stop the rise intemperature (and this will workevery time): shut off the fuel.This makes it simple: one thingto watch; one thing to do.

O.K. We got that one going solet s think about the second.First of all remember how longthe battery was working. It s abit tired; so run up the liveengine to at least 6 percent andi f the battery is really tired, 70-

75 percent.N ow crank the second and get

the live generator on the line asquickly as possible. On early aircraft i t will be on the line; onaircraft with the generator assistbutton, push the button as you

mood let s save brakes by feathering one prop while taxiing. fthe bird has nose-wheel steering,this will keep taxi speeds proper

drive away. Without nose-wheelsteering or on a slick surface,let s get ahead of the bird beforewe start to move.

Out of the ohawkRa lph o n nell

intermittently apply ignition.Now that we have both en

gines turning and have savedthe battery, let s focus our attention on saving the prop auxpump. f the basic engine is atGround Idle the pump has to beenergized for

4-6seconds to un

feather. At Flight Idle this is 2-3seconds; at 7 percent rpm, onlyabout 1 second.

The only other times that theaux pumps run are for feathering and reversing. There is noway to shorten the feather time,but reverse time can be shortened by only using them forlanding and testing, instead ofduring taxiing as well.

While we are in a saving

June 963

without using the brakes.While we are on the subject,

remember the first time youdrove a car with power steeringand power brakes? Overcontrolled both, didn t you? Wellthe Mohawk has both, and thetendency to overcontrol will bethere until you get acquainted.

T K EOFF

Now for takeoff. Check comple te -a l l switches, knobs,wheels, cigarettes, lighter intheir proper places. Look at thetop engine gauges-torque. Thebird has tor.que two sources,both want to make you turn androll left. With nose-wheel steering and dry runway, no problem,

We know that no two engineswill accelerate the same fromidle but all are very close froma cruise power. O.K. so let shold brakes to cruise rpm onboth engines before advancing totakeoff power.

Torque is going to turn us tothe left. So either add a bit morepower to the left engine beforejamming an d / or point the ir -craft a bit to the right and lettorque turn the aircraft straight.

Mr. Donnell has been MohawkProject Pilot for Grumman Air-craft Engineering Corporationsince April 1959. He has over5 000 flight hours more than 65hours in the Mohawk

2


24/52

Right rudder and right stick dothe rest.

Takeoff: f the stick is heldul l back through the takeoff

roll, the aircraft will get off theground in a minimum groundroll, BUT i t gets off the groundat just above the 1.0 g stallspeed. By definition, no morethan 1.0 g can be pulled at thisspeed so it is not going to bepossible to rotate the aircraftnose-up to climb until morespeed is attained. A cleaner takeoff is accomplished by gettingthis speed first and then rotatingsharply. It s also much smarterin case one of the fans quit.

The only time a stick-backtakeoff run is the best is inrough or soft terrain. In this casethe stick should be back to getthe weight off the nose wheel.Otherwise the nose wheel creates a bow wave of debris thatcan hit and damage a prop.

L NDINGS

Landings: These can be putinto two categories: normal andmax effort.

On a normal landing-well ,make just that. Sure it s fun tostop quickly, but why, i i t justmeans adding power to get to aturn-off point on the runway?It s easier on the props, engine,brakes, ears, etc., to just pull toIdle and let her roll on out. Agentle but steady use of thebrakes is better than intermittent hard application.

f you want to use reverse,fine; but even i only Idle reverse is desired, go all the wayinto full reverse lever positionand then back off to Idle. Thisway, both will reverse at thesame time, even i the microswitches are not matched in theiradjustment.

A maximum effort landing requires full reverse thrust rightat touchdown or as soon as attainable after touchdown. Engine acceleration is a big factorin this. f at Idle you are manyseconds away from full reversethrust, but i at 70-75 percentrpm (N 1 it can be had in just a

couple of seconds. So, hold yourpower right to touchdown andthen get to full power in reverseas soon as you can. Now beforeyou stop, ease off the reversepower and let the gas producerwind down to Idle with the propsstill in reverse pitch. Then, whenall is calm, push the power levers down to Ground Idle forward thrust) and drive away.

While on the subject of reverse thrust landings, let s talkabout the erosion of prop bladesin reverse. As you can tell bylooking at any Mohawk prop,they get sand blasted. The sandier the terrain, the more theerosion. Now what can be doneto reduce this? On a landing in adirt field or road, the last fewfeet of a max effort reversethrust landing are under IFRconditions. This can be elimi-

nated by using full reverse ontouchdown. Reduce reversethrust to Idle power earlier thanusual and come out of reversebefore a complete stop has beenmade. Even on a runway, thereis enough sand and grit to do apretty good job on props, eventhough the sand is not visible.Thus, i it is not necessary tomake a minimum distance landing, easing off the power a littlesooner and coming out of reversebefore stopping will save props.

