Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1987

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1987

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Major General llis D ParkerChief Army Aviation Branch

The Goal Must e Met

A s chief of the Army's Aviation Branch, oneof my primary responsibilities is to ensure thatcombat ready aviators are in our cockpits for thenext battle. A major contributor to that assurance isthe Department of the Army Aviation Standardiza

tion Program that is administered by the Directorateof Evaluation and Standardization (DES) at theAviation Center. This program is designed to ensurethat our aviator training standards are safe, yetdemanding and realistic. Successful execution, however, is dependent on each member of the aviationcommunity. Your positive contributions in this effortwill keep our aircrews fully prepared for any futureconflict.

Evaluations conducted by DES in the field revealthat w are steadily progressing toward makingcombat readiness a reality. Command involvement indeveloping and supervising the aircrew training program (ATP) has significantly improved. Emphasishas solidly shifted toward implementing a train-aswe-fight philosophy. Commanders are assessingtheir units' missions and selecting tasks for trainingand evaluation in accordance with the Commander'sGuide, TC 1-210. Units are validating that the ATP,through the use of the Commander's Guide and theappropriate aircrew training manual (A TM), is thefoundation on which to construct an effective training program and evaluation system. The final step in

developing a unit training planis

the use of tacticalmission scenarios that will integrate the accomplishment of unit mission and individual A TM tasks.

I am continuing to make available the aviationstandardization and training seminars, (ASTS), thebranch traInIng teams and the instructorpilot / standardization instructor pilot seminars to assist units in the field. These teams provide themaintenance, operations, training standardizationand safety assistance tailored to the needs of com-

SEPTEMBER 1987

manders and their units. During the past year,assistance teams have visited every major aviationinstallation in the continental United States and U. S.Army, Europe. Aviation units in Korea were visitedby ASTS teams in June 1987. Overall, the assistance

teams and seminars are being positively received andare contributing to the improved professionalismthroughout our aviation force.

As w continue to refine our tactics and doctrineat the Aviation Center, w need your feedbackpertaining to employment techniques and procedures.During unit seminars and evaluations, team membersare receptive to recommendations for better execution of aviation missions. At the same time, theseteams are prepared to address techniques employedby other units. This interchange helps put our

how-to-fight manuals in proper perspective, thusconfirming their validity or establishing a requirement for revision. I encourage you to continue asproactive participants in aviation training and standardization.

Army Aviation is in an innovative era. Tacticalinitiatives cause the A TP to be dynamic. The ArmyAviation Standardization Program ensures that ourreadiness goals are accomplished. Lasting success inthis pursuit depends on a strong commitment to theapplication of doctrinally correct procedures by allmembers of the Army Aviation team.

Finally, af w

observations on the article, Air-toAir Combat Helico pters. My views toward conventional rotor systems and their concomitant provisionof maneuverability and agility are clear. Our doctrinal manuals reflect the importance of both combatagility and flexibility in task organization and weapons mix dependent on the tactical situation. However, since w in Army Aviation don't profess tohave a monopoly on good ideas, I offer the

Air-to-Air . article as another view. . : = t


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2

The viationOfficer

Basic

Courseand the Platoon Commander

Major Richard A. Scales

The Aviation Officer Basic Course AVNOBC) provides

the basic branch education for new lieutenants assigned

to rmy Aviation. Unlike officer basic courses of past

years, this one has assigned aviation captains serving

as platoon commanders who remain with the lieutenants

throughout Phase I. Information contained in this article

is based on the personal experience of the author after

having been directly involved with the A VNOBC for

more than 2 years.

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The Aviation Officer Basic Course provides unlimited professional leadership opportunities for newly assigned ArmyAviation lieutenants. With the exceptio. of the squad live-fire all ranges are run by the lieutenants under cadresupervision.

AVIATION be-came a basic branch of the Armyon 12 April 1983 . This generatedthe requirement for viationBranch to provide professionalmilitary education to its AviationBranch lieutenants.

Ft. Rucker, AL, happily assumed this mission rather thancontinuing to rely on other branchservice schools. Training developers and many others intently wentabout the business of creating theAviation Officer Basic CourseA VNOBC) instructional materials

and obtaining necessary supportequipment, supplies, facilities and

SEPTEMBER 1987

personnel. Flight school was to bethe branch specific portion of theA VNOBC and was already a proven entity; therefore, the concentrated effort was expended on thecreation of A VNOBC, Phase I

The hard work paid off. The

first class began on 1 July 1984, ayear earlier than originallyplanned, and the course has enjoyed much success since then.What makes this course differentfrom other officer basic courses ofpast years is the course purposeand, moreover, the method forachieving that purpose.

A VNOBC, Phase I is 9.5 weeks

of intensive trammg aimed at developing basic officer soldieringskills and tactical knowledge in thecombined arms arena prior toflight school. In addition to thetactical and professional commonmilitary subjects, the course de

signers were interested in evaluating subjective leadership and officership qualities. Course designers recognized immediately thatthis type of evaluation could notbe accomplished in a sterile classroom environment; so, a companyorganization Company D, 6thAviation Training Battalion) wasformed with the capability of pro-

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VI TION OFFICERB SIC COURSE

viding situational leadership training and evaluation in conjunctionwith the conduct of more than 50percent of the course content. Keyto the company s accomplishmentof that mission was the creation ofplatoon commander positions.This article discusses the role ofthe AVNOBC, Phase I, platooncommander and the impact of thatrole on course effectiveness andthe future of Army Aviation.

A VNOBC, Phase I, ContentIt is important to know how

Phase I fits into the to t lAVNOBC training picture. Theentire program contains 45 weeksof training divided into 3 phases.

Phase I, the subject of this article,is discussed in more detail later.Phase II, which is commonly referred to as flight school, containsthe lion s share of the branchspecific technical portion of theAVNOBC. This phase lasts 34weeks and encompasses all flighttraining including ground school.Finally, the last 2 weeks of training, Phase III, can be thought ofas a regreening period and alsocontains training in the tacticalemployment of aviation units inthe combined arms arena. Theentire A VNOBC is a well-balancedprogram for bringing new lieutenants into the fold of ArmyAviation.

I t is vital that the lieutenants become proficient aviators with the

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Responsible gency

Department ofCombined Delta

Subject rms Tactics Company

Military History 6

Leadership 57 1

Military Law 6

Communicative Arts (+ 4 Ed Ct) 26

Medical Subjects 7

Land Navigation 7 9

Weapons 18.5

Communications/Electronics 1

Maintenance and Supply 35

Training Management 7 8

Combined Arms Subjects 53 12

Safety (Taught by DGFS) 5

Field Training 85

Examinations 15

In/Out Processing * 48

Platoon Commander s Time* 21

Physical Fitness * 62

Totals 234 264.5

*Administrative Time

AVNOBC Program Hours

ability to tactically employ theiraircraft and units. However, it isall the more critical that each gainsa firm foundation in combinedarms doctrine, common officershipskills, and, most importantly, thefundamentals of leadership.AVNOBC, Phase I is designed tomeet this challenge with a varietyof training events.

Phase I is a dynamic, actionpacked, 9.5 weeks with more than496 hours of instruction and re-

lated activities. The list aboveshows the hours programed foreach major section of the course.After inprocessing and completionof flight physicals, the courseshifts quickly into high gear. Whilein garrison, each day begins at0515 hours with physical training(PT). During the first week, PT iscadre led. After that, the studentstrain themselves under cadre guidance in accordance with FM 21-20,

Physical Readiness Training.

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Emphasis on both air and ground operations is stressed in the AVNOBC. Through designated exercises students learnthe difficulties encountered while engaged in an air assault mission. The land navigation course Is conducted overdifficult south Alabama terrain and presents a confidence building challenge to each lieutenant. In all unit movementsconducted during the field training exercise students learn to use the terrain for cover and conceal ment and teamworkfor effectiveness and efficiency

Attendees gain experience in Tactivities such s running guerrilladrills grass drills road marchesaerobics team sports rifle drillsand runs and protective maskruns. The end result of the Tprogram is a physically fit lieutenant with a broad knowledge of avariety of physical fitness activitiesand some of the physiologicalprinciples involved. While physicalfitness is stressed the lieutenantsalso are challenged academically.

SEPTEMBER 1987

Much of the course consists ofdiversified classroom academic instruction of which only 5 hoursare directly related to aviation.Little is taught or discussed concerning aviation related topics fortwo primary reasons. First to bean effective member of the combined arms team one must possessa well-rounded knowledge of theother team members includingtheir doctrine and tactics. An understanding of ground operations

will be essential to these futureaviators in supporting the groundtactical commander. Second asound knowledge of infantry tactics can be translated into aviationtactics with a few adjustments inscale and speed. Therefore thetr ining emph sizes the other combat combat service and combatservice support branches to ensurean understanding of how the othercombined arms team players operate. Many other important aca-

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VI TION OFFICERB SIC COURSE

demic subjects are presented invaried detail to provide a well-rounded education for the youngofficers.

Activities outside the classroominclude day and night land navigation courses, patrolling, a tacticalexercise without troops, studenttaught classes, drill and ceremonies, and much more. The courseculminates with a 5-day field training exercise.

