Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1957

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1957

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LIBRARY UST VOOR l


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U S RMY EDITOR-IN-CHIEFCaptain Theodore E. WaskoVI TION

ASSISTANT EDITOR-IN-CHIEFLieutenant John E. ArmstrongEDITORWilliam E. Vance

DIGEST STAFF WRITERJohn S. MaltroUiThe U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is an official publication

of the Department of the Army published monthly under thesupervision of the Commandant, U. S. Army Aviation School.

COMMANDANTBrigadier General Bogardus S. Cairns USAASSISTANT COMMANDANTCo lonel John J. Tolson

DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTIONLieutenant Colonel William C. Bowen, J r.The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide informationof an operational or functional natureconcerning safety and aircraft accidentprevention, training, maintenance, operations, research, and development,aviation medicine, and other related data.Manuscripts, photographs, and otherillustrations pertaining to the above subjects of interest to personnel concernedwith Army Aviation are invited. Directcommunication is authorized to: Editorin-Chief, U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST, U. S. Army Aviation School,Fort Rucker, Alabama.Unless otherwise indicated, material inthe U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

may be reprinted provided credit isgiven to the U. S. ARMY AVIATIONDIGEST and to the author.The printing of this publication hasbeen approved by the Director of theBureau of the Budget, 15 March 1956.Unless specified all photographs usedare U. S. Army.

DISTRIBUTION:Active Army:OSD, SA, JCS , CofSA,DCSPER, ACSI, DCSOPS,DC SLOG. ACSRC, CMH,CINFO, Technical Svc (DA),USCONARC, USA Arty Bd,USA Armor Bd, USA InfBd, USA Air Def Bd, USAAbn Elct Bd, USA AvnBd. US ARADCOM, OS MajComd, OS Base Comd,MDW, Armies, Corps, Div,Brig,Ft Camps (CONUS),Svc Colleges, Br Svc Sch(CONUS), Specialist Sch(CONUS), AFSC, AFIS,NWC, Trans Cen, Arty Cen,Mil Dist.NG: State AG.USAR: None.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.


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UNITED ST TESARMY VI TIONDIGEST

Volume 3 June, 1957

CONTENTSFuture of Army Aviation . . .Major General Hamilton H. Howze, USHistory of Army AviationWilliam E VancePrelude to Fifty Years of FlightJohn S MaltrottiPictorial Review of Army AircraftCubs in Combat.Brigadier General Carl 1 Hutton, USProject LONG ARM.Lt Colonel Jack W Ruby, EThe Gray Hair Department

COVER

Number 6

7

21

2631

39

41

One of the most notable firsts in U. S. ArmyAviation occurred on 8 November 1942 when threeL-4s took off from the U.S.S. RANGER located60 miles off the North African slhore. Captain(now Lt Col) Ford E. Allcorn's airplane, shownpoised on the RANGER's deck, was the first Cubto take off from an aircraft carrier. This andother highlights in the 15 busy years of ArmyA vi ation will be found in the history beginningon page 7


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Wilber M Bruckerecretary of the rmy

To the Officers and Men of the Army Aviation program.It is a pleasure to congratulate you, the officers and menof the Army Aviation program, on the occasion of the 15thAnniversary of integral Army Aviation.Because of your astuteness and industriousness our new,streamlined, atomic-age Army has impressive air mobility. Inline with our goal of putting into the hands of troops newweapons that will extend their capability, the program's increased use of organic Army helicopters and light, fixed-wingplanes has literally given wings to the ground soldier. As aresult of the Army Aviation program, we will be able, on anyfuture field of battle, to air-transport troops and supplies whereand when needed, and in quantities necessary for success. Also,as a result of the program, organic aircraft will provide us withthe superior battlefield observation, liaison and medical evacuation, which together with fire-power and movement, will beprime factors in deciding the outcome of any war in whichthe United States may become engaged.You, in the Army Aviation program, have shown by youroutstanding achievements and progress that you are imbuedwith the look to the future attitude of mind which characterizes today's Army. We are proud to have you on our great,versatile, patriotic Army team.


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Maxwell D. TaylorGeneral United States rmyChief of Staff

On behalf of the men and women of the Army I extendcongratulations and best wishes on the occasion of the fifteenthanniversary of Army Aviation.As the pioneer in the development of military aviation theArmy has always directed its efforts toward utilizing aircraftto enhance the mobility flexibility and battle efficiency of itsforces. The integration of low-performance aircraft into theArmy structure-thereby expediting reconnaissance improving target acquisition and permitting rapid shifts of men andsupplies about the battlefield - augments the combat capability of the Army. The characteristic responsiveness of ArmyAviation to the requirements of combat commanders coupledwith the professional ability of soldier-pilots provide the fundamental characteristics necessary to fulfill the Army s organic aviation needs.I join with every member of the Army in expressing pridein the accomplishments of Army Aviation during its relativelyshort history and in voicing confidence in its ability to performincreasingly important functions in the future.


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Future ofArmy AviationMaior General Hamilton H Howze USDirector of Army Aviation ODCSOPS

W H N THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEFasked me to prepare an ar-ticle under this title he obviouslyanticipated a discussion of thestatistics of the build-up inArmy A via ion, p us a disserta-tion on new aircraft types whichwe expect to come into being.But senior officers habitually rebel against doing what juniorofficers know they should do, soshall tackle the question froma very different point of view.should like to tell you inthese few paragraphs whatconsider to be the k ys to thefuture.A primary factor affecting thegrowth of aviation in the Armyis its utilization. believe thatthe combat arms of the Armyare in fact awakening to thepossibilities offered by the useof aircraft in the conduct ofmilitary operations, but this sort

of realization does not usuallycome rapidly, if only because theArmy is a very large organization. And while do not thinkthat the military man is as conservative as the press gives himcredit for being, it is of coursetrue that the soldier s responsibilities in battle are heavy, thestresses of war severe, and thepenalties for error v ry severe.One does not therefore embarklightly on radical departuresfrom tactical methods whichhave been tried and found truein the past.

nevertheless believe that theuse of light aircraft should haverevolutionary effect on the tac-tics of the Army. The problem,therefore is how the Army is tobecome convinced of this howthe Army may best proceed toward achieving new and greatercombat capabilities through the


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skillful use of light aircraft andhelicopters.The major part of the solutionto the problem must be providedby Army Aviation itself. Wemust develop a capability so obviously good that it i apparentto all who are confronted with it.This capability must be developed partly by the creation ofnew and better aircraft types,and that development must inturn come from a properly conducted research program. I thinkthat the Army has such a program; whether it is everythingit should be is of course debatable, and we will never haveall the money for it which wemight profitably use. But theaviation industry is greatly interested in this field of aeronau-tical development, and I believethat the Army s requirements inthis respect will be met.

Second, the capability of aviation to do its job must be repeatedly demonstrated; merelytalking it up won t do. This mostessential requirement must bemet by those of us who comprise Army Aviation: pilots,ground crews, and operationspersonnel.It is a simple rule of thumb,rarely proven wrong, that a goodunit looks good. This is trueeven in the midst of battle - aunit may be ragged and unshav-en, but if it is properly trainedand disciplined it will neverthe-less exude a spirit and a willto-do which is obvious. And ingarrison a good unit looks goodfrom every point of view - indress, in military bearing, inalacrity of reaction to new sit-ua ions, in alertness and courtesy. A good outfit s surround-ings are clean, no matter how


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6 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTaustere they may be and itsfacilities are smartly and efficiently run.A good unit is marked by ahigh standard of discipline discipline which is reflected in itsappearance as just described inthe condition of its equipmentand in its execution of its training mission. This discipline carries over into the actions of thepilots operating on their own farfrom the possibility of detailedsupervisIon by their superiors.Our combat capability will befurther demonstrated by courage - courage to meet the requirements of our brand of flying. In this respect I am veryproud to say that Army Aviation stands mighty tall. Greatcontributions to our professionalfuture were made again andagain in the recent past - in thegusty depths of the Grand Canyon in the heat of the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian jungles inthe floods in New England andCalifornia and in the blacknight above the rising Han Riverof Korea. The pilots and crewsparticipating in these splendidendeavors superbly executedamid circumstances of considerable peril provide not only inspiring examples these are additionally obvious manifesta-

tions of the capability of ArmyAviation.Finally let me say that ourfuture lies partly in our owninitiative and imagination. Wemust take our capability combine it with courage and display the result to the rest ofthe Army in such fashion thatthe utility of aviation will becompletely nd convincinglyobvious. This requires of our

aviators more than the bare ability to pilot the aircraft howeverimportant that may be. ArmyAviation vitally needs competent technicians but we also needcommanders and tacticians. Anofficer charged with the command of an Army Aviation unitis faced with a great challengeto his personal abilities for hemust meet fully the technicaldemands of his position yet develop and nurture the tacticalunderstanding necessary to support ground units to the limitof the great possibilities inherent in aviation. I know of noother category of job more demanding on the individual. Ourcommanders cannot be toosmart too brave too ingeniousor too imaginative.In the individual- commander pilot and crewman - liesthe future of Army Aviation.


