Army Aviation Digest - May 1989

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A UNITED STATES ARMY

Professional Bulletin 1-89-5

FrenchLieutenants

page 42

Distribution Restriction: This publication approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.


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The Aviation

11 AirLandPEARL'S

Views From Readers

NCO-ER: Aviation

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C o m n n i s ~ ; i o l , e d Officers'

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The AdrMtd tlAAT TeH

Captain Mark FerrellCaptain Scott Reynolds

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors andnot necessarily reflect the views of any Department of Defense age

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By now everyone in the worid of attack aviation has heard of advanced joint air attack team(AJAAT) operations; however, few have had the chance to leam the techniques involved. AJAATis JAAT with advanced helicopters, such as the AH-64 Apache, that can provide laser designationalong with target-killing capability. The AH-64, employed in a mid-intensity, low-altitude AJAATengagement, significantly increases U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt standoff ranges, eliminatingthe most difficult task for the A-10-target acquisition.

This article responds to the need for a "user's guide" until the results of the AJAA T test can beincorporated into our operational pamphlets and doctrine. Also, we hope to give enoughbackground to answer the question, "How did you guys come up with that? " which is sure to beasked.

So get ready for a bit of hangar flying and welcome to AJAAT, where a laser spot is worth athousand words!

A LITTLE KNOWNhistorical fact is that the firstmission flown by the Army'sinitial AH-64 squadron, the 7-17Cavalry, 6th Cavalry Brigade,was a JAAT. I t was March 1986.The AH-64s of the "heavy cav"still had their "new car smell" onthat early morning flight as theyjoined up with the A-lOs of the9l7th Tactical Fighter Group, AirForce Reserve, Barksdale AirForce Base (AFB), LA.As it often seems to happenwith those things that expand tosomething big, this first operational Apache mission startedwith a phone call. The Louisiana"Warthog" pilots needed somebombing practice. Since the 7-17Cavalry owned the requiredairspace, they decided to call upthrough the good-old-boy network(unit-to-unit) to see i f they couldwork something out. During thisphone conversation between

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

operation officers, the words laserand Pave Penny came up. I t wasagreed that the A-lO's price ofadmission to bomb the Ft. Hood,TX, impact area would be theirwillingness to bring along theirPave Penny laser tracking podsto see i f hey would work with theApache's laser.Both sides were a bit curiousbut nothing more. They did notknow that after this first mission,JAAT would never be the same.But after the A-lOs hi t the firsttarget on the first pass using PavePenny ' laser tracking, everyoneknew that something washappening "way down Texasway"! Thus, the squadron commander told the brigade commander, who told the corpscommander, who just happenedto mention it to his Air Forcecounterpart (and everyone knowsthat three-star generals tendto make things happen). The

AUTOVON lines between Ft.Hood and Nellis AFB, NV, beganto run hot. I t was not long untilthe S3 of the 7-17 Cavalry wastalking to the Air Force projectofficer for JAAT with advancedhelicopters. The advanced. JAATtest was on, and it all beganbecause the boys from Louisiananeeded to drop a few bombs.The TestFor the test, the 7-17 Cavalry(now redesignated 3-6 Cavalry)was paired up with the 422d Testand Evaluation Squadron (TES),A-lO Branch, of the 57 FighterWeapons Wing at Nellis AFB.The 422d TES is a unique unit;its mission is to test and developtactics and doctrine for the U.S.Air Force Tactical Air Command(TAC). These high-time A-lOpilots, with extensive operationalexperience, are true subjectmatter experts. They write

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doctrine only after they havetested it themselves from thecockpit.For the Army's part, the 3-6Cavalry displayed al l of thecharacteristics one would expectof a unit chosen to be first withAH-64s. Of the 45 assignedApache aviators, more than 28were senior or master aviators.All were experienced attack andscout aviators, many of whomhad taken part in earlier .T" \tests. The 3-6 Cavalry c .. Imander, LTC Kenneth R.McGinty, had been the troopcommander during the TacticalAircraft Survivability Validationtest. The tactics and techniquesfrom this 1979 joint test were themajor sources for what came tobe known as JAAT.The AJAAT test was conducted in three phases. [For additional information on the test, see"AJAAT," February/March 1987and "Scouts Out," September1987 Aviation Digest.] Phase Itook the 3-6 Cavalry to the vastinstrumented and threat radarranges of Nellis AFB to assessboth high- and low-threatdaylight AJAAT. During phaseII, the 422d TES traveled to Ft.Hood to refine the developmentof phase I.Phase II also evaluated nightAJAAT in a low-threat arena. Asanyone who has spent time inTexas can tell you, the month ofDecember is "monsoon season"at Ft. Hood. Thus, phase II of theAJAAT test was affordedEuropean-like weather of lowceilings and limited visibility.

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The third and final phasefound both units deployed to Ft.Sill, OK. At Ft. Sill, the terminology worked out during phasesI and II was tested against atarget array unknown either tothe 3-6 Cavalry or the 422d TES.In addition, the full effect ofartillery on AJAAT was providedby the 155 mm guns ofB Battery,3-18 Field Artillery Battalion, Ft.Sill. Finally, to verify the test, OH-58D Kiowa crews of the FieldArtillery School were trained forAJAAT. Their success inapplying AJAAT proceduresquickly solidified the work of the3-6 Cavalry and 422d TES.More than 300 AJAAT missions were flown during the threephases. The results of eachmission were reviewed andsometimes hotly debated duringpost-mission debriefs. Many oldand valued JAAT techniqueswere found to be outdated or unneeded when conducting AJAAToperations. Giving up these oldhabits did not come easily sincemany members of the test (Armyand Air Force) had taken part inthe original JAAT testing anddoctrine writing. Once it wasunderstood that we had indeedarrived at something that was"advanced," nothing was heldfrom questioning. Because of thededication of the members of the3-6 Cavalry and the 422d TES,the previous boundaries of JAAToperations were transcended.Lessons LearnedAJAAT Tactics. While thebasic doctrine for JAAT is sound,

a high degree of refinement wasapparent when AH-64s wereused. With AJAAT, greaterefficiency through total integration and distribution of firesis now a reality. The AH-64'ssophistication, coupled with theA-10's Pave Penny laser tracker,produces more firepower on thebattlefield. With the AH-64'simproved optics and onboardlaser designator, the AJAAT cannow detect, identify and destroyenemy armor at ranges in excessof 7 kilometers. The AJAAT canrespond better to the spontaneousbattlefield. By using the laser, thetarget hand-off between theteams was greatly improved.Communications between theteams was reduced and, thus, sowas the confusion factor ofmissed or misunderstood radiocalls.With the A-10's Pave Pennytracking the AH-64's laser, thepossibility of multiple attackswas realized and the problem ofthe A-10 not sighting the targetarea was eliminated. The A-lO'sinfrared (IR) Maverick waslocked on to targets well beyondthe pilot's visual range. The cueto the target's location, given bythe designating AH-64's laser tothe A-10's Pave Penny tracker,produced greater stand-off for theA-10. AJAAT experience indicates that the A-10 can acquirethe AH 64's laser spot in excessof 20 kilometers from the targetarea location.During engagements with theA-10's 30 mm cannon, "blindshots" were found possible. This

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means that the A-IO pilot neednot be in visual contact with histarget. All he has to do is verifythe correct target area and shootat the cue that appears on thepilot's heads-up display (HUD).This blind shot is most effectiveagainst targets in tree lines wherevisual contact by the A-IO pilotis not possible. AJAAT greatlyimproved the survivability, effectiveness and efficiency of allmembers of the team.

AH-64 Tactics. Early on duringthe fielding of the AH-64, themembers of the 3-6 Cavalryrealized that they were not onlyworking with a new aircraft, butwith new tactics as well. Thetraditional "scout-gun" mix ofodd numbers and unlike aircraft

tasked and organized into lightand heavy teams did not workwith the technologically advanced AH-64.By adopting the lead-wingmanconcept of even numbers andsame type aircraft, the true powerof AH-64 was realized. Up tothree two-aircraft AH 64 sectionscould be formed per troop.Because of this, a largerengagemen area could becovered by the AH-64s, offeringgreater target opportunity andmaneuver space for all membersof the AJAAT team. The scouts,using the same two-shiporganization, could now deploytwo sections ahead of the AH-64sto establish early contact withboth friendly and enemy

FIGURE 1: Advanced joint air attack team tests.

KILL ZONE 73..KILL ZONE 75 ----...

elements. The scouts could then"fix" the battlefield early on,bringing in theAH-64s and A-lOswhen the moment was right. Byusing two-ship sections withinthe troop framework, betterdispersion, greater flexibility andoverall mutual support wasrealized. I t was these tactics andorganizations that the 3-6Cavalry used during the test(figure 1).