The field training exercise simulates combat unit infantry) deployment and employment in atactical training environment. Inpreparation for combat operations,the first 2 days are spent on theFt. Rucker ranges in intensifiedtraining. During this period, thelieutenants zero and qualify withthe M-16 rifle; familiarize on theM 2 caliber 50 and M-60 machineguns and the M72A2 light antitankweapon; and receive training in airassault operations from the infantry viewpoint). Time is also spentrehearsing squad and platoonmovement techniques and preparing for tactical employment. Earlyon the third day, an air assaultmission takes the students to thearea of operations, where they

overcome minimum resistance, followed by a move to a companyassembly area. There, the finalphase of intensified training occurswith classes in prisoner of warcontrol and platoon offensive anddefensive operations. That afternoon, the student company movesinto and occupies a prepared position and plans for a night defense.

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Aggressors from Company C,509th Infantry, aid tremendouslyin enhancing the realism with sev-eral probes of the position duringthe night. The following morningfourth day), each squad is as

signed a reconnaissance patrol mission; leaders are selected; plans aredeveloped, briefed and rehearsed;and each squad conducts its patrol. Upon return, the intelligenceinformation gathered by one ofthe patrols is disseminated to theclass. This information is used toplan for a platoon attack to occuragainst that reconnoitered positionon day five. In addition to thisplatoon attack, the final day offield training includes a squad 12km forced march and the highlightof the course-a squad live-fireexercise in a combined arms environment. During the exercise, eachsquad employs and experiences theawesome destructive power of thecombined arms team. Integral tothis live-fire exercise is the employment of infantry squad organicweapons, artillery, attack helicopters and main battle tank armor.A final protective fire ends theexercise.

Organization for TrainingAVNOBC, Phase I, is a variedand fast-paced course. To accomplish this, the Aviation Center hasadopted a unique organizationalrelationship among trainers. Twoorganizations at Ft. Rucker shareresponsibility for training and developing each lieutenant attendingthe A VNOBC, Phase I

The Department of CombinedArms Tactics DCA T) is responsible for knowledge-based classroomtraining and Company D, 6th Aviation Training Battalion, is responsible for practical application ofthat knowledge in other garrisonand field environments. Constantcoordination is required betweenDCA T and Delta Company toensure consistency and mission accomplishment.

To cite an example of the critical working relationship betweenthe two, DCAT instructors teachthe Army Training ManagementSystem, which includes how toconduct training, and Delta Company cadre assign and evaluatestudent-taught classes. Close coordination is essential to ensure consistent standards. This analogyalso holds true with the combinedarms tactics training. DCA Tteaches the classroom portion andDelta Company takes the lieutenants to the field for practical application. While all training is important, probably the most importantis the development of leadershipskills.

eadership Training

Leadership training is incorporated into almost every aspect ofthe course. DCA T teaches theleadership core curriculum including the doctrine and how toclasses, ethics, counseling and general interpersonal skills. Theseclasses provide a fundamentalknowledge of people, techniquesfor dealing with and motivating

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n MOPP-4, a platoon commander leads by exampleon a portion of the hand grenade assault course.

The platoon commanders not only observe and evaluate butalso instruct. This platoon commander is presenting a classon how to run a range.

people, how to deal with peopleproblems and more. t is in DeltaCompany where the lieutenantsapply this knowledge allowingthem to learn through experience.Again, consistency between trainers is vital. To learn through experience, each lieutenant serves invarious leadership positions.

To allow several opportunitiesfor leadership experience, eachA VNOBC, Phase I, class is divided into platoons of 35 to 5

students. While in garrison, thissplit, along with weekly leadershipposition rotation, allows everylieutenant at least one chance toserve as a leader within the platoon (i.e., platoon leader, platoonsergeant or squad leader). Additionally, every lieutenant leads asquad in physical training andteaches at least one class to the

SEPTEMBER 1987

others. Drill and ceremony trainingalso provides leadership skill practice. Many serve in additional dutypositions such as supply officer,academic officer and security officer, all of which allow thoseselected a chance to exercise theirleadership skills to a degree. Whilethere are many opportunities forleadership experiences in garrison,many leadership challenges occurwhile in the field, too.

The A VNOBC, Phase I, stu

dents spend a total of 8 days awayfrom garrison during the course.As described earlier, there are 3range days, a 12 hour FTX, apatrolling day and a land navigation exercise day. Each day bringswith it many excellent opportunities to exercise leadership skills.Duties are rotated either on atimed basis or by simulating casu-

alties- killing student leadersduring tactical exercises. On twoof the range days, the lieutenantsrun the ranges under Delta Company cadre supervision. The landnavigation exercises provide eachindividual a chance to hone a skillthat enhances the technical side ofleadership. The real meat of theleadership practical application andlearning comes during the FTXand patrolling. During these periods about 75 percent of the lieu

tenants serve in normal infantrycompany leadership positionsdown to squad and patrol level ina simulated tactical environment.

Practical situational leadershipopportunities are plentiful duringPhase I of the A VNOBC. Thekey, however, is to learn from theexperience. Situations must be developed; performance must be ob-

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Counseling can occur at any time and any place his lieutenant is learning not only the object of this encounter but

also a teaching tool that he can use with his future subordinates

AVIATION OFFICERBASIC COURSE

served and evaluated; strong and

weak points must be surfaced; andsuggestions for future performancemust be presented. To accomplishthis a capable individual must beavailable to observe . This individual is the platoon commander.

Platoon Commander RoleThe platoon commander pro

vides the bridge by which newly

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commissioned lieutenants crossfrom the commissioning source tothe Active Army. Each platooncommander is an aviation captainwith unit experience who must bea proven performer and exhibit

high moral and ethical character.A primary function of the platooncommander is the subjective evaluation of each lieutenant in theareas of leadership and officership.

In order to do this the platooncommander must be knowledgeable and experienced. More important the platoon commander mustbe a model sold ier an example

for the lieutenants to observe andemulate. Each must personallyadopt and model the values thatform the basis for a distinctlifestyle and code of behavior andeach must be exceptionally self

disciplined and exhibit selfless service to the mission. The platooncommander must command confidence and respect s derived directly from expertise proven excellence in the combined arms arenaand loyalty and dedication to theNation and profession.

Without these qualities therecan be no credibility in the evalua -

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A protective m sk run is but one example of the tough and demanding AVNOBC physical fitness program Most do not

believe they c n until they actually do the run

tion process. Should the lieutenants e presented a negative example, the mission will, in allprobability, not be accomplished.There is much each platoon commander must learn to meet thechallenges o the job.

Each officer selected to becomea platoon commander must successfully complete an internaltraining program prior to assuming duties with a platoon o lieutenants. This program is designedto both train and evaluate theselectee in all areas. The goal is aplatoon commander who is prepared mentally and physically tolead soldiers; who is skilled incombined arms tactics, doctrineand weaponry; who inspires confidence and an eagerness to be parto the team; and who has theability to analyze, the vision tosee, the integrity to choose and thecourage to execute. With training

SEPTEMBER 987

complete, the qualified platooncommander is prepared to lead aplatoon o lieutenants through thecourse.

There is a multitude o taskseach platoon commander performswith each AVNOBC, Phase I,class. A very basic need is for theplatoon commander and the lieutenants to become acquainted.This begins during inprocessingwith a simple introduction andcontinues as the platoon commander accompanies the lieutenants through many o the inprocessing tasks. Building the lieutenants confidence in the platooncommander s expertise begins immediately with a detailed briefingand several classes presented bythe platoon commander. From theonset, the lieutenants know theplatoon commander is the oneperson from whom they shouldseek advice and counsel. The pla-

to on commander will e with thelieutenants throughout the course,will sit with them during much otheir classroom instruction, andwill e their senior instructor whenoutside the classroom. This involvement is vital to accurate evaluation and counseling.

The platoon commander is required to counsel each lieutenantseveral times during the course,both formally and informally. Formal initial counseling occurs withinthe first 2 weeks when the platooncommander ensures each lieutenant

understands the course standards;clears up any misconceptions;checks for personal or familyproblems; and gains an appreciation for the lieutenant s attitude,personal fiber and goals as anofficer. The remainder o the formal counseling sessions involveperformance. They occur at midcourse; end-of-course; after serving

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other leadership block topics, andconduct practical exercises. But,the platoon commander is the onewho assigns each lieutenant a leadership position; creates leadershipchallenges through situational development; observes, evaluates and

critiques performance; and sug-gests alternatives for future performance. The platoon commanderobserves and evaluates the professional character of each lieutenanton a continuous basis and providesfeedback using FM 22-100, Military Leadership, definitions as astandard. Without a platoon commander, there would be no studentleadership positions and the bestthat could be hoped for in professional characteristic evaluationwould be snap-shot glimpses.

Third, and the most importantfactor of effectiveness, is in thearea of mentorship. I t is not ex-pected that true mentorship relations exist between the platooncommander and the lieutenants.This implies something muchlarger than may be possible in 9.5weeks. However, such a relation

ship may see a beginning becauseof the mentor-like actions of theplatoon commander.

