Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1977

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1977

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UNITED

MG James C SmithCOMMANDER

U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTERA major activity of the

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

COL Keith J. RynottCOMMANDER

U.S. ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYA major activity of theInspector General and Auditor General

of the U.S. Army

Richanl K TierneyEDITORU.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ABOUT THE COVERCover design by USAAAVS

RMY VI TION

1GESSEPTEMBER 1977 VOLUME 23 NUTRADOC System Manager Offices Established

For Attock And Scout Helicopters ...................TOW Cobra - The School Solution

CPT Raymond P. Mulcahy TOW Cobra - Gunner Training Devices

CW3 William A. Yarlett Don t Feed the Bear CPT Roger E. McCauley .............So You Wanna Fly With A Headcold, Leon Dixon ..PeS Orders for PEARL ..........................................A Lesson To Relearn? Joseph B. Fries .....................Communications: A Motter Of Survival

CPT Barry Schiff ....................................................................Army Aviation Center At A Glance, IV ...............EPMS Corner: Promotion, SFC W.E. Trotman OPMS Corner: Personnel - ACIA - Astronauts

MAJ Thomas M. Walker Why Inadvertent IMC? MAJ Michael E. Hemdon .......How Important Is The Right Symbol? .................Follow The Leader Amold R. Lambert How To Crash - By The Book ............................Where Do You Look For An Accident Prevention

NCO? SGM Wesley E. Toon ATC Action Line ...................................................Rescue By 101 st Aviators ..................... lnside Bo

The mission ofthe U S RMY VI TION DIGEST is to provide information of an operational. funcnature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention . training. maintenance. operations . reand development. aviation medicine and other related data .

The DIGE ST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under the supervthe Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expressed herein are not necessarily tthe Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless othspecified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author.otherwise indicated .Articles . photos. and items of interest on Army aviation are invited . Direct communication is authto : Editor . US RMY VI TION DIGEST Fort Rucker. AL 36362.This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General. Headquarters . Department ofthe ADecember 1975. in accordance with AR 310-1.Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AComplete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR . AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern BouBaltimore . MD 21220. For any change in distribution requirements . initiate a revised DA Form 1National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should submit DA FoOther National Guard units should submit requests through their state adjutant general.Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST can omagazine from th e Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printin g Office. Washington. DAnnual subscription rates are $15.70 domestic and $19 .65 overseas.


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TRADOC System Manager OfficesEstablished

For Attack And Scout Helicopters1 JULY 1977 two new Tra in-ing and Doctrine Command(TR ADOC ) System Manager(TSM) offices were establishedunder the commander , U.S. ArmyAviation Center at F t. Rucker ,AL .The Attack Helicopter TSM Office

is headed by Colonel John Doc)

TSMAttack Helicopter

COL ahnsen

Bahnsen and the Scout Helicopte rTSM Office is led by ColonelGeorge Shallcross . Both a r eArmor officers and Master rmyAviators.Team members in the two of-fices are shown in figure 1.The TSM offices are chartered

Figure 1

by the commander , TRAD OC.The goal of the TSM progra m isto ensure that from the user spoint of view each vehicle is con-sidered as a total weapons sys-te m ea rl y in t he developmentontinued on page 8

TSMScout Helicopter

COL ShalkrossITraining

LTC MoHettIPersonnel

MAJ HippILogistics

CPT eachITraining Personnel

MAJ PierceILogistics

MAJ Mancuso

Address Attack TSMU.S Army Aviation CenterBldg 503

ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-AFt Rucker L 36362

AUTOVON: 558-5111/2108/3908

The TR DOC System Managers ,Colonel John Bahnsen left)and Colonel GeorgeShallcross (right)

LTC Moeller

Address Scout TSMU.S. Army Aviation CenterBldg 503

ATTN: ATZQ-TSM-SFt Rucker L 36362

AUTOVON: 558-3808/4909


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T O \ N ob r -The chool olut ionThis article intends to give units receiving TOWs an idea of what training isdone at the Aviation Center. It shares the combined experiences of more thana year s use of the system by the instructor pilots at Fort Rucker and hopefully provides some stimulation toward thinking about the sometimes very difficult task of target acquisition on the mid -intensity battlefield. It is hopedthat field units will use this knowledge as a foundation for further trainingintegrating the Cobra TOW crew with scout elements and the remainder ofthe combined arms team in the tactical situations we are likely to encounter

S YOUR UNIT is getting CobraTOWs?* Wonder what kind of training you ll need to be doing? Perhaps Ican answer that question .

tube- launc hed, optica lly-tracked ,wire -guided miss iles

on the mid-intensity battlefield

I ve served as flight commanderat the U.S . Army Aviation Center,Fort Rucker AL, instruct ing TOWtraining for the past year. During

this time the Center has graduatednearly 200 AH-l HueyCobra TOW

ontinued on page J9

CPT Raymond P MulcahyDepartment of Graduate Flight Training

Fort Rucker, AL


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T O \ N obra - ,Gunne r ra in ing ev ices

TOW gunner training devices have caused a great deal of command interest throughout Training and Doctrine Command U.S.Army Europe, and Forces Command. They have a significant effect on the training and proficiency of all AH-l Cobra/TOWgunners and crews. There been much confusion concerning

the application of these devices that this article can eliminate

T HE OVERALL TRAINING objective of the U.S.Army is to prepare to win the first battle of the nextwar. Accomplishing this objective will in all likelihooddepend upon a first shot kill capability against theenemy armor threat.

which is capable of launching a first shot armor penetrating tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guidedTOW) missile. This AH-l S Cobra TOW aircraft is the

primary delivery aircraft for this weapon in the fieldtoday.

A major answer is the AH-l S HueyCobra helicopterCWl William A. Yarlett

U S Army Aviation BoardFort Rucker, AL

ontinued on p ge 29


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O

lCPT Roger E McCauley

Lawton OklahomaBy OW EVERYONE has noticed that there isa trend toward better communication.Dont believe it?Well , how do you explain all those cars with theextra antenna on the freeway? Everyone is awareof the citizen band CB) radio craze. Whether youown a CB or not, you've heard that they can really help out in emergencies and aid the driver indetermining what ' s ahead. These handy littleradios even are used to provide better and fasterservice from business and public utility vehicles.Gettin ' right down to it, they even can keep youfrom feedin ' the bears [ a ~ i n g a fine for travelingover the posted speed limitJArmy aircraft radios have a lot n common withthose hauled around in the dashboards of many

cars. It s probably a good bet, though, that aviators who own CBs know more about them than theradios in their aircraft. Usually the only time youtalk about aircraft radios is during a check-ride when you're sure to be able to rattle off thewattage and nomenclature for everything in theconsole. The advice of the avionics officer usuallyis weathered and radios are off before crank. Still,you seldom talk to anyone about your aircraftradios except when the radios don t work.It s a good idea to get to know your aircraft4

radios a little better. In a tactical environment,you must know the ways the radio can work bothfor and against you. Our FM (frequency modulated) , UHF (ultra high frequency) and VHF(very high frequency) radios account for a greatdeal of aviation 's responsiveness by providingsimultaneous coordinatIOn, with many stations, inboth the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. Theseradios operate on a frequency band of 30.00 to399.95 megahertz, which is nice-to-know information. But , it ' s important to note that this fre quency band is completely susceptible to interference or exploitation by enemy electronic warfare.(This band also is triple the size of that used byU.S. maneuver battalions.) Operating on a line ofsight basis between the transmitter and receiver ,their average range is 50 miles. Average range isdependent on a number of variables: weatherconditions; time of day; operating frequency ;transmitter power ; attitude and altitude of theaircraft - all affect just how far the transmissionwill carry.Usually aviation assets closest to the enemy havethe most powerful radios. However there is little wecan do to vector this signal power , since the antennafrom which these signals radiate are fixed along theairframe. There is no way to vary power output, sofull power is used with each transmission whether it

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eon H DixonDeportment of Undergraduate Flight Training

U S rmy viation CenterP ERHAPS AN experience I once had couldchange your mind. We were stationed at FortRiley, KS, in a unit making preparation foroverseas shipment. A ferry flight of nine aircraftwas planned. We were to deliver our UH-l Hueys toSharp Army Depot, Stockton, CA.The first day s flight was uneventful. We landedat EI Paso, TX and rested. The next day s journeywould take us through the mountain ranges to thewest. That night my stick buddy .had complainedof a headcold. I thought very little about it at thetime. We were both only a few months out offlight school and quite inexperienced.At the ai rport the next day we were advised ourposition in the flight would be " tail-end charlie. "The climb to altitude went well - first 5,500 feet ,then slowly to 7,500 feet and finally at 9,500 feetwe were clear of the mountains. My stuffy-headedstick buddy made no complaints.After a while, flight lead advised us that wewould be descending for landing. We were toldabout a forming cloud layer and that the only visible hole was closing rapidly. Well , we had haddifficulty keeping up with the flight all day , sowhen they roiled it over to make it through thehole we were left behind.After descending about 500 feet, the pilot beganto make a rumble about his head. He said that hissinuses had pressure on them and he could notclear his ears. So, we leveled off. t seemed tohelp for the moment. However , the clouds werebuilding rapidly and we had only 500 pounds offuel remaining ' We decided to attempt a fartherdescent to visual flight rules (VFR) below the6

clouds. After receiving clearance I began to descend. By this time 7,500 feet), my stick buddyhad both hands on his head and was in severepain. We leveled off again, hoping to relieve someof his suffering. He tried everything: swallowing,chewing gum, holding his nose and blowing, decongestant sprays - all to no avail.I was now becoming consciously aware of ourfuel state. Our only alternative was to initiate aslow descent. As we started down I could almostfeel his pain. Bob was passing in and out of consciousness. At about 5,000 feet he passed out completely.I was concerned with the possibility that thepilot might slump over the controls or bind thepedals. I called the crewchief on intercom andtold him to pull the red handles on the pilot's seatand rotate it to the rear. There was no response. Irepeated myself rather loudly, thinking the crewchief was asleep. There was still no response, so Ilooked around only to discover he had unplugged his headset and was viewing the exteriorfrom the right side.Fortunately the pilot did not collapse on the controls. We landed at the airport (field elevationabout 4,200 feet) where an ambulance was waiting. The ambulance crew administered oxygenand smelling salts and my friend regained bothcolor and consciousness. Examination reve;,iled nopermanent ear damage, and he was released fromthe hospital in 2 days. He was lucky, but whatabout you? 'So now I ll ask you again, do you want to flywith a headcold?

