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Page 1: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)
Page 2: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

A note from the editor . . .

Hello from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri!

The US Army Chemical School is in the process of movingto Fort Leonard Wood to merge with the Military Police Schooland Engineer School to form the new Maneuver SupportCenter (MANSCEN).

Our move is about 25 percent complete with the Directorate of Training Developmentand the Directorate of Combat Developments already in place. The remainder of the school isscheduled to move in the fourth quarter of 1999.

Although many things have changed, some things remain the same. I am still editor of the magazine andMs. Kathie Troxell still does the design and layout. We are producing the CML, Army ChemicalReview, from MANSCEN, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as of this issue. The CML will continue tobe published twice a year�January and July.

I appreciate your support during this time of change. As always, we need your input;articles, comments, suggestions, or letters to the editor are all welcome. They help us provideyou with the professional journal you deserve.

Articles may be sent by paper copy, on disc (in Microsoft Word), or e-mail. Appropriate photographsand art are appreciated. (Hard-copy photographs are preferred. Digital photos are acceptable if savedat a dpi/ppi of 200 or more and at 100 percent of actual size. TIFF and JPEG file formats are preferred).Our new phone number and address are listed below.

Mattie KirbyEditor, CML, Army Chemical Review

Phone: Editor�676-5267 DSN or (573) 563-5267 CommercialDesigner�676-5270 DSN or (573) 563-5270 Commercial

Address: Directorate of Training DevelopmentATTN: Mattie Kirby, Editor, CMLMANSCEN320 Engineer Loop, Suite 210Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Page 3: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Commandant MG Ralph G. Wooten

Supervisory Editor Dr. JoJo CorkanEditor Mattie KirbyGraphics/Layout Kathie Troxell

CML, Army Chemical Review isprepared twice a year by the US ArmyChemical School, Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. CML presents professionalinformation about the Chemical Corpsfunctions related to nuclear, biological,chemical, smoke, flame field expedients,and NBC reconnaissance incombat support. Objectives of CML areto inform, motivate, increase knowledge,improve performance, andprovide a forum for exchange of ideas.This publication presents professional in-formation, but the views expressedherein are those of the authors, notthe Department of Defense or itselements. The content does notnecessarily reflect the official US Armyposition and does not change or super-sede any information in other US Armypublications. Use of news itemsconstitutes neither affirmation of their ac-curacy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit isgiven to CML and its authors. Allphotographs are official US Armyphotos unless otherwise noted. SUBSCRIPTIONS: Available throughthe Superintendent of Documents, USGovernment Printing Office, Washing-ton, DC 20402-9317. Third class postage for CML paidat Anniston, Alabama, and additionalmailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send addresschanges to CML, US Army ChemicalSchool, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri65473-8929.

By Order of the Secretary of theArmy:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army 05429

Official:

PB 3-99-2 July 1999

Articles

And the Winner isSustaining Critical SkillsChemical Corps Annual Writing ContestCWC Inspection�Up Close and PersonalThe Chemical Corps in the 21st Century�Our FutureWeapons of Mass DestructionTraining Gets a Boost from New TechnologyAchieving 360-Degree Smoke CoverageCDTF Moves to the OzarksThe 82d is Smokin�We Must Protect the ChildrenIntegrating the PDS with the Decontamination Site

in Today�s ArmyBlind Pursuit: A New Stivers� PrintDigital Unit Training for Chemical SoldiersThe Refitted M93A1 NBCRS (Fox)�

Shortcomings in Firepower?Stand By!

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12151718202325

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Departments

Chief of ChemicalRegimental Association Print Order FormBook ReviewsSubscription Page

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Page 4: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Chief of Chemical

As I sit here writing my last article for CML,as the Commandant of the Chemical School andChief of Chemical, I�m captured by a flood ofmemories. Operational tempo and personnelturbulence remain at peak activity: our just-concludedmeetings in Aberdeen/Edgewood, Maryland; thefirst steps of our new Maneuver Support Center inMissouri; the closing of facilities at Fort McClellan;work on the digitized division and corps at Fort Hood;the establishment of a Homeland Defense Center at FortWood; the Gulf War illness initiative; the new joint(JP 3-11) and multi-service (FM 3-4-1) doctrinalguidance; and, perhaps most important, the newChemical Corps Vision.

In these exceptionally stressful times, I believeit is vital to have a mark on the wall for Dragon Soldiersto follow. There are many paths to the future, but the one outlined in Chemical Vision 2010 has beensynchronized with other branch efforts, and represents the way I think we must address the future ofour Corps. While no one path can provide for every opportunity or contingency, I believe the inherentflexibility and adaptability of our vision will serve to guide us well over the next decade.

The future is based on our past success and as I have visited our Sibert Award winners, the 21stChemical Company (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 310th Chemical Company(BIDS) at Fort McClellan, Alabama, I am pleased with the condition of our leaders, soldiers, and units. Thediscipline, talent, pride, and espirit de corps these magnificent soldiers display make me very proudto offer them as the credentials of our success. To each and every one of you who are performinga myriad of missions and taskings so very well, to those whose support of our efforts in theFormer Republic of Yugoslavia may have gone unrewarded but not unnoticed, to DragonSoldiers worldwide, I tell you, very well done!

One of the cornerstones of our future success will require the blending of digital and analogunits into a cohesive force. We are capturing the lessons learned at Fort Hood as the digital divisionand digital corps become realities. The doctrine for these operations is currently being placed inFM 3-101-1. This will be a constantly evolving draft throughout the process, to include developmentof the Joint Contingency Force (JCF). Our intent is to build workable doctrine and then embed it intoour family of doctrinal publications rather than produce a single, stand-alone publication forNBC digital operations.

2 CML

MG Ralph G. Wooten, Chief of Chemical

Page 5: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Having mentioned our family of doctrinal publications, we are in the final staffing of our newtop-of-the-chart publication, Joint Publication 3-11. This publication has undergone extensive review by thejoint community and provides overarching guidance at the strategic theater and operational levels ofwar. As more of our literature makes the transition to joint and multi-service formats, the more we cantruly field joint task forces capable of operating in an orchestrated manner. FM 3-4-1, NBC Protectionfor Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields, provides guidance for the multi-service requirement to operatewithin an NBC environment. The new FM 3-21 will address the use of Chemical Corps assets instability operations and support operations. A chapter in this manual will guide the Rapid AssessmentInitial Detection (RAID) Military Support Detachments (MSD), which will be the cornerstone forsupporting domestic operations when an NBC condition is created or threatened.

These are just a few of the many activities in which we are engaged. I am convinced our Corps ismore relevant to America�s needs today than at any time in our past. The threat is real, it is significant, andDragon Soldiers are America�s best defense against it.

On a more personal note, let me say that it has been a pleasure serving as your commandantand chief of branch for the last four and one-half years. It has not always been fun, but I can truthfullysay it has been challenging, dynamic, and personally rewarding. I have tried to make every decisionand fight every battle in the best interest of our Regiment. Many of you have assisted me in theseefforts and I thank you.

As I conclude this article, I want to recognize two individuals who have had major impacts onour success over the past two years. COL Dan Uyesugi and CSM Jim Van Patten have supportedme and our Corps with loyalty, dedication, vision, and commitment. They have my highest praiseand gratitude. To the rest of the Regiment, good luck and continued success.

DRAGON SOLDIERS!

3JULY 1999

Chief of Chemical

Page 6: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

And the winner is . . .(It could be YOU!)

Each year the Office of the Chief of Chemical sponsors a writing competition. Thisyear�s winners of the competition are, from left to right: CPT Brant Hoskins, firstplace; CPT William J. Epolito, second place; and MSG David Zapata, third place.

CPT Hoskins� first-place article, �Sustaining Critical Skills,� begins on page 5.The second-place article by CPT Epolito, �CWC Inspection,� begins on page 8.MSG Zapata�s third-place article, �The Chemical Corps in the 21st Century OurFuture,� begins on page 12.

For details on next year�s theme and how to enter the competition, see page 7.

4 CML

Page 7: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Sustaining Critical Skills The Chemical Corps is making advances in the NBCequipment arena. New systems are being fielded to dealwith the constantly changing threat. These systems, ifemployed properly, will enhance our ability to detect andavoid contamination, decontaminate, and obscure thefuture battlefield. Chemical leadership must ensure,however, that our personnel maintain their readiness and�know how� to take advantage of these systems. Thecurrent sustainment training of battalion staff chemicalofficers on NBC tasks is not sufficient.

The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

By CPT Brant D. Hoskins

As with any skill,time erodes ourNBC proficiencyif we do not expendenergy to sustain it.

The skills chemical lieutenantsdevelop in officer basic coursesdiminish greatly while serving asbattalion-level staff officers. Thisshortfall seriously degrades the qualityof support the Chemical Corps will beable to provide in the next conflict inwhich weapons of mass destructionwill be used. We require determined efforts to ensureour officers are ready for the next fight. This articleexamines skill degradation and recommends possiblesolutions to maintain training.

Think back to the time you walked through the door atyour first unit as the battalion chemical officer. You werewell trained and ready to execute your duties as the�chemo.� Almost immediately, however, you became in-undated with the Unit Status Report, quarterly trainingbriefings, land/range management, and most likelytraining schedules. Battle-captain duties consumed

most of your training time in the field. These weregreat opportunities to learn about the Army and yourunit, but your skills as a chemical officer began to rust.As with any skill, time erodes our NBC proficiency ifwe do not expend energy to sustain it.

The Army directs in FM 25-100, Training the Force,that once we have achieved the required level ofproficiency to, ��repeat critical task training at a

minimum frequency necessary tomaintain proficiency�� We are alsoinstructed not to ��rely on infrequent�peaking� to the appropriate levelof wartime proficiency.� Thisprinciple applies to every unit andindividual in the Army. Airbornetraining is a prime example. Soldiers whohave not jumped in more thansix months must undergo training

consisting of up to a six-hour block of instructionon critical tasks necessary to execute their duties tostandard. In addition, airborne soldiers are requiredto jump once per quarter to maintain proficiency.Another example is the semi-annual sustainmentgunnery densities performed by armor, infantry, andfield artillery units. Let us take the guidance inFM 25-100 and examples from our colleagues and applythem to the Chemical Corps.

Recently, I submitted a questionnaire to studentsin a chemical officer advanced course. Their response

Chemical leadership must ensure . . . that our personnel maintain theirreadiness and �know how� to take advantage of these systems. Thecurrent sustainment training of battalion staff chemical officers onNBC tasks is not sufficient.

5JULY 1999

1st Place

Page 8: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

revealed that, while serving as battalion chemicalofficers, minimal time was spent on sustainmenttraining. Of the 20 captains questioned, most repliedthat while serving on a battalion staff, their chemicalskills eroded. This was primarily because they focusedon other duties. Seven officers indicated they hadreceived no chemical sustainment training whileserving on battalion staff. Several officers indicatedthat the most training they received was in the train-upfor and execution of a unit rotation to a combattraining center. Of the 15 combat training centerrotations, only 9 were directly supported or evaluatedby outside chemical experts or observer controllers.

Several reports from combat training centersreflect how minimal chemical staff training forlieutenants affects performance. Joint ReadinessTraining Center (JRTC) NBC experts on the topic ofchemical asset employment observed, �Virtually noplanning or coordination is being done betweenbrigade and subordinate battalion staffs for theintegration of chemical assets in support of the taskforce scheme of maneuver. No plans, use of graphics,trigger mechanisms, and so forth are discussed orcoordinated. Relationships such as OPCON orattached are seldom understood�� Major (P) ChuckMcArthur in NBC and the JRTC Experience, assertsthat one reason motorized smoke is not used by amajority of units at JRTC is a lack of knowledge atbattalion level on how to properly employ it. The causeof this �lack of knowledge,� is the lack of post-OBCtraining for chemical lieutenants. This situation canbe remedied by ensuring we continue to train ourjunior officers after they leave the schoolhouse.

I recently asked two former NBC observercontrollers, (JRTC, NTC), �in general, what weak-nesses do battalion chemical officers display mostoften?� Each officer provided two answers. The firststated that a large number of chemical lieutenantsdo not participate in the orders-planning processes.Lieutenants are given additional duties (such as battle

captain or sand-table preparation) that precludeeffective performance of NBC duties. The secondadded that officers lack the knowledge of how andwhen to integrate NBC assets. Additionally, staffchemical lieutenants do not display a great degree ofunderstanding of the capabilities and employmentof NBC assets.

METT-T determines the best approach foreach unit to deal with this training deficiency. Anysuccessful approach must involve three elements.First, the unit commander must support training, allchemical officers must attend, and it must be thepriority. Second, training must focus on the tasksperformed by junior officers to support theirbattalions. Third, it must be conducted by the highestpossible NBC element to ensure the maximumexpertise possible. Listed below are two recommendedcourses of action.

