Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1961

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1961

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HJ teJ g ta ie4 4 l,mIfVI TION IGEST

EDITORIAL STAFF JUNE 1961CAPT JOSEPH H POOLE VOLUME 7FRED M MONTGOMERYRICHARD K TIERNEYDIANA G. WILL IAMS

RTICLES

THE ARMY AVIATION STORY, Capt William K. KayHOW MODERN IS OUR CONCEPT? Capt Paul C Swink, Jr., InfARMORHELICOPTER VULNERABILITY IN AN ACR COMPANY,Capt W. A. Johnson, Jr., InfFALCON S NESTTWXEMOTIONSGETTING STARTED ON THE GAUGES,Capt James A. McDonald, ArtyFILED OR USED?A V_LK DOWN THE FLIGHT LINE, Thurber PhillipsSIGNAL CORPSCRASH SENSE

NUMBER 6

18

1014171820232527

33TEN WEATHER TIPS FOR PILOTS Inside Back

The story of Army Aviation in this issue is far too shortto adequately portray all the aspects of this dynamic part ofthe Army.

We have made every effort to be accurate but some pointsare certain to be questioned.The DIGEST plans to publish a comprehensive history ofArmy Aviation to start with the June 1962 issue to com-

memorate our 20th Anniver ary.We need names, places, events, and pictures of historical

value to do the best job possible. I f you know or have factualdocumented evidence of hi torical significance, send it to theEditors as soon as possible.

We have a year to complete the job, but it takes time todouble check facts and figures.Please send us your contribution now. Meanwhile, happyreading for this short story of Army Aviation.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMaj Gen Ernest F. EasterbrookCommandantCol Warren R Williams, Jr.Assistant CommandantCol Robert H. SchulzDeputy Asst Commandant

SCHOOL STAFFCol Allen M Burdett, Jr.Combat Development OfficeCol Oliver J. HelmuthDirector of InstructionLt Col C E. LawrenceCO, USAA VNS RegimentLt Col Julius E. Clark, Jr.Sec1 etary

DEPARTMENTSCol M H. ParsonTacticsLt Col John W. OswaltAdvanced Fixed WingLt Col Wayne N. PhillipsRotary WingLt Col Harry J. KernMaintenanceL t Col John R Riddle

Publications andN on Resident InstructionLt Col G Wilfred J aubertP1 imary Fixed Wing

The U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST ian official publication of the Department ofthe Army published monthly under thesupervision of the Commandant, U. S. ArmyAviation School.The mission of the U. S. ARMY A VIATIO DIGEST is to provide information ofan operational or functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention,training, maintenance, operations, researchand development, aviation medicine andother related data.Manuscripts, photographs, and other illustrations pertaining to the above subjects ofinterest to personnel concerned with ArmyAviation are invited. Direct communieationis authorized to: Editor in Chief U. S.

R ~ I Y AVIATION DIGEST, LJ S. ArmyAviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama.Unless otherwise indicated, material inthe U S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST maybe reprinted provided credit is given to theU S. ARMY AVIATION DIGE T and tothe author.The printing of this publication has beenaPIlIoved by the Director of the Bureau ofthe Budget, 22 December 1958.Views expressed in this magazine are notnecessarily those of the Department of theArmy or of the U. S. Army Aviation School.Unless specified otherwise, all photographsare U. S. Army.Distribution:To be distributed in accordance withrequirements stated in DA Form 12.


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VIRGINIA, 1862. The balloon was going up and Professor Thaddeus S. C. Lowerode the basket to observeConfederate troop movementsand become the first Americanaerial artillery observer. This,many contend, marks the birthdate of Army Aviation.

Others disagree, insistingthat Army Aviation was bornJune 6, 1942, when organic aircraft were first authorized inthe Field Artillery for air observation.

Still Oothers dispute boththeories. They trace ArmyAviation to the National Security Act of 1947 - oftencalled the Key West Agreement - when the U. S. Air

THRMYVI TION

STORYaptain William K ay

Force was formed frOom theU. S. Army Air Corps .

Training 94 42There are other schools ofthought on the subject. Butthe authorities set aside theirarguments and g e n e r yagreed that it was not until1941, when the Air COorpsmoved further nto bombardment, that Army ground commanders seriously began looking t o their pressing aviationneeds. I t was that year thatan Artillery major (William W.Ford suggested in an Artillery Journal article that lightaircraft, organic to the unitsthey served, be used as spot-

ters. The Chief of Field Artillery (Maj Gen Robert M. Danford) became interested. Several months, later his interestintensified when he saw experiments conducted with light aircraft at the British Royal Ar- .tillery School.Events now moved swiftly.Using civilian-type light aircraft in the 1941 Louisianamaneuvers, artillerymen discovered they had a potentiallyvaluable aid. Indeed, the Chiefof Field Artillery reported thatthe only uniformly satis-

Capt Kay is a park historianwith the Dept of the Interior atNatche z Trace Parkway TupeloMiss. He wrote this article whileon a tour of active duty


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fact0'ry report of air observati0'n during the recent maneuvers comes from these unitswhere Cubs were used.

In late fall of 1941 a directive established a test group atFort Sill for organic aviation inthe Field Artillery. By January 1942, twenty-four L-4 typeaircraft, the standard J -3 PiperCubs, and 30 Field Artillery 0 fficers and enlisted men, allholders of C licenses, wereassembled at Fort Sill. TheCivil Aeronautics Authoritysupplied a flight supervisor anda maintenance supervisor. TheArmy hired six civilian flightinstructors.The unit (often referred toas The Class Before 1) begantraining on 15 January. Within6 weeks the unit completed itstraining, split into two groups,and, began testing their theories with the 2d Division atFort Sam Houston and 31stArtillery Brigade at Fo r tBragg. They completed theirtests in April, made their reports, and reassembled at FortSill to await the outcome.

On 6 June, 1942, they hadtheir answer. The War Department had approved Field Artillery organic aviation. The 20pilots and 10 mechanics whohad conducted the tests be-came the nucleus of the newlyestablished Department of AirTraining of the Field ArtillerySchool.

In JUly 1942, orders went outrequesting volunteers with civilian pilot ratings to attendthe flight courses at the Artillery Schoo1. The students reported on 1 August and training commenced on 4 Augustand lasted until 18 September.(The course was later lengthened.) Since the students wereflight qualified, the course consisted of tactical training -

stressing short field approaches, barrier landings and operations from unimproved strips.The initial aircraft used fortraining were the L-4B Piper,the L-2B Taylorcraft, and theL-3C Aeronca.Few Artillery 0'fficers withcivilian pilot ratings were co 'ming into the Army in 1942;consequently, action was taken(concurrently with the earlyclass at Sill) to establish asource for primary training ofpilots. Agreement was reachedwith the Army Air Corps toc0'nduct primary training forArtillery pilots at Pittsburg,Kansas, and Denton, Texas.These classes began in springof 1943. The graduates received their tactical training inthe advanced course at Sill,where all students also received intensive maintenancetraining by experienced maintenance NCOs. The first mechanics course started 27 July1942 and lasted 5 weeks. Depotmaintenance and supply support was provided by an AirCorps detachment at Fort Sill.The Air Corps later providedthe same service in Europe andthe South Pacific.

In fall 1942, Sill had graduated enough tactical pilots tosend into the field. Most wereassigned to troop units in theUnited States before goingoverseas, but 10 pilots and 10mechanics were ordered directly to England, where they immediately began training as infantry replacements. The FieldArtillery quickly retrieved itsaviators and sent them to the13th Field Artillery Brigade tobecome the flight instructornucleus of the II Corps Air Observation Post School. It wasnot the combat the pilots hadprepared themselves for, butat least they were again flying.

In November the school beganmoving to North Africa withthe 13th FA Brigade. The mainbody arrived at Sidi-bel-Abbesin ~ r l y 1943 and the school expanded to care for the needs ofthe II Corps and Fifth Army.While the school was absolutely necessary to fill combatrequirements, its graduatessuffered from an administrative snarl. War Departmentpolicy of placing Field Artillerypilots on flying status extendedonly to the graduates of theDepartment of Air Training atFort Sill. As a compromise theWar Department granted authority to place. the corpsschool graduates on a nonratedflying status, allowing them toreceive $60.00 per month hazardous duty pay.ombat 1942 45Army Aviation was first committed to combat in the North

African landings. Ten officersfrom pilot classes 2 and 3 werein the convoy during this assault. Four of these pilots flewashore to the Casablanca areafrom the carrier USS Rangerin three L-4s 0 n 8 November,5 months and 2 days after theestablishment of Artillery Aviation. These four officers wereCapt Ford E. Allcorn, CaptBrenton A. Devol (who actedas an observer), Lt John R.Shell and Lt William H. Butler.Captain Allcorn was shot downby United States tro0'Ps whenhis aircraft crossed the beach,but he survived. LieutenantShell was later killed in Tunisia while serving as aviationofficer of the 1st Armored Division.

In the words of one ArmyAviator the Navy .. launchedthe L-4s into combat and almost terminated our program


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a few minutes later. Everyship in the fleet shot atrthem] ."

Later a naval gunnery officerreplied to a reproachful Artillery pilot: What would youhave done in my place? If youwere 60 miles at sea and saw aCub put-putting by, would youbelieve it?

Originally, Artillery pilotsbelieved their flights would lastno longer than 7 minutes. Theywould ly out, adj ust the artillery fire, and return to theirstrips before the enemy couldknock them down. The pilotssoon learned, in North Africa,that they could remain inthe air for lengthy periods.Friendly antiaircraft fire droveoff enemy fighters, and enemyground forces soon learned thatthe minute they revealed theirposition to the Artillery pilots,American artillery would rangein on them. The light craftsoon flew with near impunity.