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< 3 ~ ~ Moving on to bigger things inUB VB this everchanging rmy

p s orders for PE RLI N LATE 966 we decided totake on the job of telling youeverything you wanted to know- and probably some things youdidn't - about aviation life support equipment.With VIetnam came speedy development of new and muchneeded survival gear and alongwith it an avalanche of questionson how to get it , wear it , maintain it , and use it. Since therewas no single source for the fieldto turn to for answers - andrealizing the safety payoff fromthe proper use of personalequipment - we created PEARLan acronym for PersonalEquipment and Rescue/SurvivalLowdown ) to be our chief ad viser on all life support equipment matters .After the name came thesearch for a model. We didn ' thave to look far . We put a flightsuit on our editorial clerk , posedher with pen gun and flares , andscheduled release of our firstPEARL copy for the February1967 IG ST Since then we have had sevenPEARLs , clad in everythingfrom boots to bikinis, on the receiving end of our invitation toAsk PEARL. And ask you did... and discuss, and suggest, andpropose , and refer to , and quizon everything from yesterday 'sill-fitting APH-5 helmet andSeptember 1977


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pes ORDERS FOR PE RL

Mary Windham1967

Gayle alkcom1968

Judy Strickland1968

ecky Deloney1968

flammable cotton flight suit totoday s SPH-4 and Nomex.Thats the way we wanted it ...because through this exchangelives were saved by the properuse of personal equipment .. . andthat s what PEARL is all about.Over the years , PEARL has become synonymous with aviationlife support equipment , a reliable adviser and recognized authority. And that s the way she llcontinue in her new assignment.By mutual agreement she willPCS in October to the DARCOMProject Officer for Aviation LifeSupport Equipment , Mr. A.B.C.Davis. You ll still get PEARL sstraight answers and delightfulcurves in the pages of the DIGEST ... in fact the same pages,

Pearl s good looks and her dress or lack of it) inspired an occasional poetic effTO PE RL

Briefly should Vu advertiseSafety togs for tho8e fly guys,

Really, it 's a cruel miraseFor such a lithesome fuselase

To lead an ailman to reactOnly to the nicely ulltBcked

Why, PE RL Dear, are VU 8 cladIn furs and helmets mMnt for d-

Symbol of a warm flight crew?rctic wolves could do this too.Life preservers do their job,

But why must they VUT beauty rob?Leather gloves on tender wriBt-Analogous to camel's kissIs exploitation of sweet charmsVital to OUT men at arms?YOUT editor should cry Hinis "

nd put VU back in VUT bikini.-Stanley B. DemesFulle rton , CA 92633

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Martha Wiggin1969

September 1977

Pearl has come a long way since thedays of fire resistant fatigues and theAPH-5 helmet.

arbara Lindstrand1970 Wanda McLemore19711974 an Schwab1975197746 and 47. Here she ll continue toanswer all your questions onALSE. Queries should be ad-dressed to DARCOM, ATTN:DRCPO-ALSE/PEARL, P.O. Box209 St. Louis, MO 63166 or callAUTOVON 698-3241/3291.USAAAVS will stay in theALSE business, sans PEARL,through FLIGHTFAX. We ll report to you regularly on the effectiveness of your ALSE from asafety standpoint. We will alsopublish and distribute PEARL'smemoirs - a pamphlet titledThe Best of PEARL. Sure tobe a bestseller, this booklet willcombine under one cover all thestill-pertinent info from 10 yearsof PEARL. We ll let you know inFLIGHTFAX when copies areavailable.We wish PEARL well in hernew assignment ... in her increasingly important role as theArmy's chief adviser on ALSE.We are proud of all ourPEARLs. Their contributions tosafety have been considerable.And we look forward to futureissues of the DIGEST displayingall those PEARL charms ... asone reader put it:PEARL's wholesome looksMake safety a duty.We ll read your dry books,But give us our beauty.

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esson To

RELEARNThis article presents the personal views of the author and doesnot necessarily represent the views of Department of Defenseagencies

Joseph B. FriesProject Officer Directorate of Combat Developments

U .S. rmy ir Defense School Ft . l ss T XDURING WORLD WAR II theBritish lost 15 Mosquito aircraftto the fires of British and American forces . They also lost dozensof Spitfires , Hurricanes andother aircraft to the same fires.Army antiaircraft , in an 11-month period during World WarII , destroyed 12 Army Air Forcesaircraft which were violating theidentification criteria. More re cently, Egyptian air defenseforces shot down 40 of their ownaircraft during the 1973 MideastWar.There are many more suchwar stories to provide lessons onthe continuing need for bettercooperation between aircraft andground forces . Recent experiences between Army aviationand air defense artillery (ADA)indicate that these lessons mayhave to be relearned the hardway. The interface is generallyweak, but of specific interest inthis article is the fact thatteamwork on electronic identification, friend or foe (IFF) matters has been poor during simulated combat in joint trainingexercises.Aviators and air defense artillery will have enough problems(e.g. , ZSU 23 4 and the MIG-23)during combat without the selfinflicted wound of improper IFFuse. Here are two war storiesdrawn from joint exercises: In an exercise planning10

conference , a senior air defense artilleryman endorsedthe shoot-em-down-and -sort em-on-the -ground philosophyand a master Army aviator notedthat the artilleryman had flownsuccessfully for 15 years withoutusing IFF. These attitudes seem tohave carried over into the exerciseitself. The exercise plan published16 IFF mode/code combinationsfor combined air defense identification and ai r traffic control use atanyone time. The ADA rules ofengagement/hostile criteria established for Hawk Air DefenseMissile Syst em authorized en-gagement of any aircraft thatwas incomIng , nd below xfeet , nd above y knots , ndwithout proper electronic IFFresponse Division AH -l Huey.cobras frequently identifiedthemselves as hostile to Hawkby simultaneously meeting l lfour hostile criteria . The result- a number of perfectly legalsimulated engagements of Cobras by division-support Hawk.Had the Cobras used IF F , thiswould not have happened.

Another exercise plan assigned low flying helicopters acertain IFF mode , with a re quirement for frequent inflightcode-change, for air defense identification. Virtually no Army aircraft complied with the rules.which, in this case, were nearlyimpossible for aviators to implement. The air defense rules of en-

gagement for Hawk authorizedengagement of helicopters thatwere in a multiple-aircraft formation , nd not under flight plan,nd not under FCC/FOC (FlightCoordination Center/Flight Operations Center) control, nd without proper IFF response. Many

of the division's helicopter formations and some nonformationsthat looked like formations on aradar scope , identified them selves as hostile to Hawk bysimultaneously meeting l l fourhostile criteria. During the exercise, a senior Army aviator expressed no concern over nonuse ofIFF by division aviators becausewe fly so low you ADA people willnever see us anyway. Hawkskin-tracked and performed simulated legal engagements on anumber of these helicopters during that exercise. Had the helicopters used IFF , this would not havehappened.