A-10 Tactics. Because of theAH-64's laser designation, the effective use of four-ship A-IOtactics was now possible. Bothsections of two A-lOs werebrought" in on the target or ondifferent targets. The A-IO leadcontrolled the timing betweensections. When maximum fire-

-......... -

~KILL ZONE 71~ ~~ KILL ZONE 72~

KILL ZONE 74

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power was needed, the sectionswere brought in at the same timeby using a second AH-64 for oneof the sections. When conductingthis type of four-ship attack, eachA-IO section was given its ownlaser code. A single AH-64 workeda four-ship section by putting allA-lOs on a single code during asequential attack.Designating AH-64. A concernearly in the test was that thedesignating AH-64 would becomea nonkiller. This proved not to bethe case. The AH-64 thatdesignated for the A-lOs wasactually fighting with threeweapon systems. As the AH-64lased for the A-IO's attack, it alsowas launching remote HELlrFIRE missiles that are coded up

on its wingman's laser code. I tcovered the A-IO coming off thetarget with its own weapons.Thus, the designator was still akiller, but now with three different systems.The Scout. The scout is the manwho puts the AJAAT together.He clears the AH-64s into thebattle positions that best coverthe kill zones. He fires the artillerythat drives the enemy into the killzones, breaks off antennae, putsholes in his radars and buttonshim up. The scout conducts theinitial target brief to the A-lOs i fan Air Force forward air controller (FAC) is not available andturns the A-lOs over to thedesignating AH-64. While doingall of this, the scout also main-

FIGURE 2: A-10's Pave Penny tracked the AH-64's laser.

.................0: '

B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~..I D 0

Pave Penny

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tains contact with higher headquarters and briefs the nexttroop's scouts that will enter thebattle. The scouts give theAJAATsituational awareness.Artillery. Preplanning artilleryin serials on, to the flanks andto the rear of the kill zones worksbest for AJAAT. The squadronfire support officer (FSO) is thekey planner between the aviationand artillery forces. The scoutsare the executers of the FSO'splan. When able, the scouts wouldpick up the firing unit's forwardobserver (FO) for quicker artilleryintegration. During a spontaneous AJAAT, flying the FO wouldbe the best way of quicklyworking in the artillery.Pave Penny. During everymission, once the A-IO achievedintervisibility with the targetarea, Pave Penny lock-on wasquickly established. The bestattack angles off the AH-64'slaser-to-target line were within 60degrees either side of the line.Pave Penny lock-ons beyond 60degrees were seen but determinedto be undependable. One tacticthe A-lOs began to use was tomake a "recce" bump at the initialpoint (IP) to detect the laser spot.By picking up the spot briefly atthe IP, theA-IO lead could remaskand adjust his flight path for thebest terrain masking en route tothe target area. Many PavePenny lock-ons from the IP werebeyond 20 kilometers (figure 2).IR Maverick. For survivabilityand effectiveness, the IR Maverick missile is the A-IO's bestweapon. So often when thinking

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about A-lOs, one cannot help butfocus on the 30 mm cannon andits ability to rip open tanks likea can opener. While this is true,it must be noted that whenengaging a tank an A-IO mayhave to close to within 2,000 feetto ensure a kill! That is little morethan 600 meters to those of uswho think metric when measuring distance. Conversely, theIR Maverick gives the A-IO atremendous stand-off capability.The shortcoming of the IRMaverick has been the need of heA-IO pilot to acquire the targetvisually before he could lock-onand launch the missile. DuringAJAAT, the designating AH-64can use 126-power optics fortarget identification. The IRMaverick has only a 6-poweroptic. By using the Pave Pennycue displayed on his HUD, theA-IO pilot quickly aligned his IRMaverick seeker boresight over itto achieve lock-on and launch the

FIGURE 4: Specific target brief.

1. Target location . . . . . . . . . . . . PK 224569

2. Target description . . Northernmost tank

3. Elevation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n 3 feet

4. Laser code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1668

5. Laser-ta-target line . . . . . . . . 190 degrees

6. Restrictions . . . . . . . . Do not overfly spot

7. Remarks . . . . . . . . Call departing Bagget

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missile. When using AJAATtechniques most IR Mavericklaunches were beyond the A-IOpilot's visual range (figure 3).Communications

Upon the A-IO's arrival at theIP, the lead scout (or the scout

tasked by the commander to workthe A-lOs) conducted the standard JAAT brief to the A-IO lead.This initial JAAT brief from thescout to the A-IO was a situattional awareness brief and ispassed on the troop commonultrahigh frequency (UHF). UHF

DESCRIPTION: TV guided or infrared rocket-propelledair-to-ground missile for use against field fortifications, SAM sitesand armored vehicles.GUIDANCE: Homing, proportional navigations, TV guided.CONTROL: Four control surfaces on tail section,hydraulic pump and four hydraulicservopositioners.WARHEAD: Shaped charge.PROPULSION: Solid propellant,dual thrust.CERTIFIED: A-7, A-10, F-4, F-16.MGT/ENG RESPONSIBILITY:AFLC/OO/ ALC.FIGURE 3: AGM-65 Maverick missile.

Description1. PK 224569. While the AH-64's sighting and fire cont rol systems are capable ofeight digit UTMs, the A-10 pilots found six dig its worked best fo r their needs.2. Northernmost tanks. The A-10s are being brought in on the northernmosttanks firsl This helps to paint a picture fo r the A-10 pilots.3. 773 feet. Elevation of n 3 feet is also by way of the AH-64's fire controlcomputer. This information will affect the A-10's attack profile and is necessaryinput fo r the A-10's computed s ight system.4. 1668. This will be the laser code the AJAAT will use. This code will ensuredeconfliction with codes being used for HELLFIRE delivery. The A-10 pilo tenters this code into the Pave Penny by way of cockpit switch settings. 1668(typical training code) is the laser code that the Pave Penny will "look" for.5.190 degrees. The laser line, 190 degrees, is needed so that the A-10 pilot canensure that he is wi thin 60 degrees either side of it for Pave Penny lock-on.Also, by drawing a back azimuth from the target using the laser line, the A-10pilot can picture where the AH-64 is.6. Do no t overfly spot. This restriction is to keep the A-10s from flying intoImpacting artillery 2 kilometers to the south. This is an optional call.7. call departing 8agget Bagget is the name of the IP. The call for departing theIP will al low the AH-64 to ready himself to designate the targel The AH-64could have told the A-10 to "depart Bagget in__ minutes," or "departBagget at my command."

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FIGURE 5: Coordination calls.

IP and weapon. This situationalawareness call informs all in the AJAATteam that an A-10 has departed the IP andis inbound to the target. Naming the typeweapon to be used is a means ofdeconfliction. When employing theMaverick, normal launch ranges put theA-10 overhead or slightly ahead of the AH-64. Gun, rocket or high drag generalpurpose bomb employment will require theA-10 to cross in front of the AH-64 toposition itself for target engagement. Byknowing what weapon the A-10 will use,the AH-64 can continue firing (Maverick),or hold its fire (gun, rocket, bomb). TheAH-64 should hold its fire when the A-10has crossed in front of it within 1 nauticalmile of the AH-64's gun-target line. Anexample call would be, "Hog-1, Bagget,Maverick."30 Seconds. With the extended range

of the IR Maverick, it is difficult to predictA-10 ordnance impact. Therefore, theA-10s use 30 seconds to mean that theA-10s are 30 seconds away from the AH-64's area of influence. An area of influenceis defined as the A-10s entering an areaof deconfliction with the AH-64s becauseof munition flight paths. Thirty secondsgive the AH-64 time to complete its presentengagement, acquire a new target for theA-10 and prepare to lase that target. Simplystated, "30 seconds" means that the A-10

will need a laser spot from the AH-64 in30 seconds!Laser on. The A-10 calls "laser on" atthe start of its roll-out. Laser on is echoedby the AH-64 so that the A-10 is assuredthat the laser on call was heard.

Spot. The A-1 0 has a Pave Penny lockon.Terminate. The A-10 has launchedordnance or has visual contact with thetarget and no longer needs the laser.Careful planning must be done when A-10s are attacking in line or wedgeformations to ensure that the lead A-10does not terminate the laser before thewingman's lockon. When in trail, each A-10 will make separate "laser on" and"terminate" calls.Shift. Once the lead A-10 engages thetarget, a "shift" call can be made by himor the wingman to shift the laser to thenext target. The laser must remain onduring the shift to maintain a Pave Pennylockon. If the laser is tumed off, the PavePenny will revert to a search mode.Depending on the search mode, it couldtake 10 to 20 seconds to reacquire the laserenergy, leading to unacceptable exposuretimes and aborted attacks. When theAH-64 has the next target acquired he calls,"Set."Lock-launch. Maverick lock and launchadvisory call indicating that there isstandoff ordnance inbound.

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was found to have the best rangeof al l the radios within theAJAAT team with the addedbenefit of Have Quick antijamcapability. The frequency modulated radios were used to communicate with the groundcommander and the artillery.Each section within the troop hadits own very high frequency forlead-wingman communication.The scout was in the bestposition to see the "big picture"without actually having to see thetargets, which the designatingAH-64 will bring the A-lOs on.The scout must be ready toconduct a complete, nine-line,FAC-to-fighter brief i f a FAC isnot on the scene. Once the initialbrief was complete, the scouthanded the A-lOs to the designating AH-64 who gave the A-lOs thespecific target brief. Up to thispoint everything had gone thesame as any standard JAAT.With the hand-off to the designating AH-64, it becomes advancedJAAT. The AH-64 thatwill designate for the A-lOs conducted thespecific target brief (figure 4, page7). ThisAH-64can be the aviationcommander or whichever AH-64the commander has chosen towork with the A-lOs. Everyonewithin the AJAAT team must beable to conduct this brief anddesignate for the A-lOs. The notionthat the aviation commander hasto do this to control the AJAATis false. He may be out of positionat the time, bu t knowing thesituation he can task the AHwhich is in the best position touse the A-lOs. The specific targetbrief from the AH-64 to the A-IOlead was the detailed descriptionof the target that the A-IO willattack.Laser CoordinationSpecific procedures from J-LASER were used during thecoordination calls for AJAAT(figures 5 and 6). During anycomm-jam, Have Quick UHF

FIGURE 6: Example of AJAAT communications.

