Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1976

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1976

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USAARl /J eS I SUPPORT ENTER ~~ p o. OX 620577I ~ ORT RUCKER AL 36362 D57

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UNITED

MG William J Maddox JrCOMMANDERU. S ARMY AVIATION CENTERA major activity of the

S Army Training and Doctrine CommandCOL Norman W Paulson

COMMANDERU S ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETYA major activity of theInspector General and Auditor Generalof the U S Army

Richard K TierneyEDITOR

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ABOUT THE COVERAn Army C H-21 Shawnee helicopter takes off from the flightdeck of the U SS Core tied to adock in Saigon, in December1961. This marked the entry ofU.S. Army cargo helicopters into the Republic of Vietnam conflict. The cover is a line con-version photograph

RMY VI TION1GESJJUNE 1976 VOLUME22 NUMBEProfessionalism In Army Aviation AndBudgetary Constraints, BG Charles E Canedy The Army Aviation Story, Part X: The Early 1960s,

MAJ David H Price In Extremis, LTC Dick A Roach Guns A Go-Go, LCDR Donald A Mohr How s Your Learning Center, William D Dantzler Don t Melt The Battery, Walter B. Orr Cupid The Killer, CPT John B. Huffman FLIP Realignment In The Pacific Views From Readers , New Aviation Testing Concept, MAJ David M. Mabardy Medical Aspects of Survival-Part II,

LTC D H. Karney, M.D. and Patsy Thompson Why Pilots Make Errors, William C. McDaniel Realistic Training At Any Price?, Arnold R Lambert Who Killed George?, David G Holmes Briefs That Teach Bird Strike Avoidance-What s Been Done?

CPT Don A Mynard Aviation Safety Officers Course Pearl Unit-Level Life Support Section, CW2 Craig C. Laing USAASO Sez Aviation Safety, Who Is Responsible?,

BG Charles E Canedy Inside Back CoTh. mi on of the u.s. RMY VI TION IGEST i. to provide information of an op.ratior functional nature conc.rning .af . ty and aircraft accid.nt pr.v.ntion, training, maint.na

op.ration., r arch and d.v. lopm.nt , aviation m.dicin. and oth.r r.lat .d data.Th. IGEST i. an official D.partm.nt of the Army p.riodicol publi.h.d monthly und.r.up.rvi. ion of the Commanding G.n.ral, U.S. Army Aviation C.nt . r . Vi.w pr d hare not n.carily tho of the D.partment of the Armynor theU.S. Army Aviation C.Photo. are U.S. Army unl oth.rwis .cified. Mat.rial may b . r.print.d provid.d cr.dgiv.n to the IGEST and to the author, unl oth.rwi indicated.Articl photo., and i t .m. of int.r on Army aviation are invit.d. Dir.ct communicatiauthoriz.d to: Editor U.S. Army Aviation Dig , Fort Ruck.r, AL 36362.Thi. publication has b n approved by Th. Adjutant G.n.ral, H.adquart.rs, D.partm.the Army, 23 D.c.mb.r 1975, in accordance with AR 3101.Active Army unit. r .c . ive distribution under the pinpoint distribution .yst .m a . outlinAR 3101. Compl.t. DA Form 125 nd dir.ctly to CDR AG Publication. Cent.r, 2800. rn Boul.vard, Baltimor., MD 21220. For any chang. in distribution requir.m.nts, initir .vid DA Form 125.National Guard and Army Re.erv. units und.r pinpoint di.tributiori 01 . 0 .hould .ubmiForm 125. Oth.r National Guard unit. .hould .ubmit reque.ts through th.ir .tate adjug.n.ral .Tho.. not . ligibl. for official di.tribution or who d r. p.rsonal copi of the IGESTord.r the magazine from the Sup.rint.nd.nt of Documents, U.S. Gov.rnm.nt Printing OfWa.hington, D.C. 20402. Annual .ub.cription rat or . 15.70 dom ic and 19.65 ov.


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rmy viationn i - - - - ~

D URINGthe weekof 15 March theAviation Division, ODCSOPS, HQDA, reviewed thefinal draft of AR 95-1, ArmyandRegulations. RepresentativesFORSCOM, TRADOC, DARand USAATCA-ASO attendwith each having substantivewhich they wanted consid

of theat the conawesome sophistication in thewhich we now have orwill be coming into our inin the near future.Sophistication in our systems,a very human aspect

that it equates directly to indemands placed on ourand shows that now, more

1976

BudgetaryConstra ints

rigadier General Charles E CanedyDeputy Director of Operations and rmy viation OfficerOffice of the De puty Chief of Staff for Operations an d PlansWashington DC

on professionalism, both collectively and as individuals, if we areto succeed in accomplishing ourmission on tomorrow's battlefield.Professionalism, as we traditionally use it in Army aviation circles,deals most often with our operationof aircraft-how we fly how we conduct our maintenance, or how, forexample, we program our missions.It implies a wealth of complexitiesdealing with the operational aspectsof aircraft. We have all heard agreat deal about professionalism atunit level. We've heard it in speechesor in articles published in this orother aviation magazines. It's cometo us in the field by message traffic,regulations, letters of instructionand a myriad of other techniques ofcommunication. As a field commander I have personally addressedthis subject an infinite number oftimes.I would like this one time,however, to put on my Departmentof the Army hat and look atprofessionalism in a light whichfocuses on a problem very near anddear to all our hearts-aviationtraining and dollars. I want for

once to describe professionalismand aviation training in the contextof dollars so that you in the fieldcan have some apprecia tion for whyyou can train, or why at other timesyou may not be able to train.Training dollars for Armyoperations are no different fromdollars with which you and I individually cope in our private lives.Training dollars (in the same lightas we spend our paycheck) must beviewed in the perspective ofpriorities. You have to understandthe complexities involved in determining where training dollars reallyare spent. Let me briefly attempt todo this.The allocation of funds, not to beoverly simplistic, is the driving factor in how much our aircraft fly,and in turn how much training ourpilots get. Dollars really do buy theJ P4 which fuels our birds and thespare parts which keep themoperational. Each year the budgetcycle begins with the submission bythe major commands of what isknown as their CBE. This estimatein part identifies to DA what theoperational costs are estimated to


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be by the major command tooperate and train during the upcoming fiscal year. Now it s important to note that the major command determined its budget estimate based on a composite of thesubmissions of the dollar requirements from each of its subordinate commands or installations.This CBE is then submitted toDepartment of the Army. DA inturn provides program budgetpolicy guidance to the major command. The net result of this andsubsequent similar interchanges sthe ultimate appropriation of fundsas part of the overall defense budgetto the MACOM commander forhis use n operating his entire command for the coming year.N ow let s turn back to aviationtraining. When we talk aviationtraining dollars, we talk essentiallyabout the Army flying hourprogram. The flying hour programis developed by subordinate commands for inclusion in the majorcommand's command budget estimate and final submission. Theflying hours are translated by themajor command into hard dollarrequirements and consolidated withfunds required in each of the otherareas requiring training. For example, tank or artillery unit trainingdollars are added to aviation requirements to justify O&M funds.That, in fact, is the last time thatdollars dedicated to aviation orother types of training arespecifically identified as such in thebudget request's climb to DA level.

When dollars are finally providedthe major commander by DA, thatportion of the funding required tosupport Army aviation activities ispart of O&M funds, and as such,may be reprogramed to higherpriority requirements. t thenbecomes the responsibility of themajor commander to break out histotal appropriated funding to subordin te commands or installations. Subordinate commanders then determine how thosedollars will be used within theirrespective commands. Subordinate2

GLOSSARYARTEPCBEDARCOM

Army Training and Evaluation Programcommand budget estimateU.S. Army Materie l Development and Readiness

CommandDODFO

Department of Defenseforward observer

FORSCOMHQDAJP4

U.S. Army Forces CommandHeadquarters, Department o the Armyjet engine fuel

MACOMO MODCSOPSTRADOCUSAATCA ASO

major Army commandoperation and maintenanceOffice, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military OperationsU.S. Army Training and Doctrine CommandU.S. Army Air Traffic Control ActivityAeronautical Services Office

commanders, too, have reprograming authority.Each commander and major subordinate commander then mustestablish his own priorities onwhere in overall operations andmaintenance his dollars are directed. Some commanders may needmore than they expected to runcommissaries. Others may requirebuildings repaired. You must appreciate, however, that the (realworld) determination that is madeby a commander where to spend hismoney is a function of the emphasisplaced on types of training by hisown subordinate commanders andstaffs, coupled with his prudentjudgment. t becomes imperative inthis light, if we are to maximizeaviation training, that we strongly,from the bottom up, learn to express the essentiality of placingdollars where we as aviators knowthey must be placed. That, ofcourse, is in the flying hourprogram.

Another part of the equationwhich you should understand s thatthe flying hour program, while it isa specific portion of the budget,cannot now be and is not fencedby DA or even by major commanders. The guidance which wewould perhaps parochially like to

have, which n fact would constitutefencing of appropriations, wouldusurp the commander's perrogative

to determine how he should allocateand manage his dollars. This thenplaces a great portion of the burdenof responsibility for gaining thenecessary dollar support on unitcommanders at all levels, and verymuch on staff aviation officers. Letme address this point briefly, forit's one n which I'm particularly interested.

