Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1992

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Reshaping The Total Force


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Aviation DigestProfessional Bulletin

1 - 92-5 September/October 1992

1 The Total Force, MG Dave Robinson3 Views From Readers6 Reserve Forces: A New Beginning, MAJ James A. Houston III8 Will the Pentagon 's Proposed Force Mix Meet the FutureThreat?, Captain(P) Brian J. Boquist12 The Total Force Partnership, 1 LT Garth Connor14 The Army 's Mobilization of National Guard Units, CPT JamesE. Neilson II18 Army Aviation Between WWII and the Korean Conflict,1945 -1950, Dr. John W. Kitchens29 How Do Newspapers Report Army Aviation AircraftMishaps?, CW2 James M. Stewart34 Army Aviation in Level III Rear Operations, CPT JohnMagness36 Training fo r the Night JAAT, CPT Robert L. Douthit40 Aviation CSS at the NTC, MAJ Brian K. Mays43 Helicopter Maintenance Through the Years, COL William J. Blair49 Anatomy of an Ai r Crash: The Early Phase, MAJ William S. Besser54 Leader Development in the 1990s, MAJ Mark T. Littel57 Western Region Aviation Survival School Schedule of Courses,Mr. Frank Heyl58 DES Report to the Field: Equivalency Evaluations, CW3David J. Bean59 Aviation Logistics: OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Training, SSGDavid R. Jordan and SSG Herbert Ramirez60 TEXCOM: UAV, Mr. Wayne Hair61 USAASA Sez: MAMS, Mr. Robert C. Cole62 Aviation Personnel Notes: AWO Utilization63 ATC Focus: Area Maintenance and Supply Facility,Reimbursable Operations, Mr. Neal Johnson64 PEARL 'S: Who Is Responsible?, CW3 Daniel R. Vandervort65 Soldiers ' Spotlight: What's in the Future fo r ANCOC CMF 67,SFC Lawrence F. DunnBack Cover: Key Points on the Total Force, GEN Gordon R. Sullivan

Cover: This issue concentrates onthe U.S. Army 's Total Force policywhereby our Active and ReserveComponents serve as equalpartners. This partnership mustproduce a solid force-trained,ready, and capable of decisive victory on a moment's notice. The leadarticle introduces the U.S. ArmyReserve Command, Fort McPherson,GA, and discusses its potentialcohesive effect on the U.S. ArmyReserves and the Aviation community.

Major General Dave RobinsonCommander, U.S. Army Av iation CenterLieutenant Colonel Gerard HartExecutive Editor

Patricia S. KitchellEditorBy order of the Secretary of the Army:GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral , U.S. ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

~ 4 . ~MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army02715

The U.S. Army A viation Digest is an official Department of the Armyprofessional bulletin (USPS 415-350) published bimonthly under the supervision of the commander , U.S. Army Aviation Center. This publication presentsprofessional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authornot the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the off icial U.S. Army position and does not change or supersedeany information unless otherwise specified. Photos are U.S. Army unlessotherwise specified. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include bothgenders unless otherwise stated . Material may be reprinted provided credit isgiven to the Aviation Digest and to the author unless otherwise indicated .Publication uses recyclable paper.

invited. Direct communication is authorized by writing Editor , U.S. ArmyAviation Digest, A nN : ATZO-PAO-AD, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042, or bycall ing either DSN 558-3178 or commercial 205-255-3178. Manuscriptsreturned only upon request.

This medium is approved for the dissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Aviation Branch knowledgeable of current and emergingdevelopments withi n their areas of expertise to enhance their professionaldevelopment. Articles , photos , and items of interest on Army Aviation are

Second class postage paid at Daleville , AL, and additional mailing offices.Active Army , Army National Guard , and U.S. Army Reserve units receivedistribution as outlined in DA Pamphlet 25-33 . To complete DA Form 12-99-R,enter form number 12-05-E, block number 0014, and quantity. Also use DAForm 12-99-R for any change in distribution requirements . Army units submitthe form to their publications control officer .Personal copies of the Digest can be ordered from New Orders , Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh , PA 15250-7954 .POSTMASTER : Send address changes to U.S. Government Printing Office,Superintendent of Documents , AnN : Chief, Mail List Branch, Ma il Stop:SSOM, Washington , DC 20402-9373.


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Warfighter 6

Throughout our history, citizensoldiers have served our nation inpeace and in war. From the frozenrice paddies of Korea to the sands ofKuwait and Saudi Arabia, from thestreets of Los Angeles to the stormravaged south Florida and Louisianaregions; when they were needed, ourReserve Components (RC) werethere. As we anticipate the future,reliance on the RC to help defendour national security interests willincrease significantly.In the Cold War environment, Active Component (AC) forces could notdeal with the follow-on forces of theSoviet Union if hostilities wentbeyond a 30-day period. To deterSoviet aggression in western Europe,our AC forces had to be enhancedsignificantly. This enhancement wasaccomplished in 1973, whenSecretary of Defense James R.Schlesinger announced the RC wouldbe the primary uni ts to augment ourAC forces under a "Total Force"policy whereby both the AC and RCserved as equal partners.

The "roundout program," which integrates RC units of battalion- andbrigade-size maneuver units into theAC divisions, was an important part inwinning the Cold War. A significantfeature ofthe roundout program is thatit allows the Anny to maintain more

Major General Dave Robinson

The Total Force

AC divisions than ever possible, if allthe forces within the divisions werepurely AC units.

Since its inception, the concept ofa total force has evolved into a viablesystem that ensures our nation'ssecurity. The infant stages of developing the Total Force had some growingpains. Sometimes the AC was reluctant to treat the RC units as full andequal partners. However, in 1982, theAnny began to correct a significantfault in the system by authorizing theroundout units to be equipped with thesame equipment as the AC divisionswith which they were affiliated. Because of this policy, some Army RCforces are now equipped with the M- ltank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, andsome of the most modern aircraft inthe world, including the UH-60LBlack Hawk, CH-47D Chinook, andAH-64 Apache.

Today, America is at a criticalpoint in its history. The Cold War isbehind us, but we are still faced withan extremely unstable and volatileworld. Our nation's defense forces arecontingency-oriented and must betrained and ready to fight anywhere inthe world on a moment's notice. Thenature of future adversaries is uncertain. We can expect to conduct operations along the entire continuum ofmilitary operations, ranging from

peacekeeping and nation-buildingoperations to major regional contingencies, such as Desert Storm. Activeand Reserve Component forces mustpossess a solid p a r t n e r s h i ~ t r a i n e d ,ready, and capable of decisive victory.Currently, many RC forces ar eengaged in a significant operationalong the continuum of militaryoperations-counterdrugs. The roleRC units have played in helping toeradicate illicit drug production in thiscountry and other nations is wellknown.

While everyone within the Department of Defense agrees that restructuring of our forces is required because of the collapse of the SovietUnion, we must ensure that we shapeour future forces to deal with any contingency that may arise. Our militarystrategy will be built on the premise ofrapidly deployable, lethal, and expansible contingency forces-primarilycontinental U.S.-based, rather thanlarge-standing, forward-deployed forces. In the past these cont ingency forces have been exclusively AC units;however, future operations may needto be evaluated to incorporate ReserveComponents. For this to occur, however, the President and the Congressmust settle their differences over theWar Powers Act. It is imperative thatthe President have quick access to the

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forces required to support contingency operations without large mobilizations subject to congressional reviewand reversals after a 180-day period.

Significant challenges are aheadfor the Army and its aviation component. We must find cost-effectiveways to train. In the future, we willassess the benefits of consolidation.As the defense budget shrinks, wemust get maximum value for eachtraining dollar expended. We willcapitalize on all opportunities to trainActive and Reserve Componentstogether. We must look at innovativemeans of training the force. These

m u t u ~ l coordinated training eventsshould'focus on improving the combatcapabilities of both components.

We in the Active and ReserveComponents of Army Aviation haveunique opportunities to train together.We can train together in a field environment, such as the Combined

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Training Centers, the Joint ReadinessTraining Center, and the NationalTraining Center, or in combined exercises harnessing the power of simulation. In the future we must look atwhere we will conduct our flight training programs. While Fort Rucker willcontinue to be the center for ArmyA viation training, some flight trainingin our modernized systems should beshifted to the Eastern Army NationalGuard (ARNG) Aviation TrainingSite and the Western ARNG AviationTraining Site.

There are benefits in patterning Active and Reserve relationships inArmy Aviation after the highly successful model established in the U.S.Air Force. Active force augmentationis an operational necessity in ArmyAviation, but there is advantage inplacing selected aviation functionssolely in the Re. Again the placementof these selected capabilities in the

Reserves is contingent upon the President having ready access to these assets during periods of crisis.

While this is a time of great challenge, it also is a time of great opportunity. Aviation is a maneuver forceintegral to the reshaping of ournation's defenses. I firmly believe thatAviation will step into the 21 st century with its Active and Reserve Components in full partnership. Historyhas proven the value of reserves andits citizen soldiers. It is only throughthe full cooperation of all componentsthat the Army will maintain its placeas a relevant warfighting force.