LIMIT TIONS

By this time we have extendedthe lifespan of almost every part

of the aircraft except for the nutthat holds the stick, and this onepiece of equipment can use anextension.

Proper use of the equipmentwill be the biggest step in thisdirection. To use i t properly, ithas to be completely understoodand its limitations known-no tonly the airplane s limitationsbut your own as well.

The airplane itself is capable

of acomplete routine

ofaero

batic maneuvers; in fact, all ofthose that could be done by aWorld War II fighter plus a fewof its own. t is also quite forgiving to the aviator who makesmistakes in aerobatics, exceptwhen trying things t too low analtitude. Practice your maneuvers up high where there isspace to correct for errors.

Earlier i t was mentioned that


25/52

the T -53 is an internal combustion -engine. Although this isbasically true, there are somedifferent characteristics betweenthe turbine and reciprocating engines. Its acceleration time is themost obvious difference. Thisslower acceleration is no problem i f you just stay ahead of themachine. Don t get into a spotwhere you have low rpm and apossible need of power quickly.This slow acceleration can alsocause a bit of difficulty in theAutofeather circuit. This circuitis activated when three conditions have been met:

arming switch ON, torque below 10 psi, and throttles ull forward.Either on the ground or in

flight these conditions can bemet easily without an actual engine failure. The most obvioustime for this to occur is ona touch-and-go landing- lowpower at landing, torque below10 psi and then a throttlejammed full forward. To saveembarrassment of -making an

unexpected turn off the runway,a worthwhile habit is a two-stepthrottle advance. Push forwardanywhere from 3J t throttle toMil. power detent and save thelast bit until the torque is above10 psi. This can be determinedby either observing the torquegauge or just waiting until youfeel the pow er build up. Then goto full throttle. This won t costyou anything in time to getpower on, since the engine accelerates only as fast as the fuelcontrol will allow and is not concerned with how fast you movethe throttles. As long as you areahead of the acceleration thetime will be the same.

P R O RM NCE

One characteristic that is notso obvious but just as important,is the effect of altitude and temperature on performance.

June 1963

Comparing the T-53 with apiston slapper we find that therecip has the same takeoff powerfrom sea level up to a criticalaltitude. For example, a t 2,400feet on an R-1820-82. In the next7,000 feet the same engine loses21 percent of its takeoff power.

The T -53 starts losing poweras soon as altitude increases andloses i t at a rate of about 1.7 percent per 1,000 feet or a little

more than 16 percent of totalpower up to the same altitudethat the R-1820 had lost 21 percent.

Mark one up for the turbine.Temperature effect: The R-

1820 will gain 1 percent in powerfor each 10 C drop in temperature below Standard Conditions

15 C). The T-53 will gain 5percent in power for this sametemperature drop below normal10 C.

Mark two up for the turbine.But - t h e temperature effect is

a straight line function. Both engines lose the same 1 percent vs5 percent power for each 10 Cincre se in temperature abovethe Standard. t is not too hardto see that a hot day could makeyou sweat an obstacle that wouldbe no problem on a cool day.

Last, but by no means least, isthe Martin Baker seat. The Oc-

tober 1961 issue of the U. S.ARMY AVIATION DIGEST hasan article that covers the MartinBaker seat in considerable detailand needs no repeat.

Suffice to say that you shouldreally know this chair thoroughly-not only so that youwon t depart inadvertently butso that you will depart on schedule i you have to.

Have a plan. Know what will

dictate when you stay with themachine and know what willcause you to leave. Then, whenyou know that you are leaving,do so with dispatch and dexterity.

I am sure there are manyother ways to save in this machine and probably better approaches to some areas than theways covered here. f you knowof any or pick up any duringyour tour with the Mohawk, howabout passing the info o n - n o tonly to your mili ary typefriends but to us defense workers as well. It might save ustrouble in the future.

It is not the intent of the author to supersede any U. S.Army operational techniques bythis article. In many cases, fieldoperational experience may welldevelop better techniques thanare mentioned here.

3


26/52

another hitch onthe

parachuteseemedappropriate

ead Reckoning

WATCHED the ADF needleswing 180 0 Don banked the

Beaver gently to the left, thenleveled the wings.