Years ago it was generallyknown that the position of staffaviation officer was anything butthe most demanding or challengingassignment. Those were the L-19(later designated 0-1)/ artillery/FOdays. Today, as has becomegenerally very apparent, we findthat we cannot afford to have otherthan the highest quality officer filling aviation staff positions at anycommand level. Failure to possessthe expertise to advise commandersproperly can have devastatingeffects on our program.

t becomes incumbent then uponcommanders, aviation officers,every Army aviator and all ournoncommissioned officers to articulate the essential concept whichstates that if Army aviation is tomeet its mission r e q u i r e m e n t ~ it

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train. We must all be able tothe fact that we

are down to "bare bones"hours allocated for aviation

We must further be able toout the very important aspecttwo critical elements

determining what constitutesflying hourrequirements-training

operational requirements.We know, due to Congressional,

and Army budget constraints ,we have reduced aviation trainthat point which, if we were, could very

impact on our comreadiness. It is important tothat training and operationskey elements in developinghours . t is essential, and aof professionalism, that

be able to define, no matter' re at , what conour true training andional requirements. The

commander, in conjuncthe commander, Aviation

to great lengths toAR TEPs for each type ofaviation units. This will provide

structural framework uponcan develop our aviation

programs. But this is me oeguidance. The truly professionalaviator will pass beyondis provided as guidance andthe unique or particular

of his aviators, hisand his installation to deterthe needs of his total flyingprogram.

We no longer can afford to lookat the operational needs ofunits we support to submit ourrequirements for aviation

at any given installation.those days are goneWe must distinguish

training and operationsdetermine what aretraini ng and operational needs.ased on these summed re , we can then forward to

major commands therequests to support a viableeffective flying hour program.

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The key to this determination is asound knowledge of all aspects ofaviation activities which mustreceive attention if your unit is toremain combat ready. This base ofknowledge, this scope of expertise,is the framework upon which eachunit must build its trainingprogram. The handling of thismatter successfully is the functionof a professional. He has an interest, a constant interest withoutconstraints, in his unit, its trainingand in Army aviation. He can andmust articulate what the trainingneeds of his aviators or aviationunit are. The key point of which weall must be aware lies in understanding that the advice we give tocommanders may alter theirpriorities in dollar allocations immediately and continue to providethe essential future funds to buy thefuel to operate our aircraft. Sellyour program. It's solid nd defen-sible

The final point of which youshould be aware is that the allocation of flying hours" in reality isquite different from the allocationof dollars . While DA approves thenumber of "hours" flown by everyindividttal command, it cannotassign or provide the physicaldollars to meet those specific requirements. This is a function of themajor subordinate unit/installationcommander. It's a thorny issue, butit brings to reality the fact that theground commander is normally thekey individual in the Army structure who determines how manydollars are allocated for buying fuelto keep aircraft flying and ourpilots trained. His decisions arepredicted on the total number ofdollars given him in any fiscal yearand upon his estimate of how muchit will cost to operate and maintainhis entire command, to include hisaviation assets.This brings me to the second partof this aspect of professionalism,again tied to dollar constraints andwhat we must be prepared to dowith the knowledge we discussedearlier. We no longer have the lux-

ury of flying for flying's sake. Commanders and staff aviation officers,perhaps even more than you in thefield, are daily faced with criticismdirected at use of Army aircraft.Professionalism, therefore, becomesthe key to determining when ouraircraft are launched, for what missions, the blade time required toperform those missions and whatother activities can be conductedin conjunction with those missions.

We are today looking at a verytightly constrained Army wideoperating budget. The implementation of training and operationaldirectives demands the utmost inprofessional scrutiny in dealingwith aviation operational matters.I t becomes the burden of theaviator, as a professional, tomanage the aviation program ateven the lowest levels, i.e., rightthere in the cockpit. We must besure we are getting our money'sworth in aviation training. Onehour's training for one hour's flying.Simulators, now coming into theinventory, also can provide a greatdeal of training at reduced cost.Finally, as we observe Armyaviation's 34th birthday this month,I want to point out that noregulations can be written to createinstant aviation experience. Armyaviation's 34 years of experience isa function of time and training. Experience is the key element in thedevelopment of professionalism ineach of us. It's through experiencethat we learn to appreciate the needfor professionalism. This ex perience is the determining factor inthe developmental process leadingto sound judgment. Just as noregulation can be written to createexperience, no legislation can be setforth creating judgment. In allaspects, however, professionalismremains the common denominator.In these times of limited dollars,professionalism, the commondenominator, the constant in theaviator performance equation,assures our being able to train towin that all important "first battleof the next war "

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June 1976 is extra special to the Army aviation community TheU S Army on 14 June completes 200 years of service to thenation; Army aviation observes its 34th birthday on 6 June; and injust a few weeks on the 4th of July the United States of Americacelebrates its Bicentennial The IGEST begins commemoratingall three of these significant anniversaries this month with the firstof three new chapters to The Army Aviation Story The first ninechapters were carried between June 1962 and February 1963Chapters X XI and XII will cover the Vietnam years

Gl l,e Jlrmy A\liati()I St()ryGPart X:

Major David H Price

T HE U.S. RMY s airmobile concept began,not out of any predisposition toward counterguerrilla war, but out of the requirement to provideenhanced tactical mobility to the foot soldier. Thethreat considered most likely and most dangerous

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in the early 1960s was the conventional battlefield,with either or both sides possessing nuclear weapons.Yet, it was in a counter-guerrilla war in the Republicof Vietnam that helicopter airmobility proved itself.Trouble was brewing in Vietnam in 1961. At thedirection of President John F. Kennedy, GeneralMaxwell D Taylor made a visit to that beleaguerednation to assess the situation. One critical problemwas the lack of mobility of the South Vietnameseforces. On General Taylor S recommendation , Armyhelicopters were dispatched to Vietnam in late 1961.

In December 1961 the first Army aviation uni tsarrived in Vietnam. They were the 57th and 8th

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2 CH-21 helicopters. 1 The old Flyingwas hardly suited for the rigors of combat in, as had become their habit, Army aviators made

of what they had.One of the first major tasks was to train the Vietin and out of helicopters quickand safely. Then, the Vietnamese Army (ARVN)on the capabilities of theso that airmobility could be integrated intoby latethe A RVN and its U.S. advisors were conductng battalion-size airmobile operations against the

Organic Army aviation was not featured in Vietin keyin a geographic area

delineated by province boundaries. The helicopterswere under the control of the Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam (MACV), and were parceled outto the A R VN units that requested their services.M ore often than not , the early years foundAmerican helicopter commanders left out of the planning for air assaults. Command and control was a realproblem until the helicopter units could establisheffective liaison with the AR VN commanders andtheir American advisors . As time went on, cooperation grew between the lifters and the lifted, and solidrelationships were molded between allies relation-ships that would last until the American effort wasended.The Flying Banana was replaced by the powerful,agile, turbine-powered UH l Huey in 1964. BySeptember of that year 25 Hueys were operating inVietnam. The workhorse of the Vietnam war had

ontinued on page 6


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Illustrations bySSG Mike Turr andSP5 Margaret Deely

LT Dick A RoachDeputy DirectorPublic Affairs OfficeU S rmyMilitary District of Washington

ontinued on page 7

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LCDR Donald A MohrSearch and Rescue OfficeNaval ir StationCorpus Christi TX

Gu sA GO GO

M ARGINAL WEATHER with 200 foot ceil-ings had persisted n the Republic of Vietnam(R VN) since the early part of February, hamperingfixed wing airstrikes n support of the Battle of Hue.Only helicopters were flying and their operationswere conducted in the dead-man szone at such lowaltitudes they were constantly exposed to enemysmall arms fire.In an occasional break in the weather on 22February 1968 two armed AC H 47 Chinooks fromthe 228th Assault Helicopter Battalion (Air Cavalry)joined numerous other helicopter gunships to provideneeded gunfire support near the Citadel. Historianswould later laud these efforts which significantly con-tributed to the victory in the bitter house-to-housefighting during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

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ACH-47 number 64-13149 located at theArmy Development and Readiness Command sAmmunition Center, Savannah, IL, where it isemployed s a training aid for civHian careerists

During one exchange of gunfire in the firefight,heavy and sustained enemy ground fire struck ofthe supporting ACH-47 gunships. In the cockpit,numerous caution panel light segments illuminatedsignifying systems failures as the stricken h e l i ~ o p t e rbroke off the engagement, seeking a secure area forlanding. The wingman, Go-Go 9, continued to rakeenemy positions with suppressive fire as Go-Go 4 executed an emergency landing precariously close to thewalled city.

The crippled Chinook 's position was clearly visiblefrom the city and drew intense enemy fire. Momentslater o o 9 piloted by Major Alan B. Matthews,touched down near the disabled craft, effecting arescue of the seven-man crew. The men clamberedaboard as Captain (then WOl) Gary Daniel and waistgunners continued firing the 40 mm grenade launcherand 50 caliber machineguns, reducing the level of -coming fire.Go-Go 9 lifted off without incident and was in theprocess of initiating measures to secure the areaaround the downed Chinook while still en route to

am p Evans. Troops requested to suppor t the extracattempt were later cancelled when word wasreceived that Go-Go 4 had sustained a direct hit from

mortar fire and was completely destroyed.Attrition of CH-47 serial number 64-13154 -Birth Control -

1976

would mean a good deal more than the loss of anyother valuable Chinook For, without an escort or"Yingman for mutual support, Go-Go 9's career as agunship abo had been terminated as surely as if it had

e ~ n shot down by enemy fire. The loss of the thirdgunship woUld toll the death knell to the Guns A GoGo e'valuation and the 1 April 1968 demise of the 1stA viatio'n Detachment of the 228th Assault HelicopterBattalion. No evidence could be found to substantiatefurther single ACH-47 gunship operations - orothers in conjunction with either UH-IB/Cs (Hueys)or AH-1Gs (HueyCobras). Sijch an association mightwell have been as effective and lethal as the lateradopted I-fuey/Loach (light observation helicppter)'pink teams.