First, provide a computer-driven simulation forall chemical officers from battalion to division levels.Task each officer to produce an NBC annex thatincludes smoke, decon, and recon support plans fortheir respective units. The computer simulationallows each officer to exercise these plans, advisecommanders, and receive real-time feedback fromsenior experts. I had the opportunity to participatein one such exercise, IRON DRAGON I, at 1stArmored Division Headquarters in Bad Kreuznach,Germany, in 1996. My command was reluctant tosend me to this training because there were pressingmatters in the S3 shop (there always are), but thedivision�s order was clear�every battalion and higherchemical officer/NCO will attend. It was an excellenttraining exercise and the first NBC staff trainingI received in two years. It allowed me to meet contempo-raries and chemical experts within the division.

Second, a combined series of officer and NCOprofessional development seminars may be morepractical in some areas. Seminar topics may range from

Several reports from combat training centers reflect how minimalchemical staff training for lieutenants affects performance . . .The cause of this �lack of knowledge� is the lack of post-OBCtraining for chemical lieutenants. This situation can be remediedby ensuring we continue to train our junior officers after theyleave the schoolhouse.

CML6

Page 9: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

hazard prediction to NBC annex production or whateverNBC issue has the greatest impact on the unit.

In no way am I trying to diminish the contributionsour battalion chemical officers are making in the field.

At the time this article was written, CPT Brant D. Hoskins was attending the Chemical Officer Advance Course at FortMcClellan, and was temporarily assigned as the SJL of the 84th Chemical Company, Fort McClellan. Previous assignmentsinclude Battalion Chemical Officer, 2/3rd Field Artillery Battalion, Germany; 25th Chemical Company, Recon PlatoonLeader, Germany; Brigade Chemical Officer, 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Germany. CPT Hoskins has completedthe Chemical Officer Basic Course, the Ranger School, and CAS3. He was commissioned as a 2LT from ROTC at SouthernOregon State with a BS degree in Economics.

These contributions, however, do not allow juniorofficers to maintain their NBC proficiencies. Let usrecognize that our officers lose some proficiencieswhile serving in the battalion staffs. We need to takesteps now to ensure we are ready for the next fight.

JULY 1999 7

Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest is an official function of the Chief of Chemical.The competition is open to military personnel in all branches and services, including alliednations, and to civilian personnel of any nationality.

Each article should be submitted as a double-spaced manuscript, between 500 and 2,500 wordsin length, and supported by appropriate footnotes, bibliography, and graphics. In addition to themanuscript, submissions should include a cover sheet with the author�s name, title, organization,complete address, and a short biography. To ensure anonymity in the selection process, the author�sname should not appear in the manuscript itself. The panel will rank submissions on a 100-pointscale with up to 40 points assigned for writing clarity, 30 points assigned for relevance to chemicalsoldiers of the 1990s, 20 points for general accuracy, and 10 points for originality.

First-, second-, third-place winners will receive cash awards of $500, $300, and $150, respectivelyfrom the Chemical Corps Regimental Association. Certificates of Achievement will be given toall three winners plus those who receive �Honorable Mention.� All winning essays will bepublished in the Army Chemical Review. The deadline for the contest is 1 September 1999.Send your entry to:

Command HistorianUS Army Chemical School320 Engineer Loop, Suite 44Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Or call Mattie Kirby at (573) 563-5267 or DSN: 676-5267

The Chief of Chemical has approved the theme for the 1999 Writing Contest. It is:�What should be the role of chemical units in Homeland Defense?�

Page 10: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

CWC Inspection Up close and personal

Not many chemical soldiers, noncommissioned officers, or officers will get theopportunity to experience a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) inspection first-hand. Hopefully, by sharing my experience during Johnston Island�s CWC initialstorage site inspection, you will have a better understanding of the inspectionprocess. At the time of the inspection in August 1997, I was assigned as theChemical Ammunition Company executive officer. Our company was responsiblefor the storage of Johnston Island�s chemical weapons, and therefore played asignificant role in the inspection.

The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

By CPT William J. Epolito

Overview of the CWC Treaty

The CWC Treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997.The treaty

� Prohibits the development, production, acquisition,stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons.

� Prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method ofwarfare.

� Requires the destruction of all chemical weapons andproduction facilities within 10 years of entry into force. To ensure compliance, each country must submit adeclaration containing data on their chemical weaponssites and production facilities. They are also subjectto the following inspections conducted by foreigninspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC governing body:

� Initial Inspection: first inspection of a declared site.� Routine Inspection: periodic inspection after a site�s

initial inspection.� Challenge Inspection: inspection to verify alleged

treaty violations.

The treaty also authorizes investigations of allegeduse of chemical weapons or riot control agents as amethod of warfare. As of 14 August 1998, 168 countries have signedthe treaty, and 114 have ratified it. Countries do nothave to abide by the treaty until they ratify it.

Overview of Johnston Island

Johnston Island is a remote island located approxi-mately 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. It is approximatelytwo miles long by three-quarters of a mile wide. In 1990, before demilitarization began, JohnstonIsland stored 6.6 percent of the US chemical weaponsstockpile. As of June 1998, over 75 percent of theoriginal stockpile on Johnston Island had been destroyedby incineration. The storage area is controlled by the US ArmyChemical Activity, Pacific (USACAP). The demilitarization facility, Johnston Atoll ChemicalAgent Disposal System (JACADS), is controlled by the

8 CML

2nd Place

Page 11: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

program manger for chemical demilitarizationand operated by Raytheon DemilitarizationCorporation�.

Pre-CWC Inspection Preparation We started our intense preparation forthe CWC initial inspection in early April1997 before the treaty went into effect. Thesepreparations included:

� Preparing our draft facility agreement.This agreement set guidelines for theinspection on Johnston Island.

� Preparing an operational plan (OPLAN).� Preparing an inventory plan and sev-

eral briefings. The briefings included aninformation security briefing, a pre-inspectionbriefing, and a storage structure safety briefing.

� Coordinating logistical support.� Preparing a reference guide. This guide

was given to soldiers to help them follow theguidelines of the treaty and our plan.

� Conducting inspection rehearsals. Weconducted two rehearsals before our initialinspection.

Initial Inspection

Johnston Island�s initial storage site inspec-tion was conducted from 13 through 18 August1997. The inspection was only of the storagesite because the demilitarization facility isconsidered a separate site and had alreadyreceived an initial inspection.

Notification

We were notified on 9 August at 2300, 86hours before the inspection was to begin. Weused this time to conduct final preparations andlogistical coordination. One of the major differences between ourinspection and that of other sites was that theinspectors were already on the island before wewere notified. The OPCW used 6 of the 15inspectors already conducting continuousmonitoring of the demilitarization facilityinstead of bringing more to the island. On a day-

Photos: Top: JACADS (Johnston AtollChemical Agent Disposal System)Demilitarization Facility; Middle: Sealingof a stucture; Bottom: Inventory of anM23 VX Landmine Structure.

Photos courtesy of CPT William J. Epolito

JULY 1999 9

Page 12: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

to-day basis these OPCW inspectors conduct 24-hourmonitoring of the demilitarization process at JACADSto ensure it is in compliance with the CWC treaty.

General Inspection Operations The six OPCW inspectors formed into threeinspection teams of two inspectors each. Two teamsconducted inventories while the third team revieweddocuments and the draft facility agreement. Eachinspection team also had two US On-Site InspectionAgency (OSIA) personnel with them to serve as liaisonsbetween the inspectors and USACAP and to assist inanswering the inspectors� questions. To speed up the inventory process, we assigned twoUSACAP escort teams to each inspection team. The first USACAP escort team was responsible forescorting and briefing the inspectors. Also, we put aUSACAP stock control representative with the escortteam to verify the inspectors� count with ourchemical weapons inventory records. The two OSIA per-sonnel with each inspection team also inventoriedthe structure to provide a third verifying count. The second USACAP escort team was responsiblefor �opening and clearing� the next structure to beinventoried. This leapfrog effect cut the time it tookto complete the 100-percent inventory in half. �Opening and clearing� is a 15- to 30-minute processconsisting of several strict safety and security actionsthat, once complete, allow personnel to enter a chemicalweapons structure without having to put on theirprotective masks (everyone must still have their maskwithin arm�s reach). After each structure was inventoried, the inspectorssealed it with a special plastic seal. The seal ensured noone could re-enter the structure without the inspectorsknowing about it. These seals were removed at thecompletion of the inspection. To remove a sealbefore the end of the inspection, the inspectors hadto be contacted first to get approval.

Day One The inspection started on 13 August at 1300 withthe preinspection briefing. The briefing familiarized theinspectors with administrative, safety, security, andstorage operations. At the completion of the briefing we gave theinspectors several required documents in accordance withthe treaty. After discussing several administrative issues,the inspectors reviewed and rejected our inventory.Our plan dictated what chemical weapons magazineswould be inspected each day for a five-day periodbased on inventory times from annual inventories andCWC rehearsals. The inspectors did not want to follow

a time schedule; they just wanted to inspect as manymagazines as they could each day. Once we agreedto their plan, the inspectors asked to inventory severalstructures that afternoon. At 1517, we gave the inspectors a short tour ofthe storage site and then they inventoried 4 ofthe 57 structures. After the inventories, the inspectors conductedfacility agreement negotiations and coordinated thenext day�s inspection activities with OSIA and USACAP.

Days Two and Three For the next two days (14-15 August), theinspectors inventoried the remaining structures.Each day they started at approximately 0830 andended at 1700. On 14 August, the inspectors inventoried 18 ofthe 57 structures and tagged three chemical weaponsfor future sampling. Sampling will occur when thetagged chemical weapon is shipped to JACADS fordemilitarization. At that point the laboratory thatsupports JACADS will analyze the sample underthe direct supervision of the inspectors to verifythat the chemical weapon contained the agent wesaid it did. On 15 August, they inventoried the remaining 35structures and tagged four chemical weapons. Theinspectors inventoried more structures this day becausemany of the structures were empty. On average, each structure took between 10 to 30minutes to inventory once inside the structure. At the completion of each day, the inspectors, OSIA,and USACAP (including other Army representatives)conducted a meeting to discuss any inspection issuesand to coordinate the next day�s inspection activities.

Days Four and Five On 16-17 August, the inspectors, OSIA, and USACAPreviewed the inventory results, discussed issues fromthe inspection, finalized the draft facility agreement, andprepared the preliminary findings report (this documentcontained the preliminary results of the inspection).On 17 August, with the approval of the instructors, weremoved the seals placed on the storage structures.

Inspection Completion On 18 August, the inspectors, OSIA, and USACAPreviewed and made changes to the preliminary findingsreport. The finalized preliminary findings report wassigned at a ceremony at 1630, signifying the officialend of the inspection. The inspection verified thestorage site declaration submitted on 29 April 1997with no discrepancies noted.

10 CML

Page 13: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Lessons Learned Here are the key lessons learned from JohnstonIsland�s initial storage site inspection:

� There is no substitute for a well-thought-outand detailed plan. The USACAP Treaty ComplianceOfficer, Ms. Janice L. Treadaway, ensured we startedextensive planning, coordination, and rehearsals inearly April 1997, even before the US ratified thetreaty. This paid high dividends when we were notifiedof our inspection because we were able to concentrateon final coordination and preparation, instead ofrushing the planning process at the last minute andoverlooking important details due to time limits.

� Effective communication eliminates manypossible conflicts and issues. Many of the issuesbrought up during the inspection were a result ofmiscommunication or a breakdown in communication. Onegood example of this was the improper removalof an OPCW seal. Two demilitarization plant employeesneeded to get into one of their hazardous wastestructures that the inspectors had sealed. They weresupposed to notify the inspectors before removing theseal, but they did not because they were not informedof the proper procedures. This communication failurecould have resulted in serious consequences, butthankfully it did not.

� Be flexible throughout the inspection. Inspectionsnever seem to go according to your plan, mainly

At the time this article was written CPT Epolito was attend-ing the Chemical Officer Advance Course at Fort McClellan,Alabama, with a follow-on assignment as the ChemicalDecontamination Training Facility Operations Officer, FortMcClellan, Alabama. Previous assignments include BattalionChemical Officer (ADA Patriot Battalion), Battalion S4 (ADAPatriot Battalion), Battery Executive Officer (ADA PatriotHeadquarters Battery), and Brigade Chemical Officer (ADAPatriot Brigade), Fort Bliss, Texas; and Chemical Ammuni-tion Company Executive Officer, Johnston Island. CPTEpolito has completed the Chemical Officer Basic Course,Radiological Safety Course, NBC Reconnaissance (L5-Fox)Course all at Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Airborne School,Fort Benning, Georgia. He was commissioned as a 2LT inthe Chemical Corps from ROTC, Clarkson University witha BS degree in Chemical Engineering in May 1994.

because you cannot always accurately predict what theinspectors will do. The key is to make a plan and beflexible to change. A good example of this waswhen the inspectors rejected our rehearsed inventoryplan and presented one of their own. By remainingflexible and making their plan work, we not onlysatisfied the inspectors, we also impressed themwith our can-do attitude.