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VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor:As Colonel Michael K. Mehaffey, former director, Departmentof Tactics and Simulation, FortRucker, AL, requested, I am writing my comment and question Iaddressed during his presentationto the U.S. Army Aviation Branchaviators attending the Commandand General Staff Officer Course(CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth,KS.He addressed the U.S. ArmyAviation Digest and its relativemerits of providing a forum forA viation discussion and ideas. Inmy experience, primarily the last 4years, I've heard many aviatorswith good ideas who refused towrite articles fo r the AviationDigest because the chain of command had to screen (censor) articles before forwarding to FortRucker. I remember, specifically,a counterpart from 6th Cavalrywhose article made the chain ofcommand scrunity only to bereturned by the Digest as notpublishable since "it did not reflectcurrent Aviation doctrine."

Our counterparts in the U.S.Navy and U.S. Air Force use theiraviation magazines to stimulatediscussion and, I think, to promoteinitiative. By our magazine onlypublishing the "school solution,"we stifle that interaction.In my opinion, the magazineeditor's disclaimer should be sufficient to cover the doctrinal issue.Perhaps, mine is an isolated case,but I have heard this said about theDigest from several other aviators.

MAJ Michael J. HartmanCGSOC, Class 92-93,Section 23CFort Leavenworth, KSResponse: When Major

General (MG) Dave Robinsonbecame the chief of branch andcommander of the U.S. ArmyAviation Center, Fort Rucker,AL, he promoted a climatewhere "disagreement is not disrespect." He wanted an open andhonest dialogue among his staffso that all options and opinionscould be explored. From thisopen dialogue, the best solutionsfor problems could be identifiedand implemented.

Approximately a year ago,MG Robinson changed thephilosophy of the U.S. ArmyA viation Digest to reflect his"disagreement is not disrespect"philosophy. He had receivedinput from the field that theDigest was too parochial andFort Rucker-based. He eliminated the Fort Rucker reviewboard which had inhibited ideascontrary to current branchdoctrine. MG Robinson wantedless"school solutions" and morefield applications.

In his Warfighter 6 column inth e January/February 1992issue, MG Robinson said hewanted controversy in th eDigest. Aviation is a large branchand can have differing opinions.The free discussion of those ideasand concepts are essential for thegrowth of the branch in a time ofchange.

u.s. ArmyAviation Digest September/October 1992

MG Robinson has direc ted theA viation Digest to become aforum for the expression of alternative ideas, concepts, and tactics as they relate to our doctrine.Through the A viation Digest,members of the branch can exchange their views and seeresponses in "Views fromReaders" or in alternative ar ticles. This process is healthy forthe branch.

As the executive editor for theDigest, I encourage you to writefor us. The Digest attempts tocarry articles that will reach across-section of the branch. Weare relying less and less on Rucker-based products and more andmore on field-generatedproducts. One area the Digestcan always use help in is gettingarticles written by Aviation soldiers and their noncommissioned officer leaders.I hope to see more articlesfrom across the branch representing the great ideas and applications going on in the field.

LTC Gerard HartExecutive EditorU.S. Army A viation Digest

Editor:I am writing to you to see if youcan clear up something for meabout the U.S. Army AviationDigest. The inside front cover says,"This medium is approved for thedissemination of material designedto keep individuals within theA viation Branch know ledgeable of

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current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise to enhance their professionaldevelopment. "

I should like to know which individuals are referenced by thatstatement. I have seen newprograms, ideas, and tacticallyoriented stories in every issue Ihave read. I have noticed that almost all of these are related to theAH-64 Apache, AH-1 Cobra, andthe RAH-66 Comanche.The May/June 1992 issue has a26-page layout on the RAH-66. Itgoes into great detail about theT800 engine, deployment, logistical support, and many other topicsconcerning the aircraft.

I was reading in the July 1992issue of Rotor and Wing Interna-tional (RWI) that funding for theComanche might be included in anew program objective memorandum, and the production may bereinstated. According to that RWIarticle, we are not sure that there iseven going to be an Army RAH -66.

I was looking for an article thatwould pertain to a UH-1 Huey,UH-6OBlack Hawk, CH-47 Chinook, orfixed-wing pilot or crewmember inthis last issue of A viation Digest.There were a few, but not many. Thereare other aircraft in the inventory besides AH-64s and AH-1s, and thereare developments going on other thanthe RAH-66. Let us hear about thema little bit more.

Recently, I read in the Soldiersmagazine about the UH 6OQ, a newMEDEVAC variant of the UH-60.How about some information for the(very important person) fIxed/rotarywing pilot? At the Central ArmyAviation Scheduling Office, Fort Belvoir, VA, a new hub system went intoeffect 1 October 1992 for the fixedwing aviators in continental UnitedStates assignments. Why don't wehear about that? What about tacticalloading for Chinooks? What is the

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state of competition for the new initialentry trainer? What about flightmedics, flight surgeons, crewchiefs,mechanics, air traffic control personnel, their issues and tactics?I think that these things are justas important, if not more, than thedevelopment of an aircraft that weare not sure that we, in the Army,will ever fly.

CW2 Glenn S. BloomU.S. ArmyFort Sill, OKResponse: See the notice

regarding th e initial entrytrainer.

Editor:Notice: The Program ExecutiveOffice, Aviation, with the U.S.Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, MO, is vigorously

pursuing the acquisition of a newtraining helicopter (NTH). The newhelicopter will replace the agingUH-l Hueys in the initial entryrotary wing (lERW) program atFort Rucker, AL. The effort isfocused on a commercial, "off-theshelf," Federal Aviation Administration-type, certifiedhelicopter that will have significantly lower operating and support costs than the Huey, but willnot degrade training effectiveness.The program is designated as theNew Training Helicopter.The Program Executive Officer,Aviation, Major GeneralDeWitt T.Irby, has charged the NTH team tostreamline the acquisition processto the maximum extent possible,while ensuring a "best-value" approach to source selection.A "world class" team of aviationacquisition experts met in an almostnonstop series of conferences to puttogether a request for proposal(RFP). All items had to be fully justified for inclusion in this most important document or be excluded.

This was a severe irr itant to some ofthe long-standing, "rice-bowl"holders in the system. Each level, allthe way up to the Secretary of theArmy, backed the NTH team's effort in this.

A draft RFP reflected the initialefforts of the team. The RFP waswidely distributed to all known interested industrial components(159 addressees) for comments. TheNTH team analyzed the industrycomments; they incorporated thecomments, as appropriate, into arevision of the draft RFP. The teamdiscussed the RFP revisions withindustry's representatives in a presolicitation meeting. The team obtained additional comments andfully considered them in constructing the formal RFP.The formal RFP was released inMay 1992 with a suspense forproposal submission of 10 August1992. To assure total understanding of the requirement, a preproposal meeting was conducted inJune to permit all interested partiesto surface any additional questionsthey might have. Four amendmentsto the RFP were released to formalize the results from these government/industry exchanges.The evaluation process is dividedinto two major areas: the SourceSelection Evaluation Board(SSEB), which is responsible for theoverall evaluation of the proposals;and the Training EffectivenessUser Evaluation (TEUE), which isessentially a "fly-off" to be conducted at a Fort Rucker airfield andsurrounding environs by highlyskilled instructor pilots from theAviation Center. The results of theTEUE will be documented andtransmitted to the SSEB. The boardwill incorporate those findings withall others and complete an overallcomparative evaluation report.Some think of the source selection process as a glamorous, attrac-



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tive activity. In reality, whenproperly accomplished, it is agrinding, hectic, time-compressed,bundle ofhard work. Thousands ofcalculations must be made and remade. Every word of each proposalmust be reviewed again and again;rIrst to assure every requirement ofthe RFP has been touched on;second to evaluate the level, depth,and rIrmness of the commitmentsmade in the proposal; third toevaluate the accuracy of those commitments and cross-talk themagainst all other relatable areas toassure overall acceptability andcreditability; and finally to scorethem according to their place in thehierarchy of priorities for this program. Then the evaluator mustsupport his/her rmdings to at leasttwo levels of review and place therefmed findings into report form.The report must then be finalized, summarized, and briefed tothe body of senior experts known asthe source selection advisory council (SSAC). This council may require even more refinement ormore definition in the report. Whenthis direction has been satisfied, theSSEB must then make the presentation to the source selectionauthority, the final decisionmaker,usually with the SSAC in attendance.The decision is then made and acontract is awarded. About a yearlater (March 1994), the first of theNTHs will start arriving at FortRucker to be inducted into thetraining equipment inventory andbe readied to take over the IERWtraining tasks. The NTHs will continue to perform those tasks for atleast the next 20 years if currentplanning is fully executed.The NTH team is dedicated toassuring that the selectedaircraft will truly represent a"best-value" buy for the Armyeffective, safe, affordable,

rugged, and reliable enough stillto be training students in theyear 2014. LOOK FOR IT I!!!!!

Editor:The U.S. Anny Aviation LogisticsSchool (USAALS), Fort Eustis, VA,is hosting the 1993 Aviation Logisticsand Maintenance Commanders' Conference and the Maintenance TestPilot Training Update 24 to 29January 1993. For more informationabout either conference contact CW4Hrichak or Mrs. Alvord at DSN 927-6166 or commercial 804-878-6166.