A-10: "Scout 1, Hog 1, Bagget"OH-58: "Hog 1, Scout 1, brief follows."A-10: "Hog 1, ready."OH-58: "PK 2256, Bagget, 10 tanks

moving west, ZSU, SA-9east of tanks, friendlyground to the north,friendly helos to thenortheast, friendly artilleryimpacting 2 km south,contact Apache 1 thisfrequency."

A-10: "Hog 1 copies all."A-10: "Apache 1, Hog 1, Bagget"

AH-64: "Hog 1, Apache 1, brieffollows."

A-10: "Hog 1, ready."AH-64: "PK 224569, northemmost

tank, 773 feet, 1688, 190degrees, do not overfly spot,call departing Bagget."

A-10: "Hog 1 copies all."A-10: "Hog 1, Bagget, Maverick."

AH-64: "Apache 1, roger."A-10: "Hog 1, 30 seconds."A-10: "Hog 1, laser on."

AH-64: "Apache 1, laser on."A-10: "Hog 1, spot"A-10: "Hog 1, lock-launch."A-10: "Hog 2, shift, gun."

AH-64: "Apache 1, shift, set"A-10: "Hog 2, spot, terminate."

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antijam methods were used.These calls gave AJAATits senseof timing. They were crisp, concise and to the point. Each wordha s its own precise meaning and,thus, must be followed to the letter. Many will note that thestandby THUNDER and UGHTNING calls are gone. These wereeliminated once it was realizedthat, after much debate, they werenothing more than timing callsthat over the years had taken ona life of their own. THUNDERand UGHTNING have come tomean different things to differentpeople and units. The A-lOs gavethe coordination calls over UHF.

SummaryI t has now been more than ayear since the AJAAT test wascompleted. The Fighter WeaponsSchool has taken an aggressiveapproach in getting the word outto the operational units in TAC.At Ft. Hood the 6th CavalryBrigade and the Apache Training Brigade now train to conductAJAAT. All new AH-64 units aretaking the AJAAT techniquesback to their home stations uponcompleting their unit fielding atFt. Hood. The 3-6 Cavalry hasworked AJAAT with the 23dTactical Fighter Wing out ofEngland AFB, LA, and the 175Tactical Fighter Group of theMaryland Air National Guard.These two top-notch units didmuch to shape its final form. Thefolks at the AirLand ForcesApplication Agency have assist-

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ed in the review of the test resultsand soon will publish the updatedoperational pamphlets.We now truly have expandedthe use of the JAAT idea fromthe standard old front-line, poorsurvivability, defensive battleinto the more progressive, highpayoff scenarios. New aircraftentering into service quicklyadapt to AJAAT. The idea offuture growth was central to the

AJAAT test. Additionally, theOH-58D Kiowa is custom-madefor the designator role and hasproven the AJAAT techniquestime and time again. Any aircraftwith a designating laser or lasertracker is a candidate for AJAAT.But the true payoff is thatadvanced JAAT now providesthe ground commander with atrue synergistic, lethal and effi-cient tank-killing team! --=-=1

ABOUT THE AUTHORSCaptain Mark Ferrell has served

for more than 9 continuous years inoperational attack helicopter units.His assignments have taken him toFt. Bragg, NC; the Republic ofKorea; and Ft. Hood, TX. An ArmySenior Aviator with neariy 1,500hours in attack helicopters, he wasthe squadron operations officer(S3) for the initial AH-64 unit, the7-17 Cavalry. During the advancedJAAT test, he served as thesquadron S3 for phases I and II.CPT Ferrell was the commander ofAlpha Troop, 3-6 Cavalry, duringphase III. He was the assistantbrigade S3 for the 6th CavalryBrigade, Ft. Hood, before hisassignment to Directorateof Combat Developments,Ft. Rucker, AL.

Captain Scott Reynolds hastrained as an A-10 close air pilotfor 9 years and accumulatednearly 2,000 hours in theWarthog. He is a 1979 graduate ofthe Ai r Force Academy and a1984 graduate of the FighterWeapons School. After a 4-yearoperational tour at Myrtle BeachAFB, SC, he joined the 57 FighterWeapons Wing in November1985, where he currently holdsthe position of A-10 projectmanager in the A-10 Tactics andTest Division. Significant teststhat he has managed includeA-10 antihelo operations andtactics, advanced JAAT and A-10special operations support.

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Captain Kenneth E. PottieDepartment of Combined Arms TacticsU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

The opinion expressed In this article are those of the author and donot necessarily reflect the views 01 any Department of Defense agency.

My PHILOSOPHY of leadership is that anofficer must have vision to be successfulon the battlefield. The concept of vision,defined as "the capability to organize because itestablishes focus for actions and guidance to theorganization which will fOllOW," is, to a commanderat any level, one of the most important ideas fortoday's professional armies. Vision leads to successin the AirLand Battle by giving the leader and hisunit, "the ability to anticipate and deal with theunexpected," as stated in Field Manual (FM) 22-103,LeadelShip and Command at Senior Levels. Byproducing an outline of success (goal setting) foryour subordinates, they should synchronize allefforts and converge on achieving that outline. Butproducing an outline is not the end of your job. Aleader also must follow up and evaluate the execution


of his plan as he supervises. A leader who produceslimited vision, attributed as ineptness, is doomed onthe battlefield.

As a leader, vision includes many aspects ofmilitary profeSSionalism, such as a commonunderstanding of standards, teChnical and tacticalcompetence among leaders and a common understanding of the commander's intent. The key pointis that vision equals etfectiveness. Effectiveness is"producing a ecided, decisive or desired effect." Tobe effective on the battlefield means the destructionof the enemy force, while obtaining the commander'sobjective as rapidly as possible. To do this, the vision,or intent, must be clearly understood by all membersof your unit.

You can expect to use vision to achieve successin your unit in many ways. As stated in FM 22-103,you must be able to "decentralize the execution oforders within the established intent" to the greatestdegree possible. By decentralizing the execution oforders, you cultivate, with practice, a unit that istechnically and tactically competent. A leader whocan decentralize will build the confidence level ofhis troops and enable them to accomplish themission.

Establishment of goals with a unit is another formof vision. Goals serve as purpose to the unit. Thepurpose of combat is to win; therefore, goals

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establish the unit's final objective-success on thebattlefield. As a leader you must establish goals foryour unit, no matter what level you command. Togive purpose and direction helps establish a commonunderstanding of standards to guide your unit toits maximum effectiveness.

Let's tie in vision with the battlefield by using thefour tenants of the AirLand Battle: agility, Initiative,depth and synchronization.

Agility requires flexible, organized and quickminded leaders who can act faster than the enemy.The use of vision with agility allows the ability toanticipate and deal with the unexpected in a rapidand smooth manner.

Initiative implies an offensive spirit in conductingall operations. The purpose of every encounter withthe enemy is to seize or retain independence ofaction. To preserve the initiative, subordinates muststay within the commander's intent; however, theycan act independently within the context of the totalplan. The idea of decentralized orders within thescope of vision ties in with initiative. Subordinatesmust deviate from the expected course of battlewithout hesitation when windows of opportunityopen, provided they stay within the commander'sobjectives. As a subordinate commander, you must

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take those risks in battle, and your commander mustsupport your decision.

Depth is important in all U.S. Army operations;from it we get momentum in attack and elasticityin defense. The dimensions of depth are time,distance and resources. A commander must use hisvision to see beyond the current battle. He mustlook for the rear battle along with the deep battleand assess the enemies' strengths, weaknesses,capabilities and intentions. Then he must positionhis forces to meet the enemy. In command, you mustsee beyond your immediate needs for resourcingby determining, ahead of time, what men, materialand weapons systems are needed to maintainflexibility on the battlefield.

Synchronization of operations achieves maximumcombat power. To use vision effectively, a leadermust organize all efforts to converge to victory onthe battlefield. However, synchronized vision meansmore than coordinated action. There must be nowasted effort. Every effort of each element flows froman understanding of the higher commander'sconcept. Providing a well-planned outline of yourcommand concepts to your subordinates will aidgreatly the understanding of your intent. A plan willgive your unit the goals you need to win on any

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battlefield. The key to understanding the fonnula tosuccess on the battlefield is the leader's ability toapply his vision to align with the four tenants of theAirLand Battle: initiative, agility, depth andsynchronization.

We have talked on what vision is and why it isimportant, but how can you use vision for successon the battlefield? We all understand the tenants ofAirLand Battle doctrine and the imperatives that flowfrom them, but what about the imperatives ofleadership? As a leader, you must understand thatyou will have to provide guidance to your subordinates to achieve your goals. Counsel yoursubordinates on your philosophy of command andhow you expect them to achieve the goals you haveset. You may guide but do not micromanage yoursubordinates. As a commander, vision should be acentral hub, with attributes, imperatives andperspectives as spokes to a unified effort toward yourunit's goals.