Conclusion Hopefully, by sharing my experience during JohnstonIsland�s CWC initial storage site inspection, you now havea better understanding of the inspection process.

JULY 1999 11

Address: CommanderUS Army MANSCENATTN: ATZT-DT-WM-C320 Engineer Loop, Suite 220Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

New Address - New Location - Same MissionWARMOD-DOTDDSN: 676-6262, Commercial: (573) 563-6262e-mail: [email protected]

Warfighter-DOTDDSN: 676-6266, Commercial: (573) 596-0131 ext. 36266e-mail: [email protected]

Address:CommanderUS Army MANSCENATTN: ATZT-DI-WF-C320 Engineer Loop, Suite 220Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Page 14: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

The Chemical Corps in the 21st Century

By MSG David Zapata

Depicting what the Chemical Corps will be like in the 21st century makes one thinkback to when George Orwell attempted to depict what the world would be like in 1984. Youmay not get it entirely right but you can help to influence the paths we choose in the future.We can only guess what it will be like in the future. By looking at today�s world we can getan inkling of what tomorrow may bring.

Technology�s Promise

Proliferation of technologies capable of producingweapons of mass destruction (WMD) cannot bestemmed. We know this because many of these tech-nologies are dual-use technologies that can be used forpeaceful as well as hostile objectives. With dual-usetechnologies, states can produce needed vaccines,rockets to put satellites into orbit, improve pesticides,harden crops and livestock, improve the health of it�scitizens, and more. With this in mind, we must beprepared to accept the fact that the threat fromWMD will only escalate as nations become increasinglyself-sufficient. Just as computers are improvingexponentially over short periods of time, so will thesedual-use technologies. This can be seen in the ever-increasing advances in medicine and microbiology.

With all of this improving technology aroundus we cannot help but benefit. Our future nuclear,biological, and chemical (NBC) defense will have tokeep up with new and emerging technologies to ensurethat we can protect our nation and its interests. Thesechanges in NBC defense will include doctrine, training,organizations, and material improvements consistentwith new threats and missions. Increased automationof warning and reporting systems, NBC threat informa-tion flow, and situational awareness will aid futurecommanders in their decision making.

New and Old Doctrine

In the past we have used avoidance, protection, anddecontamination as our three principles of NBC defense.The principle of decontamination is expanding to includeall aspects of recovery after an NBC incident. In thefuture it will be called restoration.

Future NBC defense doctrine will encompass notonly traditional NBC threats but nontraditionalthreats from toxic industrial materials (TIMs). These TIMsinclude chemical, radiological, and biological hazardsfrom industrial sources, pollution, and low-levelexposure from these hazards over time.

The Chemical Corps� role of providing showersduring operations will become increasingly important.Showers will not only be used during restorationoperations for personal decontamination, but duringoperations in disaster relief and for personal hygiene inimmature theaters. This was evidenced in Bosnia

These industrial chemicals, through eitherintentional or accidental release, may pose ahazard to US forces. In many areas where USforces will be deployed, there may be a significanthazard to them from environmental damageor contamination.

Joint Service NBC Defense Concept, September 1997

Our Future

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3rd Place

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when some units went months without propershower facilities while possibly being exposed toTIMs. Having NBC personnel set up their battaliondecontamination apparatus in the shower mode andproviding the peacekeepers with the much-neededpersonal hygiene could have offset the effects of theexposure.

In the future, the role of the Chemical Corps inproviding smoke and flame operations will diminishconsiderably if not altogether. These missions, althoughimportant in themselves, will take a back seat to theneed for NBC defense operations.

Training, Leaders, and New Missions

We will see an ever-increasing need to providesupport to civilians at home and allies abroad duringtimes of crisis. The Chemical Corps will take the leadin providing training in civil defense and disasterpreparedness to civilian and government organiza-tions around the world.

Our leaders at platoon level will be called upon to be-come more independent in their ability to operate on theirown. Mid-level managers at all levels will be cut or takethe back seat during operations.

common doctrine that allowed them to work together. Thiswill be the case in the future. A basic combat unit will begiven a mission and will receive whatever assets areneeded to accomplish its mission to form a task force.This task force may go heavy (more than a traditionalallocation) with chemical defense units if there is a highNBC threat. It may go very light if the only threat is fromTIMs. Or, if no NBC threat exists, it may not take anyNBC defense units.

Key to operating as flexible modular plug-and-play unitsis ensuring that our basic units are self-containedand self-supporting. We must ensure that they can pluginto whatever force they are attached to and operateefficiently. This will require a redesign of the basicchemical platoon and company. Each platoon will havea few more �supporters� to assist during operationswhile attached to separate organizations. Chemicalcompanies will train, prepare, launch, and assist theirplatoons for independent operations. More and moreChemical Company Headquarters will assume the roleof liaison and/or augmentation to a division or task-force staff rather than being an �on-the-ground�command. They will be �command-less OPCON� oftheir platoons, if present at all, during operations.

Equipment

The future will provide advances in detection,identification, protection, and decontamination ofNBC hazards. Equipment will be lightweight, small,and dual-use.

Near instantaneous real-time detection andidentification of NBC hazards will allow earlywarning, reporting, and tracking of these NBC hazardsthrough sophisticated communications and artificialintelligence architectures.

Advanced vaccines and methods of self-prophylaxis will lessen the burden of having to carefor NBC casualties. The self-prophylaxis will not be aswe have today, man-in-the-loop auto-injectors, but willinclude implants and devices that will determinecasualty�s needs and provide the proper dose ofmedicine automatically without the casualty�s or medic�sintervention.

In the future, the role of the Chemical Corps in providing smoke and flameoperations will diminish considerably if not altogether. These missions,although important in themselves, will take a back seat to the need for NBCdefense operations.

As we move forward, we may require furtherreductions in supervision and centralizeddirection� Increased organizational flexibilitywill enhance our responsiveness. We will seekorganizations that can support flexible forcepackaging and work to smooth the processfurther.

Joint Vision 2010

Organization

The organization of the Chemical Corps and its unitswill change to be more modular in nature. Unitswill be designed to be �plug-and-play� organizations. Thetraditional habitual relationships units have had in thepast with their combat forces will dwindle. Forces willbe built and tailored to the mission. In Operation DesertStorm we saw units combined from all theaters ofoperations to support the central command. These unitshad no habitual relationship with each other but had

JULY 1999 13

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Future

I�ve tried to touch on a little of what the ChemicalCorps will look like in the 21st century. We are the Chemi-cal Corps� future. Our ideas are what will driveand shape the Chemical Corps as we travel downthis path together.

Standard uniforms will be made of NBC-protectivematerial thus lowering the logistics burden duringrestoration operations and providing immediateprotection in the event of an NBC attack.

Decontaminants will become more �user-friendly�and environmentally safe. There will always be a needfor liquid decontaminants, but sorbent and otherdecontaminating methods and technologies willlessen the need for such. These include peel-offequipment coatings, automatic drive-through carwash decontamination devices, and street cleaner-typevehicles for area/route decontamination.

Vision is useful only so long as it can be translatedinto effective decisions, for it is today�s decisionsthat shape tomorrow�s environment.

SOF Vision 2020

AR-PERSCOM NOTES

Let me introduce myself. I am Major Lawrence W. Meder, the Chemical Career ManagementOfficer for the United States Army Reserve, stationed at the Army Reserve Personnel Command,ATTN: ARPC-OPD-C, at 1 Reserve Way, St. Louis, Missouri, 63132-5200.

At AR-PERSCOM our mission is to provide the highest quality personnel life-cycle managementand services which result in a trained and ready force in support of the national military strategy. I performthese and other mission tasks for Army Reserve Officers in the Chemical Corps.

I am available by phone at 1-800-325-4987. If you are a Reserve officer and we have not spokenyet, call me. If you are an Active Component or National Guard officer pondering life in theArmy Reserves, call now and get answers to your questions before you switch service. I am alsoavailable through e-mail; my address is:[email protected]

Go Reserves, Go Chemical!

Major Lawrence W. MederAR-PERSCOMATTN: ARPC-OPD-C1 Reserve WaySt Louis, MO 63132-5200

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At the time this article was written MSG Zapata was the NBC NCO for the Army Special Operations Command. He began hiscareer in the 21st Chemical Company, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He served 9 years with the 10th Special ForcesGroup (Airborne) forward deployed in Europe; was an Observer/Controller in the Joint Readiness Training Center, and a senior writer/instructor for the doctrine office of the US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. During Operation Desert Storm, MSGZapata served as NBC NCO and Operations Sergeant for a Joint Special Operations Task Force. In his most recent deployment,MSG Zapata was attached to 1st AD with the Center for Army Lessons Learned in the former Yugoslavia. He is a graduate ofvarious military courses to include Jumpmaster, Tech Escort (J5), NBC Recon (L5), Recondo, Jungle Operations, ANCOC,various NATO NBC courses, the Combat Developments Course, the Training Developer�s Course, and the US Special OperationsCommand Acquisition Management Course.

The future is in our hands!

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Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are aphenomenon of modern invention. In centuries past, WMDwere the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse(Famine, Plague, War, and Death). Today, the worldis faced with a far more powerful equivalent. Anequivalent that can, in seconds or hours, destroyentire nations or even this planet we live on. The age of the atom bomb was the beginning ofWMD. On 16 July 1945, at approximately 5:29 a.m.when the first bomb exploded at the Trinity testsite, the scientists who made it possible realizedthey were ushering into the world a new age. Theydid not know how good or bad this age would be.In the more than five decades after Trinity whatthey created at Los Alamos has not been used.As of today, only the cities of Hiroshima andNagasaki have been the targets of WMD. Canthat be said of the next 50 years? We cannot say. Wecan only rely on past history for a possible answer. The atom bomb was first developed because theGermans were working on such a device, and giventhe incredible power that this device was capableof producing, President Franklin Roosevelt quicklyfollowed up a letter by Albert Einstein and launchedthe Manhattan Project. Under this innocuous name, therace to develop the first atom bomb began. In 1944, as the bomb was near completion, militaryplanners began to consider what targets the bomb mightbe used against. Since Germany was the principal reasonfor the development of the bomb, it was consideredthe first potential target. Early in the war, the allied

leaders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff determinedthat Germany was a greater danger than Japan andshould be defeated first. Intelligence clearly showed Germany had anenormous scientific capability that the Allies had to face�inventions such as the V-1, V-2, the jet fighter, hugetanks, special homing torpedoes, and other technologicalweapons of war. Had Germany not surrendered inApril 1945, the first bomb might have been exploded abovea German city. When Major General Leslie R. Groves told PresidentHarry S. Truman the bomb had been tested, and worked,Germany had already been defeated. Italy had left thewar earlier. The only member of the Tripartite Pact stillfighting was Japan. At the time, there were strong andvery lively debates among those in charge on whether ornot the bomb should be used. One interesting theorywas the �Fair Warning� concept. Simply put, the United States would invite membersof the Japanese government and its scientists to the farNorthern Pacific. The United States would thendetonate an atomic bomb on a remote and uninhabitedisland so the Japanese could see its power, and wouldthen have a chance to consider whether or not theywanted to continue the conflict. General Groves and most of the scientists vetoed theidea for an obvious reason�if the bomb didn�t work ordid not have the expected destructive power, then theUnited States would look stupid and the Japanese wouldcontinue the war. Therefore, work on the atomic bombcontinued with Japan as its principal target.

By Dr. Burton Wright, US Army Chemical School Historian

As of today, only the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have beenthe targets of WMD. Can that be said of the next 50 years?