COL William J. BlairAssistant Commandant,USAALSFort Eustis, VA

Editor:The 1993 National Conference onNoise Control Engineering will beheld at the Fort Magruder Inn andConference Center in Williamsburg,V A, on 2 to 5 May 1993. The LangleyResearch Center of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Institute ofNoise Control Engineering (lNCE)are organizing the conference.Noise Control 93 is the 12th in aseries of national conferences onnoise control engineering that beganin 1973.The theme is Noise Control inAeroacoustics. The technical program will consist of parallel sessionsof invited and contributed papers. Anexhibition of acoustical instrumentation and equipment will be at the conference, and a tour of the NASNLangley Research Center will beavailable.Noise Control 93 is being organized in conjunction with theSecond Conference on Recent Advances in Active Control of Soundand Vibration, which will take placein Blacksburg, VA, on 28 to 30 April


1993. Those aviators interested in active noise-abatement techniques forhelipad and flightline environmentsmay wish to attend both conferences.For further information, contact the

Noise Control 93 ConferenceSecretariat, David G. Stephens, MailStop 462, NASA Langley ResearchCenter, Hampton, VA 23665-5225.Telephone commercial 804-864-3640.

Editor:French army aviators are lookingfor fellow aviation soldiers withwhom to correspond. Pilots and aviation support personnel interested insharing experiences and interests inmilitary flying and service to theircountry are encouraged to set up arelationship by mail with your Frenchcounterparts. They are very interestedin a continuing interchange and take"pen pals" very seriously. I f interested, please send Lieutenant Colonel(LTC) Clay Edwards, Fort Rucker'saviation liaison officer in France, abrief synopsis of your position andinterests. LTC Edwards will matchyou with a member of the AviationLegere de P'Armee de Terre (lightaviation, army) of like interests andexperiences. I f you want to correspond with a French soldier ofanother branch, send the letter to: LTCLawynC.Edwards, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), Aviation Liaison Officer (Avn LNO), Unit 21551, BoxA209A, APO AE 09777. He will forward the letter to that branch's representative. Postage is only $.29.LTC Lawyn C. Edwards

TRADOC Avn LNOFranceReaders can obtain copies of thematerial printed in this issue bywriting to the Editor, U.S. ArmyAviation Digest, ATZQ-PAO-AD,Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042.

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Reserve ForeesANew Beginning

Major James A. Houston IIIAviation Staff Office

U.S. Army Reserve CommandFort McPherson, GATwice the citizen soldiers now have a singlechain of command to provide their leadership. Aviation units, in particular, arebenefiting from activation of the U.S. Army ReserveCommand (USARC), Fort McPherson, GA, specifically in force modernization, stationing, and facilityconstruction.Transfer of Functions from CONUSAs to USARC

On 18 October 1991, USARC, a major subordinatecommand under U.S. Army Forces Command(FORSCOM), Fort McPherson, GA, shed its provisionalstatus and became a full team player. The USARC, whichhad operated provisionally since October 1990, planned theorderly transition of functions, and command and control(C), of assigned U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units fromthe continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs). Execution of hisplan has already taken place for most units.

The new command is the result of a congressional mandate. Congress directed that Department of the Army increase the role of the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), in theC2 of USAR units and the management of USAR-specificresources. Upon completion of the transfer of functionsfrom the CONUSAs, by October 1992, US ARC will provide consolidated command authority for all USAR unitsreporting directly to the FORSCOM commander.Leadership/Staff of USARC

Major General (MG) Roger W. Sandler, who also servesas the CAR, commands USARC, and reports directly to the

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FORSCOM commander. MG Sandler also serves as thedeputy commanding general (OCG), Reserve Mfairs,FORSCOM. MG Sandler's primary duty station is inWashington, OC. The OCG, USARC, MG Max Baratz,oversees the daily operation of the headquarters, which islocated on Forts McPherson and Gillem, Atlanta, GA. TheCAR command sergeant major (CSM) Collin L. Younger,also wears dual hats as the USARC CSM.Responsibilities of USARC/CONUSs

To assist the command in managing resources, USARCis developing a "winning" staff comprised of a mix of70-percent civilian employees, 21-percent Active Guardand Reserve soldiers, and 9-percent Active Componentsoldiers. By October 1992, the staff will increase to 814personnel.

The command's responsibilities extend to all ArmyUSAR units assigned to FORSCOM. The CONUSAs willremain responsible for training, operations, mobilization,and deployment functions. USARC will provide centralized control of resource allocations, including funding, toassigned USAR forces. This change will improve the effectiveness and efficiency involved in the distribution ofthose allocations.A viation Office under USARC

Initially, USARC's primary focus was to identify andwork through systemic problems while establishing a newcommand. To meet the needs ofUSAR aviation forces, theUS ARC aviation office was formed. The aviation office

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works directly for the Chief of Staff, USARC. Formationof the office enables USARC to focus a concentrated efforton improving all aspects of aviation. The aviation officeprovides the command a single voice and point of contactfor both information and responsibility in aviation matters.Colonel (COL) George F. Francioni is the chief of theaviation office, which has 18 authorized positions (seefigure). COL Francioni serves as the principle advisor tothe commander and staff on all aviation matters within theUSAR aviation program. He provides guidance and leadership to about 7,000 aviation and aviation-related soldiers inUSAR troop program units.To manage the USAR aviation program, COL Francionihas three branches within the aviation office. The operations and plans branch manages current USAR Aviationprogram operations. This branch manages such diverseactions as special mission requests, military aviation assistance to counterdrug operations, and requests for flightorders. It manages aviation funds to include a flying hourprogram of 90,000 hours at a cost of over $40 million.Current and future aviation program planning needs andrequirements also are prepared by this branch. A majoraction for the branch has been planning for the conversionof two AH-l Cobra attack helicopter units to the AH-64Apache helicopter configuration.

The operations and plans branch is involved withanother area of interest, that of equipment acquisitionand distribution. The fielding of night vision gogglesand the distribution of U-21 Ute and UH-60 Black

Hawk aircraft to USAR units are examples.The effortsof this office toward purchasing and fielding the C-12FHuron aircraft will bring a new era to reserve aviation.The standardization and training branch develops andimplements USAR standardization and training policies.One facet of the branch's duties that reaches to the individual soldier level is the prioritizing and coordination ofcourse quotas at both formal and regional schools andtraining sites. To administer the standardization policies forthe USARC, Army Regulations (AR) 95-1, AR 95-3, andAR 140-1 are being supplemented and revised by the

, standardization branch.Th e third branch in the aviation office is thefacilities and maintenance support branch. This branchis active in monitoring the material readiness of the

513 rotary-wing aircraft and 47 fixed-wing aircraftbelonging to the Army Reserve division also involvedin the aviation support facilities program. The branchoversees the budgeting, stationing, and managementfor 33 of these facilities.Cohesive Effect of USARC

As the USARC matures, and the functions andresponsibilities of command are transferred from theCONUSAs, the aviation community, and the Army atlarge, will see the cohesive effect the USARC bringsto the Total Army Force. The aviation office will playa major role in developing that cohesiveness for theaviation community. LJ

AVIATION OFFICE ORGANIZATION I

OPERATIONS AN D PLANS

REQ7 AUTH6

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

REQ 2 AUTH 2

TRAINING ANDSTANDARDIZATION

REQ3 AUTH3

FACILITIES AND MAINTSUPPORT

REQ9 AUTH 7

TOTAL: REQUIRED 21 AUTHORIZED 18u.s. ArmyAviation Digest September/October 1992 7


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Will The Pentagon's Force MixMeet The Future Threat?

Captaln(P) Brian J. BoquistCommander, B Company, 3d Battalion12th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

U.S. Army ReservePortland, OR

I n the early morning hours of 2 August 1990,Mohamed lundi looked out his window to Fahad AlSalem Street and saw Soviet-made tanks rolling intoKuwait City. In 210 days, he watched American-madeAbrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles liberate theEmirate of Kuwait. In 7 months, Department of Defense(OOD) mobilized, deployed, trained, prepared, and executed the Gulf Warof 1990 to 1991. The 100-hour groundwar has been compared to the classic armor operations ofWorld War II (wwn). No question, armor forces carriedthe striking blow t h ~ t liberated KuwaitThe officers commanding American military units arepaid to expect the unexpected coupled with preparingprimary, alternate, and supplemental positions and plans.To analyze the Gulf War is to quickly comprehend that notall military actions enjoy the luxury of a 7-month buildupbefore action. Four questions discussed in this article comprise a tightly coupled complex issue of the Pentagon'sproposed force mix versus the future threat. This issue hasnot been raised since before WWI.Identifying Potential Threat RegionsAs stated in Congressional hearingsof he Senate ArmedForces Committee, the answer depends on assessing thepotential enemy or threat to the country. With the WarsawPact crumbling and the Soviet Union being replaced byshadows of itself, this leaves only a small list of knownthreats to America's national security. Recently, the Pentagon publicly identified North Korea, Cuba, India, Pakis-

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tan, and Iraq as potential hot spots. As the world changes,the military focus changes to identify potential geographicor climatic regions that may become a threat in the future.

In scientific terms, seven categories of climatic regionsare subdivided into subtypes as follows: Tropical rainyclimates (rainforest, savannah), dry climates (steppe,desert), humid mesothermal climates (dry summer subtropical, humid SUbtropical marine west coast), humidmicrothermal (warm summer, cool summer, subarctic),polar (tundra, ice cap), undifferentiated highlands, andextensive uplands.