I pressed the mike button andspoke, Blackstone radio, this isArmy 5720. Over.

Army 5720, this is Blackstoneradio. Go ahead.

5720 over Blackstone at threeone; 5,000; instrument flight

4

rules; South Boston, zero one;Greensboro. Over.

5720, you are fading. Sayagain South Boston estimate.

Estimate South Boston zeroone; Greensboro. Over.

Roger, understand SouthBoston zero one. Maintain 5,000.Blackstone alti . . .

A red light popped on in mymind with explosive brillance. A

quick glance showed the loadmeter indicated zero. The voltmeter showed a drop.

I reached over and flipped thegenerator switch off and on,

This account was furnished bya member of the CommunicativeSk ills class of the rmy viationSafety Course University ofSouthern California.

u S. ARMY AVIATION IGEST


27/52

watching the load meter. t stillread zero.

Blackstone radio, this is 5720.

Our generator is out. Please sayagain altimeter setting.There was a crackling sound

in the headset.Blackstone radio, we cannot

read you. Will continue ascleared.

Don glanced over. Better re -check that ADF. The needleseems erratic.

I turned the ADF volume up,but all we could hear was aslight hum.

June 963

Blackstone radio, this isArmy 5720 transmitting in theblind. Our navigation equipment

is out. Will continue on course.There was no response.I checked the directional gyro

against the compass. The lettersV AC on the bottom of the gyrostood out in welcome relief. Aquick glance at the suction gaugeshowed the vacuum system op-erating normally.

I'll hold 245 , said Don.Turn off everything we don't

need. We'll need that batterylater.

I turned off the radios. Whatabout the navigation lights?

Turn them off. We'll need

them if we break out VFR.Our forecast called for groundfog as far as South Boston, butGreensboro was supposed tohave 3,000 feet broken. The windat 5,000 was forecast at 15 knotsfrom 330 .

Don continued holding 245 .The published heading to SouthBoston was 240 , but he'd added5 for the wind after we turnedthe corner at Blackstone.

The airspeed indicator showed

25


28/52

124 miles per hour. Outsideair temperature was - 1 C. Aquick calculation on the E6Bshowed an approximate true airspeed of 115 knots.

I leaned toward Don. "Holdyour heading. We're making agroundspeed of about 118 knots.

f we're lucky and the batteryisn't too low, we should be ableto get a fix at South Boston."

"Yeah " grunted Don. Hedidn't sound too encouraged.

I suddenly remembered we'dfigured 108 knots for this leg. Ichecked the flight plan to besure. There it was: "Blackstoneto South Boston, heading 240 ,distance 54 miles, time 30 minutes at 108 knots. I set the newgroundspeed on the computerand checked it against the mileage. Twenty-seven minutes- justwithin the 3-minute limit.

"Do you think they clearedthe airways for us?" asked Donhopefully.

"I doubt it. Unless Blackstonecaught our last transmission,they don't know we're running

blind. Our next transmission isdue in aboUJt 12 minutes. They'llknow then."

"You figure we'll make ourastimate at South Boston?"asked Don , his eyes glued to theinstruments.

"I figure we'll be 3 minutes~ a r l y but it 's a dead reckoningestimate."

I saw Don's knuckles whitenas he gripped the wheel. "Wantto take a break?"

"Yeah, thanks," said Don."What do you want me to donext?"

"Better figure how early we'llhit Greensboro. I expect we mayhave to throttle back or riskplowing into their traffic."

Don lit a cigarette and reachedfor the E6B. The ship flew onsmoothly.

I felt Don's hand touch myshoulder.

26

"Looks like we'll be 6 minutesearly at Greensboro. Maybeyou'd better slow down after wepass South Boston ."

I nodded. "What airspeed?""A hundred and five. And we'd

better turn to 247 ."I looked at the clock. "We

should be over South Boston intwo minutes. How about turningon the omni and see what youcan get?"

Don turned the omni on and aslight buzz came slowly ~ t otheheadset. Nothing else. The OFFflag trembled slightly burt thatwas all. He cranked the tuninghandle slowly past .the channelon either side. Nothing

I saw the second hand on theclock sweep toward vertical. Itwas five seven, our ETA forSouth Boston. I eased the throttleback and retrimmed for 105 ktairspeed, then banked gently andpicked up a heading of 247 . Theaircraft felt sluggish and thewheel was slick with sweat frommy palms.

A heavy silence crept into the

cockpit over the roar of the engine. Twenty minutes-an eterni ty -went by.