Ironically, the elimination of those standardChinook systems which contributeq to a moredesirable gunship, and the armor added to improvesurvivability, precluded 149's return to the' fold of themore conventiol1allogistic Chinooks. Overweight and

e q u i p p e d for this mission, Go-Go 9 (known as EasyMoney) was subsequently transferred to the 1st Aviation Brigade and flown to the Army maintenancefacilities at Vung Tau where she served out theremainder of hyr Vietnam t()ur with the 17th AviationGroup (Combat) as an AAMTAP (Army AircraftMobile Technical Assistance Program) aircrewtrainer for prospective; crewchiefs. t was while serving

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in this capacity that the aircraft was reduced to a mereskeleton or hulk due to component and systemsremoval& (cannibalism). With the graveyard loomingas an imminent possibility, aid came froin an unexpected quarter.

Interested individuals who recognized the historicalvalue of this craft intervened to restore and refurbish149 and arranged for transportation stateside. Thiswas accomplished about the time the Refresher Training School at Phu Loi was closed in April 1972. Thehelicopter was never flown while it was waiting to betransported back to the V S The reworked aircraftwas then donated to the V.S. Army Aviation Museumat Fort Rucker.

One m ~ h t now expect serial number 64-13149 tofinally grace a deserved place of honor at the ArmyAviation Museum, resplendent in paint with stubwings bristling 20 mm cannon; rockets; and the M-5grenade launcher under ~ h e n o s ~ Unfortunately, notyet No pristine paint g r a c ~ s 149 today along with theEasy Money name given in combat and which hadadorned her side. Instead the helicopter is located atthe Army Development and Readi 1ess Command sAmmunition Center, Savannah, IL, where it isemployed as a training aid for civilian careeristsassigned to worldwide ammunition activities. Theaircraft is used to teach typical helicopter loading/unloading and cargo tiedown procedures. The Ammunition Center also is responsible for formulationof ammunition and nuclear handling procedures.

The inception of the combat experiment and evaluation known as Guns A Go-Go had its beginnings as aFebruary 1964 Army battlefield requirement foremployment of a heavily armed helicopter. The mainemphasis was expected to focus on increased s p ~ e d

and higher weapons payload; two major limiting factors affecting employment of the current UH-l Bgunships. The Huey was not designed for the armedconfiguration, and as armament was increased to thehelicopter's maximum gross weight, airspeeds werelimited to 80 knots. This speed proved unsatisfactorysince the escorting gunships could not overtake an airmobile force.Several alternative helicopter models such as theSikorsky S-61 Sea King and Kaman VH-2A SeaSprite, along with existing helicopters in the Army inventory, were examined by the Bush Board* as possible candidates for this escort mission. Current production lines, existing IQgistic support and spare partscommonality may have been factors which tipped thescales in favor of the CH-47. By June 1965 the Armyauthorized production of four armed ACH-47prototype configurations. The first of these, serialnumber 64-13145 (Boeing production number B-I17)was accepted for the Army by the Navy PlantRepresentative as a standard CH-47A on 7 July 1965.After weapons systems and armor installations werecompleted the first flight of the ~ H 4 7 series was accomplished on 1 November 1965.

Later in November, 64-13145 was publicly displayed at Boeing's Center Two facilities located atPhiladelphia International Airport, PA. This rolloutalmost coincided with the secret debut of a BellHelicopter Company funded prototype Model 209.This HueyCobra (which became the AH-l and commonly called the Cobra) would revolutionize armedhelicopter gunship tactics and configurations in theA Department of the Army board convened to evaluate possiblereplacements for the UH-I Huey gunshiI?s.

Number 145 n wfrom the factory

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Number 45 being readied for tests

following 2 years. During the succeeding months threemore armed Chinooks would be delivered: these beingserial numbers 64-13149, 64-13151 and 64-13154.

The most conspicuous difference between theseACH-47 helicopters and the standard CH-47A logistics support configured version was the rotatable M-5nose pod and two fuselage pylons. These were 2 /2feet wide hardpoints located on both sides of thehelicopter near station 242, just outboard of the frontwheels. To provide a fire support capability provisionsexisted for installation of a 20 mm cannon, along withan XM-I0 bomb rack for the 9 shot XM-158 2.75inch rocket pod on each side. Five fuselage stationsalso were provided with flexible mounts for either 7.62mm or 50 caliber machineguns - two along the sidesand one on the rear loading ramp. This rear positionprovided a clear field of fire to engage targets after thehelicopter had passed over them. This was a uniqueadvantage among gunships and allowed pilots considerably more latitude in attacking fortifiedpositions.A cardinal rule of gunship tactics is to never overflya target area due to the vulnerability of the helicopterafter its guns no longer keep the enemy down. Dualide and rear firing weapons permitted the Chinook towrite its own rules. The armed Chinook also boasted

Number 45 undergoing jettison tests

more than 112 tons of expendable munitions aboard.The heavier 50 caliber machineguns normally usedon the ACH-47 nearly doubled the engagementrange of the 7.62 mm machineguns then being used byUH-Is in Vietnam.

Many standard CH-47 items which were not essential for the fire support mission were not installed.These included the cargo hook, winch, heater, cargodoor, auxiliary loading ramps, sound-proofing and allbut five troop seats. Estimates of 2,000 pounds of steelarmor plate were added to protect crewmembers andvital components. To enhance the survivability of thehelicopter, a combat interphone system, fuel fire suppression, crossfeed shutoff valves and ballistic armorplate capable of withstanding the impact of 50 caliberammunition were installed. Pilot and copilot seat andtorso armor protection, known as the iron maidenderived from an early torture device of the same

Number 45 on displayname), also were provided. The normal combat practice of locating flack jackets in the chin bubble wasemployed.

Army test and evaluation boards from Ft. Ruckeroperated the first helicopter at Aberdeen, MD, forweapons capability, testing until March 1966. Following unit training at Fort Benning, GA, three of thecraft were assigned transportation to R VN for combatevaluation. These helicopters arrived and commencedcombat theater operations in June 1966 under theArmy Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) supervision . The initial testing was performed by the 53rdAviation Detachment Field Evaluation (Provisional)operating under the 10th Aviation Group (see ArmedChinooks, July 1966 and Armed CH-47A


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Number 145 shown flying with a friend was deployedto RVN as a replacement

Helicopter Employment, August 1966 DIGEST .These experiments earned high praises for the conceptand caused officers to compare the Guns A Go-Gowith the Air Force's lethal C-47, dubbed Puff theMagic Dragon.Following completion of the ACTIV tests theACH-47s were assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division(Airmobile) which had introduced the Chinook in itsstandard logistics configuration to Vietnamoperations in October 1965 Normal employment of theChinook at this time was as a prime artillery mover.With a 7,000-pound payload, the Chinook couldrelocate a complete 105 howitzer, crew and net full ofammunition in nearly inaccessible areas. GeneralJohn J. Tolson, in his monograph Airmobility 1961-1971, praised the Chinook in this way: I f the Hueyhelicopter became the cornerstone of airmobility, thenthe Chinook must be considered one of the principlebuilding blocks.12

The ingenuity and courage of all CH-47 aircrewmembers are indeed worthy of note. While twoaircraft of the Guns delivered over eight tons of ordnance in the Song Re Valley on 9 August 1967, otherChinooks were dropping napalm and riot agents fromthe rear loading ramp. This ramp , which could belowered in flight, provided a nearly perfect deliverymethod. While this mode of operation normally wasemployed only when tactical air was unavailable, theavailability of the helicopters to do this missionfacilitated considerable erpployment. A single CH-47could delivery 2 12 tons of napalm. During OperationPershing more than 29,000 pounds of riot agent wasdelivered in this manner by the 1st Cavalry.

The installed armor on the Guns effectively protected all but one of the aircraft from loss; the actualreason for the loss of 154 was never fully disclosed. Ataxi accident was to claim the first of the ACH-47s inVietnam on 5 August 1966. This occurred in the II ICorps Area, prior to 1 t Cavalry assignment. Subsequent to this accident the fourth ACH-47 aircraft(serial number 64-13145), located at Edwards AF B ,CA, for performance and flight quality testing, wasdeployed to RVN as a replacement. This aircraft isunceremoniously credited with its own destructionwhen it was lost on 5 May 1967. Due to failure of theretention of the M-24A 20 mm cannon on a gun-run, around was fired into the rotor system, striking a rotorblade and destroying the craft. The last two examplessurvived until 22 February 1968 when 154 was lost.Yet, loss is a strong word only if it is not balancedagainst what was gained for this price.

Guns A Go-Go , in its combat evaluation as an interim helicopter gunship, exhibited numerous

Number 145 was destroyed when one o its 2 mm gunswas accidently fired into its rotor system

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Guns A Go Go blazed a high trail of glory

strengths and a few weaknesses, some of which weresubsequently solved in the AH-IG. t must beremembered the AH-IG was also only an interimgunship; the ill-fated AH-56 Cheyenne, cancelled afterprototype testing, was to be the ultimate gunship.The speed, endurance and firepower of the ACH-47immediately solved the requirements necessary for escorts of the airmobile force. Although the ACH-47had to reduce forward speed when operating at maxgross weights, it still could escort CH-47 formationssince the latter seldom transited at V ne' Its enduranceequalled or exceeded UH-l fuel reserves, even whenthe Guns were armed to the teeth. With nearly j2tons of expendable ordnance onboard, targets couldbe engaged on a more liberal and continuous basisthan when each round had to be rationed for a specific purpose. This sustained fire support and longonstation time in the combat zone earned considerablepraise. The Guns excelled in landing zone preparation, r.oad reconnaissance, interdiction, escort andin direct support of the infantry.