As stated in FM 22-103, "Attributes establish whatleaders are. Perspectives govern what they need toknow. Imperatives dictate what they do." To theleader, charisma is highly admirable, but not anecessity. A leader can be effective without thisattribute as long as he is honest with his subordi-

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nates, works hard at learning all he can about hisjob and outlines his goals with simpliCity.

The most important perspective of the AirLandBattle leader is technical and tactical proficiency inall aspects of his unit's mission. This is not an easyundertaking, considering the ever-changing fieldingof new equipment and continually revised tacticalthought to counteract each new enemy threat.Finally, imperatives, defined as having power torestrain, control and direct, are the commander'sauthority. This authority, or tool, requires your useof motivation combined with experienced directionto keep your unit operating effectively. As you cansee, vision ties all three spokes into one smoothlyoperating organization. As a leader, you mustbalance attributes, imperatives and perspectives inaccordance with your unit's mission, which w i l ~ineVitably be different with each new unit orexperience. The successful commander will use thiscore or hub, called vision, to his advantage.

In conclusion, as Karl von Clausewitz wrote inthe book On War, ''Vision is an inner light." Simplyput, the idea of how a leader perceives himself, andwhat he knows he must do, is his vision. Today'sleader, as in history, must use his vision to guidehimself and his unit to success on any battlefield.

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PEARL!SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

Egress ProceduresI read with interest the egress proceduresdiscussed in the March 1988 issue of the AviationDigest. I am a member of the 82d MedicalDetachment, Ft. Riley, KS, and I am currentlyflying the UH-1B Huey aircraft. I was surprisedto see that you had advocated using an upright"crash position" for aircrew personnel who sit inaft-facing seats. In myopinion, the upright positionwould present the following problems: Compression-type back injuries could occur inthe event of an aircraft crash with vertical "G"forces. Whiplash-type injuries may occur because theUH-1 seat does not extend past the aircrewmember's shoulder blades. CW3 Pete Linn, 82dMedical Detachment, Ft. Riley, KS 66442.You are correct. We do intend to provide the bestavailable information to the field.

The best known "crash position" is the face inthe lap with hands clasped under the legs for anyseat other than the pilot/ copilot.New Helmet LinerGentex Corporation, Carbondale, P A, has founda way to help ease Army aviators' problems: athermoplastic liner assembly designed to thecontour of the head. Wearing the new assemblyeliminates the problems of pressure points and hot

14

spots. The assembly also adds more comfort andstability with night vision devices. The U.S. ArmyAeromedical Research Laboratory, Ft. Rucker, AL,tested and approved the liner for its crashworthiness in 1984. The SPH4 Helmet Technical Manualincludes this information. Testing is ongoing forthe improved SPH-4 helmet at Ft. Rucker. Thehelmet will include several features: Kevlar shell,crushable earcups, adjustable retention assembly,dual visors, thicker energy absorbing liner and thethermoplastic liner."When impact happens to the earcup area, theearcup will collapse," Jim Angelos, aviation lifesupport equipment (ALSE) technician, said."Before, it was a solid, hard plastic that pressedthe earcup against the head. The new liner andlayer assembly will cushion the blow. It's a firstclass item for our aviators," he added.u.s. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)Design HandbookChapter 6 of the AFSCDesign Handbook statesthat the life support area interacts with humanengineering, medical support and safety. Personnelare concerned with reducing, as much as possible,any hazardous condition that poses a threat topersonal safety. Life support specifically appliesto state-of-the-art biomedical and bioenvironmental knowledge. This information includes design-

MAY 1989


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ing systems that enable individuals to perfonnefficiently without undue personal risk. A majordesign goal of the life support area is 11 enablepersonnel to function with maximum effectivenessduring nonnal operations but be ready to perfonnfor emergency situations.

Survival Training AdventureThe Aviation Division, U.S. Anny ElectronicProving Grounds, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, has recentlyfinished its first annual survival training exercise,which involved a number of personnel. Before theexercise, classes were given on survival techniques,first aid, escape an d evasion, use of the PRe-gosurvival radio, aircraft rescue procedures, landnavigation techniques and survival equipment an dits use. All personnel were required to fire flares

to demonstrate the use of the day night smokeflares.The training area was in the rugged mountainous terrain of the White Mountains in north centralArizona where there was an abundance of naturalresources. Personnel were organized into fourgroups, and they were dropped off, by helicopter,20 nautical miles south of the base camp. Eachgroup had one SRU-21/ P survival vest and anindividual survival kit; each person was issued oneemergency food packet and two cans of emergencywater. The groups had 3 days and 2 nights to travelfrom the dropoff point to the base camp. The survival training was highly successful, and the majorobjective was met. People learned how difficult asurvival situation can be. All participants learneda lot and readily agreed that such training was- ,aluable. ,J . .If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear. write PEARL S, AM C Product Management Office, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE. 4300 Goodfellow Blvd . St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY 88 (through 30 April) 14 971,031 1.44 30 $41.3FY 89 (through 30 April) 18 909,622* 1.98 11 $39.0

*estimated

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 15


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AVIATION MEDICINE REPORTOffice of the Aviation Medicine Consultant

Age and the Army AviatorMajor George A. Alexander, M.D.Commander116th Mobile Army Surgical HospitalDelaware Army National GuardThe opinions expressed In this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any Department of Defense agency .

HUMAN AGING IS a normal biologicalprocess. I t is a continuing process t h ~ t ~ g i n s atconception and ends with death. Agmg IS characterized by a general reduction in functionalcapacities and by structural c h a n ~ e s in the. body.Some changes, such as graying harr and harr loss,are inconsequential to flying while changesassociated with acquired chronic diseases, such asheart disease, may be significant.

I t is important for you, as an Army aviator, tobe aware of and understand the potential effectsof aging on an aviator's performance. This articlediscusses some ofthe visual and cardiac age-relateddysfunctions. I t also d e s c r i ~ e s how canincrease your chances of havmg a lasting andhealthy aviation career by maintaining a lifestylethat is low risk for developing cardiovasculardisease. The Army's health promotion programalso is discussed.The ability to process information and performmultiple complex tasks while flying sophisticatedmilitary aircraft are only a few of the skillsdemanded of today's U.S. Army aviator. Sincethere is little room for error, aviators must makethe best use of all the variables affecting theirperformance. An aviator's physical condition isperhaps one of the most important variables thatcan affect performance. Specific physical. standards exist that determine the degree to which an

16

aviator can continue flying. Army Regulation 40-501, Medical Fitness Standards for Flying Duty,specifies medical fitness s tandards for flying.

As an individual's chronological age increases,sensory, perceptual decision-making andpsychomotor processes begin to deteriorate overtime. Medical evidence shows a number ofperformance skills start to decline in early middlelife and are adversely affected by age. These skillsinclude: Performing complex tasks rapidly. Adapting to quickly changing conditions. Processing incoming information. Making complex decisions and judgments.

Resisting fatigue. Performing effectively in a stressfulenvironment.A recent study designed to identify aviationrelated, information-processing abilities, that doand do not deteriorate with age, found that spatialskills, focused listening and perceptual-motorcoordination decline with age. Speed of nformationprocessing declines beyond age 40 and timesharing skills do not decline with age.Aging of Visual FunctionPresbyopia or farsightedness is probably themost common age-related dysfunction of the eye,affecting many people after age 40. Presbyopia is

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the result of a gradual loss of lens elasticity, aflattening of its shape and an increase in it sdensity. As a result, the lens loses some of its abilityto change shape and bend light rays when viewingnearby objects. The ability of the lens to accommodate for near vision is absent or greatly reducedin most people by the time they are 55 years old.Because of presbyopia, most people need readingglasses. Glaucoma, perhaps the most commonserious eye disease associated with aging, is mostcommon in persons more than 40 years of age.Glaucoma is the result of elevated pressure withinthe eye. Pressure is caused by deficient drainageof the aqueous humor from the anterior cavity ofthe eye. Elevated pressure can squeeze bloodvessels shut within the eye, causing degenerationof the retina and resulting blindness. Glaucomamay develop suddenly and last only a short time;or it may develop so slowly that the eye is damagedby the time the person is aware of the condition.An early indication of glaucoma is a gradual lossof peripheral vision. As a result, objects that areoff to the side of the visual field go unnoticed.Most visual functions decline to some degree withage. A recent review of medical literature indicatesthat almost all available information regardingaging and vision was derived from the generalpopulation. There is, however, little data onmilitary aviators and to extrapolate findings onage effects from populations of nonpilots requirescaution. Moreover, individual variation on theeffects of age is great. Military aviators as a selectgroup are presumably in better general health thanthe general population. Since visual functiondepends on the health of many organ systems,aviators having better health may run less riskof visual dysfunction. Several visual functions thatdecline with age are particularly relevant to aviatorperformance. These include: Contrast sensitivity.

Dynamic acuity. Recovery from glare. Function under low illumination. Information processing.Contrast sensitivity function summarizes thevisual system's overall sensitivity to objects ofvarying spatia l structure, from the finest structuresthat can be resolved to the coarsest. Aviators mustbe able to detect, analyze and respond appropriately to visual objects of low contrast. Dynamicvisual acuity appears to be important to tasks


requiring rapid scanning and acquisition of visualtargets. Aviators sometimes encounter rapid andextreme changes in glare. Because of lightscattering in the eye, older avia tors need more timeto recover from the effects of glare. Military pilotsmust at times perform visually demanding tasksunder nighttime conditions. Changes with age inthe lens and pupil reduce the amount of lightreaching the retina of the eye. Age-related changesin the retina also may further reduce visualperformance under situations of low illumination.Research indicates that in older pilots a declinein the speed with which visual information canbe processed is noticeable only under demandingconditions.

