Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1965

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1965

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UNITE

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Brig Gen George P. Seneff Jr .

COMMANDANT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMaj Gen John J. Tolson III

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCol George W . Putnam Jr.

EDITORIAL STAFFCapt Frank A. MarianoFred M . MontgomeryRicha rd K TierneyWilliam H. SmithDiana G. Williams

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTH. G . LinnH. A. PickelD. L CrowleyA . Lofe

USABAAR EDUCATION AND LITERATURE DIVPierce L WigginWill iam E Ca rterTed KontosCha rl es Mabius

RMY VI TION1GESJSEPTEMBER 965 VOLUME NUMBERInstant Soldiers, Maj Milton P . CherneMumbo Jumbo, William H. SmithWinging Westward, Capt John KosloskyHand Tools and Small AccidentsReport on the Arm y OilAnalysis Program, William R. OldhamRed Dog, Maj Al SmithAircraft Recovery withthe Chinook, Capt Dwight N. JacksonCircle of Safety, CWO Robert R Vaughn, Jr.Santo Domingo Operations, Lt Col Earl K. Bu chanHuey Flying Sense, WO Br uce P . MauldinAviation Safety Planning GuideCrash Sense

18

1013

1520

242630343642

Help WantedVIP Fligh t

Inside Back CoverBack Cover

The mIssIon of the U. S. ARMY AVIAT ION DIGE T is to provide infor mation of an ope rationfunctional nature concerning safety and aircraf t accident prevention, trai ning, maintenance, ope rarc carch and development, aviation medicine, and other related data.The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published mon thly under the supervof the Commandant, U. S. Army Av iation School. Views expressed herein are no t necessarily thoDepartment of the Army or the U. . Army Aviation School. Photos are U . . Army unles othespecified. iaterial may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author,otherwise indicated.Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Avia t ion are i nvi ted. Direct communication is aui;ed to: Editor.in.Chief U . Army Aviation Digest Fort R ucker AlabamaUse of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Headq uar ters, Departmen t oArmy, 29 December 1964Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR20 ~ a r c h 62, and DA Circular 310-57, 14 March 63. Complete DA Form 12-4 and send directly toAG Pu b lications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Md. 21220. For any chanj e in distribrequirements, merely initiate a revised DA Form 12-4.National Guard and Army Reserve units submit requirements through their tate adjutants generaU. S. Army Corps commanders respectively.For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of thc DIGEST, paid.criptions, 4.50 domestic and ~ 5 5 0 ovcrseas, are available from the Superintendent of Document,

Government Printinj Office, Washington, D. C., 20102.


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GENERAL tried to rubout of his eyes and

at a 2-day stubble ofmatted with the grime and

battle His bones achedand he found iton the ac

that were to take place into now, the plan had been

and his divimoved over 80 miles


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practically unopposed. The last 5had been on foot, but the corpscommander did not want to letthe attack bog down until after abridgehead across the Mesda Riverhad been established. Now, after2 days of exploitation, they werepreparing to make a river crossingassault in less than 3 hours.

When the action began 2 daysago, the plan was to feint an attack on the left flank of the enemy's VI Army. However, after theinitial assault by U. S. Forces, anarmored division plunged throughthe hole made by the infantry andquickly secured a limited objective 25 miles to the north. Theentire operation was conductedwith such startling ease that thegeneral's infantry division wasimmediately committed from reserve. He was ordered to passthrough the armored division,maintain contact with the enemyand secure a river crossing on theMesda River in hopes of encircling the entire left flank.A chill ran down the general'sspine. He wasn't certain whetherit was from exposure to the continuous drizzle that had slowlyand almost deliberately soakedhim to the skin, or whether it wasa feeling of foreboding that all2

seasoned combat veterans sensewhen the jigsaw of conflict fails tofall into a pattern. He had experienced this same uneasiness in previous situations: once beforejumping into Holland in WW II;again at the Yalu in Korea; oncemore in a small, unnamed nondescript village in Vietnam; andnow, the feeling was stronger thanever.

Nothing seemed to add up'Vhy was the penetration so seemingly effortless? Although fightinghad been intense for a short time,the enemy didn't attempt to employ his reserves, to plug the gap,or to counterattack the flanks ofour assaulting unit before theshoulder of the breakthroughcould be rolled back and held.The enemy's delaying actions hadbeen deliberate, and brilliantlyexecuted.

When the enemy wanted tobreak contact with our forwardelements or main body, he justseemed to vanish into thin air,only to be encountered again atthe time and place of his choosing.Although our exploitation hadprogressed with seemingly littleresistance, each delay, each deployment, and each attack againsthis positions had taken its toll.

\ \lith each attack against a delaying position we fOlAnd only thedead, wounded, empty foxholes,and a shower of incoming enemyartillery fire-brief, but effective.

Wounded aggressors were wellfed and clothed, and their moralewas high; contemptuous andarrogant better describes them.

They were not the kind of soldiersyou would expect to overrun in aretreating, panicking force-a forcethat was being thoroughly beatenand didn't have the brains toknow it. That young, woundedenemy platoon leader still had ashine on his jump boots when weoverran his position. Nothingadded up- the jigsaw wouldn't fallinto place.

General, the G 2 shouted ashe interrupted the thoughts of hisCO, I don't believe in ghosts, butthese guys we're fighting are acting like a bunch of 'spooks.' Sinceour attack started, we have positively identified personnel fromthree differen t divisions."

What's so unusual about that?"retorted the general. It isn't unusual to grab anyone that's available including cooks and bakerswhen the going gets rough."The general knew that he waswrong. He clearly understood that

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he was not fighting cooks andbakers, but a first-class combatforce.But general, I have pay records, letters, privilege cards, and

other proof that some of theirtroops were billeted in majorci ties more than a thousand milesfrom here only yesterday. I'm convinced that some of them lefttheir areas not later than yesterday ""Impossible Utterly and absolutely impossible," cried the CG,half wanting to believe what hewas saying. This stinking weatherwouldn't let a helicopter fly, muchless large numbers of transportairplanes. Besides, our radarwould have picked up any aircraftflying within 50 miles. No, it hasto be something that we justhaven't grasped yet. Maybe a deliberate plant to force us off ourguard and delay our river assault.It's got to be something else Butwhat?"A cheerfu l voice hailing a brightand chipper Good Morning"spun the G-2 and CG around.Despite the miserable, cold, wet,intolerable hour of the morning,the general had to grin when hesaw his hollow-eyed, mud-coveredG-3 almost humorously envelopedin an oversized poncho.

Well, chided the general,what happy news does Peter Panhave to spread on this ingloriousoccasion?"

I think I'm getting punchybecause the news isn't at all cheerful. Permit me to quote from thiscorps dispatch . . .'Aerial machines of unusual

design have been striking the exposed Hanks of the division trainsin large numbers and with devastating effectiveness. Rappelled orair anded observers are directingaccurate fire on support vehicles.Gasoline in critical supply. Willattempt aerial resupply as soon asweather permits. No change inorders.' "SEPTEMBER 1965

assault from where FrontFlank Rear How in thisterrain and weather could aircraftpossibly land

Thank you," said the generalin a solemn tone. A short whileago I was thankful for this limitedvisibility and fog. It should havegiven us a cover for our rivercrossing, but it appears to be acurse and not a blessing. Leave mealone for a few minutes to thinkthis thing out. Continue to planthe assault and I'll call you i Ihave any changes to make.

The general sucked on his unli tpipe as he propped himself againsta nearby tree and tried to searchhis memory for some clue thatwould put everything into perspective.

. In all these years, with all ofmy experience and background,there must be something I read,saw, or did that will give me theclue I'm seeking . . . Where?\.There? Where?

December 1944: Operat ionMarket Garden-one of airbornewarfare's greatest efforts and myfirst combat experience with verti-cal envelopment. Air columns. 35minutes long blanketed the sky.The enemy saw us coming andtook their toll; indeed they didin the air and on the ground.They established effective areadenial systems - without modernair defense equipment. But whatam I facing? f these . . . thesethings haunting me would justget up to radar altitude I couldmake our muscles felt.I remember General Gavin'sstatement. " armies will neveragain fight in the close massescharacteristic of World War II .

surprise is the essence of airborne and antiairborne s u c c e ~ sboth sides will endeavor to theutmost to attain it. In engagements involving adversaries ofcomparable means, victory will goto the commander with the bestexecuted plan and cover plan."I do wish that an old fashionedairborne counterattack were myproblem now. I could deal withthat, I know.

The Yalu-what an odd namefor a river. I'll have to admitthat things were quite different inKorea in 1950. We might haveturned the tide if we'd had helicopters by the hundreds insteadof the handful, and i we'd hadtransports that could carry 50 to70 men from CONUS in 20 hoursand land on a 100-foot squarefrozen rice paddy.

What a tremendous capabilitycould be developed with such airships. Think of it Instant Sol-diers able to ride to work from athousand miles away, open theback door, step out fresh, and geton with the business at hand.' ' ' 'hat a capability to exploit

How we used to wheel and dealon these subjects back in 1955 atFort Leavenworth, Kan. So manyofficers were obsessed with athought that everything must bebigger, faster, and vastly morecomplex. Then a group at FortRucker, Ala. , was valiantly trying

Maj Cherne is Asst Secretary Gen-eral Staff U S. Army AviationCenter} Ft Rucker} Ala.


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INST NT SOLDIERSto sell their ideas on Sky Cavalryand vertical envelopment-helicopters with guns and rockets providing their own mobile firepowerto support integral infantry elements. What a lot of MickeyMouse equipment they had inthose days. But what they thoughtand what they did made goodsense. They had the same spiritof pioneering that we had back inthe early days of airborne warfare.