Strategists are familiar with the humid mesothermalclimates and terrain in America and Europe along with theformer military force structures. However, what about therest of the world? In lay terms, dry climates compriseroughly one-quarterof the earth's land, while true desert isone-seventh; mountains comprise one-fifth; rainforests andtropical rainy climates, about one-third; about one-quarteris subarctic or continental; and the remaining lands aremostly in America and Europe.About three-quarters of earth's land surface is desert,tropics, arctic, tundra (subarctic), or mountains. Classicalarmor or mechanized operations are nearly impossible inthe tropics, arctic, tundra, and mountains. Desert warfareislimited to logistical and time constraints of the situationcombined with geological characteristicsof the desert. TheIsraeli Defense Forces are fully aware of the inoperabilityof armor in sandy deserts common to northern Africa andparts of Arabia. Moreover, regions in South America,



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Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Australia are thousands ofmiles away from the continental United States.The Requirement for Light Forces

Obviously, the requirement for classical armor andmechanized forces in the desert will not disappear nordiminish in the next decade. This is true, despite the article"But Whom Will We Fight?, Frustration at U.S. ArmyTank School," in the 4 February 1992 issue of the Interna-tiofUll Herald Tribune. Can armor and mechanized forcesbe projected to move 1,000 to 8,000 miles in a few days orweeks? No. Can armor or mechanized forces be airlifted tothe battlefield by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) or aircraftfrom the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)? No. Army'sAbrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle are too large orheavy for the USAF's C-130, C-14IA, C-14IB, and C-5Awhile CRAF aircraft face similar problems. Yes, armor andmechanized forces can be sealifted to destinations aroundthe world given time, ships, and lots of fuel.

The premise that lighter forces are required by Americanforces is evidenced by Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and theGulfWar. The speed ofdeployment depends on the aircraftavailable for lifting the forces to the theater of operations.The fIrst major forces on the ground in Saudi Arabia werethe 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, NC. Thoughwell trained in infantry, the airborne soldier's antiarmorweapons are limited. Airborne has short-range (1,000meters (m)) capability with the Dragon; limited numbersof TOW medium-range (3,75Om) anti armor weapons; andminimal artillery support with the 105 millimeter (mm)artillery piece. An organic organization, the 82d, or anylight infantry division, lacks any serious antiarmorcapability in the face of an armored division.

In simple terms, everybody held his breath and prayedthat Iraqi armored divisions did not move south into SaudiArabia. Grinding infantry under the tank tracks of Sovietmade armor is no way to delay a foe while awaiting sealiftarmor and mechanized forces. The conventional tacticalresponse would be to delay the enemy through fire andmaneuver. The classic concept is to trade space for timewhile withdrawing intact either under pressure or throughdeception. Unfortunately, the airborne division, or lightinfantry division, has neither the maneuver or fIrepowercapability to accomplish this mission. These soldiers travelby foot at a rate of 3 kilometers (km) per hour while armoreasi ly d0eS 35km per hour.

An average airborne or light infantry battalion shouldhave 2 to 4 TOW antiarmor launchers, 27 Dragon antiarmorlaunchers, and 27 7.62mm M60 machineguns. Hopefully,the battalion will have limited 105mm artillery support. TheTOW launcher has a range of 3,75Om; time of flight to thetarget is about 19 seconds with a basic load of 7 rounds per


weapon. The Dragon launcher has a range of 1 000m beinga single-round weapon. The M60 machinegun has a rangeof 1,000m with ammunition limited to what can be carriedon the personnel.

The average opposing armor battalion would be comprised of 40 tanks and 2 BRDM amphibious antiarmorscout vehicles supported by 122mm self-propelled (SP)howitzers and possibly a rocket battery. The tanks likelywill be equipped with 125mm main guns fIring 6 to 8rounds a minute effective 50 percent of the time at 2,000m.The basic load of ammunition on each tank is 40 rounds.Each of the 40 tanks should have one 12.7mm machinegunand one 7.62mm machinegun, a total of80 for the battalion.The 122mm SP howitzer has a range of 15km.Discussion of Issue

1. Would the first American forces on the ground inAugust to September 1990 have been able to turn backthe Iraqi armored forces?Clearly, the capability of airborne infantry battalions toaccomplish this feat can be seriously questioned. The claim

of massive air superiority has merit; however, the lack ofadequate quantities of aviation fuel again seriously questions whether forces on hand could have accomplished themission.

The discussion of task-organizing special antiarmorunits to support the airborne units commenced immediatelyafter the Iraqi invasion. Several challenges were apparentthat needed to be overcome before successfully deployingthese special units. The units with the best command,control, and communications (C3) assets were Special Forces (SF) detachments, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC. The separate antiarmor battalionshaving the required firepower and maneuver capabilitywere under the command of the U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA. I f he antiarmor battalion andSF company could have been task-organized, the airborneforces could have been immediately augmented with superior antiarmor capabilities.

Unfortunately, the four separate antiarmor battalionswere rated combat-ready but belonged to the GA, OK, WI,and OR National Guard (NG). Even though the U.S.Marines, Navy, and Air Force mobilized combat reserves,the U.S. Army did not follow suit whether for political orother reasons. Whether Reserve Component (RC) or Active Component (AC), the task organization of antiarmorforces merited consideration in Iraq in 1990 and meritsconsideration in the future.

The four separate antiarmor battalions were not dedicated assets but had tremendous mobility and fIrepower.Each of the battalion's fIve line companies could have beenteamed up with an SF detachment and host country counter-

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parts to perform overwatch, screening, raiding, and reconnaissance missions. The SF detachments could haveprovided C3, 60mm or 81 mm mortar, and Stinger airdefense expertise with host nation forces providing guides,language, and other liaison.

Each antiannor company is virtually self-sufficient withmedics, mechanics, supplies, logistics, fuelers, limitedmess facilities, and communications. Each of a battalion'sfive companies has 12 M996 TOW high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs); 6 M 1025 ScoutHMMWVs; 7 M998/l038 Command HMMWVs; and 8other support vehicles. In addition, the TOW and ScoutHMMVs have M60 machineguns for a total of 18 percompany. The Command HMMWVs have two emptyseats while the TOW and Scout HMMWVs have oneempty seat per vehicle. There is seating for an extra 25personnel along with mortars and Stinger missiles.

The HMMWV's ground weight per square inch allowsit to operate on desert sand and tropical clay, while armoris too heavy and sinks. Further, the HMMWV can operatein mountains and arctic environments restrictive to annor.The HMMWV vehicle range is 515 km, but the vehicle cancarry additional fuel and water. The maximum effectiverange of the TOW II weapon is 3,75Orn, which is stand offto most armor such as those weapons possessed by the Iraqiforces in 1990. Two mortars for each company could haveprovided indirect fire support out to 4,595m. Two Stingermissile launchers could have provided adequate air defenseagainst attack helicopters. The Scout HMMWVs are configured for MK-19 40mm grenade launchers and M2 .50-caliber machineguns to include ammunition racks. Companies organized in this nature would have more firepowerthan a light infantry or ranger battalion.

Space existed for additional SF or host nation personnelthroughout each antiarmor company with no requirementfor additional vehicles. The Command HMMWVs couldbe used for Stinger and/or mortar carries without anyproblems since redundancy exists in the line platoons.

These company-size teams could have conductedunconventional raids, reconnaissance, screening, andpsychological operations deep in enemy territory or tothe front of airborne forces. Unlike armor, the antiarmor task forces could operate in the limited terrain ofthe desert, tropics, and mountainous environments.The HMMWV can climb grades of 60 percent andtraverse slopes of 22 to 40 percent. Armor does nothave the same capability. On hilly terrain, theHMMWV can expect to achieve speeds of 30 to 40miles per hour. This is critical in geographic areas thatrequire the mobile firepower to conduct operations andsupport airborne or light infantry. The U.S. Armyshould note that other military forces in desert, tropi-

10

cal, and mountainous geographic regions havewheeled armored vehicles for this same reason.

Company teams of this nature could be resupplied by airdrop and are fully capable of being sling-loaded by helicopter. The anti armor companies could provide combat firepower for the offense or defense. The SF detachments couldprovide air defense, indirect fire support, command andcontrol, psychological operations, civic action, long-rangecommunications, and liaison. Host nation forces couldprovide liaison and language skills coupled with commandcoordination with allied forces.

Unlike the MI Abrams tank weighing 60 tons, thevehicles of the antiarmor battalions are all capable of airliftby USAF aircraft. The M966 HMMWV has a gross vehicleweight of 8,200 pounds (lbs) while other HMMWVs donot exceed 9,100 lbs. Six HMMWVs could be carried on aC-141 USAF aircraft, while 10 could be carried on a C-5USAF aircraft at a minimum.

To airlift an entire antiarmor company with attachments would require six C-141 aircraft or possiblythree C-5A aircraft. This means every 6 aircraft wouldlift 12 TOWs, 6 MK-19 40mm grenade launchers orM2 .50-cal iber machineguns, 18 7.62mmmachineguns, 20 M203 grenade launchers, 92 rifles,17 pistols, 2 mortars, 2 Stinger missiles, 27 nightvision devices, and 109 combat-ready personnel withtheir equipment and vehicles.