Indeed, the light planesproved to have a sort of psychological counterbattery effect. German batteries tendedto cease fire when the observation craft were in the air. In1943 most divisions in Italywere keeping at least one Artillery observer in the air during daylight hours.I t was soon discovered thatenemy gun positions could bereadily located at dusk and inthe early morning hours fromtheir prominent flashes. Thisevolved into night adjustmentof fire below Casino and lateron the beachhead at Anzio.Frequently the fire adjusted bythe AOPs amounted to guns ofall calibers, with many volleysper battery. On one particulartarget on the Anzio beachhead,over 370 guns were fired on aTOT (time on target). This included support from three

cruisers off shore - the USSBrooklyn, the HMS Dido andthe HMS Orion.After the breakout at Anzioin 1944, L-5s were used to direct air strikes by fighterplanes. Many units in the Pacific also used L-5s extensively

to direct strikes by fightertype airplanes.In the Italian campaign aircraft of the 1st Armored Division landed. on the outskirtsof Rome on 3 June to contactlead tanks and armored carsentering the city. As Rome fellon 4 June, the L-4s continuedsurveillance of the retreating

German army. Since the German air force was beingpress.ed in France, Army A viators were able to fly deep intoenemy territory without toom u c h danger except fromground fire.

With, the aircraft remainingin the air from daylight todark, Artillery pilots soonfound themselves flying surveillance and reconnaissancemissions, controlling columns,and making aerial photographs. t was not long beforepilots, discovered they could laywire from the air. In Italy andthe South Pacific, particularly,L-4s carried D-4 reels, laying ahalf mile of wire at a time -all the aircraft could carry.Since the planes could live inthe combat environment, theysoon had other obvious missions: transporting commanders and staff officers, and flyingmessenger and liaison flights.Such flights were not alwaysroutine. One division commander flew deep into unfriendlycountry on a 2-hour flight.While returning to the Alliedlines the plane was forced downby lack of fuel near a forwardoutpost. The pilot obtainedenough gasoline to fly his com-

STORY OF ARMY AVIATIONmander back to division headquarters.

In 1944, Artillery pilotsstarted aerial evacuation, particularly in jungle areas of theSouth Pacific. The L-4 was notdesigned to carry a litter patient; however, at Bougainvillean L-4 of the 37th Division AirSection was modified by insertion of a plywood deck extending backwards from the frontseat. This enabled a litter patient to be evacuated by theL-4. Later this sys tem waswidely used during the Philippine campaign to evacua ewounded to airstrips fromwhich Army Air Force pilotsin L-5s could fly them to fieldhospitals.

At the same time, the pilotsbegan flying limited supplymissions. Some a m a z i n gstories of small aircraft dropping supplies to isolated unitsand combat patrols came out ofthe j u n g I e s - only to bematched by equally amazingstories from the Europeantheater. Such units often werecompletely supplied by L-4swhich d r p p e d everythingneeded to survive and fight.In both theaters the problemof launching small craft intoinvasions had to be met. InSouthern France the. first L-4sflew into combat from an LST'sjury-rigged flight deck. Forthem, there could be no return.They flew their reconnaissanceand naval fire directing missions and landed where theycould.The 37th Infantry Divisionused another system to get itsaircraft ashore in the landingat Lingayen Gulf, 9 January1945. The wings were removedfrom the division's five L-4sand each was loaded with itswings aboard a DUKW. TheDUKWs were transported from

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BO ugainville aboard LSMs andlaunched at sea O ff LingayenGulf. The L-4s SCR 610 ra-diO s were used to maintain cnntact as the grO up prO ceeded toa predesignated dirt rnad O nthe beach. The L-4s were reassembled and tonk to the airto becO me the first Army air-craft active in the LuzO n Campaign.

In the Okinawa invasinn,light aircraft flew frnm theLST NO . 776, equipped with theBrO die Device - a cable ar-rangement which would launchand retrieve a ligh plane.MiraculO usly, nO t a pilot waslost. There were some gO O dpilnts in that invasiO n.At the end O f the Pacificwar, Army A viatiO n againpulled a chestnut from the fire.When General MacArthur annO unced the date of the surren-der) to be accepted aboard theUSS Missouri in TokyO Bay,the Cnmmanding General, AF-WESPAC, in Man i I a an-nO unced that General Yamashi-ta wnuld surrender simultane-O usly to COMWESPAC atBaguin.Later a staff O fficer pointedO ut that as yet Yamashita hadnO t been consulted. Off intoJapanese-held cnuntry flew anL-4 bearing a flag nf truce.Yamashita prO ved cO nperativeand an L-4 brO ugh t him intOBaguio to take part in the sur-render ceremnny.By 1945 it was clear thatsmall craft were useful to manyarms and services. In that yearaircraft were authnrized fordivisinn headquarters, Infantryregiments, Cavalry squadronsand grO UPS, and Engineer andSignal Corps units. At thesame time, the restrictiO nwhich had kept Artillery pilotsfrnm flying any but cub-typeplanes, ended.4

The burgeO ning prngram began refitting with L-5s. Still,the L-5 was not the answer toall the Army's prO blems. Anumber of experimental air-craft appeared. Mnst werefO und wanting, althnugh theL-17, thO ught to be strictly anairport airplane, later farO utperfnrmed it s, supposed capabilities in KO rea. Finally, theArmy settled on the L-19,which was designed by Cessna.The original cnntract fnr 420was let in June 1950.Rotary Wing istory

Early in 1945 the Army began investigating the feasibility nf adapting rO tary wingaircraft to the Army Aviationmissinn. The first Army helicO pter pilO ts were trained inlate 1945 under an informalagreement with the Army AirCnrps. They were selected onan individual basis and trainedin Sikorsky R-4 and R-6 helicO pters at Scntt Field, Ill., O rSheppard Field, Texas.

As interest in rotary wingO peratinns mounted, the BellHelicopter CO mpany wasawarded a contract to trainhelicopter pilots and mechanicsfnr the Army. In 1946 Bell began the first fO rmal Army helicO pter pilO t training course.Attending were Lt CO I Jack L.Marinelli (nnw CO lonel andPresident nf the U. S. ArmyAviation Board, Fort Rucker,Ala.) ; Capt Hubert D. Gaddis(now Lt Col and Director, TestDivisinn, U. S. Army AviationBoard, Fnrt Rucker) ; Maj JackBIO hm (nO w retired and withHumRRO, (Fnrt Rucker) ; andCapt Darwin P. Gerard (nowretired and with Grumman Aircraft Engineering CnrporatiO n).This grnup received its instructinn in the successful new

YR-13 (H-13) at Buffalo, N. Y.In early 1946 Army Aviationpurchased its first helicO pters,thirteen Bell H-13s. (TheSikorsky H-l9: and Hiller H-23were added after the KnreanWar started.) The H-13s wereassigned for testing to theArmy Field FO rces BO ard No. 1at FO rt Bragg, N. C ; the 82dAirborne DivisiO n, alsOl at FortBragg; and the 2d InfantryDivision at Fort Lewis, Wash .

In early 1947 the U. S. ArmyAir CO rps agreed to give Armystudents primary rntary wingtraining at Randolph Field SubBase, San Marcos, Texas. Thefirst class, consisting nf fourstudents, began in September1947 and lasted 6 weeks. Train-ing was in the YR-13. The firststudents to receive trainingunder the formal agreementwith the Air Corps were MajorHarry Bush (now LieutenantCnlonel); Capt Jack Tinnen(nnw Lieutenant CO lnnel andwith the White Hnuse presidential flight); Capt TrO y B.Hammnnds; and Lt L. C. Boyd(nO w Major and Chief, OperatiO ns Division, DOl, FortRucker). Upon graduatiO n thisgrO UP received assignments inthe United States as Army helicopter pilots.

In Octnber 1948 the Armyestablished a helicopter advanced tactical training cO urseat Fort Sill, Okla. Lt CO IHubert D. Gaddis set up theflight training course and flightstandardized the first Armyrotary wing instructor pilots.Members nf this group, whOtook their helicopter flighttraining from either the AirFO rce or Bell, included threeArmy officers and two civilians: Lts RO dney J. Collins,Norman Goodwin, and MarcusSullivan, and civilians James K.KnO x and Charles L. Martin.


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These men instructed theArmy s first tactical helicoptertraining course. In August1954, when the Army AviationSchool was moved to CampRucker, the rotary wing coursewas, changed from a section ofthe flight department to a department of its own.

In the early days of theKorean War, Army groundcommanders became increasingly aware of the many anddiversified jobs the helicoptercould accomplish in the combatzone. A cry went out for morehelicopter support and an initial order of fifteen H-13s wasrushed to Korea. The 6thTransportation Company (H-19s.) arrived in Korea in December 1952 and became thefirst Army transportation helicopter company to supportunits engaged in combat.

In 1956 primary helicoptertraining was moved fromRucker to Camp Wolters,Texas. The post was transferred from the Air Force tothe Army on July 1 and ColJohn L. Inskeep assumed command. On 26 September theU. S. Army Primary HelicopterSchool at Wolters became anofficial Army schoo.l. On 21November Class 57-6, composedof warrant officer candidates,arrived for preflight training.During the first week o.f January 1957, this class of over 50eager young candidates beganPhase II training.At Rucker the helicopterpro.gram has evolved into fivemajo.r co.urses within the Department of Rotary WingTraining: the transition of Woltersgraduates into flight trainingof cargo and utility helicopters(H-34, H-19, and H-21) , the Helicopter InstrumentFlight Co.urse,

the Helicopter InstrumentFlight Examiners Course, the HU-1 Instructor PilotCourse, the H-37 Transitio.n Training Co.urse.Army Aviation was the firstorganization, military or civil,to develo.P helicopter instrument flight operatio.ns., In December 1954, a test and evaluation program for helico.pter instrument flight was started at

Camp Rucker. Highly qualifiedfixed wing instrument pilotswere utilized. The tests weresatisfactory and in January1956, authority was obtainedfrom Department of the Armyto operate helicopters underactual instrument cO'nditions.This led to the first helicO'pterinstrument ratings, which theArmy Aviatio.n SchO o.I awardedin mid-1956.The Department of the Armyofficially recognized helicopterinstrument flight in May 1957.In January 1958, the first Helicopter Instrument FlightCO'urse was O'rganized at FortRucker.

On ts wnWith the establishment ofthe United States Air Force in1947, an Army-Air Forceagreement set the limits ofArmy A viatio.n. Army fixed

wing aircraft were not to. exceed 2,500 pounds. RO'tary wingcraft were to weigh no morethan 4,000 pounds. Army A viation missions were limited tsurveillance of enemy fo.rwardareas, aerial route reconnaissance, control o.f marchcolumns, camouflage inspections of ground forces areas,local courier service, emergency aerial evacuation, emergency wire layi ng, limited aerial photography, and limited

STORY OF ARMY AVIATIONresupply. In 1951 ano.theragreemen t eliminated theweight limitations and substituted a definition of functions. The missions allowedArmy Aviation, whHe restated,were generally the same asthose outlined in 1947. Anotheragreement, reached in Octo.ber1952, placed a weight limit of5,000 pounds O n Army fixedwing aircraft.