Let s see The first time theArmy really engaged in combatsupport assault operations by employing helicopter vertical envelopment techniques was in Vietnam in January 1962. That wasthe key: shock action, increasedmobility, and firepower. Put thetroops where you want them,when you want them, and howyou want them. Attack from dispersion, concentrate on the objective and disperse just as rapidly.Ve had them rocking on theirheels for a while, but we couldn texploi t our gains as we couldagainst a known and uninformedenemy. It seemed incredible, eventhen, to be able to mount up thetroops a hundred miles away fromthe objective and in less than anhour have these fresh soldiers debark in battle formation for theassault.The general peered into theovercast as the zoom of an "invisi-

ble," low-flying aircraft destroyedhis train of thought. The treesalmost swayed with the rapidityof its passing. The battle station of the enemycommander was in an obscurelooking farmhouse 40 miles northof U. S. units. His communications were there for effectivelycontrolling his fighting forces. Hewas controlling the unorthodox.His mind was clear and his thinking flexible. A plotting board,radios, a time distance computer,prior plans and years of studywere his primary tools.The enemy general was in direct con tact with the pilot of theaircraft that had interrupted theAmerican general's thoughts. Hewas receiving automatically relayed radar data concerning U. S.troop locations based on reflections cast by equipment and vehicles. This information was beingfed into a computer, and targetconcentrations (by density ofblips) were automatically readout into grid coordinates to thefire control center.

Looking up frolp. a closed circuit TV set, the general directedthat the radar reconnaissanceplane make another sweep on the200-400 mile radian. As these instructions were being relayed, hestudied his troop location plottingboard once again. Fresh troops indispersed locations were standingby awaiting orders. Mentally

Think of it Instant Soldiers ableto ride to work from a thousand 'nilesaway open the back door step out .freshand ready to fight. What a capabilityto exploit4

pointing to the board, he computed the flying time of TaskForce Zebra, which was now 600miles away. Task Force Romeowas only 400 miles away, and themultitude of other dots rangedfrom 150 to just over 300 miles.

Another quick check of the intelligence teletype machine verified the impending attack of themain U. S. force. With apparentease, he ordered Task ForceRomeo to reinforce units in contact with the main U. S. elements.In 53 minutes, the prepositionedremote area letdown systems wouldbe activated. The pilots wouldmerely punch the approach coupling button on the autopilot oftheir VTOL transports and thelanding would be completed automatically-a landing that wouldhe made vertically and under anyvisibility condition. In an hour,all of the U. S. intelligence datathat had been so patiently collected and evaluated would beuseless. Instead of attacking a '.lnitdefending a broad front, they


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would march into the mouth ofa tiger.The general paused a moment

and chuckled cynically as he compared his situation with that ofthe Americans. Now I'll showthem some real mobility, hethought as he turned to a mapdepicting the positions of theAmerican division poised to crossthe river.

"Fire Control Center," the general commanded, "light and medium artillery and missile fires onradar centroid targets.

"Air Control Center," he called,"VTOL attack craft positionednorth to south along the axis ofadvance of U. S. divisions willcommence attack in 3 5 minutes.A ttack will be made from westto east."

Upon receipt of these orders,the enemy pilots gave their machines a final check and, although92 miles west of their plot, theyhad ample time to devote to lastminute planning.

The American general pickedup his map as he called for theG-3 and other members of hisstaff. "I don't like the looks ofwhat is going on, and I am takingit upon myself to delay the riverassault crossing un til we can getsome air support and have ourhelicopters resupply us. I wanta perimeter defense establishedalong these terrain features I'veoutlined on the map. Have yourmen fell as many trees as you caninto every open area-no matterhow small it is. This may destroypotential landing areas.

"I want all areas that are toolarge to be spoiled by felled treescovered with all available automatic weapons. Park our vehicles inrandom fashion in these largeareas and hope that they will fillin as hasty obstacles. We haven'tenough gas to use them for muchof anything else anyway.

"Signal Officer I want any andall unusued wire strung fromtreetop to treetop in hopes oftangling whatever kind of ma-

chines they have. I want mines,booby traps, and whatever goodGI ingenuity we can come upwith to play these open areas.Gentlemen, this is our threat. Notthe likely avenues of approach.Not the heavy forest that couldcover infantry movement. We'vegot to worry about open areasthat will permit access to ourlocation from the air. Are thereany questions? Then move out "Before the general could finishhis order the unforgettable howlof artillery shells whining throughthe air and crashing into the treetops with shattering explosionsfilled the air. This was not harassing fire; this was preassault fire.But assault from where? Front?Flank? Rear? How, in this terrainand weather, could aircraft possibl y land?

Wi th devastating accuracy theartillery shells continued to bombard the areas containing thegreatest number of men and equipment. Slowly the units started topull back toward the sou th in an


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INST NT SOLDIERSeffort to escape the punishing fires.s quickly as it started, the firesterminated-only to have the si-lence broken by the whine ofapproaching turbines in the stillobscured skies. This was followedimmediately by the swoosh of missiles homing their way to division's vehicles. The chatter ofmachinegun firing was unnerving,despite the fact that it was unaimed. In a matter of seconds, allwas quiet except for the occasionalexplosion of a gasoline tank orbasic load of vehicle ammunition.

The general stood up just intime to hail a messenger who almost ran past him. Sir, pantedthe runner, we just got this message from corps.

Thank you, son, replied the

general as he unfolded the message. By the first light of morninghe strained to make out the contex t of the message. Unaccoun tedenemy reinforcements have contained the main assault. Corpsfalling back to original lines awaiting support. You will fall back toobjective Orange. Air support andresupply available soonest. Expedite.-Thrush.

Grabbing a pad, the generalscribbled a note reading:WILCO, have casualties from artillery bombardment and aerialassault negative contact withenemy closing station, moving

out request aircover priority.Here, soldier, the generalsaid as he passed the message to

the runner; get this out as quickly as possible.As rapidly as could be expectedunder these situations, the now

exhausted men reformed theirweakened uni s and prepared todisplace to the south. Grudgingly,they gave up ground they hadfought to take only a short timeago.Again the rain and drizzle fellupon them, promising them another day of low ceilings and wetmisery. The breaking dawn gavelight to the forest and rollinghills, bu the sereni y of themomen t was soon broken by thescream of more artillery shellsfalling aimlessly in their area.Through the din of these noisescould be faintly heard the unmistakable whine of aircraft engines.This time they did not pass by athigh speeds, but increased involume as they were acceleratedto high rpm in terminal approach.To the north, to the south, westand east could be heard this blood-


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curdling sound. This was not asmall attack machine, these weremultiengined craft unloadinghordes of troops in complete encirclement of the ragged division.Small arms fire broke out almost immediately, followed bylight, rapid-fire artillery. Beetleshaped, antimachinegun armoredcars were observed careening intoposition before bringing their intense fire on our hastily dug-introops.

Reaching for his pad again, thegeneral scratched out anothermessage. Contact established withenemy we are surrounded andunable to break out requestarmored linkup immediately .request air support soonest .situation desperate. Looseninghis own pistol in its holster, heanxiously awaited a reply to hisrequests.

A stray round ricocheting off anearby tree caused him to instinctively duck. However, the clickingof the radio soon commanded hisattention, and he momentarilyignored his environment.

Armored Division already moving north. Opposition light tomoderate. Expect linkup 1200hours soonest. Forecast weather tolift 1500 hours. Air priority toyour unit. Request your status.Again the general handed theradio operator a message. Underheavy attack all flanks. Enemy unconfirmed. Estimate two divisions.We will make our stand here.Custer, CG.Shortly after 1100 hours thescout elements of the armoreddivision cau tiously moved throughthe battle-scarred terrain. Thesilence was deafening. Occasionally a cry arose from a wounded

man, but nowhere was there alive, dead, or wounded enemy.Silence and a void was all thatgreeted them. The enemy hadvanishedl Task Force Zebra hadcome-and was gone

Tom-Tom Custer, will youwake upl You're working too hardagain. I wish you'd finish thatpaper you're working on and takea little vacation. You've just beenworking too hard and when yougo off like this, I rcally do worryabout you, chided his concernedwife.Sweetheart, I wasn't fightingHolland, nor Korea, nor Vietnam.I was really fighting our officialposi tion on that 'paper' you mentioned that I'm working so hardon. It's been a real tough one allright, but I just made up mymind. e cannot afford less "


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henyou speaksay what you meanin clear language

MUl bo JUl oWilliam H mith

OR HUNDREDS of yearsmany brilliant and devoted

men have worked to refopn andclarify our language so that wecan all unders tand each other.Everyone who has graduated fromschool has had years of Englishcourses designed to help him com-municate effectively.Yet many professional or semi-professional men seem to forgettheir early English training and

develop a language of mumbojumbo seemingly designed onlyto confuse and impress the layman.This tragedy of modern com-munications failure is illustratedby a story of the famous author,Stuart Chase1 Mr. Chase says thata plumber wrote to one of thegovernment agencies in Washing-ton to ask if it is safe to usehydrochloric acid to clean outclogged drains.

The agency wrote back, Theefficacy of hydrochloric acid is in-disputable, but the chlorine resi-due is incompatible with metallicpermanence.