The platoon commander helpsthe lieutenants to grow in theirprofession. To accomplish this, theplatoon commander not only observes, evaluates and counsels, butalso befriends and, primarily, setsthe example for the lieutenants inprofessional character and ethicsby actions, words and deeds. Thegoal is for the lieutenants to learnfrom observing the actions of theplatoon commander. Aside fromthe training and evaluation duties,a very important task of the platoon commander is to provide advice and assistance in solving personal and professional problems.With young lieutenants experienc-

SEPTEMBER 1987

ing their first Active Duty assignment, problems abound and theplatoon commander works painstakingly with the lieutenants toresolve their difficulties. This, too,is part of the example that is setnot only for the one with theproblem but also with the rest ofthe platoon. Even though it is upto the lieutenant to accept theplatoon commander as a mentor,each platoon commander exhibitsthe qualities of mentorship therebyproviding the lieutenants with amodel to take with them throughout their careers.

So, it is in the areas of continuity, leadership training and mentorship where the platoon commander positively impacts the effectiveness of the A VNOBC. yhaving such an impact on thecourse, the platoon commanderrole also impacts the future of theAviation Branch in that the basicfoundation, the cornerstone of anaviation officer's career is set during the A VNOBC. A highly effec-

tive and quality course will naturally set a higher point from whichto start a career that should translate into a higher quality officercorps in the future. Phase I of theA VNOBC is such a course.

CapstoneThe A VNOBC, Phase I, is a

tough and demanding course fromwhich Aviation Branch's futureleaders learn a great deal. To be aplatoon commander requires anabundance of energy along withconst nt vigilance of actions,words and deeds to ensure theright example is consistently portrayed. The hard work does, however, p yoff in many ways. Thelieutenants grow professionally ina short time due in large part tothe positive impact of the platooncommander. Likewise, the platooncommander learns and grows professionally and receives an abundance of personal and professionalrewards. Ultimately however, it isArmy Aviation that benefits.

ABOUT THE AUTHORMajor Richard A. Scales U.S. Army Is a former commander

of Company 0 6th Aviation Training Battalion the AVNOBCtraining company. His other assignments have Includedexecutive officer of the 6th Aviation Training Battalion AH64training development team coordinator M main battle tanktest officer and various positions In an assault helicoptercompany and an air cavalry troop. His military educationincludes the Army Command and General Staff College theAir Force Air Command and Staff College the Armor OfficerBasic and Advanced Courses the Officer Rotary WingAviator Course and the Operations Research/SystemsAnalysis Military Applications Course I. He holds a BS degreefrom Louisiana Tech University and an MS degree from theUniversity of Southern California. Major Scales Is currentlyserving at Ft. Rucker AL as the Assistant TRAOOC SystemManager for the V22 Osprey.


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PEARL SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival Lowdown

AR 95-17 Aviation Life Support Equipment ALSE)Program

Modular type survival kits are being developed forutility, observation and attack type helicopters. DT-Itesting is scheduled for late 1987 OT-II testing isunder consideration for waiver by the CombinedArms Center; initial operating capability is scheduled

for July 1988. These survival kits are two to fiveman configuration with environmental modules attached.

Cyalume Light SticksCyalume light sticks are available from General

Services Administration and a new one has beenadded. I t is white, about 6 inches long and lastsabout 12 hours continuously. Other colors includegreen, yellow, red, blue and orange.

Survival RadioMessage, DA, DALO-AV, 131824Z November

1986, subject as above, delayed implementation ofparagraph 2-9b of AR 95-17 until 15 May 1987. DAmessage authorizes a further delay of implementationof the requirement until 15 November 1987. TheArmy is still experiencing shortages in survival radioscaused by contractor problems, including varyingconfiguration, unmatched data and inadequate data,which have resulted in delays in expected deliveries.

Cold Climate Survival KitThe new cold climate survival kit, national stock

number NSN) 1680-00-973-1862, which retains thesame NSN of the previously issued cold weathersurvival kit, is 2 inches greater in depth and has beenredesigned to accommodate the larger size of the newarctic sleeping bag, NSN 8465-01-131-7921. Thissleeping bag can be packed only in the survival kitsmanufactured in July 1985 or later. The manufacturedate is stamped on the survival kit itself. Usersshould repack this kit using the same arrangement aswhen the kits were received from supply. The arcticsleeping bag, NSN 8465-01-131-7921, is vacuumpacked in a thin vinyl bag that is easily damaged.

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Care must be taken when handling and packing toprevent tearing and losing the vacuum. Should thevacuum be lost, the sleeping bag will swell andbecome too bulky to repack in the survival kit.Sleeping bags in this condition must be removedfrom service and replaced.

We will keep you informed through our ALS

SGRAMs and PEARL S articles. Point of contactPOC) at the Army Support Center, Philadelphia,PA, is Mr. Ted Fletcher, AUTOVON 444-2525;POCs at AMCPM-ALSE are Mr. Boone Hopkinsand Mr. Rainy Bell, AUTOVON 693-3215/3817.POC for Support Activity Digest is Ms Vickie OiDomenico, AUTOVON 444-2569.

Aircrewmembers Authorized Flight ClothingWe receive many questions regarding this area so

felt we would provide you with the latest availableinformation. The following are the only items offlight clothing that are authorized for issue to

aircrewmembers:

CLIMATICITEM ZONE

Coverall, Flyer s, Lightweight, Sage Green AllJacket, Flyer s, Lightweight, AllJacket, Cold Weather, CVC/Aircrewman, AllJacket, Extreme Cold, Sage Green, V-VII

CWU-45/PHood, Extreme Cold, Sage Green, CWU-17/P V-VIITrousers, Extreme Cold, Sage Green, F 1 B V-VII

NOTE: The two-piece Nomex camouflaged uniform is a developmental item currently in the designstage. Shirt, hot weather, LIN No. T03002; Trousers, hot weather, LIN No. X35980-the old twopiece aviator/tanker Nomex uniform, is authorizedfor issue to combat vehicle crew personnel. Aircrewpersonnel may retain/wear the two piece Nomexuniform until it is unserviceable in accordance withlocal policy. POC is AMCPM-ALSE-L, Jim Dittmer, AUTOVON 693-3215/3817.

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Protection From Smoke and Fog Oil MunitionsAny concentration of smoke is potentially hazard

ous when inhaled. When it becomes necessary forpersonnel to be in any concentration of smoke,vapor, the protective mask must be worn-visibleevidence of the presence of smoke will requirepersonnel to wear a mask. Personnel experiencingbreathing difficulty or discomfort also will serve as asignal for all similarly exposed personnel to put onmasks. POC AMMCOM Surgeon, AMSMC-56,AUTOVON 793-5818, Gary Smith, AUTOVON793-7147, Ext, 373.

Seat Belts/Shoulder HarnessesI keep hearing people tell me to wea r my seat

belt and shoulder harness. I find them to beuncomfortable, so I have been ignoring their advice.My buddy has really been harping about this andI ignored him too. Now I can see the wisdom oftheir advice and concern. We do have a lot of pretty

nurses here in the hospital. Yes, I would give myright arm to be back in my unit flying someimportant missions, and home with my wife andkids. S-o-o-o-o, a message to the wise - don ' t flyor drive unless your seat belts and shoulder harnessesare properly fastened.

Aircrewmember Body ArmorThe aircrewmember body armor, small arms

protective, front torso and front/back torso, assetsare available from RIC S9T for all sizes of theassembled items and for all replacement components.NSNs are:

ASSEMBLED ITEMSBody Armor, Body Armor,Front Torso Size Front/Back Torso

8470-00-935-3183 Short 8470-00-935-3192-3184 Regular -3193-3185 Long -3194

REPLACEMENT COMPONENTSSize Vest Front Plate Back PlateShort 8470-00-999-1473 8470-00-935-3177 8470-00935-3174

Regular -1474 -3178 -3175Long -1475 -3179 -3176

Survival KitThe survival kit, individual vest type, size small, is

now available from Defense Personnel Support Cen-

ter (DPSC). The new size small kit is intendedprimarily for personnel on flying status exposed toemergency escape and evasion situations. A replacement component of the kit, the survival vest,SRU-21/P, size small, is also available for replacement purposes. The added small vest size fits smallbodied male and female aviators (up to 7 inch chestmeasurement). The survival kit is authorized in CTA

50-900 under LIN U72733, survival kit, individualvest type. Requisition information follows:

NOMENCLATURE NSN u/P U/I SOS

Kit, Survival, SmlIndiv Vest Type 8465-01-174-2355 226 .90 Ea S9T

Vest, Survival ,SRU-21/P 8415-01-173-9098 80.05 Ea S9T

Jacket, Flyer's, Heavyweight CWU-4S/PDPSC (RIC S9T) is now accepting funding requisi

tions for the jacket, flyer's, CWU-45/P, heavyweight, NSN 8415-00-310-111 series. This jacketreplaces the jacket, flyer's, N2B, heavyweight, NSN8415-00-118-7569, 7573, 7574 and 7587 (S, M, LandXL). The CWU-45/P, made of Nomex fabric,provides flame resistance, which the N2B jacket didnot. The unit price of the jacket is $110.00, and theunit of issue is EA. NSNs, sizing and recommendedtariff are as follows:

TariffJacket, Flyer's Size per 1,000

8415-00-31 0-1111 S- 34-36) 151

-1123 M- 38-40) 363-1133 L- 42-44) 325-1140 XL (46-48) 161

The basis of issue for the new jacket CWU-45/Pis identical to that of the replaced jacket, N2B,found in CTA 50-900 under LIN 14978. The CWU-45/P jacket, flyer's, is to be worn with hood, flyer's,NSN 8415-01-167-7242 series, which has an effectivedate of supply of 1 July 1987. f required, the Navyhood, winter, flyer's, NSN 8415-01-027-6034, isavailable as an interim substitute. The unit price ofthe Navy hood, winter, flyer's, is $30.65, and theunit of issue is EA. Source of supply is S9T.Information will be supplied in the Army SupportCenter Digest when the new flyer's hood is available.The unit of issue is EA, source of supply is S9T.NSN 8415-01-167-7242(s} is the new NSN for thishood. (

f you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL S , AMC Product Management Office,ATTN: AMCPM-ALSE, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd. , St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3817 or Commercial 314-263-3817.