New agreements also werereached in the maintenance andsupply system. Prior to 1949,the Air Fo.rce had full reSPo.nsibility. In November 1949, theChief o.f Ordnance assumed theresPo.nsibility for field maintenance and supply from theAir Force. This was laterturned O ver to the Transportation Corps by authority of Department of the Army GeneralOrders No. 76, dated 11 August1952.On 26 October 1955, the Assistant Secretary of Defenseapproved in principle the transfer of responsibility for depo.tmaintenance and supply fromthe Air Fo.rce t the ArmyTransportation Corps. Thetransfer was to be effective 1July 1957.Korea

With the outbreak of theKo.rean War, the emergencyaerial evacuation role became amajor function. The helicopterproved invaluable in the evacuation of wounded in Korea.MO re than 25,000 men wereevacuated by helicopter - menwhose chances of survival wereenhanced by speedy evacuatio.n.Army Aviation s air evacuationrole in Korea expanded greatlyfrom the first halting efforts inW orId War II.Similarly, World War II mis.;.sions repeated themselves in

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Korea. Army Aviators flewsurveillance, reconnaissance,transportation, courier, and resupply missions. But the pilotsfaced problems dissimilar tothose of World War II. Whilethe Korean landscape might bevaguely reminiscent of that ofItaly, the Communists foughtin a different manner from theGermans. Army Aviators soonfound they had little of the immunity from ground fire theyenjoyed in Europe.

In the latter stages of thewar they were forced up to analtitude of 7,000 feet. Theylearned they were not safe justanywhere behind the UN line.Communist infiltrators wouldmake short work of a pilotforced down in country theycontrolled. Infiltrators sometimes attacked airstrips, keeping the pilots awake and jumpy.

There were enough changesto allow it to be said that ArmyAviation came of age in Korea.Some of the pilots started theKorean action flying WorldWar II's ubiquitous and agingL-4s, L-5s, and L-16s. But asnew type aircraft appeared, airofficers began matching planesto the missions. L-5s and L-17sbecame useful in courier work.The L-19 became the favoredship for reconnaissance and insome cases VIP transportationafter its introduction. t provided better visibility for itsobservers, and pilots and passengers found its heater madeit more comfortable in which tofly and ride. Everyone seemedto feel just a trifle safer in theall metal plane.Some pilots found the L-19wanting in aerial photographymISSIons. As one veteranpointed out, aerial photographyin the L-19 was all done on amakeshift basis. The mountsfor the cameras were generally6

unsatisfactory due to poor sta-bility or lack of proper sight-ing devices. Other pilots reported satisfactory results withthe K-20 camera and later theK-24.

The L-17 did a creditable jobin Korea, even though it wasnot designed for use in a combat zone. The Army began replacing the L-17 with the L-20for transportation of equipment, supplies, and personnel inthe front lines. Toward the endof conflict in Korea, the L-23replaced the L-17 for transpor-tation of commanders and staffofficers.odayIf in the Korean War theArmy Aviation Program came

of age, it has shown no signs ofnearing senility. In August1954, Camp Rucker was reactivated when the advance partyof the Army Aviation Schoolarrived. In March 1955, the installation was designated theArmy Aviation Center, and inOctober it was redesignated asthe permanent post, FortRucker.Firmly established in its ownhome, the Army Aviation Pro-gram continued to concentrateon the mission for which it 'Yasestablished: support of groundtroops. This mission includesthe development of tactics, thesolution of problems confronting the Aviation Program, andcoordination with industry inthe development of new air-craft and equipment.The work has not been fruit-less. t has led to promisingconcepts such as the arming ofhelicopters for aerial combatreconnaissance. This idea, de; .veloped by a few farsightedmen, led to the formation of anexperimental company for

aerial com bat reconnaissance(8305th ACR Company).Tactical demonstrations bythe 8305th ACR Company soimpressed Army planners thatthe U. S. Army Armor School,

Fort Knox, Ky., was directedby USCON ARC to organize anAerial Reconnaissance and Security Troop (ARST). Thetroop, patterned after the experimental ACR Company atFort Rucker, was tested by the2d Infantry Division in Janu-ary 1960 at Fort Stewart, Ga.The final test report of thedivision found the ARST organization, as tested, to bebasically sound. It recommended, with various modifications, that the troop be adoptedas an organic element of the infantry division. Headquarters,Third United States Armyagreed and recommended thatthe troop be located in the division cavalry squadron. ThirdArmy also spelled out variousother recommended modifications. Final approval or disapproval at higher levels hadnot been received at time ofthis, writing.

Another promising conceptwhich is new t the Army is theoperation of transport and utility helicopters from helicoptercarriers (aircraft carriers) .Units from Fort Bragg, N. C.Fort Benning, Ga., and FortCampbell, Ky., tested this concept in opera ions from theUSS Antietam last June andJuly.The 32 Army Aviators whoparticipated were the firstArmy pilots to receive U. S.Navy qualification as carrierhelicopter pilots. The conceptthey tested would provide theArmy with a capability to execute airborne amphibious assault. Tactical advantages af-forded are rapidity of move-


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ment, surprise, flexibility, anddepth of assault.IndicatiO'ns at this writingare that the tests were highlysuccessful. Further tests areplanned fO r this summer.omorrowWeare alsO seeing the devel

opment O f new aircraft whichwill increase the effectivenessof Army Aviation. Presentlyfour modern aircraft-the Iroquois, Caribou, Mohawk, andChinook-are moving into theArmy inventory.

It is hoped that over 2,500turbine powered HU-1 Iroquoiswill be in use by 1970. TheHU-1 series can be equippedwith fire suppression weaponsand will se'at from 6 to 12 persons, depending O n the modeland circumstances. The HU-1will ultimately replace the H-19Chickasaw, the H-34 Choctaw,the H-21 Shawnee, and the L-20Beaver.The Army has 51 twin engine, fixed wing AC-l CaribouO n hand or on order. A requirement exists for over 300 STOLmedium transport airplaneswithin the next decade. A likenumber of medium tacticaltransPO'rt helicopters are required. The first O'rder for 28HC - 1B Chinooks has beenplaced. This newest Army helicopter is)designed to carry thePershing missile or deliver 33fully equipped troops into areasinaccessible t the Caribou.The twin turbine engineAO 1A Mohawk has completeduser tests. Some 250 of this typesurveillance aircraft should bebrought into the program by1965. Various models, equipped with side looking airborneradar (SLAR) and infraredphO'tographic equipment, willbe able to operate at night and

under other conditions of reduced visibility.Army planners hope to boostthe fleet of about 6,000 Armyaircraft to 8,500 by 1970 andto reduce the inventory toseven types O f manned aircraftand two drones. Steps havebeen taken through the ArmyAircraft Requirements Review Board - often called theRogers Board - to initiate im

mediate development O f thethree types which are cO nsid-ered most urgently needed: The light observation aircraft (LOA) to replace theL-19 Bird DO g, the H-13 Sioux,and the H-23 Raven. The heavy observation aircraft (HOA) to carry a multisensor package for aerial combat surveillance and target acquisition. This aircraft may bea type similar to the G-91NATO jet fighter (see DIGEST, April 1961, page 7). The heavy tactical transport(HTT) to carry troops from therear to a field army area as farforward as possible and landwithout the benefit of a permanent runway. This aircraft maybe of a V/ STOL type somewhere between the Caribou andthe Hercules C-130 in size.The remainder of the familyof aircraft: The medium observation aircraft (MOA), which presentlyis the Mohawk. The light tactical transport(LTT) , which presently is theIroquois. The medium tactical transport MIT) , which nO w includes the Caribou and Chinook. The flying crane, which willgive the Army an extra heavylift capability in the field. Thisaircraft may be similar to theS-60 (see DIGEST, NO V 1959).Rounding out the family are

STORY OF ARMY AVIATIONthe surveillance drones SD-2and SD-5 which will replace theSD-l. They are equipped witha number of sensory devicesfor battlefield reconnaissance.

Army Aviation has grownconsiderably since ThaddeusLowe's first balloon flight, orwhichever birthday we preferto recognize. t has produced adiversified group of aviatorswho owe primary allegiance tothe various Army branches.These pilots do not see all ofArmy Aviation's problems inthe same light. But they havetwo things in common. Theyknow the value of Army A via

tion to units engaged in combat, and they know that it willbe a difficult task to developthe full potential of air supportintegrated down to the lowestpossible levels of the Army.This generation of Army

Aviators must face the futurewith vigor and open minds.Brig Gen Clifton F. von Kann,Director, Arm y Aviation,summed up the Army Aviationpicture in an article publishedin March in the Army AviationSymposium magazine:Much progress has beenmade. I wish I could detailthe thO'usand and one actiO ns that have been positively influenced by the solidprO'grams of this last year -actions that have importanteffects O n our long range airmO'bility goals. We must not

w e dare not-let the impetus die. We must nO t settle back in a sea of complacency and expect a 10-yearplan to hatch itself withoutfurther effort. Equally imPO'rtant we must not belocked in concrete, oblivious to a changing situationand a changing state of theart. A plan is for guidance;it is not an immutable law. . .


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How Moderns ur Concept

aptain Paul C Swink, Jr., Inf

I s OUR ARMY AVIATION CONCEPT ofmodern vintage?Our current and proposed employment of

Army Aviation is bringing about new equipment and new organizations. These TOEchanges have been made in the light of ourmodern concept of the Army Aviation mission as stated in FM 1-5.Mission of Army Aviation: Expedite andfacilitate conduct of Army operations. Specifically, Army Aviation units are equipped andtrained to provide commanders with a significantly greater capability for -Mobility and ManeuverabilityCommand Control and Communications

Observa ion-Reconnaissance-Target Acq ui-sition.The effect of recent technological advancement is apparent in1. the armed helicopters of ARS troops andcompanies;2. superior battlefield mobility to offset theeffects of conventional and nuclear yields;3. improved target acquisition through thedevelopment of airborne infrared and airborneradar;

4. improved battlefield surveillance thatkeeps the commander abreast of the situationby furnishing him with current information(even surveillance between widely dispersedunits is furnished by aerial vehicles equippedwith television cameras ) ;

5 improved aerial photography through theuse of drones.But do we really have a modern concept?Let's take a look at a statement of aviation employment made some 43 years ago. I quotefrom Notebook for the General Staff Officer.The Air Service is a combat arm. t is usedfor the purpose of command, observation, liaison, and combat, and is employed as an integralpart of large units such as Divisions, ArmyCorps, Armies and General Headquarters .Reserves.