The plumber wrote back tothank the agency and said he wasglad it was all right to use theacid. He promptly received an-other letter saying the governmentcould not assume the responsi-

bility for the production of toxicnoxious residues of hydrochlorideand suggested he use an alternateprocedure. The plumber againwrote to thank the agency andsaid he was glad they still thoughtit was all right for him to use theacid.By return mail he got a lettersaying in unmistakable terms,Don't use hydrochloride; it eatshell out of pipes.

Keeping company with the pro-fessionals who have forgottenplain English are many ArmyAviation people. They have falleninto the rut of vague, ambiguoustechnical jargon which is some-times annoying and can be down-right dangerous. When aviatorstalk among themselves about theirwork, aeronautical jargon is likelyto creep into the discussion.There's no objection to this, butwhen these terms spill over intoconversation with nonflying per-sonnel, there is danger of a mis-understanding that could jeopard-ize a mission.A good example of this occurredlast winter. A division was plan-ning to move some troops by sup-porting transport aircraft. Staffofficers had assembled to makefinal plans. They were worriedbecause the weather had beendamp and overcast for the lastfew days. The division aviationofficer got up and said that for theflight it would be thick stratusall the way.To his amazemen the otherofficers immediately started mak-ing plans to move the troops by

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land. They had understood theaviation officer to say that theweather was very bad; therefore,they didn't want to chance goingby air.

Of course, the aviation officerquickly explained that he meantit would be good instrument fly-ing all the way with no thunderstorms.

In another case an aviator onground duty burst into his battalion commander's office and reported that one of the divisionfliers had bought the farm. 2

The CO looked up, his mindstill on the paper he was reading,and said, That's fine. Real estateis a good investment.

The Army spends much moneyand time training its men to deliver clear and precise orders. Inthe field and in combat there isseldom time for an officer or NCOto explain in detail what is meantwhen they give an order or passa message. When an aviator lapsesinto fancy words to make his fly-ing seem interesting and glamorous, he loses the ability to makehimself understood. Even when

1 Attributed to News Front, Management's News Magazine, August1964, published by YEAR, Inc.,21 W 45th Street, New York, N. Y10036.

SEPTEMBER 1965

one of the division fliers h d 'bought the farm'

the phrase or term is one that canbe understood by nonflying personnel when they have time totranslate it, the unfamiliar wordsare still troublesome and inconvenient.Pity the young line officer whoin his personal military educationprogram has digested the morethan 5,000 entries in the Dictionary of U. S Army Terms(AR 320-5) . He knows that Elephant Steel Shelters are not shelters for elephants but are for personnel and materiel-and are presumably as strong as elephants.He knows that Decay Curveshave nothing to do with overagegirls but are graph lines representing the decrease of radioactivitywi th the passage of time.

Then on his first day in thefield as platoon commander he isconfronted by an experienced aviator who tells him: Pucker upaand get your gravel scratchers4under cover. The enemy birds5have TAR and this zero-zer07won't keep them from flathattingin on our positionS with their armthrough the firewall 9 and theirwings bristling .As new equipment and techniques are developed, the situationgets worse. Consider the followingstatement:

We'll use VSTOLll craft to getthe troops into the field. Fromthere the heavy stuff will move byAGG12 while the lighter stuff willbe LUGed13. Personnel will IDGHor FLEEPHi.

Can you understand it? Yet theequipment mentioned is eitheravailable today or in developmentstage and deals with aviation.Army Aviators are not the onlyones with mumbo jumbo problems. In the 22 December 1961issue of TEC T AC, published bythe U. S Army Signal School, aletter points up the same typetrou ble in the Signal Corps.The writer says: Allow me tosuggest that TEC T AC do something to combat the increasinguse by Signal Corps people oftechnical terms that have noproper place in the vocabulary ofsignal menI would suggest that theuse of pretentious terminology,instead of commending a signalofficer, may often reveal a suspicious lack of information or ofunderstanding on his part

The pity of it is that there isno need in the Signal Corps forany but plain, simple, everydaywords

And for Army Aviation personnel the same holds true.

9


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aptain John Koslosky

Our course wasfrom Beirut to Naples,but en route heading isof little consequenceif you fly withweather forecaststhat go sour

ingingestward

T WAS a bright sunny morning when we arrived at the

international airport in Beirut,Lebanon. As in most New andMiddle East countries the formalities of customs, airport fees, gaspayments had to be dealt with.Two of us were returning fromextended TDY to India and we, ere familiar with all the stepsnecessary for one to .get an Armyaircraft into the wild blue.I t being my turn to ride theright seat for the morning leg ofthe flight, I carefully went aboutthe task of checking weather, fil-ing a flight plan and checkingNOTAMs.Let s go back to that weathercheck I mentioned. The weatherat Beirut that December morningwas a high scattered and visibilityunlimi ted. The forecast for mydestination was 3,000 broken withrainshowers and isolated T-storms.Minimum ceiling en route wasforecast to be 3,000 broken in thevicinity of our fuel stop. Our

apt Koslosky s assigned to dutyin the Republic of Vietnam

rou te was direct from Beiru t,Lebanon to Athens, Greece, (fora fuel stop) and then to Naples,Italy, where we would spend thenight.Because of some towering euand isolated T-storms I decided tofile VFR and was assured of ano-sweat by the civilian weatherman who had an office full ofrush-rush airline pilots. The worstI might find would be a few rairishowers to circumnavigate. Withan armful of charts prepared bythe friendly weatherman, 1 headedfor the parking ramp where mycompatriot was busily preflightingour rather weary U-SD (which isanother story). Of course it hadnot been fueled, although wewere assured the night before thatit would be. No problem, however. With a minimum of confusion the bird was filled and wewere winging westward, with anidea that we just might make itback to our home base beforeChristmas.

Beirut being located on thecoast, we were out over the bluewater minutes after takeoff. About

90 percent of the flight would beflown over water with the exception being mostly islands scattereden route. There was no terrain toconsider, so 3,000 feet minimumceiling sounded good.

The first 45 minutes was uneventful, except the ceiling wasgetting lower a lot faster than wehad expected and there was lightturbulence.

We were well out from Beirutwhen the ceiling dropped to 500feet and turbulence began in-

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creasing. The cloud cover wasbroken so we had no problem urging our D model to 10,000 feetwhere we leveled off on top. Aswe had suspected, however, themiddle morning clouds were building fast. Fourteen thousand wasabout as far as we could nurseour sick bird, which was alsoburdened with high frequencyradio antennas that created additional drag.Because of the communicationdifficulty we had been having inSEPTEMBER 1965

that area and the length of timeit took to get an IFR flight planfiled in the air, we decided to geta clearance now while we hadtime. After many frustrating transmissions we received our clearanceand were assigned to 13,000 feet.About this time there were isola ted cumulous buildups in theneighborhood of 25,000 feet.

Radio transmissions were sobroken that we couldn t even sendposition reports, to say nothing ofour requests to fly around the

buildups. We transmitted in theblind and then took necessaryevasive action t avoid the towering Cu.Finally the inevitable happened:we were surrounded. Withoutmuch choice in the matter we reluctantly picked a penetrationpoint. Without radar this is agame comparable to Russian roulette. After going through a Tstorm penetration check in thecockpit we entered the storm.

The reputation given thesestorms stood tall and proud thatmorning. We were well above thefreezing level so we began pickingup rime ice immediately. The turbulence was such that I adjustedthe power while the pilot attempted to fly a decent attitude,with airspeed varying from oneextreme to the other and powersettings from METO to justenough to keep the carb heat ac-ceptable. Altitude varied 1,000feet each side of that assigned.Hail was accompanied by severeturbulence and then we weregratefully tossed out for a moment of rest.

This encounter was repeated afew times over but with less intensity. Finally we arrived at ourfuel stop, Athens, with full intentof calling it a day-and what aday. We informed our crewchiefthat we would almost certainlyRON in Athens, but just as aformality we would check withthe weather forecaster.I posed a negative question tothe forecaster at Athens. UNochance of getting to Naples tonight is there? He promptly toldme Naples was CAVU and forecast to remain so for the rest ofthe night and tomorrow. As forT-storms, one storm was in thevicinity and that would lie wellsouth of our course.Well, we had been gone a longtime and since there was noweather problem there was noreason not to proceed as planned.


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After we filed an IFR flight plan,which was routine for night flyingand mandatory for night flights inmost countries, we had a bite toeat and then blasted off for Naples.It was almost dark when wefinally took off. About 10 minutesout from Athens we saw thatT-storm, and i t was about 10 milessouth of course. That was theonly accurate information we received in our weather briefing.

The flight was smooth and uneventful. Because it was mostlyover water we saw no lights below; after a while we saw no starsabove. I thought to myself, Theforecaster really blew the CAVUforecast, but at that time littledid I know how badly he blew it.I patiently tried to see some signof light on the water: a ship orglare or any sign of reference. Ofcourse I never saw that sign andI don't really know how long wewere on actual instruments.N ow came the big question:what type weather were we in andhow long would it last and howlow did it go? The free air temperature gauge read -15 C. Arewe picking up ice? I dreaded turn-

12

ing on that landing light. When Idid, it was like looking up into ashower nozzle-not rain but a solidsheet of water. We began pickingup light rime on the leading edgesand the antennas but lost onlyabout 5 knots airspeed.

We tried to get a revision onour exploded forecast but theradios were full of static. We fi-nally arrived over land and wereto track inbound to a NDB andchange our course from westwardto north. Our newest problemcame about when we tried forthe tenth time to tune in thisNDB and received absolutelynothing. Our course was now being held by a VOR which waslocated about 90 miles eastwardand going off and on , as indicatedby the off-on flag.

