Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1977

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1977

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UNITED

MG James C. SmithCOMMANDER

U.S. ARMY AVIATIO N CENTERA major activity of theArmy Training and Doctrine Command

COL Keith J. RynottCOMMANDER

ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYA major activity of the

Inspector General and Auditor Generalof the U.S. Army

Richard K TierneyEDITOR

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ABOUT THE COVERWe thank Joseph M. Watson Jr., for offering his person.al photographs for useon the cover and in the story beginningon page 2

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RMY VI TION

1GESJJUNE 1977 VOLUME 23 NUMBOfficers Roadmap To EPMS, MG Charles K. Heiden Army Organic Light Aviation: The Founding Fathers,

Dr. Laurence B. Epstein Beware Of The Summer Thunderbumper,

Larry Collins ....................................................................OPMS Corner: Aviation Materiel Management -

OPMS Specialty 71, MAJ Thomas M. Walker ..................Army Aviation Center At A Glance ............................EPMS Corner, SFC Douglas E. Allen ....................................Around The World, CPT Brendan P. Blackwell ...................Human-Error Accidents And Character Assurance,

Gerard M. Bruggink ...........................................................A Little Less Realism ....................................................Break Time .....................................................................Fatigue - A Consideration In Mission Planning,

CPT Ronald A. Huether ......................................................Pearl ...............................................................................A Comparison Of The AH-1 S And The AAH,

CPT Mortin R. Karig ..........................................................A TC Action Line ............................................... Back C

The mission of the US ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operational ofunctional natlll e concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention . training. maintenance. operationsresearch and development. aviation medicine and other related data .

The DIGEST is an offical Department of the Army periodical published monthly under the supervision othe Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expressed herein are not necessarily those othe Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwisspecified . Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author. unlesotherwise indicated .Articles . photos . and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorizeto : Editor. US ARMY AVIATION DIGEST Fort Rucker. AL 36362.This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General. Headquarters . Departmentof the Army. 2

December 1975 . in accordance with AR 310-1.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR 310-Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore. MD 21220 . For any change in distribution requirements. initiate a revised DA Form 12-ational Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should submit DA Form 12-Other ational Guard units should submit requests through their state adjutant general.Those not eligible for officiai distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST can order thmagazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. DC 2040Annual subscription rates are 15 .70 domestic and 19 .65 overseas.


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What every rmy officershould know about PMS

IOMEONE WERE to askyou what you know about the newEnlisted Personnel ManagementSystem (EPMS) what would youranswer be? Do you really understand what EPMS is all about?This question has been asked ofmany of your fellow officers. Mosthave been well informed, butsome still are confused aboutEPMS. Either they lack sufficientknowledge of the subject or theyperceive EPMS as strictly an enlisted matter. They don t understand where they fit into the picture. This situation is a matter ofconcern.Years have been spent developing a system which benefits theindividual Soldier and at the sametime enhances the professionalstatus of the entire Army. EPMSis a good program, but its successis largely dependent on the activeparticipa tion of the officer corps .Below, I cover what every officershould know about EPMS.June 977

Major General Chartes K HeidenCommander

Military Personnel Center2 Stovoll StreetAlexandria VA

The old ystem served us wellfor a number of years. But, timehave changed and the Army hadto change with them . It was recognized early that to have a trulyprofessional force we would haveto develop a different system forthe management , training andevaluation of our enlisted Soldiers.The EPMS task force wasformed at Military PersonnelCenter MILPE RCEN ) andTraining and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) to work on this problem. Its members spent 18 monthsseeking counsel , ideas and opinions from about 20 ,000 Soldiers todevelop the framework forEPMS .During group interviews statements like these frequently wereheard: I m in a dead end Mil i tary Oc-cupational Specialty (MOS )

I m an E9 - been in the Army27 years. Advanced Individual

Training (AIT ) was the last for-mal school that I had the opportun-i ty to attend.

I can t get promoted as long asI stay in my MOS , and the Armywon t let me reclassify into a newMOS.

I m a deep sea diver and theArmy sent me to Noncommis-sioned Officers Education System( NCOE S ) in a t ranspor tat ionMOS . t just doesn t make sense.

My job is boring , and I l lprobably get out after this (f irst )hitch.

Last month I graduated topsin my advanced NCOES course.My current job has nothing to dowith my MOS.

The green machine has hadme. I can t get there (grade E8)from here (grade E6 ) .

Unfortunately many of theabove were valid comments.They describe some factual Solontinued on page 8

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ODA Y S ARMY aviationprogram , with its proven airmobile/air assault doctrine , beganprior to World War II as an effortby individual members of theField Artillery to obtain adeq uateaerial observation to adjust Artillery fire . The vehicles they judgedbest for their purposes were unarmed , unarmored , single en gined, tandem two-seater aircraftwhich cruised at about 70 milesper hour and could be found anySunday buzzing local civilian ai rports. They were powered by 65-horsepower engines. Their flightinstrumentation consisted ofairspeed indicators , nonsensitivealtimeters and magnetic com passes - but with no turn-andbank indicators , lights (they werenot flown after dark) or naviga tional radios .Observation always has beenessential to the successfulemployment of an army in thefield. Wellington wore at Waterloo that he would give up half hisarmy to know what was happeningon the other side of the hill . TheU.S Army s first experience withaerial observation came duringthe Civil War through the use ofballoons.Professor Thaddeus S.C Lowe,Director of the Balloon Corp of

the Army of the Potomac from1861 to 1863 , was the most successful balloonist. Using telegraph anda balloon over Fort Corcoran , outside Washington, DC , he directedArtillery fire in 1861 against Confederate positions across thePotomac River in Virginia . During the Spanish-American War, aballoon was instrumental in theAmerican success in 1893 at theBattle of San Juan Hill.

During World War I , airplanesjoined balloons to provide groundcommanders with criticallyneeded information. [Balloons,due to their vulnerability toairplane attacks and lack of mobility , were abandoned almost entirely by 1940 ]

The role of air observation andthe adj ustment of Artillery firewas of critical importance to theField Artillery during World WarI The increa ed range of its fieldguns added to the difficulties oflocating , adju s ting and hittingtargets quickly on a rapidly moving battlefield . Corps aviationsquadrons were assigned to corpsheadquarters exclusively to perform Artillery spotting mi ions .All requests were made throughcorps headquarters.The as igned aircraft , stationedat an airdrome in the rear , flew to

the front where it contacted therequesting division Artillery byradio . The gunners never knew ormet the observers and, upon completion of the mission , the pilotreturned to their airfield foranother assignment.

Since the Air Service observerswere not responsible to the Artillery commanders whom the yserved the latter s acrificed a vitalelement of command. The FieldArtillery found these aircraft fewin number , rarely available whenwanted , and unfamiliar with theneeds of Artillery.

The Growing Artillery/Aviation Rift. The experience of WorldWar I led Artillery and the Army sair segment to conclude divergentdoctrines . The rift widened duringthe interwar years. Major GeneralRobert M. Danford , Chief of FieldArtillery , was convinced that airobservation was essential to theeffective use of Artillery . He or dered a thorough study of the FieldArtillery s experience with ba lloons and aircraft during the previous war .The study concluded that to beeffective the airborne observershould be Artillery, familiar toand with the gunners being directed , and that the aircraftshould e organic to the Artillery

y Organicig t AviationThe ounding athers

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Army] service of which it was buta small component. And , it wassuffering from limited appropriations that an extremely fru galCongress was doling out to themilitary with the approval of anisolationist American public .These conditions all helped div rtthe Air Corps ' inter t from itground support role. But the cruxof the matter was that within theArmy only the Air Corp had theauthorization to purchase or usean airplane .

The Origins Of Organic ArmyAviation Charles Lindbergh ca ptured the imagination of the worldin 1927 when he b came the first tofly the Atlantic alone. Aviation became the dream of youth as itstechnological advances continuedto rapidly supersede one another .Many Americans believed thatwithin their lifetimes the privateairplane would become almo t ascommon as the automobile. FI -ing was the way of the future. Theownership of a light airplane wasexpected to be within the capability of every middleclass Americanfamily .

One una suming young manwho played a key role in making

Army Cub lands on grovel strip constructed bythe 34th Division Air Operations n Italy . Thegrovel was collected from Italian roods . Thestrip was 10 feet wide and 150 yards long . Thegrovel enabled the Cubs to operate n any typeweather. At right , on aerial view of the some

runway

organic Army aviation a realitywas Joseph McCord Watson JrReturning from the Univ rsity ofAlabama to his home in San An tonio, TX, in 1928 he went to workin his father 's prosperou retailshoe company. He believed in thefuture of aviation and was determined to learn to fly . He arrangedto take lessons from two friendswho held instructor ratings in civilian light aircraft The next year ,with 50 hours flying time , Mr .Watson became the 6 619th personto receive his private pilot licenfrom the CAA (Civil AeronauticAuthority) .Convinced that another war wasprobable, Mr. Watson and severalof his friends in 1930 enlisted in theU.S. Army Reserves Followingcompletion of the necessar ycourses at Ft Sam Houston , TX,he was commissioned a econdlieutenant in the Field ArtilleryReserve . He became a firstlieutenant 3 years later , all thistime continuing to fly as a hobby.