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History ofrmy viation

William E ance

B OR N OF THE BATTLEFIELD ne-cessity for improved artillery observation and easilyadapting its unique capabilitiesto other varied and critical tasksArmy Aviation has advancedwith seven-league strides sinceits inception June 6 1942.From the humble beginningat Fort Sill Okla. through theyears of warfare which followed

Army Aviation played an increasingly important role in thehostilities as commanders cameto realize its many potentialities.Continuing to improve its roleby testing and adapting new aircraft Army Aviation was readyto come of age when the fightingbroke out in Korea. Teaming upits past-proved highly successful fixed-wing aircraft with thevastly more versatile helicopter

William E. Vance is Editor of theU S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST.Views expressed in this article O/re theauthor s and are not necessarily thoseof the Department of the Army or ofthe U. S. Army Aviation School.Th e Editor

-seemingly designed especiallyfor the rugged terrain encountered in Korea-Army Aviationdisplayed new and outstandingcapabilities which firmly established it as a vital part of anyarmed force.Present day activities of ArmyAviation serve as an interestingcurtain raiser to ar. excitingfuture in which one can easilyvisualize vertical takeoff andlanding aircraft flying cranesand flying jeeps in addition toother projects still on the drawing boards.Although Army Aviation iscelebrating its 15th anniversaryaerial observation for militarypurposes dates back to the CivilWar. A balloon company attached to Union forces under command of General McClellan gained information of Confederatetroop movements in the vicinityof Richmond. The U. S. Armyalso used balloons Tor a similarpurpose during the SpanishAmerican War and by this timemost of the world powers had


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8 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Juneestablished balloon corps in theirarmies.

Observation balloons in useduring World War I sufferedwith the appearance of combatairplanes, and this type of dutybecame extremely hazardous.Since then the airplane has beenthe principal means of aerial observation.Before World War II, aerialobservation was furnished bythe Air Corps Division andCorps aviation squadrons. Thetype of aircraft developmentforced the separation of the observation aircraft from the supported units. Disturbed by inadequate support in this area, manyArmy officers discussed meansof overcoming the shortcomingsof the system. In 1941, MajorWilliam W. Ford (now BrigadierGeneral, USA, retired) wrote anarticle advocating use of commercial aircraft for the adjustment of artillery fire. In this article, which appeared in the -TILLERY JOURNAL, Maj Fordsuggested that these aircraft beorganic to the units they served.The article caught the attentionof Major General Robert M Danford, then Chief of Field Artillery, and his interest was further extended when, during avisit to the British ArtillerySchool several months later, hesaw experiments along this sameline being conducted by theBritish.

LOUISI N M NEUVERSPermission was obtained touse aircraft of Piper, Aeronca,and Taylorcraft design in theLouisiana maneuvers of 1941.General Danford, in his report,stated Only uniformly satisfactory report of air observa-

tion during the recent maneuvers comes from those artilleryunits where Cubs were used.In the fall of 1941, GeneralDanford visited Fort Sill and,during his visit, Maj Ford (thenassigned to the Staff and Facultyof the Field Artillery School)pleaded the case for organicaviation for Field Artillery. Inthe late fall of 1941, a directivewas received at Fort Sill to establish a test group for organicaviation for Field Artillery. Thedirective also included the recommendation that Lt Col Fordbe placed in charge of this testgroup.

From the 18th Field ArtilleryRegiment, Lt Col Ford borrowed First Lieutenant Robert R.Williams (now Col Williams,President of the U. S. ArmyAviation Board) and SecondLieutenant Delbert L. Bristol(now Lt Col Bristol, chief ofArmy A via tion Branch, officeChief of Research and Development, Department of the Army)who formed the nucleus of thisnew organization. Both of theseofficers held civilian pilot licenses, and had been experimentingwith the use of aircraft for airobservation during that year.Major Gordon J. Wolf, a reserveofficer in Cincinnati, Ohio, hadbeen corresponding with Lt ColFord on this subject for sometime. Immediate arrangementswere made for Maj Wolf to becalled to active duty and to proceed to Washington to assist inthe selection of officers and enlisted personnel of the Field Artillery with previous pilot experience to complete the testgroup.

Twenty-four L-4 aircraft wereborrowed from the Air Corps


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1957 HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATIONand delivered to Fort Sill. Theseaircraft were standard J 3 PiperCub airplanes, painted olivedrab. Maj Wolf selected 30 offi-cers and enlisted men from theField Artillery with CAA pilotlicenses who were ordered toreport to Fort Sill on or about1 January 1942.At the same time the CivilAeronautics Authority suppliedone flight supervisor Mr. Richard AIle) and one maintenancesupervisor Mr. Stanford Stelle)from their Washington office.The Civil Aeronautics Authorityalso assisted in obtaining six experienced civilian flight instruc-tors with outstanding records inthe flying of light aircraft. On15 January 1942 the training ofthe test group began at Fort Sill,Oklahoma. The training programconsisted primarily of an elimination process to determine thebest qualified of those selected,and some concentrated trainingin short field landings and take-offs.On 1 March 1942, the 20 pilotsand 10 mechanics, who had sur-vived the training program, weresplit into two groups. One groupwas sent to the 2d Division atFort Sam Houston, Texas, andthe other group went to the 31stArtillery Brigade, Fort BraggNorth Carolina, to conduct thetests of organic aviation for FieldArtillery. The tests were completed and the reports forwardedin April, 1942. The two testgroups reassembled at Fort Sillto await the outcome of the re-ports.

W R DEP RTMENT PPROV LOn 6 June 1942 the War Department approved organic aviation for Field Artillery. Im-

mediately thereafter the Depart-ment of Air Training of theField Artillery School was established, with Col Ford as its director. The members of the testgroup for Army Aviation provided the nucleus around whichthe Department of Air Trainingwas built.Initially the course was forfive weeks, but this was gradual-ly extended as time went by. Asmost personnel with flying experience had already been takeninto the Air Corps, specialschools were set up at PittsburgKansas, and Denton, Texas, bythe Air Corps to provide primarytraining to prospective Field Ar-tillery aviators. Advanced train-ing, including short field procedures and observer trainingwas given at Fort Sill. Even withthis late start the program withthe help of unit training wasable to equip artillery battalionsin each of the several theaterswith two aircraft and crews atthe time of entry into action.This feat was not accomplishedwithout considerable difficulty,however.

Early in September, 1942, theField Artillery School receivedclassified instructions from theWar Department to send tenField Artillery pilots and tenmechanics to the EuropeanTheater as quickly as possible.This was the first requirementplaced on the school for sendingaviators to tactical units.The group, most of whom arenow high ranking officers, wasselected by 14 September andshortly thereafter shipped toEngland. This group of pilotsfrom Class No. 1 included Captains Joseph M. Watson, Jr. andJ. Elmore Swenson; First Lieu-


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1957 HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATIONbegan.The II Corps Air OP Schoolprogressed satisfactorily ndlate in November received instructions to move an advanceparty to North Africa with the13th FA Brigade. A new schoolwas to be set up there and the29th Infantry Division also established its own flying school.

CUBS ENTER COMBATThe first force to employ AirOPs in combat were elements ofthe Fifth Army almost fivemonths to the day from the anniversary date. On 8 November1942, three L-4s took off fromthe U.S.S. RANGgR 60 miles offNorth Africa. Four pilots representing the I Corps were aboardthese aircraft: Captain Ford E.

Allcorn, First Lieutellant Brenton A. Devol, Jr., First Lieutenant John R. Shell, and SecondLieutenant William H. Butler.Captain Allcorn, now Lieutenant Colonel and Director, FieldService, Transportation Supplyand Maintenance Command, saysof this historic event: Our pessimism was heightened by thefact that a number of Navy air-craft had been shot down by ourown forces. We asked the Commanding Officer of the RANGERto break radio silence and informthe units ashore that we were ar-riving off Fedala shortly, but herefused.We checked our 609 radiowhich we intendea. using to adjust artillery fire and then werelaunched. We didn't give muchthought to the fact that we flewthe first light planes ever totake off from a carrier. We wereapproximately 60 miles offshorewhen we became airborne.

About three miles offshore,

the U.S.S. BROOKLYN openedfire on us. We immediately peeled off and started hopping thewaves from there on into shoreand received very little damage.I saw Shell and Butler getthrough all right. I learned laterthey proceeded north and landedin the vicinity of a French fort,where they were captured andremained prisoners of the Frenchfor a time.

Captain Allcorn was seriouslywounded by friendly forces .50caliber machine gun fire andcrash landed his airplane in afield near the shore where itburned. After spending someharrowing hours in unfriendlyterritory, he was evacuated to aU. S hospital ship. He was thefirst Field Artillery pilot shotdown in a combat operation inWorld War II.

Other Air OP sections of theI Armored Corps came over thebeaches or through ports in thebuild-up ashore. Hostilities wereon the wane in this area andlittle time was available to usethe new Air OPs.Forces of the II Corps hadbeen moved to reinforce the Brit-ish Forces in Tunisia. Elementsof the 1st Armored Division andthe 34th Infantry Division forsome time had been fighting inTunisia and there was a growingdemand for air observation. InDecember, to meet this demand,Fifth Army redistributed planes,

pilots and mechanics of the ICorps to II Corps units. One ofthe first pilots dispatched toTunisia was First LieutenantJesse U. Overall, III, who withtwo other pilots flew three Cubsfrom the Casablanca area toTunisia, a distance of more than1,000 miles.