Existing knowledge does no t allow identificationof the specific visual functions that are most crucialto flying performance. More research, however, isneeded to further investigate the effects of agingon visual function and on flying performance.Aging of Heart Function

The effects of aging on an individual's cardiovascular system are the result of two factors: adirect influence of aging on the heart and arteries,and an indirect influence of body metabolism oncirculation. Aging effects on the circulatory systemprobably would not impair an aviator's capacityto fly i f the aviator could maintain an acceptablelevel of physical conditioning by following a regimeof regular aerobic exercise.Several types of age-related heart dysfunctionsoccur in aviators:

Irregular heartbeats. Conductive disturbances. Coronary heart disease (CAD).CAD is a major cause for grounding aviators.Because of progressive narrowing of the coronaryarteries, blood flow to the heart muscle is decreasedby th e constricted lumen. Therefore, the heart'soxygen needs cannot be met and the heart musclebecomes ischemic. The most frequent cause ofdiminished coronary blood flow is plaques thatdevelop in the lining of the vessels. As the plaquesenlarge, they protrude into the vessels and partiallyblock blood flow. The plaques may eventuallyenlarge enough to completely block the vessel.Immediately after an acute coronary arteryblockage, the heart muscle that has no blood flowbecomes infarcted. This is called a myocardialinfarction or a heart attack.

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Incapacitation in flight from CAD directlythreatens flying safety and mission completion.Sudden cardiac death has resulted in documentedloss of aircraft and passengers in civil and militaryaviation. In addition, CAD is the leading causeof nonaccidental deaths among flyers in the U.S.Air Force.

Angina pectoris refers to short episodes ofcardiac pain that result from progressive narrowing of the coronary arteries. The pain is dull,pressing and constricting. It occurs when the heartcontracts more strenuously than the restrictedcoronary blood flow can support. Most people whohave angina pectoris feel pain when they exerciseor experience emotions that accelerate the heartrate. The early detection of CAD is a majorchallenge for the flight surgeon.Elevated blood pressure also is a significantthreat to the aging aviator. I t is a primary causeof heart failure and injury to the coronary arteries.The most common causes of elevated bloodpressure in older people are plaque formations onthe inner surface of the artery walls and "hardening of the arteries." Because these conditionsdecrease the diameter and elasticity of the arteries,the heart must contract harder to maintain normalblood flow to various organs. The additionalworkload imposed upon the heart by theseconditions results in high blood pressure. Highblood pressure is not an automatic consequenceof aging. A number of factors contribute to thedevelopment of both high blood pressure and heartdisease. Among these factors are obesity, lack ofexercise, excessive intake of salt and smoking.

Health Promotion ProgramThe Army has established a new healthpromotion program (HPP). General Arthur E.Brown Jr., the former Vice Chief of Staff, Army,expressed the importance of the HPP. He stated,

"the Army of the future must focus on wellness ...We can't wait until our people are 40 years oldto identify health problems. This program allowsus to focus on people who are 30 years old andyounger to catch health problems before theybecome major."The Office of The Surgeon General, FitnessPolicy Division (FPD) has the primary mission

of promoting wellness in the Army throughdeveloping policy for healthy lifestyle behaviors.According to the FPD, "Health represents apositive state of physical and mental well-beingand a high level of function and not merely theabsence of disease." The Army's health promotionprogram, "Fit to Win," includes the following:

Antitobacco. Stress management. Elevated blood pressure. Nutrition. Weight control. Physical conditioning. Substance abuse. Hearing conservation. Dental health. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome(Human Immune Deficiency Virus).By using these programs and taking control ofyour own lifestyle, it is possible to balance the scalebetween wellness and illness. The programs alsoinfluence coronary artery disease by diet, nonsmoking and regular daily physical exercise. Leadinga healthy lifestyle will enhance your chances ofhaving a long and satisfying aviation career. Yourimproved level of physical fitness might even helpyou to combat fatigue that so often occurs becauseof unusual working hours, daily stresses and otherfactors.Medical evidence links abnormal plasma-lipidlevels with accelerated thickening and hardeningof the body's arteries. Regular examination of theplasma-lipid profile of serum cholesterol andtriglyceride levels allows for early detection andtreatment of these abnormalities. Regular healthrisk screening also is important from a healthprevention standpoint. This screening allowsfollow-up of aviators with high-risk profiles byflight surgeons who have developed close relationships with their aviators. The flight surgeon canhelp prolong the careers of aviators who haveelevated blood pressure, abnormal serum cholesterol and triglyceride levels, or obesity. All of theseconditions are a resUlt of the aging process inconcert with poor health habits and stress thatyou can control and prevent. By taking care ofyourself, improving your lifestyle and staying Fitto Win, you can learn to be healthy and fly healthy.

The Aviation Medicine Report s a monthly report from the Aviation Medicine Consultant of TSG. Please forward subject matter of currentaeromedical importance for editorial consideration to U.S. Army Aeromedical Center. ATTN: HSXY-ADJ. Ft. Rucker. AL 36362-5333.

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A SUBJECT MATTERlong clouded in mystery andvaguely addressed in most aircraft operator's manuals is thephenomena known as inertia.How does inertia apply to helicopter rotor systems? Most helicopter pilots are fairly certain


whether the main rotor is designated as a high or low inertiasystem. They usually get it cor-rect during their annual evaluation, especially when given twoguesses! But how can a betterunderstanding of inertia contribute to increasing the population

of old, gray-haired aviators?First of all, we can plagiarize"Webster" and rigorously defineinertia as "an object's resistanceto changes in motion." But what

determines the amount of inertiain a system? An object's inertiais determined by the distribution

WHATISINERTIA

Captain R. E. Joslin, USMCNaval Postgraduate School

Monterey, CA

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ROTORSPEEDERCENT

What Is Inertia?

8 0 ~ - + - - ~ ~ ~ - + - - - h ~ ~

2 3 4 5TIME, SECONDSFIGURE 1: High inertia.

ROTORSPEED 80 ......--+---...- .....PERCENTROljOR

* - , - + - ~ S T A L LLIMIT

2 3 4TIME, SECONDS

5

FIGURE 2: Low inertia.

of its mass about its center ofrotation. For example, if we takea sword and swing it around ina circle, as depicted in the titlegraphic, it is relatively easy to get

20

started and very easy to stop.This is a low inertia system. Conversely, ifwe now take a ball andchain of the same mass andswing it around in a circle we find

that it is hard to start and hardto stop. This is high inertia.This is a simplistic, albeit fairlyaccurate, explanation of rotorsystem inertia that can be influenced somewhat by adding orremoving tip weights. However,inertia is essentially unchangeable for a given rotor system. Sohow does this inertia stuff relateto helicopters?Suppose we are flying along,have a total engine failure andthen delay in getting our collec-tive down to put our blades at flatpitch. Figure 1 shows estimateddata of transient rotor speed asa function of cOlTective controltime delay (time to get blades toflat pitch) following the loss ofmaximum power from an initialcollective position correspondingto maximum velocity straightand level of a high inertia system.This estimated data is qualitative only and not indicative ofany flight test performed with aparticular rotor system; however,it is illustrative of comparativetrends for transient revolutionsper minute (rpm) in an autorotative entry and flare. For example,if we delay 2 seconds in gettingthe collective down, we wouldhave decayed our rpm about 26percent to a value of 74 percentafter 2 seconds. Two secondslater, at 4 seconds running time,the rpm will have risen by 9percent to 83 percent.

Figure 2 depicts the sameinformation for a low inertiasystem, and as would be expectedthe rpm variations are muchgreater. After 2 seconds with thesame 2-second response time, therpm already has decayed downto 68 percent. However, oncerecovery was initiated the rpmrapidly built back up to 84 per-

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,; ~HIGHINERTIA

~ ~

cent, 2 seconds later. Hence, thelow inertia system decayed muchfaster than the high inertiasystem, but once recovery wasinitiated, in the form of downcollective to obtain flat pitch onthe blades, the low inertia systemregained rpm at a faster rate thanthe high inertia system. Note:Rotor rpm decay is also a functionof aircraft climb or descent attitude and altitude along withapplied power. Of course, low orhigh inertia are all relative termsand probably not evident to theindividual pilot unless he flies twoor more aircraft with disparateinertial properties.Another consideration of inertia occurs in the autorotativeflare. Just before leveling theskids for landing, following anautorotative power-off descent,

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

we execute a flare that acts todissipate the forward velocity,decrease the rate of descent andincrease rpm rotational energy.We are trading all of the rpmrotational energy from the freewheeling main rotor blade for aone time final bite of air justabove the ground surface so asto "cushion" the final touchdown.If you have a high inertia systemwith low rpm, you might not beable to recover quickly in a flareenough of the depleted rpm toadequately cushion the landing.On the other hand, a low inertiasystem will build rpm in a flaremuch more readily. However, i fthis rapid rpm rise goes unchecked, we can produce overspeeds that create large centrifugal forces on t4e hubattachment points. This is similar to the forces you feel whenyou are driving around a curveand are thrown toward the outside of the curve more and moreviolently as you increase yourvelocity around the curve. Thesecentrifugal forces can createstresses on the rotating components in excess of their designedmaterial strengths and mayresult in deformation or failure.So what is important to knowabout a high or low inertia rotorsystem? A low inertia system willtend to build and decay rpm morerapidly than a high inertia system. Sounds like a low inertiasystem is the only way to go whenwe are talking about rpm recovery in a flare, as long as we canavoid overspeeds. But what aboutthe case when we are flying atlow altitude, have a total enginefailure and delay in getting thecollective down? The low inertiasystem rpm will decay muchfaster than the high inertiasystem and i f allowed to dip too

[I ,I\ I\., i \ _\

"; t, ,

-'

, . J < ? / ~

( LOW '\~ E R T I ~

low can reach a point from whichrecovery is impossible.Additional detrimental features of an excessively low rpmare that certain electrical equipment, such as generators and thesystems they power, will drop offthe line along with possibly areduction in directional control,thereby compounding the emergency. So, for delays in autorotative entry, the high inertia systemlooks much more forgiving andbeneficial.