JULY 1999 15

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

MASS DESTRUCTIONofWEAPONS

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The target committee picked five Japanese citiesas potential use for the atomic bomb. These cities werepicked for specific and scientific reasons. First, theyhad not been bombed to any extent, so the damageafter the drop would be solely attributable to the device.Secondly, these cities had specific geographicalanomalies that would enable the scientists to studythe blast damage of the bombs for future uses. The two bombs being worked on��Fat Man�and �Little Boy��used different triggers to causeimplosion�a plutonium trigger and a dynamite trigger.Since such a device had never been triggered before, noone was sure that either one would work. When theEnola Gay took off from Tinian, the bomb wasn�t evenarmed. They thought it would be wise not to arm thedevice until the aircraft was far away. If it was armedon takeoff and had an accident, the device couldbe triggered, causing enormous damage to thefacilities on Tinian. The dropping of the first atom bomb on Hiroshimaushered in what was thought to be a new era ofWMD. Think of it�one bomb destroyed an entirecity. It would have taken hundreds of B-29s to dothe same damage, and more than one mission wouldhave been required. This type of large-scale destructionhad never been accomplished by humans�onlynaturally occurring hazards such as hurricanes, massivefires, tornadoes, and tidal waves had the same effect. At that time, the United States had a monopolythat gave it unprecedented power to destroy an enemy.There was considerable debate among the scientificcommunity on how to use this new device. Many ofthe greatest intellectuals in the world had worked onthe Manhattan Project, and they wanted to ensure allcountries had the same information�that the USwould not maintain this monopoly. Some, like Ted Hall, a brilliant Harvard physicistwho was sent to work on the project at the age of 18,took it upon themselves to share the atomic secret with

the Soviets. The Soviets, according to newly releasedinformation, had a huge spy apparatus at Los Alamos thatenabled them in 1949 to detonate an atomicdevice. The Soviets would have eventually created sucha device on their own as would the Japanese or otherdeveloped nations. The information they obtainedfrom the Americans simply accelerated the process. The considerations of the use of the atomic bombwere based on its destructive potential, not its tacticalcapabilities. Such bombs were meant to persuade thosestill fighting that continued resistance would only bringfurther �ruin from the air.� It was a weapon to force-fully persuade by total destruction. Whether the bombwas used to persuade the Germans or the Japanese wasnot the issue. If one believes history, Japan wasbombed because President Truman wanted to impressthe Soviets with the new US weapon. In planning for Operation Downfall, the directassault on Japan�s home islands, the use of WMD tosupport the landings was being considered. When thetwo bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima,the United States had one more device that could havebeen put together and used, but it would have takenseveral months before more bombs could be provided.Thereafter, an indefinite number could be provided�about one every two weeks because the logistics systemdeveloped at Oak Ridge and other factories createdby the Manhattan Project would then be running atfull capacity. Had the United States desired to use WMD insupport of tactical operations, it would have beenpossible to do so, but it is doubtful that the Armywould have used them. General George C. Marshallwas not supportive of dropping the bombs in the firstplace, and was most reluctant to use WMD. It was notthat he was frivolous with the lives of his men, farfrom it, but he worried about the precedent that wasbeing set and the retaliation that might come to theUnited States for using WMD.

One bomb destroyed an entire city. It would have takenhundreds of B-29s to do the same damage, and more thanone mission would have been required. This type of large-scale destruction had never been accomplished by humans . . .

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Training Gets a BoostFrom New Technology

By Mr. Daniel Mack

The soldiers work quickly and cautiously. The task:To detect biological agents in the atmosphere using theArmy�s new Biological Integrated Detection System(BIDS). The accuracy of the information gathered andtransmitted will be crucial to the mission as well as tothe health and well-being of troops in the area. First,the soldier uses an ultraviolet aerodynamic particle sizer(UVAPS) to check for particles in the air. Then, he usesa biodetector device (BD) to identify the sample. Although the process takes place in themiddle of a potential battlefield, each step is precise and accurate.

Lab training in BIDS processes.

The above scenario is repeated often as soldiers train to detect biological warfare agents. Trainingsoldiers to operate complex equipment such as the BIDS has historically been costly and time-consuming. First, it is difficult for instructors to monitor the trainees� progress. Second, using realequipment for training is very expensive; and third, even though real biological agents are not used,the simulants used in training still require the filing of environmental impact statements.

The obvious answer to this challenge is to develop a mockup training system that can train soldiers onthe equipment in realistic scenarios, inexpensively, effectively, and free from environmental concerns. ITT TIndustries (formerly KAMAN Science Corporation) has developed advanced computer simulationtechnology for training the New P3I BIDS that meets these requirements.

A BIDS in the field with camouflage in place.

ITT�, under contract with the US Armyprogram director for biological defense, will build amockup training system at Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. The soldiers will be able to operate theBIDS during an integrated, end-to-end biologicalscenario using computer simulations that areintegrated with actual BIDS equipment. As thesoldiers learn to test for the presence of biologicalagents in real-time, the instructors will evaluate theirefforts. This will provide state-of-the-art trainingfor chemical soldiers.

JULY 1999 17

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By CPT Andrew M. HerbstBackground

Producing and maintaining 360-degree smokecoverage is easy to say but difficult to do. As chemical(smoke) platoon leaders, we try to maintain 360-degreesmoke coverage of a given target for the desiredmission duration regardless of physical or tacticalconditions on the battlefield. Current doctrine statesthat by using cardinal directions and compass-pointorientation or by clock orientation, a smoke platoon canshift to another location quickly and safely in order tomaintain continuous smoke coverage. This is not the besttechnique given the complexity of a rapidly changingsituation. Furthermore, this technique does not possesseffective control measures to limit risk and promotemission success. Adjusting smoke in this mannerrequires much of the platoon to move in its own smoke,where we often lose control of the mission and putmission accomplishment at risk.

Grid System Technique

The Grid System Technique is a better way to achieve360-degree smoke coverage. This system accomplishestwo objectives. First and foremost, it nearly guarantees100-percent continuous and uninterrupted smoke cover-age of the target. It also uses effective control measuresthat provide a safe and reliable method for moving smokeelements during adverse weather or tactical conditions.

Procedures�Platoon Leader

1) Map Reconnaissance. Prior to departing the tacticalassembly area, conduct a map reconnaissance to identifythe objective and smoke target boundary. In accordancewith FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, the boundary mustsurround the target by �five times its size to prevent theenemy from saturating the entire smoked area with fire.�The objective and smoke target boundary combine to formthe objective area.

2) Grid Planning. Begin the Grid System Techniqueduring your leader�s reconnaissance. Once you reachthe primary smoke control point where you can surveythe area best, divide the objective area into grid boxes.Choose easily identifiable natural or man-made features,such as roads or trails, to segment the area. If these arenot present, then the squad leaders who accompanyyou on the reconnaissance will mark their locations witheither pickets, chem-lites, or engineer tape. The area withineach grid box provides a smoke sector for a squad orthe platoon.3) Grid Identification. Once you feel confident thatyou have divided the area into manageable smoke sec-tors, identify each grid with a letter and number. Theletter-number grid identifiers follow chronological se-quence in a counterclockwise fashion starting with thes e c t o rclosest to the primary smoke control point, for example,A1, B2, C3, D4.

Achieving360-DegreeSmokeCoverage

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4) Moving into Position. Initially, designate asquad as the main effort (1SQD). It moves fromthe objective rally point (ORP) directly to itsprimary sector. Their position is based solelyon the wind direction taken during the leader�sreconnaissance. The squad designated as thesupporting effort (2SQD) remains in the ORPuntil 1SQD makes a subsequent wind check inthe objective area. If the wind direction has notchanged since the leader�s reconnaissance, then1SQD will remain in hide positions and report thewind direction to you every five minutes. If the windhas changed direction, however, 1SQD will moveto a sector where it can best cover theobjective area and report its position to you. Youthen order 2SQD to move to its designatedsector and to remain in hide positions until you givethe order to initiate smoke. (See Figure 1, right.)

5) Adjusting Smoke. Your three objectives for ad-justing smoke are to (1) conduct the adjustmentquickly, (2) maintain smoke on target during theadjustment, and (3) conduct the adjustment safely.You observe the objective area from the primarysmoke control point. From this vantage point, youcan see the effects of your unit�s smoke on thetarget area. When the wind direction changesto 45 degrees and the platoon can no longer coverthe target, order 1SQD to displace to H8 wherethe target area can be covered better. Simply radiothe squad leader the adjustment. It is standard forsquad leaders to take the most direct route to thealternate sector, as long as they do not crossinto the other squad�s sector. Once 1SQD is inposition, it is safe to move 2SQD to point A1, whereit can better support the mission. (See Figure 2,right.)

Conclusion

The Grid System Technique is the mosteffective method for adjusting smoke on themodern battlefield. It is nearly foolproof, because itinvolves all the unit�s leaders in mission planning,

Figure 2

The wind direction has changed from 360 to 45 degrees. First,1SQD is moved to H8 to avoid having 2SQD enter its sector whilethey are still there. (This would be unsafe.) Once 1SQDis set in H8, 2SQD is ordered to move into A1. As standardpractice, smoke pots are employed by 1SQD during theirdisplacement to maintain smoke on target.

Radio: �1SL this is PL, move to Hotel Eight, over.� �PL thisis 1SL, wilco, over.� �1SL this is PL, out.� 1SL employs smokepots and moves on the most direct route (1) to H8, gets set, andreports to his PL. �PL this is 1SL, I am set, over.� �1SL this isPL, roger out.� The same radio procedure is followed to move2SQD to A1, (2).

The bridge is the smoke target. Wind direction is 360 degrees.Each squad has three smoke vehicles. The boundaries andtrails have good trafficability. The boundary corners were markedby the squad leaders during the leader�s reconnaissance.1SQD is the main effort and 2SQD is the supporting effort.Each smoke vehicle carries two smoke pots. The platoon leaderis located at the smoke control point (SCP), and the platoonsergeant is on the smoke line between the smoke squads.

Figure 1

preparation, and execution. The squad leaders,who are responsible for marking all of the smokesectors, gain a clear understanding of what isexpected of them from the beginning of the smokeoperation through its completion. When the task forcecommander chooses smoke as a combat multiplier, youcan feel confident that your technique for maintainingsmoke on target is effective in nearly all weather andtactical conditions.

At the time this article was written, CPT Andrew M. Herbstwas assigned as a Chemical Officer Basic Course Tactical AirCommand Officer. CPT Herbst has a BA in BiologicalScience. His source of commission is Officer CandidateSchool, Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of theChemical Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. Previousassignments include Commander, 101st Chemical Company,Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 82d Airborne Division NBCCDirector, and Division Artillery Chemical Officer, Fort Bragg,

JULY 1999 19

and dual-purpose Platoon Leader, Berlin Brigade.

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CDTF Moves to the Ozarks On 19 August 1999, the US Army ChemicalSchool will train its last military student in theChemical Defense Training Facility or CDTF at FortMcClellan, Alabama. For more than 12 years theCDTF staff has provided a realistic trainingexperience designed to create �Chemical Veterans,�while instilling confidence and credibility for morethan 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,and civilians. In June 1995, recommendations of the BaseRealignment and Closure (BRAC) Commissionrequired the closing of Fort McClellan, Alabama,and the relocation of the US Army Chemical andMilitary Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. In addition, the commission�s recom-mendation stated that the CDTF would continue to

operate at Fort McClellan until such time as thecapability to operate a replacement facility at FortLeonard Wood existed. Prior to beginning construction, the installationhad to have Missouri State Air and Storm Water Permits,complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),and obtain an approved Department of Defense(DOD) site safety submission. Construction began26 May 1997. After three and one-half years ofenvironmental and safety planning, facility design, andconstruction, the US Army Corps of Engineers,Kansas City District, turned the facility over to theChemical School on 1 February 1999. The new $28million facility covers 13 acres and includes 72,000square feet of administrative, security, storage, andtraining space.

By MAJ George Heib

The new CDTF complex at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as it appeared on February 17, 1999.Photo courtesy of the Hensel Phelps Construction Co.

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ServiceParking

EquipmentStorage

Area

Filter Room

Service Galleryand

Training Bays

Hot and ColdLaundries

Men�s and Women�sLockers and Facilities

MedicalRoom

Lab

MechanicalRoom

Dock Service Area

Equip. StorageI.P.E. Drying

EquipmentStorage/Destruction

Area

Receiving/DisposalStaging Area

General floor plan of the trainingand storage sections of the newCDTF complex.

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In preparation for the facility turnover, theCDTF advance party, led by CPT Kent Soebbing,Operations Officer, arrived at Fort Leonard Wood inSeptember 1998 to supervise the final stages ofconstruction, finalize government equipment andsupply requirements, and complete the wastedisposal and operations and maintenance contracts.By December 1998, the first instructors wereassigned led by MSG William Gunter, ChiefInstructor. On 4 January 1999, the Chemical Schooltook receipt of the administrative building. Laterin the week, the newly mobilized operations andmaintenance contractor, EG&G Defense MaterialsIncorporated, moved in and began their contractphase-in. Over the next few months, the newlyformed CDTF staff received supplies and equip-ment, set-up training bays, reviewed SOPs, andparticipated in training events at Fort McClellanto learn instructor skills firsthand. Additionally,the CDTF participated in the initial ChemicalWeapons Convention inspection of Fort LeonardWood. By mid-April, the advance party completedall tasks in preparation for its Pre-OperationalSafety Survey. Designed by The Benham Group, St. Louis,Missouri, the new facility incorporates an opera-tional concept similar to the Fort McClellan design.The facility includes emergency backup generators,a negative pressure system with continuous airmonitoring, redundant air filter systems, wastewater containment and neutralization, and anearthquake and tornado-proof design. Additionally, thenew design incorporates the latest innovations intechnology and lessons learned in operation at theFort McClellan CDTF.