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u.s. RMY

irectorate of Evaluation Standardization

l ~R PORT TO THE FIEL VI TIONST NO ROiz T ION

The viation Family Grows

Sergeant First Class Richard A uckDirectorate of Evaluation and StandardizationU.S . Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

INTRODUCTION OF new and more sophisti

cated aircraft and the development of new dutyspecialties required many changes be made inaviation-related publications. By using the exampleof the creation of a new military occupationalspecialty (MOS), this article illustrates the manychanges required to ensure those soldiers are properlytrained and proficient in the skills necessary toperform in their specialty.

The new MOS is 93B, Enlisted Aeroscout Observer. After the duty description and course development were completed, the work began on incorporating the aeroscout observer into the unit individualtraining program. The first step in this process wasthe development of an air crew training manual(ATM), FC 1-215-1. This manual was specificallydesigned in the same format as an aviator ATM, tooutline the training necessary for an aeroscout observer to maintain technical proficiency after completion of school. As this is an A TM, the aeroscoutobserver also falls under the provisions of theCommander's Guide. It, therefore, became necessaryto revise TC 1-210, Commander 's Guide, to givethe commander the proper guidance to develop theunit training program.

Much time and research were devoted to the nextrequired change. Because observers are required, byduty description and the ATM, to maintain proficiency in emergency aircraft handling, it was necessary to include them in AR 95-1, paragraph 1-8(personnel authorized to fly Army aircraft). Along

4

these same lines, the decision was made to require

observers to fly with an instructor pilot at one set ofcontrols. Since the observer is now participating inthe aircrew training program ATP), he must meetall the training objectives of his ATM. AR 95-1,paragraph 3-9, had to be modified to include theseindividuals if they failed to meet ATP requirements.Changes to the wording were necessary to ensurethat all areas pertaining to observers and th ir flightminimums were discussed.

Because of the unique status of the observers, achange to AR 600-106 has been requested. In the

current regulation, there are no concrete provisionsfor placing observers on flying status as crewmembers, nor how to deal with them if they fail to meetATP requirements. Based on this, we have requestedthat paragraph 9j be changed to state that onlypersons that have completed the formal course of

instruction at the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.Rucker, AL, be placed on status as aeroscoutobservers. In accordance with paragraph 12a, enlisted personnel are required to meet Class III flightphysical standards. Enlisted observers, however, arerequired to pass Class II flight physicals-so weadded this requirement to the regulation.

Failure to meet A TP requirements poses anotherproblem concerning the flying status of observers.AR 95-1 is very clear about what the commanderwill do in the event one of his observers is in thissituation. He can either grant a 30-day extension orterminate the individual's flying status orders. This,



17/48

however, is not addressed in AR 600-106. To coverthis possibility, an addition has been requested toparagraphs 3c and 5c that gives the commanderthe guidelines he needs to terminate flying status asnecessary. This will provide the regulatory authorityto place an observer on status as a crewmember and,if needed, to take him off status if he does not meetall of the requirements for his MOS.

Now comes the most significant change of -

FM 1-300. Revisions in this publication were definitely influenced by the new MOS, particularlychapter 8, enlisted flight records. Tracking of flighttime for enlisted aircrew personnel has long been amajor problem for the operations personnel, mainlybecause there was no defined procedure.

Developing a system to maintain flight records for

nonrated flight personnel in itself was a simple task.The problems surfaced when the observers wereincluded. Flight time under different flight conditionsis a part of their A TP, which includes such areas asnight vision goggles. In order to properly track theflying time for the observer, we have a system verysimilar to that for the aviator. This system is

different than that for all other enlisted personnel.

DES welcomes your inquiries nd requests to focus attention on

an area of major importance . Write to us at: Commander U.S .

Army Aviation Center ATTN: ATZQ-ESFt.

Rucker AL 36362-

The information maintained on all enlisted personnelis not the same, thus, the need for different records.

While the flight records were the main objective inthe change to FM 1-300, other areas concerningflying status and pay were included in the newmanual. Extracted information from AR 600-106,AR 37-304-3 and the DOD Pay and IncentiveManual was included to give the operations personnel a quick single source reference for all aspects ofenlisted flight time. This was not designed to replaceany of the other documents but to be used as aguide to answer the most often asked questions. Theregulations mentioned are still the final authority.

You can now see how incorporation of a newsystem or MOS affects today's aviation community.Changes in equipment, doctrine or training dictate

continuous updating of related publications. Maintenance of publications is a team effort in the aviationfield. Input from the users in the field is needed;your ideas and recommendations are a vital link inmaintaining the most current and usable documents.Use of the DA Form 2028 is the best method formaking your intentions known. We all need to worktogether to keep Army Aviation Above the Best"

5000; or call us t AUTOVON 558-3504 or Commercial 205-255-

3504. After duty hours call Ft Rucker Hotline AUTOVON

558-6487 or Commercial 205-255-6487nd

leave a message .

u s Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsFlying Hours Total Cost

Number (estimated) Rate Fatalities (in millions)FY 86 (to August 31) 32 1,512,770 2.12 25 69.8FY 87 (to August 31) 35 1,544,388 2.27 42 81.1

SEPTEMBER 987 5


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6

.. . a .


19/48

Scouts utwith th AH 64 Apache

I IS NO SCOOP that the AH-64Apache provides the Army with the most advanced

and lethal tank-killing capability ever introduced intothe front line aerial arsenal. Its capability o operating during day, night and adverse weather conditionsis well known, but what is normally overlooked, isthat for it to achieve its full potential, a scouthelicopter possessing an improved target acquisition/designation capability and an air-to-air protectionsystem is needed.

In our operations s the first tactical unit equippedwith the Apache, the OH-58C Kiowa proved that ascout is s much now, s ever, an importantingredient o the attack team. The OH-58C canoperate during day and most night scenarios with theAH-64, while complementing its capabilities. Duringour Apache attack helicopter operations, the scoutwas required to accomplish ll those missions inherently associated with attack missions, such s security, reconnaissance, coordination o indirect fire,joint air attack team JAA T) operations and liaisonwith the ground commander. The only drawback,and - it w s a definite drawback, w s the lack o atarget acquisition and target handoff capability forthe scout. Nevertheless, s we hope to show, the

OH-58C accomplished its assigned missions s theyapply to the OH-58C/ AH-64 attack team.While performing security missions, the scout

conducts day/night reconnaissance o the holdingareas, battle positions and the routes to and fromthese areas. A great advance toward success o thescout mission was the introduction o the aviatornight vision imaging system, ANVIS-6, night visiongoggles NVG) that allowed the OH-58C to accomplish its operations during nights with very low

SEPTEMBER 987

illumination, thus increasing scout crew survivability.With ANVIS-6, we are no longer restricted to

following lunar schedules, as they work well usingthe prevailing starlight as long s no overcastconditions exist. It must be kept in mind, however,that an overcast sky coupled with low illuminationdegrades NVG operations and ultimately scout operations. A scout equipped with ANVIS-6 provides theApache with an extra degree o security to and fromits attack positions that was not possible with theearlier models o night vision goggles. This alone

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R McGintyCaptain Joseph P Duffey

7


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The OH-58 Kiowa has been tested with a variety ofarmament in luding Stinger air-to-air missiles right), 2.75in h rockets above and inset above left) and the M 27E1

7.62 mm minigun above).

Scoutsut

gives the commander greater flexibility to exploit theimmense capabilities of the AH-64.

o

emphasize the importanceof

this night capability it is relevant to note that roughly 5 percent ofour unit s Apache operations are executed at nightwhile organized under the corps aviation brigade.The end result of the ANVIS-6/0H-58C marriage ,isthat it allows for a greater level of reconnaissance,which translates into security for all phases of themission. Along with these traditional day/night roles,the OH-58C also remains an excellent troop command and control platform for AH-64 operations.