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2 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST JuneMeanw hile, the advance detachment of the II Corps Air OP

School had established itself atthe airfield at Sidi-bel-Abbes andbecame a staging area for pilotsand mechanics moving to Tunisia. The main body of the IICorps Air OP School arrived inNorth Africa in early 1943 andthe Fifth Army commander decided to expand the scope of theschool. The mission was to trainpilots and mechanics for the IICorps as well as I Corps.Pilots, mechanics and planesof I Corps were transferred tothe II Corps school and FifthArmy units were combed for officers and enlisted men who hadprevious flight training and whowould volunteer for flight train-ing. Pilots were graduated andassigned to units which were already engaged in combat inTunisia.

FLIGHT ST TUS SN RLEDOperating impromptu schoolsto fill combat needs inevitablyresulted in administrative snarls.Although the War Department

had established a policy of placing Field Artillery pilots on flying status, Fifth Army was unable to obtain this status forgraduates of the Corps School.As an alternative, authority wasobtained to place all graduateson nonrated flying pay whichentitled them to receive $60 permonth hazardous duty pay. Thissituation prevailed until late in1943 when the War Departmentdecided to return overseas schoolgraduates to Fort Sill for furtherflight training. By this time,many had seen extensive combat action. A few accepted nonflying assignments rather thanreturn to the uncertain future of

additional training at Fort Sill.Others returned to officially wintheir wings.In early 1943, all major U. S.Army units in Tunisia had received some air sections. Thesesections were performing dutiesat considerable variance with theoriginal intent. They were flyingmany missions not connectedwith artillery observation.The uncertainties and unknowns of combat, coupled witha lack of opportunity to partici-pate in unit training prior tocombat, all contributed to aninitial mediocrity of success inemploying Air OPs. Another deterring factor was the completelack of supply and maintenancesupport. Although the Air Corpswas charged with providing thissupport, the responsibility hadbeen overlooked in their planning of overseas stock levels andmaintenance support units. Im-provisation was the key to success in North Africa. Muchcredit can be given to the engineering officers and air mechanics of the various Air OP sections who had to work doublyhard to keep the Cubs flying.

MOR LE DROPSArtillery commanders w rnot accustomed to looking outfor their observation airplanes.n several occasions, air sections awakened in the morningto find their unit had departed

during the night without notifying them. Care and feeding ofair section personnel varied fromthe best possible to that of begging for handouts from sym-pathetic passing units.As the campaign progressed,considerable improvement wasmade in integrating the air sec-


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1957 HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION 13tion into the artillery units. Amajor factor in getting recognition was a banded, enthusiasticgroup of pioneer pilots pluggingagainst adversity and gainingthe support of commanders. Cubsspearheaded General George Patton's crushing armor and bothGenerals Patton and Omar Bradley found them invaluable forother missions. The use of AirOPs for this purpose rapidly developed into expanding requirements for organic air sections totransport commanders and staffofficers throughout the combatzone.The difficulties over organization and control of liaison aircraft in this period was complicated by the question of whattype plane was to be used by theArmy. The plane used to adjustartillery fire in the 1941 maneuvers was a field expedient. A Cubwith a 65-hp engine designedfor civilian use, it was obtaineddirectly from the manufactureron a loan basis. To take care ofthe rapid expansion of aviationfor the Field Artillery, which indicated that in time and no laterthan 1943 it would require atotal of 2,508 light planes, othertypes than the L-4 were supplied to the Army. These wereTaylorcraft and Aeronca, original designation YO-57 and YO-58. Original designation of theCub was YO .59.

SHORT GE OF L 4SExcept for the shortage ofL-4s, no difficulty arose until thedesire for a different type ofplane began to be pressed fromthe field. The 'airborne divisionsparticularly needed a s t e r airplane to keep up with airbornemovements. This request was de

nied on the grounds that thehigher horsepower craft wouldneed more room for takeoff andbe less maneuverable in achieving evasion. Another question ofequipping the Cubs arose whenthe Army wanted to use themfor missions other than adjusting artillery fire. The War Department strongly reaffirmed theresults of artillery observationaircraft, but opposed any otheruse by ground commanders.The Seventh Army, invadingSouthern France and coming upagainst the lower end of theSiegfried Line, brought with itthe airborne controller to directair strikes. The Little Brotheract, of the Cub directing thepowerful bombers and strafingfighters to objectives, receivedmuch attention from writersand reporters of that period.

CUBS PROVE V LUEProgress of the war in 1944left not a shadow of doubt thatthe Field Artillery now regardedits light planes as indispensable.The Germans acquired such ahealthy respect for the Cub'sability to spot fires that the verypresence of the Air OP had acounterbattery effect.It was standard procedure forthe 2d and 3d Armored Divisions to keep at least one artillery observer in the air duringdaylight hours. The pilots were

daring and resourceful. Theywere not supposed to fly overenemy lines, but they wentwhere necessary to see whathad to be seen. They becameskilled at dodging enemy fightersat tree-top level and in escapingantiaircraft fire. Casualties fromenemy action approximated thoseof field artillery observers on


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14 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junethe ground.

When the Pozit fuse was introduced the perils of theirflight amid the trajectories offriendly shells were greatly increased. Though hard workingand without the public prestigeafforded the Army Air Forcesthey developed high esprit. Thisspirit resourcefulness and dailyidentification with the life andinterests of the troops madethem immensely popular.Uses of Army Aviation expanded with experience gainedin combat. The Air OP controlled naval gunfire in landing operations. The Artillery commander of the Americal Division rigged an L-4 with a camera and developed a method ofaerial survey in jungle terrain.Early in 1945 a method was developed for instant location oftargets on the maps of the Ar-tillery Fire Direction Centers bymeans of radar fixes on liaisonplanes.

OTHERS WANTED CUBSOther branches of the servicewere aware of the success of theartillery Air OPs and began todemand aircraft for themselves.Early in the war, they had beenused by commanders as courierand liaison planes. Every majortype of combat unit except anti-aircraft, found a use for themand borrowed them from the fieldartillery when it could meetsome vital battle need such asvisual and photographic reconnaissance.One such flight occurred whenLt Shell took his Division Commander, General Orlando P.Ward deep into unfriendly ter-ritory on a two-hour flight thatwas enlivened by a forced land-

ing near a forward outpost toobtain enough fuel to get backto Division headquarters.The Fifth Army in Italy wasmeeting a vital need with theCubs. They were being used forboth visual and photo reconnaissance column control emergency resupply speedy evacuation and even close-in bombing.They were in demand for relaying communications betweenfront-line troops and some bolder spirits were equipping themwith rocket-firing units.

FUTA PASS SKI JUMPGeneral Lucius K Truscott,Fifth Army Commander spentmuch of his time visiting theCorps Division and other unitsof the Army when forward headquarters was located just off themain road halfway betweenFlorence and Bolognia near LittleFuta Pass in Italy. The Generalsuggested that it would be niceif the airstrip were closer toheadquarters. Colonel Jack Marinelli Chief Special ProjectsBranch, Plans Division DCSLOGwas then a captain and air officer. He contacted the Army En-gineer and asked him to builda Cub strip near the CP thecloser the better.It was finally decided to builda strip on the mountain sidewith the grade running up anddown slope. The Engineers had

a good strip in four days coveredwith coco-matting and piercedsteel plank. The strip was so situated that the aviator had toland uphill and take off downhill. The top part of the stripwas surrounded by cliffs andpeaks and committed one tolanding once the approach wasset up.


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957 HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION 5

Ski Jump airstrip n Futa Pass, Italy.The interesting feature, ColMarinelli says, was that we hadto use full throttle to taxi to thetop of the strip after landing.But you could also take off downthe strip without power.

PL CE OF O RETURNIn planning the invasion ofsouthern Europe, one of the

serious problems was how to getthe L-4 type aircraft into operation during the actual landings.Field Artillery pilots wor kedwith the Navy in developingLSTs into aircraft carriers forthe L-4s.Flight decks were built on topof the LST, using pierced steelplank. The flight deck had tostart forward of the super struc-ture of the ship. This made itpossible for the L-4s to take off,but no provision could be madefor landings. Once the L-4 waslaunched, it was committed tocarry out its mission and thenseek some landing area ashore.An L-4, flown by First LieN-

tenant Julian W. Cummings,took off on D-Day from southernFrance, conducted reconnaissance and directed the fire ofbattleships with great effectiveness. On completion of this mission, the pilot landed on therough terrain of the beach. Forhis action, the pilot was awardedthe Distinguished Service Cross,the first such decoration to beearned by an Artillery pilot.In the Pacific Theater, ArmyAviation came into its own muchas it did in Europe. The widelyscattered units found liaisonplanes invaluable in covering thegreat distances. Light planeswere used so extensively, in fact,that a jungle and rOlAgh terrainlanding system was devised.