The Air Service at no time will be givenan independent mission.Its great mobility permits its employmentat great distances. Its mission, even in thisBefore his recent retirement, Capt Swink wasa senior instructor in the Dept of T actics, US -A V NS . H e s dual rated and instrument qualified

with apprf ximately 4,000 flight hours.


11/40

case, is the advancement of the interest of theArmy.The Corps Air Service is under the command of the Chief of Air Service of the ArmyCorps who, in accordance with G-3 of the Corps,

prepares the general plan of action for all theair units of the Corps. He insures the coordination of the Air Service plans of the Divisions,and supervises the employment of all Air unitsthroughout the Corps in accordance with approved plans.FQr tactical cQntrQI a PQrtiQn of the CorpsAiri Service--nDrmally one Observation SquadrDn and one Balloon Company - is usuallyplaced at the disPQsal Qf each divisiQn in theCQrps. The Divisional Air Service is under thecommand Qf the seniQr Air Service Officertherewith, and is emplQyed under the Qrders Qfthe DivisiQnal CQmmander.On the principal fighting front the Artyof the Divisional sectors or the Arty under thedirect command of the CO rpS Commander musthave at least Qne Air Flight at its disposal.This Flight is generally best placed under thecQmmand of the Arty CQmmander of the Division, or of a DivisiO'n or Corps Arty GroupCommander, since the impQrtant Arty tasks tobe carried Qut with airplane QbservatiQn CQmewithin their sphere. The Arty Commander ineach case allQts the airplanes to sub grQups inaccordance with tactical requirements. Thechoice of the pilot and Dbserver is left to theAir Service Commander.

The Infantry airplane liaison, as well asall the Infantry Missions within the sector ofthe Division, will generally be carried out by aFlight from the Observation squadron assignedto the Division for tactical cQntrQI, but nQt theFlights placed under the control of the ArtyCQmmander. Infantry and Arty airplanes mustmutually SUPPDrt each O'ther's actiO'ns. Battlereconnaissance in cO'nnection with the Infantrycombat necessitates continuQus Qbservation Qfthe whQle battlefield O n the main battle fronts.The Infantry airplane is, when there exist prQP-er cooperation and teamwQrk with the groundtroops, the mQst reliable and rapid means ofrecQnnaissance and of obtaining infQrmation ofthe battlefield.CIQse range aerial phQtQgraphy is usuallya function Qf the Corps Air Service.The fly leaf of the NO'tebook fDr the General Staff Officer bears the following inscription:

HOW MODERN IS OUR CONCEPT?General HeadquartersAmerican ExpeditiDnary ForcesOffice of Chief of StaffFrance, June 30, 1918This notebook for the General Staff Officeris approved and is published for the informa-

tion of this Command.By Command of General Pershing:Official:Robert C. DavisAdjutant General

James W. McAndrewChief of Staff

Technological advance in the field of aerodynamics has surely provided us with machinesfar superior to the Dnes f 1918. The air vehicles on the drawing bO'ards defy our imaginations even today. With the air vehicles nowavailable and those being developed, our hDrizons are unlimited. It is apparent that this improvement of the machine is one of our biggeststrides.In the realm of training, we are cDntinuallyrequiring more from the aviatO'rs whO fly theseadvanced aircraft. We require an instrumentrating and desire dual qualified persO'nnel. Wealso demand that the aviator be highly proficient in his ground branch.Greater stress is being placed on night missions, and our instrument flight capability isadvancing daily. These requirements are merely extensiDns of the qualifications demanded ofthe WWI aviatDr. The basic flight task ofArmy AviatiQn remains the same.The execution of this mission is dependentupon the complete integration andcoordinationof Army Aviation support of the Ground Tactical Plan. The methods and modes of accO m-plishing ur 43-year-Dld mission are limitedby the imagination and initiative of the users.We must continually explDit every methodmode of operation to accomplish our mission. We must use ingenuity comparable tothat example given to us by the aviator of WWIwho passed information to his ground commander by means of a note tied to a wrench.Is our great concern the development of amodern concept or doctrine? Or should ourmain efforts be aimed at the development ofthe operational modes and techniques of integrating Army Aviation as a tactical supportmeans? It was 43 years ago that the Note-book f r the General Staff Officer, stated, It isused fDr the purpose of cQmmand, observatiQn,liaison and COMBAT. 0

9


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rmorrmors erial Vehicle Must

Live n ombat EnvironmentARMOR IS A FIGHTINGcombined-arms team whosetraditional role emphasizes ahigh degree of mobility andfirepower in combat.Consisting 0 f t n k s n darmored infantry artillery engineer, and reconnaissance andsecurity units, the team is ablysupported by Army Aviation,a flexible and rapid communication network, and a mobile

logistics system all trained andequipped for mounted combat.The United States Army Arm-or School is continually appraising the mobility of theseunits realistically keeping inperspective current and projected capabilities of groundand air vehicles.

The potential value of newaircraft capable of living inthe forward area environment

) j,

>':''' RECONN ISS NCE _EFFORT:- ///,::r /// _ ..... ....... ,COMMUNlC TlON

10

excites the interest of thosewho visualize the dynamic bat-tlefield future of aerial andground combat elements working together and operationallycomplementing each other. Toaccomplish t h is cooperationand coordination, the ArmorSchool contends that an air-craft cannot be considered asophisticated, exotic item ofequipment. Instead aircraft

'\..'\.. -

- '\..


13/40

should be considered anothercombat vehicle-one not relying on ground means of locomotion or limited by terrainobstacles. When the aerial vehicle is so considered it mustbe provided to the ground combat commander who habituallyrequires its use.Traditionally cavalry unitshave performed ground reconnaissance for armies in thef i e I d. These reconnaissanceunits have always possessed animproved mobility differentialover ground combat forcesfrom the time of the horse cavalry to modern reconnaissanceunits in today s mobile Army.I n f a n t r y units are nowequipped with armored personnel carriers that can movecross-country and swim inlandwaterways. Tank units nowhave improved cruising rangesand obstacle crossing equipment. Artillery stresses mobility and increased ranges tosupport these mobile forceswith effective fires.

These advances create a needfor Armor reconnaissance unitsto continually improve theirmobility differential. How canthis be done? The solution liesin giving small reconnaissanceunits an organic aerial capability. Light observation aircraft organic to these highlymobile rapidly reacting reconnaissance units translate thefunctions of the old horse cavalry onto the modern battlefield.The aerial vehicle organic tosmall reconnaissance u n i t smeets the requirement for anagile observation platform responsive to the needs of theunit. In addition a need existsfor an air cavalry troop organicto battalion size reconnaissanceunits. This troop provides amobility and firepower differ-

ARMOR

PROPOSED ERI L VEHICLESIN RMOR UNITS

IMPROVED LIGHTOBSERVATION AIRCRAFT

CURRENT ERI LVEHICLES

IN RMOR UNITSL 19 BIRD DOGL 20 BEAVERH 3 SIOUXH 23 RAVEN

HU 1A IROQUOIS

MEDIUM OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT

UTILITY HELICOPTER

Figureential over ground units whileextending the capabilities ofthe parent reconnaissance unit.

Designed to perform reconnaissance and security missions the air cavalry troop iscomposed of aeroscout aerorifle and aeroweapons platoons. This unit carries thedexterity of the old cavalry into a third dimension with agilescout units, responsive rifleelements and an organic weapons platoon capable of providing an aerial base of fire forthe troop or for supportedground elements.Most exponents of improvedtactical mobility agree thatintegration of aerial vehiclesinto combat units at the lowestpossible level is a necessity.This opinion is quoted frequently in military periodicalsservice school stUdies andcombat development objectivestatements. As newer aircraftbecome available which possessgreater speed and require lesssophisticated main t ena nce,

they will progressively complement the efforts .of groundunits with newer ground vehicles.

Integration of aerial vehiclesat the organizational levelwhere they are constantly usedwill increase the number ofthese vehicles required in armor units. This increase ofcourse must conform to essential requirements and realisticprocurement capabilities. Implementation must be phased.A reduction in types of vehicles and product improvement will save on cost.

In the past year considerable publicity has been givento the Army s plans to reducethe various types of aerial vehicles from 15 to 7 The eighttypes of aerial vehicles now inarmor units will be reduced tothree. This reduction will simplify operation and maintenance reducing logistical costs.he resulting savings wil lgreatly offset expenditures inincreasing the numbers of


14/40

JUNE 1961a e r i a 1 vehicles. Figure Ag r ap h i ca l l y portrays t h ereduction.

ARMOR S ANSWERThe improved light observation aircraft will be organic toforward combat elements. Current Armor doctrine requiresthe new light observation aircraft in most combat units ofbattalion size and down to company size reconnaissance units.This means that the aircraftwill have to be rugged and reliable enough to operate andsurvive in the forward combatarea environment. The days ofthe helicopter s returning to anairfield at night will be a thingof the past; aircraft will livewith combat units. This helicopter must contain featuresthat will permit it to operatecontinually in forward combatareas and be rugged enough toplay its essential battlefieldrole.

Certain design features, important to the aircraft s compatibility to the forward area,present a real challenge to industry. Many of these featureswill have a corresponding commercial application. The following items represent problemareas that become apparentwhen considering aircraft employ men t closely integratedwith the tactical employmentof ground elements. The s ethoughts are intended to bringproblems into focus. They donot propose specific solutions;nor should they be consideredas qualitative materiel requirements.The improved light observation aircraft should be a small,versatile, two-or three-passenger vehicle. t must be simpleto operate, and organizationalmaintenance must not requirehighly skilled technicians.

The imp r 0 v e d helicopter2

should be quieter than presentmod e Is Some reduction innoise may be experiencedthrough improved rotor andengine design and by placingheat, light, and noise suppressors on the exhaust manifolds.Reduced noise will enable theaircraft to fly at low altitudesin forward areas while minimizing the probability of disclosing the locations of friendlyground elements.