After the time to the ADF intersection (ETA had passed, Idecided to turn northward andtry to pick up some form of navaid. The ADF seemed completelyworthless, and now we were being called by Rome Control.They were concerned about ournot reporting this beacon towhich we were blindly tracking.

After many transmissions we convinced Rome Control that wewere not certain of our posi tionand thusly could not comply withtheir request for our descent to7,000 feet. According to our charts7,000 feet would be disastrous i fwe had not passed this coastalbeacon. Also, we could handle theice we were accumulating at12,000, but a change in temperature could set that rain out thereinto severe airframe ice.

We finally got a controller whonot only rogered clearances butactually understood English. Hewas very sympathetic and turnedus over to Naples Radar, whichpromptly gave us a transpondercode and had us on the groundafter we broke out at 400 and lThe nice weather forecaster atNaples explained the phenomenonvery thoroughly-except why wedidn't pick up more ice with thatmuch moisture at that temperature. At any rate, the next time wefly this route, I hope both theweather forecasting and communications will be better. After all,even Ulysses had the stars to navigate by.

inning ritersvVINNERS OF the first twoplaques presented for the bestmonthly articles in the ARMYAVIATION DIGEST receivetheir awards from Maj Gen John JTolson, Commandant, USAAVNS,Fort Rucker, Ala. Maj FrederickL. Clapp (center) won the contest for July with his concept forfighting an antiguerrilla war. WOBruce P. Mauldin (left) earnedhis plaque for his article in theAugust issue which describes anew method of airlifting troopsinto a combat zone in Vietnam.(See Help Wanted, inside back.)



15/52

d Tools andSmall

ccidentsisuse of the wrench fl1e

HET "lER OR not you area mechanic, at some timein your life you will use a handtool to loosen or tighten a nut,file a piece of metal, or chisel offthe head of a bolt. And when youdo you are a sitting duck for ana cldent.Why? It's because hand toolsare considered so simple tha thardly anyone bothers to learnthe correct way to use them. Butimproperly used they can causepainful, if not serious, inJuries.Mechanics at Guthrie Field,Fort Rucker, Ala., report thatfour small hand tools Gause mosto the accidents-the wrench, Ie,hammer, and chisel. Connec edwith the use of each of thes oolsSEPTEMBER 1965

are several bad practices.At installations such as Guthrie

field, maintenance consists most-ly of replacing parts or compo-nents. }:: ere is not much ham-mering, filing, or chiseling. Sincewrenches are used quite exten-sively they naturally account formany injuries. On the other hand,files, hammers, and chisels areunfamiliar tools and cause acci-dents for this reason.

The habit of pushing on awrench rather than pullin on itprobably causes most of the smallinjuries wi th wrenches. When atight nut is loosened, it comesfree quickly and often unex-pectedly. Or the wrench may slipoff the nut. In either case you

can't stop the momentum quicklyenough, and more than likely youwill strike yout knuckles againstsomething. But i you pull on liewrench, your knuckles ire out ofdirect line of fire and this typeaccident can't happen.

When you can loosen r tightena nut only by pushing on it, usethe base of the palm and holdyour hand open. Th' will saveyour knuckles and . your palmshould hit something, its naturalpadding will cushion the blow.Files cause a surprising numberof accidents, especially when theyhave no protective handles. Thedanger in using files without pro-tective handles is that the tangsare often quite sharp. When the

3


16/52

H ND TOOLSfile meets an obstruction and issuddenly stopped, the sharp tangcan go through your hand. Beforeattempting to use a file, make sureit has a good, tight fitting handle.Another important thing to remember about files is that theyare no good as pry bars. The tangend is soft and bends easily. Thebody is made of brittle metal andany slight bending force will causeit to break. When this happens,the broken end usually flies up inyour face.

Then there's the dangerouspractice of hammering on files.The brittle metal will shatter, andthe chips have a nasty habit ofhitting your eyes or some other

14

sensitive spot on your face.The simplest hand tool in your

kit is the hammer. It's also poten-tially the most dangerous. Whenin one piece it can smash fingers,and when it comes apart the headflies off with almost the speed ofa bullet.Before using a hammer, checkto see that the head is on tight.f it s loose, don't use it.

The hole in the hammer headis called the eye. It tapers in bothdirections from the center. Thehandle is tapered to fit on one sideo the eye. When you insert thehandle into the eye you make itfit the other side by driving in asteel wedge.

f the handle is loose in the eye,it indicates that the steel wedgemust be replaced by a larger one.1 the wedge is missing replace itwith another. Don't use nails orother metal objects as wedges;they are not properly shaped tohold the handle on tightly.

Another tool that mechanics atGuthrie Field have learned tohandle wi th care is the chisel.

It's obvious that the hand holding a chisel is in danger of beinghit by the hammer. There's noway to prevent this if your aim isbad, but there is a way to lessenthe blow. The technique is tohold the chisel in the left hand

with the thumb and first fingerabou t an inch and a half from thetop. Your grip should be steadybu t rather loose. f you miss thechisel and strike your hand it willslide down, thus lessening theeffect.

When striking the chisel with ahammer, look at the cutting edgeof the chisel and not the head.Grip the handle of the hammernear the end. This makes the faceof the hammer con tact the headof the chisel on a flat plane andlessens the chance of its slippingoff and onto your hand. Strike oneor two light blows to get the feel,and then hit harder.

When chipping, be sure to weargoggles. And watch out for bystanders. f they are close theyshould have goggles also. Alwayschip away from you, never towardyourself.

Keep chisels dressed. There isless chance of a slip if the cuttingedge is sharp. The head also needsattention. f it is mushroomed,grind it down. Mushroom edgeshave a tendency to fly off, andrough edges can be rough indeed.

These are only a few of themany dangers of using hand tools.There are many more, of course.You become a pro when youwork so carefully that you haveno need for a first-aid kit.

Top: Before using a hammer be sure the head is on tight. If it s loose you mayhave to insert a new wedge. Botton left: When the file meets an obstruction and ssuddenly stopped the tang if exposed may puncture your hand. Middle: Hold achisel near the top. If you should hit your hand it will slip down thus cushioningthe blow. Right: If possible pull on a wrench instead of pushing.

U. S ARlVIY AVIATION DIGEST


17/52

Report on the ArmyOil Analysis ProgralD

N AUGUST 1962 an article ap-peared in the DIGEST aboutthe oil analysis program being con-ducted at United States ArmyTransportation Aircraft Test andSupport Activity TATSA) , FortRucker, Ala. This method utilizeslaboratory analysis of used lubri-cants to determine the internalcondi tion of oil wetted parts.Since this article was published,great progress has been made insome areas, and great expectationsare forecast for this method as anadditional tool for the use ofmaintenance and flight operationsand as a monitoring device for theuse of management.T ATSA was consolidated withthe U. S Army Aviation TestBoard in 1962 and the entire com-mand was placed under Test andEvaluation Command TECOM).The Aviation Test Board Labora-tory continued to accept voluntaryMr. Oldham is deputy chief OilA nalysis Branch Services Divi-sion USAAVNTBD Ft RuckerAla.SEPTEMBER 1965

WIlliam R Oldham

]5


18/52

contributions until the fall of 1964for the following reasons:The capacity of the spectrometer.The need for a large number ofsamples to obtain sound evaluation cri teria.

The need to prove the systemoperable with field units.

The desire for operational uni sto use the system for failure prevention.

At that time over 2,000 aircraftwere being monitored at FortRucker and the 3,500 major components of these aircraft were producing 700 to 800 samples perweek. The workload became solarge that the staff could not adequately evaluate more aircraft,and the lab has since had to refusethis service to many requesters.In 1963, U. S Army Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Center

AADMAC), Corpus ChristiTexas, placed in operation a similar instrument that could performoil analysis in conjunction withother spectrographic work. [SeeDIGEST March 64.] The laboratory is continuing an orderly expansion of the program that willultimately include all of ArmyAviation. In January 1965, thisAADMAC laboratory staff was increased to enable it to monitoraircraft in the Far East.U. S Army Board for AviationAccident Research USABAAR)has long advocated the use of oilanalysis as an early warning device and urged its widespreadusage. Through its efforts, theinterest of higher headquartershas increased. A proposed Armyregulation is being staffed underwhich the oil analysis programwill realize a much greater poten-

Incorrect sampling technique se only when tube cannot be usedDrain one p nt first to remove dirt and sludge

tial. Upon its approval, Armywide use of oil analysis will berealized. Other non-aviation components may be monitored ifjustifiable.The spectrographic techniqueused by the Aviation Test BoardOil Analysis Laboratory to analyzean oil sample is based upon a

16 U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/52

process involving the excitationof metal atoms with an alternating current spark. Sample oil isburned and through a series of,,,, ave lengths derived from defracting equipment, the concentrationof metal in the oil is determined.The entire sample is processed in2 minutes, 10 seconds.

SEPTEMBER 1965

Results obtained from the sample are then compared to the sample history of the particular engine from which the sample wastaken. A marked increase in wearmetal content is a sign of possibletrouble within the component.One high reading is usually followed by an immediate laboratory

eft and below: Propersampling techniquestor oil analysis lab use

request for a resample. f the re~ m p l e continues to read high, aninspection is requested.Between September 1961 aildJanuary 1965, the laboratory discovered over 160 engines and transmissions that might have failedha d , their weakriesses not beendetected in the oil analysis program. In each of these instances-Spectronietric results showed increased w.ear.The laboratory notified the operator.