2. Does the United States have a force structure ofunits capable ofdeploying in a few days or weeks to meeta th reat similar to the situation faced by the 82d Airborne Division in September 1990?

The proposed task organization of antiarmor companies and battalions together with SF detachmentswas never implemented. Even though a Rand NoteReport titled, "TOW Missile System Utilization at theNational Training Center," dated October 1990,pointed out the advantage of the wheeled TOW, theseparate antiarmor battalions are being inactivated.

Further, an article titled, "Military Lessons Learnedfrom the Gulf War," in the NovemberlDecember 1991issue of the Army Research, Development, and Ac-quisition (RDA) Bulletin reports, "New tactics mightresemble guerilla warfare writ large [sic]: smaller,agile, stealthy units stage hit-and-run raids with tanks,armored cars, artillery, and helicopters integrated withtactical air support." It appears inactivating highlymobile, airlift-capable units means fewer units will beavailable to respond to crisis situations around theworld.

3. Will the Pentagon's proposed force struc ture of heU.S. Army meet the geopolitical realities of the worldnext year or in 5 years?



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The RDA article points out America 's military continueto focus wrongly on weapons systems and defense acquisition. The basis of the article is an analysis from the Centerfor Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.The article points out that the most important factor towinning a war is having quality, capable, well-trainedpersonnel. Another important point is that Americandefense strategy remains inappropriate for the threat facingthe United States in the world today. America needs a"balanced defenses investment strategy" to meet futuredefense requirements, but it must "place the greatest emphasis on the quality of military personnel."

Presently, the Pentagon is proposing to eliminate about25 percent of the combined military personnel. This willallow further acquisition ofweapons systems or retainmentof present equipment over personnel. In late March 1992,Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed massive cutsin Reserve and NG personnel, focusing on combat armsunits. Even though these units are more cost effective, it isconsidered important to transfer combat arms control to theActive Army. The reasons cited by Secretary Cheney andGeneral Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, run counter to educated recommendations, the experience of Reserve service in the Gulf War, and theconcept of a balanced defense strategy.

4. Should U.S. citizens rely on an Active ComponentU.S. military or a mix combined with the citizen soldiersof the Reserve and National Guard components of thevarious services?

This question was first put to ink during July 1776 by thefIrst Congressional delegation that adopted the Bill ofRights. The right to bear arms focused on the ability ofstates to control a militia that could counter the tyranny ofa central government. Today, we focus on the right forpersonal ownership of weapons, but that was not the worryof America's founding fathers.

Recall that the King of England used the British Armyto suppress opposition and control the population in theColonies. The "Red Coat" soldier became a symbol of theoppression to freedom-loving Americans. Just the same,the Nazi Storm Trooper became the symbol of oppressionin Germany in the 1930s. The Committee for State Securityand Chief Intelligent Directorateof he General Staff servedthe same purpose in the Soviet Union until just last year.The interrelationship of the army and nation in

geopolitical terms are inseparable according to Karlvon Clausewitz, author of "On War," published 1832-1834. Clausewitz' s thoughts served as a basis for thedeveloping modem military concepts like the tenantsof AirLand Battle Operations and combined armsphilosophy. Unfortunately, in Clausewitz's country,the people experienced the army's support of fascism


and the literal extermination of those opposing thegovernment.

The military cannot be isolated from their responsibilities to a nation whether open warfare, economic distress, drug overdose, or foreign assistance (nation-building). A look at America's national debt, which is primarilydue to defense spending, is like looking in the mirror. EvenafterWW II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill fellvictim to failing to adhere to public demands. Americanleaders in government who assume responsibility acquiretheir legitimate authority from the people in our democracy.

Further, America should note the National Guard hasremained at the same strength since President TheodoreRoosevelt set the present level almost 100 ago. I f here is afailure in the readiness of the National Guard and ArmyReserve, it should be fIxed. However, the U.S. Armyleadership in the Pentagon did not point out any failuresuntil discussions of mobilization in August 1990. Even i fthe NG combat units required 90 days to train up, the ActiveU.S. Army required 7 months from August 1990 toFebruary 1991. The readiness issue of the National Guardand Reserve is still being debated within the ranks of theActive Component of the U.S. Army.

It could be stated that the soldiers of the four separateNG antiarmor battalions being inactivated in OR, GA, OK,and WI probably gave more to their country than theiractive counterparts. The citizen soldiers who gave up theirweekends to be trained, equipped, and prepared to servetheir country also during the week held civilian jobs tosupport their families and pay taxes. Similar tax dollarshave been overcommitted by the military and governmentalike, in tum creating a portion of the national debt to builda massive military industrial complex.Conclusion

In closing, remember this is a political rather than aneconomic issue. The federal expenditures for the NationalGuard are 2.8 percent of the OOD's budget. To cut theNational Guard in half will only save 1.4 percent of thebudget. What would we be saving? We need to focus onrealistic future missions not political and economicalrhetoric.

The four questions discussed in this article deserveserious consideration by every American. Military personnel, government leaders, business people, and homemakersalike will be influenced by the fInal outcome of this discussion. Never in U.S. history has such a complex issue beengiven such little public discussion. The fmger-pointing andpolitics of an election year must be put aside to discuss theseimportant issues. The future of America in geopolitical,military, social, and economic terms depends on the rightsolution being implemented in the next year. c::J

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(I), .. .. ..Force

AW TotalPartnership

First Lieutenant Garth ConnorAviation Officer Advanced Course, Class 91-3Fort Rucker, ALT he integration between the U.S. ArmyReserve and the Active Army can and mustimprove. Proposed budget cuts and changinginternational security requirements have made theTotal Force partnership increasingly important.Several incidents during Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm show that the Total Force partnershipbetween the Reserve and Active Army is not working.In contrast to the Army, the U.S. Marine Corps wassuccessful in implementing its Total Force conceptduring Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.The Marine Corps' success came from a total commitment, during peacetime, to integrate its Reserves andActive Force. By studying the Marine Corps' Activeand Reserve relationship, the Army can improve theintegration of its Active and Reserve Forces.

The Total Force partnership is more important to ournational security now than ever before. Disintegrationof the Warsaw Pact has greatly reduced the threat andhas expanded the warning time for an attack. This facthas made it difficult for Army senior leaders to justifya large standing force. With lack of justification, Congress has decided to reduce the Active Army andincrease the nation's reliance on the Reserves.This cut will reduce the Active Army from 18divisions with 730,000 personnel to 12 divisions with540,000 by 1995.1 This 25 percent cut in the ActiveArmy increasFs the nation's dependency on the National Guard (NG) and Army Reserve, and makessuccess of the Total Force policy critical.Results from Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm show that the Total Force concept is not workingfor the Army. On 22 August 1990, President GeorgeBush authorized the callup of 200,000 NationalGuardsmen and women. Immediately after this callup,Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney enlisted onlythe combat support and combat service support (CSS)units of the NG. Secretary Cheney did not alert NG

12

combat units because Department of Defense (DODlconcluded that these units were not ready for combat.On 8 November 1990, after pressure by Headquarters, National Guard Bureau, DOD activated threeroundout brigades (48th Infantry (Mechanized)(Mech), Georgia Army National Guard (ARNG), assigned to the 24th Infantry Division; 155th Armored,MSARNG, assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division; and256th Infantry (Mech)). Although, these brigadesspent 2 months training, thej never deployed with theirActive Army counterparts.In contrast, the Marine Corps deployed Reservecombat units to the Persian Gulf with great success.The 8th Tank Battalion, Marine Corps Reserve, mobilized and deployed to Southwest Asia. The battalionwas successful in its mobilization and participation inthe attack on Kuwait City. The unit received highpraise during Operation Desert Storm for its ability,professionalism, and readiness.4 The Marine Corps'ability to send combat reserve units to the Persian Gulfis a result of the Corps' peacetime reserve system. TheMarines concentrate on keeping their Active andReserve Forces similarly structured, equipped, andtrained. These practices ensure that the Marines havean effective Total Force integration upon mobilization.5The Marine Corps Reserve maintains its structureby recruiting most of its manpower from its ActiveForce. This policy ensures that its Reserve units willconsist mainly of former active-duty personnel. TheMarine Corps also maintains an active full-time support program. This program maintains a strength of 70percent active-duty personnel, whose full-time job isto support and train Reservists. These active-duty personnel provide the current operational and technicalexpertise that is hard to maintain in a Reserve Force."Without {the} leadership and support of the ActiveMarine Force, the readiness of the Reserves would



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decline. ,6 The high percentage of former active-dutypersonnel and full-time support program combine toimprove the structure and integration of the MarineCorps Reserve.

The Marine Corps Reserve continues to procure newequipment along with its Active Force. "During theacquisition process, the Total Force requirements areidentified, validated, and funded accord ing to the firstto-fight policy.,,7 This system ensures that the MarineCorps meets its goal of providing new equipment tothe Active and Reserve Force at the same time. Alongwith its joint equipment modernization program, theMarine Corps continues to upgrade the Reserve andActive Force facilities across the board. These policiesimprove the integration of the Marine Reserve Forceand Active Force.