Closely associated with thisnoise problem is one of easycamouflage. Newe r p a i n t sshould stress camouflaging aircraft during flight. The plexiglass inclosure on helicoptersis difficult to camouflage inmost combat situations. Reflected light readily disclosesthe location of aerial vehicleseven when in dense forests.Conventional camouflage netsdo not eliminate this particularproblem.

Perhaps a I i g h t wei g h t ,rugged throw-cover could bedeveloped with different camouflage patterns on each side.The cover could be constructedso it fits over the rotor huband extends in the form of atent. Then it could double as acamouflage cover and a forward area maintenance tent.The rotor would serve as a tentpole. Besides providing additional camouflage, this tentwould enable the crew to perfo r m organizational maintenance unhampered by weatheror blackout.Those who have manhandledcurrent helicopters 0 nt eground know that they areawkward to move, even on improved runways. This is a result of size, weight: and current helicopter landing gear.Visualize a present-day helicopter landing in a cleared areain the field. The required

ground handling into the surrounding woods illustrates theproblem of ground mobility. Toenable the vehicle to land andto be moved rapidly into awooded area for concealment,three things are needed: The helicopter s h 0 u I dhave collapsible r o t 0 r sthat can be folded back,clamped to the fuselage,and reassembled in a minimum of time. This will

make the helicopter moremaneuverable t h r 0 ughunderbrush and woo d sand adaptable to concealment.

Either retractable or detachable ground wheelswith improved flotationshould be added to facilitate ground handling. The weight of the vehicleshould be reduced.Many contend that the heli

copter will be too vulnerablein the forward areas. If aerialvehicles operate carelessly toofar out in front of friendlyground elements, they will become lucrative targets to hostile ground fires. This can beminimized by consistently employing ground and air elements so that each can reactrapidly enough to assist theother.Vulnerability can be furtherreduced by the h el i cop t e rmoving at high speeds whileat low levels. Called nap-of-theearth flying, the aircraft movesso fast in relation to its altitude that its vulnerability isr ed u c e d considerably. Theenemy is not given sufficientreaction time to employ effective ground fire.

Even during periods of normal visibility, nap-of-the-earthflying is not easy and requiresspecially t r a i ned personnel.During periods of limited vis -


15/40

bility, low-level flying is evenmore difficult-or impossiblebecause of the lack of adequatelow-level navigation e qu i pment. Equipment to rectifythis deficiency must be lightweight and rugged and shouldnot detract from the aerial vehicle s payload or performancecapabilities.Another facet of the vulnerability problem is the inabilityto protect personnel and critical aircraft parts from smallarms fire. Devices such as selfsea1ing gas tanks and sometype of protection for crewmembers and vital aircraftparts are one solution. The protective material used must belight enough to prevent interference with the aircraft's maneuverability. We are not quiteready for a flying tank

Although this article doesnot propose the flying tank,aerial vehicles must be armed.Air vehicles habitually operating in forward combat areasrequire an aerial weapons system. If the aerial vehicle is tolive on the dispersed, fluid, andporous battlefield of the future,it must have a defensive capability, primarily agairu;t groundfire. This defense involves thecapability of mounting weaponsystems on all vertical takeoffand landing aircraft. Speciflcvehicles to be armed can bedesignated in unit organizational charts, based on missionrequirements. The requirementfor aircraft armament systemsshould be solved initially byproviding aircraft with mounting kits to allow them to acceptmachinegun, rocket, or guidedmissile weapon systems. Thesemounts should be incorporatedinto the basic aircraft design,but again must be light enoughto preclude reducing the ma-

neuverability of the aircraft.Aerial vehicles must be designed to facilitate logisticalsupport in forward areas. Themost potent weapon on the battlefield is virtually worthlessunless it can be supported logistically. One phase of logistical support is maintenance.Armor has had long experience in solving maintenanceproblems associated with surface vehicles. Vehicle availability was, and is, the difference between survival and defeat. Current experience indicates that aerial vehicles canbe no more difficult to maintainthan tanks.Industry can do much tom a k e aircraft maintenanceeven simpler. A continuing effort should be made to developease - of - maintenance featuresfor the newer models of aerialvehicles. Ease-of-maintenancefeatures, including u n i t r e -placement of major components, will do much to minimizethe requirem,ent for aircraftmaintenance.

The trend toward turbine engines in Army aircraft produces one major problem area:JP-4 fuel. The highly volatilenature of this fuel creates

RMOR

handling problems in forwardareas. Since the turbine engines possess many desirableaviation maintenance and performance features, an apparentsolution lies in finding newer,more stable fuels. An alternative would be to develop a fuelcon t r 0 1 unit that, w h nmounted on the engines ofaerial vehicles operating in forward areas, will enable theaerial vehicle to utilize groundvehicle fuel.

The aerial vehicle as part ofthe Armor team has a greatpotential on the modern mobilebattlefield. Properly employed,it can play a dynamic role as amember of our modern combined-arms team. To realizethe capabilities of the aircraft,we must exploit its design possibilities and characteristics tomake it capable of living andoperating in the forward combat area environment. The developmental concepts and objectives presented h r e i nshould prove a challenge to industry's knowhow. With theseproblems solved, aerial vehiclesof the future will become morecapable of performing theiressential roles on the modernbattlefield.


16/40

Helicopter Vulnerabilityin an CR ompany

THE EXPERIMENT ALAERIAL COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE COMPANYhas been conducting firepowerand tactics demonstrations atFort Rucker and other poststhroughout the country andoverseas for the past 4 ;2 years.These demonstrations, viewedby large and varied audiences,always draw many favorablecomments from the spectators.However, many military viewers ask, What about the vulnerability of your armed helicopters to enemy fire, smallarms, enemy aircraft, missilesand electronic devices?" Theanswer of course is that helicopters utilized in an armed reconnaissance role are vulnerable, more or less to all typesof enemy fire mentioned. Everything that operates on thebattlefield, whether in the airor on the ground, is also vulnerable to these same enemyweapons.

Personnel who have workedclosely with this experimentalunit in evolving tactics andtechniques of employment believe that our present armedhelicopters have as good achance, or better, of successfully completing their missionas any vehicle used in an activereconnaissance role today. Notethat I say present armed helicopters - the ones we can havefully operational today.We have fought two wars inrecent years with a large partof -our ground recOnnaissanceforces - consisting of lJt -ton-- -

,: . - ',14,

Captain W. A. Johnson Jr., Inftrucks with .30 cal machineguns" light tanks, and infantrymen transported in halftracks or other vehicles withlimited mobility. Such a reconnaissance force could operateon roads at speeds up to about15 mph; cross-country, 5 to 8mph would 'be a fast pace. Inextremely rough terrain orswampy areas, you walk.At any of these speeds itisn't toOl hard for the enemyto mount some sort of counteraction to stop or reduce yourreconnaissance effort. Virtuallyall weapons on the battlefield,even small arms, are capable ofknocking out lJt -ton trucks andhalf racks. Tanks are coming infor more and more trouble asantitank weapons grow in number and accuracy. Conditionsof terrain will also affect theability of these groundboundvehicles to "dodge" concentrations of enemy weapons.Let's take a look now at thevulnerability of the helicoptersin an ACR Company. t is theopinion of personnel who workclosely with this unit thatACRC has an excellent chanceof survival on the battlefield.To give you some idea of whythey think so, let's examinetechniques that would be utilized in t ypical combat situa-tions.The company may be assigned at corps or divisionlevel and further attached toor placed in direct support ofa battle group or armored cavalry regiment. Regardless of

its echelon of employment, alarge number of its operationswill begin at rear areas- l0 to15 miles behind the battle area.This affords a relatively sheltered area from enemy weapons. This position is often thefinal assembly area. Units thatmust assemble closer to thefront, because of their limitedspeed and maneuverability, areoften under fire from enemyartillery.As the unit moves out on itsassigned mission, it takes advantage of routes over terrainheld by friendly forces. Groundunits moving in the forwardarea are often subject to enemy interdiction and observedfire. The ACR unit is movingtoo rapidly for conventional artillery to adjust on. Routes areselected to avoid known or suspected interdiction concentrations. Flight is along defiladedroutes and at extremely lowlevel to avoid enemy antiaircraft weapons.This extremely low flight notonly affords good protectionfrom antiaircraft and other automatic ground weapons butwill usually completely avoiddetection by radar and otherelectronic detection devices.ACR personnel believe theiraircraft will actually be safer

Capt J ohnson is the executiveoffier of the 8305th Aerial Com-bat R econnaissance Company 2dBatt le Group 31st Inf ntry Divi-sion F ort Rucker. H e is dualrated with 2 000 flight hours.


17/40

than high performance aircraftthat must operate at higher altitudes and be exposed to ra dar-operated antiaircraft ands0'phisticated missile systems.ACR helic0'pters can, of course,be attacked by enemy high-perf0'rmance aircraft, but they willn0't be an easy or safe target;they fly on the deck and havethe capability 0'f c0'ming to acomplete stop and changing oreven reversing direction almostinstantly.

Many ACR missions will, because of the very nature of theunit, have to be conducted 0'verterrain not held by friendlyforces. Under these circumstances, the armed helicopterconcept has many advantagesover conventional ground reconnaissance. The ACR unit willcarry out its reconnaissance atspeeds up t 90 mph. Whilespeed alone will not make, a reconnaissance vehicle invulnerable to enemy fire, its speedand maneuverability will certainly make it harder to hitthan vehicles traveling at 15t0' 20 mph.

This unit can aV0'id roadblocks and possible ambushesby simply by-passing suspectedlocati0'ns. Flight r0'utes 0'verswamps, heavy woods, and extremely r0'ugh terrain are therule rather than the exception.Fligh s over 0'pen, level terrain under enemy dominationare conducted only when absolutely necessary to the accomplishment 0'f the mission. Mostrec0'nnaissance can be conducted with0'ut actually flyingdirectly over the specific areaof interest. Here the helicopter has a distinct advantage inbeing able t quickly climb toa few hundred feet, check thesuspected area, and dive for thepr0'tecti0'n of the earth's cover.In S0'me instances, to ade-

quately perf0'rm detailed surveillance 0'ver a given area, itwill be necessary f0'r the reconnaissance helicopters to conduct their flights at altitudes 0'f200 to 300 feet to be able t0' 0'bserve fully. In such instances,the helicopters disperse overwider areas to reduce vulnerability. A flight of f0'ur reconnaissance aircraft may be dispersed, over a 5-mile area. Because 0'f their speed and abilityt0' travel 0'ver any type terrain,no matter h0'W rough 0'r impassable to ground vehicles,they are still mutually self-supporting.