Main tenance .or teardown verified laboratory findings.These findings were reportedback to the laboratory.Other discrepancies have beendiscovered by the laboratory, but

since one of the four steps listedwas missing, the discrepancy haseither counted against the program accuracy or remained in thesuspect category 01 into overhaul,and the teardown results were notmade knowh to the laboratory.

As the four steps required forverified success illustrate, one ofthe most i ~ p o r t n t single factorsaffecting oil analysis is communication. f the operator does notparticipate in the program enthusiastici:llly, the analytical results are largely meaningless. Thelaboratory knows only as muchabout an engine or transmission ascan be gathered from operatorsand manufacturers. Therefore, upto a point the operator will receive only as much assistance fromthe laboratory as he contributes.

To illustrate: oil consumptionof the aft transmission fromCH-XX has increased above normal (new oil has no signifi


20/52

OIL N LYSISand race, bronze cage, aluminumhousing . Here was pertinent in-formation within reach of themechanic, the operations officer,the maintenance officer and thelaboratory via TWX, FONECON,

semaphore, or VISIt. Each factor,though insignificant individually,helps to complete the puzzle.

It is interesting to note thatidentical sampling problems occurin the oil analysis programs of theArmy, Navy and Air Force. Somepoints to remember are- Take the sample properly.

Alert crewchief plus oil analysis sample head off

otentiNOH-ISS, belonging to the11 th Aviation Company

GS), I I th AAD T), was enteredOnto the oil analysis program nMay 1964. Samples were regularlyubmitted and the results of eachample showed that a normalamount of engine and transmis-. ion wear was occurring. In De-ember of 1964, however, . the rec-ords of the oil analysis laboratoryeftected an unusually largeamount of wear metal in the oilample. A caution notation wasplaced on the records of the Sioux.In February 1965, a numberwo inspection was performed bythe crewchief in the Support Pla-toon and an oil sample taken.en he pulled the oil filtern, he noticed several smallmetal particles present. He tookthe particles he found to the unittech inspector, who also examinedthem. It was decided that extrattention should be given to theanalysis of the oil sample that had. ust been taken.The support platoon mainte-nance officer and the tech inspec-tor took the oil sample to the oilanalysis laboratory at Fort Rucker.In a few moments the test wasmpleted and the results showedn unusually large amount ofear metal present. Laboratoryrsonnel recommended that the

The lab has no need for sludge,new oil, cigarette butts or sand. Fill out the sample informa-tion sheet completely. The labwould like to know where you gotthe oil and why you are sendingit. Air mail it quickly. Untiltoolboxes, outbaskets and desk



21/52

f the operator does notpartici pate in the programenthusiastically, the analytical results are largelymeaningless.

drawers are converted to spectrometers, you must rely on the onesat the laboratories.) Sample nytime you perfonnmaintenance on components thatmight affect the lubricant. (Wemay not help you this time,but. ) Keep the lab infonned as towho to notify in case unusualwear is observed. (It is difficult topanic others when you can t findthe button.)

While we ,are on this soml:>ernote, lees briefly list the limitations of the oil analysis program. The spectrometer can onlymeasure metal that is in solutionor suspension in the oil; therefore, only wear will be measured.So-called materiel failures willnot be seen; neither will pilot error. The wear must occur over along enough period for a sampleor two to get to the laboratory.To expand slightly, answer foryourself: How many wear failuresoccur in Anny aircraft as opposedto other discrepancies'? Now youcan see why the percentage of discoveries is so low when comparedto the number of aircraft beingmonitored. Also, you can see thatcontact with the laboratory willbe rare.Beyond doubt, the oil analysisprogram has economically justified itself; yet there is no way toplace a true value ori somethingthat did not occur or somethingthat was corrected with a minimum of cost and inconvenience.Neither can you accurately valueSEPTEMBER 1965

Metal particles from loose clamps and scarred bearing retaining plateT53-L-IA engine) show up in oil analysis and pinpoints po tentialdangerous breakdown condition

the increase of mission reliabilityr increased safety that is assistedby this method.One seldom used major benefitof the oil analysis program is itsability to conclusively determine

a good component insofar aswear is concerned. The laboratorycannot always predict a failure,but if oil consumption is nonnalthe laboratory can always say thatthe component is not wearing abnormally. The ultimate usage ofoil analysis would be to stop thewear failures that occur beforethe usual TBO, while pennitting

normal components to continuein operation until they too beginto wear abnormally.

Certainly, the above statementis an oversimplification; however,if the oil analysis program couldassist in a TBO extension of a fewhours the economic impact wouldbe both immediate and substantial.Oil analysis is not a cure-all;neither can it replace existing procedures. However, properly used,it can enter your toolbox, yourcockpit, and your taxpaying pocketbook.

9


22/52

Here s a significant attempt to devisean all weather tactical air traffic controlsystem for helicopter use in the forwardbatt le area using presently available equipment

Red ogMajor I Smith

N ASSAULT force of twentyUH I helicopters must bemoved from a base area in o a for

ward area 30 miies away. A 500-foot overcast with 1 mile visibilityexists at both base and objectiveareas. En route conditions arezero/zero and forecast to remainthe same. The commander hasreadily available a pathfinder ele lment with its organic equipmentand nondirectional beacons. Thisoperation is to be conducted usinga system of command controlcalled Red Dog.

Red Dog is a simple, quick,pbint-to-point aitway system thatprovides a commander an excellen t means to accomplish his mission and exercise command control over his aircraft at distancesup to 50 miles. I t is especiallyadaptable to operations or tacticalsituations where instrument flightconditions en route may preventor unduly delay an operation.Consisting primarily of two nondirectiorial homing beacons, RedDog pieks up where AATRIArmy Air Traffic Regulationsand Ident ification System) leavesoff - at division - and operates

from there into the forward battlearea.SETIING U

From a map study, a centerlineheading magnetic course) is determined between the base andobjective area beacon site fig. I) .Areas 3 miles on either side of thecenterline and within a 5-10 mileradius of both terminal ends aremarked off for close study of terrain or obstacle heights.Based on the map study, andwhen possible previous terrainstudy, a minimum altitude orlevel is determined for safe flightbetween the base and objectivearea. It provides a minimum of400 feet vertical clearance from allterrain or obstacles within 3 nautical miles of ei ther side of thecenterline and within a 5-10 mileradius of both terminals. Next,five additional flight levels are determined, each one being 400 feetabove the other for a total of sixlevels fig. 1).The number of flight levels es-tablished depends upon factorssuch as: how fast the aircraft must ar-

rive at destination, how much usable airspace ISavailable to the commander, how many aircraft must beinserted in to the sys tern, what the distance is betweenthe base and objective areas, whether or not mixed typesof aircraft will be used, aircraft loading requirements, enemy radar capabilities.Various flight levels are desig-nated for departures and returns.

For example, the lower threelevels might be for aircraft goingto the objective area and the upper three for those returning.Variations of this system mightbe employed as necessary. Perhapsall levels could be reserved forone-way traffic for certain periods



23/52

UH 1 formations race to join up for troop delivery and assault after release from ed Dog system onto objective

of time, or lower levels could beheld open for emergencies.Charts are prepared lis tingheadings, altitudes, pertinentclimb, cruise and descent speedsfor use in departing returningmissed approaches and emergencyprocedures. Other informationrelative to beacon frequencies,identifiers, and other communications procedures are included.These charts are issued (or the information therefrom) to all aviators and pathfinder personnel in-volved in the operation.

After the date and time for beginning the operation is established, the commander deploys hispathfinder elements to establish abase site and objective area site.SEPTEMBER 1965

Each site must be clear of enemywithin a 5-10 nautical mile radiusand a n o n d i r e ~ t i o n a l homing beacon established on predeterminedfrequencies with appropriate callsigns and complementary communications system.

After a final check on theweather, equipment and personnel the operation begins. One beacon is located at the base or marshalling area and the other at thedestination or secured objectivearea. In large-scale operations aneqtergency backup beacon woulqprobably be flown into the objective area, with the first airlift.

Four types of beacons have beentried during Red Dog experim ~ n t s in the II th Air Assault Division:

The AN / GNR-6 standardrange beacon, which was considered too heavy (9,308 lbs) . The HRT-2 State Department beacon, which weighs 25pounds. The Tridea an off-the-shelfitem with a 100-watt output amplifier. It weighs 35 pounds (50with amplifier). The AN/PRT-7 developedby Special Forces. It weighs about2 p o ~ n d s

Under direction of a dispatcher/controller aircraft are releasedto departure levels in time i n t r ~vab to allow a minimum longituqinal separation of 5 minutes.between UR-I type aircraft onthe same level and 4 minutes between CH-47 type aircraft on the

21


24/52

RE OGsame level. (This difference inseparation is based upon the relative speed of the aircraft.) MixingDR-Is with CR-47s on the samelevel is avoided.

With these separation timesand using six one-way flight levelsseventy VH-Is or ninety CH-47scan be handled per hour. The development of advanced avionicsequipment will probably allowformation flights at each levelthus increasing the volume of traffic.

All climbs and descents aremade at the rate of 60 knots and800 feet/ minute. Cruise speedestablished at 80 knots for VR-I,and 110 knots for CH-47. (Otherrates of climb and descent may benecessary due to size of terminalarea or aircraft limitations whenfully loaded.) All altitudes areMSL.

For departure from base area,a controller/dispatcher issues aclearance code number (i.e., D-I,D-2, etc.) and clears the aircraftfor departure on a time interval

~ a s i s V pon departure, aircraftclimb to assigned altitudes on apredetermined heading to intercept and fly an b o u n d trackfrom the base beacon, which co-incides with the inbound track ofthe objective area beacon.