18

During the conduct of an actual battle, certainsituations would require the troop commander to be

in a scout aircraft. This would allow him thefreedom to maneuver and coordinate his attack teamoperations without occupying a critical AH-64 seat,thus detracting from the total combat power of histeam. Since the scouts inherently watch the battledevelop from a larger perspective, the commanderwould be able to see and receive intelligence from hislocation in one scout as well as from his other twoscouts, which allows him to concentrate on maneuvering his troop in support of the ground com-



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mander and other units in the attack. The greatestadvantage of flying the troop commander in a scoutaircraft is that an OH-58C has a longer station timeand has the ability to receive first hand informationwhile not being committed to the actual fight. Itis a well designed fact that the force with the mosttimely and accurate intelligence, coupled with maneuver assets, has the upper harid in any engagementand the scout is a key element in this highlyperishable intelligence chain.

In addition to the foregoing, the team scouts alsoare responsible for providing security to the flanksand rear of the attack team from both ground andair threats; although currently passive, the requirement is valid. This is where the technology of theAH 64 can aid the scout. The target store capabilityof the Apache adds a new dimension to a reversehandoff. It can locate targets and give exact coordi

nates to the scouts so they may then better call andadjust precise indirect fire with greater speed andefficiency. This, in turn, leaves the Apaches free toengage other high priority targets, bringing to life theprinciple of massing accurate fire on the enemy.Again, the troop commander, or his designee, working from the scout, can coordinate and direct J AA Toperations between the Apaches and A-lOs duringthis attack helicopter engagement.

The JAAT has come of age with the Apache. It isnow possible for the Air Force to be preciselydirected onto a target array through the use of its

Pave Penny coupled with the Apache's laser. (Theenhanced scout would improve upon this conceptwith its integral laser capability, thereby providinganother armor destroyer to the team. Until then, thescout continues to be the orchestrater and director ofthe entire JAA T having radio communications withboth his close air support and his Apaches whilecontinuing to see the entire battlefield.) Although nota doctrinal or aircrew training manual role of thescout, the task of decoy in and around the battleposition before a JAA T should not be overlooked.We have found that a scout ruse to decoy and ordetect enemy air defense systems is extremely effective, and will certainly be useful for cross-forwardline of own troops (FLOT) and night attack operations.

With the capability of the Apache to conductcross-FLOT missions, there are several operationsthat the scouts need to accomplish to improve attackhelicopter efficiency. Prior to the mission beginning,precise and accurate planning must be accomplished,

SEPTEMBER 1987

Only the birds above it could clearly see this OH 58 innap of the earth flight

and it is the scout that would dictate the speed withwhich first hand information is passed to the

planners.The scouts need to recon routes to the passage

points in order to determine nap-of-the-earth suitability, security and hazards to flight such as wires,poles and towers. f the anticipated passage pointsare unsuitable, they must quickly recon and recommend alternates early in the planning sequence.

Scouts also must coordinate and conduct liaisonwith key ground commanders to establish artillerycorridors beyond the FLOT as well as time andcoordinates of each passage point. It is here thattime specific air defense artillery (ADA) corridorsshould be established and executed to ensure the

safety of all friendly aircraft.It is also important for the scouts who areassigned the ruse to establish and coordinate a rusepattern with the ground commander in whose vicinity the plan is intended. Again, this ruse is a valuabletool that the scout can use to confuse the threat andensure the success of the Apache passing undetectedat passage points. Essentially, this type ruse encompasses a flight of OH-58s acting as decoys, atsubstantial range from the threat, at a predetermined

19


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Scoutsut

point and time in order to allow enemy radar to alertand attempt lock-on. This allows the AH-64s to passthrough the FLOT undetected, while also providingprecise ADA location for destruction via accuratesuppression o enemy air defense missions. This typeo mission, as close as it is to the FLOT, must useoperational APR-39s to avoid lock-on, in conjunction with terrain where the scout can quickly deployto cover. Properly executed, the Apache should cross

undetected while enemy air defense systems arepreoccupied with the ruse and incoming artillery.The cross-FLOT techniques used to date usually

include an artillery corridor forward o the passagepoint. In this instance, the squadron fire supportofficer sets up predetermined fire series to beexecuted in concert with passage point times. Theseseries can be activated or canceled by the scouts asthe situation dictates, thereby allowing the scout tocontrol the flow o battle. So while never crossingthe FLOT, the evidence presented heretofore addscredence that the scout contribution is valid; how

ever, the advent o an enhanced scout would greatlyexpand his role in this mission area.

Even after the Apaches are cross-FLOT, thescout s role is still critical. The scouting process isaccomplished in reverse as the AH-64s egress frombehind enemy lines. Timing, coordination and communications are just some o the functions requiredto egress passage o lines. Most importantly though,the scouts also must have completed coordination atthe forward arming and refueling points (F ARP), toensure the quickest and safest refueling and rearmingsequence among the returning troops. This is especially critical at night when there may be 18 or moreApaches short on fuel, converging on one, maybetwo axes, into mUltiple F ARPs. Safety is the criticalfactor. Because in many instances the ANVIS-6, withits improved light amplification qualities, providesbetter stat ion keeping visibility than does the pilot snight vision sensor o the Apache, the ANVIS-6should be used. In most situations, the scouts canbetter coordinate sequencing into the refueling points

20

from nearby holding areas, without running the risko midair or ground collisions. This is a semiadministrative task but one that is imperative to ensurethe safety o all personnel and aircraft during asquadron surge mission.

In summary, we have seen thus far in our trainingthat there is an absolute need for a scout platform tofight alongside the AH-64, and in many cases theOH-58C performs this mission well. We have discussed some o the areas that would substantiallyimprove the efficiency and effectiveness o the attackteam. The most obvious o these is the need for animproved optics and laser designation capabilitycombined with an automatic target system. As anend thought, we have found that the OH-58C has itsshortcomings. Nevertheless, during some 12 days ointensive training, it has reaffirmed the need for ascout, an enhanced scout, as the need for reconnaissance, security and battlefield management continues

to build with the increased capabilities and lethalityo all advanced attack helicopter operations.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

LTC Kenneth R McGinty commands the 3dSquadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, th CavalryBrigade AC), Ft. Hood, TX, which is the firsttactical unit to field the AH-64 Apacheformerly the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry). An

OCS graduate, he has commanded bothmechanized infantry companies and attackhelicopter companies. Before assumingcommand of the 3-6th Calvary, LTC McGintyserved as the force integration officer for

attack helicopters in the office of the ViceChief of Staff.

CPT Joseph P Duffey is the aeroscoutplatoon leader for B Troop, 3d Squadron, 6thCalvary Regimen t, 6th Calvary Bridgade AC).He is a 982 graduate of West Point and hasserved as an OH-58 section leader beforeassuming his present pOSition.

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/48

u s RMY S FETY CENTER

'== =THERE S ONE word that can strike terror

into the staunchest aviator s heart, that s -WIRES. Safety people have been writing about wirestrikes just about as long as there s been anythingcalled a helicopter; but these accidents are stillhappening.

From 1 October 1983 through 27 August 1986,wire strikes damaged 45 Army aircraft, killing 7people and seriously injuring 14 others. Of these 45mishaps, 10 were Class A; 1 Class B; 9 Class C; and25 Class D. Total cost of injuries and damageamounted to more than 17 2 million .

Human error is almost always the cause of wirestrikes. It s rare that a wire strike occurs after anin-flight, materiel-related emergency. A study of 141wire strike incidents, occurring since 1980, revealsthat most wire strikes happen during cruise flight ataltitudes below 75 feet above ground level (agl) ,although some have occurred above 150 feet. Theaverage wire strike happens at 82 feet agl, and mostfatal wire strikes occur at airspeeds above 60 knots.

Some causes of wire strikes listed in mishapreports include: unauthorized low-level flight; deviation from nap-of-the-earth (NOE) route; overconfi

dence; approach to unauthorized confined area; nowire recon and no hazard map; unauthorized highspeed maneuver in confined area; wires not markedon map; wires were marked on map but pilot didn tlook at map; misjudged clearance during hover;failure to realize effects of darkness on depthperception; and incorrectly set altimeter.

One set of wires over a river accounted for theloss of two Army aircraft; an OH-58 Kiowa and anOH-6 Cayuse . The mishaps occurred in exactly the

SEPTEMBER 1987

ame place-but happened 12 years apart . In the

first, the aircraft was flying at an unauthorizedaltitude along a route that hadn t been safetychecked. The crew didn t see the wires, and oneperson was killed when the OH-58 hit the wires andcrashed. The OH-6 was on an authorized low-leveltraining flight when it, too, hit the wires. A safetyrecon of the flight route had been made, but thereconnaissance flight crew failed to detect the wiresthat weren t plotted on the hazard maps .

Sometimes the problem is simply a wire that hasbeen strung up overnight, isn t marked and doesn tappear on any of the hazard maps. Too often,though, the wire is on the unit s hazard map, but themishap aircrewmembers fail to compare their map tothe unit map, so they don t know the wire is there.That s what happened in the following mishap.

An OH-58 crew was engaged in NOE flight duringa tactical exercise. The aircraft was flying down themiddle of a valley when the copilot, who was on thecontrols, saw a wire directly in front of the helicopter. He was able to fly over that wire, but theaircraft struck three wires above it that he hadn tseen.

The wires the helicopter hit were draped over thedraw from supporting poles located on ridges aboveeach side of the valley. The poles were partiallyconcealed by trees.