When actually fired on orwhen enemy contact seems imminent, the higher-observationaltitude is immediately deserted f0'r ACR's old friend: thenap 0'f the earth. Those wh0'have seen the demonstrationsput 0'n at the U. S. Army Aviation Sch0'ol know what wemean when we use the termflying the nap of the earth.For those who may not be familiar with the technique,here's how it works: This isflying actually bel0'w treetoplevel. The aircraft often mustclimb 0'r roll their rot0'r toaV0'id trees or 0'ther obstacles.At this altitude it is not 0'nlydifficult to see the helicoptersbut actually hard to tell the directi0'n from which they arec0'ming because the noise is dist0'rted and will 0'ften sound asthough it is coming from an-0'ther direction.This ability to hide in thef0'lds 0'f the terrain is a w0'rkable technique in almost anytype of country. This wasproved during an ACR demonstrati0'n at Fort Bliss, Texas.The demonstration area wasthe flat desert floor. The terrain did not appear to varyover 10 feet in elevati0'n in 10

HELICOPTER VULNERABILITY

miles. At first we thought itW0'uld be impossible to concealhelic0'pters in flight in this typeof terrain. Once operationswere under way, however, wedisc0'vered that the desert vegetation (cactus, greasewood,etc.), small mounds and draws(that were not n0'ticeable atfirst) pr0'vided excellent covered avenues of approach.Eight armed reconnaissancehelic0'pters approached approximately 600 spectators in elevated bleachers over a distanceof four miles. Alth0'ugh thespectators were oriented as tothe helicopter's r0'ute of appr0'ach, they were n0't able topick them up until they hadapproached t0' less than 3/ 4-mile 0'f the stands. The helic0'pters c0'ntinued their appr0'ach and were within 600-700 yards bef0're they were visible long en0'ugh t0' be effectively engaged with small armsfire.

S0' far we have 0'nly mentioned rec0'nnaissance helic0'Pters 0'f the ACR unit. Thelight transport aircraft carrying the aer0'infantry platoonand the rocket-carrying ships0'f the aeroweapons plat0'on employ the same techniques ofevasi0'n while in flight. Thecapabilities of these two platoons add greatly t0' thestrength 0'f the unit; conversely, they cut its vulnerabilityfactor.

When detailed ground rec0'nnaissance is necessary, it isc0'nducted dism0'unted by theaeroinfantry p I t n , thuseliminating the requirement ofsending the reconnaissance heliC0'pters into extremely closeC0'ntact with suspected enemypositi0'ns. If the aeroinfantryC0'mes up against more thanthey can handle, they withdrawt0' a pickup point to be airlifted15


18/40

JUNE 1961out. The aeroweapons platoonalso helps reduce the unit's vul-nerability, not by e v s i v emaneuvers, but by offensive ac-tion. This platoon is composedof 4 rocket carrying helicoptersand 2 ships armed with SS-llwire guided missiles.Our latest rocket armamentsystem calls for each aircraftto carry two .50 cal machine-guns and twenty-four 4.5rockets-96 t these rockets inall. Each rocket is the approxi-mate equivalent of a 105 howit-zer shell; 96 of them equals thefirepower of more than 5 bnsof 105 howitzers firing 1 volley.These aircraft are used to workO ver and neutralize known andsuspected enemy troop concen-trations, convoys and similartargets, all of which will reducethe amO'unt of enemy fire be-ing directed at our friendly hel-icopters. These aircraft don'texpose themselves more thannecessary to deliver these fires

either. They can deliver thissuppressive fire on the run at80 mph, at ranges up to 1,500yards. This keeps them out ofrange of a majority of enemysmall arms fire. The helicoptersmounting SS-ll guided missilesadd a joint target capabilitywith the means and ability ofengaging and destroying armored vehicles, bunkers andsimilar hard targets. Theycan do this from up to 3,500meters a way, well out of rangeof enemy small arms fire in thevicinity of the intended target.While we do not advocate heli-copters attacking armored col-umns in a normal mission, thisweapon adds greatly to the cap-abilities of the unit; increasingit si firepower and flexibility ofmission assignment, and by sodoing further decreasing thevulnerability of the unit as awhole.Bear in mind that this dis-cussion on vulnerability is

based on the machines andequipment that we have avail-able today. Helicopters avail-able in the near future shouldbe faster, more maneuverable ,and will possibly incorporatesome type of armor protectionfor the crew and vital parts ofthe machine.Perhaps the best testimonialas to helicO'pter vulnerabilitycomes from the pilots whO flywith the Experimental AerialCombat RecO'nnaissance Com-pany. Many O f these aviatorsare veterans of ground combatin WO rld War II and Korea.Many pilO'ts upon init ial assign-ment t the unit are skepticalof the feasibility of the ACRconcept. After working withthe unit for a while they are al-most unanimO'us in stating thatthey WO uld prefer conductingextensive recO'nnaissance oper-atiO'ns by armed helicopterrather than by conventionalground vehicles.

An aeroweapons platoon armed with latest equipment has firepower equal to five battalions o1 5 howitzers firing one volley


19/40

As technical publicatiDns undergO cQnversiQn to the newmultimanual (TM-55 series)system, pilDtS and maintenancepersQnnel are cautiQned againstmisinterpreting the cQntent Qftime cQmpliance publicatiQnsunder the Qld and new systems.

PublicatiQns in the new system are gDing into use as theyare printed, but in the interimSQme cQnfusiQn may result dueto title and numbering changes.Time Compliances (TC's)will be retitled ModificationWork Orders (MWO's) underthe revised system. TC's listedin the DutgDing TM-1 systemwill not be entered Dr carriedQver to the new TM-55 system.On the date the new system beCQmes effective fO r yQur air-craft Dr equipment, MWO's willbegin and cQntinue Dn wherethe Qld TO's and TM-1's ended.However, equipment MWO's

may nQt be' listed under MWO-55 but under applicable technical service listings.CDnversiO n has been prQ-ceeding since early 1960. BycQnsulting the latest DA Pam310-4 "Index of TM's, TB's,SB's, LO's and MWO's yQUmay knDw if yQur aircraft Qrequipment publicatiDns are nDWcarried under the new systemas well as the current publication system.

Remember: TC's under theTM-1's are nQt reprinted as anew number under the TM-55's.Beware If yQU have cQmpletedall Qf the required TC's on your

equipment befQre the new system's publicatiQns b e c 0 m eavailable, yQU may begin wQrkQn the first listed MWO's withthe full knQwledge that yQUhave nQt QverlQQked any required wQrk Qr inspectiQns QnyQur equipment.

CQmbat aviators have beenfaced with the PQssibility Qfflash blindness since the adventQf nuclear weapQns back in1945. The intense flash Qf lightemitted by a nuclear explQsiQnis sure to cause temporary lQSSQf sight to anYDne IQQking inits directiQn. FDr Dver a decadea tDP priQrity prDject has beena means to protect the aviatorfrDm this temporary blindness.A visor has nQW been designed tol filter Qut Dver 90 percent Qf all infrared and ultra-viDlet light. The visQr is. a natural filter cQated with a gQldfilm, just slightly darker thanthe sun visDr Qn our presenthelmet. This visQr is to beadDpted by the Air Force as aninterim protective device.A secDnd prQPosal is to useeye glasses Qr sun visQr cQatedwith a chemical which turnsQpaque when activated by anultraviQlet light source. Thefirst light rays reaching theaircraft frQm the nuclear flashWQuld be ultraviDlet and WQuldturn the pilQt's cQated glassesQpaque, thus prQtecting himfrDm blindness. The ultimatedesign WQuld be glasses thatWQuld turn Qpaque when activated and then becDme clearagain after the fraction-of-asecond nuclear flash. Suchglasses have nDt yet been designed.

If Army Aviation is, to CQn-tinue to be the eyes in the skyfor the grQund cDmmander,

these eyes must nDt be threat-ened by nuclear flash blindness.

The first Army A viatiQnCommand and Staff OfficerCQurse gQt underway Qn 27March. This CQurse replacesthe Aviation Staff OfficerCQurse, which had a life spanQf abQut 31/2 years. The 6weeks prO gram Qf instructiQnprDvides fQr a cDmprehensivestudy f aviatiQn Qrganizationsin u type field army with emphasis Qn principles Qf emplQY-ment.

The employment of ArmyA viatiQn is geared to the dQc-trines of the cDmbat arms andis primarily applied as a CQm-bat support element Qf the typefield army. TO emplQy ArmyA viatiQn in terms Qf the unitsit is designed to supPQrt, theprQgram prDvides instructionQn the DrganizatiDn f the typefield army and the principles QfemplQyment Df its majDr CQm-bat, cQmbat sUPPDrt, and service sUPPQrt elements.Department f the Armylevel guest speakers supplement instructiQn by prQvidinga broad backgrQund of the highlevel planning of the ArmyAviation PrQgram. This CQm-prehensive course prQvides instructiDn which is nQt duplicated by any Dther service

ontinued on page 2217


20/40

IROQUOIS H34 CHOCTAW

Our thanks for the many comments andcritiques concerning TWX Excerpts which havebeen received recently.

Almost without exception, these commentscomplained about the brevity of the excerpts .For this we have no cure. TWX Excerpts arepublished solely to give you a picture of WHATtypes of accidents are happening so that youcan concentrate your preventive efforts in theright directions. To accomplish this and keepyou abreast of the latest accidents, it is impossible to always give the WHY . For instance,this month s excerpts cover the period 15 April-15 May 1961 . These must be in the hands ofthe printer by 17 May to be included in thisJune issue. Because of this, we cannot publishthe complete facts of each accident, incidentor forced landing .