The bottom line is that anunderstanding of the inertialcharacteristics of our main rotorsystem, and what to expect in agiven situation, put us all one stepcloser to becoming an old, grayhaired aviator instead of a flaming hole in the ground out of rpmand out of ideas! "

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AVIATION LOGISTICSu.s. Army Aviation Logistics School

ABCS3A Field's-Eye Look at SupportMr. Robert E. HowardDeputy DirectorDirectorate of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation Logistics SchoolFort Eustis, VAN T LONG AFTER the U.S.

Army consolidated all divisional aircraft assetsinto single aviation brigades in the mid-1980s,field commanders began to voice concerns overthe logistical support system for such brigades.The concerns involved all facets of combatservice support (CSS); and they were often tiedto the unique, rapid-moving , across-thebattlefield role of aviation brigades in theAirLand Battle.

The issue of aviation brigade CSS becamea major topic at commanders' conferences. Thesubject eventually ended up on the agenda ofthe 1986 Logistics Systems Program Reviewpresented to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army(VCSA). At that session, the VCSA agreed toa recommendation by the U.S. Army AviationLogistics School (USAALS), Ft . Eustis , VA,that the Army conduct an analysis of the CSSsituation. The USAALS assumed responsibility fo r the tasking and conducted theAviation Brigade Combat Service SupportSurvey (ABCS3) during 1987 through 1988.

The ABCS3action officer visited 12 divisionsand associated corps units in U.S. Army ForcesCommand; U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR);and U.S. Army Western Command. He solicitedoperator and logistician viewpoints from

22

enlisted through general officer command, staffand technical personnel from operating unitsthrough major Army command levels.

Although the survey addressed the entireCSS spectrum, the most highly discussed areaby choice of interviewees was aircraft maintenance. This article focuses on how thoseinterviewed in the field perceive aircraftmaintenance.Who Does What?

As the action officer moved from division todivision , he saw a wide disparity regarding thetype and extent of work performed at thevarious levels of maintenance. The mostsignificant example was phased inspections(PIs), the scheduling of aircraft maintenanceat regular intervals. In some divisions, theaviation unit maintenance (AVUM) organization did the vast majority of PIs, whichcomplies with current doctrine. In otherdivisions, the inspections were arbitrarilywork-ordered to the divisional aviation intermediate maintenance (A VIM) or corps AVIMunit-depending on which one was the leastbusy at the time.

Of the divisions visited, only two were doingPIs in the manner intended by doctrine; that

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the AVUM platoon (company) passed a PIto the AVIM support unit only as theThe exception was when a signifiA VIM-level work requirement coincided

the PI or when an unusual work overloadexisted at the AVUM level.The PI situation was but one manifestationa mindset that seemed to exist in many units:

functions were totally the responsibilityI AVIM organizations. At the oper(aircraft owner) level, crewchief dutiesat servicing aircraft and writing up

faults. In many cases, the operatg unit personnel gave little or no thought to

doing the required repair actionscrewchiefs carried

(deferred) writeups until PI time. Somethe writeups by the aviators or crewchiefslonger to log than the time needed tothe discrepancy. Such deferments

in extremely long PI turnaround timeselements tried to "clear thebefore returning aircraft to operating

The long turnaround times caused aAVUM work overload; PIs wereto divisional and corps AVIM unitss a matter of course. (At one location visited,

aircraft work ordered to the corps AVIMs scheduled for a PI.)In these cases, AVUM units often fixedthe AVIM company fo r

lacking a sense of urgency." The AVIMattributed turnaround delays to the

maintenance condition of the aircraftto them. Some of th e AVIMimplied that AVUM units were

and keeping "easyfor themselves.The crux of the problem appeared to be thatVUM organizations work-ordered so manyIs to supporting AVIM companies that thenumbers weakened the efforts at resolv

ng th e question of where the real PI problemsIn any event, excessive downtime for

Is was a real problem.Those personnel who were interviewed also

confused over "who does what" at themaintenance levels: The tasks that

allocation charts (MACs) toldto perform were incompatible with the


maintenance equipment they were issued.Supervisors complained they were not authorized the equipment needed to perform relatively simple tasks that the MAC listed at theirlevel. Conversely, there were many tasks thatAVUM units felt they could easily have donewith onhand assets, bu t MACs placed them atthe next higher level.The problem also existed at th e nondivisional(corps) AVIM level where maintenance limitations frustrated some technicians. At onelocation, the Directorate of Logistics ., whichperformed backup AVIM for the divisionalAVIM, had constantly sought approval toperform more tasks. These tasks were wellwithin the directorate's capability, but manyof the requests for those tasks were disapproved. Also, the administrative hasslefor approvals was aggravating and timeconsumIng.

Bottom-line:The field perceived an inefficientMAC formulation process and an inadequatetie-in between MAC developers and table oforganization and equipment (TOE) writers.This situation contributed to reduced aircraftmission-ready rates. Still, in the interest ofmission readiness, some units took it uponthemselves to do maintenance they wereconfident they could perform, regardless ofMAC guidance. Unfortunately, though intentions were good and ability unquestionable,this placed units in a vulnerable position hadsomething gone wrong.Who's in Charge?AVUM commanders and platoon leaderscomplained that, although they ultimately wereheld responsible for all maintenance within theaviation brigade, they had no substantiveauthority over units who flew the aircraft.Consequently, they often left unchecked themaintenance jobs and management problemsuntil PI time. In the case of low flying-hourunits, this represented considerable calendartime. Operating units actually overflew timebetween-overhaul component l imitationsbecause the units were not "keeping up" withmaintenance. This "operator, not a maintainer" mindset appears to be one of the most

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ABCS3negative factors in today's aviation maintenance posture.Regarding the day-to-day separation ofmaintenance from aircraft operations, oneaviation brigade commander proposed that al laircraft be assigned to the AVUM company,which would, in turn, provide available aircraftto operating companies as immediate missionrequirements became known. That would givethe AVUM company better control over themaintenance standards and markedly improveflexibility. One program could be implementedto evenly space scheduled maintenance events,particularly PIs, on an overall asset (battalionlevel) basis, rather than each operating unit'sindependently attempting to space maintenance events for six or seven aircraft in theface of mission assignment changes.

The Army has successfully employed thisapproach of maintenance-owned aircraft in thepast. The other services have also found thisway to be "the only way to do business."First-Line Erosion

As the number of visits to units increased,it became increasingly obvious that ArmyAviation was drifting away from the closecrewchief-aircraft relationship that onceexisted: Crewchiefs were often assigned at lessthan one pe r aircraft ratio; distractors, responsibilities other than aircraft maintenance, wereincreasing; and external organizations(AVUMs/A VIMs) were usually given majorPIs to perform. In the latter case, crewchiefsseldom accompanied the aircraft because ofunit personnel shortages. In effect, the crewchief found himself working on his aircraftmore as the exception rather than the rule."Pride of ownership" had become a thing ofthe past.

Supervisors complained that this turn ofevents seriously diminished crewchiefs' incen-

24

tives and performances. The action officernoted that, in some cases, this problem wascompounded by no basic first-line maintenancemanagement and quality control measures; forexample, daily review of logbook entries andcomponent replacement schedules. As previously noted, this erosion of operator-levelmaintenance was invariably at the root ofbogged-down maintenance up the line.Shortages and Distractors

Maintenance officers commented on Armyinitiatives to "streamline" support people fromTOEs. They consistently pointed out that aviationmaintenance differed from ground maintenance inthat vehicle operators perfonn maintenance. In

Aerial recovery, repairs in the field and ground support equip

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aviation, the operator (officer/warrant officeraviator) is not charged with any maintenanceresponsibility (preflight and postflight excluded).Thus, the perceived "additional" maintainer inaviation TOEs was the only maintainer and wastotally responsible for day-to-day maintenance.The point was made that the crewchiefs aircraftwas, in reality, his assigned weapon system.Reductions in available crewchiefs inherentlydecreased the available operational helicopterweapon systems.

Commanders and supervisors were highlyupset over the reduced authorizations of manyvital technical military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the newest TOEs. They cited anumber of areas in which new technology andmateriel acquisitions increased workloads.However, there was an apparent void in gettingattendant repair-MOS requirements into theconsolidated TOE update process.