The pilot in command (PIC) was acting as navigator of the OH-58 and was using the copilot s map.He used that map because the copilot was the lastone to receive a mission update from the platoonleader, and the copilot s map was used in thebriefing. The PIC should have used his own map

21


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A I C ~ ~. I n l : . ~ Continued

because it had a wire hazard posted in the same gridsquare where the wires they hit were located. Or, heshould have checked the hazards map in the operations office for known hazards along the route offlight. The copilot had posted his map with the wirehazards that were made available by the incountryaviation safety office, but only wires 5 feet agl andabove were included on that map overlay. The wiresthe aircraft struck were only 4 feet agl so theyweren t included.

Sometimes wires are incorrectly plotted on a map.In the following mishap, pilots identified low wiresthat corresponded to the location of plotted wires onthe map; but, the plot was wrong. When acrewmember in the rear o f the aircraft saw wires andalerted the pilot, the instructor pilot (lP) made an

evasive maneuver, but one rotor blade hit a one-halfinch cable.The pilots were wearing night vision goggles

(NVG) during the navigation training flight. Inpreparing for the mission, they failed to ensure thata route recon had been made as the major Armycommand wire strike prevention pamphlet required.The route had been partially reconned a few daysbefore, but the recon was flown at a higher altitudethan would be used on this mission. In spite of thefact that he lacked adequate route information, the

P decided to fly at an altitude of 200 to 400 feetagl. He also decided to combine a route reconnaissance update with the NVG mission. The result wasa wire strike.

In an area where wires are already a problem, addother factors, such as NVG and overextending acrew s endurance, and the stage is set for a mishap.That happened to an aircraft s aircrewmemberswhose intentions were good, but the outcome leftone crewmember dead and two others seriouslyinjured.

After working all day, the UH-60 Black Hawkcrew took off on a 3-hour NVG training mission.After about 2 hours, the PIC received a request forassistance to locate a downed aircraft that had strucka wire.

The UH-60 pilot quickly located the aircraft and,after leading a medevac aircraft to the site, returnedto the airfield to resume training. Another requestcame in to transport guards and a truck to thedowned aircraft. The PIC turned down this requestbecause his aircraft wasn t equipped for that kind o f

22

mission. He did agree to lead another aicraft, whichcould handle the mission, back to the site. Arrivingthere, he landed and, after being assured that hishelp was no longer needed, departed once again forthe airfield.

While still en route, the control tower again askedhim for assistance in contacting the transport aircraft. He attempted to make radio contact with theaircraft but was unsuccessful. The pilot then decidedto return to the site of the downed aircraft andattempt to contact the transport aircraft by radiofrom the air. He descended to about 3 feet agl andbegan flying up the valley to the accident site at 1to 2 knots. Suddenly, he saw a wire out his rightwindshield. He pulled collective pitch to try to avoidthe wire, but it was too late. The aircraft climbedinto several more strands of wire and crashed. Thewires were marked on the pilot s hazard map.

Some time ago, the Army Safety Center published

a seven-point program to prevent wire srikes. I t stime to stress these seven points again.

N tanding operating proceduresSOPs) and directives. Directives and SOPs

for terrain flight should reflect all the safest procedures possible for the types of missions being flown.Detailed responsibilities for the pilot at the controls,the pilot not at the controls and other crewmembers

should be specified. The procedures should be reinforced regularly at aviation safety meetings.

Supervision Commanders and supervisors must ensure that pilots adhere to establishedprocedures. All missions should be planned, and allaircrews should know the plan. Immediate andpositive action should be taken regarding any violation of flight discipline.

Hazard maps Wires and other obstacles that pose a threat to terrain flight should beaccurately depicted on hazard maps. In areas such asEurope where the prominence of wires would undulyclutter the map, major wire hazards and wires thatare located in unlikely areas should be plotted and



25/48

aircrews made aware of other unplotted wire locations .such as along roads, railroads, etc. When it ispossible for all wires to be plotted without compromising the usefulness of the map, then they shouldbe. Crews should be thoroughly briefed on wirestrike hazards before every terrain flight mission.

~ l r emarking Whenever possible, allwires around potential takeoff and landing sites onand off military reservations should be marked.Certainly, all wires around frequently used sitesshould be marked. While pilots should know whento expect wires, markers make them easier to see.

= inimize contour flight Mostwire strikes occur during terrain flight in the contourmode or on takeoff or landing. Unless required bythe mission, contour flight should be avoided. Crewsalso should be extremely careful when landing in ortaking off from an unfamiliar area. And, theycannot be complacent when going into or out ofplaces they know. Wire hazards can be constructedin a matter of minutes.

M a X i m u m rew coordinationThe more crewmembers actively engaged in spottingwire hazards on any given flight, the less the risk ofwire strikes. When flying in a wire environment,maximum coordination among all crewmembers isneeded to search for wires. During terrain flight, thepilot s full attention should be on flying. Navigation,setting radio frequencies and monitoring instrumentsshould be a copilot function. I f the pilot must directhis attention away from flying, he should land orclimb to a higher altitude.

. o slow when you go low Theslower the airspeed, the more time a pilot will haveto identify and react to an unforeseen obstacle in hisflight path. Assuming good visibility, if two aircraftare approaching wires and one is at 8 knots whilethe other is at 40 knots, the pilot of the faster

SEPTEMBER 987

aircraft will need to spot the wires at a distance ofmore than 1,650 feet to react and avoid them. Thepilot of the slower aircraft will have ample time toreact if he sees them at 600 feet.

Some aviator errors that lead to wire strikes arealmost unbelievable. For example: An AH l Cobracrew with more than 2,100 rotary wing flight hoursbetween them chose to risk taking off from anairfield where it was raining. The weather at theairport was below VFR (visual flight rules) minimums, with a measured ceiling of 900 feet brokenand 5 miles in light rain and fog. The crewmembersnot only failed to file a flight plan or get a weatherbriefing when they were told of the weather conditions, which mandated a special VFR clearance, butthey also asked for and got a special clearance.

They remained below 600 feet agl to avoid a cloudcover and followed an interstate highway. Twentyseven minutes after taking off, the AH -1, then flying

about 1 feet agl at an estimated airspeed of 100 to12 knots, hit the top two strands of a transmissionline crossing the highway. The helicopter crashed,and both pilots were killed.

These crewmembers had been well briefed, notonly about the mission, but also on safety. Thepotential for bad weather had been covered, andthey had been told that an overnight stay wasacceptable should the need arise. The unit had awell-organized and active safety program. Safetymeetings were held monthly, and subject matter andattendance were well-documented. Both of thecrewmembers attended the safety meeting held themonth before the accident. One of the topicsdiscussed at that meeting was the hazard of wirestrikes while trying to maintain visual flight in IMC(instrument meteorological conditions).

One mistake is all it takes for you to be a wirestrike statistic flying down a river or valley at 80 to90 knots, getting lost or failing to update yourhazard map anyone of these will do it.

Unit commanders, operations officers and platoonleaders share some of the responsibility for wire

strike mishaps, but the final responsibility belongs tothe crewmembers in the cockpit. Who, after all, hasa bigger stake in preventing wire strikes?

23


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JI f =

taff Sergeant Paul J Cook

s aircrewmembers we are all taught that ifwe feel we are unable to fly for medical reasonswe should consult a flight surgeon. Regrettablywe often fail to do so On one particular occasionwhile I was suffering from a head cold Ineglected to see the flight surgeon. s a result othis I paid a rather high price. Fortunately thisprice was not as high as it could have been. Thisarticle recounts my failure to comply with regula-

tions and good common sense.

TN THE EARLY part of February 1986, I 24th of February. About 1 week prior to this missionwas scheduled to fly a cross-country mission from I developed a head cold. I didn t think it was seriousStuttgart Army Airfield, Germany, to Rota Naval so I didn t consult a flight surgeon, and I didn tStation, Spain. The date for this mission was the self-medicate.

24 u.s. RMY VI TION DIGEST


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By the 21st of February I found that my cold wasmuch worse. I recall thinking that I was in a realbind. The mission to Spain was 72 hours off, and Iwas not medically fit to fly. This situation created aproblem in my mind. Should I ground myself, orshould I treat myself so I could fly? The flight toSpain required a great deal of planning and coordi

nation with higher headquarters and other agencies.To compound this, we were faced with a personnelshortage and had no one else available to fly.

Cognizant of these facts, I scurried over to thepost exchange and, when no one from my unit waswatching, purchased several cold medications. Electing to treat myself was my first mistake. Carryingout that decision was my second. I quickly read theinstructions attached to the medication, and decidedthat if the medication were discontinued by 1800 onthe 23d, I would be all right to fly.

The 22d of February was a particularly nasty day.The weather was very cold and windy, with snowshowers. I thought it would be wise to spend the dayin bed. This thought was reinforced by the realization that my cold medication was just not working.Because I had a class that day I was unable to stayin bed. I left my apartment early that morning andheaded for class. When the class broke for lunch Iheaded to the commissary and purchased some morecold medication. I discontinued the original medication and started taking the new medication like itwas penny candy.