Another comment, mainly from nonaviators,concerns the designation of aircraft types. Thesepeople are unable to develop a mental pictureof the type of aircraft involved . For this wehave a cure in the new head which includes allaircraft in the current Army inventory.H 13H HOVERED INTO TREE while parkingin confined area. Major damage to both mainrotor blades. No injuries .H 19 ROTOR BL DES STRUCK overhead signwhile aircraft was taxiing toward fuel pump.Major damage to main rotor blades. No injuries.L 19A PILOT S SHOE became wedged betweenright rudder pedal and side of cockpit duringlanding. Pilot s foot came out of low-quartershoe whi e attempting to get shoe free . Incidentdamage to aircraft. No injuries.

8

H23 RAVEN

HU 1A ENTERED HIGH RATE OF SINK duringlanding approach. Aircraft landed hard on leftskid. Major damage to left skid and rear crosstube. Rotor hub cracked. Engine drive shaftbent. Right rear engine mounting bolt andbracket torn free . Throttle inadvertently rolledoff during approach .U l A ENGINE SPUTTERED and backfired immediately after takeoff. Aircraft completedforced landing off end of takeoff strip with nodamage. No. 3 cylinder (unmodified) split fromaft spark plug across top of cylinder to forwardplug. Suspect valve clearance adjustment asoutlined in TB AVN 23-5-1 as possible cause .L 19A NOSED OVER while taxiing behind DC-6which was running up . Major damage. No in -juries.H 23C ENGINE FAILED in fl ight . Aircraft completed autorotative forced landing with no damage. Exhaust valve found stuck in open position.Piston assembly partially disintegrated. Causeundetermined pending analysis.L 19A STRUCK TREE during approach to roadstrip. Incident damage to left wing. No in juries.AO 1A RIGHT ENGINE FAILED in fl ight. Aircraft completed forced landing with no damage.Suspect materiel failure of No. 2 turbine wheel.L 20A VEERED TO LEFT during landing on wetrunway in l ight rain. Aircraft struck drainageditch and nosed over coming to rest on enginecowling and main gear. Major damage to leftmain gear forward bulkhead, fuel and controlsystems. Sudden engine stoppage. No injuries .


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L-23 SEMINOLE H-37 MOJAVE

H-19D CREWCHIEF O SERVED SMOKE infl ight . Aircraft completed precautionary land ing with no damage . Suspect materiel failure ofNo . 4 cylinder . Cause undetermined pendinganalysis .L-20A NOSED OVER to inverted position duringlanding roll. Suspect brakes locked . Maintenance performed on brake system day before .Right wheel found locked after accident. Majordamage . No injuries .H-13G ENGINE FAILED in flight. Aircraft com pleted forced landing with no damage . Gasketbetween carburetor throttle body and bowl failed ,causing carburetor malfunction .H-13E TIPPED OVER on left side during at tempted night landing to pick up injured patients . Dust caused vertigo at an altitude ofapproximately 3 feet during landing attempt.Major damage to all components . Passengersuffered slight head abrasion .H-21C EMITTED HEAVY SMOKE during take off. Aircraft completed forced landing with nodamage. Magnetic chip light came on just before touchdown . Suspect materiel failure ofengine .H-21C ENGINE BACKFIRED once, then stopped.Aircraft completed forced landing with no dam age. Cause of engine failure undeterminedpending laboratory analysis .H-21 C MAGNETIC CH I P detector I ght cameon in flight. Aircraft completed forced landingwith no damage. Forward magnetic sump plugchip detector revealed numerous metal particles .Suspect internal engine failure .

AC-l CARIBOU H19 CHICKAS

HU-l A CRASHED AND BURNED. Two passengers killed . Pilot crewchief and 3 passengerssuffered serious injuries. Short shaft betweenengine and transmission failed . Gear couplingfroze as result of extreme heat . Shaft shearedfrom coupling after seizure . Evidence indicateslow rotor rpm and high sink rate during emergency autorotation and at t ime of impact. Causeundetermined pending analysis.H-13G ENGINE LOST POWER in flight. Aircraftcompleted forced landing with no damage . Sparkplug from No . 2 cylinder blown ou t . Suspectfailure of threads in spark plug orifice .H-13G PILOT FELT IMPACT on aircraft inflight immediately followed by high frequencyvibration. Aircraft was autorotated to landingand struck trees. Major damage to main rotorblades, dynamic stop cables and right skid.Cause undetermined pending investigation.HU-1A TAIL ROTOR STRUCK TREE during lowlevel photographic mission. I ncident damage totail rotor blade. No injuries.L-23D SETTLED as landing gear started to retract during takeoff. Major damage to bothpropellers and main landing gear system.H-34C LOST CYCLIC CONTROL at altitude ofapproximately 800 feet . Aircraft executed several 36 0 0 turns while diving toward ground. Itstraightened out just before touchdown and completed forced landing with no damage. Aircraftwas apparently inverted once during the t ime itwas out of control. Suspect servo malfunction .Cause undetermined pending analysis .

9


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Qf reactiQn is much greater inan electric cQmputer than inman. But fQr intricacy Qf reSPQnse man is - thus far -superiQr.A majQr advantage Qf machines is their cQmplete freedo m ro m psychQIQgicalstresses anxieties and frustra-tions. Not sO we hQmo sapiens.The flier's anxieties can prQvefatal. Anger can quickly divertnormal reactions into a cumulonimbus Qf cQnfusion.MQst aircraft accident reports cQnclusively prove whathappened. The why is a differ-ent matter. t Dften leaves usbaffled. It has IQng been suspected that if we knew whatemQtiQns the pilQt was experiencing during the flight, wemight gain a much clearer insight Qf this why. OccasiQnally,an emQtiQnal factDr is clearlyevident. As when . . . .

LOST OVER TH EIRON CURTAIN

TwO aviators prQmised amorning Dff to conduct persQnalbusiness, were called back tothe flight line and assigned aChickasaw courier flight with

only 30 minutes nQtice. StQPand think a moment. WhatWQuld you feel in similar circumstances? Resentment? Anger? TO be cQmpletely hQnest,we'd probably have to admitbQth to sO me extent.HQW dQes this type Qf emQ-tiQnal experience manifest itself? In this case it began withpreflight planning. Althoughthe pilO t apparently intended tonavigate by radiO' aids, neitherhe nor the CQpilot thO'ught tobring along a Jeppesen manualor other publication listing enrQute and. destinatiO'n frequen-cies.

The flight departed on time,made twO brief passenger stQPSand cQntinued O'utbound. Theaircraft passed thrQugh an areaQf IQW visibility caused by thinfQg, light rain and haze. Emerg-ing into better visibility, bQthaviatQrs searched for familiarlandmarks. There were none.The flight was cO'ntinued to theestimated time Qf arrival at theQutbQund destination. Still nOfamiliar landmarks. The pilO tattempted to cQntact the destinatiQn to extend their ETA.He was unsuccessful. A red star

EMOTIONSwas sPQtted O n a rQQf belQw.The pilQt immedia tely turned toa west heading, flew to a high-way and landed. Attempts tofind their IQcatiQn and thedirectiQn to a familiar tQwnthrO'ugh questioning bystand-ers failed because Qf languagedifficulties.AnQther takeoff was madeand the aircraft was flQwn upand down the highway in asearch fQr familiar landmarks.NQne were fQund. The aircraftwas again landed near the high-way. This time they found 3mQtQrist whO was able to tellthem they were near a tQwn behind the irQn curtain. WithQnly 35 PQunds Qf fuel remain-ing, the pilQt elected to fly westward until the fuel was exhausted hQping to get back intOfriendly territQry.

He took O ff and flew west-ward alQng the highway. After15 minutes, the engine cQughedand died. The pilQt enteredautQrO'tatiQn and made an apprQach t an open area. ThefrQnt gear sank into SQft earthat touchdO'wn and cDllapsed,pitching the nQse Qf the air-craft dQwn. The pilQt appliedaft cyclic to keep the Chickasaw upright. This caused themain rO'tor to strike and severthe tail bQom. The aircraftcame to rest in a nQse IQw, upright positiQn. Crew and passengers fQund themselves stillbehind the irQn curtain.Mistakes made during thisflight were numerQUs. All Qriginated in the emQtiQnal state Qfthe crew befQre the aircraftever left the grQund.

TROUBLESWE ALL HAVE THEM

C h r 0 n i c Qr intermittentWQrry can cause preQccupation,a dangerQus disease for fliers.A man can wO'rry abO'ut almQst21


24/40

anything, and usually will. Hecan worry about his, wife, hischildren, his bank account, orhis career. If he runs out ofsomething to worry about, hisimagination will generally provide him a new worry in shortorder. The point is that worryis perfectly normal. It's sO me-thing we all live with. But thepoint at which it changes froma normal circumstance into adangerouS) cO'ndition is hard todefine. Continued distraction isprO'bably one of our best warnings. You've heard about theman who put the cat in therefrigerator and the beer onthe porch. An aviator in themidst of wool gathering may

Continued from p ge 7school. To satisfy the ever increasing need for command andstaff knowledge of Army Aviation, commanders in the fieldare encO'uraged to establish acontinuing requirement for

22

ignore a critical altimeter reading, or fO'rget to give properattention to his remaining fuel.Domestic difficulties probably rank as the number oneproblem for the average married man. A young aviator,married only three years, wasconfronted suddenly with divorce proceedings. Previouslyknown as an easy going andefficient pilot, he fell quicklyinto a depressed state-angrywith the world at one momentand sorry for himself the next.I t didn't take long for him tocrack up a Bird Dog on a routine flight.

Flying is an unforgivingtask. It cannot be properlyaccomplished by s m eon ewhose thoughts are centeredmiles away on divorce proceedings or any other distraction.Emotional upsets should rankwith head colds and brokenarms as a cause for temporarygrounding.Medical men have a theorythey call psychomotor reversalwhich involves distraction anda low level of attention. Anexample is the driver who stopsat a red light. While waitingfor the light to change, hepushes in the cigarette lighter.When the lighter pops out, offhe drives, firmly convinced thelight has changed. This typeof reverse reflex could provedisastrous in an aircraft.Fear is a normal emotion andone we have some degree ofcontrol over. Fear is the triggeryour body uses to marshal allquotas to the course.The first class in residencegraduated 5 May and then departed for Fort Lee, Va., wherethe students participated inLOGEX-61 for one week. ArmyAviation students manned avia-

its energies in the face of danger, real or imagined. This iswhy tranquilizers - which doaway with fear to some extenta r e dangerous for aviators.Chances are, the pilot who uses

tranquilizers, and dulls his fear,won't receive his red alertsoon enough to act in an emergency.A word about good cheer orbuoyancy. No one in his rightmind will knock a good mood.But the man whO is overly exuberant to the point of neareuphoria develops an attitudethat nothing can go wrong. Inthis state, it is very easy to exceed your own or your aircraft's limitations.The solution to the problemof emotions in flight is foundin early diagnosis or recognition. It's not a simple solution.The pilot who runs to the flightsurgeon with an earache willprobably shy away from revealing his domestic troubles. Often, the flight surgeon couldspot emotional strain. But theflight surgeon isn't alwaysavailable. The aviation commander, in direct daily contactwith the aviators in his command, is probably best situatedto note emotional changes.When these occur, he shouldinsist on prO'fessional care. .