Reorganizations that put people formerlyassigned to technically oriented positions intocommand/ supervisory jobs had caused additional problems. However, no concurrent TOE

of Army Aviation logistics.


provisions were made to cover former technicalresponsibilities. The AVUM platoon leader, forexample, also served as the production control(PC) officer. Because these platoons wereconverting into companies, should he, as acommander, continue as the PC officer? Shouldhe continue as a test pilot? Similarly, operatingunit reorganizations resulted in the same 67Vfunctioning both as crewchief of a helicopterand platoon sergeant.

Compounding the reduced-authorizationproblem, supervisors vehemently. objected tothe amount of time that maintenance personnelwere required to spend on nonmaintenanceactivities. Some units estimated that maintainers spent as much as 75 percent of their timeon tasks unrelated to direct aircraft repair.

Besides the immediate negative impact onaircraft availability rates, these distractorsseriously affected work attitudes and proficiency. The impact of maintenance distractors,according to several organizations, was due totheir completing PIs faster on field exercisesthan in garrison. Repairmen spent more timeworking on aircraft when in the field.

The problem was particularly acute in lightdivisions: maintenance personnel perceivedauthorizations to be less than "bare bones";distractors were more prevalent than innonlight divisions because of priority on "lightfighter" training. A prime example existed atone AVIM company. Slashed to 139 people byforce structure cuts, the company expendedmore than 50 percent of its efforts on AVUMlevel work; it had no corps AVIM on site tohandle th e 46-percent, pass-back doctrinalworkload. During the visit, five AVIM repairmen attended week-long, light-fighter training.

Most divisions had their own particulardistractors beyond those normally consideredin the TOE development process. USAREUR,for example, had thousands of man-hours lostto details, such as dependent school busmonitoring, "community relations" participation and gate guard.Management and Training

Interviewees saw these distractors and "barebones" authorizations playing a heavy role inreducing maintenance effectiveness. Still,

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ABCS3many agreed such problems sometimes wereovershadowed by basic field managementweaknesses, particularly at the first-linesupervisory level. The action officer noted thatpersons who complained of dis tractors oftencould not quantify lost time because they keptno basic man-hour accountability records. Also,supervisors did not monitor logbook entries. Anextremely high amount of double maintenanceexisted because personnel obtained partsthrough cross-leveling (controlled substitution)as the norm rather than the exception. Thelatter also lent itself to maintenance-induceddamage, further widening the gap betweenrequirements and capabilities. These observations suggested a strong need to better educateand train military leaders and supervisors infundamental maintenance managementtenets.

Several commanders recommended that th eproponent school (USAALS) develop exportable training films / tapes depicting typicalmaintenance situations. They also recommended that USAALS provide basic standardsfor new maintenance officers and supervisors.For example: How long should they carry forwardlogbook entries? How much time should a PI take for aspecific aircraft? How many hours a day should a maintenance officer expect to have techniciansavailable for work?All maintenance officers interviewed indicated the need for more management training.As first-time incumbents, they continually go t"wet feet." This situation is different than othermaintenance oriented fields; fo r example,Ordnance career assignments progressivelybring officers through various and oftenrepetitive maintenance jobs on the way tocommand positions.

26

Modified TOE (MTOE) InconsistenciesThe field perceived a strong disconnect and

poor coordination between doctrinal writers,developers of TOEs and MTOEs and agenciesresponsible for fielding materiel. Units weredisgruntled at being burdened with equipmentthey could not use. For example, the aircraftinstrument repair MOS had been deleted fromTOEs; however, units still carried, and had onhand, the instrument repair shops on theirMTOEs.Similarly, machinists and welders weredeleted from some TOEs that continued to carrymachine and welding shop sets. Many supervisors objected to the loss of such skills. Theysaid machinists and welders did not work muchon aircraft; however, they were invaluable tothe repair of aircraft ground support equipment(AGSE) and local manufacture and fabricationof repair items and tools. For example, manyspecial tools for the UH-60 Black Hawk weredesigned as locally manufactured items, butunits no longer have machinists to make them.The supervisors offered this as a prime exampleof the need for more field input to the TOEupdate process.Aircraft Ground Support Equipment

Support and repair responsibility for AGSEwas often confusing. Maintenance supervisorsgenerally believed that sending aviationpeculiar equipment to ground-support maintenance units fo r repair was a lost cause.Although skills generally existed in these units,because of ground equipment repair training,the natural tendency was to work on familiarequipment first. As a rule, items of aircraftpeculiar equipment were not included inresident programs of instruction for groundequipment repair personnel.

Because of delays in getting AGSE back fromground maintenance units, many aircraft

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maintenance officers used aircraft repaIrpersonnel to fix this equipment "in-house."Such man-hour expenditures on an Armywidebasis were substantial but rarely documented.Thus, TOE developers did not consider themwhen computing manpower authorizations foraircraft maintenance units. Accordingly, thissituation adversely impacted aircraft operational readiness rates. This was because everyman-hour spent on an unprogramed AGSErepair was a man-hour lost to repair of aircraft.Many maintenance people felt that the AVIMorganization should have an authorized capability for AGSE repair. They also believed themagnitude of the workload merited a dedicatedMOS for such repair.

Although many complained about the inadequacy and unreliability of some AGSE items,equipment improvement recommendation(EIR) submission rates were almost nil. In somecases, this appeared to be a simple lack ofmanagement emphasis, while in other casestechnicians complained they considered theEIR channel unresponsive.

Several units complained they had beenrequired to turn in their auxiliary power units(APUs) because the new aircraft ground powerunits were replacing them. The turn-ins hadtaken place; however, no replacements wereissued, which created a serious maintenancesupport problem. Such situations made soldiersreluctant to let AGSE go either to groundmaintenance organizations or a turn-in facility.Essentially, units had little faith in the Army'smanagement system to maintain or replaceAGSE.

Many AGSE problems are having a negativeeffect on aircraft availability. This effect wasnot generally recognized because AGSE shortcomings have been around so long thatmaintenance personnel, including supervisors,seemed to have accepted them as a way of life.However, observations from an Armywideperspective showed significant downtimebecause of AGSE problems.

Armywide, aging aircraft sat idle on flightlines waiting for operational APU s so person-

ne l could perform powered maintenance (usingelectrical current). Additionally, repairmenwere constantly pulled from repair jobs to moveaircraft because nonstandard towing vehicles(tugs) were inoperative, extensive man-hourswere wasted as repairmen looked for one "good"set of ground-handling wheels. These were justa few examples of the unnecessary, day-to-daydowntime resulting exclusively from AGSEproblems.Aircraft Recovery

Aircraft recovery capabilities were a majorconcern. Although attempts at air recoveriesare rare and ground recoveries usually successful in peacetime, major problems are expectedduring war.The current manual on aircraft recovery isoutdated and does not address many of theArmy's existing aircraft. Fielded recoveryequipment is not adaptable to al l Army aircraft.Moreover, confusion reigns regarding whoshould be issued such equipment and who isactually responsible for different facets ofrecovery operations; for example, authorizationof lift helicopters, rigging and ground hookup.

The action officer assured interviewees thatthese particular discrepancies were well recognized by USAALS going into ABCS8, and highpriority programs are underway to correctthem. In particular, doctrine is being updatedand a unit maintenance aerial recovery kit isbeing tested.

As previously noted, these comments concentrate on field perceptions of today's aircraftmaintenance situation. Many of the problemsmay be misinterpretations or misapplicationsof doctrinal guidance or the simple lack ofmanagement at the first-line level. Unfortunately, whether the problems are systemic ormanagerial, their effect is the same. TheUSAALS is currently spearheading an effortto implement corrective actions where necessary-whether those corrective actions meanrevising the way we do business, or whetherthey mean better clarification of our currentaircraft maintenance support doctrine.

Fo r a copy of the complete ABCS3 report, write to Mr. Robert E. Howard, U.S. Army AviationLogistics School, ATTN: ATSQ-LCD, Ft. Eustis, VA 23604; or call AUTOVON 927-6804.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 27


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Directorate ofEvaluation/StandardizationREPORT TO THE FIELD AVIATIONSTANDARDIZATION

CH-47 Chinook "Hands-Off" Flying?CW4 Frank MurrayDirectorate of Evaluation and StandardizationU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

CHANGE 15 TO Technical Manual 55-1520-240-10, CH-47D Operator's Manual, changed thepolicy on when the flight controls must be manned.This article provides some background for thechange and discusses the implications of this newpolicy.Let's look at what led to the change. Since themid-1OO0s, CH-47A, B and C operator's manualshave had a requirement that "the flight controlsmust be monitored and manned anytime the rotorswere turning." When the aircraft was on theground, this ensured that control limitations werenot exceeded and droop-stop pounding was notencountered. In the air, control of the aircraftrequired monitoring and manning the controls.Before 1970, the CH-47A, B and C aircraft hada control centering switch on the overhead panelto allow release of the control centering andmagnetic brakes for the cyclic control anddirectional pedals. When the switch was off, theflight control magnetic brakes were released. Thisallowed flight control movement, free of controlcentering spring pressure, without depressing thecontrol centering button on the cyclic grip. Whenthe switch was on, the control centering buttonhad to be depressed to release the flight controlmagnetic brakes.This switch was to be in the on position whenthe aircraft was on the ground. Sometimes this

28

switch was inadvertently left in the off position,when on the ground, making it easier for thecontrols to move out of the neutral position. Thiscould only happen i f the pilot relaxed his hold onthe controls and didn' t monitor their position. The

The policy on when the flight controlsmust be manned has changed.