These examples are twoamong many that threaten Armyhelicopter survivability on thebattlefield. They also illustrate ahazard to the health of aviatorsas well as a potential waste oscarce and expensive ammunition intended for use against theenemy.The rest of this article presents one man ' s views for consideration by Army aviatorsThe views are unofficial, possibly biased, and perhaps do no

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identify all the culprits. But theproblem is real and the article isintended to get Army aviatorsthinking more about this seriousand significant problem area.Problem Causes. The p o t n t i ~ lfor self-inflicted wounds seems

to stem from several causes: Army aviation and ADAlack experience working together. Doctrine, service school in-struction and unit training regarding dissemination and use ofIFF instructions appear in adequate. Some in air defense artillery have the mistaken idea thatthey will only be worried aboutjet aircraft during combat. Some aviators are notaware that electronic IFF is amajor part of the air defenserules of engagement. Further-more, some are under the falseimpression that their flight tactics will always make them un-seen to friendly air defenseradars. Some do not distinguish thedifferent environments for IFF

use: civil ATC (air traffic control), exercise and combat.Environmental Differences.The IFF environment varieswith the theater and the situation:

Civil ATC: Army aircraftmust fit into the civil ATCscheme when operating in andentering/departing that environment. Much of the electronicIFF capability is turned off, un-less a request for turn-on is received from an air traffic controller. Codes may be changedinflight as necessary to enhanceair traffic control service. Misuse of IFF rarely imposes a severe penalty. Exercises Exercises takeplace in a mixed civil ATCcombat environment. Divisionaviation may not use formalATC services in the exercisearea and aviators may thereforenot be motivated to turn on theirIFF and check code settings. Or,maybe they do not get the word.This has been the case in mostexercises the past few years.Failure to use IFF would cause

no great problem if it were notfor the requirement to train forair defense-aviation teamwork inas realistic an environment aspossible. Aviator misuse ornonuse of IFF degrades the AirDefense force's ability to identaircraft. Nonlethal mistakes thenaccumulate. Aviators rarely findout that they caused themselvesto be killed by their own ADA2 minutes into exercise D-Day.Combat In combat, mostof the IFF capability must beturned on; codes must bechanged frequently on a rigidarea-wide schedule; and the ATefunction is not permitted to in

terfere with the use of IFF thatprovides identification to otherfriendly weapons. The price ofIFF misuse may be high i we donot learn to use IFF equipment.Equipment. The IFF systemconsists of transponders and interrogators: Transponders The air-borne element of the electronicIFF system has the task of receiving a coded question andthen sending a coded answer.

APX

September 1977

MODEO


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The answer to air traffic controllers often contains aircraft andflight details further augmentedby ground-air-ground voice contact. The Army air defenseforces do not use ground-airground voice links and only areconcerned with the aircraft'sfriendly or hostile character.Interrogators Interrogators ask the question: Areyou a friend? Air defense primary radars and air defense aircraft have IFF interrogators theinterrogators are often calledsecondary radars ). Future visually directed Army air defenseartillery systems, e.g., theshoulder-fired Stinger, also willhave an IFF interrogation capability to augment visual identification.Modes And Codes. The systemof transponders and interrogators uses various mode/code

combinations to complete thequestion-answer cycle for aviators, ATC and air defense. Themode/code combinations arebulk allocated at or above thejoint force level and translatedinto specific rules and lists at theair defense commander/airspacemanager (normally the AirForce commander) level. Thenecessary information is thenprovided to all users. The Armyis responsible for internal dissemination of procedural andcode list information. Four IFFmodes, each with changeablecodes, are the key to the successful interface of aviation andair defense forces. All fourmodes may be on simultaneously.Mode 1: Transponder response to interrogations in thismode provides part of an aircraft's signature: In peace-

time the Mode 1 code changes in-frequently. In war the code in effect changes frequently on a rigidschedule. Changes are accomplished inflight. Mode 1 isnormally on in peace or war theArmy aviator with an APX-44transponder can turn Mode 1 offonly by placing the entire transponder to the off or standby setting) .

Mode 2: This mode provides the remainder of the aircraft's unique signature. Eachaircraft or aviation unit has itsown Mode 2 code setting. InflighMode 2 code change is not required in peace or war. UnlikeMode 1, Mode 2 normally isturned on only when requestedby a ground controller. Otherwise , Mode 2 if off in peace owar. This mode is not usually ofinterest to the Army ADA forcesin combat.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -APX-72----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -R PLY T ST

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Mode 3/ A Also called " 3"or A ): To this point, IFF useis not greatly different inpeacetime versus combat conditions. However, Mode 3/A usageis different (APX-72). In the civilATC environment. Mode 3/A oftenis off; it is turned on and codechanges made inflight as directedby ATC via ground -air-groundvoice communicatiens. Differentblocks of codes may be assignedto different aircraft or functionsin an area and used as necessaryto aid in ATC . The combat concept is almost diametrically op-posed to the civil ATC concept.In combat , Mode 3/A always ison , only one Mode 3/A code is setin and changed per an area-wideschedule and ATC usually is notauthorized to order code changeor Mode 3/A turn-off. This is because, in combat, identificationfor weapon control purposestakes priority over ATe usage.

Mode 3/A becomes the primarymeans for an aircraft not equipped with Mode 4 to electronicallyidentify itself as a " friend " tothe various other weapons. Anaircraft not responding properlyin any of the modes employedfor air defense identification during combat is in danger of destruction by friendly forces.

Mode 4: Suitably equippedaircraft use Mode 4 as the wayof securely identifying themselves electronically as " friend"to weapon controllers. Mode 4comes close to providing " positive friend" identification. Theaviator has an indicator light totell him when he is being interrogated in this mode. ATC doesnot use the mode for purely ATCpurposes. Codes are keyset whilethe aircraft is on the ground.Mode 4 normally is on in combat. Because not all aircraft areequipped with the Mode 4 capability, the air defense forces in

Aviator Control Preflight Initial InflightSetting Setting ChangesFunction Control MOD None(APX-44 only)Mastlr ~ 2 t m l NORM None*Mode Enable SwitchesMode 1 (APX-72 only) ON None

Mode 2 OFF As ATC requestsMode 3/A ON ..t:lsHIaMode 4 OFF** None~ e Control DialsMode 1 Code List OnlI as I rt

of exercise-widechanle scheduleMode 2 - no access Code List (one- Noneinflight in most time assignment)

aircraft)Mode 3/A Code List Onll as i rt ofexerciM-wiele

cha e schedule

* Except actual inflight emergency requires ute of EMER setting and, forAPX-44 only, Mode 3 code 77Because of normal security requirements. May not apply in some cases

September 1977

combat continue to use Mode 3/Aas the primary means of identifying nonmode 4 aircraft.Suggested IFF Use. The IFFconcept must be implemented byproperly setting switches anddials in aircraft and on ADAweapons. Suggested rules are:Exercises: Rules for IFFuse are, or should be, publishedin exercise directives. The mostcombat-like environment will besimulated in the exercise areaby the mode/code use shown inthe figure below. The figureapplies to single aircraft flights ,flight leaders and tailmen instrung-out formations . Differences from common civil ATC applications are underlined. Initial settings and self-tests should bepart of the preflight checkout procedure.Combat: Rules for use ofIFF during combat are published in each theater in classified directives. Such rules aremuch like the suggested exerciserules with the understanding thatMode 4 use for air defense identification purposes is stressed .Also, the joint commanders 'combat rules may specify thatthe entire IFF transponder beturned to standby when overenemy territory and outside therange of friendly weapons . Thisreduces the possibility of enemyexploitation of the IFF radiations to the aviator's disadvantage. IFF turn-on occurs uponreentry, as described by the jointrules, because the need to identify oneself then takes precedence.

f Army ADA and Army aviation are to do their thing - tothe enemy rather than to eachother - they will have to understand the rules and play bythem. One of the rules calls foraviators to obtain and use theIFF mode/code lists. Theyshould not wait for a shootingwar to practice this. Lessons re-learned are expensive

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CQm municationsatter Ofu rvival

Barry SchiffTrans World Airlines, Captain

Reprinted from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association AOPA) Pilot

COMMUNICATION is the fundamental toolused by man to build an advancing society. Without it, there would not be antibiotics, footsteps onthe moon, or supersonic flight.

t seems incongruous, therefore, that one ofaviation's most pressing problems is the often unacceptable quality of this vital necessity. For despitethe marvels of sophisticated ARTS III computertechnology, the weakest link in the ATC chain is theinterface between pilot and controller. Because theyoften communicate with confusing terminology andutilize variously misinterpreted procedures, thislink can stretch to intolerable limits. Occasionally, itsnaps.The result is the type of accident that occurredon 1 December 1974 when TWA's Flight 514 wascleared for an approach to Runway 12 at DullesInternational Airport near Washington, DC. Thecaptain interpreted this to mean that it was safeto descend to the lowest altitude published prior tothe final approach fix; the controller thoughtotherwise and a communications gap occurred.The resultant tragedy clearly demonstrated (according to NTSB) that a major cause of the accident was a lack of understanding between pilotand controller.Although it may be self-serving to condemn the

captain for having descended prematurely, it isworth noting that the approach clearance hasbeen misunderstood by the aviation communityfor years.In 1967 the Air Force requested clarification ofCleared for the approach as it pertains to terrain avoidance responsibility. In 1970 at least onemajor airline repeated the need for definition. Asatisfactory answer was not provided.FAA did respond, however, to the loss of 9214

lives. A few months after the TWA accident, FARPart 91 was revised to state, in essence, that whena pilot is cleared for an approach, he shall maintain the last assigned altitude until established ona published route at which time he may descendto the applicable published altitude.Admittedly, no one has the foresight to deviseprocedures that anticipate all potential problems.Even if this were possible, the resultant body oflaw would be impractically voluminous. But whenpilots wave a red flag and admit confusion regarding a specific procedure , someone in thebureaucratic hierarchy should have the commonsense to pay attention. Similar misunderstandingsbetween pilots and controllers cannot be tolerated.One reason for the confusion is that controllers

ARTSATCFAAFARIAFIFRILSMEAMSAMVANTSBSTARTWAVFRVHFVORVORTAC

GLOSSARYAutomated Radar Terminal Systemair traHic controlFederal Aviation AdministrationFederal Aviation Regulationinitiol approach fixinstrument flight rulesinstrument landing systemminimum enroute altitudeminimum sector altitudeminimum vectoring altitudeNotional Transportation Safety Boardstandard terminal arrival routeTrans World Airlinevisual flight rulesvery high frequencyVHF omnidirectional rangeVHF omnidirectional range/toctical airnavigation