Lieutenant Watson transferredout of the Reserves to 36th Infantry Division , Texas NationalGuard , commanded by BrigadierGeneral Claude Birkead The

young offic r served as S4 on thestaff of the 61st Field ArtilleryBrigade . He began to develop hisconcept of Artillery spotting fromthe air in 1936 Confident that goodair-ground communications couldbe e tablished from a commerciallight aircraft , Lieutenant Watsonenlisted the support of CaptainJohn K Burr , the headquartersbattery commander and anonflyer .From 1936 to 1938 , LieutenantWatson rented airplanes at Stinson Field. The rental fee came outof his pocket , with Captain Burrsometimes chipping in . The twomen experimented with establishing ai r-ground radio communications between the airplane andtrucks or jeeps on the groundThey would strap various types ofField Artillery radios on the shelfbehind the second seat of a TaylorCub (it became the Piper Cub in1937 ) and dangle a 10 to 12-footchain out the window to serve asan antenna Satisfactory com-munications were achieved at distance up to 15 miles with line ofsight being mandatory betweenthe airplane and the radio vehicleon the ground They also triedtheir hand at directing vehicles onthe march .'The 36th Division was assembled at Camp Beauregard, LA , formaneuvers during its annualsummer encampment in August1939 The recently promoted Captain Watson rented a Piper Cub onseveral occasions to practice theadjustment of Artillery fire. Hewas the only man in the divisionwho had a pilot s license.

In 1940 Captain Watson pro-posed to Brigadier General RobertO Whiteaker, commander of the


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61st Field Artillery Brigade thatthe Piper Aircraft Corporation beasked if it would furnish a coupleof its airplanes to experiment withthe adjustment of Artillery fire. InJu ly of that year , Captain Watsontel phoned Mr. William T . PiperSr. , who promised to have Mr.Thomas A. Ca e his dis trict salesmanager for the Ea tern UnitedStates who was working with thePiper dealers in New Orleans ,participate in the maneuvers .The Piper Aircraft Corporation,located in Lock Haven , PA , for merly wa known as the TaylorAircraft Company. It marketedthe Taylor Cub (the forerunner ofthe modern popular -pricedAmerican light airplane ), de veloped by its president , C.G .Taylor. Mr. Piper was the treasurer until 1937 when he bought outMr. Ta y lo r , thereb y becomingboth president and general manager.Mr. Taylor moved to Alliance ,OH , where he started a new ai rcraft company named Taylor-craft .During its fir t full year of production in 1938 , Mr. Piper sold 737Cubs . Most were painted brightyellow for better visibility in theair. The factory produced 1,806 thenext year and 3,016 the year after .The 10 ,000th Cub rolled out thedoors before the end of 1941 .As Mr . Piper promised , TomCase flew a radioless J-4 , a sideby side two seater Piper Cubcoupe, to Camp Beauregard on 12August 1940 for a 2-day stay . Mr .Case thought the demonstrationswent well . But he found the loudrendition of Stars and Stripesby the division band at revei lle ob- une 977

noxious. On the firs t day he flewCaptain Watson and other Artillery officers in slow eirel s abovethe batteries on the Artilleryrange while they practiced adjusting Artillery fire. Due to the ai rborne observers ' ability to see theexplosions beyond the vision of thgunners, the latter were able toaccurately hit the targets morequickly and with fewer shells thanbefore.On the second day , Mr. Case observed and controlled thebrigade 's long column on it 93-mile return march from the Artillery ranges near Camp Beauregard to its base camp near Cavens , LA. Following the dem onstrations, Tom Case flew backto the factory to discuss the detailsof the exerei e with Mr . Piper .Captain Watson and Mr. Ca e continued their dialogue on the problems encountered and possiblesolutions during the followingmonths .The 36th Division, a veteran ofthe Meuse-Argonne Campaign in1918, again was activated on 25November 1940. It was assembledat Camp Bowie near Brownwood ,TX. When the Artillery rangeswere completed , General Whiteaker wrote to Mr. Piper requesting more extensive tests in light ofthe favorable results achieved theprevious summer . He wanted tocompile the factual data necessary for a formal recommendation for organic aviation.

Recounting the experience ofthe first demonstration the general noted that the Cub's ability tomaneuver at low speeds and extremely low altitudes allowed theairborne observer to give com

mands directly to the batterycommanders either by voice or bydropping messages attached toorange or red streamers . Thisavoided the delays encounteredusing Air Corps aircraft.The target could be hit quicklyand with fewer rounds of ammunition. In fact , General Whiteakerwrote that the savings of 40 roundsof 155 mm or 200 rounds of 75 mmshells would exceed the retailpurchase price of a Piper Cub( 1,700) .Use of the Cub for column control during the long road marchfrom the Artillery range con vinced General Whiteaker of thelight aircraft ' s value for thesefunctions. Other merits of th Cubwere: Its ability to land and takeofffrom unprepared fields near thebatteries or on any country roadwithout obstructions within 500feet. The small consumption of fueland lubricants which limited theburden upon the supply system . The ease with which a pilotwith limited training could successfully fly the aircraft.

General Whiteaker suggestedthat a built -in radio would besuperior to the Field Artillery ' sSCR 178 and 194 sets whose bulkinterfered with the freedom ofmovement of the pilot and observer . Folding or detachablewings would enable the airplanesto be transported by truck whennot needed - or when grounded byweather.

Captain Watson 's initiative incontacting the Piper Aircraft Cor- ontinuedo p ge 1

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ou don t have to penetrate a ine system or dodge arounda sing e cell to have a bout with nature at ts worst. hedangers can exist as far as mi es awayl

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WITH THE HAZARDS ofwinter flying forgotten foranother ye ar , pilotseverywhere breathe a sigh of re lief and look forward to easy-going

summer flying . But many are thepilots who have flown into the serenit y of summer onl y to besucked up , pelted with hail , covered with ice , shaken bywindsheers , and , if lucky, blownout of a summer thunderstorm .Make no mistake - weather is ayear-round hazard , and the sum mer thunderstorm is a mostdeadly adversary.A local weather phenomenon ,the summer thunderstorm de velops from a cumulus cell and ismodified by its immediate su rroundings . It ' s the ultimategrowth form of cumulus activityand must be considered highlydangerous because of its heavyrain , icing conditions, hail , lightning , strong windsheers , and se vere turbulence . Thus thenickname , 'Thunderbumper .Obviously these packets of violence must be avoided, but that isnot always easily done . With agood working knowledge of thisweather phenomenon and usingtried flying techniques associatedwith it, your chances of survivalare vastly improved.Generally , thunderstorms arecommon from late winter to earlyfall , with June , July , and Augustbeing the months having the highest frequency of storms. Althoughthe Pacific coast has an occasionalsummer thunderstorm , the Southeast , especially Florida , has thehighest number of instances perday , per year , over a specific re gion. Stretching from the Dakotasto parts of Texas is a region called

Tornado Alley , and it lives up toits name . Summer thunderstormsune 1977

< ~ U B V B

Larry olliereprinted by permission of ROTOR WING July August 1976

mass in a line and march acrossthe plains , causing much crop andmaterial damage.There are four basic requirements for a thunderstorm to build.These ingredients are: Unstable air Lifting action High moisture content Sufficient condensation nucleiWhen the actual lapse rate of anair layer is higher than that of thedry adiabatic lapse rate , the airlayer is said to e unstable. An airmass lifted in this condition will bewarmer than the surrounding air ,and like a hot-air balloon, will eforced even higher . Air of this na ture , if forced to rise , will becomemore unstable and can cause se vere turbulence. The greater thelapse rate difference , the moreunstable the air.Lifting action may be the resultof any type of weather front ,mountainous or rough terrain ,heating from below, or air convergence. f warm air from thesurface region is thus carried tothe free convection level, the potential for moisture condensationincreases.

f the air does not containenough moisture , cloud buildupcannot take place. In this instance ,clear air turbulence (CAT) maybe experienced. When adeq uatemoisture for cell building doesexist , the heat produced from themoisture condensation processtends to make the air even moreunstable.Condensation nuclei may beanything from particles of dustcarried aloft by lifting action, toartificial condensation nuclei suchas sodium iodide used in cloudmodification. Iron, salt , and evenother ice particles are often a partof the process. Anything that

moisture can condense and buildon is cons idered nuclei .A thunderstorm cell mustbreathe and feed itself to li ve . Thebreathing takes place in the formof updrafts and downdrafts , andthe feeding occurs when condensation nuclei and moisture arecarried into the cell on updrafts.

Drafts are nothing more thanlarge , vertical air currents thatare continuous through thousandsof feet in height and may cover theentire length of an individual cell.Drafts should not be confused withgusts , which are short in duration.