Arriving over the destinationbeacon, the aviator, dependentupon the assigned departure clearance, either turns left q 0 and holds head

ing turns right 45 0 and holdsheading continues straight ahead

for a period of 30 seconds; thenon the same heading, he begins a

Major Smith was administrationofficer for Project TEAM Ft Ben-ning a . when he wrote this ar-ticle. He is now serving in Korea.22

RETURN LEVEL R3R TURN LEVEL R2

RETURN LEVEL R l

THIS CLE R NCE NORM LLY 400

TOP VIEW CENTERLINE

Figure 1. Red Dog system of flight separation and en route levelsdescent to visual flight conditions.V pon reaching visual conditions,the aviator turns right 180 0 andproceeds to track inbound to thebeacon under VFR separation andconsequent landing under controlof pathfinders or other groundcontrol personnel.

The advantage of a beacon located within the center of theoverall objective area is twofold.It provides a homing device forthe pilot after breaking out VFRin an unfamiliar area, and iteliminates the necessity of securing two separate areas.

MISSED PPRO CHESMissed approach proceduresconsist mainly of the following: Hold minimum descent alti

tude (normally 200 feet absolute)and take up prescribed headingfor 30 seconds. Report missed approach toground con trol. Climb to and main tain predetermined altitude on prescribedheading. Vpon reaching altitude, execu te left turn to fly directly to thebeacon and proceed as directed bythe ground controller.

When leaving the objectivearea, a code and time interval departure sys tern is again used.Based upon the clearance codenumber, the aviator (after takingoff and flying directly over thebeacon) assumes a headingfrom the desired departure track.He hqlds this heading for 3

~ i n u t e s and 45 seconds after passing the beacon (to insure lateralseparation), then climbs to predesignated altitude. After reaching altitude, the aircraft is turned90 0 to intercept and fly the returntrack to the base area beacon. Thesame approach techniques are employed in die objective area(fig. 2 .

Emergency return proceduresmay be required by some situations, such as loss of the assaultarea beacon. When such loss oc-curs, ground controllers will orderthe execu tion of emergency returnprocedures. Vpon controller s or:der, aircraft en route to thefaulty beacon will be turned to apredetermined heading and flownto their point of origin wherepredesignated approach and landing procedures will be followed.Execution of emergency return



25/52

2,400 FTo J t - ~ VISUAL FLIGHT

. ~ O x MIN 45 SECXFS

O . Y ~ C 315 0 - ~ 00 00 ,.,, 30 SEC, ~ ) (

VISUAL FLIGHT800 FT. MSL

XBT

Figure 2. Example f code and time interval departure system

procedures may be initiated asnecessary, but only by groundcontrollers.WEATHER RESTRICTIONActual weather imposes one restriction to a Red Dog operation.

There must be a minimum ceilingof 200 feet and a minimum visibility of 1/4 mile in a 5-10 mileradius from both the base andobjective area nondirectionalbeacons.

Another factor that must beconsidered is the requirement forsterilization of the airspace being utilized for a Red Dog operation. This will normally be ac-complished by the FOC's setting

aside a block of airspace intowhich no air traffic will be clearedduring the period of the operation.A major advantage of the RedDog system is that an aviator on anormal round trip is required tomake a maximum of only twoclimbs, two descents, and fourturns while under instrumentflight conditions. A copilot handlesall navigation and communications so the pilot can give his fullattention to ' flying the aircraft.

An additional major advantageof the Red Dog system is the simplicity of communications. FM orUHF equipment in use today willeasily meet the limited requirements. Also, with the exception of

a missed approach or an emergency situation (such as loss of abeacon), no airborne radio transmissions are required. Because ofits closed-circuit type operation,although the traffic density maybe exceptionally high, the inherent features of this systemgreatly reduce the possibility of,or necessity for, a breach of communications security.The Army plans to continueevaluating the Red Dog concept.Although still in the Model Tstage, i t nevertheless represents asignificant development' in helicopter instrument flight operations in the forward battle area.And, it's destined to improve withtechnical advances in avionics.

The F.ederal Aviation Agencyhas expressed considerable interest in Red Dog. After reviewingthe concept, FAA personnel helpeddevelop the system by providingtechnical assistance m o ~ t l y in theair traffic control field) throughthe National Aviation FacilitiesExperimental Center (NAFEC),Atlantic City, N. J. About 1,000hours of evaluation were conducted through FAA's unique $10million flight simulator complexand other facilities while reducingthe concept to established procedures for actual flight testing.

Chinooks climbing to separation levels after going IFR en route to objective. Ninety CH 47s canbe handled each hour using ed Dog system of separation /control.


26/52

AircraftRecoverywith theChinook

Captain Dwight N Jackson

HE MISSION was aerial recovery of an OH-13H, whichwas upside down in a swampyarea in pine trees a p p r o x i m a t ~ l y100 feet tall and located 65 milesfrom home station. This was therequest received by the operationsofficer of Company A, 228th As-sault Support Helicopter ~ a t t a l -ion (Chinook), 11 th ir AssaultDivision (Test) at 1530 hours on20 January 1964.

Could the recovery of the Siouxbe accomplished by the Chinookwith only three hours of daylightremaining? With the inge 1uity ofthe recovery t e ~ m frolJl the aircraft maintenaqce b ~ t t a l i o n tileversatile capabilities 'of the Chinook and the professional skill ofthe crew, the mission w a ~ accomplished.

In this instance, the Chinookwas hovered at treetop level bythe pilots while two m e m b ~ r s ofthe recovery team were lowered

Capt J a c k s o ~ was wit the 228thAssault S u p p o r ~ Helicopter Bat-talion Ft Benning Ga. when hewrote this article. .24

by hoist to prepare the Sioux forlifting. A 150-foot length of steelcable was used to attach the aircraf to the cargo h o ~ k of theChinook. The crashed Sioux waslifted from the swamp and deposited on a nearby airfield. TheChinook returned to pick up therecovery team members then returned to home station with therecovered aircraft as an externalload.

This was one of several aerialrecoveries effected using theChinook as the recovery aircraft.Others include Hfting a Mohawkwith a wiped t landing gear180 miles to the tlanta GeneralDepot for major repair, and recovering an Iroquois at night.These missions lave been accomplished by organizing recoveryteams from the aircraft maintenance battalion and putting together recovery kits for each typeof aircraft and situation. Some ofthe items included in these kitsare pioneer tools, lighting sets,aircraft hoisting slings, etc.Mohawk Recovery

To p r e p . f l r ~ the Mohawk for

Sioux, Hueys, h i n obeen easily recoveto repair facilities


27/52

Mohawks havequickly transportedCH 7

aerial recovery, r u d d e ~ and elevator controls must be locked inneutral position and the propellers ust be tied to prevent windmilling. An OV-l hoisting sling isattached to the Mohawk and an8-00t nylon sling strap is used toallow clearance between the twoaircraft. Approximately ope houris required for two men to prepare a downed Mohawk for recovery. Chinook pilots of the firstMohawk r ~ c o v e r y said they couldfly 80 knots with the Mohawkattached. On the first r e c q v ~ r yspoilers were tied to t ~ e wings toprevent floating aqd a windsockwas tied to the tail jacking pointto aid in streamlining. During themost recent recovery, it was foundthat this action was not necessary.The OV-1B, with full fuel andall components installed, can belifted approximately 60 nauticalmiles by the Chinook wi th a 30minute fuel reserve remaining. Bydefueling the Mohawk it can belifted approximately 120 nauticalmiles, allowing for fuel reserve.roquois Recovery

An Iroquois with full fuel andheavy armament installed can belifted for the full fuel range O fthe Chinook. Blades may be lefton the UH-l by blocking the mastand using a fabricated blade leveling yoke to prevent damage. TheIroquois is lifted with a 6-footnylon sling fastened to the liftingeye of the mast. Preparation foraerial recovery requires approximately 30 minutes. The UH-lstreamlines when the recovery aircraft moves forward.

hinook RecoveryNormally a downed Chinookwill be repaired and flown out;however, aerial recovery is possible when repair is not practical.A Chinook can be r e c o v ~ r e d by

another Chinook operating at33,000 pounds gross weight, by

defueling, removing the blades,rotor heads, transmissions and engines. This allows the strippedChinook to be lifted 70 nauticalmiles with a 30-minute fuel reserve at optimum flight conditions .A minimum of four personnelare required to prepare a Chinookfor aerial recovery. By use of themaintenance davit, a crane devicewhich attaches to the Chinookwhen in an upright position, thenecessary componen s can be removed and the aircraft defueledand readied for recovery in approximately 8 hours. f thedowned aircraft is lying on itsside it can probably be ~ p r i g h t e dby installing the hoisting slingand pulling it upright wi th therecovery Chinook . Then the maintenance davit could be installedand the components removed.

At this writing, two Chinookshave been lifted using anotherChinook as the recovery aircraft.The biggest problem e n c p u ~ t e r e dwas getting the recovered C,hinookto streamline in flight. When thefirst one was lifted, ' drag chutewas attached to aid in streamlining the recovered aircraft. Aftertakeoff, the recovered aircraftstreamlined nicely at first. However, during c1imbout the dragchu te began tq t ~ i s t and finallycollapsed i t ~ e l f vyhen this happened the recovered aircraftturned broadside and created toogreat a drag force fpr the recoveryaircraft to maintain safe flight.The Chinook was released fromapproximately 2,000 feet altitude.