RODIE DEVICECalled the Brodie Device, forits developer, Lieutenant JamesBrodie, it grew out of his serviceat New Orleans Port of Embar-kation. He visualized it as something to combat the submarine


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6 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST June

Brodie Device elimin ted l nding fields

menace. Attached to a merchantship, this device enabled an air-plane to be launched and retrieved, providing air cover. Inland application, an airplanewould land on a wire stretchedbetween two poles.The Brodie Device was testedat New Orleans Moissant Airport and in the Gulf of Mexicoon the City of Dalhart Sometimelater a ground system using steelpoles for wire suspension instead of ship s booms was set upat Fort Belvoir to demonstratethe Brodie for the late GeneralLeslie McNair, who immediatelythought of its application to ar-tillery planes.Not long after that, the Artillery School began training pilotsto use the new technique. Whenthey were graduated they got abright and shiny turnbuckle instead of wings, because the

Brodie Device used turnbucklesto hold the rig tight. They woretheir caps crossways because allthis was not quite natural andthey saluted one another with ahooked forefinger, in imitationof the hook-and-wire technique.Lieutenant Brodie s work resulted in the only LST in servicehaving an official name. LST No.776 was also known as theU.S.S. BRODIE and it played alarge part in the invasion ofOkinawa. The mission was to setup artillery Long Toms on islands in the Kerama Retto groupso they could lob shells intoOkinawa s defenses and softenthem up for landing parties.Photography and aerial observation were musts. But there wereno landing strips in the hills ofKeramas, and the winds werehazardous. If an observer tookoff in a light plane, there was no


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1957 HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION 17place for him to land; it meantlosing the plane and maybe thecrew except for the U.S.S.BRODIE.D-Day on Okinawa the lightplanes were flying sorties fromthe landing strip on shipboard.They flew over the Japs and tookpictures; they made notes andmaps and dropped them to a bigNavy warship. Then they returned to the LST landed on thewire refueled and took off againto repeat the operation. Not apilot was lost.

CUB IDS SURRENDERAt the close of the Pacific warArmy Aviation again pulled achestnut from the fire. terthe atom bombs were droppedand the Japanese Emperor suedfor peace General MacArthurannounced that the surrenderwould take place upon the U.S.S.MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay.The Commanding General ofAFWESPAC in Manila promptlyannounced to the press that General Yamashita would surrenderto COMWESPAC at Baguio 10

cated in northern Luzon. Headquarters Luzon Area Commandwas directed to make the necessary arrangements. At thispoint a staff officer pointed outthe embarrassing fact that thematter had not yet been coordinated with General Yama-shita. Consternation reigned until someone remembered thatsince the air section had doneeverything else they may aswell do this.An officer was dispatched bear-ing a flag of truce into the enemystronghold. Colonel Howe wasflown into the area in an L-4and the negotiating committeefound General Yamashita mostcooperative. An Army liaisonplane and jeep brought the Jap-anese General to headquarters intime for the surrender ceremony.

INCRE SE REQUESTEDThe successes of Army Aviation all over the world led theArmy to again put forward amodest proposal for an increasein ground liaison aviation. In-formation from all theaters in-

Aerial view from ub dropping message to Yamashita


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18 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTdicated the greatest need wasfor light planes for reconnaissance.The request as finally formulated asked that two each, planes,pilots, mechanics, trucks andthree radio sets be added to eachcavalry reconnaissance squadronmechanized). This was rejectedon the ground that not enoughstudy has been given to the employment of Army Air Forcesfor the mission.At this juncture the Army began building a case for the extension of organic aviation basedon evidence from sources inthe various battle areas and onfirm requests from theater commander.With this information as abackup, the Army asked thatfive light planes be added to theequipment of each infantry airborne, armored cavalry andmountain division and renewedthe recommendation that two beassigned to each separate reconnaissance squadron mechanized) .

The case finally went to thehigh command and the terms ofthe agreement provided six instead of five additional lightplanes for each infantry airborne and mountain division;nine to each armored division;seven to each cavalry division;two to each cavalry squadron,separate tank battalion and tankdestroyer battalion; one to eachsepara e engineer battalion; twoto each cavalry group and tankdestroyer group. The airplaneswere to be L-4s and L-5s, sincemore suitable types had not yetbeen produced.

WORLD W R II ENDSOn 14 August 1945, while the

program was being set up, thewar came to an end. At theclose of the war the Army had1,600 single - engine aircrafteither the L-4 or the slightlylarger L-5 by Stinson.

The post-war period saw a reduction in the number of Armyaircraft in service, but distribution was on a much broaderbasis. In 1947, aircraft becameorganic to all the combat armsand to a few technical services.Officers from these brancheswere sent to school for pilottraining. t was also during thisperiod that serious attentionwas given to the development ofthe helicopter program and special emphasis was placed on making all Army avia ors rotarywing qualified.

Coincident with the expansionof aircraft within the Armywere efforts to find aircraftmore suitable to Army needs.Up to this time, the only aircraftflown by Army pilots were theCub, or L-4 which was underpowered or the L-5 which wastoo heavy.The first aircraft to be builtaccording to strictly Army specifications was the L-15, but thisaircraft did not prove satisfactory in all of its field tests. TheL-16 a military version of theAerdnca Chief an was an interim model and in 1950, theArmy finally adopted the CessnaL-19 as its observation airplane.

Utility, command and cargo aircraft were added later.Rotary-wing aircraft also assumed a permanent place inArmy Aviation with procurement of reconnaissance, utilityand cargo helicopters. The U. SArmy Aviation Board is chargedwith the mission of testing all


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Army helicopters ferry U N troops from ship to Korean mainlandproposed new aircraft and equipment before it is adopted byArmy Aviation.

KOREAN EVACUATIONArmy Aviation and the helicopter came of age together inthe Korean struggle. One medicalgroup alone the 30th) with only18 two-place helicopters evacuated over 20 000 casualties during the war. There were only twocargo helicopter companies available in Korea the 6th and 13thand with their 21 helieoptersthey proved themselves invaluable in evacuating wounded andsupplying units on the front.Since its inception ArmyAviation has been organized intosmall sections each dependenton the parent unit for administrative and logistical support.The same organization prevailedafter aircraft became organic toother branches of the Army.The number of aircraft assignedper division was increased andthis expansion created problemsthat had to be solved. To meetthis need a provisional aviationcompany was formed during the

Korean conflict.This company was designed tobe completely self-supporting. Itwas organized into a headquarters group a base flight and threelettered flights. The headquarters group was the command element and included maintenancesupply transportation, and communications sections and performed all administrative functions. Each of the lettered flightssupported one of the Infantryregiments in the division whenthat regiment was on the frontline; otherwise it functioned aspart of the base flight. .

The base flight commandedby the operations officer supported Division Headquartersand Division Artillery and flewmissions other than those handled by the lettered flightswhich were requested by division units. Grouping all of thedivision aircraft under one centralized command and assigning missions as they were requested insured stricter adherence to the principles of employment, and yet maintained ahigher degree of flexibility with-


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20 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTin the division than had previously existed.One feature that went far tomake aircraft more availablewas the establishment of amaintenance dock . This system similar to the one used bythe Air Force, so drastically reduced the number of hours necessary for periodic inspectionsthat very seldom was more thanone aircraft in for inspection atany time.With this type of an organization, an aircraft could be keptin the air over each regimentalarea 24 hours a day. Each air-craft carried sufficient radioequipment to maintain constantcommunication with the fire support coordination center and toalso function as a radio-relayunit for stations with the regimental net.

The Army emerged from theKorean War with the realizationthat Army Aviation possessedthe capability of revolutionizingmany of the techniques of tacti-cal employment.Following the war in Korea,the Army did not allow organicaviation to languish but wentahead full speed in providing themobility demanded by atomicwarfare.

PROGR M EXP NDSThe growth and extended useof Army aircraft necessitatedexpansion of the aviation pro

gram. In September, 1954, the

U. S. Army Aviation Schoolmoved from Fort Sill, Oklahoma,to Fort Rucker, Alabama. Thisextended program was continueduntil July, 1956, when ArmyAviation took over from the AirForce all basic training programs. For the first time in history the complete training ofArmy aviators and mechanicscame under full control of theArmy.In peacetime, Army Aviationhas displayed the same courageand skill that brought recognition from the highest commandin war. In June 1956, when twocommercial airliners collided andfell into the Grand Canyon,Army Aviation gained worldwide attention in flying helicopters into the canyon in rescueoperations.That same year saw the U. SArmy Aviation Board set numer-ous helicopter flight records andcomplete the first nonstop coastto-coast flight of an H-21, a featthat also turned the eyes of theworld on Army Aviation.Army Aviation, which was thedream of a few Army officers ashort 15 years ago, is the fastestexpanding field in the militaryservices and well it deservessuch a place. Most of that 15years has been spent fightingfor its very existence. Whilestruggling and between strug-gles it accomplished the missionwith a distinction that assuresits place in a modern fightingforce.


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U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junethe year 1670 Father Francescode Lana, an Italian Jesuit, worked up a rather logical idea for anaircraft. The plans on his drawing board called for the construction of four large copper sphereswith paper thin walls. He intended to pump the air from thecopper spheres figuring, sensiblyenough, that the vacuum ballswould then rise like an air bubble in a bottle of oil. Then fromthe spheres he would suspend arowboat fitted with a sail fornavigation from place to place.

In the midst of his research itsuddenly struck Father de Lanathat this flying machine mightlead to much unnecessary destruction and bloodshed. Hebrooded about this for a whileand then reluctantly put asideDe Lana s Airship

his work, writing Where is theman who can fail to see that nocity would be proof against sur-prise, when the ship could at anytime be steered over its squares,or even over the courtyards ofdwelling houses, and brought toearth for the landing of itscrew? Iron weights could behurled t o wreck ships at sea, orthey could be set on fire by fireballs and bombs; nor ships alone,but houses, fortresses and citiescould be destroyed, with the certainty that the airship couldcome to no harm as the missilescould be hurled from a vastheight. Fortunately for Fatherde Lana and his people no oneelse had either the plans or theknow-how to build an airship ofwar.