Although updrafts anddowndrafts may occur throughoutany cloud cell, there are two general guidelines for finding thesemajor feeders. In a single cell , themajor inflow feeder is found on therear portion of the cell (rear in re lation to its movement) , while theoutflow is forward . On a linetypesystem , which may be hundreds ofmiles in length , this inflow/outflowprocess is reversed , with the inflow now located along the leadingedge and the outflow to the rear .These areas of inflow or outfloware usually indicated by scudclouds, which are caused by moisture condensing at a lower leveldue to fast-moving air currentsgoing in and out of the cloud base .These scud clouds often appear toe an extension of the cloud edge ,

hanging down and out.In the beginning or building

stage of a thunderstorm cell , updrafts may move as fast as 3fpm. There is no rain falling, as itis suspended or being carriedaloft, and no lightning is present.t is the mature part of the cyclethat contains hazards in the extreme ; therefore , it is here the

emphasis is put.ont nue on page 44

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OfficerPersonnelanagementSystemajor homas M. Walker

A viation Mana gement BranchProfessiona l evelopment Div ion

Off icer Personne l Management Direc torateA IATION MATERIEL Management (Specialty 71 ) is an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) specialty encompassing operationaland nonoperational flying positions relating to thelife cycle management of aviation materiel Thisincludes aircraft engines ; airframes; components ;accessories ; instruments ; rotor blades; powertrains ; or hydraulic , mechanical and electrical fuelsystems .Officer aviators designated this specialty mayperform a variety of functions concerned with re search and development ; tes t and evaluation ; procurement and production control ; inventory control ; storage ; distribution ; maintenance ; supply;and transportation The D partment of the Army(DA) taff proponent for Aviation Materiel Management is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics(DCSLOG) , while the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school proponency rests with theU.S. Army Transportation School at Ft Eustis , VASpecialty 71 is designated a primary specialty forcommissioned officer aviators assigned to theTransportation Corps or an alternate specialty forofficers assigned to other Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD ) branches Transportation Corps second lieutenants designated specialty71 attend Army flight training following completionof the officer basic course. Upon completion of flighttraining specialty 71 officers attend the AviationMaintenance Officer Course (AMOC ) at Ft Eustis.The length of AMOC is 13 weeks and it provides theaviator the technical knowledge required to ac complish maintenance test flights and qualityassurance on Army aircraft Flight school andAMOC represent the basic schooling qualificationsfor specialty 71

Utilization As with all graduates of flight train-ing , specialty 71 aviators receive DA directed opera-tional flying as ignments for utilizat ion of both theiraviation and aviation maintenance officer training.Normally, the length of these assignments is 3years

AVIATION M TERIELMANAGEMENT

OPMSSPECI LTY 71The ass ignments are des igned to provide the officerwith a solid foundation in Aviation Materiel Management Additionally, early utilization ensures ahigh probability of successfully passing the 12-yearAviation Career Incentive Act (ACIA) gate - thatis, 72 months operational flying experience duringthe first 12 years of aviation service.

Upon completion of initial utilization specialty 71aviators usually are assigned to duties which increase their expertise in their primary or alternatespecialty . Ideally, whenever possible , the assignedduties support the officers primary or alternatespecia ltie . Although OPMS has accomplished greatstrides in d veloping the right number of qualifiedoffic rs for the Aviation Materiel Management specialty, om ass ignm ent out id an officer s designated specialt ie will continue in upport of Armyrequirements .Along with the various functions previously addressed , an Aviation Materiel Management officermay serve in key positions both as commander andstaff officer. For example the officer may serve ascommander of a section, platoon, detachment, company, battalion or group engaged in aviation unitmaintenance (A VUM ) , aviation intermediatemaintenance (A VIM ) or depot support levelmaintenance and supply. As a staff officer , dutiesmay be performed at battalion and higher troopcommand , commodity command or high level staff.Additionally, specialty 71 officers may serve as aproject manager (PM ) for an aviation system thathas entered the production/deployment or operationand support phase of its life cycle management

Considering the increased complexity of new andemerging aviation systems the challenges as sociated with duties a a PM are evident. Factorswhich influence utilization/assignment to these positions are : Army requirements . Professional development needs of the officer. The officer s manner of performance and potential. The officer s desires



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The ounding athers tion was Major William W. Ford, acareer Soldier in the Field Artillery. Major Ford began flying as ahobby in 1934 and by 1941 accruedmore than 500 hours as a pilot. Hewrote an explosive article,Wings For Santa Barbara, forthe April 1941 issue of he Fieldrti l lery Journal (see June 1974IGE ST for a reprint of the article). In it , he noted that not onceduring the 4 months of maneuverswith the Third Army during 1940were actual air observers available to adjust fire of their Artillerybattalions . More importantly,Major Ford believed the flat terrain at the Artillery School at Ft.Sill , OK, misled gunners intothinking that observed fire andgood maps were the rule - not theexception. Major Ford 's articlegreatly impressed Major GeneralRobert M. Danford, the Chief ofField Artillery, who also played aninstrumental role in bringingabout the birth of Army aviation.

Continued from pageporation was the catalyst that ledto the establishment of organicArmy aviation. Many thought thecommercial light airplane wassuperior to the standard Air Corpsobservation aircraft, and thevalue of air observation to theField Artillery was undisputed.But Captain Watson was the firstto undertake actual experimentswith light aircraft - and at his initiative and expense. He approached Piper because he couldfly the Cub and he knew it wassuitable for the role. Aeronca andTaylorcraft produced similarairplanes.

t was an uphill struggle for organic Army aviation, but CaptainWatson could not have enlisted thesupport of a more vigorous advocate than William T. Piper Sr. Healready was a successful businessman in 1929 when C.G. Taylorasked him to invest 600 in hisfledgling aircraft company.Mr. Piper believed in the futureof light aviation in America. Thepractical, affordable and dependable little airplanes he sold werean exponent of his philosophy. Hebelieved that only by getting alarge number of Americans to flycould the future of light aviation besecured. It was only commonsense that some of these pilotswere going to want to buy theirown airplanes . The youngLieutenant Watson's unusual request did not seem unreasonableto a man who often traveled longdistances to demonstrate thecapabilit ies of one of his airplanesto anyone who showed theslightest interest.Concerned that light aviationmight be overlooked in the confusion surrounding the Nation 's rushto rearm, Mr. Piper sent a letter toSecretary of War Henry L. Stimson suggesting a number of military and semimilitary uses of light10

aviation. Surprisingly, the adjustment of Artillery fire was notamong them. Included were control of columns from the air,liaison, ev cu t ion of thewounded, and their use as radiocontrolled flying bombs.Although a commercial venture, Mr. Piper pointed out that hiscompany represented 50 percentof the country's light aircraft industry and wished to contribute tothe Nation's defense. He informedSecretary Stimson that the bearerof the letter had his authority toact for the company.The bearer of the letter wasbanker John Edwards ParsonsMorgan, who had known littleabout aviation when he was votedonto the board of directors atPiper. A man of great energy, Mr.Morgan founded the National SkiPatrol. t was intended to bothrescue skiers in distress and alsoserve as a model for American skitroop training during World WarII . He also was responsible forbuilding the first ski lift, whichwas located at Sun Valley, ID.Equally important, he knew manyof the Nation's prominent citizens,including Robert A. Lovett fromcollege days at Yale.Mr. Lovett was a former U.S.Naval Reserve pilot who hadtaken up flying in light airplanesas a hobby when PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt appointedhim Special Assistant to the Secretary of War and later AssistantSecretary of War for Air.

Mr. Morgan remained inWashington where he became aneffective lobbyist for the Pipercompany. He also later served as aspokesman for the Aeronca andTaylorcraft aircraft companieswhom he asked to join in a bipartisan campaign to sell light aircraftto the Army.Another who played a large rolein the development of Army avia-

Never during the Third Armyexercises did the terrain allow forobserved fire. And, the maps usedwere inadequate. The airplanewas the solution, but Major Fordwrote in his article, The troubleis that we do not have an adequatenumber of planes or observers forthis purpose; nor are they on order; nor are the types of planes wecontemplate the best suited to thejob. He advocated a pilot andf l ivver type commercialairplane organic to each Artillerybattalion to carry a trained FieldArtillery observer. There werethousands of commercial lightplanes in this country, availableupon requisition and thousandsof civilian pilots holding CAA certificates of competency to flythem. An inadequate number ofobservers and aircraft wereavailable and Major Ford saw little hope of improving the situationwithout such a program.Ford noted in his article that theflivver airplane had a lowhorsepower engine and a slow

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in June, I t might be a useful experiment to have 10 or 12 of theselight planes, piloted by men youmight select, attached to an Artillery unit. " Mr. Morgan repliedthat Piper would be happy to supply 10 or 12 airplanes and alsowould ask Aeronca and Taylorcraft each to send aircraft to makeit an industry test.General Henry Hap Arnold ,Chief of the Air Corps, approvedthe arrangements. The manufacturers supplied the radios for theirairplanes, while the Army provided ground radios and the observers, and also housed and fedthe men and furnished gasoline.Two Air Corps squadrons of 0-49observation aircraft also were assigned. General Arnold directedthat all ground units make complete reports on the value or use ofthe light airplanes in the maneuvers. The tests were to be official

Tennessee Maneuvers. On 18June 1941, Henry Wann, TomCase, James M. Helbert and JulesParmentier flew their Piper Cubsto Manches ter in eastern Tennessee where the Second Army was toconduct its war games aroundCamp Forrest. They were joinedby four additional Cubs and twoairplanes each from the Aeroncaand Taylorcraft companies. Allwere equipped with RCA two-wayradios.