The most essential element of the Marine CorpsReserve system is training. The Marines believe thataggressive, realistic individual and unit training isessential for the Reserves' success. The Marine Corpshas several innovative programs that concentrate onindividual training. However, the Marines' real success comes from unit training. On a regular basis, theMarine Reserve Forces conduct training with theirActive counterparts. The Marine Corps assigns andrequires its Reserve rifle companies to train with active-duty battalions. On a daily basis, Reserve CSSunits support active-duty Marine Corps units. Thisdynamic relationship between the Active and ReserveMarine C01s units has led to a successful MarineTotal Force.

The Army's Total Force concept resembles theMarine Corps' but fails to rigorously follow theArmy's own guidelines. In his article, "Total ForcePolicy Examined in Wake of Desert Storm," MajorGeneral (MG) T. Eston Marchant concludes that theArmy Reserve training focus must change. MG Marchant writes, "Prior to mobilization, the basics of gunnery; maintenance; and squad-, crew-, platoon- andcompany-level maneuver must be mastered. Taskforce- and brigade-level maneuver should be trainedprimarily through staf f exercises and battle simulationexercises".9 MG Marchant spells out that the Army'sconcept of training before mobilization must be improved.The Army also has been slow at ensuring theroundout brigades receive the same equipment as theirActive counterparts. In Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm several NG combat units did not deploybecause they had not had enough time to train on theirnew equipment.

An Army Total Force partnership as successful asthat of the U.S. Marine Corps needs to be developed.


For the Aviation elements of the Reserve Components(RC) of the Army Total Force, this means that theroundout and roundup Reserve and NG Aviation unitsmust be similarly equipped as their Active Component(AC) counterparts. The Directed Training Associationand CAPSTONE affiliation programs need to be puton the front burner with greater emphasis and ACresponsibility for RC individual training as well ascollective training.

Locations of some RC units may need to be changedto faciliate monthly training with their affiliated units.Relocation of RC flying units may not be as necessaryas for road and rail transported elements. But eachaffiliation needs to be examined and decided on anindividual basis. A policy of actively recruiting RCAviation personnel and giving preference to AC A viation experienced personnel leaving the services wouldensure that RC Aviation units are kept current in thelatest policies, procedures, training, and maintenancetechniques currently used by AC Aviation units.The proposed budget and Total Active Force cutshave made the Total Force partnership critical to AirLand Operations. Results from Operation DesertStorm show the inability of the Army to execute theTotal Force concept. Failure of the roundout brigadesto deploy to Saudi Arabia resulted from a lack ofintegration between Active Army and the RC. Toprevent future problems, the Army should study andlearn from the Marine Corps' execution of the TotalForce. The Marine Corps successfully integrates itsActive and Reserve Forces by maintaining similaritiesin structure, equipment, and training. With future cutsin military strength, the Total Force is not merelyimportant, it is critical to our national survival.

NOTES1. Bruce B. Auster, "Can Reserves Do the Job?" U.S.News and World Report, 28 January 1991, p. 40.2. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., "The 48thInfantryBrigade (Mech), Georgia Army National Guard:A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization,"National Guard, May 1991, p. 13.3. Ibid., pp. 12-15.4. MG T. Eston Marchant, "Total Force Policy Examinedin Wake of Desert Storm," National Guard, August1991, p. 23.5. Hollis E. Davison, "Active/Reserve Relationship Actsto Enhance Corps," The Officer, February 1991, pp.68-70.6. Ibid., p. 72.7. Ibid.8. Ibid., pp. 68-74.9. Ibid., p. 23.

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The Army's Mobilization

"Roundout is a fact of life . . . the 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the thirdbrigade of my division . . . I expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated (theircapability) through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center . . . they are, infact, combat ready."

14

Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.(when he commanded the 24th Infantry Division(Mech

u.s.Army Aviation Digest September/October 1992


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Of National Guard UnitsCaptain Joseph E. Neilson II

Headquarters and Headquarters Company1-185th AviationMississippi Army National GuardTupelo, MS

T he success of our armed forces in OperationsDesert Shield and Desert Storm proved, to adegree, that America could mobilize its for-ces with a certain amount of effectiveness. However,the buildup was not without its problems. The UnitedStates and other countries of the United Nations hadmore than 5 months to build their forces in the PersianGulf.ProblemsMobilization of a large force naturally createsproblems. Most of these problems are organizational,as they pertain to the National Guard's (NG's)mobilization to active service, and the Active Army'sattitude toward the NG. For example, Army NationalGuard (ARNG) AH-64 Apache battalions, certifiedthrough Fort Hood, TX, were not called.Several state aviation officers and state adjutantsgeneral voiced concern that the Army has a system todetermine the readiness of any given unit but does nottrust the system. ARNG combat units met all statedArmy standards of training, manning, and equipping;however, these units were not mobilized or deployed.The problem may lie in the Regular Army's (RA' s)attitude toward the NG and not necessarily the process.

This example of the Army's attitude toward the NGdates back to W orld War II. In February 1941, the 29thDivision (Blue and Grey), an NG Division fromMaryland and Virginia, mobilized and eventually wentto England. Active Army officers replaced the seniorleadership after the NG Division completed the organizational work. This created a huge morale prob-


lem in the ranks of the 29th Division. The prejudicethat RA officers had against NG officers drasticallyreduced the Guard's confidence.A parallel can be drawn between this example andwhat happened in the most recent callup for OperationsDesert Shield and Desert Storm. The argument couldbe made that the Army wants the NG trained and up tospeed, but does not want to provide any guidance orhelp to ensure NG units can fully accomplish this. NGunits are left to themselves when it comes to training.Under the CAPSTONE program, an NG unit mightreceive an Army Training and Evaluation Program todetermine its readiness, but not necessarily itsCAPSTONE organization. If it is to use theCAPSTONE program, the Army has to commit to thepart of the program pertaining to mission readiness.InconsistenciesThe May 1991 issue of National Guard magazinecontains General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. 's article,"The 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech), Georgia ArmyNational Guard: A Chronology from Invasion toDemobilization." The article discusses the inconsistencies and problems the Army had calling up ARNGunits. It is a good example of why the Army shouldconsider the Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)program.On 7 August 1990, President George Bush signedthe Declaration of National Emergency. This gave theDepartment of Defense (DOD) all of the authority itrequired to implement a partial mobilization. It permitted a I-million man callup in late August 1990,

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citing the 180-day limitation. Under partial mobilization, DOD never had any such restriction. Around thatsame time, DOD alerted the 24th Infantry Division(Mech) to begin uploading its equipment for the Persian Gulf. Final elements of the 24th Infantry Divisiondid not reach Dhahran Harbor until November 1990.This would have given the 48th Brigade (Mech) 75postmobilization training days by the time final elements of the 24th Infantry Division reached the PersianGulf. The division was fully "stoodup" had it been .mobilized on 24 August 1990.Instead, the 48th Brigade had no idea when or if itmight deploy because it did not receive an alert. The197th Infantry Brigade (Mech), the resident brigade atthe U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA,went in the 48th Brigade's place in a C-5 status (needing new equipment training). The 197th InfantryBrigade had received M-60A3 tanks and M-113 personnel carriers on 2 August 1990. According toDepartment of the Army (DA) data, the 197th conducted no field training above battalion level in fiscalyear 1990. The 197th conducted only one brigadelevel field training exercise at Fort Stewart, GA, withthe 24th Infantry Division after being alerted.On 22 August 1990, President Bush signed the200,000 673(b) callup order. On 24 August 1990,Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney issued instructions to call up only combat support (CS) andcombat service support (CSS) units. The first CS andCSS ARNG units received their call on 27 August1990. The decision to avoid calling ARNG combatunits came 1 day after General Carl E. Vuono toldsenior military association executives, including a representative from the National Guard Association of theUnited States, that the 48th Brigade callup would beannounced the next day. It did not occur for more than3 months.In early September 1990, Congress asked SecretaryCheney why ARNG combat units were not beingcalled up. Secretary Cheney said the 180-day calluptime did not allow enough time to call, train, anddeploy the units. Senior DOD officials explained the200,000 callup authority did not allow enough time topermit a full rotation. General Colin Powell, Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that, if the 200,000authority added a 180-day extension to the original 180days, the Army would call up combat units. At thesame time, the 24th Infantry Division and its 197th"roundout" Brigade took 90 days to reach SaudiArabia.On 8 November 1990, Secretary Cheney announced,at a Pentagon press conference, the near doubling of

16

U.S. Forces in the Persian Gulf and the callup 'of thethree roundout ARNG brigades. General Powell saida "workup" would be necessary to ensure the combatreadiness of ARNG units. This would include a tripthrough the National Training Center (NTC), FortIrwin, CA, even though the 48th Brigade had gonethrough the NTC the previous summer and did wellagainst the NTC's Soviet opposing forces doctrine.Before 2 August 1990, all brigades in the 24th InfantryDivision, including the 48th, reported almost identicalcombat-ready status.On 30 November 1990, the 48th Brigade reported toits mobilization station, Fort Stewart, to find the previous combat readiness rules that it understood with itsparent units changed. The parent organization rated thebrigade "combat ready" before 2 August 1990. However, the Brigade did not receive this rating uponreaching the mobilization station. The 48th Brigadehad to certify to a C-l readiness status, rather than toa lower combat readiness rating. Remember, the 197thdeployed in a C-5 status. Additional tasks that none ofthe active units deployed had training in includedcounterreconnaissance, advanced guard, andrepositioning. No doctrine exists for repositioning. Asudden requirement to be fully qualified at the gradelevel assigned, rather than a generic qualification byposition, left the noncommissioned officer (NCO)corps unqualified in the military occupational specialty and diverted many NCOs for further training. Thisaction broke up crews who had worked together foryears.The 48th Brigade's maintenance problems receiveda lot of publicity. The problems stemmed from maintenance personnel being required to undergo computertraining on the new maintenance software. This meantunits were not being supported by maintenance personnel and resulted in significant maintenance breakdowns. The 48th Brigade's unit status report, knownby 2d Army and U.S. Army Forces Command, ratedthe brigade combat ready the day it reported to FortStewart, with a recommendation for 42 days'postmobilization training. As stated earlier, mobilizing the 48th Brigade with the 24th Infantry Divisionwould have given it 75 postmobilization training days.On 7 January 1991, the 48th Brigade began the moveto Fort Irwin, CA. Upon arrival, the brigade's leadersfound that the brigade would receive the "crawl, walk,run" training program of instruction. Training accomplishments, such as tank gunnery during the previous annual training period, received no credit.On 28 February 1991, the 48th Brigade was certifiedcombat ready by the 2d Army Commander, Lieutenant



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General James Crysel, 51 days after its arrival at theNTC. That same day the ground war ended and President Bush announced the cease-fire.