Some years later in 1709,Father Bartolomeo Gusmao ofPortugal, also a Jesuit (appar-ently they were the only aeronautical engineers of the time)escaped from Lisbon after he wascharged with having devised acontrivance from which destruc-tion and death would be hurledupon the cities of Christianman. The accounts differ, butthere are some who claim he flewhis machine (see illustration)around the Lisbon square several times, while the citizenryand the King of Portugal him-self looked on enchanted. At anyrate, Father Gusmao had man-aged to induce the King to putup funds for the research projectwhich in itself was something

John S Maltrotti is a PublicationsWriter on the staff of the U. SARMY AVIATION DIGEST Viewsexpressed in this article are theauth01s and are not necessarily' thoseo the Department of the Army or ofthe U. S. Army Aviation School. -The Editor


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1957 PRELUDE TO FIFTY YEARS OF FLIGHT 3

Gusmao s Flying Shipof a milestone in the history ofaeronautics.

BALLOON INVENTEDThough men worried about theultimate employment of aerial

machines, nevertheless w h nthe Montgolfier brothers invented the balloon in 1783, itwas almost immediately madeorganic to the French groundforces. Gerond de Villette, afriend of the first aeronauts, putwhat must have occurred to manyin a letter to the Journal ofParis, At once I was convincedthat this machine, although asomewhat expensive one, mightbe very useful in war to enableone to discover the position ofthe enemy, his maneuvers andhis marches . . .

At the battle of Maubeuge onJune 2, 1794, the French sent upthe world's first aerial observation balloon, L'Entreprenant, toobserve the Austrian earthworksand gun emplacements. In a fewdays, the Austrians brought upartillery to blast this French intelligence agent out of the sky,but the French aerialist complicated the problem of the Austrian gunners by towing the balloon from place to place when-

ever the shells began to burst atclose range.BALLOON RAID ON VENICEAnother first came about ahalf century later, in 1849, whenthe Austrians decided to makean air raid against Venice. Theyhad long used balloons for reconnaissance, but now they asked : why not bomb the enemy?Several thousand small balloonswere assembled, 30 pound bombsattached to each, and they weresent on their way, but as in theJapanese attempt during WorldWar II, few fell on the targetand there were no Venetian casualties. On the contrary, the

ontgolfier Balloon


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24 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junewind shifted once and blew theballoons back over the launchers, causing, it is said, muchconcern among the Austrian soldiers.At the outbreak of the CivilWar, Thaddeus Lowe, w eknown aerialist of his day, demonstrated to President Lincolnthe advantage of a balloon forobservation by making an ascentover the grounds of the Smithsonian Institution. He reportedthe scene to Mr. Lincoln via atelegraph wire from the basketdirect to the White House; thePresident was immediately convinced, and directed GeneralWinfield Scott, head of the Unionarmies, to employ Lowe.Lowe made many ascents toobserve the enemy and on atleast one occasion (Sept 24,1861) he directed artillery firefrom Fort Corcoran, Virginia,to the Confederate positionsnear Falls Church - the firstsuch recorded adjustment of artillery fire.

SILK DRESSES USEDThe Confederate Army wished to match the Union balloonwith one of its own, but hadlittle silk for fabric. The orderwent out to scour the land forthe scarce material and eachsouthern lady responded with asilk dress from her closet. TheConfederates then put togethera gayly colored patchwork of aballoon and sent it aloft to peerdown at the 'enemy.Alas, the unsentimental Yankee quickly captured the balloonand the last silk dress was takenfrom the ladies of the Confederacy. As General James Longstreet remarked in his memoirs,somewhat bitterly, this capture

was the meanest trick of the warand one I have never yet forgiven.After the Civil War theArmy's interest in military aircraft waned. t was admittedthat a balloon was of some value,but it was vulnerable and notvery maneuverable and, anyway,it was a time of prolonged peace.Men everywhere were experimenting with powered heavierthan-air flight witb little success. However, one of them, Dr.Samuel Pierpont Langley, cameextremely close, so close thateven today his failure is a debatable point in some quarters.

MODEL PL NE L UNCHEDDr. Langley was a brilliantscientist and the Secretary ofthe Smithsonian Institution. Hehad become interested in theproblems of flight some yearsprevious. On a bright spring dayin May, 1896, he launched aquarter size model airplane froma catapult over the Potpmacriver; it soared aloft and swungabout in easy circles, covering

over a half mile and when itsfuel was gone, descended gentlyto the water.Since the Spanish Americanwar was imminent, Congress appropriated funds to enable Dr.Langley to continue his experiments. After several years ofpainstaking work he completed afull sized model and on October7 1903, launched it from a catapult floating on the Potomac. Unfortunately, the launching gearfailed and the aircraft dove immediately into the river.The machine was recoveredand repaired, and on December8, 1903, just nine days beforeKitty Hawk, he set it up again


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1957 PRELUDE TO FIFTY YEARS OF FLIGHT 25for launching. A report of theevent was made to the Secretaryof War by the Board of Ordnanceand Fortification:. . . between 4 and 5 P.M.,another attempt at a trial wasmade, this time at the junctionof the Anacostia with the Potomac, just below WashingtonBarracks . . . The launching carwas released at 4 :45 P.M., beingpointed up the Anacostia towards the Navy Yard The carwas set in motion and the propellers revolved rapidly, the engine working perfectly, but therewas something wrong with thelaunching. The rear guy-postseemed to drag, bringing therudder down on the launchingways, and a crashing, rendingsound, followed by the collapseof the rear wings, showed thatthe machine had been wreckedin the launching, just how, itwas impossible for me to see.The fact remains that therear wings and rudder werewrecked before the machine wasfree of the ways. Their collapsedeprived the machine of its support in the rear, and it consequently reared up in the frontunder the action of the motor,assumed a vertical position, andthen toppled over to the rear,falling into the water a few feetin front of the boat.Public ridicule now forcedCongress to withhold any morefunds for this useless questfor human fiight and Dr. Lang-

ley discontinued his bo r s,broken hearted and bitter.WRI HT ROTHERS SUCCEEDNevertheless, just nine dayslater the Wright Brothers madethe first powered flight in thehistory of the world at KittyHawk, N. C Unfortunately, theLangley fiasco had created a climate of skepticism and whenthey offered to Congress, allthe scientific and practical information we have accumulatedin these years of experimenting,together with a license to useour patents, they stirred littlereaction except disbelief.Rebuffed by our government,the Wrights were negotiatingwith the French government

when the imaginative TeddyRoosevelt saw the advantage ofthis new machine to the UnitedSta es Army and directed Secretary of War Taft to look intothe Wright's claims.In December 1907 the SignalCorps advertised for bids calling for an airplane that would

do at least 36 mph, carry twopeople and remain aloft at leastone hour. No other airplane approached these specifications except the Wright entry. The Signal Corps gave them the goahead and the United StatesArmy took possession of its firstmilitary airplane, the WrightA Flyer, granddaddy of all theworld's military aircraft.


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Pictorial Review o rmy ircraft/ L 2

L 3B

L 4

L ll

L 13


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L 21

YL 1S/

YL 24

YL 26

U 1A


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H 13H 19

H 21H 23v

H 25

H 34

H 37

XH 40


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Photo courtesy De HavillandDHC 4 Caribou

Ryan Vertiplane

Bell XV-3

Photo courtesy ell

Vertol Tilt Wing VTOL

Aerial Jeep


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CUBS IN COMB TBrigadier General Carl I Hutton l US

The following are extracts from a memoir entitled AnArmored Artillery Commander, written specifically to beplaced in the Artillery School Library, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.They are perhaps largely of academic interest, but they do pertain to one man's recollections of, and opinions about, theoperations of Army airplanes in combat. We have too little ofsuch material.Every war has its own circumstances. The Western European campaigns in World War II were fought against an enemywho was heavily engaged on two other land fronts and whohad suffered severe defeats on both. He was no longer a firstclass fighting power. General lessons about combat must betempered with knowledge of the particular situation.-Author.

4TH ARMORED F BATT LlON 944June 14 marked the entry intocombat of our air OPs. Thesehad been on the Division Artillery airstrip since they flewacross the channel in formation,guided by an Air Force airplane.Since there had been fairly lowclouds the day of the movementto Carentan, somebody at the division artillery airstrip decidedour airplanes could not join us.This was one of the characteristic mistakes which occurs whenthe airplanes are under the con-

trol of someone other than theman who is going to use them.If the airplanes had been withus for the second attack on theafternoon of the thirteenth, itmight have been possible to havedetected any rearward movementof the enemy after he had feltthe full force of the attack. Onthe fourteenth the air observers had fine shooting, especially since the Germans were notyet accustomed to seeing the airplanes in the air, and measuring