The new facility has no thermal treatmentunit for the on-site treatment of solid and liquidwastes. The installation will ship all special 3Xdecontaminated wastes to a federally approved off-site incinerator. The new facility is completelyautomated and utilizes a Y2K-compliant HoneywellDirect Digital Control System, which increasesthe staff �s safety and operational monitoringcapability. Design improvements increased the training andlaboratory floor space. The design team added a trainingbay to accommodate joint service training devices. Thelaboratory staff received additional floor space toinclude a separate �dry� or non-toxic laboratory withits own ventilation hood and separate storage andbalance rooms. Also, the designer expanded the glovebox to accommodate two-person toxic-agent operation. With the conclusion of the facility agreementwith the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons at The Hague, the new facility and staff will beready to begin toxic-agent operations by mid-August1999. The Chemical School will continue to provideDOD�s only toxic chemical agent training experienceat Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. It will ensurethe Army of the 21st century remains chemicallytrained and ready.

MAJ Heib is the Director of the Chemical DefenseTraining Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Priorto this assignment, he served as the forward ChemicalSchool Relocation Officer on the Fort Leonard WoodBRAC Transition Office staff overseeing all aspectsof the school�s move. Other assignments include chemicalplatoon, company command, and battalion executiveofficer with experience as a chemical staff officer onbattalion, brigade, division, corps, and theater army staffs.

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Did you know? Major (later Colonel) Earl J. Atkisson was an Engineer Officer at thebeginning of World War I when he was given the critical duty of creating the30th Engineer Regiment (Gas and Flame). The 30th was sent to Francewhere they were trained by the British Army�s Special Brigade andrenamed the 1st Gas Regiment.

The Personnel Proponency Office is currently developing a plan for COAC students tocomplete a master�s degree program. Please view the Personnel Proponency webpage for updates.

http://www.mcclellan.army.mil/usacmls/prop/prpindex.htm

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The 82d is Smokin�

Even armies with all the high-tech weapons systemsthey can field have a hard time defeating one of theoldest battlefield tactics�smoke. In October 1998, the 82d Airborne Division�s 21stChemical Company became the first unit in the Armyequipped with the new Infrared and Visual SmokeSystem. The company has 18 units of the system,called the M56 Smoke Generator. Traditionally, smoke has been used in battle to blindand confuse the enemy, camouflage troop movements andmaneuvers, and decoy the enemy. But the Army�s new system does much more. �The M56 offers the division a unique capability todefeat smart weapons and to screen itself from sensors,�said Lt. Col. Thomas Woloszyn, the 82d Airborne Division�schemical officer. The system is the Army�s first smoke generator thatcan defeat infrared weapons systems. The Army�s oldM157A2 system had only visual capability.

By Tanya S. BiankStaff writer, Fayetteville Observer-Times, Fayetteville, North Carolina

Staff photo by Justin CarlsonMembers of the 21st Chemical Company work with a civilian manager to test a smoke system onSicily Drop Zone. The system was heavy-dropped for the first time.

Ground-up graphite in the M56 smoke absorbs thermalenergy that smart weapons systems need to function.�It acts like a sponge sucking up energy,� said JohnGreen of the Smoke/Obscurants Office, where thesystem was developed. The smoke generator system took eight years todevelop. Green�s office is part of the US Army Soldier,Chemical and Biological Command at AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland. The smoke generator can be placed on the back ofthe M1113 Humvee, which is also new. The systemcosts $145,000. Over the next five years, 267 systemswill be fielded in units throughout the Army. Fort Bragg soldiers say the new system is easier tooperate than the old. �On the old ones, we had to play and tinker with themto keep them running,� said Cpl. Kevin Cox of the 21stChemical Company. �We can adjust the fog levelwithout worrying about the engine overheating.�

23JULY 1999

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The modified Humvee, called an M1113, carry-ing the M56 smoke generator, descends slowlyto the drop zone. It is held by three parachutesafter being dropped from a C-130.

The system can produce 90 minutes of smokewithout refueling. One smoke generator system canblow enough smoke to cover 50 football fields. The question for the 82d unit was whether it couldsurvive being air-dropped from a C-130. In October,soldiers with the 21st Chemical Company got achance to find out. Beneath three huge cargo parachutes, a brandnew 10,380-pound M1113 Humvee with the M56Smoke Generator System strapped to its back floatedto the ground at Fort Bragg�s Sicily Drop Zone. Thevehicle and generator landed in one piece, albeit witha cracked windshield. Once on the ground, getting the vehicle off therigging platform took a bit of muscle. Soldiers, who hadparachuted in, pushed, shoved, jumped on, and rockedthe vehicle to no avail. The driver revved the engine. The Humvee wouldn�t budge. And to complicate matters, the system landed on aslope. A Red Cross truck finally came to the rescueand pulled the Humvee off its rigger platform. After a few minutes, the Humvee looked like arocket ready to blast off as white billows coveredthe drop zone. �Our mantra is, if you can�t see it, you can�t hit it,�Green said.

Staff photo by Justin Carlson

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The Sibert Award is presented annually to the best company-sizedchemical unit�one to an Active Component unit and one to aReserve Component unit. The award covers a calendar year, so wehave just selected the winners for 1998.

To apply for the award, each unit submits a packet IAWRegimental Regulations to its MACOM. Each MACOM selects itsbest and forwards their packet to the USACMLS, where the directorsand their Sergeants Major vote the best of the best.

Congratulations!21st Chemical Company, 82d Airborne Division,

Fort Bragg, North Carolinaand

310th Chemical Company, Fort McClellan, Alabama

The Sibert Award winners for 1998

Page 27: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

WE MUST PROTECTTHE CHILDREN!

By MAJ Robert D. Walk

Protection of children during war is a major concern forgovernment planners of all nations. Children are, after all,the future of any nation. As a result, the advent of chemicalweapons led to the adoption of several forms of protectionfor children and at least a few innovative ideas.

Child protection in World War II consisted ofair-purifying respirators (APRs) and human-poweredair-purifying respirators (PAPR). This articleexplores protection for infants, young children, andolder children used by the Germans and Americansduring World War II and describes current trendsin child protection.

Infants

Infants represent a challenge to protection efforts.Their body size and composition change constantly.They grow by leaps and bounds. Not only are infantssmall and cute, they defy all efforts to get them tofollow instructions! One can only imagine trying to put arespirator on a struggling, colicky 3-month old. Thus, aprotective apparatus had to be built to contain the entirebody, not just the head. However, an infant lacks airintake potential to overcome a filter�s resistance, sofresh air must be continually provided to preventsuffocation. The Germans designed a baby cradle for infants��Gaskettchen.� This is a human-powered air-purifying respirator. The cradle consists of a plywoodframe, a rubberized white fabric cover with viewport, a German Volksmaske 37 filter, and a hosethat connects the �Gaskettchen� to a bellows unit. Toaccommodate needed parent-child interaction, the�Gaskettchen� has a built-in gloved mitten. To use therespirator, the infant is inserted into the protector on the

plywood frame, the side is rolled up, and the elasticstraps are attached. The attending parent pumps thebellows 15 times a minute to push fresh air throughthe filter on the inside of the cradle to the infant andcontinues until the �All Clear� signal is given.�Gaskettchens� were manufactured and distributedthroughout Germany for use in case of a chemicalattack. They were probably adopted in the late 1930s.Late in the war, examples of this apparatus werecaptured and tested by Allied forces. American testsof the apparatus in 1945 showed that it was a usable,although bulky, device. These tests showed no realadvantage over the standard US Infant Protector. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the perceived threatof continued attacks against the Hawaiian Islandswas high. Such attacks could conceivably includechemical weapons. COL Unmacht, chemical officerfor the Department of Hawaii (and the territory ofHawaii), sent a request for children�s masks toWashington, DC on 18 December 1941, but none wereavailable. As a result, COL Unmacht, in conjunctionwith the Hawaiian Surgeons Office, set about tocreate infant protection equipment from resourceswithin the Hawaiian Department. The result ofthese efforts was a box respirator and aprotective hood for infants. The box respiratorwas never produced in quantity. The protectivehood for infants was known as the �Bunny Mask�because COL Unmacht found that adding �ears�

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German infant protector, �Gaskettchen� with doll in place. The attached glove hangs in front of the doll.Photo courtesy of Major Robert D. Walk

Photo courtesy of Major Robert D. Walk

Closed �Gaskettchen� showing the window and bellows. The attending parent pumpedthe bellows 15 times per minute to circulate fresh air in the unit.

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to the hood and wiggling them put a sense of playinto children that could entice them to wear theprotective hood. The mask was locally designed, tested, and producedusing available materials. The mask had an inner and outerbag, an eyepiece for viewing, and a drawstring. The outerbag was constructed from felt or denimimpregnated with CC-2 (chloramide powder) inparaffin. The inner bag was muslin impregnatedwith paraffin. The eyepiece was scrap celluloid fromold x-ray negatives. Inside the hood was a small

and easier to carry. The US Infant Protector, M1, wasdestandardized in 1945. After the war, technology of synthetic materialsadvanced quickly. As a result, the M2 Infant Protector(Civil Defense designation: CDV-815) was made ofvinyl and shaped like a GI pup tent. The protector wasmeant for children up to 4 years old. The designallows for the diffusion of air through enclosed filtersin sufficient quantity to provide ample oxygen to thechild and eliminate the need for an air pump.The tent-shaped protector has three large filters on the

breathing pad made of a double layer ofheavy Turkish toweling that wasdampened with a 5 percent sodiumphenolate solution prior to use. Allseams were double stitched. This was a multifunction maskthat served as an infant protector(entire infant placed into the hood),toddler protector (tied around thewaist), and youth (under 5 years)mask (tied about the neck). Themask was issued with a small bottleof sodium phenolate and BulletinNumber 5 (Directions for Use ofBunny Masks), published on May 14,1942. This mask, an air-purifyingrespirator, was produced in quantitywithin the Hawaiian Department. Thefirst 3,000 masks were issued inHawaii in June 1942, with deliveriescompleted to the outer islands byDecember. A total of 37,643 masks wereissued within the territoryof Hawaii. To meet the needs of the continentalUnited States, several designs wereexamined, including box respirators.Ultimately, the Office of Civil Defensedesigned, adopted, and produced theM1 Infant Protector. This is animpermeable, rubber-coated, layeredfabric bag with an acetate viewportfor the baby. An external hoop maintains the shapeand the protector is sealed with a drawstring cord. Thebaby is inserted into the bottom of the protector andthe drawstring is pulled and tied. The attendingparent pumps air using a rubber, accordion-styledbellows unit through an M1 Training Filter tothe infant. To ensure adequate air for the child, thebellow must be pumped about 15 times per minute.Like the �Gaskettchen,� the M1 Infant Protector isa human PAPR. In comparison to the German cradleprotector, the US Infant Protector is lighter in weight

two long sides of the protector withone clear viewport covering theremaining area. An exterior metalframe supports the tent and ashoulder carrying strap is attachedto the frame. The child is insertedinto the protector through an apronon the front; the apron is rolled upand sealed with snaps onto theframe. The viewport allows Momand Dad to see the baby and thebaby to look out. Toys can beplaced in the protector to keep thebaby occupied. Finally, the protector was designedfor mass production using the latestmanufacturing technology. Thisreduced its cost to about $25 andtheoretically would allow the averageAmerican to purchase one easily. Thisprotector was adopted as standard in1960 but was not produced in quantityin the United States.