I t was not an unqualified success because someone had failedto get the word to all involved. Thebrass was puzzled by the appearance of civilians flyingpuddle-jumpers. Consequently,the volunteer squadron receivedfew orders and it was not until thefourth (and last) week that theumpires discovered that the onlyway to find out what was going onwas from the backseat of the littlecivilian airplanes. The squadronpilots slept under the wings oftheir airplanes and had toscrounge for their food.Operating from a landing strip298 paces long on a heavily wooded12

Army Piper Cub on reconnaissance mission ov r North Africa in 943mountainside, the Cub pilots observed 155 mm gunfire by flying at1,000 feet above and behind theguns. The excellent visibility theyenjoyed, their slow speed, and theease with which one man was ableto handle the aircraft favorablyimpressed the officers with whomthey worked. Besides the adjustment of Artillery fire, the provisional squadron performed scouting missions, delivered messages ,and transported commanders andstaff officers about the battlefieldas they performed their duties.They also worked with the regularAir Corps observation squadrons.The unique ability of the lightaircraft to land almost anywherewas demonstrated in 102 landingsupon dirt roads , fields and pastures. When the exercises werecompleted, they dropped flares infront of some hard-charging tankunits to inform them so. When onecommander failed to comprehend, a Cub landed in a nearbyfield and taxied up the road to thestartled tankers.The rapidly expanding Armywas suffering growing pains as itwas forced to take half-trainedcadres to staff newly formed divisions.1t lacked adequate numbersof modern equipment (civiliantrucks posed as tanks and woodenguns as antiaircraft weapons) butfound the volunteer squadron to beone of the highlights of the maneuvers.Ft. Bliss Manuevers. The volun-

teer squadron , composed of thesame airplanes and pilots fromPiper, Aeronca and Taylorcraft ,and joined by two additional Cubs,flew to Ft. Bliss . This was in response to an invitation to participate in the desert maneuvers from11 to 26 July 1941 among the sand,cacti and clumps of grass.General Arnold cut orders forthem to be based at Biggs Field,outside EI Paso, TX. The postcommander , a National Guardsman called to active duty, toldthem , I know nothing about youor why you are here. " He refusedto allow the motley gang of civilians with their Sunday-flyingairplanes onto the airfield. Afterseveral frustrating days at thecivilian airport in EI Paso , Mr.Morgan telephoned SecretaryLovett ~ o quickly got the commander straightened out.The nickname "grasshopper"was bestowed upon the light aircraft during these maneuvers.Major General Innis P. Swift,commanding general of the 1stCavalry Division, was startled tosee a Piper Cub land on the desertbeside his headquarters, 50 milesoutside EI Paso. He invited thepilot, Henry Wann, to share hislunch with him, telling him that helooked like a damned grasshopper" as he bounced along theground during the landing.Forty-five minutes later a radiomessage arrived to inform thegeneral that Mr. Wann's airplane

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was being dispatched to assist himand was then leaving Biggs Field .The general sent Wann with hisaide back to Biggs Field to getsome fresh hams for the head -quar ters mess. Meanwhile ,angered at the delays in gettingradio messages through , GeneralSwift decided to send for Mr. Wannand the Cub and told an officer tosend a message , SEND GRASS-HOPPER . SWIFT. When the of-ficer asked , What ' s a grasshopper? the general replied ,

They ' ll know when you tellthem . They did , and thenickname was born.

Members of the squadronquickly fashioned a Grasshopperemblem which they painted on thesides of their ubiquitous littleairplanes . Mr . Morgan sent aGrasshopper lapel pin to Secretary Lovett.

The biggest desert operationsyet undertaken by the Army tookplace in temperatures up to 115degrees and at elevations from4 000 to 6,000 feet. Dry lake bedswere used as landing fields. In oneinstance , three Cubs landed on anunprepared field where the first

two damaged their landing gear.They radioed for repair parts andboth were flying again within 80minutes . On the other hand , theAir Corps ' 0 49 a i r c r a f tcrashlanded so often that ordersfinally were issued that no AirCorps airplanes were to use anewly prepared airfield until theGrasshopper Squadron had used itfor 48 hours . Damaged Air Corpsaircraft had to be trucked 50 milesor more to Biggs Field to be re-paired .Louisiana Maneuvers. TheGrasshopper Squadron flew to Ft.Beauregard for the Second Armymaneuvers from 11 to 30 August1941. On the way , Mr. Case stoppedoff at Camp Bowie to brief CaptainWatson and Brigadier GeneralWhiteaker on the results of the Ft.Bliss Maneuvers. Meanwhile,General Danford, enthusiasticover the performance of the lightaircraft in the summer maneuvers , had flown to the UnitedKingdom to visit the Royal Artil-lery School at Larkhill. Impressedwith the British use of light spotterairplanes with their Artillery , herequested War Department per-

mission to officially test organiclight aviation.

The Grasshopper Squadron flew12 to 14 hours a day during August.Secretary Lovett wrote to Mr.Morgan , then at Third Armyheadquarters , Camp Polk , LA,that the Third Army had re quested the use of the Squadron inthe combined Second and ThirdArmy maneuvers scheduled forthe same area in September. Sec-retary Lovett suggested that theThird Army rent the airplanes. Upuntil this time the airplane com-panies were paying their expensesand providing the airplanes free ofcharge.

Colonel Eisenhower. Back inApril 1941, Henry Wann , in hiscapacity as western district salesmanager for the Piper company,was trying to drum up some busi-ness with the Army. He telephonedFt. Lewis , WA , where , being un-familiar with Army organization,he talked with various desksergeants and junior officers. Finally he was put in touch with alieutenant colonel. The officer waspleasant and told Mr. Wann thathe himself had a pilot' s license,

General Eisenhower (then a junior officer)had served on General Douglas MacArthur'sstaff in the Phillippine Islands during the mid-1930s. As they worked to build up an ind.enous army, they realized the need for asmall air force to reach their 90 trainingcamps. They needed l i lht airplanes that couldtakeoff and land on short airstrips in order toreach the camps, since the 7,100 islands of thePhillippine archipelago had only a primitiveroadnet, except for the island of Luzon.An airfield was informally established outsideManila in 1936 and Colonel Eisenhower, at age46, began pilot instruction. He passed hislicense examination on 19 July 1939. By thetime of the Louisiana Maneuvers he had lolledmore than 600 hours in light airplanes.General George C. Marshall, Army Chief ofStaff, was so pleased by Colonel Eisenhower'swork in the LOUisiana Maneuvers that hepromoted him to brigadier general in late

September. On 26 July 1942, GeneralEisenhower replied to a letter from a ...adlerGeneral Ralph W. Coane commandlnl .the 41stInfantry Division's Artillery in Australia.General Eisenhower knew General Coane fromFt. Lewis and had been a student of the 41 atDivision's commander, Major General HoraceH. Fuller, in 1926 at the Command and Gener.'Staff Collele, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He asked,By the way, he (Fuller) and I were alw.,.interested In gettlne so e little puddle-Jumperairplanes for each Infantry division. - to beflown and maintained by the divisionorganization itself, entirely separate from theAir Corps. The idea was that they were merelyflying motorcycles and were to be for command,,liaison and limited observation missions. Theuse of the plane was to be limited str ict ly to the

June 1977

divisional area and to the rear. GeneralEisenhower wanted to know If the 41st Divisionhad ever received any.13


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but that Ft. Lewis had no authority colonel was on the friendliest of J. McCloy. Mr. Morgan drew upto purchase any airplanes . terms with members of the squad- the contract and General GregoryThe officer that Henry Wann ron since he often went out to their signed it. Mr. Morgan had drawntalked with was Dwight David field and borrowed an airplane to up the contract with no authorityEisenhower, who soon was pro- escape the heat of the hot, humid whatsoever from either the Piper ,moted to colonel and was chief of August evenings , with J.M. Hel- Aeronca or Taylorcraft comstaff to Lieutenant General bert of Piper. Colonel Eisenhower panies. It was never questionedWalter Krueger , commander of told Mr. Morgan to get a figure. and the Army promptly paid thethe Third Army. While the Grass- Mr . Morgan talked with W.T. bills upon presentation.hopper Squadron was participat- Piper who had just arrived for the Grasshoppers Indian Summer.ing in maneuvers with the Third maneuvers and who told Mr. Mor- Following the monthlong ma-Army in Louisiana, Colonel gan, f we don't get it, let 's not get neuvers in Louisiana with the SecEisenhower came to inspect them hasty and pullout our planes. The ond and Third Armies , the volunwith the chief of the Third Army Army needs the planes more than teer Grasshopper Squadron flewAir Corps , Lieutenant Colonel we need the money. to the Carolinas. There it particiSam Davis. Colonel Eisenhower Colonel Eisenhower gave Mr. pated during October and intolater returned to the football field Morgan a maneuver order for November in First Army ma-which the Grasshoppers were 24 ,000 and sent him to the quar- neuvers . Two airplanes each fromusing as an airstrip and flew with termaster general , Major General the Rearwin and Interstate airone of the Grasshopper pilots. Edmund B. Gregory, who told him craft companies joined the Gras-

Secretary Lovett's suggestion to to draw up a contract and shopper Squadron for these maGeneral Krueger that the Third make it short and simple. Mr. neuvers.Army rent the Grasshoppers was Morgan already had telephoned Through the summer the Grassturned over to Colonel Eisenhower Secretary Lovett and his Army hopper Squadron flew more thanto implement as chief of staff. The Ground Forces counterpart , John 400,000 miles and completed moreAnother Armored Force officer who ap- The 2d Armored Division moved West in earlypreclated ,.,ht aviation's potential was Georle 1942 to test tank doctrine and train for desertS. Patton Jr then actinl and later commandinl warfare. In a report to General McNair on 20lenera' of the 2d Armored Division. Durinl May 1942, General Patton wrote, II since it is1940. he incorporated I ht planes in all his the first time to my knowledge that a fairly larleexercises, usinl them to transmit orders to Iroup of Armored vehicles were successfullysubordinates In the field, to locate and Identify commanded from the air by voice radio, theunits. and to fly himself and his staff officers report may be of interest .. When he wrote thequickly to their destinations. He experimented lessons learned in Notes On Tactics Andwith light airplanes that could use open fields Techniques Of Desert Warfare (Provisional),unsuitable for other military aircraft and came 30 July 1942, General Patton concluded thatto prefer the Piper Cub. the comma nder should exercise comma nd fromOn 12 December 1940. General Patton sent the liaison plane by two-way radio until contactthe 2d Armored Division on a 400-mile round was made with the enemy. Then a staff officertrip from Columbus, GA. to Panama City, FL. should replace the commander in the airplaneThe 4-day trip, the lonlest march yet un while the latter leads the attack from thedertaken by an American Armored division, ground.used I ht airplanes to control the columns The officers and men of the 2d Armored

composed of 1,100 vehic1es. Division never knew when or where GeneralGeneral Patton wrote to his friend, Patton would show up to witness theirLieutenant Colonel W. C. Crane, then on progress. He used jeeps, sedans tanks, halfGeneral LesHe McNair's staff at Army General tracks and light airplanes to move about amonlHeadquarters. in the sprin. of 1941: . am his dispersed units. General Patton nearly lostpersonally lett lnl so air-minded that I own an his life while landinl his Cub near hisaeroplane and expect shortly to have a pilot's headquarters, narrowly missing some nearbyUcenle. Next time you come down here (Ft. telephone poles. Upon their initiative, his8ennlnl), I may be able to take you for a ride if troops cut down the offendinl poles and buriedyou have sufficient Insurance. the wires underlround.14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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than 3,000 missions. Not oneairplane was lost in the line ofduty. There were not any enginefailures or aircraft grounded formore than 24 hours for repairs.During the same period, the AirCorps had to write off 11 0-49s at acost of 25,419 each (the Cub, withradio, cost $2,432).