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have a lexicon and a procedures manual that isnot readily available to most pilots. Occasionallythis creates an impossible situation and is likeplaying football with one rule book while the op-posing team uses another. Pilots, however, havemore than touchdowns at stake.Even a supreme authority, the NTSB, contri

butes a confusion by misinterpreting certainterms. Two members of the board, for example,stated officially that the TWA accident would nothave occurred, if the pilot had maintained theminimum sector altitude (MSA) as depicted onthe approach plate. This is true but erroneouslyimplies that when a pilot is on a radar vector andis cleared for an approach , he should not descendbelow the MSA. Figure 1 helps to demonstratewhy this is completely absurd.The diagram is a simplified view of an ILS approach to Runway 25 at Ontario, CA. The aircraftis on a vector to the localizer at 3,000 feet. Prior tointercept, the pilot is cleared for the approach atwhich time he determines that the MSA for thenorth-easterly quadrant is 11,900 feet because ofmountains north of his position. According toNTSB's implication, a pilot should not be belowthe MSA. Is he expected, therefore, to climb to11,900 feet? Obviously not.The MSA is an emergency altitude to be considered only when a pilot is unable to determine anapplicable safe altitude due to radar or communications difficulties.There are a host of other terms subject to misinterpretation. Take, for example, something assimple as a VFR, straight-out departure. Recently, a pilot requested and was cleared for a

11,100 11,900 6,700

2800

.... 4768',

1361

Elev. = 952

straight-out. After tracking the extended runway centerline until well outside the traffic pattern 3 miles), the pilot turned right to proceedenroute. Shortly after turning, however, he had anear-miss with a helicopter.A violation was filed against the pilot becausehe failed to make a straight-out departure fromthe airport traffic area, which has a 5-mile radius.The pilot ultimately got off the hook because theFAA did not have an official definition for astraight-out departure.There are a number of terms taken for grantedthat have no official status in modern, ATC jargon.Parenthetically, the TWA accident probablywould not have occurred were it not for somethingelse that most pilots take for granted - the radarvector. Had the captain been allowed to navigateby following published routes , he never wouldhave been in doubt as to the minimum enroute altitude for any portion of his flight. MEAs areprinted plainly for all to see.Radar vectors ars usually accepted graciouslyby most pilots because these presumably simplifynavigation and allow additional time to preparefor an impending IFR approach. But some pilotsare beginning to regard radar vectors with mixedemotions. By accepting a vector, navigation andterrain clearance responsibility shifts from thecockpit to the controller. For a variety of reasons,this can result in disaster - aircraft have beenvectored into mountains.Once an aircraft is removed from a publishedroute by a controller, it is often difficult for thepilot to determine applicable minimum safe al-

Minimum Sector Altitudes MSA)T v.l ld only within 2S nm ofthe prim.ry appro.ch f .cl l l ty whiChin th l . c is the LOM

FigureA 2197'

Intercept Glideslope from Below at 2 800

15


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Livingstonirport

Figure

AlphaVORlACand even the pros get caught making assumptionsthat can res ult in accident statistics . As procedures become more complex and communicationsbecome a battle of semantics , it behooves a pilotto question anything about which he is in doubt.For many , this is a difficult pill to swallow. t is aform of ignorance they are reluctant to admit.But unless a pilot thoroughly understands what isexpected of him at all times , picking up the mikeand reques ting clarification can be one of themost important survival techniques he ' ll everuse.Pilots and controllers both are guilty of addingto confusion by using improper terminology. Aircarriers , for example, have been requesting descents at pilot 's discretion . The purpose of thisis to remain high as long as is practical in an effort to save fuel.

As a result , you' ll often overhear something likethis: Flight 76 , descend to six thousand , pilot 'sdiscretion .The pilot gets cute and responds , Roger , sixthou, Papa Delta .Papa Delta , of course , has come to unofficially stand for pilot's discretion. The controllerpicks up on this jargon and uses it when controlling someone unfamiliar with the phrase . A Comanche , for example , was cleared to fourthousand, Papa Delta .Before the confused pilot had a chance to respond, another pilot piped up with, Center , this isNovember Four Papa Delta , did you call? Nonstandard terminology is easily misinterpretedand using it is a dangerous habit.September 1977

CharlieVORTAC

In response to NTSB 's recommendations re garding the TWA accident, FAA assigned a taskforce to develop a Pilot-Controller Glossary inan effort to prevent misunderstandings caused byunfamiliar phraseology.After reviewing a proposed draft of the glossary , I must admit that this is a significant step inthe right direction, but am disappointed that thepresentation isn ' t more down-to-earth legalese is used profusely ... .it is published in theAIM , the glossary should be mandatory study for allpilots who use a radio. In addition to clarifying previously undefined terms , some new ones have beenadded such as closed traffic which means successive takeoffs and landings without leaving thetraffic pattern. Pilots will also learn that when flying a direct route (other than an airway) betweentwo fixes , these automatically become compulsoryreporting points. We 're also told about special IFR ,torching, fast filing, MVAs and what is expected ofpilots as a result of various requests and clearances.[This publication has been disseminated to thefield. ]Pilots , especially the inexperienced, often are inawe of the faceless voice that booms from thespeaker. They respond to controllers' instructionsas if they were commandments chiseled in stoneby lightning from atop Mount Sinai. But controllers, it must be remembered , are mere mortalsand , like pilots , are capable of error. When indoubt , don' t hesitate to ask for clarification abouta confusing clearance or phrase. Question any-'thing illogical.

Sometimes an instruction from ATC must be17


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placed in proper perspective. Take, for example,the case of a pilot about to execute a VOR approach. He is told by approach control to contactthe tower at the VOR. Passing the final approach fix (the VOR, in this case) is usually thebusiest phase of a nonprecision approach, and theleast important duty is to contact the tower.Communications should be delayed, therefore,until four of the five Ts have been satisfied: 1)time (start stopwatch); 2) turn (toward the finalapproach course); 3) tuck (begin descent); 4)tune (the proper radial); and, after these dutieshave been accomplished 5) talk (to the tower).Numerous approaches have resulted in misses(and worse) simply because pilots were so un-necessarily anxious to report to the tower thatthey failed to properly exercise prudent IFRtechnique. Fly first; talk later.Unintentionally and occasionally , controllersmake requests or ask questions during criticalphases of an approach or landing. I f confronted bysuch a distraction, ignore the controller until youfeel it is safe to take the time to respond.Pilots readily complain about being mishandledby controllers but there are equally valid complaints on the other side of the coin.Controllers have one particular pet peeve thatpilots frequently commit, and it is something thatcan lead to disaster. The scenario goes like this.The controller issues a clearance to a pilot, butpauses slightly before completing the transmission. Quick to respond, the pilot begins to transmita reply without realizing that the controller hassimultaneously begun to broadcast the remainderof the clearance. The controller releases his mikebutton in time to hear what he assumes to be anacknowledgement of the entire clearance when, infact, a key element of the clearance was neverreceived by the pilot.Other incidents are caused by:

transmissions containing sound-a-like wordsand aircraft identifications; transposing numbers in transponder codes; incorrectly copying a clearance containing along string of numbers; wrong aircraft acknowledging a clearancewhen this goes undetected by a busy controller; a controller who forgets about an aircraft he hastold to standby ; and incorrect clearance readbacks not caught bycontrollers.FAA is attempting to resolve these and othercommunications difficulties by improving controller training programs. But the pilot's help is

8

needed. The ATC system cannot work withoutmutual respect and cooperation. When in doubtabout something, ask for a repeat or a clarification. Be alert for partially blocked transmissions.Don't hesitate to speak up when you overhearsomeone else make a mistake (such as when thewrong aircraft responds or when a controller failsto recognize that a clearance has been read backincorrectly) .Among other items, do not be overly cooperative by accepting dangerously fast approachspeeds. Alert the controller when it appears that aradar vector for an ILS approach will not providea satisfactory intercept or when a lower altitudeis needed to establish glide slope intercept prior tothe outer marker.Pilots can also assist the. ATC system by exercising tolerance and constraint. I t is not unusuafor a pilot to misinterpret the harried, freneticvoice of a controller and take personal affront towhat appears to be a curt , overbearing attitudeGenerally, when a controller sounds rude it is because he is temporarily overloaded with trafficPilots can help by being more considerate of acontroller's problems.Unfortunately , a few controllers do oversteptheir authority and are unnecessarily demandingand dictatorial. Although it is human nature tuse the VHF frequencies as the medium for a rebuttal, this can only lead to distractions, misdirected traffic and a generally hazardous environment. Pilots have a far more powerful weapoto use against errant controllers - the pen. Simply state your complaint and submit it along witthe time of occurrence to the branch chief oeither ATC Evaluations or Operations at the respective FAA regional headquarters. When youletter (or phone call) is received , the tape of thconversation (which is kept for only 15 days) wilbe consulted and the misbehaving controller wilbe put on the carpet.Should a controller, however, require somethingthat a pilot considers unsafe and more immediataction is required, he can respond simply witnegative or unable. A pilot is not obligated tabide by a clearance until it has een accepted

The purpose of this critique is not to induce confrontations between pilots and controllers. Enougof such misguided thinking has been publisheelsewhere. Our purpose here is to simply point ousome major problem areas and emphasize that thATC system consists fundamentally of human beings, all of whom are fallible. The common goal osafety requires alertness, honesty and a clear, understandable channel of communications betweeeveryone involved.U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGES


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The choo l o lu tionContinued from p gequalified aviators and upgradedits fleet from AH-IQs to AH-lSsmods). Plans call for converting to AH-lSs (new) by the endof the year.This article covers three general areas: training currentlybeing conducted at the Center;lessons learned in a year ofoperating the TOW; and targetacq uisition.The last area deals with usingthe TOW system for target acquisition and has applicability tonearly all active Army and Reserve component aviation unitsthat may e involved in searchingfor targets on the mid-intensity(high threat) battlefield.