The 23d of February was much like the 22d, and Ihad both the same thoughts and obligation. I againtrudged through the snow and headed for class. Atabout 1500 hours my sinuses broke and I reallybegan to feel better . I really thought that I would beOK to fly the next day.

Show time for the mission was 0400 on the 24th. Igot up around 0130 and was amazed at how well Ifelt. I still had some congestion, but it felt veryslight. I did not feel any real pressure in my sinusesand I was able to Valsalva. At that time, I was, inmy own mind, medically fit to fly. Just to be safe,however, I brought along a bottle of Afrin to use incase of an emergency.

I arrived at operations about 0315 on the 24th.The mission had been planned before close ofbusiness on Friday, so all I had to do was read thebrief sheet, get my call signs and tail number. WhileI was waiting for my pilot to arrive, I calledweather, rechecked my logs and chatted with theduty coordinator. I did this to stay inside and

SEPTEMBER 987

minimize my exposure to the cold weather. While Ifelt fit to fly, I didn t want to take any chances.When my pilot arrived, we re-briefed the missionand headed out to preflight. I made my preflight asbrief as possible, and retreated to the warmth ofoperations.

We strapped in at about 0600 and cranked.Everything was going as planned, and we took offjust about on time. The mission called for two legs.The first leg was from Stuttgart to Bordeaux,France. The en route forecast was pretty good, witha small chance of encountering some light turbulence. With this forecast no problems were anticipated. Unfortunately things did not develop asexpected.

Our cruise altitude was flight level (FL) 110. Wemade the climb to altitude with no problem andenjoyed a routine, comfortable flight to Bordeaux.After receiving our clearance for the descent intoBordeaux, we experienced our first problem-I wasunable to clear my sinuses. We continued ourdescent in what turned out to be very poor weatherwhile I tried to clear. Upon reaching 1,500 feet meansea level I was still unable to clear my sinuses. Ipulled the bottle of Afrin from my pubs bag and putit to use. During this time we were flying theapproach. When we reached decision height we werestill unable to see the field and began to execute amissed approach. We flew the published missedapproach procedure, and returned to the initial

approach fix. On the second try we were able to seethe field, and my pilot made a very nice landingunder some uncomfortable circumstances.

During the initial approach, my pilot notified thetower that a crewmember was experiencing physiological problems. This transmission had been monitored by one of the other aircraft involved in themission. When we landed, some questions wereasked and then the incident was dropped. Theaircraft were r f u l landing fees paid and thesecond leg of the flight was filed. When theadministrative work was completed, we returned toour aircraft. We were now ready for the second legof the mission.

This leg started poorly. We were trying to complywith the instructions of a novice ground controllerwho was not fluent in English. We finally receivedour takeoff clearance after a long and expensivedelay. We had originally planned to fly this leg atFL 130. However, more favorable winds were foundat FL 170 therefore we requested and received

25


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clearance to FL 170. The climb to FL 170 had methinking more and more about the problem Iencountered during the descent into Bordeaux. Weleveled off at FL 17 and remained there for thenext few hours.

As we closed on Rota I became increasinglyconcerned about my cured cold. My pilot askedme how I felt and I told him that I felt OK. Westarted our descent into Rota about 30 miles out,established a descent rate of 500 feet a minute andbegan getting ready for landing. We were at about7,500 feet when we completed the descent/arrivalcheck. As we passed through 7,000 feet, I suddenlyfelt as if someone had jammed a knife through theroof of my mouth while rotating the blade.

We were low on fuel by this time (the expensivedelay in Bordeaux), and I did not wish to distractmy pilot so I did not say anything about myproblem. When he noticed a bloody tissue at mynose, I told him I had broken a small blood vesselwhile sneezing. My pilot, who knew when he wasbeing fed woof cookies did not believe that; but hewas too busy to argue. My nose continued to bleed

excessively during the approach, landing and taxi totie down. When we went through the engine shutdown checklist, my nose was still bleeding. Thosewere my third and fourth mistakes. Flying afterhaving difficulty clearing and creating a distractionduring a critical phase of flight. Once the aircraftwere taken care of, we headed for base operations.There, at the urging of my pilot, I asked where Icould find a flight surgeon.

On the morning of the 25th, I walked into theNavy hospital at Rota and asked to see a flightsurgeon. After a brief wait I was examined. Theflight surgeon examined my ears, nose and throatand then ordered an X-ray series of my skull andsinuses. When the flight surgeon received the X-rayshe made his final diagnosis-sinus barotrauma. Forthe uninformed, sinus barotrauma is a condition inwhich the explosive release of trapped gas literallyskins the sinus cavity. The X-rays that were shownto me showed a dense cloud of tissue in what usedto be a normal sinus. The prolonged bleeding that

26

occurred during our descent was not a broken bloodvessel. It was the discharge of blood, skin, mucusmaterials that normally remain inside a healthy sinus.After making his diagnosis and showing me theX-rays, the flight surgeon presented me with one lasti t em-a grounding slip.

Because I was grounded I had to fly MEDEV ACfrom Spain to Germany in an Air Force C-9 thatwas required to hold cabin pressure at sea level.Since I had self-medicated and decided to do theflight surgeon s job for him, I was DNIF (duty notinvolving flying) for more than a month. I wasfortunate this time. f I had tried to fly back in anOV-1, I could have found myself permanentlygrounded when I landed.

Crew members , there is a lesson here. Selfmedication will not make you flyable. It will onlycreate problems when you find that your choice ofmedication does not work. In this case, I needlessly

jeopardized my pilot, our airplane and myself bydistracting him during a critical phase of flight. fmy pilot was not as competent and experienced as hewas, things could have turned out very differently.

f you feel the need to self-medicate, you are notfit to fly. Instead of taking 1 minutes to drive overto the post exchange for some over-the-countermedication, take 20 minutes and see the flight surgeon. He may recommend grounding you for awhile,but that is far better than some of the alternatives. fyou don't believe this is the case, then self-medicateall you want. Just remember, one day it isn t goingto work. Can you tell when that particular day willbe? sr

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SSG Paul J. Cook Is an aerial Intelligencespecialist aSSigned to Company A, 2d MI BNAerial Exploitation). A 1979 graduate o the

USAICS Aerial Sensor Specialist Course, he hasserved as an OV 1 technical observer in Alaska,Georgia, Korea, Arizona and Germany. At thetime o this inCident, he had logged just morethan 600 hours In OV-1s.



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VI TION PERSONNEL NOT S

Expanded Warrant Officer RolesAviation warrant officers (AWO) will now have

more opportunity to exercise leadership while servingin aviation positions. Several developments havecombined to make this expanded leadership role areality; they are:

-Commissioning of the warrant officer.-A rmy of Excellence restructuring.-Warrant officer position coding.The largest number of leadership positions opening

up to the warrant officer population is the positionof section leader. An important point of emphasis isthat the AWO must maintain technical competencewhile occupying a leadership position.

Specific developments relating to warrant officer

position coding were completed in March 1987.During that month, the U.S. Army Aviation Centerprovided the U.S. Army Soldier Support CenterNational Capital Region with new A WO data forArmy Regulation 611-112, Manual of WarrantOfficer Military Occupational Specialties. The newdata consisted of specifications, qualifications andduties for each warrant officer area of concentrationand military occupational specialty (MOS) for whichAviation Branch is the proponent. As mentioned,this is one of the actions helping to open up warrant

officer leadership opportunities.Additionally, a rank coding table (RCT) was

provided for each MOS. The RCT is a list ofwarrant officer positions classified by three rankgroups: Warrant officer (W1/W2), senior warrantofficer (W3/W 4) and master warrant officer W 4 orW5, if approved). The RCT will replace the sectionin AR 611-112 referred to as positions, units, codeand title in which authorized.

SEPTEMBER 987

93J/93H Air Traffic Control ConsolidationIn February 1982, the U.S. Army Information

Systems Command submitted a proposal to theSoldier Support Center requesting that MOS 93J, AirTraffic Control (ATC) Radar Controller, and MOS93H, ATC Tower Operator, be consolidated into oneMOS. The action was deferred by U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) duringthe then pending formation of the Aviation Branch.Once the Aviation Branch Implementation Plan wasenacted it encompassed a requirement to study the93J /93H consolidation proposal.

During February 1983, further impetus was givento the proposal by the Army Audit Agency Report(report on the Army's ATC program) recommending

consolidation approval. By February 1984, the U.S.Army Aviation Center hosted a working group todetermine how best to study the management ofMOS 93J/93H. Subsequently, a study plan wasdrafted to determine feasibility. TRADOC approvedthe draft study plan and a Study Advisory Groupwas organized at the Aviation Center in May 1984.

The fruition of the foregoing actions will berealized on 1 October 1987 when MOS 93J and 93Hwill be combined and designated MOS 93C, ATCOperator. Those soldiers who currently hold MOS

93J/93H took their skill qualification test (SQT) inJuly but will be exempt from SQT during FY 88.This is to allow cross training via an exportabletraining packet to be provided by the Army TrainingSupport Center, Ft. Eustis, VA. Cross training willbe completed during FY 89, and all 93C MOSsoldiers will again be tested by SQT that same year.