The most militarily uneducated in-dividual should see that the Army'ssystem for mobilizing ARNG unitsdoes not work . . .

On 4 March 1991, the 48th Brigade prepared tomove back to Fort Stewart. On 11 March 1991,Secretary Cheney demobilized the 48th Brigade at FortStewart and ordered it to return to home stations.The most militarily uneducated individual shouldsee that the Army's system for mobilizing ARNG unitsdoes not work as effectively as it should. There isduplication of training, such as, reassignment of personnel, new equipment training, and requiring NGunits to make additional rotations through NTCwithout regard to some NG units having successfullycompleted a rotation the previous year.The Army should restructure its method of evaluation. The V.S. Air Force uses the ORI system, whichvalidates or certifies NG and V.S. Army Reserve(USAR) units on an annual basis, depending on theunit's mission and deployment time. An inspectionteam from the gaining command conducts the OR!.The team looks at all areas, resource areas, spare parts,performance of ground and aircrews, scenarios, closedbook testing, etc.

The five levels of capability in all inspection reportsthat require the use of a rating system are as follows:outstanding, excellent, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory. These levels describe the overall rating ofmajor grading areas, subareas, and other functionalareas. Team chiefs may assign ratings that reflectobserved performance regardless of statistical outcomes. However, when ratings differ greatly fromestablished criteria, an explanation should be given. Aunit found to be deficient in an area must respond inwriting to the gaining command as to how the unit willcorrect the problem. The unit is placed in adowngraded status until the deficiency is corrected.All of this ensures that the Air Guard and Reserves arecombat ready at all times. The units are certified by thegaining command before mobilization rather than aftermobilization. I f the ORI program had been in place at


the time, the 48th Brigade would have been able todeploy with the 24th Infantry Division.Suggested SolutionsThe Active Army, the ARNG, and the USAR mustmake an effort to solve the problems of mobilization.Close coordination must take place. The DA, DOD,and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) must take aclose look at equipment shortages in the NG and RAinventories. Adjutants general, NGB, and the ActiveArmy should use a memorandum of understanding(MOU) to facilitate lines of communications amongthem. An MOU also defines what an organization hasand how to use what it has.The Army has all of the assets to conduct an ORItype inspection, but the organization is not there. Fixedresponsibility and authority for training subordinateNG and USAR units must take place. For example, thecommander of the 18th Aviation Brigade would beresponsible for training the two NG battalions in hiscommand.Gaining commanders would enforce standards setby Fort Rucker, AL. All units found to be deficient ingiven areas would have to respond, in writing, to thegaining command, and explain a course of action tocorrect the deficiency.There are many other aspects to the mobilization ofNG units than time and the author's knowledge permit.This article does not attempt to solve the problem oftraining and evaluating NG and USAR units. It merelysuggests a course of action to take, and tries to bringto the reader's attention the fact that the Active Armydoes not give the NG the credit it deserves.The Active Army should realize that it is going tohave to fight with, and rely on, the NG and the USARin an extended conflict. With this in mind, it seemsobvious that the Army should oversee and train the NGand USAR to the standards it trains itself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Air Force Regulation 123-1: Chapter 1, "The InspectionProgram," 29 December 1989.Balkoski, Joseph, Beyond the Beachhead, StackpoleBooks, Harrisburg, 1989.Gleason, Paul LTC, Summary of the minutes from theArmy Aviation National Guard Symposium, 15 July1991-Schwarzkopf, H. Norman Jr., GEN, National Guard,The 48th Brigade: A Chronology from Invasion toDemobilization, May 1991.

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A rm y Aviation B e t w e e n WWIIDr. John W. Kitchens

Aviation Branch Command HistorianU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

Howdid the Army andAirForce define their separate roles between WWII and the KoreanConflict? Once aefined; how did each effectIvely operate and function to complementthe other without arguIng over who did what and getting in the other's way? How didthe Army solve the problem of the Air Force's control of Army Aviation training?RegulatIons of 1949, functions p'apers, and other arguments andproposals that reignedbetween WWII and the Korean Conflict, 1945 to 1950, answer these questions.

F or several months following the end of World WarII (WWII), organic ArmyAviation maintained its inventoryof aircraft and also continued totrain pilots and mechanics at asteady pace-even as the Armywas scaling down most .otheroperations.

As a result of the expansion oforganic aviation to branches of theArmy Ground Forces (AGF) otherthan Field Artillery, the Department of Air Training of the FieldArtillery School at Fort Sill, OK,was reorganized as the AGF AirTraining School effective 7December 1945. The commandantof the Field Artillery School,Major General Louis E. Hibbs, became commandant of the new AGFAir Training School as well. Actual administration of the schoolwas under the direction of the assistant commandant for air training, Colonel (COL) William W.Ford. l

The Army Air Force (AAF) continued providing primary flight

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training at Sheppard Field, WichitaFalls, TX, until May 1946, whenthis training program was trans..,ferred to Gary Field, San Marcos,TX.2Decline and Resurgence

Coincidentally with the establishment of the AGF Air TrainingSchool, the supply of studentsbegan to decline. All classes in session on 7 December 1946 were permitted to finish, but the beginningof new classes was delayed. Thefirst class for mechanics after thereorganization did not begin until21 January. The start date of thefirst 1946 pilots class was delayeduntil 11 March when enough students were finally assembled.Besides reducing the number ofclasses, the Air Training Schooleliminated seaplane training fromthe curriculum and reduced thetime devoted to the Brodie device.3

In November 1946, as a result ofdemobilization throughout theArmy and the consequent shortageof students, th e Air Training

School was discontinued. It wasreplaced by a new Department ofAir Training, with COL Ford asdirector, established within theField Artillery School.

The general demobilization ofthe armed forces affected ArmyAviation in another way. Beginning in early 1946 and continuingthrough mid-1947, the number ofaircraft in the AGF inventoryrapidly declined. From a WWIIhigh of around 3,000, the aircraftinventory was reduced. throughdisposition by the Surplus PropertyBoard and otherwise, to between200 and 250.4

Even as its aircraft inventorywas being reduced sharply, organicArmy Aviation continued searching for the most appropriateaircraft for its various missions. Ina design competition held shortlyafter the end of the war, the Armyselected the Boeing L-15; thisaircraft failed the field tests, however, so the search continued.

In a finished-article competit ionheld in early 1947, the winner was



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And The

the Aeronca 7BC Champion. Thistwo-place aircraft, similar to theWWII era L-3, became the ArmyL-16.Between 1947 and 1949, theArmy purchased over 500 eighty

five horsepower L-16As andaround 100 ninety horsepower L-16Bs. The L-16B had a grossweight of 1,450 pounds and a maximum speed of 110 miles per hour.The Army bought these aircraft forthe bargain price of around $1,200each, complete with spare partsand data packages.The Army also bought over 200four-place Ryan L-17s during thelate 1940s. This purchase alsoresulted from a finished-articlecompetition. Although some AirForce leaders expressed reservations about the Army's acquisition

The first Army helicop-ter pilot was Captain(CPT) Robert J. Ely.CPT Ely graduated fromthe Army Air CorpsCourse at Scott Field,IL, in 1945.

Korean

1 9 4 5 - 1 950 'of the higher power and largercapacity L-17 s with retractablelanding gear, no major problemarose. Both the L-16s and the L-17s served the Army well untilthey were replaced by Bird Dogs,Beavers, and Seminoles during andafter the Korean conflict.