The ACH-47s prototyped the forward cabin andrear ramp machinegun installations later adopted onthe logistic model CH-47s as the M-24 and M-41 armament systems. With a full 360 degrees of firecapability, the aircrew could effectively engage andobserve the aircraft being fired upon from all quarters.A serious shortcoming of the later AH-IG Cobra wasa lack of knowing when the aircraft was under fire until actually being hit. Introduction of the SA-7 Strellamissile later in 1972 forced AH-IG gunship pilots tokeep their heads on a swivel.

The installed forward firing 20 mm cannon armament gave these helicopters the first opportunity toengage troop concentrations armed with 50 caliberweapons or larger, rather than being forced towithdraw and/or await tactical airstrikes. The increased target accuracy and engagement range of the20 mm also enhanced survivability. The area fireeffectiveness of the 2.75 inch rockets, identical toJUNE 1976

those carried by the UH-l, needs no further accolades.Additional target area suppression fire existed in theM-5 grenade launcher controlled by the copilot.Basically Guns A Go-Go carried the combination ofweapons systems any three single UH-Is mightemploy and the capability to continue the barragetwice as long. A pair of armed Chinooks were indeed aformidable adversary.

Today various positions prevail concerning the idealsize, agility and speed requirements for gunships. Certainly the effectiveness of this experiment must beassessed, recognizing the excessive size and somelimitations in maneuverability. Significantly, initialrequirements recognized the Chinook would have little to no agility advantage over the UH-l, but it wouldexcel with a distinct firepower advantage. The Gunsalso operated with the earlier lower powered Lycoming T55-L7, 2,650 shaft horsepower (shp) engines, andnot the present L-IIAs which power the Super Cmodel Chinooks and are rated at 3,750 shp each.Perhaps the ultimate tribute to The Guns can best

be summed up in the words of their Vietnam commander, Major General Tolson, who said this aboutthe Guns A Go-Go:Though anything but graceful, it had atremendous effect on the friendly troopswhich constantly asked for its support.From an infantryman's viewpoint, whenthe Go-Go Bird" came the enemy disappeared.Whenever an Army can field equipment the enemyis reluctant to engage and can do so much to improve

morale and assist the fighting man on the ground,they're on the right track

The Guns A Go-Go blazed a high trail to glory intheir short combat evaluation. The fact that theDepartment of the Army elected to discontinue thearmed Chinook concept in no way diminishes the outstanding combat record of these craft and the heroicdeeds of the pilots and aircrew who flew them.

3


16/52

B y NOW YOU should have a. learning center. Of course,being in a progressive professionalaviation unit means you have initiated your learning center already.Did I hear you say you're going towait until the TEC (Training Extension Course) program providesyou with the equipment for a learning center? Well, maybe so, butyou're going to have a long wait.

Why wait? Stay with me a fewminutes and I will tell you how tostart your own learning center.Drawing on experience gained atthe U. S. Army Aviation Center'sAviation Learning Center at FortRucket:lc ~ ~ y o l l t h a t peoplewho need . l ~ a ~ ~ w i n o m TheA i a t i o n e n t e r had beeniIi o p e t : a t i o ~ x a c t I y 4% years on 10Septem;g.er W ~ t.he lOO,OOOthstudent came through>In 1971, anaverage of 34 students per day used14

William D antzlerFormer Chiefviation Learning Center

U S rmy viation Center

the facility and in the first halfof 1975, 109 students per day cameto study.'Overall, an average of 71.6students have used the AviationLearning Center each day.HStudents includes v ryon whocame to study.First let's discuss the concept ofthe learning center. There areseveral types and definition(of theterm learning center.;' Any; :l:ar i:: .ing center should be structuredt,()provide individualized, Ie , 'services to the host populatiohfacility should be a v a i l a b l ~ \ ~ e hthe students need it, but the primetime a learning center is opened is

1900 to 2100 hours, or off-dutyhours.A variety of media ranging fromcomputer assisted instruction toflash cards should be provided thestudents. Reliability oftheinforma-tion presented tends ..lo build thestudent's confidertce j e acility.Fifty students may rbe studying40 different lessons in the privacyafforded by carrels and headsets atone time, which reduces greatly theneed for instructors.

Facilities: What do you need inthe way of location, space andequipment?The ideal location is a placewhere the intended users will see itarid have convenient access during()ff-dllty hours. You may considerworking with one or moreI1'(; ighboring units to set up a learn-ing center.Your learning center will need



17/52

1 Students working in individual studycarrels2 Individual carrels afford privacy3 Student performing preflight check4 Student preparing for an examination5 Video tape player and TV monitor6 Tape provides instruction as studentviews slidenormal creature comforts such asIlO-volt AC current, ...heating andair-conditioning. Good Hghting is amust, even where audiovisuals aren use. Students often will want totake notes or refer to a publications they view an audiovisualprogram.A learning center can be installedangar or a truck. Initially man-

0

OI -0

1976

power may be a problem. f so, youshould consider installing yourlearning center where it is nearsomeone who is ..on duty, like acharge of quarters, dispatcher orstaff duty NCO Starting yourlearning center with a request forone competent individual tooperate it may dash your hopesagainst the hard boulders of personnel shortages, so use someonewho already is on duty but not fullyoccupied.Carpeting is a necessity in alearning center. t will keep downthe noise and will appeal tostudents. Ceiling soundproofing isnot absolutely necessary but it willprovide added benefits in keepingdown the noise level.

What about carrels? The wordcarrel is a Latin )Yord meaning

0

FigureCarrel Configuration

0 0

0 0

study position. Each chair andplace to work at a table can be acarrel, but carrels should be designed to provide privacy for eachstudent. Carrels may be built inseveral configurations such asshown in figure 1.For the most part, the size of thecarrels is up to you. But the heightof the work surface should be 28 inches from the floor. The width and

of carrels can vary providedyOli.bonsider the fact that yo'u needad.eqllate space for audiovisualequipment and the student's notesor publications. Unless you canacquire special lens for short distances for your audiovisual equipment, you also must ensure thatyou have adequate projection thatreflects an image large enough toread. f not you may need ll0re diS -

0 0

15


18/52

tance b ~ t ~ ~ e n the projector and the m ~ t e r i a l . The U.S. ~ r m y has standscreen. . ardized certaifl ' types of audio-Equipptent The type .of ( quip- visual equipment to ensure 'reliamentyou h a v ~ ,will p ~ o b a b l y d e t ~ r - bility and capaqility. h e n ~ e buymine th'e le&sorl ; materifll that you a standard ized item we know.that itcan a ~ q l J i r e . PrQgramed texts ~ r e will s e ~ v e o ~ r purposes ahd hold

a v a i l a b l e ~ u b j e c t s and they up for a reas()nable 'time.only requjre yeS s t o c k th'em Earphones should be used onanq a place for t ~ d e ~ ~ s to sit and each pjece of q u i p m e ~ t to providework. . privacy , o the student and 'fo' o l dSpunQand slide ,lessons can be down the noise level in the room.acquired t h r q ~ g h your sl,lpporting We have actually had 50 studentsTraining Aids S( rvice ,Office studying 40 different It?ssons the(TASO), so a 35 mm projector and Aviation Learnil1g Center and thean auqio-cassette tape recorder only nOIse was the elicking of pro

s h o ~ 1 9 be your basic audiovisual j ~ t o r s a s they c h a n g ~ d slides. Thesystem. Personally owned equip- eonibination ' of acoustical ceilings,ment Gould be ' to ge(your c a r p e t ~ d floors, earphones and'learning c ~ n t e r moving. Btter .carrels :that reduce the vision allaudiovfsuiH equipment can ' be combjne to provide the student withp ~ r c h ; : t s e d after ' the idea takes root. .freeoom from distractions.

You w i ~ l need s o ~ e type of Beyond , audiovisuals you mayequipment to show motion. The find' that you have equipment inmost available ~ q u i p m e n t you will your unit that coulq be used in afind these days is 19 mm motion l e ~ r n i n g center for real hands-onni'cture projectors. Try to a later training. Each Soldier could bem'odel because "the older machines allowed to bring his weapon (withrequjreconslderable" expertise to certain precautions) or a piece ofload and unloap. ; r h e n e w machines equipment, such as a VRC-12 type'r e q u ~ r e that 'someorie 'bt ~ v a i l a b l e qldio, could be installed and riggedto load and uploa


19/52

n ~ t el isontinued from page

the speed and agility of these hard-hittingairmobile troops.Kirk felt the wind freshen and the Tasslurched at the top of a puffy cloud. She wasflying smooth ly enough now but, even so, theshifting upper air had pulled her down tooclose to the grey overcast. The character ofthe challenge was changing and Kirk knewthat before it was all over his real adversarymight well be nature instead of man. He hadbattled natural elements many times beforeas an aviator and always had emerged thevictor-but he was running silent now andwith much of his aircraft damaged byshrapnel, he was in extremis . . a situationthat called for a rare brand of human innovation.Kirk was in the first class to train in theTass and when the swords began to rattle hisoutfit had been the first to see duty with theBosphorus Task Force. Yes-and the firstpiiot to make 6 intercontinental flightsacross the Bosphorus on his first day of combat . And now he was the first aviator to survive a missile ambush in the finger ridges ofthe Alps. The road to this first was litteredwith the dead.Again he scanned his console but the instruments yielded no clues as to his position.He examined the clouds more closely now,but they remained omino usly puffy and grey.Not a hint of land or thinness in the clouddeck below to suggest even the possibility ofa safe descent. It was as if he were sailingalong in uncharted waters, an odyssey on anunknown sea. That's not what he was trainedfor-to fly half-crippled in the unknown.And, this trip was predesti.ned to end in nomore than 40 minutes. At that time the fuelsupply would be exhausted . How far was hefrom friendl y airspace? How many milesw s he away from home? He recalled that ithad been more than 18 months since he saidgoodbye to Carolyn and the childrenKirk was oddly hungry and his body achedfrom the flesh wounds. He attempted onceagain to make some logic out of the sloppymovement of his gyro compass. He imagined that it might eventually tell him what heneeded to compute his approximate location. If he could only fix his position abovethe clouds he would be willing to try a TLS(tactical landing system) letdown-a hoverdown, minimum forward airspeed to a skidsdown landing-just as in training when thehours of practice seemed insufferably longand tedious. Drowsiness, hustled along bybattle fatigue, was beginning to set in.