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32 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junetheir effectiveness by the artillery fire which fell upon themwhen they exposed themselves.At any rate, from this time onI struggled to have my airplaneswith me, although not alwayswith success

une 17: The air OPs hadproven their effectiveness andtheir ability to observe counterbattery fire, as well as to detectother targets in the Bocage countryuly 3: (Diary Entry) ThankGod for the Cubs. Keep Jerrydown.uly 1-18: (Caumont) Our airOPs were again proving theirworth. The air section locatedtheir landing strip perhaps amile in rear of the commandpost. Beca.use of the conformation of the front, however, (weoccupied the front left-hand corner of a sharp salient) they werenot very far from the enemy. Inspite of low approaches whichthey made to the landing field,they were occasionally shelled.On one occasion, Lieutenant Feinand Sergeant Pechar, becomingirritated at this discourtesy,took off under shell fire and didsome fine shooting back. Thegood which the airplanes didwas not limited to the negativebenefit of holding down hostile

fire. Again and again they proved their worth in locating hostile guns. At dusk, this wasespecially easy since the flashesof the guns were very distinctuly 4: I flew an air missionover the front to check on thework of the observers. After seeing the enemy side of the linesfrom the air, I tended to putmore faith than ever in the airOPs. They were really lookingright down the enemy's throat.No big movement could havetaken place close to the enemylines in the daytime without itbeing detected from the air. After repeated missions over thesame front, the observers became so familiar with the frontthat adjustments on targetswere frequently unnecessary.They could tell the coordinateswith remarkable exactnessuly 5: (Diary Entry) Goodair observation from 2200 to2300uly 18-19: An incident during the relief from the Caumontfront convinced me that my demands for full control of my airplanes were justified. The wholerelief was an echeloned affair,with the 14th Field Artillerymoving out last. Division artillery moved out during the day

Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton was Commandantof the U. S. Army Aviation Schoo,l from July, 1954until June, 1957. At present he is en route to his newassignment in Germany as 8th Inf Div Arty Com-mander. In March, 1944, he commanded the 14thArmored Field Arty Bn and in August, 1944, assumedcommand of the 2d Armored Div Arty where he remained until Sept., 1946. It is this period of combat inEurope about which he writes in this article, whichfirst appeared in the March, 1955, issue of the ARMYAVIATION DIGEST. Views expressed in this articleare the author s and are not necessarily those of theDepartment of the Army or of the U. S. A rmy AViationSchool.-The Editor


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957 CUBS IN COMBAT 33and the air officer took my airsection with him. Although thiswas simply a misunderstanding,it demonstrated the possibilityof a misunderstanding, and I ofcourse did not fail to point out toColonel Roberts that I did notlike it. He agreed, and alwaysfrom then until his death, madea point of letting me have myown airplanes . . .

July 25: StLo Breakthrough)The air OPs were to operate independently under each battalioncommander since we were againlimited by the lack of inter-changeability of the radiosJuly 26 August 1: Tessy-SurVire) The air OPs in this fightgave us about the only real observed fire we had. The forward

observers were hemmed in bythe trees and hedgerows andcould not see beyond their immediate front. The German ar-tillery was behind the ridge andwith observation all along theline of our attack. The air observers did a fine job, in spite ofalmost constant sniping at themby 88mm antiaircraft guns.On one occasion we managedto save General Rose, who waspinned down by artillery fire, bythe efforts of Lieutenant Feinand Sergeant Pechar. Towarddusk on this day, they were hav-ing wonderful shooting at thehostile artillery, but they report-ed they were about out of gasoline, and would have to comedown. Of course, I told them tostay up and keep up the shooting. Finally, it got too dark forthem to see, and they headedfor the airstrip. They ran out ofgasoline on their final approach,and had to make a night forcedlanding.During part of the battle,

Captain Dyson was acting as observer with the 1st Battalion,66th. He switched his radio tothe battalion air channel, and bytalking back and forth with theair observer, managed to get effective fire on his front. As far asI know, this was the first timethis obvious and effective coordination between the air OPsand forward observers was used.t was an excellent scheme.

t had the disadvantage offocusing the attention of theair observer on this small partof the front to the exclusion ofthe others. t worked out so wellthat we soon started the samesystem with all of our observers,under the control of the S-3, toprevent one observer from hogging all of the observationD RMORED DIVISION RTILLERYAugust 9: Major Gordon, myair officer, and a division observer were injured when theirL-5 flew through the tops ofsome trees in an attempted take-off. I appointed Captain Mahon,an Air Force rated observer, tobe air officer. Although this wasunusual to have a non-pilot asair officer, I never had occasionto regret the decision Mahonalways did a very fine job . . .August 10 11 One of the 62dField Artillery light airplanes, inflying back to its former area topick up some equipment leftthere, made the mistake of re-peating a route which he hadflown the day before. He disappeared and, only later, we learned that he had been shot downby light antiaircraft fire fromthe ground. He survived and wasliberated in a hospital in ParisAugust 1944: There were veryfew changes in policies. One,


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34 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junehowever, I made in regard to theair ops. I was willing to havethe unit air sections bed downon the division artillery airstrip,but I preferred that the bat-talion commanders assume fullcontrol. At any rate, whetherthey were on my strip or not,the battalion commanders wereto be responsible for them. Ashabits developed, the 14th and65th kept their sections on a separa e field.Division artillery and the 92dhabitually kept their airplanes onthe division artillery strip. Thisarrangement arose quite nat-urally, since the poker playerswere pretty much concentratedin these two air sections. The78th moved back and forth,sometimes with us and sometimes on unit strips. In spite ofall the talk which was and isgoing on about centralized control of the airplanes, I still believe that they are furnished tothe battalion commander to assist him in the accomplishmentof his mission, and they shouldnot be taken from him withoutcogent reasons.The system which we finallydeveloped was about as follows:The 14th and 65th habituallysupported A , and theypooled their four airplanes toassure full time air observation.The 78th and 62d habituallysupported B and they pooled their four airplanes. Divisionartillery, the 92d, and the 258thpooled their airplanes for generalsupport missions. When the situation stabilized, the divisionartillery air officer made out aschedule of hourly flights, amongall of the airplanes in the artil-lery. The aircraft relieved eachother in the air on these mis-

sions, and therefore it made nodifference whether they were onthe same strip or not . . .ugust 24: (Elbeuf) Duringthis day, I was attempting toobserve from the air, and Icould see and hear the shellsbursting among the tanks belowme. But the artillery doing theshooting was well hidden, or atleast I could not pick it upugust 26: (Seine) A massedgroup of about 400 German vehicles was detected by Lieutenant Moyer from an air OPe Theywere hub to hub, waiting theirturn to be ferried over the river.Moyer begged, prayed, cursed,and screamed through the wholegamut of the fire request lexicon.It didn't do any good since theywere out of our range and in theCanadian sector besides. We hadto tell Moyer to come down tokeep him from having apoplexy

September 1: (Belgium) The14th Field Artillery supportedthat attack on this column, andall of the while there was ahue and cry, Where are theCubs? There was a high windon the ground, and above thetree tops the velocity must havereached sixty miles per hour.The air OPs were valiantlystruggling (against the wind)to get into the fight, when oneof them discovered what he estimated as a battalion of Germaninfantry attempting to escape tothe northeast. The 14th swungaround 3200 mils and took thisnew target under fire. The Germans were caught in the open,and suffered terrible losses under this accurately directedfire

September 1944: (Belgium)Again on the 7th we had to wait


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1957 . CUBS IN COMBAT 35for gasoline. The ReconnaissanceBattalion, however, had patrolsout as far as twenty miles to ourfront. The division artillery airOPs were working with thesepatrols. Captain Mahon as observer and Sergeant Welsh as piloton this work had an experiencewhich changed rapidly fromfun to ludicrousness. They wereworking with an armored carsection when they discoveredabout a company of enemy infantry attempting to seek coverin a woods. Mahon radioed thisinformation to the armored cars,who immediately started forward to round up the catch. tbecame apparent to Mahon thatthe Germans would escape intothe woods, and probably forgood, unless they were delayed.He therefore staged a strafingattack, firing at the troops onthe ground with his submachinegun, and even dropping handgrenades in their midst. This wasfun and very exciting, and theGermans stopped at each pass tohit the ground or to fire back.On one pass, however, somebody,either Mahon or the Germans,shot the propeller off the Cub,and the situation rapidly deteriorated out of the realm ofstrategic air warfare. The onlyfield available for the forcedlanding was the one which theGermans we r e dominatingthrough occupation. Welsh madethe landing. Just as the Germanswere descending upon them inorder to exact their pound offlesh, the armored cars arrivedand saved the day for the alliednations

eptember 16: Holland) Theair OPs reported more enemy artillery in the area than they hadyet seen

October 2: Ubach, Germany)We were given the mission ofcounter-antiaircraft fire duringthe preparation bombing by themedium bombers. Air OPs wereto fly surveillance missions, taking under fire any antiaircraftguns which opened upOctober 6: Despite the heavyflak, our air OPs were doing awonderful job, especially in coun

terbattery, since their commandof the terrain ruined all defiladeOctober November: Our airOPs received concentrated andaccurate 88mm flak constantly inthis area, yet we did not lose asingle airplane. There was a flakbattery to the north of us, inprolongation of the Geilenkir

chen-Ubach Road. W hen wecrossed this road going east orwest, we could expect flak. Allof the pilots soon became accustomed to the gauntlet andthey would approach it doingsomething different - diving,climbing, twisting, or turning.When the weather was good, theobservers could see Cologne andAachen, and if they could fly atall, they could see all of theenemy artillery on our front.This artillery was well dug inand very hard to silence.Adjustments had been maderepeatedly on most of the positions, and the observers wouldcall in something like this: That

095362 battery just fired again.Do you want to do anythingabout it? Depending upon thestatus of ammunition expenditure, we might or might not engage the target. Invariably, ifwe did shoot at it, the batterywould stop firing while the guncrews returned to their shelters.Therefore, the results of such


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6 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Juneshooting were largely negative.October 16: (Ubach) CaptainStone was our liaison officer fromXIX Corps Artillery. He was anambitious officer, and every dayor two he would return to Corps,and using one of their airplanes,he would fly a mission in our sector. On the 16th, Captain Stonewas flying such a mission in anL-5 with Major Hatch, XIX