As of 30 June 1950, the Armyand Army National Guard inventories consisted of 1,155 fixedwing aircraft. This total included664 L-16s, 228 L-17s, 219 L-5s,and 44 L-4s.5The National Security Act of1947

Th e National Securi ty Act(NSA) of 1947 abolished the Warand Navy Departments, created theDepartment of Defense (DOD),and made the U.S. Air Force


Conflict

(USAF) a separate service coordinate with the Army and Navy.President Truman signed the act inJuly, and it was implemented inSeptember.James Forrestal became the firstsecretary of defense (SECDEF) on17 September. Transfer Order No.1, signed by Secretary Forrestal on26 September, transferred militarypersonnel, bases, and equipment ofthe former AAF to the Departmentof the Air Force and the USAF.The division of assets and personnel was completed during the following 2 years t h r o u ~ h 39 additional transfer orders.The NSA gave the Air Forcegeneral responsibility for aviationwith specified exceptions. Themost important exception was thatthe Navy and Marine Corps were

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Organic Army A viation continued searching fo r the mostappropriate aircraft. In adesign competition held shortly after the end of WWI/, the

Army selected the Boeing L-15. The L-15 failed the fie ldtests, and the Army continued

to search for a suitable aircraft.

20

The L-16 replaced the L-15 asthe aircraft suitable for ArmyAviation's various missions.This two-place aircraft, alsoknown as the Aeronca 7BCChampion, was similar to theWWII era L-3.

The L-17s served the Armywell with their higher powerand larger capacity.

u.s.Army Aviation Digest September/October 1992


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given extensive authority todevelop and employ air power. Theonly significant limitation on theuse of air power by the Navy andMarine Corps was that strategic airoperations were reserved to the AirForce.

Another exception to the AirForce 's monopoly of military aviation, and one that is of particularinterest to the student of ArmyA viation history, related to the airarm of the AGF: organic ArmyAviation remained with the Army.The key phrase in the NationalDefense Act was that the U.S.Army would consist of "land combat and service forces and suchaviation and water t r a n ~ o r t asmay be organic therein."To implement the NationalDefense Act, the Army and AirForce entered into more specificagreements published concurrently with the act. One of these agreements stipulated tha t -

The Air Force would provideand operate liaison squadronsaccording to Army requirements;

The Air Force would provideindividual training to Armypersonnel for the operation andmaintenance of organic ArmyA viation equipment; and

The Army would provide tactical training for ilots of organicArmy aircraft.This agreement, for the mostpart, extended existing arrangements for cooperation in trainingaviation personnel; however, it

also gave the Air Force the addedresponsibility to train organicArmy Aviation mechanics. Thesecooperative arrangements weremade to avoid duplication andpromote cost effectiveness, butthey often proved unsatisfactory toone or both parties during theprocess of or following implementation.

In late 1947, the Army proposedto modify and amplify existingagreements and understandingswith the Air Force. Here were fourproposals-First, the Army wanted the AirForce to accept the Army's term"light" in lieu of the Air Force term"liaison" in all references to Armyaircraft.

Second, the Army requested thatthe Air Force agree to the assignment of Army aircraft to Army organizations as individual units"orin groups of such size as to permitperformance of assigned missions."Third, the Army proposed thatthe new interservice agreementshould stipulate that the Armywould provide its own aircraft requirements whenever the primaryfunction of such aircraft consistedof the following missions-

Aerial surveillance of enemyforward areas Locating appropriate targets Adjusting fire Obtaining information on hos-tile and defensive forces Aerial route reconnaissance Control of march columns Camouflage inspection ofground force areas and installationsFourth, the Army proposed that

the Air Force continue to providelight aircraft service to the Armyfor courier service, messenger service, aerial evacuation, aerialsupply, and aerial photography.9

The Army had been performingthe missions listed in part three ofthe proposal throughout WWII.The extension of organic ArmyA viation to branches of the groundforces other than Field Artillery inAugust 1945 at least tacitly recognized this.

The difference was that theArmy now wanted the Air Force toformally recognize the Army's


authority to use organic aircraft forany purpose in support of theground forces when the primaryfunction of the aircraft consistedof one of these listed missions.Both the Air University and Tactical Air Command (TAC) objected to the 1947 Army proposal.The Air University opposed theuse of the term "light" for Armyaircraft because "light" did not indicate a limitation of function asdid "liaison."

Also, in response to the Army'sproposal to organize its aircraft ingroups when required, the AirUniversity countered that only AirForce aircraft should operate asaviation units and Army aircraftshould be assigned only to operateorganically in units of division sizeor smaller.10The T AC opposition was muchstronger; it recommended that theArmy and Air Force negotiate anew agreement providing for theAir Force to assume responsibilityfor all liaison aircraft activities andthat organic Army Aviation beabolished.

The arguments used includedeconomy of forces, centralizationof control, recognized doctrinalprinciples regarding the employment of air power, and the historical example of the expansionisttendency of organic Army A via-. 11hon.The Key West AgreementIn response to these and otherdisputes among the Army, Navy,and Air Force, the joint chiefs ofstaff held two series of conferencesin 1948-the first at Key West, FL,and the second at Newport, RI. Theagreements or "Functions Papers"worked out at these conferenceswere issued as directives by theSECDEF.

The first of the FunctionsPapers, also known as the "Key21


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West Agreement," was signed on26 March 1948. I t effectivelystymied the efforts within theArmy to expand the functions ofArmy Aviation.This was accomplished in partby listing among the functions ofthe Air Force: furnishing closecombat and logistical air support tothe Army, and secondly, providingair transport for armed forces except as otherwise assigned.The first of these functions wasdefined as including airlift, support, and resupply of airborneoperations; aerial photography;tactical reconnaissance; and interdiction of enemy land power andcommunication. The Key WestAgreement also withheld from theArmy any mission assignment thatwould justify force requirementsfor airlift, tactical air operations, orair defense other than antiaircraftartillery. In the development ofdoctrine, procedures, and equipment for air defense and airborneoperations, however, the Air Forcewas required to coordinate withother services.12JAAF Adjustment Regulations5-10-1Neither of the 1948 FunctionsPapers provided significant satisfaction to the proponents of organic Army Aviation, except that itwas not abolished as some AirForce leaders advocated. In theJoint Army andAir Force (JAAF)Adjustment Regulations 5-10-1 of20 May 1949, however, several ofthe Army's proposals of the previous 2 years were recognized andimplemented.The 1949 regulations stipulatedthat organic Army aircraft consistof "aircraft used by the Army forthe purpose of expediting and improving ground combat proceduresin the forward areas of the battlefield."22

The functions of Army Aviationincluded those proposed by theArmy in 1947 plus the following- Local messenger and courierservice Emergency aerial evacuation Emergency wire laying Limited aerial resupply Limited front-line aerialphotographyThus Army Aviation wasspecifically authorized to conductmost of those functions performedduring WWII, and other possiblemissions were not precluded. Fur

thermore, th e Army wasauthorized to assign or attachaircraft to Army organizations "individually or in such numbers asare required to perform assignedmissions." As a symbolic Armyvictory, the term "liaison" was notused in the regulations with reference to Army aircraft, referred toas "fixed-wing aircraft" and"rotary-wing aircraft."The 1949 regulations furtherstipulated that the Army was todetermine quantitative requirements and budgeting fo r itsaircraft, accessories, and parts. TheArmy was also responsible for itsown unit and field maintenance.The Air Force was to budget forand provide "liaison aircraft units"when the Army required such unitsfor the following specific functions: courier service, messengerservice, aerial evacuation, aerialsupply, aerial photography, andaerial wire laying.

On the downside, from theperspective of proponents of an expanded organic Army Aviation independent of Air Force controls,the Air Force was to purchaseaircraft, parts, and accessories forthe Army and store and issue themat the depot level. The Air Forcealso was responsible for depotmaintenance of Army aircraft andfor field maintenance in overseas

commands until June 1950. Also,the weight of Army fixed-wingaircraft was not to exceed 2,500pounds when empty, and Armyrotary-wing aircraft were limitedto an empty weight of "3,500 to4,000 pounds. ,13The 1949 regulations did not address the issue of the training andrating of Army pilots, thereby leaving primary training and rating ofArmy aviators under the control ofthe Air Force.

Effect of the Cold War on AirForce Tactical Air SupportAnother issue that producedfriction between the Army and theAir Force during the late 1940s was

the degree to which the Air Forceprovided the required aerial support to the Army. This was primarily an Army-Air Force disputerather than specifically an organicArmy Aviation-Air Force dispute.It nevertheless impacted on theevolution of the Army's air arm inthat the Army came to insist onusing Army Aviation for thesefunctions when they were not adequately provided by the Air Force.As already explained, the KeyWest Agreement assigned to theAir Force the functions of establishing local air supremacy;providing ai r transport to theArmy; and furnishing close combat and logistical air support to theArmy.During the late 1940s, especiallyafter the Soviet Union became anatomic power, the attention of AirForce leaders, somewhat like thatof their Army Air Corps counterparts during the 1930s, came to bedominated by strategic and airdefense concerns.

This attitude was clearlydetrimental to tactical air powerand to close air support of groundforces. For example, the TA c wasreduced to the status of a subor-u.s. ArmyAviation Digest September/October 1992


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dinate command under the Continental Air Command from 1948until it was restored as a majorcommand after the beginning ofthe Korean conflict. During thelate 1940s, the Air Force placed alow priority on the support ofground troops. The official AirForce position announced in October 1949 was as follows:"Inasmuch as a democracy cannot afford to maintain a high standing army in peacetime, it followsthat the peacetime requirement forair units to perform the air supportmission is neither so large nor sourgent as that for units to performthe air defense and strategic bomb-. .. ,,14mg mISSIOns.

The Air Force's neglect of theArmy's perceived air support requirements during this periodcaused the Army to demand morein

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