27


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P RSONN L NOT S Continued

ajor Selection Boards TrendsDuring the past five ajor Selection Boards

aviation captains experienced a 78.02 percent selec-tion rate as compared to an Armywide rate of 76.3percent for first time considerations. Although avia-tion officers were slightly below the Armywide selec-tion rate during 1987 it is anticipated that futureselections for the rank of major will be higher thanthe Army average . This is based on the positiveimpact of the Army Aviation Personnel Plan and the

Previously

continued conversion to the Army of Excellence. Thechart below shows how Aviation Branch captainsfared compared to the rest of the Army from FY 83

to FY 87.

Astronaut SelectionThe annual Army Astronaut Selection Board is

expected to convene in November 987 to selectsoldiers for nomination to the National Aeronautics

First Time TotalConsidered/ Considered/ Considered/Selected

Selected Selected Below the Zone)

Army 689/65 2 944/2 133 3 609/115(9.4 )

198772.5 0/0) (3.2 )

Aviation 66/4 224/156 356/26.1 00) (69.6 ) (0.6 )

Army 576/59 2 629/1 982 3 060/46(10.2 ) (75.4 ) 1.5 0/0)

1986

Aviation 81/7 2241196 232/2(8.6 ) 80 .3 ) (0.9 )

Army 591/119 2 204/1 695 2,749/5220.1 0/0) (76.9 ) 1.9 0/0)

1985Aviation 87/14 237/185 254/2

16.1 0/0) 78.1 0/0) (0.8 )

Army 708/144 2 161/1 686 2 282/30(20.3 ) (78 ) 1.3 0/0)

1984Aviation 107/26 189/152 202/4

(24.3 0/0) (80.4 ) 20/0)

Army 857 191 2 382/1 878 2 192/12. (22.3 0/0) (78.8 ) 0.5 0/0)1983

Aviation 113121 214/174 191 1(18.6 ) 81.3 ) (0.5 )

28 u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


31/48

and Space Administration (NASA). Applicationsbegan to be accepted 1 July 1987 and will be takenthrough 1 October of this year; the applications areopen to soldiers of all ranks in both Active Armyand Reserve Components. Those selected by theArmy in 1987 will be considered by NASA for dutyas astronaut candidates beginning 1988.

NASA is looking for the best qualified applicants,particularly those with technical backgrounds andoperational experience. Applicants must have a bachelor s degree from an accredited institution in engineering, biological science, physical science, or mathematics and also have the equivalent of 3 yearsrelated experience. Another prerequisite (not waiverable) is to, have distant visual acuity (20/100 or

better, uncorrected, correctable to 20/20, for eacheye). There is no age limit.Historically, NASA has selected 8 to 10 candidates

annually and has an affirmative action goal ofhaving qualified women and minorities among theastronaut candidates selected. Therefore, women andminority soldiers are especially encouraged to apply.Selected Army astronauts generally have aviationexperience but find it difficult to be competitive forastronaut-pilot positions because of the 1,000 hoursof pilot in command time required in high perfor

mance jet aircraft. Soldiers, however, have been verycompetitive for astronaut-mission specialist positions.

Selection is ultimately based on NASA s needs andanticipated astronaut attrition; however, the AviationBranch is continually trying to increase the numberof astronauts selected from its ranks and, therefore,encourages all qualified personnel to apply. Thosemeeting the prerequisites may request applicationpackets by writing to:

CommanderMILPERCEN

ATTN: DAPC-OPZ-AV200 Stovall StAlexandria, VA 22332-0400(AUTOVON 221-9338/9282 orCommercial 202) 325-9338/9282).

SEPTEM ER 987

Instructor Pilot Training for aptainsAre you a captain heading for an assignment at

Ft. Rucker? f so, you ll now have more opportunityfor professional development while at the AviationCenter than at any time in the history of ArmyAviation. Here s why:

t is essential that the Aviation Branch haveofficers who are not only outstanding troop leadersbut who can provide requisite technical and tacticalexpertise in all facets of aviation. To meet thesetechnical requisites and significantly increase theprofessional development opportunities for aviationcaptains, Major General Ellis D. Parker, AviationBranch chief, recently authorized increased instructorpilot training for captains (initial training under the

program began in mid-May 1987) at the AviationCenter. This program helps grow battalion commanders and meets the Department of the Armyrequirement that all battalion and brigade commanders be qualified as instructor pilots before takingcommand.

Under this new program, captains (or first lieutenants promotable to captain) serving a normal 4-yeartour at Ft. Rucker have significantly increased opportunity to spend 18 to 24 months of that time asinstructor pilots. Rotation will be required after this

length of time to enable officers to complete otherbranch and promotion enhancing requirements whileat Ft. Rucker, such as company command orinstructing training/doctrine.

Branch qualification of more aviation officers isthe key benefit of this program, but there are anumber of other very attractive benefits as well---:compliance with Department of the Army guidance,increased technical expertise to the field, increasedflight time in the commissioned ranks and no newcost. There also will be an added safety benefit fromthe program; as commanders become more technically experienced, they will be better able to evaluatesafety within units they lead.

Are you a captain heading for Ft. Rucker?Excellent opportunities await you.

29


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3

illustration y Ida Corona

magicor

madness

t has been proven that when manpower, personnel and machines are effectively combined the results are improved, moreefficient performance. That s the function of the Human Engineering Laboratory. However, efforts to enhance mission effectiveness through integration of a single side-arm, multiaxis controllerinto helicopter cockpits, though feasible, are not without problems. Therefore, your suggestions as users are needed and arestrongly encouraged.



33/48

The Human ngineeringLaboratory (HEL), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD,is the Army s lead activity for human factors engineering. The pur

pose of human factors engineeringis to optimize the interface between men, machines and theirenvironment in order to maximizeperformance, efficiency and safety.

t is also a cornerstone of the newinitiative to improve the effectiveness of Army materiel, MANPRINT (manpower and personnelintegration).

One traditional application ofhuman factors engineering has

been in cockpit layout. The ultimate objective is to enhance mission effectiveness through reducedpilot workload. The advent ofmodern computer and fly-by-lighttechnologies has made possiblenew flexibility in cockpit displayand control design such s theintegration of the cyclic, collectiveand antitorque controls into a single, multiaxis controller. Severalstudies have been conducted by theHEL, National Aeronautics andSpace Administration, industry, andthe research community as a wholethat examined this type of primaryflight control system s well s aclassic two-axis (pitch and roll),side-arm device. Generally, acrossthe majority of these studies, it hasbeen found that a two-axis, side-

SEPTEMBER 1987

aptain John K SchmidtHuman Engineering LaboratoryAberdeen Proving Ground MD

arm controller with a small displacement range is more desirable thanboth a center-stick and an isometric(stiff stick) controller. However,when the functions of collective

and anti torque control are addedto a two-axis, side-arm controller,making it four-axis , the resultsare not s clear cut.

There are several advantagesand disadvantages to a single sidearm, multiaxis controller. Initially,such a device would free a hand toperform other mission tasks thatcannot be performed when the lefthand is providing collective input;and the improved sitting posture

would help reduce pilot fatigue.With the elimination of foot pedals, it may allow a wider anthropometric range of pilots to beselected. In addition, removing thecenter stick increases both panelvisibility and crash survivability.

Conversely, the modification oftraditional crew stations is notwithout cost. With only one control head, switch functions normally assigned to the collectivewhen combined with those on cyclic will not fit on a single controller and must be relocated. Evenmore complex is that the numberof switches now on the cyclic mayhave to be reduced because whenoperated, switch pressure crosscouples with flight control. Theseinadvertent, small control inputs

taken in conjunction with justbumping the control can result inlarge flight perturbations. Finally,control repositioning may causedisorientation, especially in emer

gency conditions.A series of interviews were conducted at the 7th Aviation Training Battalion, Ft. Rucker, AL,with regard to the integration of aside-arm, multiaxis controller intohelicopter cockpits . Instructor pilots at Hanchey Army Heliportgenerally expressed opinions thatreflect the findings found in thepreviously discussed empiricalstudies in that they perceived gain

ing the same advantages as well sincurring the same problems. Theircomments provided the basis fordeveloping a questionnaire thatwill be mailed out to each operational unit.

To broaden its data base, theH L is interested in drawing uponthe experience of the user community and encourages you to helpby providing your comments onthe questionnaire about the proposed changes in flight controls.Your responses could help shapeour research program. Any questions concerning flight control research at the Human EngineeringLaboratory may be addressed toMr. William DeBellis, the HumanEngineering Laboratory project engineer, AUTOVON 298-5836.

3


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CW Danny WinnCW3 Winn was assigned to 7th Aviation

Training Battalion Ft. Rucker AIwhen he wrote this article.

Fixed

illustration by Doug Harr ison

WingTransitionA Gentleman s Course?

T ERE I WAS, a Ft. Rucker OH-58 Kiowastandardization instructor pilot sitting inside of aT-42 Cochise for the very first time. My instructor

pilot (lP) said, go ahead and taxi out. That was myfirst problem, I had no idea of how to do that. Hegave me 2 seconds of instruction and I was on myway. I then s turned all the way out to the runuparea before I realized that the rudders and not theailerons were what you steer with.

The run up portion came and went without toomany problems. That was only because we had spentthe 4 previous days

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Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1987

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