The sudden slap of turbulence shook himout of the hypnotic doldrums and Kirkmused at recalling the sign back at the training base which read, To sleep in a chair,you have nothing to lose, but to sleep in the 'cockpit is a permanent snooze." To sleepnow would be certain disaster, and Kirk

JUNE 1976

stretched his arms and legs and loosened hisbody armor to lessen the danger of musclecramps. He checked a small wound on hisleft arm. The arm stretch had pulled on thecut and it was bleeding slightly. Heretightened his body armor and subconsciously rechecked the engine suppressorcircuit switch.

He was startled by the sudden activationof the engine suppressors. He had checkedthe switch and circuit breaker at least adozen times since departing the valley. Withsuppressors operating, he ration alized thathe could stop worrying so much about thethreat of missiles and concentrate more onthe mechanics of getting home safely. Themere thought of safe sanctuary back at thehome base suddenl y filled him with hope and

the adrenalin began to flow. Fate owed hima favor, and he had a gutsy feeling that thepayoff was just around the corner.

The fuel gauge showed about 37 minutesof fuel remaining. From the corner of his eyehe noticed that his copilot had shifted in hisseat, and it was good to know he was stillalive, even if completely out of the action.So, patiently, Kirk settled back and searchedfor an answer to his dilemma.

H is helmet crackled, Captain. Kirklooked around toward the middle seat wherehis crewchief had managed to prop himselfup. He face was grey with stress, and his skinwas mangled and blotchy. He was leaningshakily against the gun mount trying tosteady himself, and gave in momentarily toseveral spasmodic heaves . He was affectionately known as Crapper after thecommotion he precipitated during a oneshot inspection of the temporary latrine oneday. The base development officer hadclaimed that there was no sanitary way to

dispose of the human wastes from the deeppit below the uriit's two-holer. Crapper hadargued that the unit had most assuredlyfound a proper and acceptable solution longbefore the inspection and offered todemonstrate the procedure to the inspector.Unfortunately, the inspector accepted theoffer whereupon trapper dumped someMOGAS through one of the open seats,threw in a lighted match , and proceeded toblow the crapper-some say-about 40 feet

n ~ o the airWhere ya' hit, Crapper?In my right side, sir, and I think my rightleg above the knee. I can't feel anythingbelow the knee. Sir . . ."Yes, Crapper?What about Mr. Parker?"

I don't know, Crapper. He took somehits . . . he's out . . . probably shock, I justdon't know. Look, Crapper.; . I knowyou're hurt which puts you in a very exclusive c lub but the wors t isbehind . . . You'll make it, you can believethat . . ."

Yeh, I know, Captain, I'm not going tocave in . . . I'll make it . . . I mean, whoelse'd patch up this tin Lizzie "Crapper retched and slumped back acrossthe seat. Some minutes passed and Kirktried to make himself more comfortable. Hisbody armor had shifted against his pistol,pushing the muzzle end against the fleshwound in his right thigh. He figured if hecould raise the seat an inch or two and getthe gun clear of the wound it would ease thepain in his leg. Kirk lowered himself painfully toward the latch but it was out of reach.

He tried shifting toward the left side andoddly enough the hurt left him momentarily.Y o u ~ e lucky to be alive, he thought, luckier

7


20/52

for sure than Brownie, Cretlo and Pointer,his platoon leaders who went down in thewak"e of the missile barrage if notluckier, at least more conscientious. Youworked at those mission profiles until theywere second nature; no horsing around withhot-rod techniques; you just flew missiontasks the way they were laid out in the book.Maybe you're alive right now because ofthat . And yet, it's hard to believe that otherways would be so unforgiving .

"I'll take it for a while, if you'd like." twas Mr. Parker He was sitting straight inhis seat as though he'd just gotten the wordto crank up. "What's the course?"

"Just hold what we've got. The gyrotumbled coming out of the valley . and themag compass took a direct hit so we'vegot no directional reference and the cloudlayer below is solid as far as you can see.Main hydraulics are gone and generators areout. I've got no idea where we are butnobody's bothering us, so we're that much tothe good. You might say that we know twothings for sure. That is, the engine's runningfor now, but in 20 to 25 minutes it's gonnastop wherever we are. At any rate, let'scontinue straight ahead . The gyro is sloppyand nondirection ai, but at least it gives us aheading reference."

There was no tactical or emergencymaneuver that Kirk could remember thatcalled for a helicopter to continue flyingalong an unknown course until the fl el wasexhausted. The more he thought about thesituation the more sarcastic his thoughtsbecame. He could feel himsel f becoming embittered by the seemingly hapless predicament. He figured on a more optimistic notethat if circumstances had been just slightlydifferent he would be safely back at thehome base by now . woundspatched . and a craw full of hot food, notsoaring above the clouds with crippled menn a crippled war machine

Kirk tholJght back about the men he'd loston the slopes of the Alpine Valley that morning. He knew they always had been afraid ofhim, and that most had hated him . He hadalways insisted on an impeccable performance. Flying had to be done by the book.And yet, he didn't believe as ot hers did in theauthoritarian approach. He insisted that itwas a coward's way of getting a good performance out of an aviator. He wellremembered what a contact flight instructoronce told him when he was having difficulties with a particular upper-airmaneuver. Keep all your mistakes withinmanageable limits. nd always want to doyour best . then work your butt off to seethat you do. The philosophy was intriguingand had stuck with Kirk more or less as acredo for dealing with his fellow airmen .

That his troops could hate him was incomprehensible to Kirk. t was not normal, for itwas he who commanded them throughouttheir many victories; it was he who planned

8

the missions, controlled the formations and,until today, had led them safely into combatwithout a single loss. That kind of a recordshould command respect, admiration andprofessional gratitude. But for some reasonnot easily understood, it hadn't. Andtoday today's catastrophe had been agross miscalculation by the high mucketymuck planners and Kirk felt no need torationalize his guilt in the slaughter.Of course, any mission in the Alps thesedays would be undertaken with considerableapprehension. The Alpine Passes have beenregarded strategically as prized highways ofconquerors and that's where the action wastoday. Because of the bad weather, the valleyhad been much too confining and the plan ofmaneuver had made the cardinal mistake ofassuming that the enemy was stupid.The missiles had swarmed at them from

the walls of the valley. The launchers werewell disguised along the slopes, and thesudden departure of the missiles from thehillsides turned the valley into a sea ofrichocheting red flashes . Kirk calculatedthat his flight had been painted on no lessthan 30 scopes, and every missile had takenadvantag.e 0 f the flight's vulnerability.Kirk's assault flights had never before runup against more than two launchers at a timeand chaffing had, for the most part, beenhighly effective. But today the valley was avery carefully contrived and concealed trap.

Parker spoke haltingly. "I know this isgonna' sound basic, captain, but if we couldjust get a north-south bearing we would atleast know whether it ' s hot or friendly downthere."

To hear Parker speak in fundamentalswas somehow reassuring to Kirk that he wasno longer alon e to solve the problem, and thesimple assessment of their tragic situationmade it seem like they were on a routinecross-cou ntry flight back home.

"We're really lost, aren't we, captain?"Kirk studied the map as if looking for atelltale clue mountain contours, streambeds, the very depths of small lakes andprobable compass courses between prominent terrain features. He wondered about the

many thousands of times a map of this sorthad been used by others who knew exactlywhere they were. For them it was an easymatter to decide how to get where they weregoing and how to get back . A simple crosscheck of instruments would provideeverything necessary for a safe flight.

Kirk was numb he would very shortlymake a judgment in which once again lives,including his own, might be claimed as theprice of a slight miscalculation. In the air, hewas leader, and the master of ship and crew.These were dizzy, heavy thoughts constantlypreying on his mind, never to be forgotten, agood way to keep alive when others die.

Kirk took a canteen from the side of hisseat, drank a little and offered it to Mr.Parker .

"We've got to try now, captain. It's theonly chance we've got. I mean . if wedon't like the way it goes the first time we'llstill have enough fuel to give it another try.If we wait it's a one shot probability .Besides, even if we get down safely throughthe overcast early and we don' t like what wesee we can still make our way to some otherarea "Kirk glanced at Parker who looked moredead than alive, his eyes puffy and red withfatigue.

"You're right, Bill, we really don't haveany choice . read me the emergency descent checks."As Mr. Parker read the items aloud, Kirkperformed the checks. He noted that rotorrpm (revolutions per minute) was holdingsteady at 100 percent and the Tass wasbeginning to decelerate to 90 knots inresponse to the repositioning of the cyclic.