Suggested solutions to this problem ~ r e to put a swivel in the linesecuring the drag chute so it cantwist freely or to replace the dragchute with two or three largewindsock1i.

h ~ second Chinook recoverywas s u c c e s s f u ~ al though streamlining was st ill a problem. The pilotssaid they could not faster than40 knots due to drag caused by theturning of the ex ternal load.

25


28/52

CWO Robert R Vaughn Jr.

IR L. ' . .

S ECIALIST-5 Crue A. Cheefpulled his flight parka dghtlyabout him and drew the hoodover his head to help ward off thecold of the dark early morning.He trudged through the snow andout to the flig,ht line to ,preflighthis bird.

There's not one reason in theworld why I have to be out herethis early," he thought. We won'tget weather until around 0900 or1000 this morning, if we get it thatearly. But try and tell Operationsthat. They are too eager' to jumpthrough the apex every time somecolonel needs a ride."Specialist Cheef approached thesquatting yH-IB ignominiouslycovered with snow.

Mr. Vaughn s maintenance officerfor D Tro.9P, 3/7 Cavalry, APOew York 09036.

26

on the battery, and pulled thestarter trigger. The turbine enginestarted its whine, and the gaugesbegan their reluctant climb topower., That's funny," Cheef thought,the blades should be turning by

now." He sat in the seat, lookingat the blade hanging way out infront of the ship. The whine ofthe engine told him it W3S starting, but the blade just stayedthere. "Well, it takes a long timefor these blades to start turningthough," he said to himself.He suddenly remembered thatstart fuel was still turned on andthe starter trigger was still pulled.He released both with a start, failing to notice that the EGT hit700.Suddenly he felt a slight lurch

Must be 3 inches of snow on and the blade began to turn. Hethis thing," he thought. wen;-I'U didn't notice the tie-down blockdaily it after I run it up. The get thrown across the fence andblades will blow most of the into the motor pool of the trucksnow off." company next door.Cheef wiped off the windshield He co,mpleted the runup. Thenon the pilot' side and hopped ~ ~ ' ' ' , ~ I ' , measure he ' decided tointo tlle seat. " , >' . pitch t ttlake

I thought Helper was s u p p o s wash camebe ,out here somewher.e,"


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noticed with satisfaction thatsnow was flying about everywhere.No doubt, when he got finishedthe aircraft would be clean.

Let's see now, he thought,add a little power, push leftpedal. Well, here goes.

He pulled pitch up, keeping hiseye on torque, and at the sametime he slammed left pedal in.Pretty smart of me to remember

that, he complimented himself.Suddenly the ship gave a sickening lurch to the left. Cheefslammed the pi tch back down andstomped right pedal so hard thathe heard the pop of the cablestop. The helicopter reversed itsspin and pivoted hard to theright, winding up almost 18 0from its original heading.Cheef sat frozen to the controlsfor a second. When he decidedthat everything had stabilized, herolled throttle off (he forgot thebeep button), noticed that therpm ~ r n i n g light didn't comeon, pushed the detent button, andshut the ,engine off. He took the13 out, signed off the daily, and

entered the defective rpm warning

groaned, squeaked and popped.The small crack in the tail boomthat had started several flightsago, and had been missed everydaily, had become large enough tobe seen very easily now-if themelting snow hadn't refrozen overt and sealed t off.Captain Schedule leafed throughthe papers on his desk and saw the

reminder to check the time onU3. It was only I hour and 45minutes out of PE. He scheduledit to return Colonel Bulle to headquarters-a short 2 hour trip.Nothing like getting the maximum utilization out of a ship. Itwould be overdue by the time itgot back but would go over in theair, so he would be covered. Thatstill left three other ships flyable.The maintenance officer had protested a little, but he didn't haveto ' worry about meeting commitments with division, so let himsquawk.

them had done a dance routine onthe bar at a local night spot about0400 in the mo:rning. The otherthree were off duty this morning,but-well, he was young, withamazing recuperative powers

Good morning, LieutenantBachelor, Sergeant Noncomyelled when Bachelor entered theorderly room.

The lieutenant winced underthe pain of the sudden noise. Notso piercing man, please, not sopiercing, Bachelor ariswered .Oh, I see, the sergeant answered. Big night, huh?Yes, I think I will sneak downto the suppiy room and just dieon one of the mattresses there.Can't 4 it, sir; you have an0830 takeoff, Sergeant Noncomanswered as he briefed Bachelor

about his passenger, Colonel Bulle .James Bond was facing hishardest test, and Specialist-4 N otams was engrossed in the adventure, sure that his hero would es-c ~ p e as he always did. Thenagain, just to be sure, he had better stick with the book until thispart of it was over annvay.

Here is some new weather,N otams, Messinger s a ~ d laying afolder down on the desk.Yeah, thanks Messinger, I'llpost it right away.

Good morning, sir, Messingersaid to Lieutenant Bachelor as 'heleft.Good morning, Messinger.Got weather to Centerville?Yes, sir, just what you see on

the b9ard, N otams :answered, rel u c t a ~ t l y laying rom Russia Withove face down on the folder of

new weather information that~ f e s s i n g e r had just ' brought him.Bachelor scrawled the information across his 175, then signedwhat could have been his name onthe bottom.

We ready to go? he askedCheef as he approached 'the ship,and exchanged greetings with hispassenger.

27


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cm LE O S FETY"Yes, sir," Cheef answered, put

ting down this month's Playboy"Good, my head is much toobig to preflight this thing. You'vedailied it, haven't you?"

"Yes, sir; it's all ready.""Good. We've got weather; let'sgo."Notams looked up as the UH-IB

roared past the window, spillinghis coffee in the process. "DarnWell thank goodness, none of itgot on my book, just these papershere. Wonder what they are? Oh,some old weather."

Notams threw the warning ofthe high turbulent weather inthe vicinity of Centerville intothe waste basket, and went backto helping James Bond escapeSpectre's hlred killer.Lieutenant Bachelor looked inthe back and saw that the colonelwas busy looking over some notes,and didn't have the headset on."Somebody left this thingbeeped up. I was lucky I didn'tget a hot start," he said."Yes, sir, I guess it was me; Iforgot," Cheef admitted.

"Well, watch it in the future.""Yes, sir."Bachelor strained to stay awake.The rush of the squelch in theearphones soothed him, the heatfrom the bleed air relaxed him,and he hung in t h ~ shoulder harness only barely awake.

Suddenly he was awakenedwith a sti)rt Severe turbulenceslammed him around like a

P i n g p o ~ g ball on the ocean,and he fought to regain controlof the ship.Thankfully the aircraft neverentered any attitude from whichi t couldn't be recovered, andBachelor managed to stabilize theqescent and the gyrations."There wasn't anything in thebriefing about severe turbulentarea," Bachelor growled over theintercom.28

"We gonna make it okay, sir?'""Yeah, no sweat; this is a solidlybuilt aircraft and can take a lot ofpunishment. How is the colonel?"

"He looks scared."Bachelor looked around andsaid something encouraging andthe colonel perked up a bit.Ou tside the aircraft, the cold airwh'ipped by the sleek, waspwaistedUH-IB, caressing the streamlinedcontours gracefully-except in thearea of the tail boom, where itwas burbling. The burbling wascaused by the crack that hadgreatly enlarged with the lastviolent stress put on it by theturbulence tossed ship."Centerville Tower, this isArmy 709, passing through yourcon trol zone, across the north endof your strip at 2,000 feet indicated.""Roger, 709, negative traffic.v\That type aircraft?""OV-I.""Roger."

"Well, we made it Cheef;there's the airfield. What's theirfreq anyway? I want to ask themfor clearance for an autorotation."

"I don't know, sir.""Never mind; here it is. By theway, turn the audio rpm off. I

don't want that thing driving mebatty during the descent.""Centerville Tower, this isArmy 113; request clearance toshoot an autorotation on oneeight.""Doggone it, this thing sure isbusy," PFC Mike Button said ashe put down the crossword puzzleand walked over to the radioagain."Roger, 113, clear to land atpilot's discretion; negative trafficin local area."Bachelor started an autorotation from 3,000 feet. An approaching Mohawk bore r e l ~ n t e s s l y toward him. At about 100 feetabove a sure collision Bachelorsaw him. He grabbed pitch in a

death grip, and didn't feel himself depress the detent button.His grip rolled the throttle off andthe engine died, but Bachelordidn't realize it and rolled thenow useless throttle the rest ofthe way on. The Mohawk shot bybeneath them and Bachelor, whohad his eyes on it, breathed a sighof relief.

He took a quick look at the rpmlimit light and saw that it wasn'ton, so he knew he had his enginerpm back again-or did he? Theaircraft started to descend again.He looked back at the instrumentpanel; the tach was unwinding.Both rotor and engine were waydown, and the engine--impossibIe The light wasn't on Onlyone thing to do now: try to getrotor rpm back. He dumped thepitch and willed rotor rpm to rise.Good, good, it's coming back, it'salmost there

Observers on the ground sawthe tail boom whip around forsome unexplained reason, thenseparate, as the aircraft plummeted to the ground.

f the board had had access toall the facts, they still would behard pressed to pu the blame onanyone thing. The little thingsthat can slip by, occasionally,can be compounded into a chainof events that renders an accident inevitable.

f the daily had been properlypulled, i f the runup had beenproperly done, if scheduling hadnot tried to cheat on the hours,if weather had been properlyposted, i f the pilot had read the-13, preflighted, or been morealert, if the tower had remembered the traffic in the pattern,the accident might have beenavoided.