Young Children

Young children, ages 2 to 6, alsorepresent a serious challenge to thedefense planner. As with an infantthe child is constantly growing, but isstill not able to completely followinstructions! The child is very ener-

getic and will not sit still long; thus the protectiveapparatus should be built to contain the torso.As with infants, it is best, although not required, toprovide air in an over-pressure mode. Infantprotectors could also be used to protect toddlersand young children, as long as the child fits in theprotector. The Germans designed the �Gasjaeckchen� forchildren up to the age of about 4. The �Gasjaeck-chen� was a hood for older children who could notbe fitted with the adult civilian gas mask. The hood

German �Gasjaeckchen�

JULY 1999 27

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is manufactured of rubberized whitefabric with arms, an oval viewport forthe child to look through, and ahose connected to a bellows unit toprovide the air. A German standardVolksmaske 37 canister is installedinside the hood which is attachedto the hose. Commonality of manyparts with the �Gaskettchen� mademaintenance of both easier. Thehood fits over the torso of thechild and ties around the waist andwrists with a drawstring. As with the �Gaskettchen,� the�Gasjaeckchen� must be constantlysupplied with air by the parentpumping the bellows. Like the otherGerman and American World War IIefforts, the �Gasjaeckchen� is a humanPAPR. These protectors were storedthroughout Germany in air-raidshelters. Like the cradle, the�Gasjaeckchen� was sent to the UnitedStates and evaluated by Americanscientists. This protector included such good ideas thatscientists recommended a child and infant protectorusing it�s best design points (arms, waist tie, andpumped air) be designed in the United States. One idea acted upon in the United States forprotecting young children during World War II wasthe Mickey Mouse (�Disney) mask. On January 7,1942, one month after the Pearl Harbor attack, theowner of the Sun Rubber Company, T.W. Smith, Jr.and his designer, Dietrich Rempel (with approval ofWalt Disney), presented the design of the MickeyMouse Gas Mask for children to Major GeneralWilliam N. Porter, Chief of the Chemical WarfareService (CWS). After approval of the CWS, SunRubber Products Company produced sample masksfor review. This mask, made of injection-moldedcolored plastic, complete with mouse ears, lookslike Mickey Mouse! They are APRs. The hope wasthat the design of the mask was such that childrenwould carry it and wear it as part of a game. Thiswould reduce the fear associated with wearing thegas mask and would, hopefully, improve their weartime and, hence, survivability. A few Mickey Mouse maskswere manufactured, but studies showed the key tokeeping children in masks was adult interaction,not mask design. Another World War II mask, the M2-2-1 SmallChild�s mask, was developed from the M1-seriesNoncombatant Gas Mask. The M2 Noncombatant

Gas Mask, Small Child, was issued with the M2Noncombatant Canister and the M1 NoncombatantCarrier, M2-2-1. The mask was an adaptationof the M1 Noncombatant Gas Mask to fit the smallerface of a child. To allow for a small child�s face size,the M2 mask only has one eyelens (similar to laterM14/M24/M25-series masks). A smaller filter (theM2) is also used to reduce weight and bulk. In tests,with proper coaching and good salesmanship by theleader, most young children could be induced towear the gas mask for extended periods.

Older Children

Older children represented less of a problemin protection than smaller children. Their faces arelarger, they are more disciplined, and their lungcapacity is greater. Thus, if small masks are available,older children can more likely be fitted withadult-styled respirators. PAPRs are not required, butare preferred. Again, the quick-thinking Hawaiian Departmentcame up with a solution. Utilizing stocks of thestandard M1 Training Gas Masks (only manu-factured in a universal size later called medium),they developed a modified mask for older children.The M1 mask was modified with the addition of arubberized material to the chin and sides to fitchildren. These masks were a stopgap measure used

Prepared for an attack, children wear the CD V-805 masks.Photo courtesy of Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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by the Hawaiian forces to ensure protection ofchildren until a supply of children�s masks could beobtained from the United States. These modified trainingmasks were developed immediately after the PearlHarbor attack in order to protect the island population.A total of 78,000 masks were modified and issued. Later in the war, the M1A2-1-1 NoncombatantMask was available in five sizes, including a child�ssize. This mask was the second alteration of thebasic M1 Noncombatant Gas Mask (M1A2) with theM1 Noncombatant Canister and the M1 NoncombatantCarrier (M1A2-1-1). The mask had two celluloideyelenses, an outlet valve, and a filter attached andbuilt into the mask. It was designed for massproduction. This mask, developed before the war byEdgewood Arsenal, was a major US success story.Mass production of the mask by firms throughout theUnited States was such a success that production wasstopped after more than 8 million were produced. Postwar, development of Noncombatant ProtectiveMasks continued. The M16 Noncombat Protective Mask(Civil Defense designation CDV-800) was designed insix sizes. Sizes 1 and 2 (using the E3R3 NoncombatFilter) were designed for use by small children but werenot procured. With improvements in plastics technology,a low-cost mask, the M22 (Civil Defense designationCDV-805) was developed and fielded. At the time,it was an amazing advancement. The filters wereintegrated into the cheeks of the mask as part of theproduction process. It is easy to use, provides lowresistance to breathing, and takes up little space instorage. Manufactured in six sizes, the mask can beused by anyone over the age of 4. The vinyl M18 facepiece is stored in a vinyl M16 carrier withinstructions for use written on the outside�completewith pictures showing how to put the mask on. Amodern design, the M22 Noncombatant Mask wasdesigned to use the latest manufacturing technologyand deliver a mask to the public for $2 to $3 permask. Starting in 1960, thousands were manufactured.The mask was declared obsolete in 1987. The

At the time this article was written, Major Robert D. Walk was the Weapons of Mass Destruction Individual and Instructor TrainingOfficer at the US Army Reserve Command. His education includes a Master of Science Degree in Environmental Engineering from theUniversity of Oklahoma, a Master�s of Business Administration from Long Island University, and a Bachelor of Science Degree inChemical Engineering from the University of New Hampshire. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College (Residentand Correspondence), the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Chemical Officers Advanced Course, and the ChemicalOfficers Basic Course. Previous assignments include Commander, 184th Chemical Detachment; Commander, HHC, 59th OrdnanceBrigade; Acting Commander, 1st Battalion, 377th Regiment, 95th Division (Institutional Training); S-3, 1st Battalion, 377thRegiment, 95th Division (Institutional Training); S-3, 197th Ordnance Battalion; Chemical Officer, Readiness Group Stewart;and Chemical Officer, 60th Ordnance Group.

manufacturing equipment was held in storage untilthe 1990s and then destroyed.

Current Trends

The current trend in young children�s protectionis to provide them with PAPR. This eliminates theneed for a good mask fit because the PAPR providesan overpressure in the mask; thus airflow is always out.Modern PAPRs use electric air pumps andprovide improved protection for the child over theolder human PAPRs. This provides the only majorimprovements over the basic protection concept usedin the US M1 Infant Respirator, German �Gaskettchen,�and German �Gasjaeckchen.� Israel, concerned withthe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, issuesa hood with PAPR for children ages 3 to 8, calledthe �Bardas Magen,� and a protective suit withPAPR for infants, called the �Shmartaf.� For thoseof us in America, there are several examples availableon the commercial market. For older children, the PAPRs are still preferred,but children have sufficient lung capacity to use anAPR. The only problem with APRs is fit; hence thePAPRs are preferred because of their higherprotection factor. There are many APRs available inchildren�s sizes, including masks from the formerSoviet Union and Israel.

Conclusion

This article examined child protection effortsusing APR and PAPR by the German and Americangovernments during World War II and looked atcurrent trends in child protection. Advancementsin technology have replaced the human PAPRs ofWorld War II with relatively inexpensive battery-operated PAPRs for the 1990s. The basic conceptremains the same�provide clean air to children toensure their survival in a contaminated atmosphere.Children are the future of the nation and the world.They must be protected!

JULY 1999 29

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The proponent for the Patient DecontaminationSite (PDS) has not been clearly identified in eitherFM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, or FM 8-10-4,Medical Platoon Leaders Handbook. Both fieldmanuals state that a �PDS must operate under thesupervision of medical personnel to ensure no furtherinjury is caused to the patient by the deconprocess.� Chemical School-trained personnel are notmentioned. It has been my experience through three

reduce NBC contamination levels to a negligible riskbefore the patient receives medical treatment. From my experience as a decontamination platoonleader, when one individual was contaminated, theimmediate response was to request decontaminationsupport. All equipment and personnel were transportedto the decontamination site whether or not thecontaminated elements had casualties. Unless the PDSis collocated, that contaminated casualty would be sent

Integrating the PDS withthe Decontamination Site

in Today�s Army

If the National Training Center is coaching the concept for integrating thePDS and the decontamination site, the Chemical Corps should take the leadin putting this concept into doctrine.

By CPT Jeanie M. White

Integrating the twosites would causeless confusion on

the locations of bothareas and

limit the spreadof contaminationon the battlefield.

rotations at the National Training Centerthat integrated, collocated decontami-nation and patient decontamination siteswork more efficiently to support thebrigade, although it is not currently inour doctrine. According to FM 3-5, a decon-tamination site on the battlefield is whereeither �operational or thorough decon isconducted to reduce NBC contaminationlevels from equipment and personnel whilestill in a contamination vapor environment,or to negligible risk levels to restorecombat power dependent on METT-T.� There are two techniques to both decon processes:Thorough decon consists of detailed equipment anddetailed troop decon, while operational decon consists ofvehicle washdown and MOPP gear exchange. Apatient decontamination site is where the patientdecontamination team decontaminates casualties to

to the nearest ambulance exchange pointcontaining the PDS, which could bekilometers away. Integrating the two sites wouldcause less confusion on the locations ofboth areas and limit the spread ofcontamination on the battlefield. (Thebrigade would maintain control of dirtyroutes.) This would reduce loss ofcontaminated casualties due to confusionof the PDS location. The decontaminationplatoon leader maintains commandand control (C2). C2 controls accessfrom one link-up point over one net for the

collocated sites guiding the contaminated parties into theirrespective sites. The logistics push package for bothsites is collocated in the reconstitution area, which makesresupply more readily available for the next mission.The decontamination platoon is set to facilitatequick turnaround of casualty collection transportation

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and logistics vehicles that are contaminated. Finally,with the sites collocated, the brigade will receive amore accurate report of actual contamination via an NBC5 Report (area of actual contamination). This report issent by the decontamination platoon leader after themission for both sites is completed. This procedureensures the brigade avoids the contaminated area. If the National Training Center is coaching theconcept for integrating the PDS and decontaminationsites, the Chemical Corps should take the lead inputting this concept into doctrine. The MedicalService Corps or the Chemical Corps must make thisconcept doctrine and teach it in our Training andDoctrine Command (TRADOC) schools as a jointeffort to clarify �who is responsible for what.� If thisdoes not happen, the operational experience ofsuccessful integration will linger in SOPs forever. Unitshave benefited greatly from the integrated PDS/decontamination site concept according to executivesummaries provided by CPT Chesney (National Training

Center Chemical Company Trainer), whose decontami-nation platoons were task-organized and postured toconduct effective integrated PDS/decontaminationoperations. If we are to �train as we fight,� theintegrated concept must be trained at home station forthe brigade combat team to reap the benefits on thebattlefield.

At the time this article was written, CPT Jeanine M. Whitewas attending the Chemical Officer Advanced Course atFort McClellan, Alabama. After graduation, she will reportto Fort Carson, Colorado. CPT White graduated from theUniversity of Tennessee at Chattanooga in 1994 with a BSin Psychology. Her previous assignments as an officerinclude; Battalion Chemical Officer for 1/1AV, BrigadeChemical Officer for 4 BDE AV and 1 BCT, 1 ID (MECH),and Decon Platoon Leader/XO for HHC, 1 EN BN at FortRiley, Kansas. She has attended three rotations to NTC(1 as BN Chemo, 1 as BDE Chemo, and 1 as Decon Plt Ldr)and a BCTP in Germany as BDE Chemo. She is a 1994graduate of the Chemical Officer Basic Course at FortMcClellan, Alabama.

JULY 1999 31

Image size: 16 1/2� x 26�For purchase informationand order form, see page 34.

A new print by Don Stivers

BLIND PURSUITSMOKE IN THE SHENANDOAH

The beginning of May 1862 heralded a low point in Confederate fortunes: Yorktown had been evacuated,as had Williamsburg; Norfolk had to be abandoned; and the Confederacy�s first ironclad, the Virginia, wasscuttled to keep her from Federal hands. One high point, however, had come from their renowned�Stonewall.� Thomas J. Jackson had won a victory in the Shenandoah Valley at McDowell, Virginia.

Union General George B. McClellan�s Peninsula Campaign was succeeding in spite of his owncautiousness and Northern troops were approaching Richmond from the east. Union General Nathaniel P.Banks felt the need to reinforce his army after the Battle of Kernstown. While technically a Confederatedefeat, Kernstown drew more Union troops to the Shenandoah Valley, turning McClellan�s well-orchestratedadvance along two borders of Virginia into a dangerous, uncoordinated, two-pronged shuffle. Then came theBattle of McDowell on May 8,1862.