Corps Artillery air officer, aspilot. The airplane was shotdown by a flight of g 109s,which came in on the deck andmade one upward pass, and bothHatch and Stone were killed.This was the type of fighter attack which the Luftwaffe usedextensively later on, with someresultsNovember 16: (SeigfriedLine) In preparation for the attack, our air OPs took obliquephotographs of the terrain.These were reproduced in quantity and distributed in sufficientnumbers to provide one set ofphotos for each platoon leader.The theory was that the obliquecould be marked and used as amap. I do not know whether theplatoon leaders actually usedthese photos, but the idea is agood one to be remembered forfuture use, especially in poorlymapped countryecember 23: (Bulge) Atabout 1600, Captain Mahon, inan air OP, was investigating theLeignon-Dinant area when hediscovered German armor insome woods southwest of thehamlet of Liroux. A British11th Armored Division reconnaissance troop had an outpostabout 1,000 yards from the Germans, and along the Ciney-Dinant Road. The air OP landed bythis patrol and warned them of

the presence of the enemy.ecember 25: (Bulge) Thefighting around Celles was naturally somewhat confusing. Lieutenant Moyer, as observer in anair OP, was observing a mission in this area. He was adjusting fire on the surroundedreconnaissance and artillery elements. He could see our tanksbeyond the target. When the

Typhoons peeled off for their attack, Moyer and Welsh assumedthey were attacking our tanksinstead of the enemy. They decided to fly in front of the Typhoons in order to divert the attack. They had done this severalother times, and thus preventedmisdirected attacks by our fighter-bombers upon our own people.This time, much to their surprise, they found themselves inthe midst of quite an air-groundbattle. The enelny was firing20mm s, and the Typhoons werefiring rockets. Our air OP retired in confusion to look overthe situation and Moyer admitted for once the Air Force hadbeen right while the air OP hadbeen wrong

945March 2: (Germany) A counterattack in force was reportedcoming across the E rft Canal inthe Grevenbroich area. This wasmiles behind our leading elements, and we sent an air OPback to investigate. t happenedthat Lieutenants Kistler andMoyer were the crew of this airOP, and they had an opportunityto indulge their specialty of interposing themselves betweenour fighter-bombers in the airand our troops on the ground.According to Moyer, the P-47sknocked out five enemy tanks


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1957 CUBS IN COMBAT 37and six of ours. A picture of thisaction appeared in an issue ofLIFE with the caption that anAmerican column shown on firehad been destroyed by theenemy. They were in fact, destroyed by our own fighterbombersMarch Rhine River) TheLuftwaffe in this area for thefirst time made an organizedattack upon our air OPs. Al

though I cannot verify the figure I remember eleven as thenumber of air OPs which wereshot down in Ninth US Armyby these attacks in less than aweek. Compared with the num-ber of light aircraft which wereconcentrated in the area, thisnumber is insignificant. One ofour own aircraft was shot downwounding both the pilot and theobserver and we had an accurate description of the methodof attack. Lieutenant Reid pilotand Lieutenant Middleton observer, were on a routine mission patrolling the front of the113th Cavalry Group on March17th. The first they knew oftheir being attacked was when20mm tracers struck their Cubcoming from below and behind.Reid proceeded to make a crashlanding. Four ME 109s hadmade the pass from across theRhine at about fifty feet alti-tude. After the crash, the enemyfighters strafed the crashedplane on the ground. Two ofthese fighters were shot downby our AA fire while trying toescape.

An isolated attack of this kindcould be attributed to chance. Inconnection with the other at-tacks along the Ninth ArmyFront, however the element ofchance in such precise attacks

can be disregarded. It is obviousthat the fighters were directedto their target by some controlmethod which enabled them tocross the Rhine at very low altitude and at the exact timewhich would allow them to makethe attack from below and to therear.

Any number of methods couldbe employed effectively for ar-rangement, from radar directionto simple visual observation bya concealed observer on theground and radio contact withthe fighter flight in the air. Theboldness and the unconcern ofthe air OP personnel growingout of the months of safety,contributed to the success of theenemy scheme. Variations ofpattern, course altitude, andspeed would lessen the chance ofa fighter attack being able tostalk the flight without beingseenMarch 31: Across the Rhine)We began to have a seige oflosses in our air OPs. We weremany miles ahead of othertroops in our vicinity and theCubs had no protection exceptwhen they were immediatelyover the columns. The enemyfighters downed one almost everyday for a while. The exploit ofLieutenant Emerick and CaptainMahon near Ahlen demonstratesthe safety of the Cub-type air-plane. They were attacked bytwelve ME 109s. One flightmade a pass at them on the waydown and when they arrived onthe deck the twelve were coming at them from the rear inline abreast.If they continued straightahead the flight immediately inrear would get a shot at them,while if they turned in either


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P .R OJE T

LON G R- .t Colonel Jack W Ruby E

T HE FIRST higher performancetest unit in the history ofArmy A via ion has been established at the U. S Army Aviation Center.T h r e e higher performanceArmy observation aircraft onloan from the Air Force are tobe used as the test medium. Theover-all purpose of the test unit,code name Project LON GARM , is to determine the organization, techniques and procedures for higher performanceobservation aircraft within the

Lt. Colonel Jack W. Ruby, CEo isDeputy Director of Project LONGARM. Views expressed in this articleare the author s and are not neces-sarily those of the Department of theArmy or of the U S. Army AviationSchool.-The Editor

U. S Army. The use of higherperformance aircraft would permit the Army to extend its airreconnaissance, observation andadjustment of artillery fire tomeet the requirements of atomicwarfare.Immediate test objectives are:the determination of trainingand logistic problems incident tothe introduction of higher performance observation aircraftinto the Army system; development of the most effective organization for such aircraft;development and testing of operational procedures; preciseevaluation of higher perform-ance aircraft vulnerability andsurvival probability to determinethe relat ive observation capabilities at various altitudes and


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T 7 nspectionspeeds and to determine desir-able performance characteristicsfor an Army higher performanceobservation aircraft.Initial considerations in or-ganizing the unit focused on thenecessity for providing transi-tion and other specialized train-ing for pilots and maintenancepersonnel; the establishment ofnew supply channels and proce-dures; and the development ofadequate maintenance support.These matters are currentlybeing resolved while the unit isstill at Fort Rucker in its or-ganization and training phase.

TEST PL NThe plan of test, formulatedat the U. S. Army AviationSchool and approved by Conti-nental Army Command and De-partment of the Army calls forthe unit to enter its second oroperational phase on or about 1October 1957. At that time theunit will move with full equip-ment, to the U. S. Army Artil-lery Guided Missile SchoolFort Sill Okla.; the U. S Army

Armored School Fort KnoxKy.; and the U. S. Army Infan-try School Fort Benning Ga.

The unit will remain at eachof these installations for periodsof from three to five weeks con-ducting a variety of missionsunder varying conditions in sup-port of the combat arms. Thesetest missions will include the de-tection location and identifica-tion of targets for Army wea-pons adjustment and surveil-lance of fire damage assessmentand obtaining information of theenemy by means of visual ob-servation.The unit will then return toFort Rucker for composite eval-uation of individual tests, and

reorganization in preparation forparticipation in field exercisesduring 1958.IMPORT NCE OF TESTS

The atmosphere in which thesetests will be conducted can bestbe explained by quoting a por-tion of a letter written duringthe test unit's formative periodby Brig. Gen. Carl 1 Hutton,Commandant The U S. ArmyAviation School and Command-ing General of Fort Rucker whostated,

The importance of theArmy's test of higher per-formance Army observa-tion aircraft cannot beoveremphasized. The suc-cess of this test will deter-mine to a large measurewhether or not the Armywill be allowed to operatethis type aircraft in thefuture.


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FROM THE INITIATION of avia-tion in the Army in 1908, until the following accident reportswere compiled in 1914, therewere 11 fatal accidents, resulting in the death of 12 commissioned officers, one noncommissioned officer, and one civilian.Of those killed, nine were pilotseight military, one civilianand five passengers.In those early days, the philosophy of Army flying wouldappear to have been quite similarto that of present day ArmyAviation. Although the terminology is out of date, the prob-

lem of accident investigation wasexactly what it is today. Insome cases the Accident Boardsseem to ask, How could he havedone it? In others, the questionis : What happened?The following accident reportsare presented through the courtesy of the Directorate of FlyingSafety Research, Norton AirForce Base, California. Unfortunately space does not permitpublishing the report in its entirety and accidents 5, 8 and 9were omitted, along with chartsand part of the summary pertaining to the charts. However,Lieutenant Colonel William C. Bowen, Jr., TransportationCorps, the Senior Army A viator pictured above, is the acting Direc-tor of Instruction, the U S. Army Aviation School, Fort RuckerAla. He is a graduate of the Liaison Pilots Course No.5 at FortSill, Okla., in 1942. Earlier that year, he completed the BatteryOfficers Course at the Fort Sill Artillery School and returned therein 1951 for the Advanced Officers Course.From 1942 to 1944, Colonel Bowen served as Battalion AviationOfficer of the 34th Field Artillery Battalion of the 9th InfantryDivision which saw action in North Africa, Sicily and Europe.


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42 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Junethe analogy includes the omittedaccidents.