When any person in Army Aviation neglects his full responsibility to himself, his aircraft, or hisjob he breaks the circle of safetyand sets the stage for an accident.

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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SEPTEM ER 965 9


32/52

SWEEPING IN from the sea,the Army's 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion task force arrivedin the Dominican Republic onMay 5th to provide an air transport capability for the 82d Airborne Division on duty in SantoDomingo.The 229th Stacked Deck Battalion, a part of the I I th Air As-sault Division [now 1st CavalryDivision (Airmobile)], departedFort Benning, Ga., on I May andloaded aboard the USS uadal-canal at Jacksonville, Fla., fortransport to the Dominican Republic.

In all, the task force consistedof ~ b o u t 200 men, 20 UH I Dtroop lift helicopters, I UH-II

~ e d i c l evacuation helicopter, 6UH-IB weapons helicopters armedwith XM-16 rocket-machinegunkits, and varied ground vehiclesand supplies.Fifteen miles off the coast of theDominican Republic, at 0700 fouraircraft led by the battalion commander were flown ashore to es-tablish a receiving area at SanIsidro near Santo Domingo. Enroute, the battalion vanguard was

30

he 9th(Stacked Deck)

HelicopterBattalionheld a pat

hand inisland operation

unable to establish radio communications with shore units, despitetrying all frequencies. Apprehension began to rise as the helicopters proceeded inland withoutknowing what tactical situationsmight be encountered. However,the sight of u S aircraft at theairfield at San Isidro brightenedthe picture.

Upon landing, a communications system was set up to bring inthe remainder of the aircraft.Meanwhile the task force's groundvehicles were landed on the beach,and despite some sniper fire hadrejoined the battalion by 1800.

The four vanguard helicoptershad arrived at San Isidro just intime to allow the battalion commander to attend a briefing with

commanders of the 82d. The taskforce was assigned at corps level,and included in the 82d's contingency plans.

Immediate liaison was established with the 82d. The taskforce commander visited all 82dbrigades and battalions to exchange information concerning ca-pabilities. Also, one task force of-ficer was designated to maintainliaison with each brigade and battalion.Next, the 82d concentrated ona comprehensive training programwith the task force to cover loading and unloading of troops,equipment, and supplies; arm andhand signals; and the execution oftactical situations with infantryplatoons.

anto omingo


33/52

In one instance a night raidwas conducted, using four helicopters and without the aid ofair-to-ground radio communications with friendly forces in theobjective area. After a map recon,three Hueys flew troops to the objective area.About 1500 meters from the LZall lights were extinguished except on the lead aircraft. At thesame time the fourth UH-IDwith 48-foot blades) acted as adecoy. All lights were turned onand the helicopter was slowedfrom 90 to 20 knots to create aloud flapping of the blades. Undercover of this distraction, the otherthree aircraft picked up flashlightsignals from the ground andslipped into the LZ. During land-

ing the flashlights were beamed atthe ground and moved ahead ofthe landing Hueys to light theway.To accomplish such raid-typemissions the helicopters must arrive at exactly the right time andfrom the right direction or theground signals will not be given-necessitating the abortion of theentire operation. Flashlights onthe ground are held to form a funnel pattern-three in the cone andone in the stem. Aircraft approachinto the cone.Flashlights also proved instrumental in the successful evacuation of an ill Dominican farmer.The mercy call came after dark.Despite severe thunderstorm ac-tivity, unit pilots flew a UH-ID

perations

from San to Domingo over themountains by radar to Nagua.There they picked up a Dorp.inican doctor and a special guide totake them to the village of Lamota-10 miles farther north.Landing was made possible pynatives holding flashiights. Theentire mission covered over 130miles and was made on instrumen s in near zero visibility asthe pilots took direction findingsteers from the radar.A pure air security missionwas run when the U. S Consulatein Santo Domingo was . hreatenedby force and food supplies becameshort. The 82d was ordered to se-cure an airfield in Santo Domingoand hold it until U. S Air Forcetransports could bring in food.

Lieutenant Coionel Earl K BuchanCO 229th Assault Helicopter Bn1st Cavalry Division

Intensive trainingpaid dividendsfor the 9thdeployed insupport of the8 d Airborneivision

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Santo omingot sing the task force, the 82d

launched an airmobile operationon the airfield. After determiningthe exact moment the firs t lightof day would appear, the helicopters took off into the morning

32

darkness and flew 65 miles at lowlevel. At about 1,000 meters fromthe LZ the area e g ~ n to get light.This, phis aircraft landing lights,permitted a successful landipg 15minutes before the C-130s begancoming in to the secured area.Professional ability and ingenuity are ~ v i e r i t in the mission.They also appeared when an improvised GCA was made at seato the USS a Salle which wasequipped with landing platform.The GCA took place during apassenger mission to the La Sallewhich was routine until the pilotran into IFR conditions.Since the La a ~ l e did not haveinstrument landing equipment,the electronics men among hercrew improvised with theit combat radar

While flying at 100 feet abovethe waves, and in heavy rains andturbulent winds, the UR-1D wasguided to wi thin V mile of theship. The pilot then could makeout the outline of the LaSalle andlanded safely on the rear deck.Later it was learned this was the

first IFR approach made to theLa Salle.The Army and Navy teamed upfor another first a t least forthe USS Miles C Fox} a U. SNavy destroyer. It occurred duringthe delivery of equipment neededby the Fox, which was operating

in heavy seas about 15 miles offthe coast of Santo Domingo. Theplan was to lower the equipmentfrom the helicopter onto the deckof the ship, which was steamingat 10 knots.

Upon arrival over the destroyerit was noted that a 30-foot squarearea had been cleared on the aftsection of the ship. The aircraftwas landed-a first for the Foxand the Army Aviators receivedthe compliments of the ship's captain for the proficient manner inwhich the landing was accomplished.

Maintenance was another areain which professionalism paiddividends for the task force.

The Stacked Deck battaliontook .22 maintenance men fromCompany of the 611 th Mainte-

eftabove: Stacked Deck battalion ground vehicles ready tomove aboard U Guadalcanal while Hueys are flown aboard (left). . . and (below) secured tor sea transport to the Dominican Republic

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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nance Battalion and 5 days back-up supplies to the Dominican Re-public. They were equipped withthe lI th Air Assault s shop vans(air transportable maintenancekits . These combined with sup-port from the 82d s 2Y2-ton vansenabled the task force in the 900hours flown in the first month tohold a 98 percent availability ratefor aircraft. Usually 2 and neverless than 9 aircraft were avail-able.

The deck may be stacked-butnot against the 229th.From 15 miles o the coast ueys left thecarrier for more familiar terra firmaright) . . and soon were actively supporting the 82d Airbo rne Division below)

SEPTEMBER 1965 33


36/52. ;. \

flyin g se:n seWO Bruce P auldin

Mr. Mauldin is assigned to the Dept of RotaryWing Training) USAAVNS Ft Rucker) Ala.

M EET HARRY Hot-Rock, chopper pilot firstclass. This guy has umpteen thousand hoursin evez:ything from Sioux to Choctaws, and justfinished the Huey transition course down at FortRucker. "Man, what a bunch of bull that was Allthat talk about turbines and droopers (or something like that), power lag, and governors. Hohum.

His first day in class, the instructor said some-

4

thing about what a fabulous helicopter that birdcould be when treated right, but that she couldturn on you in a hurry if you gave her too muchrope. Old Harry, he had umpteen thousands hoursand "Boy, that was some fine chow last night, andzzzzzzzz

Then they walked out on the flight line. Eachstudent went with his instructor, and soon therewere lots of bright faces as experienced teachers

An engine s an engine, and boy, that w s someway to spend Saturday night . U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


37/52

The flying business has an amazing way of eliminatingthe arry Hot Rocks permanently

explained the many differences between the Hueyand her reciprocating sisters. Lots of bright faces,except Harry s. Man, what an insult. That youngwhippersnapper trying to tell me the world s hottest pilot, what makes an eggbeater go? Hal Turbine, schmurbine. An engine s an engine, and thisone puts a lot of power at your fingertips and boy,that was some way to spend Saturday night,zzzzzzzz.

Time to go fly. Now I'll show this kid what awaste of time this course is for me. I'll just whip thisbaby up into a Hot-Rock special, super-duper 360overhead takeoff, with a crowd-thrilling departureat treetop level, and- hey, man, who closed thethrottle?

Our hero extracts himself from the wreckage, unwinds his rabbit's foot from the console, and departs the scene, stage right-older, wiser, and soon tobe poorer, minus that flight pay.

Sound familiar? Sure it does. Perhaps, i f you're asafety officer, too darned familiar.Harry exists in many places. f the place happens

to be a quiet safe little airfield on the corner ofyour post, he may succeed in livening things up.Give the crash crew some practice.

The Harry Hot-Rocks in the Army somehownever really believe that grabbing a whole armloadof collective in a heavily loaded Huey doesn't work.They never believe, that is, until they find themselves facing a long row of somber faces across a bigtable. Our friends at the Lycoming factory havemade numerous improvements to their engine, untiltoday we have a whole lot of power and a relativelyfast reaction rate. However, deep in the heart ofTexas, the boys at Bell have found a way to makethe Huey use all that power. Add bigger blades anda bigger cargo area on the same old airframe and,just like magic, you're right back where you started.You gotta use the 01 bean.

F'rinstance, back in flight school, every time youcould get away from your instructor, chances areyou tried a couple of those landings that ended witha quick flare at the bottom and a fas

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Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1965

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