I felt Don's hands on the con-trols. "Let me spell you awhile.You look like you need a break."

He was right. I released thecontrols and relaxed my crampedmuscles. There was nothing butinky blackness outside.

Suddenly, there was a bumpand another as we hit turbulence. Tension increased. Theclock showed 7 minutes to go forour ETA at Greensboro. I wondered how we'd make the letdown without radio.

Don must have been thinkingthe same thing. He asked, "Whatdo we do when we get there?"

"We'll have to let down to2,300 feet, procedure turn alti-tude. Our only hope is to breakout and recognize something toget a position." It was a sobering

thought. Another hitch on thep r c h u ~ estraps seemed appropriate.

The blackness outside seemedto squeeze in. Wait a minuteWhat was that? Probably seeingthings but it sure looked likesomething moved. There it wasagain.

"Hey, I can see some stars upthere-no, they've gone again "

The air became more turbulentand occasionally the outline ofthe clouds was visible.

The minutes inched by. It wasnow three one.

Don glanced at the clock. "I'llstart a procedure turn. Weshould have passed the airportby 3 miles i f we are on time. Thestation was 3 miles southwest ofthe airport, i I remember correctly."

"Right "Don started a slow turn to the

left and eased back on thethrottle. My eyes strained intothe blackness, watching for abreak.

The altimeter passed through

4,000 feet as Don started histurn to the right. Sweat trickledinlto the corners of my eyes.

Don rolled the wings level ona heading of 030 , continued thedescent for another minute, andleveled off at 2,300 feet.

All at once some lights flick-ered downward and to the left.

Don had seen them . "Watchthe gauges," he shouted, "I'll trythis hole. Turn on the navigationlights and don't let me get below1900 feet "

He banked sharply to the leftand leveled off just under 2,000feet. Our heading returned to030 and the visibility was good,probably 8 miles.

The lights we had first seendrifted by and we spotted another town to the right.

Suddenly, dead ahead, was aflashing green and white beacon-Greensboro . . . .

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


29/52

Army Aviation is called upon to perform many varied and unex-pected missions. This account offers some cogent operational tipsfor all helicopter units.

SHIVERING nights at 350 F,

noonday lunch at a blazing110 0 takeoffs from the shiftingdesert sand and landings onmountain crags all in one helicopter operation pose problems-challenging but not insurmountable.

This was the environmentconfronted by the 421st MedicalCompany (Air Ambulance) operating in IDA (Iranian DisasterArea) as part of the ArmyEmergency Relief Operationundertaken after the disastrous1962 earthquake wreaked devastation upon a 5 by 6 mile areaof Iran.

The unit , represented by 1Medical Service Corps aviators,15 enlisted men, and six UH-IBIroquois helicopters, was selected by Seventh Army to provide air support. Maintenancesupport was provided by a teaIl .from the 29th TAAM Company,also a part of Seventh Army.

ASSIST FROM MATS

Movement from Germany toTehran, Iran, was by C-124 aircraft provided by MATS. Thefirst problem encoun ered was

loading the UH-IBs. The UH-IAcan be loaded by removing themain rotor blades and one tailrotor blade, but the UH-IB, witha 9-inch longer mast, must alsohave both the head and mast removed. Fortunately, despite theuse of inexperienced personnelat the off-loading point, only oneship received damage (minor) tothe tail boom when an attemptwas made to move the aircraftwith a skid tied down.

June 963

IDCaptain Louis L izellUpon reassembly, the helicop

ters were flown to Quazvin,where a base camp was established adjacent to the 8th Evacuation Hospital, which had arrived two days previously. Anadvance camp was later established 4 miles south, in the desert at Buyin, on the northernedge of the devastated area.

Although each officer was anexperienced helicopter pilot, thesituation required new techniques to be learned and a few,long unused, to be reviewed.

OPERATIONAL HAZARDS

A normal day usually began at0530 and ended at 1830. The onlybreak was a t midday when theextremely high temperatures

sent the density altitude soaring.The temperatures and elevationin the area of operation made i timperative that the early morning coolness be used to the maximum; therefore, the first light ofday was scheduled as takeofftime. Night flying was not attempted since there were nolights for visual reference andno reliable navigational aids located in or near the area.

The base and advance campswere in the desert (elevation4,000 feet); the area of devastation was a 60-mile stretch ofmountain range, 50 miles wide,ranging in elevation from 4,000to 10,000 feet. Temperaturesvaried from 35-40 0 F at night to100-110 degrees at midday. Densityaltitude (which all pilots became proficient a t computing)was 8,000-13,000 feet. Winds atmidday were 4 to 6 mph in the

higher elevations and subject to180 0 changes within less than 3minutes.