The 0-49 was three timesheavier than the Piper Cub, and its55-foot wingspan was 20 feetlonger. t took 6,000 manhours tobuild and, unlike the Cub - whichtook 300 manhours and could landon the highway and taxi up to thelocal filling station - it required100 octane aviation fuel. On 12 September, Third Army Air Operations showed nine 0-49s in serviceand 12 out of commission, while all11 Grasshoppers were available.One Cub used as a spare was lostwhen a sudden wind squall atCamp Polk tossed an 0-49 up in theair and dropped it on top of theCub.The Grasshoppers proved to beindispensable wherever theywent. Even General Krueger useda Cub to untangle an Armored column enmeshed in a huge trafficjam. Flying at 200 feet, the generalused a megaphone and straightened out the mess in 20 minutes.The Air Corps' problems werenot due simply to the superiority ofthe Grasshoppers to the 0-49s. Aswith other components of theArmy, it was having difficultiesreorganizing and mobilizing for awartime footing. Major GeneralLewis H. Brereton, commander ofthe Third Air Force, had set up andoperated the two Air Corpsmaintenance commands for theopposing armies in the east Texasand Louisiana maneuvers. Hefound that he lacked sufficienttrained staff to handle the maze oforganization and detail. We simply could not put supplies in theplaces where they should be and inthe quantities required, he said.

Tanks Horses and Cubs. TheArmored Force was establishedune 1977

on 10 July 1940. Brigadier GeneralAdna R. Chaffee was assigned aschief of the Armored Forces andcommander of the I ArmoredCorps. General Chaffee wasaware of the implications of airpower to Armored warfare. TheNazi blitzkrieg, unleashed againstFrance in May 1940 , married thedive bomber to the fast movingGerman Panzer units. This led tothe rapid collapse of what mostpeople considered the finest armyin the world.General Chaffee telephoned Wil liam Piper Sr., on 9February 1941 ,and asked if he would send anairplane to the U.S. Army ArmorSchool, Ft. Knox, KY. The generalwanted to test his ideas on directing Armored columns andmethods of adjusting tank gunfirefrom the air. He believed that lightaviation should be organic to allbranches of the combat arms. Mr.Pjper agreed and Tom Case flewthe now veteran (Cub), still without a radio , to Ft. Knox. He workedclosely with General Chaffee andhis staff from 10 to 15 February .After further tests at CampBowie, Mr. Case flew to Lock Haven, PA, where the Piper factoryinstalled a standard radio . Although not designed for the aircraft the radio did provideadequate two-way air-groundvoice communications. Four dayslater (on 23 April) Mr. Case returned to Ft. Knox to continue thetests .

Ft. Riley Demonstrations.Piper Cub demonstrated the advantages of light aviation toCavalry officers from 12 to 14 June

1941 , at Ft. Riley , KS . Convincedthat light airplanes and horseswere compatible, the enthusiasticofficers arranged for a more extensive demonstration. This tookplace from 1 to 8 July 1941 whenfour pilots , with a mechanic , returned in Piper Cubs. They di rected Cavalry operations whileliving in the field with the troopers. Official reports evaluating thesuccess of these experiments wereforwarded to Washington.

Organic Aviation Becomes AReality. Eleven Air Corps and 21federalized National Guardsquadrons were assigned in 1940 tothe ground units . They were subject to periodic withdrawal for AirCorps training. When this systemproved unsatisfactory, GeneralMcNair (General George C. Marshall 's chief of staff and in chargeof all field training) ordered fieldexercises for the observationsquadrons in conjunction with thefield force maneuvers in July andAugust 1941.Air Corps ground support aviation was reorganized on 25 June1941 into five air support commands , one for each of the fourfield armies and one for the Armored Force. They included pursuit, bombardment, dive bomberand observation squadrons. Thelast included a mixture of reconnaissance , observation and liaisonairplanes .General Danford made anotherofficial request (the first had beenin July 1940) for organic aviationmanned and maintained by theField Artillery. This again was rejected by G3 , War Department


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scheduled for March 1942.The favorable results of the testscaused the Army Ground Forcesto recommend that the programbe expanded without delay to include all Field Artillery units. "The War Department, acting inGeneral McNair ' s absence tomeet a deadline, approved therecommendation . At the sametime it was made clear that ArmyAir Forces observation units stillwere to share responsibility foradjusting Artillery fire. GeneralMcNair did not think the testswere conclusive, but he soon became convinced of the program'svalue. Thereafter he gave it hisfull support.The Class Before One. The WarDepartment authorized the Chiefof Field Artillery to organize andequip the Artillery components ofone Infantry division and onecorps Artillery brigade withairplanes, pilot-mechanics andmaintenance crews. The purposewas to test the concept of organicair observat ion for Field Artillery.General Danford appointedLieutenant Colonel W. W. Ford,who while a major authored"Wings For Santa Barbara, tocommand the training. The ArmyAir Forces loaned Colonel Ford 24YO-59s, its designation for the[LA] Piper Cubs. it had purchasedafter the Ft. Bliss maneuvers . Mr.Henry Wann and Thomas F.Tony Piper, W.T. Piper's son,were among the nine civilian instructors. A couple of first lieutenants, both with civil pilot licenses,who had been working on behalf ofthe program for a year, togetherwith a reserve major named Gordon J. Wolf , aided Colonel Ford insetting up the program at Ft. Sill.The lieutenants were Robert R.Williams and Delbert L. Bristol,both destined to play key and continuing roles in the development ofArmy aviation. The Class BeforeOne was composed of 14 officersand 21 enlisted men with civilianpilot licenses - all from Field Ar- une1977

tillery. Training was at Ft. Sillfrom 15 January to 28 February1942 . Twenty members of thisunique class graduated.The Class Before One was divided in Flights A and B. Flight Ajoined the 13th Field ArtilleryBrigade at Ft. Bragg, NC. Flight Bwas assigned to the 2d InfantryDivision at Ft. Sam Houston. Eachgroup conta ined 10 pilot mechanics, an engineering officerand three mechanics.From 1 March to 16 April the 10LAs with the 2d Division logged607 hours. Nearly everyone oftheir 3,400 takeoffs and landingswere on dirt roads and open fields.Even in the rocky , wooded hills ofthe Leon Springs Military Reservation, suitable landing areas always were found. Despite difficultterrain, there were no injuries ,aircraft damage or engine failures. In fact, the engines werefound after the tests to be insuperior condition.The series of tests included: 1)adjustment of Artillery fire; 2)general and road reconnaissance;3) column control; 4) selectionof possible battalion areas; 5) location of enemy batteries; (6)spotting of targets on the map forprearranged fires; (7) surveil lance of fire; and (8) batterycamouflage checks. The slowspeed of the LAs allowed the pilotsto read messages off a blackboardwithout difficulty.Some limited tests were conducted in competition with anArmy Air Forces observationairplane stationed at nearbyBrooks Field. The Army AirForces airplane averaged 30 minutes to receive and complete a firemission while the L-4 averaged 10minutes.The LAs did not fare as well in a2-day survival exercise, whenseveral were destroyed in theair and one on the ground by thecamera guns of P-40s. But unofficial Army Air Forces observerswere of the opinion that the P-40s ,

flying at treetop level, would havethemselves been destroyed byground fire. An Army Air Forcespilot from the 22d ObservationSquadron remarked in his reportthat , due to its maneuverabilityand in the presence of friendly antiaircraft support, the L-4 wassafer in the air than on the groundagainst the P-40.

Objective Achieved. The testboard concluded that short-rangeair observation should be providedfor all Field Artillery units withoutdelay . Subsequently , on 6 June1942 , Arm y aviation was born TheWar Department directed that ateam of two liaison airplanes, withtwo pilots and a mechan ic , bemade organic to each Field Artillery battalion plus two in eachbrigade and corps Artillery headquarters . This meant 10 airplanesfor each Infantry division and six,later eight, for each Armored division. The number for each Artillery brigade varied with thenumber of battalions it contained .The Army Air Forces were to buythe airplanes for the Field Artil lery , as well as furnish spareparts, repair materials, auxiliaryflying equipment , and providebasic flight training for the pilots.The Grasshoppers went into ac tion in North Africa in November1942 and soon were flying in combat in every theater. The Army AirForces made an attempt later inthe war to regain control of theprogram . But General McNairwould not allow it because theArmy Air Forces could not perform the Army aviation duties ithad relinquished by default.