Center Training: The course ofinstruction for the Cobra TOWCourse includes 27 hours ofacademic instruction (figure 1).This instruction covers airframedifferences between the AH-IGand the AH-lS; detailed instruction on the TOW Missile System(XM-65); Helmet Sight Subsystem (HSS) (XM-128); and theturret subsystems (M28AIEl).Each student receives 6 hoursof dual flight instruction; 4 hoursof practice tracking; 1 hours of

range firing and hour of theuse of the pilot steering indicatorPSI). Each student fires 3,000rounds of 7.62 mm , and 250rounds of 40 mm using theM28AIE 1 turret. This firinggives the student the opportunityto fire live ammunition usingboth the telescopic sight unit(TSU) and the HSS One studentper class also has the opportunity to fire a TOW missile with ahigh explosive warhead.The major goals of the courseare: to provide the students withdetailed knowledge of system operation and integration; sufficient opportunity to applytheir knowledge and gain confidence in their ability to effectivelyuse the system; the importance of crew coordination and cockpit teamwork;and to develop the students ' ability in using the TSU to smoothlytrack a moving target.

The detailed instruction onsystem operation begins inacademics , which at the AviationCenter is completed prior to thestudent reporting to the flightline. Here students are taughtairframe differences on the Smodel to include instruction onthe hydraulic , electrical , trans-

Figure 1 COBRA TOW COlAcademic Subjects HoursAH-1 S differences ................................. ...............................5Cockpit familiariza tion ........................................................ 2Operating limitations/characteristics ..................................1Intraduction to TOW ........................................................... 1TOW Missile System (TMS) unit description ...................... 3TMS operations, malfunctions and trauble shooting ......... 3TMS safety precautions ....................................................... 1Introduction t the helmet sight subsystem ....................... 1Cockpit procedures ....... ......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ...... 2 (PE*)TMS tracking and firing practice ........... ........... ........... ....... 6 (PE)Exam and critique ...............................................................227Flight SubjectsTMS tracking .............................................. .............. .......... 4 (Dual)M28A 1 E 1 firing ............. .... _............................................1.5 (Dual)Use of pilot steering indicator ......................................... (Dual)6.0* Practical exercise

September 1977

mission, directional control andengine systems. Also coveredare cockpit modifications required for the TOW system, operational limits and performancecharacteristics. Instruction onthe weapons systems includesunit description , location andfunction of the major components , principles of operationand operator troubleshooting ofsystem malfunctions. Academicinstruction also is used as thefoundation for some additionalflight line briefings on how themissile is guided to the targetand the time sequence involvedin missile launching .On the flight line orientationcovers effective use of the system. One of the prime vehiclesfor accomplishing this is theAH-lS checklist. The checklist outlines the armament check to beperformed after engine runup. Infollowing these checks, the crewputs the systems into operationand also manipulates the majorswitches and controls, checkingfor proper operation. A crew thatunderstands and follows thechecks will be able to effectivelyemploy the system. The length oftime required to complete thesechecks also may serve as a measure of crew confidence and cooperation. A well trained crewshould complete the checks in 5 to8 minutes, roughly the samelength of time required for the engine start and runup checks.Crew coordination and cockpitteamwork always have been important in the Cobra. But theywill be even more important inthe Cobra TOW. In the AH-IGthe pilot fires the primaryweapons system while doing themajority of the flying. The gunner performs the crucial tasks ofNOE navigation and can providecovering fire with the turret.In the Cobra TOW (AH-IQ andAH-lS), the pilot still does theflying but also provides coveringfire with the turret using the

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Figure 2Pilot

TARGET HANDOFF PILOT TO GUNNER

GunnerTankOn Ridgeline

Gunner

Acquisition

Tank - T62Moving Leftto Right2 Mils3,400 meters

HSS , while the gunner fires theprimary weapons system , theTOW.Crew tr aining is enhanced bymaintaining crew integrity to thegreatest extent possible. Repeated battle drills with thesame crewmembers greatly reduces required engagement timeand enhances crew survivability.Crew coordination is addressedin the TOW course by involving

hem DescriptionAlertTarget DescriptionVisual cue to assist gunner intarget locationGunner states when PHS button isreleased. Indicates TSU has targetand that pilot can movehis head:Gunner identifies as eitherfriend or foeGunner specifies movement sopilot can plan for prelaunchconstraintsGunner states width, in mils,of targetGunner uses WORM formulato estimate range

both members n the armamentchecks, various discussions ontarget acquisitions, engagementand disengagement techniques(as outlined in TC 1-4, HelicopterGunnery ) and a target handoffprocedure to be used when thepilot acquires a target of opportunity and wants the gunner to engageit using the telescopic sight unit(figure 2).A part of the flight training in-

volves the gunner tracking amoving target and receivingfeedback from the instructorpilot lP) in the form of a numerical score produced by thegunners accuracy control panel(GACP, but also commonly referred to as a GAZAP). TheGACP measures how consistently the gunner tracks a moving infrared target M-89 targetsource) .The scores displayed by theGACP indicate the relative consistency with which studentstracked the target in both thehorizontal and vertical axesThis device , while extremelyvaluable in initial qualificationhas little application in tacticaltraining and may not be widelyavailable in the field units. (Seepage 3 for more information onCobra TOW training devices.) Acrucial lesson students encounterwhile learning to track smoothlyis that they can be their ownworst enemies. The reason isthat the track stick , unlike ahelicopter cyclic, does not movein response to pressures applied

Figure 3 Pilot should maintain 125 feet GL when gunner uses TSU sight d e ~ i c e In case of electricalpower failure the turret automatically reverts to gunner's helmet sight for positioning commands.k gunner is looking down into TSU rounds will impact just below the aircraft

20 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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'\Figure Position of the Stow/TrockiAcquisition switch must be checked carefully when firing turret. When

in track the turret follows the TSU. Above a Cobra fires at extreme angle due to drift of T U

to it. It merely measures thepressures applied and moves theTSU accordingly. Errors are increased if a great amount of pressure is applied to the track stick.A very light touch is sufficient toproduce the desired results. Thecourse also includes a basic introduction to vehicle identification, range estimation using the13X optics, and boresighting ofthe TOW Missile System.Lessons Learned Below aresome characteristics of the system learned in the school of hardknocks. Heed the warnings on page4-1 of the S model -10 (Change3). When the gunner is firing theturret using the TSU as thesighting device, maintain 125feet altitude. Should electricalpower to the TSU fail (and ithas) the turret will 8.utomati-cally revert to the gunner's helmet sight for its positioningSeptember 1977

commands. Since the gunner islooking down into the TSU, therounds will impact just below theaircraft (figure 3). (Does notapply to new (production) S. ) Remember to physicallycheck the position of theStow/Track/Acquisition (S/T/ Aswitch when firing the turret.When selecting the TSU/Gunsmode for turret firing, the onlyswitch that determines whetherthe turret takes its positioningcommands from the TSU or theHSS is the S/T/A switch. When inthe stow position, the turret responds to the HSS. When intrack, the turret follows the TSU.See figure 4 for an idea of whatcan go wrong. [Gunnery IP'snote: When the gunner selectsTSU/Guns, and depresses the lefthand grip action bar, the PSI indications are no longer valid.] Exercise extreme cautionwhen using the HSS to fire the

turret. It's human nature to turnthe head and look at anythingthat catches the eye. Should anaircraft suddenly unmask to yourside while you're firing, you'llwant to turn and look at it. Don't doit while you are firing or you'llshoot your wingship down. Manyother flying duties require us tohave our heads on a swivel, butremember to concentrate on yourtarget during firing. Let the nonfiring crewmember's head be ona swivel. When firing missiles withmore than one TOW aboard useeither the Manual Armed Modeor release the action bar andtrigger after missile launch. fthe action bar and trigger areheld depressed, and the ModeSelect is in Auto Armed - and ifthe pilot still has the aircraft inprelaunch constraints when thefirst missile hits the target - asecond missile will initiate its

21


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firing sequence after the first missile hit the target. Check your Left Hand Grips(LHG) to see that they have amodification work order (MWO)number stamped on them. Theunmodified LHGs have a problemwhen switching from low to highmagnification. The optics willswitch from low to high, but asticking relay sometimes pre-vents the remainder of the system from switching to the highpower setting. The result is thatthe gunner is viewing throughthe 13X retricle, but still has thefast slue rate, and will not beable to fire a missile. When the gunner is lookingthrough the TSU, particularly inhigh magnification, the concentration area is on a given point -the target. The effect is tunnelvision. The gunner may notrealize the aircraft is movingand may not notice that some-thing is about to interrupt the direct line of sight. The result canbe that the gunner does not compensate for a changing range tothe target or fails to give thepilot ample warning that something is about to break directvisual contact with the target(figure 5). For unit training without agunner accuracy control panel,Figure unnel vision effe t

you will need to save and rewiresome expended missile tubes.Without a rewired tube, the system will not display the attackready or fire flags for crewtraining. Contact your localtechnical representative for details on rewiring the tubes. To optimize gunner orienta-tion and minimize wear on thesystem, the gunner should always go to Low Magnificationand Stow position when not viewing through the TSU. A missile with a 3 ) ) ) meterrange is designated BGM71-A,one with a 3 750 meter range isdesignated BGM71-A-l. Have the gunner doublecheck the estimated range to thetarget using the WORM (widthin meters over mils) formula.The gunner can most accuratelyestimate range using the 13X optics in the TSU (figure 6).