In terrain too mountainous to use artillery, the two armies� infantry slugged it out, toe-to-toe. ThoughJackson lost more men, the Federals, under General Robert C. Schenck, began a retreat with the brilliantConfederate cavalry commander, Turner Ashby, and his troopers snapping at their heels. By May 10, Jackson�sinfantry with the famous �Stonewall Brigade� in the lead caught up to Schenck. In desperation, the Uniontroops set fire to the thick woods, cleverly laying down a smoke screen. A member of Jackson�s staff recalledthat, �Soon the sky was overcast with volumes of smoke, which almost hid the scene, and wrapped every distantobject in a veil, impenetrable to the eyes and telescopes of the officers alike.� Jackson, always the consummatewarrior, admired the subterfuge. He declared this smoke was the most adroit expedient to which a retreating armycould resort to embarrass pursuit, and that it possessed all the disadvantages of a night attack.

Don Stivers� most recent print portrays Jackson�s pursuit of the Federal army, which was stalled by a unique tactic notusually associated with the American Civil War�a smoke screen.

��

� �

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By SFC Richard A. Alker

Digital Unit Trainingfor Chemical Soldiers

TFXXI NBC INITIATIVES(JWARN/MICAD/IMETS)

Note: Weather data is compiledat Offutt AFB, NE and madeavailable by satellite relay.

32 CML

The Army is in transition to the 21st century�Army XXI. Task Force XXI laid the foundation forthis transition which involves experimentation with a digitized brigade. The Army Warfighter Experimentfocused at the division and corps levels. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is breaking ground fordigitized division- level operations. Division XXI changes the organizational structures and the way we fight as part of Army XXI. Some ofthe changes made which will impact future NBC operations include:

M8A1 ALARMWITH MICAD

M1A1/2, M2, ANDM3 WITH MICAD

M21 RASCALWITH MICAD

M93A1 FOX BLOCK 1

FBCB2(JWARN)COMPANY TOC

BRIGADE TOC

AN/VDR-2WITH MICAD

MCS(JWARN)

MCS(JWARN)

ASAS

DIVISION NBCC D-MAIN/TAC1 CP

BIDS

FBCB2(JWARN)

MCS(JWARN)

BATTALION TOC

BSOLDIERS WITH NBC PAGERS

NE

IMETSOFFUTT AFB

SATELLITE RELAY

��Relocating the heavy division chemical company.��Consolidating organic decontamination assets (for operational decontamination) in division support command�sforward support companies (located with maneuver battalions).��Assigning Fox reconnaissance platoon to the Division Reconnaissance Squadron.��Fielding new equipment (Fox Block 1, JWARN, and MICAD).

The Chemical Corps must readdress its current training procedures and policies with regard to training chemicalsoldiers to work in a digitized unit. Digitization enhances lethality, survivability, sustainability, and tempo using Army Battle Command System(ABCS), advanced communication equipment and positioning systems, high technology weapons, multipurposesensors, and vehicle-mounted detectors. A typical scenario would be at company, platoon, or section level (see figure below). A detector (M8A1, M21, orAN/VDR-2) receives indicators of an attack/hazard that the MICAD transmitter (attached to the detector) sends up to5 kilometers (line of sight) to the MICAD receiver in the company command post. At the command post, the MICADreceiver sends information to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), which formats an NBC 1Observer�s Report using JWARN and auto-forwards the report to the Battalion Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Atthe battalion TOC, the report is sent to the Maneuver Control System (MCS) and auto-forwarded to the brigade TOCand division tactical who prepares an NBC 2 Evaluated Data Report, NBC 3 Immediate Warning Report, and thecontamination overlay. The end result is that an NBC 1 Report is received at the division tactical command postwithout a soldier initiating it (autonomous NBC Warning and Reporting System). This article proposes a training plan for chemical soldiers assigned to digital units. Training must be structured tocombine live and simulated training. This training plan requires a coordinated effort combining the US ArmyChemical School, gaining unit, and self-development.

2

2

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JULY 1999 33

The Chemical Corps must orchestrate an aggressive fielding plan for equipment upgrades, complex operatingsystems, and the integration of existing equipment. At the installation level, there currently is a lack of militarypersonnel with any experience in operating the systems listed on the previous page. The train-up effort is furtherhampered by the lack of opportunities to train (unavailability of equipment) requiring much longer periods to becomeproficient at battle tasks, and limited tests (checking specific functions, not all). New initiatives have created a demandfor soldiers with high levels of computer skills. Soldiers must have basic knowledge of modern NBC equipment,automation, and Microsoft Office programs to be efficient in a digital unit. Individual skills can be improvedthrough self-development. As a soldier receives advanced technical training, the soldier becomes more valuable to thesuccess of the unit. The instructional training base must include the courses listed in the following table.

InstallationTrainingRequirementsStaff Officers(O3 and above)Officers(O1-O2)

Senior Staff NCOs(E7 and above)

Staff NCOs(E5-E6)

Soldiers(E1-E4)

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

*OPER *OPER OPER*OVER *OVER OVERSYS MAN TECH

MCS FBCB2 MICAD

InstitutionalTrainingRequirementsCaptain�s CareerCourseOfficers BasicCourse (OBC)Advanced NCOCourse (ANCOC)Basic NCOCourse (BNCOC)One-station UnitTraining (OSUT)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

OPER OVER OPER OVER OPER OVER OPER OVER OPER OVER OPER OVER NBCWRS

MCS FBCB2 ANBACIS JWARN IMETS MICAD ANALOG

* Limited MCS/FBCB2 operator instruction must be provided to understand how NBC systems (ANBACIS, JWARN,IMETS, and MICAD) are integrated.** An MCS/FBCB2 overview must be provided to understand how NBC systems (ANBACIS, JWARN, IMETS,and MICAD) are integrated.

Installations supported by Project Managers and equipment Field Office Representatives are responsible for provid-ing personnel and resources to train new soldiers and sustain unit battle-task proficiency. Installation training mustinclude the courses listed in the table below.

* The MCS/FBCB2 operator and overview instruction must include ANBACIS, JWARN, IMETS, and MICADoperation/overview.

Brief description of Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) courses listed above:OPER: Operator course provides detailed instruction on all aspects of equipment use.SYS MAN: System Managers course provides information to manage/troubleshoot ATCCS terminals and LAN.

* *** **

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TECH: UNIX Technicians course provides detailed programming information to troubleshoot ATCCSUNIX programs.OVER: Overview course highlights capabilities and key features.

Installations must establish division-level training facilities equipped with ATCCS. Availability of a properlyequipped facility and technical support is essential to the success of MCS and FBCB2 training. The Chemical Corps must implement the following changes to meet the demands of Army XXI.

THE CHEMICAL CORPS REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION PRINT ORDER FORM

The Chemical Corps Regimental Association (CCRA), in honor of the Chemical Corps 80th Birthday, has commissioneda limited edition Regimental Print by renowned military artist Don Stivers. The print portrays Stonewall Jackson�s May 1862pursuit of the Federals after the Battle of McDowell and their subsequent escape through their use of smoke. Prints are currentlyavailable and orders will be accepted until the edition is sold out.

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***NOTE*** All orders are final Total Payment $___________Example: Print ($125) + Shipping ($15) + AL Order ($5.60) + Credit Card ($5.82) = $151.42Example: Print ($125) + Shipping ($15) + Credit Card ($5.60) = $145.60

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� Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for primary functions (battle tasks) including digital andanalog operations and integrate nondigital units into digital operations.� Ensure the most current equipment information is available and incorporated into institutional and installationprograms of instruction (POIs).� Update school POIs on using digitized products during the IPB process and the employment of digitizedchemical units.� Establish an additional skill identifer for each ATCCS system and associated course.

The success of Army XXI is measured by our ability to prepare soldiers to conduct operations as digitalwarfighters. Soldiers and technology are our most valuable resource. As leaders we have the responsibilityto ensure our soldiers are educated and ready to fight and win in a digitized division.

Mail form and remittance to:

Chemical Corps Regimental Association, Inc.Office of ProponencyATTN: Regimental Print320 Engineer LoopFort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Page 37: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

Making a Better Chemical Corps in the 21st Century:

Introduction

As a platoon leader and later as executive officerof 51st Chemical Company, a Fox-pure companyduring the mid-90s, my fellow platoon leaders and Iagreed on one major shortcoming of the Fox�self-protection. In addition to its silhouette (oftenconfused with enemy armored vehicles) and its tediousmission sometimes requiring slow speeds in unsecuredterritory, the Fox was Table of Organization andEquipment (TO&E) equipped with the M240 machinegun. The USACMLS, more specifically the Directorateof Combat Developments, is reconsidering the TO&E anddoctrine of this relatively new system. Threeproposals are currently on the table and initialconferences propose both a short-term and a long-termsolution to the Fox�s protection deficiencies. I willintroduce the options under consideration andhighlight excerpts from the field input received from chemi-cal officers and NCOs throughout the Army.

History

The original version of the Fox, the Operation DesertStorm M93 or XM93, received the M240 machinegun without a front sight post. During the fielding ofthe systems after 1991, approximately half of thesystems arrived at the unit configured in this manner,while the other half were given the M240E1 MG with afront sight post. According to Major Jon Drushal,USACMLS Doctrine Writer, the M240 MG was

the original choice because it is an area weapon andwas to somehow keep the Foxes out of a direct fight.The program manager Fox team leader, Mike D�Andries,reiterated this, stating that both TACOM and the ArmorSchool suggested using the .50 caliber machine gun asthe Fox�s main weapon system, but the Chemical Schooldisagreed based on the concerns summarized above. TheUSACMLS believed that commanders would misuse, oralternatively use, this asset as so many other chemicalassets, including personnel, have been misusedthroughout modern history. The assumption was that com-manders would see the weapons system and place thehard-to-replace Fox and its crew into direct fire,possibly even offensive situations. LTC Robert Harbs,S3 of the 464th Chemical Brigade, provided anexcellent example of such a situation:

CPT Norma J. Honaker

The RefittedM93A1 NBCRS(Fox)ShortcomingsIn Firepower?

During a recent wargame, the controllers wereplanning to send an MP and Fox platoon tocounter an OPFOR SOF insertion into the Corpsrear. They were under the impression the Fox wasarmed with a .50 cal MG and could be used asan offensive weapon system to bring the �heavy�firepower of the .50 to bear on this situation. Aftertwo days of discussions with the controllers, theMP brigade S3 and I were able to convince themthe Fox was not equipped for this mission andwas purely a defensive weapon. We also indicatedthe number of Fox vehicles was limited on thebattlefield and that each has a specialized recon

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mission with a highly trained and difficult-to-replace crew. We conceded that if a Fox was inthe area and the MPs needed support, the Foxcould be made available. The point here is thatmounting a .50 cal on the Fox may seemattractive but situations like I just described willcome up and we�ll have to address the issue ofthe Fox as an offensive or defensive system.

squad (two vehicles). This gives the squads greatersurvivability by allowing them to break contact in anundesirable engagement. The doctrinally correctemployment of Fox in a minimum of two supportsthis option best of all options under consideration. TheFox is a vehicle that �routinely operates either alongthe front-line trace far behind lead elements ofmaneuver unit formations, where the direct andindirect fire threat is extensive, or along MSRs wherethe principal threat is small but heavily armed forcesintent on severing/blocking our line of communications.�

Decision

LTC Harbs lived the Chemical School�s fear of Foxmisuse; this situation is the reason why the Fox nowhas the M240 MG.

Options

The first school of thought is to leave the systemas it is currently configured. Supporters of this ideabelieve the M240 MG should stay without a front sightpost. This would allow the crew to use it as an areaweapon while preventing misuse by maneuver com-manders. Thanks to the input from the field by Foxplatoon leaders, field grade supporters of the system, andNCOs who have worked with the system throughout thedecade, this option is no longer a consideration.LTC Bob Neumann, Command Chemical Officer of theUnited States European Command, states the risksassociated with not improving the current system:

At the time this article was written CPT Norma Honakerwas attending the USACMLS Chemical Officer AdvancedCourse at Fort McClellan, Alabama. CPT Honaker�sprevious assignments include platoon leader and executiveofficer, 51st Chemical Company; Squadron ChemicalOfficer Regimental Support Squadron, 2d ArmoredCavalry Regiment; and executive officer, Company C,82d Chemical Battalion. She is a graduate of the ChemicalOfficer Basic and L-5 ASI Course.

The US Army Chemical Corps� doctrine discussionand the resulting conference propose both a short-term plan and a long-term plan. A time line for theimplementation of either plan remains unfinished. Theunits will begin to exchange their M240s for M240E1sat an unspecified time. The Strac manual containsM240E1 MG qualification tables, and crew qualificationand vehicle adaptations will result in changes to theFox-specific 3-series FMs. This short-term solutionprovides crews with the necessary ability to aim andengage, increasing their survivability. The long-termsolution is in its infancy. The current choice of the .50 calMG requires much planning. This upgrade requiresanother refit of Fox systems (current refit of the systemis ongoing at Anniston Army Depot) with a mount asyet undesigned. It is likely that designers will drawheavily on current and tank mounts for the TC hatch.The cost is unknown at this time.