During the war the LAs becameas useful as the jeep and withinminutes could direct massive Artillery barrages on enemy positions. Indeed, they became indispensable to the Army GroundForces. In a short while theyproved the concept of Army aviation and laid the foundations of theU.S. Army 's current airmobile/airassault doctrine.17


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P S-O F F C E H S ~H O D M P

Continued from page 1dier problems with the old enlisted personnel and educationsystem . Clearly, a better systemwas needed if the Army hoped tomaintain a volunteer Army ofqualified , professional Soldiers. Asystem that was not peopleoriented as well as missionoriented was just not going to dothe job.The causes of much dissatisfaction and many problems werefound in what is known as the personnel management subsystems.These subsystems training ,evaluation , classification andpromotion) tended to operate in dependently and were not supporting one another. Soldierswere promoted to higher gradesand then evaluated to determinetheir abilities to perform in thosegrades. In other instances , Soldiers, who had been performingwell in jobs for several years ,were sent to school to learn thesame respective jobs . After re viewing situations like these theobjectives of EPMS started tocome into focus. Every Soldier needed logicaljob progression from grade E1through grade E9..A system of career-long training that prepared the Soldier toassume duties at the next highergrade had to be developed. Fair and reasonable promotion opportunity had to be developed . Soldiers needed a meaningful ,challenging job at every level oftheir careers .In general , the attitude of theenlisted corps was that officersalready had those elements builtinto their personnel system. Why18

MOS 7N Job ProgressionE -Aircraft Maintenance Senior Sergeant 67Z)E6 -M aintenance Supervisor/Technical Inspector

ES -Utility Helicopter Repairer/CrewchiefE4 -U tility Helicopter Repairer

Figurewasn t there the same concern forenlisted personnelGetting There From Here. In1972 the Army adopted a systemto group military occupationalspecialties that were related ,manageable from a personnel andmanpower standpoint , and provided vis able and logical progression from grade E1 to E9. Thesegroupings are called career management fields (CMF) .It was a good step but only thefirst. The next move was tofurther refine the career man agement fields to achieve the objectives of EPMS and provide atotal system for enlisted professional development. Understanding how this is done in each CMFwill assist later in understandingwhy specific changes were made.It usually takes at least a yearto develop a prototype careermanagement field . First , information found in the automateddata banks and surveys filled outby Soldiers are studied. Tasks andduties performed at each grade inan MOS are analyzed . Soldierswho serve in the MOS are interviewed to gain further insight intothe tasks they perform, theirproblems , attitudes and recommendations. Do meaningful jobsexist at each grade level ? Should

the MOS be consolidated withanother MOS or merged withanother at the grade where theproblem exists? What effect willnew equipment have on the Sol-dier s job? Is the reenlistmentrate low ? If so, why?In this probing manner eachMOS is carefully examined . Thisresults in the development of several prototype career fields . Theprototypes are then analyzed bycareer managers , trainers , doctrine developers and users. Themost feasible receive furtherstudy: Logical job progression ?MOS in the proper career field?Can it be supported with a realistic career-long training program?Job challenge ? Are promotionopportunities reasonable?Let s pause at this point to dis cuss promotion opportunity because promotions are a primemotivator in career development.Soldiers tend to avoid an MOS inwhich there is little chance foradvancement. What causespromotion bottlenecks, and howcan they be resolved? MOS 67N,Utility Helicopter Repairer , is agood example. Job progressionwas logical and visible (figure 1but there was a promotionbottleneck going from grade E5 toE6. This caused many Soldiers to



21/52

move to another MOS to get pro-moted. To see this clearly one hadto look at the job positions foundin the authorization modificationtable of organization/tables of dis-t r ibu t ion and l low nces(MTOE/TDA) documents. Thenumber of positions available(authorizations) impact on howmany Soldiers can be promoted ina specific MOSThe left column of figure 2shows the worldwide profile of jobpositions at grades El through E6within the MOS There were notenough 67N positions at grade Elthrough E4 to support adequatepromotion opportunity within theMOS . The underlying cause wasthe basic organization of the avia-tion company .Solving the problem involvedreconfiguring company organiza-tion , evaluating job positions andrealigning positions to allow forsufficient personnel in each gradeto support promotion to the nexthigher g r de . The MOSbottleneck was broken as shownin the right column of the chart.The advantage of being able tokeep highly qualified utilityhelicopter repairers in their jobsrather than moving them forpromotion purposes is obvious.Now le t ' s return to the de -velopment of a eMF. The pro -totype CMF is wargamed by agroup of qualified Soldiers , ex-perienced in the MOS involved .The end product of this process isthe EPMS recommended careermanagement field.Each career management fieldthen is formally coordinated withthe training commands, majorfield commands and the Depart-ment of the Army (DA) staff.When that coordination is com-pleted and disagreements havebeen resolved , the CMF is pre-sented to a steering committee ofgeneral officers representing theDA staff, major field commandsand TRADOC. The SergeantMajor of the Army also is aJune 1977

member of the committee . Dur-ing this meeting any issues whichmay still exist within a CMF areironed out , decisions are madeand the CMF is approved or dis -approved for implementation.Developing a CMF is a lengthy,painstaking process involving alot of highly qualified , conscienti-ous people . This is what it takesfor a Soldier to be able to say , Ican get there from here .

Consolidating several MOSsinto one and merging others at ahigher grade has been the sourceof much discussion . Some believethat this process causes a loss ofexpertise. Others argue that itprovides the Soldier with greaterchallenge and more variety in as-signments . Members of theEPMS task force had to come togrips with this problem when theybegan to examine the MOS struc-ture . Some MOSs had few au-thorized spaces , were extremelylimited in scope and offered littleopportunity for advancement. Aquick fix solution would havebeen to eliminate or consolidateany MOSs with fewer than 150positions. This was ruled out be-cause a lot of good Soldiers 'careers would have been hurt.Some MOSs had to bebroadened at the entry level to

provide both challenge and oppor-tunity so that the Soldier wouldwant to stay in the service. Thereason was obvious. The Armycannot afford the cost involved intraining new people to completelyrefill an MOS every 2 or 3 years.Further , it is the reenlistee whoeventually provides the experi -ence and expertise that everyMOS needs to survive.

I t has been asked if there is aconflict between more generaliza-tion under EPMS and increasedspecialization under the OfficerPersonnel Management System0 PMS). The answer lies inperspective . Before EPMS andOPMS, enlisted Soldiers and of-ficers were at opposite ends of a

spectrum . Some enlisted Soldierswere too specialized, and some of-ficers were overly generalized.Under EPMS and OPMS, the twoare now moving toward the centerof this spectrum to provide amore balanced, responsive force.It should be noted that EPMS wasnot an outgrowth of OPMS. Thesystems were developed sepa-rately.

Slower Promotions? Since 1968all of the Services ha ve beenunder increasing pressure fromCongress and Department of De-fense to halt grade creep and

MOS 7NuthorizationslOE/lDA

Before PMS fter PMS

igure

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Army Top Six: (E4-E9)- Total Enlisted100 Key

80

Requiremento 0 0 0 0 Budget Authority- - - - Actual Strength

00 0o 0 0 0 - 0 ~o 0 0 060 0 0 0 00 /o 0 0 0 0 0 - - _0o o o ~ ~ ~ ~ /__ _I,..-..40 ,..'20

68 69 10 72

bring the grade structure intoalignment with budgetary constraints Some people interpretthis as a forerunner to slowerpromotions and maybe even apromotion freeze. This is not trueGrades E4 through E9 commonly are referred to as the topsix of the enlisted grade structure. Figure 3 plots the top six as apercent of the total number ofSoldiers. The solid line representsthe Army's requirement for combat organization (total authorizedenlisted strength as determinedby totaling all of the TOE andTDA documents for the entireArmy). This is called the requiredforce.The dotted line represents thecongressional budgetary authorization for the top six. In otherwords , this is the number of topsix Soldiers for which Congresswill pay. The dashed line represents the percentages of Soldiers

73 74 i 77Figure 3

who actually have one of the topsix ranks on their sleeves.When unit commanders look attheir authorization documents(solid line) , they perceive a Non commissioned Officer (NCO)shortage In reality the Armydoes not have the money to promote the number of Soldiersstated in these documents (dottedline). At first glance it would appear that this would cause a general slowdown or promotionfreeze.Prior to fiscal year (FY) 75 werarely spent all of the money Con gress authorized for promotioninto the top six (dashed line). TheEPMS task force was given themission to relook at our gradestructure and to bring what theArmy says it needs down to alevel that Congress will fund. Atthe same time EPMS is trying toadjust CMF and MOS so thatevery Soldier has a greater oppor-

78 79 80

tunity for promotion. By 1978 theArmy expects these three lines tobe in close alignment.What does all this mean? Tobegin with, no one is going to losestripes On the contrary , asEPMS is fully implemented andpromotion bottlenecks are re duced, more Soldiers will havebetter op,?ortunities for promotion. Commanders may not be au-thorized a grade structure as highas before, but the Army will bebetter able to fill by grade what isauthorized.Perfection is not promised, butprogress has been made Commanders will have a more realistic picture of their organizationand what they will have availableto complete their mission . Thedays of promising champagne ona beer budget are coming to anend.From what has been said tmight appear that EPMS has20 u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

provided a means of ensuring thatthe Army will have a Soldier inthe proper grade for each re quirement. This is not entirel ytrue. Other factors impact onpromotions and hinder perfection .We said before that authorizatiOllS drive promotions . This istrue , but authorizations don ' tstand still for very long . They arechanged to meet requirements.