The references found infigure 7 should be helpful.Target Acquisition: Army doctrine calls for the initial search forand acquisi tion of targets to be accomplished by elements otherthan the attack helicopter. But thefact remains that once the attackhelicopter unmasks in the firingposition, it still has to make visualcontact with the target before itcan fire on it.

..........

~ I u t 1~~ U M O U J ut ; ,d u.. tJ u ~ .

We can expect that on themid-intensity battlefield, targetswill not be as obliging as those towhich we are accustomed. Ourgunnery training often has beenconducted on cleared rangeswith no attempts made tocamouflage the targets. And, thetargets have most often beenstationary.Compare this to what we couldexpect in combat. The targetswhen stationary would be concealed and camouflaged. On themove, they will be makingmaximum use of camouflageand concealed avenues of approach. Attack helicopter pilotsstill have to conduct a search tofind targets. Cross training withour scout crews can be of greatvalue to us training to ac-complish this job.Three general means ofsearching have been developedwhile using the TOW systems tosearch for targets. Before goinginto these it is helpful to discussfactors governing the type ofsearch technique to be used.Two basic factors govern thetype technique to use. The firstis the nature of the terrain.Evaluation of probable avenuesof approach, landforms restricting maneuver, and maximumobservable range obviously aregoing to be evaluated. The sec-ond factor is the type of targetinformation received.A worse case basis might bethat we only know that thetargets are in front of preplanned attack position A.This requires a search of a muchlarger area then if we knew thathere were three tanks on a heading of 150 degrees, at a range o2 500 meters, from attack position

A.The three means of searchingare: Both the pilot and gunner ustheir helmet sights. This wouldbe required when the situationdictates search of a large area



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such as that given in the worsecase situation above . The pilotand gunner both search withtheir helmet sights. When locating a target or suspected target,the gunner manipulates the appropriate switches and takes acloser look using the magnifiedoptics in the TSU. The gunner searches with 2Xoptics while the pilot searcheswith the HSS. This is used wheninformation available fallssomewhere in between the situations mentioned above. Using the2X optics the gunner has a 28-degree field of view and about a70 feet-per-second slue rate withthe TSU. This allows coverage ofa relatively restricted area 30degrees to 60 degrees dependingon terrain) in detail in a relatively short period of time . Remember exposure time will be acritical factor in crew survivability on the mid-intensity battlefield. The gunner searches with 13Xoptics while the pilot searcheswith the HSS. When the target isknown to be in a relatively smallarea, the pilot can unmask the aircraft on the known heading to thetarget and the gunner can searchwith the 13X optics. Here the gun-

ner has 13 power magnification ofthe target area. This allows picking out greater detail but imposesa 4.6-degree field of view restriction and a slue rate of only about 4degrees per second. Obviously alarge target area would be difficult to cover in a reasonableamount of time.The three means of searchinglisted above are tied to the TOWsystem. But the concept behindthem applies as well in decidingwhether or not binoculars wouldbe used by a scout when searchinga given target area.Some general thoughts onsearching: Reflection: Very few things innature reflect the Sun. f you seeSun shining off an object it 'smore than likely man-made. fit's man-made and in your targetarea, it may well be your target. Smoke: Nearly every tank inthe world emits a plume ofexhaust smoke. In a conflictsituation, where vehicle maintenance hasn ' t been performedquite as often as it should , thisexhaust smoke is likely to bevery pronounced.

Dying camouflage: f a unitremains in a defensive postureand doesn't regularly replace its

f = 3

Figure Site image and WORM formulaSeptember 1977

Figure 7 Referencesa) TC 1-4 Helicopter Gunnery - ParticularlyChapter 1, and the formula for range estimationon page 43.

b) TC 17-17 Gunnery Training for AttackHelicopters .c) FM 90-1 Employment of Army AviationUnits in a High Threat Environment .

d) TM-55-1520-234-10, -Cl , and -23, AH-1SMod) Operators and Maintenance Manuals and

checklist.e) TM 9-1090-203-12 Operator and Organiza

tional Maintenance Manuals on the M28A 1Eoturret.

f) TM 9-1270-212-14 Operator, Organizational and Direct Support Manual on the XM 128Helmet Sight Subsystem .

g) TM 9-1425-473-20 and -34 MaintenanceManuals on the XM-65 TOW system .camouflage , this gives away itsposition. Outline: Few things in naturehave square corners and straightedges. Even if a vehicle is partially camouflaged, these may bedetected and should cue us totake a closer look. Sun: Whenever possible try tohave the Sun at your back orside. It's much harder to find atarget when looking into the Sun ,so make the enemy's job moredifficult - not yours. Having theSun at your back also enhancesthe possibility of catching theSun reflecting off the target.-.

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rmyviationCenter

Located on the western boundaryof Fort Rucker, Lowe ArmyHeliport 1) serves as the base fieldfor UH-l, OH-58 and AH-IG/S aircraft. In all, 117 aircraft are maintained at Lowe. These aircraft support the undergraduate transitionand tactics training, AH-IG qualification and instructor pilot OPtraining, and several UH-l IPcourses. With the introduction of

the night qualification porthe undergraduate flight pr-Lowe Army Heliport will ophours a day.Matteson Range 2) is thepal aerial gunnery rangfacility can support all the wsystems in the active inventusing the surrounding terraAH-l HueyCobra above) gruns are made using nap


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NOE) doctrine.Runkle 3) is a multiusewhich supports tacticsof the tactics training areaare exposed to rapid refuel,GCA and under the wire

n addition, stuproficiency on the various

nonstandard maneuvers.Skelly Stagefield 4) is a converted fixed wing training facilitythat now is used for the UH-l transition phase of the undergraduateflight program.Below, a TH 55 Osage performsNOE flight in the vicinity of astagefield used by the Departmentof Undergraduate Flight Training.

tlanceIV


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nlisted Personnel Management System

PromotionsSF W. E. rotmanu.s . rmy Military Personnel Cen te r

lexandria V A

WHEN SOMETHING IS not understood, it can bea frustrating thing to make sense of it. Where do Ilook who do I ask When it comes to Army policy , knowing who to ask or where to look canclear problems up and make things easier to understand.Let 's take promotions - an area of major concern to Soldiers at all grades . Every Soldiershould understand the Army's enlisted promotionpolicy, not only for his or her sake, but also forthat of subordinates and coworkers.The enlisted promotion " bible" is Chapter 7, AR600 200 . Chapter 7 contains an Armywide promotion policy which sets Armywide opportunities foradvancement.The objectives of the Army promotion systemare to fill authorized enlisted spaces with qualifiedmen and women who have demonstrated potentialfor increased responsibility; provide for careerprogression and rank which is commensurate withability and potential; attract and retain highcaliber individuals for a career in the Army; provide an equitable system for all Soldiers; and ,preclude from promotion the individual who isnonproductive/nonprogressive. Attainment ofthese objectives would present a challenging goalfor the Soldier seeking advancement.Subject to Department of Defense (DOD) constraints and the necessary exercise of authorityand ~ e s p o n s i b i l i t y of higher commanders, the authorIty to promote is delegated to the commanders indicated for the following_g :ades: For promotion to pay grades E4 and below -company, troop, battery and separate detachmentcommanders. Field grade commanders, of any organizationwhich is authorized a commander in the grade oflieutenant colonel or higher may promote assigned personnel to pay grades E5 and E6. Department of the Army (DA) retains thepromotion authority to pay grades E7, E8 and E9.A higher commander within the chain of command may restrict the exercise of promotion authority by a subordinate commander.6