Even this is not a total solution. The issue ofremote firing capability remains unsolved for theMilitary Police�s own MK-19s. Project Manager SmallArms is currently working to develop a remotecapability for the MPs, and similar technology willlikely provide a solution for a Fox squad leader�sdecision about weighing concerns of the over-pressure system with those of the need to breakcontact rather than engaging the enemy.

36 CML

�We must assume that we will be fighting on anonlinear battlefield. With this in mind, a Foxteam sent to recon a rear area or route couldencounter an enemy force. I would not normallyassign a combat force to overwatch these Foxes.Additionally, the Foxes operating in the Corps� rearwould not be supported by a combat force. EachFox team must have sufficient combat power tobreak contact and survive. We cannot burdencommanders with the need to be watched andescorted every time we conduct a recon mission.�

The second school of thought is a completeupgrade of the systems through the replacement ofthe M240 MG currently on half of the fielded systemswith the M240E1. This option allows the crews toprotect themselves and allows the unit commanders toactually track their crews� training proficiency byallowing them to qualify with the weapon, an optionnot available with the current M240s.

The third school of thought is a complete upgrade ofthe systems by replacing the M240 MG and M240E1 MGwith a .50 cal MG or MK-19 at a minimum of one per

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�STAND BY!� That was the command thatechoed across the air as the 82d Airborne Division andFort Bragg prepared to greet the RegimentalCommand Sergeant Major of the Chemical Corps,CSM James E. Van Patten.

Stand by!!!By SGM Ronald G. Loeder

CSM Van Patten exiting 34-foot tower.

On 16 and 17 February, CSM Van Patten visited the 83d Chemical Battalion�s 101st Chemical Company andthe 82d Airborne Division�s 21st Chemical Company. He also addressed the enlisted soldiers of Fort Bragg and at-tended an 82d Airborne Division Joint Readiness Training Exercise.

After leading the 21st Chemical Company on a brisk 4-mile run, CSM Van Patten attended a demonstrationat the division�s advanced airborne school that highlighted all aspects of an airborne operation. MSG Baldwin of thedivision chemical section presented the briefing, which included prejump training, marshalling area control officer (MACO)briefings, rigging procedures, and jumpmaster pre-inspection (JMPI) procedures.

Upon completion of the demonstration, CSM Van Patten donned his ballistic helmet and parachute harness. MSGMack, Division Chemical Operations Sergeant, performed a Jumpmaster�s final inspection of CSM Van Patten�s equip-ment and gave his personal seal of approval. Then, looking up and swallowing hard, CSM Van Patten began his climb

CSM Van Patten listens to briefing at 82d Airborne DivisionAdvanced Airborne School.

to the top of the 34-foot airborne tower.With his eyes on the horizon and his handover the end of the reserveparachute, the command sergeant majorexecuted his best exit posture out of thetower. Elated by the thrill of his firstjump, the command sergeant majorcontinued his visit with a betterunderstanding of the airborne chemicalsoldier�s perspective. Impressed with the overall profession-alism and candor of the soldiers of the21st Chemical Company, CSM Van Pattenpresented his personnel coins to fourof them. As he departed, the commandsergeant major expressed his sincereappreciation for the past two-day�sactivities and the professional mannerin which the chemical troopers of FortBragg execute their duties.

Keep your feet and knees together.Airborne!

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Much has been written about the Germandevelopment of the atomic bomb. In some books, theGermans were very near development of a devicesimilar to the ones dropped by the United States onHiroshima and Nagasaki. Others say the Germanswere some distance from development of afunctioning bomb. In the past few years, several books have beenwritten by scholars seeking to explain the role ofDr. Werner Heisenberg in stopping or side-trackingthe German bomb. Indeed, Dr. Heisenberg himselftook much of the credit for ensuring that Hitler didnot have this weapon at his disposal. In a book written in 1995, author Mark Walkergoes one better. He focuses on not only the Germanatomic bomb, but Nazi science in general. It is aninteresting story. As the communists did in Russia, the NationalSocialists took over the scientific community. However,they did it more by infiltration than by the directmethods used by the Russian communists. In theopening pages of the book, the author explains insome detail how German science�that is physics andassociated disciplines�ran prior to the war. The earlypart of the book deals with the Prussian Academy ofSciences. Prior to World War II, this was one ofthe most respected scientific organizations in Europe.

Mr. Walker shows how the Nazis took control ofthis scientific organization and molded it to theirown views. Like art and culture, Hitler and hissupporters had a unique point of view. This waslater translated into a �view� of science. Many National Socialists were not members ofthe lower and less educated classes; a number ofthem were well educated. A principle supporter ofthe National Socialist German Workers Party�stakeover of science was Dr. Johannes Stark, whoepitomized the idea of �Aryan� science versus �Jewish�science. It was just this type of bigotry that forcedEinstein to leave Germany and come to the UnitedStates. He was not the last �Jewish� scientist to findwork in America. Many of the principal �brains� behindthe Manhattan Project were Jews. People like Stark and his Deutsches Physik (GermanPhysics) crippled the enormous capability of Germanscientific accomplishment during World War II. Duringthat conflict, even with some of their best and mostarticulate �brains� working for the other side, Germanscience managed to develop rockets, special torpedoes,jet aircraft, robot tanks, anti-aircraft rockets, submarineswith greater depth and speed than any on the Alliesside, and other and smaller weapons that are nowstandard in most of the armies of the world.

Nazi Science: Myth, Truth, and the German Atomic BombMark Walker, New York: Plenum Press, 1995

By USACMLS Command Historian,Dr. Burton Wright III.

BookReviews

38 CML

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Half of the book deals with the fight within thescientific community to avoid absorption into the Naziscientific mold. Although the author shows there wasresistance, eventually the Nazis won, and Germanscience fell into step. The author then focuses on Werner Heisenberg andhis work with the German atomic project. His view issomewhat different from some of the latest literature�he doesn�t believe Heisenberg actually stopped theatomic bomb because of his principles but, perhaps,because he didn�t quite know �how� to do it. In anyevent, the author takes the view that this �sabotage�of the program is probably overdone. He takesHeisenberg to task, and probably properly so, for actingas a spokesman for Nazi ideas and culture. Remember, Albert Speer built a great reputationafter World War II on the idea that he knew nothingof the Holocaust and was not a willing supporterof it. Yet, in recent work by historians, documents havecome to light that show Speer had knowledge of the�Final Solution� well before the end of the war, andthat as the chief city planner of Berlin, Speer�s officedelivered hundreds of Jews into the hands of theGestapo. It would be very difficult now for someonelike Heisenberg and Speer to claim that their handswere �clean� of such atrocities. The last chapter is very interesting. After the war,the major German nuclear scientists were debriefed at alocation in England called Farm Hall. Their debriefingswere transcribed and the author read them. Fromthese, he makes some interesting deductions aboutwhether or not the Germans could have built thebomb had they been given the material and personnelthat the United States used (120,000 workers and upto $5 billion). Of even more interest is the attitude of thescientists�that is, did they want to build a bomb?Even the Farm Hall transcripts do not give us a solidanswer. Clearly, though, they understood just as wellas those American scientists at Los Alamos that whatthey were ushering into this century was a weapon ofterrible destructive potential. The Germans were justas scared of the future as the Americans. This book is written in a good style that generallykeeps your interest. In the recitation of the mundanethat is much of the book, one can conceptualize howscience was used for evil in the Third Reich. If thepurpose of the book was to ensure we understandhow this can be done, it has succeeded admirably.Reading Nazi Science is worth the time. We shouldtake heed of the lessons it teaches us.

BLOOD AND WATER: SABOTAGING HITLER�SBOMBDan Kurzman, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997

One of the most important operations of the war wasthe British and American efforts to stop the developmentof the German atomic bomb. No one can say howhistory would have been changed if the Germanshad managed to give Hitler the ultimate weapon ofits time. Although he apparently did not want to usethe chemical and biological weapons that had already beendeveloped, Hitler might have used this weaponhad any been available. Blood and Water: Sabotaging Hitler�s Bomb is awell-written and researched book by the prolific authorDan Kurzman. Other books have been written on thissubject, some by participants themselves, but this bookdoes a good job of covering the initiation of the effortbefore World War II to its end. The title is appropriate. Much blood was spilled tostop the development and manufacture of deuteriumoxide or �heavy water.� This chemical was a possiblemoderator for the development of a chain reaction, thefirst step in the development of the atomic bomb. The author takes the reader from the first stirrings ofthe idea of an atomic bomb through the attempt by theGermans to acquire large amounts of heavy water throughthe Norwegian company at Vemork that made the heavywater. At first, the Allies (the British and the French)attempted simply to buy the water right out from underthe Germans. This worked until the Germans conqueredNorway in 1940. This brought the plant at Rjukanunder their control to make heavy water for the atomicexperiments being conducted by the famous Germanphysicist, Dr. Werner Heisenberg. Recently, there have been a number of new bookswritten on the part this man played in the developmentor nondevelopment of the atomic bomb. Some believehe was silently holding the project back to ensure Hitlerwould never have the bomb. Others think he was anationalist and was working to give Hitler that weapon.Hiesenberg made the decision that heavy water wasto be the only moderator for the Germans experiments,and that made it a high priority for the Allies to stopits production. A survey team of four Norwegianpatriots was dropped into Norway to prepare the wayfor a team of engineers that would make the actualassault on the Norsk factory. Their operation wasgiven the curious title of �Grouse.� First, Special Operations Executive (SOE) wastasked to set up a commando raid on the factory atRjukan called Operation Freshman. This ended indisaster when the two gliders carrying the commando

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team crashed and killed many; more than 20 whosurvived the crash fell into the hands of the Germansand were later executed. Next, an incredible attack, carried out by less thana dozen Norwegian saboteurs, crippled the plant byblowing up an important part of the heavy-water process.Called Operation Gunnerside, these enormously bravemen bought the British and Americans more time becausethe Germans had the heavy water plant up and runningwithin a few weeks after the attack. Because of the attack, the Germans decided tomove the stock of heavy water to Germany, and itwas moved under heavy guard from the Norsk Plantdown to a ferry. In a lapse of security, the ferry wasrelatively unguarded. Two saboteurs boarded theferry Hydro and placed time charges in the ship�svitals that would sink the ferry when it was at thedeepest part of the lake�1,300 feet. Those planningthe assault knew that when it was carried out, theGermans and their Norwegian allies would takereprisals against the population, but the decision wasmade, and the Hydro sank, on cue, in the middle ofLake Tinn. The heavy water canisters, so vital to theGerman nuclear research, rest on the bottom of the laketo this day. The sacrifices made by the Norwegians halted theGerman�s development of the atomic bomb. As theauthor relates in Blood and Water, this was one ofthe epic struggles of the war and was essential to itssuccessful outcome.

I recommend Blood and Water as a �mustread� for all who are interested in knowing the completehistory of one of the pivotal intelligence operationsof the war. The author introduces the reader toa number of the main characters of the story. Theyspring to life in the pages of the book. If you look inthe back of the book, you will find the authorthoroughly researched this episode of the war againstthe German nuclear bomb. He interviewed numerouspeople with direct knowledge of this operation more thanfive decades ago. This book shows what courage andlove of country can do when the chips are down andsacrifices need to be made. Any effort to hamper the development of weaponsof mass destruction by nations that would use them fordestruction is not wasted. The heroes of Telemarkmay be the first among many to come forward in thefuture to stop experiments on weapons even morepowerful than the atomic bomb. History sometimeshas a nasty habit of repeating itself. If this book interests you, the author has writtenother books that are also interesting to include thetragedy of the sinking of the cruiser Juneau and the lossof the five Sullivan brothers in the Pacific. Its title isfitting�Left to Die�because the task force thatthe Juneau was part of did not stop to pick upsurvivors and did not inform higher commanders ofthe sinking until the ships reached port. By that time,only a few of the ship�s crew were still alive.

40 CML

TAPS The flag has been furled�signifying the closure of the postknown to many as the Military Showplace of the South.

On 20 May 1999 at 0900 on Gullion Field, Fort McClellan heldits official post-closure ceremony. Numerous citizens from thecommunity, distinguished visitors, local officials, past commanders,and employees attended the ceremony.

Fort McClellan was the home of the Chemical Corps andRegiment for the past 20 years and home of the Military PoliceCorps and Regiment for the past 24 years.

Page 43: Army Chemical Review #2 (1999)

41 CML

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