Shoulder harnesses were locked and wheelbrakes were released. t seemed terriblyforeboding to Kirk that the critical systemswhich were provided by the Tass' engineersfor just such occasions were either battledamaged or not available because of theelectrical power loss.

The fifth item on the list was the survivalkit located in a rear compartment. t was acrewchief check, and since Crapper was out,Mr. Parker commented that what was needed more than a ground survival kit right atthe moment was a good "air" survival kit.

Mr. Parker's words seemed to hangfrozen in the air. Both he and Kirk realizedat the same moment the true significance ofwhat had been said."My gawd," exclaimed Kirk, "the compass The compass in the survival kit "Mr. Parker moved quickly to release hisharness and to slip out from behind the ar

mor screen which blocked his way to the midcompartment. He stepped gingerly over theaft section on the center console and for amoment he was looking down at the limpform of Crapper lying across the crewseat.He didn't appear to Mr. Parker to bebreathing.Mr. Parker worked his way through thecenter area to the rear of the compartmentand released the webbing which restrainedthe kit in its compartment. He worked at theVelcro fasteners and paused to study thediagramatic listi ng of the contents. The compass was located in a small webbed pouch onthe side of the kit and in seconds Mr. Parkerwas edging back into his seat with hisprecious cargo . The compass was lusterlessand somber in appearance, but a mostbeautiful sight to behold. t took less than 2minutes to retrieve the compass and to affixit with survival tape to the center consolewhere both he and Kirk could observe theneedle's oscillations.

The compass could not have told a morebeautiful story. From the last known position, Kirk calculated that he had now been

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/52

flying for roughly 35 minutes in a southsoutheasterly direction. Discounting liberally for the "unknown unknowns, his computations fixed his position somewhere overground that was flat nd friendly quitepossibly near a forward base used by his battalion."I think Crapper is dead, sir," Parker saidaloud. "He didn't appear to be breathing."Kirk had been so terribly tired. He hadresisted the temptation to sleep even if onlyfor a few minutes. He had slept only a fewhours in the last several days and most of

that was done in the cramped confines of theTass . He forced his hand to unfasten his armored vest and lift out a package of rationwafers. He bit on the nourishment and looked ponderously at the compass on the console. Once the needle had stabilized he hadset his panel gyro which had now beenholding reasonably steady for severalminutes. Things were looking up for certain,but a glance outside at the dull greyish, bottomless clouds below told Kirk that in spiteof his dramatically improved situation,nothing had really changed with regard tohis descent through the overcast.

"Break ahead " cried Bill.Kirk's eyes darted out of the cockpit tothe cloud deck ahead and fell squarely on asmall break in the overcast that he judged tobe less than 5 kilometers at his one o'clockposition. He began to clear the loose itemsaway from his lap and console, trying not tonotice his heart pounding and a noticeablydrier throat.He altered course for a straight shot at thehole which he calculated to be only minutesaway and instructed Mr. Parker to preparefor descent. The hole itself which was nowonly about a kilometer ahead appearedtreacherously small and wispy and Kirk

momentarily studied the swatches of mistfoaming at its edge. He signaled Mr. Parkerto continue the descent checks.

There was no warning except for the slightyaw of the nose followed by a gentle tug atthe controls. Kirk saw that Mr. Parker wasgreatly alarmed and followed his finger tothe "engine fail light on the annunciatorpanel. Kirk reacted instinctively, slappingthe "battery power" switch into theemergency mode. His eyes darted over theengine instruments noting the torque splitand, at the same moment, catching thewarning tone in his headset. The rapiddecrease in engine rpm and drop in EGT(exhaust-gas temperature) confirmed hisdeepest suspicions and he reacted instinctively. As his hand started down with the collective, his eyes darted out beyond the nose ofthe ship. The hole was still about 300 metersahead. He heard M r Parker gasp as theTass flattened against the cloud tops andbegan to slip into the enveloping mist.

The sudden entry into autorotation jarredseveral of the large packets from the survivalkit which Mr. Parker had left hanging, but

1976

open, in the rear. The sharp clatter of themslamming against the compartment floorassaulted what little calm remained in theforward cockpit. As the sink speed increasedthe ship appeared to be hurling out of control through the swirling froth.

"Quick Emergency descent checks "shouted Kirk.Mr . Parker could see that Kirk hadshifted to the left side of his seat and wasapplying great restraining pressure to keepthe cyclic from nosing the ship over. Rotorspeed continued to hold slightly high butsteady. As indicated by the centripeter theship was in an exaggerated flat turn to theright. Kirk signaled Mr. Parker for help inrepositioning the directional pedals and thetwo exerted all their strength as the main

blades began to adjust toward a cen-

trosymmetric plane.Painfully Kirk jammed his foot hardagainst the left antitorque pedal and almostinstantaneously the centripeter began toshow a decrease in turn velocity."Continue the checks," shouted Kirk, asthe nose began to pivot back to the left. Kirkcould sense from the ship's motion pattern

that the descent path had carried them intoshifting currents and the winds had begun toswirl heavy rain through the damaged areasinto the crew compartment. The centripeternow oscillated left and right as Kirk foughtto control the wild turns. The Tass had slowed so that the main rotors were now carryingthe full load and Mr. Parker was gamelyperforming the few remaining descentchecks.Heavy air currents seized the Tass and shefishtailed violently from side to side . Kirkthought that he' d lost her, but she flutteredforward like a halfback shaking tacklers, theblades flexed and once again gripped thewind.

Rainwash surged through the openeddoors of the troop compartment and as Mr.Parker turned to complete the last of hischecks, passengers nd cargo secured hesaw to his dismay that Crapper's body wasgone.

The ship lurched forward and began torock wildly and Kirk strained with Mr.Parker calling out his best interpretations ofthe centripeter's movements. The cloudscontinued to churn around them, and yetKirk sensed that the cover was thinning out. . . then he saw the first gap, followed byother scattered cracks in the cloud cover.

"Check for a landing area , Bill, we'rebreaking through " Kirk' s voice was filledwith excitement and confidence. They haddefied obstacle after obstacle and now as hefought to keep the Tass level, he himself

couldn't help but wonder how they hadmanaged to survive so long.Gravity sucked them away from the turbulent overcast into smoother air below.Kirk estimated that they had 1,000 to 1,500feet of altitude remaining."To the right two o'clock open

patch," shouted M r Parker.The nose of the Tass turned right a fewdegrees following Mr. Parker's hand signal.Kirk caught sight of the small clearing and

noted that the wind favored a straight aheadapproach into an area which was ratherbroad on the approach side but narrowedsomewhat ominously at the far side. Nomatter, this was sanctuary . refuge for awounded bird thank God for smallfavors. Kirk slowed the Tass and the treesraced past on left and right.

"Easy, Tass baby," Kirk's musclesknotted against the strain, but touchdownwas smooth and the Tass rolled severalmeters through tall grass to a safe halt, andthe silence beyond.

19


22/52

I N THE PAST there have beenseveral T -42 airc raf t n i c k e l c ~ amium battery failures because of sus-pected overch ng (thermal runaway). A recent0modification callednickel cadmium battery chargingrent detector system was devel.oped to warn the operator of a battery overcharge condition. Becauseit is a new system o n l Y ~ e n t l y published in the T -42 Air,craft Operator's Manual (dash 10), many

i ~ 2 " ircraft pilots are not awareof what it accomplishes and whatthey, the pilots, can do with thesystem. The monitoring system isdesigned to inform t h e p i l ) ~ ,of abattery wcharge c u r r e n t w J i ~ m a ydamage .rt)1e battery. ' .

The nitor illuminates theyellow ,ning light anytime thebattery 'charge current excee& s 'normal input (7 amperes). Foil . gbattery engine start, thelight may about sec-onds after sm cties

position. Theextinguish within.o 5 minute , dicating that thettery is approaching a full chargeThe dine will increase ' the batter

20

A'ircraft Maintenance Instr-actorMaintenance Training DivisionDepartment of Academic TrainingU.S. Army Aviation Cent er

tate of charge; thebatterY4elll ature is very low; ori the battery previously has beendischarged at a very low rate (i.battery operation of radios 'orcraft lights forprQhmged periodhe warnin ighl. .a1so may it,:minate ort . periods after 'nffing gear alidlor flap operation.

Action the pilot should take on U-l u m i n a t i o n ~ e warning lightdepends on s e v e r ~ conditions.Following a b&.:ttery engine startthe warning light normally illuminates for a short period of time,relative to the aQiount qf b a t t e ~ yusage. The light should ~ x t i n g u i s hwithin 5 minutes ;under most con Failure to ,do. so indicates alIy dischargecl battery and theing check should be ac-co ished at 90-secondintervals.

1. Throttle se t -per minute (rpm).2. ' One alternator3. After ammeterstabUiz,es,, 'W momentarily urn thebattery switch off and note changein ammeter indication. A continueddecrease in charge c u r r e n t 0consecu tive 90-second ychecks indic.ates a saUsf , Ybattery ch', ~ o n d i t i o n . ' Batterycondition unsatisfactory if "thelight remalnsilluminated anClt1 ebarge current fails to decreasebetween checks.

f the warniluminate duringindicates that c


23/52

may cause a battery , thermalrunaway. f this occurs the batteryswitch should be'turned off and turn-ed back on for 'landing gear andflap extension.During engine shutDown if thewarning light illuminates, conducttwo consecutive b a t t ~ r y checks at90-second intervals as describedabove. IT the battery charge currenthas not decreased after two checks,record on DA Form 2408-13.