The eligibility criteria for promotion to gradesE2 through E6 is listed in Sections II and II I ,Chapter 7, AR 600 200. Your first sergeant andpersonnel staff noncommissioned officer (NCO)are highly qualified to assist you with questionsyou may have.By using the standardized promotion scoringforms with predetermined promotion point factors , Soldiers can generally measure how wellthey qualify for promotion. Precise goals can beset within a self-improvement training program toincrease potential for promotion. Soldiers will berecommended for promotion only after they develop the skills and abilities to perform the dutiesand assume the responsibilities of the next highergrade. Promotions will not be made to recognize ajob well done, but rather to recognize the individual with potential for leadership or increasedtechnical skill in his or her chosen field ofspecialization. t also follows that, if Soldiers doan outstanding job in their present grades , theyprobably have the competence to perform well inthe next higher grades.A centralized promotion system has been in effect for the promotion of enlisted personnel to paygrades E9 since 1 January 1969 , E8 since 1 March1969 and to grade E7 since 1 June 1970. Basiceligibility for consideration for promotion togrades E7, E8 and E9 is based on date of rank ,high school education and cumulative enlistedservice creditable in the computation of basicpay. Headquarters, DA will announce the primaryand secondary zones of consideration for eachgrade. No provisions exist whereby an individualmay decline promotional consideration.Under the centralized system, individuals maynot appear before a selection board on their behalf or in the interest of another person who is ina zone of consideration. Soldiers within an announced zone of consideration may write a letterto the President, DA Selection Board, inviting attention to any matter of record on file at HQDAwhich they feel important in the consideration oftheir records. Such letters may not contain reflection upon the character, conduct or motive of anyindividual. Letters of this nature will not beacknowledged and will not be used as a basis forpromotion reconsideration. Letters of commendation, appreciation, recommendation for promotionmay be forwarded directly to the selection boardwhen such a board is in session.Selections by DA selection board are based onimpartial consideration of all personnel eligible



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for promotion in the zone. Selection boards use thebest qualified method of selection for promotionto these grades. Under this method selectionboards recommend a specified number of individuals from the zone of consideration who areconsidered to be the best qualified to meet theneeds of the Army. The number of selectionswhich may e made is that number which is projected by the Army to be required to maintain itsauthorized-by-grade strength at any given time.The analysis of the individual 's background willinclude, but not be limited to, a careful evaluationof the following factors: Scope and variety of assignments and howwell performed Degree or level of responsibilities Trends in efficiency Length of service and maturity Moral standards Integrity and character Awards, decorations , commendations and re-commendations Education - civilian and military General physical conditionSelection board action is administratively final.Reconsideration for promotion will be affordedonly when substantial material error is deter-mined to have existed in the records consideredby the regular constituted board or when adversesuitability information concerning an individualalready recommended but not yet promoted is revealed and the information would appear to war-

rant removal from the recommended list. A removal determination will e based on the recommendation of the standby enlisted advisory boardconvened at Headquarters, DA Promotion reconsideration does not apply to personnel in a secondary zone whose records were available to theboard. For those in the secondary zone, theStandby Enlisted Advisory Board will consideronly those Soldiers whose records were not available to the regular board.Soldiers not selected for promotion by DA centralized enlisted selection boards will not e provided specific reasons for nonselection, as boardmembers are not required to record or divulgeany reasons for selection or nonselection.Summary Promotion in the Army is based ondemonstrated and potential ability and is not in-tended as a reward for performance in the present grade and duty. Therefore, no single factor isallowed to become overriding in determiningwhether the individual can perform the duties andexercise the responsibility of the next highergrade.The Army wants to promote qualified Soldiers.But those selected should be willing to return thepromotion investment to the Army by makingthemselves available for Armywide assignmentswhen called upon. The point needs reemphasis. fSoldiers accept promotions, they should be willingto accept the accompanying responsibilities andmake themselves available for Armywide assignmen t. IiiiiiI

Onicer Personnel Management SystemPersonnel - el - V I T I O N

stronautsManagernen t

Branch, OPMD: Two positions inthe Aviation ManagementBranch, Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD),have new faces. They are:branch chief, LTC George AMorgan; and specialty 15monitor, MAJ Ben Couch. LTCMorgan's previous assignmentwas as commander, 24th Aviation Battalion, while MAJ Couchserved as executive officer of the25th Aviation Battalion. Both of-ficers bring with them to these im-September 1977

portant positions a combined totalof more than 30 years of aviationexperience.Senior and Master AviatorBadges: Army units requiringSenior or Master Aviator Badgesfor presentation at award ceremonies may obtain them at Gov-ernment expense through theU.S. Army Support Center, 2800South 20th Street, ATTN:STSAP-AS, Philadelphia, PA13101 Request for badges shouldbe in a military letter format,signed by unit commander or ad-

ajor ThomasM Walkerviation management Branch

Officer ersonnel Management Directoratejutant, and include a justificationstatement. Normal order-to-shiptime is about 3 weeks.Aviation Career IncentiveAct (ACIA) Data Correcti9Ds:DA Circular 600-11, AviationCareer Incentive Act FlyingData, announces the fiscal year1976 aviation data as required bythe ACIA of 1974 The aviationdata recorded in the circular includes: aviation service entrydate (ASED); cumulativemonths of total federal officerservice (TFOS); and months of

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total operational flying dutycredit (TOFDC). Aviators are encouraged to review current datafor accuracy and direct ques-tions to their servicing militarypersonnel office (MILPO). Questions which cannot be resolved atthe local level may be directedto the CDR, MILPERCEN ,ATTN: DAPC-OPP-V, 200 StovallStreet, Alexandria , VA 22332 ortelep)lOnically: AUTOVON 221-0727/0794; commercial 202) 325-0727/0794. Requests for changes

Figure 1 PROJECT M N GER

in aviation data (ASED, TFOS,TOFDC) must be accompaniedby appropriate documentation tojustify the change (e.g., OfficerEfficiency Report , DA Form 2-1 ,orders, or DA Form 759).

Army Astronaut Program:Thirteen Army aviators wereamong 33 Army officers nominated to the National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNASA) for service as either astronaut pilots or missionspecialists in the Space Shuttle

Program . The Army nominees ,along with nominees from thecivilian community and otherDepartment of Defense services,will be competing for 40 spaceshuttle crewmember positions -20 pilot and 20 missionspecialists. The NASA SelectionBoard convened on 1 July 1977and will remain in session until31 December 1977 , at which timethe board results are expected tobe announced.

TR DOC SYSTEM M N GERTechnical Feasibility Development Plan Determine Tradeoffs Input ToDevelopment Plan COEA CTEA

Requirement Operatio-nal Deficiency Alternatives Cost Risk Assessment Technical Characteristics Operational Concept Design h a r a c t e r l ~ l I s t i c s logistic Support Package Logistic Support Plan Military Characteristics Scheduling Training Support Package Training Support Plan User TestingField System Personnel Support Package Personnel Support Plan Validate Performance Post Deployment Support COEA CTEA Input Tradeoff Analysis Validate TradeoffsDevelopment Testing Correct Deficiencies Technical Alternatives Force Integration Product ImprovementsCos ts

COEA CTEA= Cost & Operational Effectiveness Analysis/Cost & Training Effectiveness Analysis

TR DOC System ManagerContinued from p gecycle and that plans and re-quirements in all areas (personnel , training, logistical, opera-tional , organizational , test anddoctrinal are developed andfully integrated early. The totalsystem approach continuesthroughout the life cycle of theweapons system.

Figure 2

The TSM does not replace norduplicate the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) project manager. The TSM represents theuser first and foremost and interacts with and complementsthe project manager as shown byfigure 2.Each TSM has a small staff ofthree that integrates , energizesand ensures that the TRADOC

TSM - UTHORITY

system as it exists today , and inthe future, works. The TSM isthe focal point for all user interests. He will actually pull together the TRADOC effort andcoordinate the work with theDARCOM community. More inportantly , he will work for andwith the Army Staff representingthe user. The TSM respon-sibilities and authority areshown in figure 3.

Chartered Derivative From Avn Cen Commander Coordinate TR DOC Tasking Coordination All Levels

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Coordinate With MACOMS Review Contractual Actions User Input To Life Cycle SystemManagement Model Ensure Force Integration Participate In Decision Reviews

TS M - RESPONSIBILITIES Interface With D RCOM Special Study Group TaskForce Member Defend System Requirement COE Ifigure 2 Preparation Participate In Testing I Planning& Test Design)

Interface With PM Review PM Tradeoffs Represent Avn Cen CommanderOr Commanding General TR DOC Prepare TR DOC Position Schedule rntegrate UserActiv ities



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Gunner Train ing ev i cesContinued rom p ge

The XM-65 TOW missile system is employed byhighly skilled pilot/gunner teams , trained to trackand destroy enemy armor targets at ranges out to3,750 meters .Due to increased emphasis in the antiarmor rollof the Cobra TOW on the battlefield , much interest has been directed toward the training thatgunners receive both during initial system qualification (see TOW Cobra - The School Solution ,page 2) , and later at the unit level. Interestinglyenough, many TOW qualified gunners have neverfired a missile.Of the nine gunners being graduated by theU.S. Army Aviation Center , Ft. Rucker , AL every2 weeks, eight never have had the rewarding sensation of killing a tank. Trained gunners subsequently are assigned to tactical units where, asat Ft. Rucker , the high cost of ordnance allowsvery little if any live missile firings.The low , livefire experience level of Cobra gunners raises concern for their proficiency and ability to destroy armored targets if and when theyare called upon to do so. But this problem coulde offset by training devices, should they proveeffective and feasible to procure. One such device isthe gunner accuracy control panel (GACP).The GACP (figures 1 and 2) is a device initially

OUME N:CURN;Y CONTROl.0 ON0-----' EE] 0 EE]ICORI Of' ICOfIEDlMICORIr E 0 C]9 I UTAZIMUTH - ELEVATION -Figure 1 Schematic drawing of GACP control panel

designed to demonstrate that gunners could tracktargets smoothly with the XM-65 airborne sightingsystem. I t was adopted as a training device by theArmy Aviation Center where TOW instructor pilots(IPs) receive feedback about the student 's trackingprogress. Feedback consists of numbers representing the tracking error made as a gunner aims andmaintains the sight on target for 12 seconds - atypical scoring interval.During the 12-second scoring sequence , the sightmust track a conditioned target. The M-70 targetsource , powered by the electrical system of a tactical vehicle , provides the infrared (IR) energynecessary for detection by the telescopic sightunit (TSU).The TSU contains IR detectors which discernemitted energy and its location (IR line of sight(LOS. This can be compared to the gunner'saiming point (optical LOS). When these two lines