The authorization for a givenMOS will go up or down as theArmy ' s force structure ischanged. A good example of thiswas the decision to go to a 16-division force. Adjustments hadto be made in a larger number ofMOSs to allow for this expansion.As a result of such change , commanders experienced grade shortages in some MOSs and overagesin others. To correct this Soldierswere transferred from overage toshortage MOSs (reclassified ).Since the Army bases promotions on future projections , thiswill minimize the shortage problem. Keep in mind that the suc-cess of this program is dependentupon the timely submission ofdocument ( force structure )changes. The personnel systemmust have time to react

EPMS - Leaders'/ Comman-ders Responsibilities. He is oneof my best NCOs, and I can ' t understand why he wasn ' t pro-moted. Usually we blame thesystem when a deserving Soldieris not promoted on time. Well , itwill continue to happen until officers learn how to get their Soldierspromoted. They must understandEPMS and assume their roles inmanaging enlisted careers.EPMS places more emphasis onthe commanders ' roles in the professional development of their enlisted Soldiers .

Skill Level. Skill level , that ' sthe key. It 's the glue that holdsEPMS together. There are fiveskill levels associated with MOSs.They are found in the fourthcharacter of the enlisted MOSJune 1977

Skill LevelsGradeE8 E9E7

Skill Level5

E 6 _ = = = = = ~ p ~ r o ~ m ~ o g t i ~ o n ~ n = u a : \ i = f i = e d = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = : :E5 MOS QualifiedE E4

Figurecode - llB20 , 76Y3 , 63C4 . Figure 4 depicts the new relationshipbetween grade and skill level thatis standard for all MOSs.

What is a skill level? UnderEPMS it reflects the skills typically required for successful performance at the trade with whichthe skill level is associated.

What else must commandersknow about the skill level ? A Soldier must possess the skill level ofthe next higher grade in order tocompete for promotion to thatgrade. As an example , a sergeantmust hold skill level 3 - 67N3 -to compete for grade E6 . Thisprovides a stimulus for profes sional development and pre cludes Soldiers from being promoted beyond their currentcapabilities.Getting The Skill Level -Training. There are two ways tocomplete the training require-ments for the next higher skilllevel. The first is by learning thehigher skills while serving on thejob. t is called on-the-job experience (OJE). The second is tocomplete the designated schoolcourse (NCOES). They are equal.Completing the training requirement is what is important, not theroute used. This subject is coveredlater.

Counseling - E PMS. SergeantBill Smith has arrived in his newunit. The first sergeant has obtained a printout of SergeantSmith's record , and the comman-

der is reviewing it: Single. Secondenlistment. Three years , twomonths of service. Grade E5.Promoted to current grade 6months ago. Previous comman-der appointed him to specialist 4;filled an E5 slot . Must be a frontrunner. Nice to get good men.MOS 67N20. Whoa there Withmaximum waivers on time ingrade and time in service ,Sergeant Smith could start com-peting for E6 in about 10 months .But first he needs the E6 skilllevel - 3. I ll discuss that withhim:Sergeant Smith , the com-mander says , near the end of theinterview , one more thing -your professional development.Since the start of EPMS this is onething I personally monitor. Yourrecord looks great , but you needthat next higher skill level within8 months. Here 's what we can doto get you there .The first step is to locate you,grade E5, on the EPMS ladder(figure 5). This EPMS thing islike a track meet , and you havetwo hurdles to cross. First , complete either OJE or the basic NCOcourse. I just happen to have aquota for the basic course thatstarts next month, and you 're going. Your basic course is taughtover at the division NCOAcademy , so there ' s no TDYproblem.The second hurdle is the skillqualification test (SQT). You

21


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have to get that higher passing onSQT 3 in order to be awarded skilllevel 3, and we have about 8months to get you ready for thetest. Do you have the " E6 Soldiers 'Manual" that covers all the critical skills you must be able to do topass the SQT? Good I ll be gettingreports on your progress throughthe chain of command. You ' regoing to find that the unit trainingprogram will help you gain proficiency in some of those criticalskills. In others it will take someeffort on your part. "

Training and Evaluation. Let 'srefer to figure 5 again and reviewthe significant features of theEPMS ladder. AIT normally results in the award of skill level lThe primary, basic , advance andsenior courses teach the skills ofthe next higher grade level.An SP4 attends the primarylevel to learn grade E5 duties ; asergeant E5 attends the basiclevel to learn grade E6 duties, andso on. Each Soldier is administered the SQT of the next higherlevel. The SP4 takes SQT 2; thesergeant takes SQT 3, and so onup the ladder.When the tr aining and SQT requirements are successfullycompleted, the higher skill level isawa r ded The U.S. A rm ySergeants Major Academy(USASMA) will continue to be thetop level of NCO training. Notethat under the old NCOES therewere only basic and advancedlevels and the USASMA. UnderEPMS two additional levels ,primary and senior , have beenadded. These successive levels oftraining are the cornerstones formaintaining and increasing theproficiency and expertise of theNCO corps. But don ' t forget , OJEalso is an equal and totally ac-ceptable route to the developmentof professional qualificationsA number of new course namessuch as primary technical course,primary leadership course andbasic technical course are enter-

22

ing our training vocabulary. Whatare they , and how do they fit intothe NCOES under EPMS?

Essentially they are new , moredescriptive names for the combatsupport NCOES course (figure6). This figure does not mean thatevery support MOS will have acourse available at every level oftraining. Availability will dependon the technical requirements ofeach job. For example , MOS 95B,Military Police will have both aprimary and basic course at thelower levels and some type ofcourse at the advanced and seniorlevels.MOS 34H, ADMSE repairman ,will have a primary course , sometype of advanced and senior levelcourse but no basic course . I f asupport MOS requires leadershipduties at grades E5 or E6 , a pr imary leadership course will beavailable as appropriate.

Our roadm "ap is almost com plete. As mentioned, OJE is theroute to a higher skill level whenthere is no school course at a levelof training or if the Soldier doesnot attend the school course(figure 7 .

Successful completion of OJE isjudged by the commander. Aminimum of 6 months service foraward of skill levels 2 and 3 and 12months service for award ofskill levels 4 and 5 are the prerequisites. This service must be ina job calling for the Soldier ' sprimary MOS at the current ornext higher grade. OJE servicedoes not have to be continuous.Part could be completed in oneunit and the remainder inanother .

To ensure that OJE and schoolcourses are given equal weight ,promotion boards will be givenvery specific guidance on thispoint. It is a recognized fact thatthe OJE route will require moreindividual application and initiative. At the same time Soldiersusually will contribute a full dayto their unit. OJE will be given

igureE9 nMAE8I I \Skill level 5

SNCOC UJ SOT 5Skill level 4A COC ClJ SOT 4Skill level 3COC 1 SOTE5IN Skill level 2

'OC E4 1 SOTE3EI 2NC Skill level 1AT I \

E

U lassification UPromotIonTraining Evaluation

due recognition under the EPMSpromotion system .

On The Way. When all of thiswill happen can be an article byitself, but a broad brush overviewis appropriate . Below is achronological list of key eventsalong the implementation trail:

CMF approved. Start EPMS NCOES. Convert Soldiers to newMOS. Convert TOE/TDA. Administer SQT. Start award of higher skill

level (DA announcement). Start new promotion system(DA announcement).January 1979 is the scheduled

date to start administering thefirst SQT to Soldiers in CMF 67 ,Aviation Maintenance. That pro-



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Combat Support NCOES Courselevel Of Training Combat Arms Combat Support / Combat Service Support

SeniorSeniorN OCourse FunctionalCourse or MFCourseI IAdvancedN OCourse

AdvancedN OCourse

Advanced FunctionalCourserI I IBasicN O

BasicTechnicalasic Primaryleadershipnd/orCourse Course CourseI I I*Primary

N OPrimaryTechnicalrimary

Pri maryleadershipnd/orCourse Course Course

*Will become mandatory for MOS 11B 11C 110 11 12B 13B 13E 16P 16R in late 1977.

vides a perspective as to wherethe overall implementation proj-ect stands . t is envisioned thataward of the higher skill level willbegin shortly after SQT is ad-ministered to all Soldiers in anMOS. Mid 1979 is the projectedtest completion date for eMF 67.Finally, according to the currentschedule , all MOSs should beunder the EPMS promotion sys-tem by late 1979.

Figure 6Possible Mission No one

doubts the complexity of the per-sonnel management businessThis is especially true in theArmy. In the past , many com-manders were confused andsomewhat mystified as to wherethey fit into the picture. Timeshave changed The success ofEPMS depends upon comman-ders understanding and in -volvement in the system . Under

RouteASkill level Progressionom lete

RouteB

June 1977

N OES Course

CompleteOJ

Figure 7

EPMS the role of commandershas been well defined.The key is knowing how to as-sist the Soldiers in obtaining thenext higher skill level. For theSoldier this means greater profi-ciency , job satisfaction andpromotion. For the commanderthis means a better Soldier , a bet-ter unit and increased combatreadiness. That s what EPMS isall about. . . .

PassSQT

PassSQT

HigherSkillLevel

23


26/52

THIS IS THE FIRST in a ser ito familiarize readers with thThe series will include photosand municipal fields in the oIn addition, each article will caircraft fleet.

rmy vit

This month our Center glanclockwise: The OV -I Mohawkairport - used by the aircraftperforming confined area apprT-42s, OV-Is, U-Bs, U-21s and foNOE; 6) Bainbridge Municiping; 7) T-42 Baron out of Caisites for the TH-55.