ACCIDENT NO 1Mr. Orville Wright was flyingthe original Wright type of machine for acceptance test at FortMyer Va. with Lieut T. F.Selfridge as passenger, on September 17 1908 when one ofthe propellers broke the ma-chine being at that time about 75feet from the ground. The ma-chine side-slipped and nose-divedstriking the ground with suchforce as to fatally injure LieutSelfridge and break Mr. Wright sleg. Cause of accident: Breakingof propeller and consequent lossof lift in the machine. Lieut Selfridge s death can in no way beconnected with any question oftype of machine or skill of pilot.

ACCIDENT NO 2Extract from Proceedings ofBoard of Officers held at SanAntonio Texas May 10 1911:From the evidence given theBoard finds that Lieut Kelly hadmade a flight of approximately

five minutes duration, in a Curtiss bi-plane at about 7 AMMay 10 1911 under good atmospheric conditions. As a result ofthis flight he met his death.He had made a not abnormally hard landing. Upon landingat least one and possibly bothsides of seat fork were broken at

a point between pilot seat andfoot rest. At the same time itappears that one diagonal bamboo brace from front wheel tofront elevator was broken andits mate was bent.After striking the ground thefirst time the machine boundedto a height approximating 10feet and gradually rising toabout 30 feet until within about7 yards of the camp of theEleventh Infantry, it made asharp turn to the left bankedup the turning wing and madean abrupt dive to the ground.Lieut Kelly was thrown clear ofthe machine to a distance ofabout 20 feet.As a result of the first impact with the earth, it is apparent that the pilot lost control of the front elevator andtherefore had only partial control of the machine.

It is the unanimous opinion ofthe Board that the front wheelmust have struck an abrupt depression in the ground or someobstacle causing the strain whichresulted in the break.From all the preceding facts,the Board is of the unanimousopinion that the accident wasdue to the efforts of Lieut Kellyto avoid endangerir:g the occupants of the Eleventh Infan-try camp in which endeavor itbecame necessary for him tomake a sharp left turn, which

From 1944 to 1945, he served as 9th Infantry Division ArtilleryAviation Officer. He received his B.S. from the University of Floridain 1946.He returned to Europe again in 1951 when he became V CorpsArtillery A viation Officer, remaining in that position untU 1953.From 1953 to 1954, he commanded the 41st Transportation Battalion A ircraft Maintenance in France. Colonel Bowen has loggedapproximately 2,200 ours in his 15 years of flying and is bothrotary- and ixed-wing qualified.


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1957 THE GRAY HAIR DEPARTMENT 4in the crippled condition of themachine put more strain on thecontrols than would have beenrequired in a straight awaylanding. Such straight awaylanding was impracticable owingto the proximity of the tents.Probable Cause of Accident:Error in judgment on part ofpilot in selecting an unsuitablelanding place.

ACCIDENT NO 3Extract from Proceedings ofBoard of Officers held at CollegePark Md. June 12 1912:That the machine arose fromthe ground made a circle of thefield and then flew south a distance of nearly 1/2 mile madea turn towards the trees andflew north at a height of about150 feet. The machine was thenpointed down at an angle of about45 degrees with the power onand glided down in this positionto a height of about 30 or 35feet from the ground. Mr. Welshwas then seen to work at hislevers and the machine came upto the horizontal position whenit seemed to quiver and thewings appeared as if they wereraised up the ends being fromtwo to three feet higher thanthe center section. t seemed topause for a moment and thendove head-first into the ground.The engine was heard to rununtil the machine struck; then itwas enveloped in a cloud of dust.This accident occured about 6: 13PM.From all testimony of eyewitnesses and a careful examina-Views expressed in The Gray HairDepartment are not necessarily thoseof the Department of the Army or ofthe U. S Army Aviation School.The Editor

tion of the machine the Boardis of the opinion that the accident was due to the fact thatthe operator endeavored to bringthe machine upward too suddenly thus throwing a greaterstrain upon the front sparsthan they were able to withstand. The spars broke and thewings collapsed bending outward and backward. The machine being relieved of the support of these outer planes wasprecipitated to the ground.Probable Cause of Accident:Error in judgment on part ofpilot in gliding with power onand pulling machine up too suddenly.

ACCIDENT NO 4Extract from Proceedings ofBoard of Officers at College ParkMd. October 2 1912:Immediately after the accidentthe Board proceeded to examinethe wrecked machine and uponthis examination found that thecontrol wires were all intact.From the testimony of eye-witnesses the Board is of the opin

ion that the accident was causedby the aviator misjudging hisheight from the ground and hisfailure to bring the machine outof the glide in sufficient time toclear the ground.Probable Cause of Accident:Error in judgment on part ofpilot in not straightening up machine before striking the ground.ACCIDENT NO 6

Extract from Proceedings ofBoard of Officers held at SanDiego Cal. May 10 1913:No person actually witnessedthe accident. From the testimony and evidence obtainablethe Board reached the follow-


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44 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Juneing decision:Lieutenant Park left the aviation field at North Island approximately 5 :20 o clock AM,May 9 1913, with the intentionof flying to Ascot Park near LosAngeles.His object in an early startwas to avoid strong winds whichmight arise later in the day.

At 8 :30 in the morning a telephone message was receivedstating that Lieutenant Parkhad been killed at Olive, California.The members of the board andthe medical officer, Captain M.A. Reasoner at once proceededto the scene of the accident inan automobile arriving thereabout 1 :00 o clock PM.The wreck of the machine andthe remains of Lieutenant Parkhad been removed to Santa Ana,Cal., by direction of the CountyCoroner, the wreckage beingtaken to the National GuardArmory, and the body to theundertakers. The wrecked ma-chine was examined by theBoard and the body identified by

the President of the Board before proceeding to an examination of the scene of the accident.Lieut Park had landed on asmall knoll, the area of the topof which was such that it gavehim about a run of 300 feet before he came to the slope whichwas about 20 degrees. At thebottom of the slope is a ridge or

embankment. Beyond the ridgeis a small valley or ravine,which is covered with trees. Onthe opposite side is anotherequally steep slope to the ton ofanother small hill, beyond whichis a flat open valley of about fouror five square miles in area. Thehigh barley so retarded the speed

of the machine that it did notrise before reaching the descending slope.t ran down the slope until itreached the ridge, and strikingthis undoubtedly bounded intothe air. About 50 feet beyondthe ridge is a tree or sapling.The machine struck the treeabout five feet from the groundat the left end of the enginesection. The force of the blowtore away the entire left sideof the machine.

t swung around to the rightof the tree, landed at a distanceof about 100 feet on the rightrear wheel. This broke the rightpanels and caused the machineto turn completely over to theleft, as the entire left side ofthe machine was gone. From theposition of the radiator, it hadevidently fallen on Lieut Park shead and due to the weight ofthe engine behind, had crushedit into the ground. The machinehad apparently never left theground until it reached the smallridge above mentioned and thenonly for a distance of about 50feet.Nothing but a perfect landingin the small difficult area couldhave avoided an accident inalighting.The Board is of the opinionthat the accident was due entire-ly to the poor judgment of LieutPark in attempting to rise fromsuch a place.The knoll was of such a smallarea and surrounded by such obstacles that it would have beenimpossible for any machine tohave arisen from it. The accident was in no way due to thefault of the machine which wasin perfect running condition.The following features con-


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1957 THE GRAY HAIR DEPARTMENT 45nected with the accident remaininexplicable to the Board:

1. Why Lieut Park did notchoose any of the large flat fieldsin the vicinity in which to land.2. Why, after landing, he at-tempted to leave in the directionhe did when a glance around himwould have shown him its veryapparent danger.3. Why he disregarded instructions received prior to hisstart to communicate person-ally with the Commanding Officer in case he landed beforereaching his destination.Probable Cause of Accident:Poor judgment of pilot.

ACCIDENT NO 7Extract from Proceedings ofBoard of Officers held at TexasCity, Texas, July 8, 1913:That Lieut Loren H. Call leftthe aviation field at 6 :21 AM,July 8, 1913, in aeroplane No.11, a type C machine, made bythe Wright Company, of Dayton,Ohio for the purpose of practic-ing accurate landing withoutpower. This landing is one of

the tests for qualifications asmilitary aviator, and LieutenantCall left the field with the under-standing that Lieut R. C Kirt-land and the crew of the ma-chine would follow him to thesmooth ground north of thecamp of the Fourth Field Artil-lery, where he would make thetest with Lieut Kirtland as official observer.The air conditions were quitegood at the time he left the field,although there was a slight puffywind blowing from the north, theanemometer record showing thatat 6 :45 AM, the wind had astrength of six miles per hour.While flying at an elevation

variously estimated at from 600to 1200 feet Lieutenant Call sbarograph was broken, the record sheet showing that theneedle failed to register at anytime during the flight), theplane fell resulting in the instant death of Lieutenant Calland the complete destruction ofthe aeroplane, at 6 :45 AM, July8, 1913.

From the testimony it ap-pears that the aeroplane assum-ed a very dangerous angle, withthe left wing at least 45 degreeslower than the right; that Lieu-tenant Call evidently attemptedt straighten out the machine byturning t the l ft and pointingthe nose down that the ma-chine then took a very steepangle downward which gradual-ly became a perpendicular drop,and that between 200 and 300feet from the ground the planebegan to turn upside down, atwhich time the wings collapsed,the plane then falling straightto the ground striking upsidedow

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Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1957

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