The nickel cadmium batterycharge current detector system, ifused properly, can definitely extendthe life of the battery installed in theT-42 aircraft. The alternators installed on the T -42 ai rcraft enginesare not initially self-exciting. TheylI1.ust be excited by a source of electrical power such as the aircraftbattery. Once they are excited andare operating, they can excite them- "selves and each other.

The alternatorsline when subjeet -oloads when the batthe off position orhas failed. When this .ppens therewill not be any electrical power onthe aircraft. A pal to t the modification was installing a separateemergency exci.tation system. Thisincluded a miniature sealed batterypowerpack and an excitation positi9n in the alterna tors' switches. Toc' it e ' tbe alternators with thee ~ e r g e n c y excitation system, place

er of the alternators' switches. mentarily up from the "on" position. This action completes an electrical circuit from the sealed batterypowerpack to -cite the alternators.- The accompanying photo is onecell from a damaged battery. fhecause of damage was a thermalrunaway battery. Rapid ~ e r ycharging and h i g h l e m p ~ [ a t u r e o m ~

the extent that ,caused thelectrolyte to boil Row out t vAtt .Aused battery charging, systelJ) c a l l y o i dthis type damage to the battefy' inin the T -42 aircraft. ,

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ t \ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Captain John B Huffman3 st Aviation BattalionMississippi Army National Guard

T WO PHRASES THAT havebeen widely circulated throughout the military establishment in allcorners of the globe are "Dear John"and "Jody." f a fellow aviatorreceived a "Dear John," we sympathized with his misery and suggested, in our consolation, that"Jody" must have been a fatherless child. In our thoughts, we'vepassed off the occurrance with nothing more than a touch of humorand the promise to ourselves that itwon't happen to us. Enter realitySquadron has just passed down acontact fire support mission totroop operations. It's your missionas team lead in a low bird with

CW2 Jones covering high with hisarmed snake. You could be happierover operations choice of a wingman for you. Jones has been downin the dumps since mailcall lastweek and recently his aim hasn'tbeen what it should be. This mis-

sion has to go and go quickly andsince Jones is the only one in theweapons platoon that hasn't flowntoday he'll have to do.You brief Jones, get your crewtogether and ' crank. After' . shortflight, you make contact WIth theenemy and begin to do your thing.The radio is alive with the excitedvoices of the ensuing battle and youcan ' t get the air to tell 'ole Jonesto get his sweet bippey on down inposition and give you some support." . . . Why isn't he in position? . . .Taking fire . . . Taking fire . . .Damn it Jones, shoot"I'm hit . . . Mayday Mayday "Where was Jones as your aircraftand crew went down in a fierycrunch?Mr. Jones was where many of ushave been or could be at some timein the future. He was preoccupiedwith the apathy that displacesemotional well-being after he

21


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endured the emotional shock of a.. Dear John.Just exactly what percentage ofall aviation accidents are piloterror? We've all read the statistics

and realize it s a large percentageindeed. How many of these accidents that were classified as piloterror were in fact emotionally instigated either through the loss of aloved one or as a result of heartbreak within a relationship?

The statistics will never revealthe true percentage because thedead hold their secrets and thewives and lovers of these aviatorsand crewmen will never comeforward and say, Yes, I left himand caused him to take his mind offhis work.

I can't pretend to be a practicingpsychologist, but I do know whatI've witnessed in my own experience. I've climbed into thecockpit, taken the controls, andflown when I should have voluntarily grounded myself until a particular period of emotional stresshad passed. I've seen an experienced, seasoned pilot take a civilianhelicopter (OH-13S) through a

cloud deck 3,000 feet thick and stayIFR (instrument flight rules) for 30minutes in an aircraft that wasbarely equipped for VFR (visualflight rules) flight. Why did he doit? t was his decision but could thefact that he had just lost his fianceehave influenced his thinking? Ithink it definitely could havebecause I know how I felt; I saw theway the OH-13 pilot ignored allgood sense; and I helped in therecovery of the bodies of Jones andhis crew. How could these instanceshave been prevented along with themany like them that have beencovered with the entry pilot erroron the accident forms?Field Manual (FM) 10 1 5 onstaff procedures says that the commander is responsible foreverything that his unit does ordoesn't do. Does that make himresponsible for Jones? Yes, in asense, if he was aware and didnothing or if he had dictated to hismen that mission comes before allelse-including good sense.

The real world tells us that thecommander cannot be everywherenor can he know everything about

everyone in his command. Wherethen does the responsibility lie fordetecting these emotional disordersand dealing with them in a rationalmanner? This is one monkey thatshould-and can-rest firmly onthe backs of each of us withoutshame. As professional aviators, weshould be able to detect this kind ofinstability and remove ourselvesfrom the cockpit long before we endanger everyone in the aircraft.Most of us can do this for ourselvesbut we must be prepared to do it forothers by encouraging them toground themselves. Or we shouldnotify the right person to make surethat they stay sidelined until theyrecover. Each of us must feel thatabsti nence, at a rough time in ourlives, is a responsible course of action and should be respected ratherthan ridiculed or criticized.I ask every aviator and crewmanto reflect on the words I've writtenand ask themselves if these truthscouldn't apply to their own lives. fwe can keep the arrows that piercea broken heart in their quill andremoved from the cockpit, Cupidwill never be the Killer.

FLIP RE LIGNMENT IN THE P CIFICOn 15 July 1976, the Pacific and South Asia (PSA)

and the Australia, New Zealand and Antarctica(ANZA) FLIP (flight information pUblication) Enrouteand Terminal publications will be combined into asingle package. The title of the new publication will be ,the same as Area Planning Three-Pacific, Australiaand Antarctica (P AA). The new P AA FLIPs also willbe published on an expanded cycle.

The PSA and ANZA Supplements will be combinedinto a single P AA Supplement. The Enroute Chartcoverage will remain the same, but the current ANZACharts 1-9 will become P AA Charts 11-19,The chartsand supplement will be published every 16 weeks with aMilitary Aviation Notice (MAN) issued at the interven-

22

ing 8-week midpoint.The Instrument Approach Procedures (lAPs) will be

combined into three high/low combination volumes.These volumes will also contain the Standard Instrument Departures (SIDs) plus any existing expandedairfield diagrams and Standard Terminal ArrivalRoutes (STARs). The radar minima for the airfieldswill be removed from the supplement to the front ofthese volumes. The lAP volumes will be published every24 weeks.

The bound MAN s will be published at each of the 8-week intervals between cycles with the second MANbeing cumulative.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIG EST


25/52

JEWSROME DERS

Sir:Your November issue had a letter fromTom O. Mathews who stated that LTCPatrick H. Brady was the only dustoff pilotto receive the Medal of Honor.

There have been two dustoff pilots toreceive the Medal of Honor. The otherrecipient was CW4 Michael J. Novosel foractions on 2 October 1969 while performin ga mission under the cal1 sign of "Dustoff88. CW4 Novosel is currently an instructorat the Warrant Officer Career Col1ege, FortRucker, AL.CPT David L ConnerAcademic InstructorWarrant Officer Career Col1egeFort Rucker

You are correct, See "Honor Times 29" inthe January 1974 DIGEST for the storyabout CW4 Novosel and "Out Of The ValleyOf Death" in the May 1970 DIGEST for thearticle about Major Brady.

Sir:I have enclosed the attached for possiblepublication in the A VIA TION DIGESTWOC Wayne P. Johnson61st WOC CompanyFort Rucker

ROTOR IN THE GREENA t times. in sunlit solitude ofdrifting cloudsAs turning on the wind I flewClimbing to gaze down upon a broken wind-swept shroudHovering there s I looked down. motionless

it seemedA bove the spinning Earth I ve untoldpassed

JUNE 1976

There joined with fleeting speed. s i indistant dreamMy agile craft on high once moreWith Rotor in the green.

Sir:The China-Burma-India Hump piiots Association will hold its 31st annual reunionat the Ramada I nn, Monroe , LA 5 through 8August 1976. For further information con

tact:CBI Hump Pilots Assoc. Headquarters917 Pine BoulevardPoplar Bluff, MO 63901Phone: (314) 785-2420

Jan ThiesExecutive SecretaryThe advanced attack helicopter (AAH)prototype acceptance ceremony was heldon the 16th of this month at the U.S.Army Engineering Flight Activity locatedat Edwards AFB, CA. Two prototypeaircraft were accepted from each of theprime contractors-Jlell Helicopter Tettron and Hughes Helicopters. The l\AHswill be undergoing operational t c ~ s t i n gwhich will lead to selection of the winning contractor.

Sir:I am inclosing the following "words mostv i ~ o r s hate to hear" which 1 felt you mightshare with your readers:

When you're a new guy, an old guy says,"Did you ever see anyone do this with aUH-1?"At 5,000 feet on the second leg of a crosscountry flight, "Did you check the fuelcap after that last stop?"With a 1: 1 vibration, "No, 1 didn'tpreflight the head, I thought you did.""Do you smell wires burning?"

With the master caution light on, "What'ssupposed to be where the 'spare light' is?While riding front seat in a cobra at nightyou hear the backseater say, "oh no "Flying NOE, "WOW, Did you see thatwire we just flew under?Flying formation your wingman says,"Hey, Lead, Your EGT looks higher thanmine."When you call Branch, "No, you can't goto Hawaii or the Canal Zone, we havealready cut your orders for Korea "On short GCA final at night in a rainstorm, your copilot says, "Hey man,listen to the groovy sound on the NAY."In an inadvertent I FR when your onlymap is a VFR sectional, you hear" Army2,3,4 radar contact lost.""The CO wants to see you as soon as youland "

CW2 James E. NunnSir:

The United States Army Warrant Officers Association (USA WOA) will host itsfourth annual meeting of the members at theBordeaux Motor Inn, Fayetteville, NC, during the period 7 through 9 July 1976. Allwarrant officers, active duty, reserve,National Guard and retired are invited to attend. For more information, please contactUSA WOA, P.O. Box 3765, Washington,DC 20007.