27/52

IGEST will publishon Center, Fort Rucker, AL., stage fields, tac sites, rangesarea used for aviator training.s current

Center

at the top 0 and proceedinglevel; 2) Dothan Municipaltraining; 3) TH-55 Osage,rmy Airfield - home for theUH -ls; (5) the venerable UH-l atarily fixed instrument trainstagefield - one of the training


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Those new modification work orders which werecomplied with last time your bird was in maintenance must be on your mind. Do you really understand why the changes were made? The troops overin the field maintenance shop probably would belad to help you understand them.An occasional visit with your unit aviation safety

officer could prove to be very interesting. They havesome good information to pass on to those who wantto learn . And , from time to time you may be able toassist the unit safety officer.Keep in mind, your brain is like a muscle - if itisn t used and kept in good condition it may get soft .

Keep it in good condition and maintain your proficiency. Early 1979 is not as far away as it mayseem.Job Descriptions Under EPMS. Have you readyour job description since EPMS was impJemented?Some changes can be found in most jobs. Duties havebeen realigned by skill digit and in some cases dutieshave been transferred from one MOS to another.The new descriptions are in Change 7 to AR 611 -201. Your first sergeant may have a copy. I f not, yourpersonnel staff NCO or servicing military personneloffice will have a copy available.

Continued rom page Officer Personnel anagement Systemtinue to be a major concern to commissioned aviators . Specialty 71 is no exception. Specialty 71 officers are eligible for command of units at both theplatoon and company level. At battalion level theyare considered by the Combat Service SupportCommand Selection Board for command of bothspecialty 71 and any other designated specia lty supported logistics unit. Additionally, if requested inwriting , officers will be considered in their alternatespecialty by other Central Command Selection(CCS) boards; however, if selected will commandonly one. Currently there are eight specialty 71 battalion level commands in the force structure. Bytype unit and location these units include the 70th,205th and 394th AVIM Battalions in Europe; 194thMaintenance Battalion in Korea; 1st Student Battalion, Ft. Eustis; 5th Transportation Battalion , Ft.

Campbell , KY; 34th Support Battalion, Ft.Hood,TX; and the 42d Transportation Battalion, Ft.Meade, MD.Today s advancements in aviation technologyhave provided increased challenges for those personnel in logistical support roles. These challengesare being met by officers in the Aviation MaterielManagement specialty. The wide range of responsibilities associated with specialty 71 positions require the highest degree of leadership, trust andmanagerial ability. Without question the AviationMateriel Management specia lty is one of the newestand most dynamic career fields within the U. S.Army. Questions regarding specialty 71 should bedirected to the Combat Service Support Division,OPMD, ATTN: DAPC-OPG-T or AUTOVON 2217504/7505 .

D VI TION COMM NDSEPARTMENT OF the Army recently released the selected for aviation commands, while seven officersnames of officers selected for battalion level command were selected for aviation maintenance units by theduring fiscal year 1978. Selectees will be assigned to Logistics Troop Command Board. In addition, 14 avocommand positions beginning in October 1977. Twenty- iators were selected for nonaviation commands.nine lieutenant colonels or promotable majors wereAviation Troop Commands Owen, Dean M.Callender, William Pratt, James T.Dexter, Charles E. Reilly, William F .Dolloff , Theodore J . Robinson , John D.Golding, Willard Rosser, Terry N.Hannon, Harold M. Rushatz , Alfred S.Haselgrove, Leighton Sheaffer, Phillip G.Hennies, Clyde A. Smith, Billy V.Herrick , Curtis J . Stiles, HowardHolcombe, Jerry V. Turecek, Jack LKarjala, Lawrence Wilson , Donald E.Keating, David W. Logistics Troop CommandsKimes Kenneth (Aviation Maintenance Units)Lasch , John A. Archer , C.A.Mayer, Frank H. Dunnington, WarrenMcQuestion, John R. Irby, Dewitt T.Miller , George R. Johnson, Benjamin F.Morris, Jimmy Pepe , Michael J .Ostovich, Rudolph I Wade. Jerry F.

June 1977

Woodson, William BCombat Arms Troop CommandsBean, Roger KentColeman, Ronald A.Franklin, Forrest E.Funk, Paul E .Helms, Harold J.Howe, Michael BruceMassey, Ronald F.Newsome, Joseph D.Noack, Richard R.Peters , Donald L.Rittenhouse, WilliamSchweitzer, WilliamCombat Support Arms TroopCommandsBurke, Paul F.Simerly, Charles S.

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A I U U ~ ~ D 11 1 WUI


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FigurePERFORMANCE/WEIGHTS

egs 1100 MBasic Weight = 1,200 poundsPilots 2) 350 poundsFuel = 1,350 poundsGW /TO 2,900 poundsEnroute Time < 10 hoursReserve > 2 hoursESTD Min 120 knotsrate of advance

egs 1100 NMCritical leg)= 1,200

Pilot 1 180= 1,620= 3,000= 12 hours= 2 hours115 knots

inimum Team ake UpOH -6 ATW Pilots ; 10C-12 Pilots 4CE OH-6 ATW ) 2Maintenance NCO 1CE C-12) i

* Two OH -6 ATW qualified in maintenanceOne pilot acts as advance18

Five OH -6 ATW aircraft are shown here , but thenumber could be adjusted when the study of cost iscompleted and the initial go/no-go decision is made.The risk associated with theATW program is qualitatively assessed as acceptable. To start with, theaircraft have demonstrated a range capability ofmore than 1,900 NM and under adverse worst case

Figure 4

June 977

wind conditions a range in excess of 1,500 NM . Alightweight, very low frequency navigation systemis available. The OH-6 has an established track record of infrequent dynamic systems failures whichwould require a forced landing. Repair/replacementof components under austere conditions can readilybe accomplished. The aircraft is expected to flyabove its normal maximum gross weight limit forfewer than 15 flight hours and this can be furtherreduced by increasing the number of landing points .I t must be remembered that the whole flight isessentially steady state flying with relatively fewhigh-low power cycles and virtually no -maneuvering. About 32 percent of the flight is over water whichis considered to be the greatest risk situation .

In total , the probability of completing 225 flighthours without a critical mishap is high consideringthe inherent aircraft reliability, the refined state ofthe aircraft at the start , the steady state flight conditions to which the aircraft will be subjected , theminimum hours flown outside the currently approved flight envelope , the relatively nonexistentpressure of schedule constraints and the favorableweather expected during the critical phases at theproposed June-July timeframe.Completion of this world aviation first would addanother chapter to U.S. Army aviation history. Thisfeat will be accomplished by someone - there arefew aviation firsts left. f the stage can be set, theU.S. Army should most appropriately claim thisaviation f irst as its own.

TW TE M

3


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HUMAN ERROR CC ENTS

_ t ~ . . .

32

Aircraft accident investigators have been accused of dodging their duty with regard tocause determination by implicating the pilot without considering the underlyingreasons for his actions or inaction

< a ~ ~U S V SGerard M ruggink

Mr . Bruggink is the deputydirector Bureau of AccidentInvest iga t ion Nat iona lTransportation Safety BoardWashington DC . Before join-ing the NTSB in 1969 Mr .Bruggink was an air safety in-vestigator with the U .S ArmyAgency for Aviation SafetyFort Rucker . The views ex-pressed by the author do notnecessarily reflect positionstaken by the National T rans-portation Safety Board .


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H L ~ C T E R A S S U ~ N C EH U M N ERROR and Technology I believe thatcomplaints about our lack of understanding of thewhy of human error are actually expressions offrustration about the inability to counteract everyhuman shortcoming with technology. Although accident rates in all forms of flying made a nose-diveduring the last 5 years , one elusive factor has re mained relatively stable: the percentage of accidents attributed to the pilot.On the surface , this observation suggests that little or nothing has been accomplished in the form ofhuman error research, specifically with regard tothe why of behavioral aspects . However, the factthat the pilot 's statistical involvement remained thesame seems to have a straightforward explanation:We never increased the pilot 's margin for error. Assoon as we improved cockpit instrumentation andinstrument landing systems , we lowered the approach minimums. As soon as we developed weatherradar and other aids we expected the pilot to flyapproaches in weather that he might have avoided inanother era. As soon as we improved the handlingcharacteristics of tactical aircraft and associatedinstrumentation, we put the pilot at treetop level.And so on-My point is this: As soon as we learned how toreduce the pilot's error potential we used this knowledge to increase his production, be it from theeconomical or milit ary viewpoint..Consequently, hismargin for error never changed; nor has the nature

June 977

of his errors and his tendency to make errorschanged. t appears that we are confronted with aresidual accident rate that cannot be lowered unlesswe design the human element out of the system byautomation. We may have reached the last frontier in the area of human reliability.Will additional human error research help us toproceed beyond the last frontier? Specifically, willan understanding of the why of each error teach usanything we don ' t know already about the behavioral role in accident causation?There are two possible answers to this question ,depending on one 's interpretation of the behavioralrole. For reasons that will become evident, I make adistinction between innate, or true , human error andsystem-induced error.With regard to the system's role, the answer to ourquestion is: Yes. Continuing human-error researchinto the why of system-induced error is essential toensure compatibility of man, the constantly changing technology, and the operational environment.True uman Error With regard to true hmnanerror, additional research will teach us little that wedon' t know already. From the moment man stoppedusing his legs as his sole means of transportat ion, he

had an opportunity to observe the cause/effect relationship between less-than-desirable behavior andaccidents . No adult with average reasoning powerscan claim ignorance of the fact that emotions, distractions, fatigue, and a variety of other stresses

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HUMAN ERROR ACCIDENTS ND CHARACTER SSUR NCEaffect his performance. This acquired knowledgeform

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