After flying in Germany,where temperature, wind, elevation and density altitude were noproblem, the pilots had a tendency to approach the new areaas they had their home bases.This attitude was short-lived,and thereafter all items weredoublechecked before loading,takeoff, or landing.

Loads had to be drastically reduced, from the UH-l s normal3,000 pounds with a full fuel loadto a combined total of 1,500pounds. Even with 200 extra engine rpm while landing and taking off, a loss of rpm was oftenexperienced. However, the avia

tors felt no other aircraft in thefield was capable of performing,in this particular area, as well asthe UH-l.

Due to the varying degree ofslope at most landing sites,wheeled landing gear would havebeen unsuitable. Landing areaswere often small, mountain-siderice paddies barely large enoughto accommodate the skid gear ofthe helicopter. (Here too, the

rotor diameter had to be takeninto consideration.)An additional hazard in take

offs and landings, requiring highproficiency, was the powder-likedust and sand throughout mostof the area which preventedtakeoffs from a hover. Takeoffs

Capt Mizell is operations offi-cer for the 421st Medical Com-pany Air Amb) located atNelligen Germany.

27


30/52

were from the ground. Once thepower setting and attitude wereestablished, they were held forthe first few seconds. (All visualcontact was normally lost in thedust.) For the most part, instrument takeoffs, though of shortduraltion, were an accepted partof the takeoff maneuver.

Landings were somewhat lessdifficult when the approach wasmade shallow and to the ground.Because of the dust, runninglandings with little forward motion were required to enableskid contact before the loss ofvisual reference.

LE RNING FROMEXPERIENCE

The techniques described wereperfected after an incident earlyin the operation in which a pilot,due to the dust created on takeoff, lost visual contact with theground and pulled excessi vepitch. This caused a loss of rpmand contact with the ground, resulting in a broken right lowersection of plexiglass and a bent

forward cross tube.t is interesting to note, this

aircraft flew more ho urs duringthe operation than any of theother five. The nose was patchedwith a discarded C-ration boxand due consideration for thecross tube was taken on landingsand takeoffs.

Since landing sites were onmountain sides, narrow ridges,in creek bottoms, or in small boxcanyons, they were reconnoitered carefully, with wind direction receiving special attention.

Pildt fatigue became a problem after the first few days of theoperation. This is easily understood when you consider theaviators daily schedule, and thealtitude and temperature as compared to that of Germany wherepersonnel were accustomed toflying.

A pilot and copilot were used

8

when possible, but even underthese conditions, advantage wastaken of each refueling and loading stop to obtain a few minutesrest. This situation was latereased by sending two pilots, withan aircraft returning for maintenance, into Tehran on a dailybasis. .

Navigation was strictly bypilotage, and here basic mapreading came in handy. Due tothe nature of the terrain, atopographic map was a must.There was no problem in dis-orientation; however, familiaritywith the topographic map andcontour lines was necessary to

locate and pinpoint a particularvillage or drop site. At times themaps were found to be inaccurate since some villages hadbeen abandoned or built-upsince the maps were published.

MISSION OPER TIONS

The mission itself, althoughbasically medical, involved con-siderable air delivery of foodsupplies, clothing, blankets, andtents, since all of the victims belongings had been buried underthe rubble.

Several hundred small villageswere in the area of operation;therefore, a systematic survey ofeach village was conducted. Initially, a team consisting of a doc-tor, corpsman or nurse, andinterpreter were flown in. Theteam was left while patientswere air-evacuated. On the next

sortie, food was flown in and theteam flown out. Based on theirsurvey, successive flights weremade to deliver needed items.

Obtaining supplies in sufficientquantity to ensure maximum useof the helicopters proved to bean unending job. All supplieswere in the hands of organizations located some 100 road milesfrom the advance camp, wherethe supplies were needed for airlift into the remote villages of

the higher elevations.Fuel was delivered to both the

advance and base camps by refueling tankers provided by theImperial Iranian Air Force-onetanker each at the base and advance camps and one shuttlingfrom Tehran (90 miles away) toreplenish fuel in the other two.The only major problem encountered in this area was the lack offuel for the truck and pump engines.

M INTEN NCE PROBLEMS

Maintenance, always a problem, was aggravated by the abrasive action of sand and dust. Alack of water prohibited washing; therefore, all

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Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1963

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