Figure 2 Gunner Accuracy Control Panel GACP)


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are not aligned, the GACP deducts points from amaximum total of 99, proportionate to the percentage of time and displacement of the aiming error. As tracking error decreases, the GACPscores increase, indicating the gunner s trackingimprovement to the instructor.GACP scores for each student gunner were averaged with scores of all other gunners for 1 year.This provided a mean score for comparison purposes. Student GACP scores became the gradingsystem for determining the below average , average and better than average gunner graduates.This process did not provide a means to determinewhat a graduating gunner s hit probability (PH) [informula the H would be lowered half a letter]would be against enemy armor.The mean GACP score of all previous graduatesof the AH-l Cobra/TOW Gunner QualificationCourse is 73. The lowest average score for anyonegunner was in the low 60s and the highest in themid- to top 80s , yielding an average deviation ofplus or minus 15 points.Can gunners average GACP scores be converted somehow to indicate hit probability? f so,how significant is the 15-point GACP score deviation when represented by PH? To answer thesequestions formulas and charts were derived fromextensive computer simulated missile firings by thesystem s manufacturer. They were prepared toallow a gross estimation to be made of hit probabilityfor GACP scores. The equation is found in figure 3.The results of the equation are plotted on a PHchart. There are five charts developed from computer simulated launches at 2.5; 2.75; 3.0; 3.5; and 3.75kilometers (km). The scores are inserted in thechart corresponding to the launch range. Graduategunners scores at the Aviation Center course wereobtained while tracking at 1,700 meters, a range forwhich a chart is not available. Hopefully, futureclasses will be scored at ranges comparable toavailable charts and/or the device manufacturerwill develop graphs for more variable ranges.Figure

ee l 113.5- GACP Score (elevation) I t. 532 : :8 e eva Ion

eaz 113.5 -GACP Score (azimuth) _ .532 -:8 aZImuth

eaz ee l :8t

I 8 (sum) e (theta) :8t(sum total)30

For demonstration purposes , when applied tothe 2.5 km chart, the graduating student scores result in a PH approaching 1.0 (PH +1.0) for themean GACP score of about 73. The PH for thelowest score of about 60 is PH +98, assuming thegunner received a 60 in azimuth and a 60 in elevation. Therefore , graduate gunners of the Cobra/TOW Gunner Qualification Course, though deviating 15 GACP points around a mean score of73 , deviate only one point around a mean PH ofabout .99.For an azimuth score of 93 and an elevationscore of 13 the PH at 2,500 meters would be about 85.The same GACP scores attained at 3,750 meterswould result in a PH of only .40. Note that the abilityof the gunner to maintain the sight on target at longranges and close ranges equally well results in ahigher PH at the short ranges. Theoretically, thereverse should hold true. However, PH decreases atlonger ranges due to IR tracker noise and systemimbalances, in addition to gunner tracking error.

Thus, when GACP scores are converted to milliradian tracking error, they can generate PH estimates for gunners when simulating missilelaunch and target tracking. GACP operating limitations include but are not limited to the followingrequirements:.An unobstructed LOS between the gunner andtarget..A conditioned M-70 IR target source..A rigid standardization of variables such astarget range , speed, direction of movement, andaircraft altitude and speed. There currently is no source of information inthe form of training guides or manuals to describetypical, standardized GACP scoring criteria , orconversion tables to indicate PH.Why procure GACP, a scoring device , toevaluate gunners when their hit probability of .99at graduation rarely varies more than 1 point?Have not PH charts left the impression that the TOWsystem, designed for simplicity of operation, meetsthat specification and in so doing eliminates furtherskepticism over the proficiency of TOW gunners?Possibly , however , the PH averages of gunners arerepresentative of institutional, basic tracking skill.They do not reflect tracking under combat conditions.Testing has shown that PH decreases during tactical tracking and engagement scenarios. Recent testing indicates that GACP can reduce training timeand now, with PH conversion formulas available, iteliminates the requirement to fire a missile to verifytracking performance.Preliminary tracking tests taken by student gunners during a recent Aviation Center study resultedin a .92 PH mean score before ny training took



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Figure TOW Missile Sight Video Camera System TMSVCS)place. Only academic training and a 2 to 3 minuteintroduction to tracking was performed before thistest. Students all progressed to a PH that approached 1.0 in less than 2.5 hours. The XM-65 is ahighly accurate weapons system, and when fired inan institutional training environment , hit performance results are excellent.Because of the reduction of time required to reachpeak tracking performance levels with a trainingdevice , it may be practical to revise the 4 hours ofinstitutional tracking time to include some combattracking training in which GACP scores could thenbe based on combat tracking skill . These scoreswould indicate a realistic assessment of battlefieldPH and training time could be used to improve t isperformance. Thus , student graduates would be better prepared to combat the real armor threat.

A newer training device than GACP is in the prototype stage of development. t is the TOW MissileSight Video Camera System TMSVCS) (figure 4).Unlike GACP which was designed to demonstrate acontract specification , the TMSVCS was builtprimarily as an airborne TOW training device. Thesystem consists of three major components:

.A video camera installed in the TSU gun camera mount..A video recorder mounted behind the pilot sseat to record what the camera sees (recorded information later is played back in the debriefingroom on a TV screen with a cassette type videotape attachment).

.A cathode ray tube (CRT) mounted atop thepilots instrument panel in place of the M-73 sight.The monitor allows the IP to view what thegunner is viewing in the TSU anytime the systemis being powered. Gunner tracking ability is observed in the CRT by monitoring movements ofthe TSU crosshairs offtarget caused by gunnertracking error. Primarily, the TMSVCS provides theIP an indirect means to view and subjectivelyevaluate gunner tracking performance. FutureSeptember 1977

modification of the system could include a GACPtype objective scoring device which could superimpose tracking scores on the CRT.TMSVCS enables gunners to track any target ofopportunity for evaluation purposes. There is no requirement for a conditioned IR target source. Also,the IP can observe what the gunner sees before andafter a tracking sequence, to include the acquisitionand identification phases .Although present system design makes it nearlyimpossible to predict PH without rigorousanalyses of video film , the future growth potentialof the TMSVCS includes hit probability processing, and hit-or-miss indications at impact time.Computer generated imagery (CGI) could permitthe projection of a simulated missile image intothe unused eye of the binocular eyepiece of theTSU when training is being performed.

Some disadvantages of TMSVCS are its bulkand weight. Additionally , a system with a scoringdevice modification would cost more than GACP,but system potential could outweigh cost.Testing of the two training devices , GACP andTMSVCS , was completed in February 1977 at Ft.Rucker. The U.S. Army Aviation Board, in cooperation with the Army Research Insti tute , was tasked toperform an operational test of the two devices todetermine:.The effectiveness of the two training devices asa means of enhancing first-round hit probability..The need for either the GACP or TMSVCS, orboth devices, to teach TOW missile tracking at theArmy Aviation Center..The feasibility of effectively teaching TOWmissile firing sequence and/or tracking to aviatorsat the Aviation Center without firing missiles.The evaluation lasted 6 months and was conductedin the institutional training environment of Ft.Rucker. For comparison purposes and to ascertaindifferences experienced in a tact ical tra ining environment data amassed during Modern Army

31


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Selected Systems Test, Evaluation and Review(MASSTER) operational test (OT) 131 and 185 wasresearched. During the two MASSTER tests , GACPand on-the-job training (OJT) (without devices) wasperformed and live missile firings were made tocompare group performance.During OT 131 , both OJT and GACP traininggroups fired an equal number of missiles. Eachgroup had the same number of misses. These results seem to indicate no increase in hit performance after training with a device. When thescores of the GACP trained gunners are insertedinto today 's charts , they suggest a much higher hitprobability than resulted. Actual hit performancewas a .875 . Estimated performance using the chartnow available was in the .98 to .99 range derivedfrom average GACP scores taken after 110 simulated firings.During the Aviation Center evaluation , GACPscores were taken during every 20-minute intervalof training , or 15 practice simulated firings ,whether trained by PMSVCS , GACP or OJT, aswell as before training began and after trainingfinished. The groups trained with TMSVCS andGACP reached their peak tracking performancesin 1 to 1.5 hours of training. OJT trained gunnerspeaked at 2.5 hours of training without a device.Peak performance , measured by milliradiantracking error, when converted to PH results inscores that approach 1.0 PH. Therefore ,OJT trainedgunners , when given sufficient tracking practice,should have similar results when compared toGACP trained gunners during missile firing tests.Such was the case during the MASSTER study .The hit performance of gunners on the MASS-TER test was only .875 compared to the .96 hitperformance of the group in the Aviation Centerstudy. The performance variable appears attributable to the differences in institutional and tacticaltraining listed in figure 5.

f student GACP scores of past graduates hadbeen obtained in the tactical training environmentas depicted in figure 5, the PH would likely belower than the .99

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