illus tration by Paul Fretts

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was "hot" refueling, the controlwas not turned on. The flight

had lowered the ramp toand left the ramp lever in the down,

off, position. The pilot relaxed his holdand did not notice it slowly movingthe cyclic control moved forward, the

of the aircraft went from level tothe af t landing gear became light

nd then came off the ground, the ramp continuedAt this point, the pilot noticed that

was well forward of neutral andwas nose low. Not

ramp was on the ground, the pilotramp and structuralthe ramp actuator cylinders wererced up into the back of the aircraft.Shortly after this incident, to reduce the chances

wass "on" all the time and the magnetic brakes

by depressing the controlire period, before and after removing the control

switch, the dash 10 required theand manning of the flight controlse the rotors were turning.When the CH-47D arrived in the early 1980s,its advanced flight control system (AFCS) ,e requirement to man the flight controls neededbe reevaluated. The CH 47C flight control systemfor "hands-off" flying. The stability

and pitch stability augmenin the pitch, roll and yaw axis. Conversely,47D AFCS did allow for hands-off flyingthe aircraft. The AFCS would, i f properly used,heading, bank angle, airspeed and

Thenot need to be moved to affect

In fact, one of the things that will

cause the AFCS to stop maintaining heading orbank angle is to move the cyclic or pedals onetenth of an inch. So, to fully use AFCS, the cyclicand pedals should not be moved unless a differentheading, bank angle or airspeed is desired. Someaviators, though, have a "heavy foot" or "movinghand" and inadvertently move the controls,causing an interruption of heading hold and bankangle hold. To reduce the chances of inadvertentcontrol movement and therefore AFCS interruption, change 15 to the CH-47D dash 10 requiredmanning the flight controls only when the aircraftis on the ground. The flight controls need to bemanned on the ground to preclude inadvertentmovement that could cause damage to thehelicopter.Some common sense needs to be used whenapplying this change. Just because you can takeyour hands and feet off the controls while flyingdoes not mean you can take your mind off flyingalso. The dash 10 change does free your handsand feet but does not change any of the otherresponsibilities and requirements for flying theaircraft. When you have responsibility for flyingthe aircraft, it is not the time to be perusing afully opened map, engrossed in reading the dash10 or involved in other nonpilot duties. When thepositive transfer ofcontrols is made and the aviatorstates he has the flight controls, it means he isresponsible for the flight controls regardless ofwhether or not his hands or feet are on them.

Trainers, instructors, examiners and evaluatorsshould ensure that all aviators understand theimportance of being responsible for the flightcontrols, and all that goes with it, when flyingthe aircraft. Evaluators should ensure that aviatorsare equally prepared to handle situations andemergencies, when flying with their hands andfeet on the controls, as when flying with handsand/ or feet off the controls. Other aircraft havehad systems that allow hands-off flying and havenot had problems; let's not make problems for theCH-47D. r" ,

and requests to focus attention on an area of major importance. Write to us at Commander, U.S. Annyor call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or Commercial 205-255-3504. After

duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hotline, AUTOVON 558-6487 or Commercial 205-255-6487 and leave a message.

ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 29


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AVIATION PERSONNEL NOTES

Commissioned Officers' IssuesIn the 15 February 1989 copy of the "AviationBranch Update," Major General Ellis D. Parkernoted two issues vital to commissioned aviators.Because of their importance, they are quotedverbatim.

COMMAND OPPORTUNITYFOR CAPTAINS

The opportunity for an Aviation Branch captainto command a company is steadily improving.Those opportunities are based on the captaininventory, the number of combined TOE and TDAcommands and the length of the command tour.An officer spends approximately 8 years as acaptain, during which time he must attend the

Aviation Officer Advanced Course and CombinedArms and Services Staff School. Together withmoves, it is assumed that captains have a 6-yearwindow of opportunity in which to complete acommand. The current command opportunity fora 12-month tour is 93.7 percent. The opportunitydrops drastically, however, as tour lengthsincrease. For instance, the percentages for 18- and24-month commands are 62.5 and 46.9, respectively. An enclosure to this memorandum depictsin figure 1 the impact of the command opportunityas tour length is increased. Even with the projectednumber of commands increasing as we movetoward 1993, it will remain critical to adhere asclosely as possible to 12 months. Figure 2 showsthe current command tour lengths by year group

FIGURE 1: Captain command opportuni ty FY 1989/1993.

120% r----------------------------------------------C ~ 1 0 0 %Z-


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nd the corresponding decrease in commandrate due to the command length. While

e overall picture is improving rapidly, thethe supportof he field commanders

order to fully realize the results. The closer weto the target figure of 12 months, the better

can train our company grade officers for the

COMPANY GRADE AVIATORSIN AVIATIONWARRANT OFFICER POSITIONSPlacing Aviation Branch company grade

in Aviation warrant officer (WO) positionsby the shortage in the WO

is a temporary measure that must

be intensely managed at the unit level. Commandsmust ensure that our lieutenants and captainsfilling these positions are in place no longer than1 year. Further, they must have tough extra dutiesof real substance, and those must be clearly statedas such in the duty description and narrativeportions of their officer evaluation reports. Any lesswill have obvious pl;ofessional developmentimpacts on their careers. To help alleviate thisnecessity, quotas for WO candidates in the initialentry rotary-wing course have been increased forFY 1989, 1990 and 1991. While the present WOshortage exists, however, commanders mustadhere to the intense management practicesnecessary to protect our company grade officers'careers. ;jjjJjji(.I

FIGURE 2: Captain command statistics.

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ATe Focusus.Army AirTraffic Control Activity

Flight Operations Center and theAviation Procedures GuideCW2 Richard R. Neher4th Air Traffic Control Battalion58th Aviation RegimentAPO San Francisco

THE SHEER enjoyment and thrill of flyingwhere lark or even eagle never has flown is aprivilege reserved for the aviator in the cockpit ofan aircraft that has bonded man an d machine asone. But, condensed into the airspace of the modemAirLand Battle, no t even lark or brave war eaglehas a chance of survival unless each one uses everyasset available to escape the potential hazards ofthe AirLand Battle.Most aviators know the local supplements toAnny Regulation 95-1, Flight Regulations, thatrequire them to adhere to some sort of formal flightfollowing system while flying. The systems mayvary from a local flight plan to a military

32

reservation supplemental flight following center orrange control advisory. While within the confinesof the military reservation, the flight followingsystem must be able to identify and monitor theprogress of all active flights. The active flightwatch accomplishes three major tasks. The firstinforms the pilot of all current airspacemanagement information within the boundariesof the reservation. Hot ranges, restricted flightareas, night vision goggles training and parachutedrops are in-flight items briefed to the aviator. Thesecond task provides the aviator with proceduraltraffic advisories. Since radar is not used at mostfacilities, aviators must identify the flight route to

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"I've topped the windsweptheights with easy grace, wherenever larle, or even eagle flew."

From Magee's poem "High Flight"

controller. The controller establishes proceduraland provides traffic information to therules route users. Checkpointde flight progress monitors to update

The third and most important task accomplishedof an active flight safety watch.e aviator's insurance policy for emergencyi f anything were to happen during flights.

I f an aircraft fails to reportcheckby 15 minutes,ncy insurance help is activated. Most of thethe aircraft. But when

and in trouble, help is on thelast known route of the suspected overduearea radio search is activatedhopes that the overdue aircraft had radioand departed the area to get maintenance

i f all preliminary searches failthe overdue aircraft, the installation

is notified and the formal launchand rescue aircraft begins.The same active flight watch system is availablethe AirLand Battle theater. The Army air trafficATC) platoons provide a network of flight

and flight coordinationters. This network keeps aviators abreast of thehazards along the route of flighting from the division support area through

area (BSA). The airspaceinformation is tailored for the specificof flight. This informs the aviator of the mostknown potential hazards that the aircraft

will encounter during the mISSIon. Both theinformation and flight restrictions will diminishonce aviators cross the BSA as they go forwardinto the battle area. The aviator's role as the wareagle develops and the fight for survival is at itsgreatest in this battle area.The flight following role of the FOC must beable to identify all aircraf t below the coordinationaltitude (XXX feet). The identification is twofold:to assist the air defenders to sort out friendlyaircraft and to help in the search and rescue ofdowned aircraft. The same aviator insurance policyis available even in the battle area.To fly with the war eagles is risky enough. Butto fly into the battle airspace and not know thehazards is purely unwise. Examples of suchhazards are artillery fire; close ai r support;restricted or exclusion areas; nuclear, biologicaland chemical contaminated areas; and parachutedrop zones. The users of airspace are many in thebattle area and the problem is multiplied even morebecause, during the battle, the enemy also will bea key user of airspace. The enemy's artillery, closeai r support and ai r assault raids will operate inyour airspace.ATC units have begun publishing aviatorprocedure guides for major exercises that presentthe airspace management program to the aviator.The guides outline the general aviation plan andidentify boundaries, facilities and responsibilitiesof both the aviators and the airspace managementelements.

The guides include elements within the Armyairspace and command control cell: air defenseofficers, artillery fire support officers, chemicalofficers, G3 ai r/ aviation liaison officers and ATeofficers. When completed, the guides comprise theannex to the division/brigade aviation letter ofinstruction. The guides serve as the contract forservices among airspace users in the AirLandBattle. To fly as the war ea

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Army Aviation Digest - May 1989

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