In the final analysis, youremotions are your problem.When they get out O f hand, it'stime to seek help. f you can'tpostpone your worrying or getsomeone else to do it for you,stay on the ground. D

tion staff PO'sitions in exerciseheadquarters of 10th Army,TALOG, BALOG, and ADLOG.The Staff and Faculty of theUSAA VNS acted as controllerswith the major effort carriedby instructors O f the C SOC.


25/40

L IEUTENANT GYROS re -turned to his unit, a corpsflight detachment, after attending instrument school inan overseas command. Histraining had been excellent, andLieutenant Gyros had showngood progress throughout thecourse and graduated well upin his class. This man obviouslyhad good future potential tothe instrument flying game.He had desire, ability, and -what isn't available to everyonet h e opportunity of making

many instrument flights withno shortage of properly equipped instrument aircraft.Did he fulfill his, potential?Well-yes, eventually, but onlywith luck and the help and encouragement of the instrumentexaminer who later took himunder his wing.

An unusual case? No, gentle-

flight commander, or anyonewho has a command functionover, the pilots concerned.Let's look at a classic example of the above. Gyros re

ported back to his unit on Monday morning. He checked inwith the aviation officer andthey batted the breeze aboutthe school he had attended."Great," says Gyros, "I'm allfor this instrument flying; it'sreally something.""I 'm glad you feel that way,Gyros," said his aviation officer, "because tomorrow morning I've got you laid on to takeMajor Hasty up north, and it'sforecast to be IFR.""Well, okay, sir. Who will becopilot ?""Copilot? What do you wanta copilot for? You've got aticket haven't you? Besides, Ican't spare anybody."

knows he isn't really ready toleap this hurdle, but he'd diebefore admitting it. Wouldn'tyou?He takes off; gets, the clearance he filed for. His copilotkept his hands off the radiosand his mouth shut. An uneventful flight up, in and out ofclouds. Well, thinks Gyros, thisisn't bad, no sweat. Nothinghappened when he was expecting the worst, so he relaxes.On the return trip, troublelooms before he ever gets offthe ground. The German forecaster won't clear him VFR,nor will he clear him in clouds,due to reported icing conditions. Who is the IP he canturn to? Where is the instrument rated copilot he can talkto? Where is anybody who hashad at least one instrumentflight before?

etting Started on the augesmen, a big emphatic NO twould be more correct to say,"an everyday event."

The reason is simple, andalthough it is taking placemuch less frequently than itwas 5 years ago, it s,till happenstoday. It boils down to thesepO.ints:

1. Lack of understanding ofthe problems and normal anxieties facing a newly instrumentrated pilot.2 Absence of advanced instrument training programsprovided for them.3. Lack of interest shown inthe newly rated pilots.All these are due to theapathy of the aviation officer,

Captain James A. McDonald Arty"Well, uh, sir, I sure would

like to have one, this being myfirst flight and all.""Alright, alright, take Lieutenant Bluesky.""Ah, sir, Lieutenant Blueskyisn't instrument rated and hejust got here last week.""Look, take him or nobody.""Yes sir."Impossible you say? Unh

Unh. Let's follow this further.That night in his quartersGyros plans his flight down tothe last detail. The next morning he files out, nervously wondering if he is a little bitchicken. All that's wrong withhim is a case of normal caution and common sense. He

Gyros may be shook, but heisn't stupid, so he asks, "Whatare the tops?" The forecastergives 8,000 feet and says hewill clear him VFR 1,000 feeton top. Sa l va t ion thinksGyros. He files, gets clearanceand climb - out instructions.N ow the party starts. Thesecond Gyros enters clouds his

Capt Mc Donald was a flightcommander in the Instrument Di-vision Dept of dv F j W Train-ing US VNS before his assign-ment to A PHS Camp WoltersT exas. H e has over 2 5 flighthours.23


26/40

JUNE 1961

windshield glazes over. Next,at 3,000 feet his ADF gQes CQm-pletely berserk. GyrO's' trainingCQmes intO play and he gQes tomanual IQQP. At 6,000 feet hisIQQP freezes and he can't turnthe crank. By this time he isicing heavily, and flying a MAGheading trying to get up ontQPHe is still in it at 8,0001 feet,airspeed falling Qff, cQntrQlssluggish, everything firewalled.He repQrts same, and is clearedto climb unrestricted to VFRQn tQP. By this time the CQpilQtis tightening up his chute and

looking fQr the door jettisQnhandle - a real cQnfidencebuilder he is At 9,500 feet heis still in it and can nO IQngerclimb. GyrO s is beginning tothink the CQpilQt has the rightidea when Qut Qf the blue anRAF base radar QperatQr callshim and asks if he desires assistance. By vectQring and descending him, they put him beIQW the Qvercast and Qn CQurse.GyrO s IQst the ice, gQt hisradiO's back, and his first consciQUS act was to cancel R -fQr then and as far as he wascQncerned fQrevermQre

FQrtunately, GyrO s was rehabilitated. His aviatiQn Qffi-cer's successor was an infQrmed, well grQunded CQm-mander, and thrQugh his interest in prQper training, GyrO swas given extensive CQpilQtduty with experts. GyrO s wassalvaged fQr further instrument flying. He was fQrtunate.HQW many are nQt?NQw, befQre all yQU: aviatiQnQfficers lean back and give anQld har de har har, cQuldn'thave happened," let me assureyQU it can, and did. I am Lieutenant GyrO s.

l i e in Winter hieldPLANNING and contrQlling traffic in the. airspace abQve the mQdern battlefield presents perplexing and unprecedented prQblems.Jets SWQQP thrQugh the air cQrridQr atspeeds Qf 500 mph. DrQne surveillance craftslice thrQugh the skies Qn recQnnaissance. Missiles need plenty Qf elbQw rQQm when theyblast to ward their target. Helicopters and fixedwing planes mQve troops and equipmentthrQugh battlefield airspace. Aerial supplycraft head fQr pinpQint parachute drops, andcargQes Qf wQunded dash thrQugh the air tothe hands of medics.CrisscrQss, crazy quilt, a hundred differentspeeds, a SCQre Qf altitudes, and CQuntless specific needs-that's the ever-changing sky pIC-ture presented to three U S. Army Flight OperatiQn Centers during WINTER SHIELD II.Each Flight OperatiQns Center (FOC) managed a sectQr Qf the 6,500 square acres Qf airspace turned Qver to exclusive Seventh ArmycQntrQI by the West German gQvernment. FrQmJanuary 25-February 10 thisl airspace becamecQmbat space, and every plane alQft cleared itsrQute, speed, altitude and destinatiQn with FOCtraffic managers.RQutes fQr heliborne battle grQUps, aerialattackers, drQne photO flights, combat and medical suppliers-all battlefield aviatiQn missiQnsare reported to flight O'peratiQns crews andtracked Qn up-to-the-minute charts. When jetQr missile rO'utes have to be cleared in a hurry,Qr simulated nuclear blasts turn nearby air-24

space intO a nO man's land, FOC staffs put theirradiO finger Qn each plane affected and clearthe danger area.As planes apprQach their landing site, FOecQntrQI is passed to ApprO'ach CQntrQI TQwers(ACT) fQr terminal directiQn. Markedly different frQm familiar tower cQntrQI adj acent toan airstrip, each ACT can radio-direct landingsand takeQffs fQr many different landing siteswithin its sectQr.When a WINTER SHIELD II aviatQr takesQff in clear weather, he may be airbQrne befQrereceiving central clearance, getting rQuting infQrmatiQn frQm his FOC while in the air.Assured of clear apprQach lanes by ACT,aviatQrs may either land ,visually, home in onradiO beacQns, Qr take guidance frQm GrQundCQntrQI ApprQach GCA) radar.As traffic techniques undergO' refinementFOCs, ACTs and GCAs will be as mQbile as

the Flight OperatiQns Center at GrafenwQehr.In its final fQrm the entire operatiQn will beable to mQve with the battle.

WINTER SHIELD II is the first time Seventh Army has had total cQntrQI Qf airspace ina simulated cQmbat situatiQn. This is a bigchange from the single prQvisiQnal FOC thathelped the Air FQrce air cQntrQllers in lastyear's winter maneuver. TQday, Seventh Armyair traffic cQntrQI is ready fQr everything frQmjet strikes to nuclear detQnatiQns abQve itsbattle area. 0


27/40

S A MEMBER of an air-craft accident investigationboard, Y U have worked manylong hO urs to gather all the information necessary fDr theaccident report. YDu ve done afine job and now it s.ended. Butis it? What happens now? Isthe repo.rt filed away and forgo.tten, o.r is it put to go.od use?To. find the answers to thesequestio.ns, let s fo.llow your rePo.rt as it leaves the investigatio.n bo.ard and arrives at theU. S. Army Board for AviatiDnAccident Research. As youlearned from DA Pamphlet95-5, Handbook for Aircraft

Accident InvestigatDrs, the so.lepurpo.se of conducting aircraftaccident investigations is to.prevent future accidents. Thisis accDmplished by assemblingdata and evidence to indicatethe conditions which, if theyhad been corrected or changed,Wo.uld have prevented the accident or minimized the extent o.fdamage or degree Df injury.

\FILED R USED

The questions is, Ho.W is thisdata used?To. get the full picture, let sgo back for a mo.ment to. thetime just after the accidentoccurred. As you ll remember,a TWX crash facts messagewas dispatched. This messageco.ntained all the info.rmationavailable at that time. It to.ldwhat type aircraft was involvedand where the accident happened. It classified the accidentas m

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Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1961

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