CW4 Don Hess, USA RetiredExecutive SecretaryContinued on page 48

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FOLLOWING ABOUT 2 yearsof study, a Joint TRADOC/DARCOM Special Study Group recommended that a sepanit( agencyfor TRADOC operational testingand another for DARCOM developmental testing be collocated at theU.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.Rucker. DA approved the provisional implementation on 17 Febru-.ary 1976 of this concept recommertded by the Study Group. Operational testing is to begin 1 July1976. Developmental t ~ s t i n g is being performed by the U.S. ArmyAircraft Development Test Activity,which formerly was DARCOM'sand TECOM's U.S. Army AviationTest Board.

Collocation of separate operatiortal and developmental testingorganizations represents a new andunique approach to the "how" problem for accomplishing testing required in the research, devdopmentand acquisition of aviation materielsystems.

The two new test agencies consist of personriel and equipmentauthorizations of the previousTECOM Aviation Test Board. ,

The TRADOC operational testorganization is commanded byCOL Robert A. Bonifacio. t hasbeen assigned the iltle of U. S.Army Aviation Test Board, whichis . the same name by whichTECOM's previous agency wasknown. The new Aviation TestBoard is authorized 88 perso n n e l 5 2 mili tary and 36Civilians. It is functionally organized as shown iri figure 1Th e D A RCO M av ia t iondevelopmental test organization iscommanded by COL Robert S.Kellar. t . IS now designated theU.S. Army Aircraft DeveloprrientTest Activity. There are 221 personnel authorized-126 militaryand 95 civilians. I t is organized asdepicted in figure 2In reachirig their findings, members of the Study Group were concerned primarily with irhplemeriting the AMARC recommendations24

New viationand the latest testing procedurescontained in ARs 70-10 and 71-3for separate operational anddevelopmental testing. Two basicorganizational alternatives were examined at great length by the StudyGroup for achieving this purpose.

The first alternative envisionedthe location of the operational testorganization at the Army AviationCenter with the developmental testactivity located at Yuma ProvingGround, AZ.

The second alternative considered collocation of operationaland developmental test agencies atthe Army Aviation Center. MGWilliam J. Maddox Jr., commander, U. S. Army AviationCenter, was instrumental in the formulation and adoption of this innov ati ve concept for aviationmateriel system testing.

The primary considerations thatled to the development of thistesting concept, its recommendation to DA and finally to DA approval were reql,lirements for: Effective test management ofaviation materiel systems Reducing time required forresearch, development, test andevaluation of aviation materielsystems Conserving resources and funds

Th ,e collocation concept for aviation operational and developmentaltesting will provide the most idealbasis for cost effective test integrat ion envisioned tn tes t ingpublications. Aviation combat andm a ~ e r i e l development actIons,their universal nature, span themajor com m ands o f both ,TRADOC and DARCOM. Thustest management of the variousaviation new development systemswill be facilitated by the focalizingof test requirements through thecollocated test organizations.

Operational and develop,mentaltest time, resources, and fund I

Major David M. Mabardy, In

AMARC U S. ~ r y MAcquisit ion ReCommitteeDA Department of thDARCOM U S. Army MDevelopment ae a ~ i n e s s CoDT Developmental

Figure 1

Admin

Mgt Division

IircraftTest

Division

ArmamentTest

Division

U.S. rmyircraft Development

Test ctivity

I IAdministrative PlanandServices Methodo

Division Divissavings will be achieved throughclose, continuous test coordinationand integration; piggy-backingof flying hours and test projects ona single testbed aircraft; sharing oftest data and instrumentation; and



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Concepttration and Management DivisionU.S. Army Aviation Test BoardFort Rucker

Operational testingReliability, v i l b i ~ i t yand maintainabilityU.S. rmy Test andEvaluation CommandU.S. rmy Training andDoctrine Command

U.S. rmyAviation Test Board

Test ConceptAndMethodology

Division

IGroundSupport

TestDivision

ITestInstrumentationndSupportDivision

Figure 2

HeadquartersDetachment

IMateriel

TestDivision

through the joint use of test supportfacilities. The uniqueness of thecollocation concept for aviationoperational and developmentaltesting, and its potential forsavings, prompted DA to direct

that the first year of testing underthis concept (commencing 1 July1976) be evaluated for its cost effectiveness.Under this concept the mission ofthe Aviation Test Board is to conduct operational tests and evaluations, concept evaluations and othertests for the research, development,and acquisition of aviation materielsystems, subsystems and ancillaryequipment. In performing this mission, the Aviation Test Board willserve as the aviation combat developer s operational test organizationrepresenting the troop user. Testingwill be conducted to estimate aprospective system s military utility; operational effectiveness; operational suitability including compatibility, interoperability, RAM,logistic supportability, operationalman soldier)-machine interface, andtraining requirements; and the needfor any modifications. In addition,the OT provides information on organization, personnel requirements,doctrine and tactics. It also mayprovide data to support or verifyoperating instructions, publicationsand handbooks.

The OT will be accomplished byoperational and support personnelof the type and qualifications ofthose who are expected to use andm in t in the sys tem whendeployed. It will be conducted in asrealistic an operational environment as possible. Normally the OTwill be accomplished within controlled field exercises and, to themaximum extent possible, use TOEtroop units and maintenance support personnel in tactical scenarios.

The mission of the AircraftDevelopment Test Activity is tomonitor, conduct, evaluate andreport on government and contractor tests of the single integrateddevelopment test cycle concept foraircraft; aircraft components; andaircraft related support equipment

in support of the materiel developer.Developmeht testing is cond ucted to demonstrate that theengi neeri ng design and develop

ment process is complete; that thedesign risks have been minimized;th t the sys tem will meetspecifications; and to estimate thesystem s military utility when it isintroduced. Developmental testingis accomplished in factory,laboratory and proving-ground environments and includes engineering design testing and human factors testing to demonstrate as t is f c tory technical man(soldier)-machine interface-usingqu l i f ied and exper iencedoperators, crews and maintenancesupport personnel.

The physical collocation ofoperational and developmentaltesting activities at Fort Ruckerwill complement and enhance theArmy Aviation Center Teamresearch and development effortsfor providing future training,operational concepts and equipment for an ever increasingtechnologicai sophistication of thebattlefield environment. I t willenable the conduct of better andmore economical testing in greaterharmony with the overall goals ofthe Army.

The collocation of these activitieswill provide a focal point for aviation test management; provide foreffective testing feedback; decreasemanpower and cost requirements;and at the same time provide thenecessary separation and independence of operational anddevelopmental testing.With the ddi t ion of anoperational and developmentaltesting capabiiity, the AviationCenter Team represents the Army scentralized source of aviation expertise. As such, it is a vital ingredient in the mix of technologyand operational requirementsnecessary for research, development, test and evaluation leading tothe acquisition of Army aviationmateriel systems of the future.d z

JUNE 1976 25


28/52

Gl he J1rmy Aviation Storyontinued from page

arrived. With its speed, survivability, carrying capacity and ease of maintenance, the Huey was particularlysuited to the ta5k and to the environment.Two other Army aircraft, fixed wing, made

widespread reputations in the early years. The OV-lMohawk was dispatched to Vietnam in 1962. TheMohawk s mission was reconnaissance and surveillance. Visual and photographic reconnaissance bythese twin-turbine airplanes produced a wealth of intelligence for supported units. Ground advisors hadgreat praise for the Mohawk s performance. Mohawkaircraft were used throughout the Vietnam War, andimproved models are in the Army inventory today.

The CV -2 Caribou twin-engine transport airplanepreceded the helicopter into the war. The first Caribou

The CH-21 Flying Bananas were the first Army cargohelicopters to arrive in Vietnam

landed in Saigon in August 1961. Two years laterthere were two Caribou companies incountry a totalof 32 airplanes). During the early years, Army pilotsflew highly dangerous missions into short, unimproved airstrips in support of far-flung Green Beretoutposts. By 1964 the Caribou had been thorollghlyintegrated into the daily operational planning of theARVN.

The Caribou was successful for several reasons: twas tough and afforded a high availability rate. Also,the Caribou filled the gap between the Army s largerhelicopters and the U.S. Air Force C-123 Provider,which weighed almost twice as much as the Caribou.Further, the system which allocated Caribou supportwas flexible and responsive to allow maximumproductive use of the aircraft. (In April 1966 theCaribou was transferred to the U.S. Air Force. The

26

The Flying Banana was replaced by the powerful, agileturbine-powered UH-1Army was assured, as part of this transaction, that theAir Force would relinquish all claims for helicoptersand followon rotary wing aircraft which are designedand operated for intratheater movement , fire support ,supply and resupply of Army forces .)By the end of 1964 the Army had more than 400 aircraft and 3,700 aviation personnel in Vietnam. Command relationships with the ARVN were well established. The formerly separate helicopter companieswere being integrated into battalions whose internalstaffs could make full use of the critically inadequateflight hours available to support the war effort.Meanwhile, defense strategists in the United Stateswere thinking in terms of the nuclear battlefield.Mobility is of essence when units and people arespread thin, as one might expect on such a battlefield.Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara viewedArmy plans for growth in the airmobile concept as

The CV-2 Caribou was one of the aircraft used by the11th Air Assault Division

U.S . ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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McNamara was a genuine advocate ofhe

In order to decide how best to u

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