Army - fm3 19x30 - Physical Security

8/14/2019 Army - fm3 19x30 - Physical Security

1/315

Headquarters, Department of the Army

(Formerly FM 19-30)

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


2/315

*FM 3-19.30 (FM 19-30)Field Manual

No. 3-19.30

PREFACE .....................................................................................................................vi

Chapter 1 PHYSICAL-SECURITY CHALLENGES.................................................................... 1-1Overview ....................................................................................................................1-1Automated Information Systems............................................................................... 1-1

OPSEC and the Threat ............................................................................................ 1-3

Chapter 2 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH ................................................................................... 2-1Protective Systems ................................................................................................... 2-1Systems Development .............................................................................................. 2-2The Integrated Protective System ............................................................................. 2-5Security Threats ........................................................................................................ 2-6

Chapter 3 DESIGN APPROACH ................................................................................................ 3-1Design Strategies...................................................................................................... 3-1Protective Measures ................................................................................................. 3-1Vehicle Bombs ........................................................................................................... 3-2Exterior Attack......................................................................................................... 3-10Standoff Weapons .................................................................................................. 3-13Ballistics .................................................................................................................. 3-16Forced Entry............................................................................................................. 3-17Covert Entry and Insider Compromise..................................................................... 3-19Surveillance and Eavesdropping ............................................................................. 3-20Mail and Supply Bombs ...........................................................................................3-22Chemical and Biological Contamination ..................................................................3-24

Chapter 4 PROTECTIVE BARRIERS........................................................................................ 4-1Overview ....................................................................................................................4-1Fencing .................................................................................................................... 4-2Utility Openings......................................................................................................... 4-5Other Perimeter Barriers........................................................................................... 4-5Security Towers ......................................................................................................... 4-5

Installation Entrances................................................................................................. 4-6Warning Signs............................................................................................................ 4-8Other Signs ................................................................................................................ 4-8Installation Perimeter Roads and Clear Zones.......................................................... 4-8Arms-Facility Structural Standards ............................................................................ 4-9

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 8 January 2001

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Contents

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 1 March 1979.

Page


3/315

ii

Page

FM 3-19.30

Chapter 5 PHYSICAL-SECURITY LIGHTING ......................................................................... 5-1Overview .................................................................................................................. 5-1Commanders Responsibility.................................................................................... 5-1

Planning Considerations .......................................................................................... 5-2Principles of Security Lighting.................................................................................. 5-3Types of Lighting...................................................................................................... 5-4Wiring Systems ........................................................................................................ 5-5Maintenance............................................................................................................. 5-6

Chapter 6 ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS .................................................................... 6-1Overview .................................................................................................................. 6-1ESS Design Considerations..................................................................................... 6-2Interior ESS Considerations..................................................................................... 6-7Exterior ESS Considerations.................................................................................... 6-8ESS Alarm-Annunciation System........................................................................... 6-12ESS Software......................................................................................................... 6-17

Interior Intrusion-Detection Sensors....................................................................... 6-18Exterior Intrusion-Detection Sensors ..................................................................... 6-29Electronic Entry Control ......................................................................................... 6-39Application Guidelines............................................................................................ 6-42Performance Criteria .............................................................................................. 6-43Data Transmission ................................................................................................. 6-44CCTV for Alarm Assessment and Surveillance...................................................... 6-45

Chapter 7 ACCESS CONTROL ............................................................................................... 7-1Designated Restricted Areas ................................................................................... 7-1Employee Screening ................................................................................................ 7-4Identification System................................................................................................ 7-4Duress Code .......................................................................................................... 7-10

Access-Control Rosters ......................................................................................... 7-10Methods of Control................................................................................................. 7-10Security Controls of Packages, Personal Property, and Vehicles.......................... 7-11Tactical-Environment Considerations .................................................................... 7-12

Chapter 8 LOCK AND KEY SYSTEMS.................................................................................... 8-1Installation and Maintenance ................................................................................... 8-1Types of Locking Devices ........................................................................................ 8-1

Chapter 9 SECURITY FORCES ............................................................................................... 9-1Types of Security Forces ......................................................................................... 9-1Authority and Jurisdiction......................................................................................... 9-2

Personnel Selection ................................................................................................. 9-3Security Clearance................................................................................................... 9-3Organization and Employment of Forces ................................................................. 9-4Headquarters and Shelters ...................................................................................... 9-4Execution of Security Activities ................................................................................ 9-5Training Requirements............................................................................................. 9-6Supervision .............................................................................................................. 9-7Uniforms................................................................................................................... 9-8Vehicles.................................................................................................................... 9-9Firearms ................................................................................................................... 9-9


4/315

iii

Page

FM 3-19.30

Communications ...................................................................................................... 9-9Miscellaneous Equipment ........................................................................................ 9-9Military Working Dogs ............................................................................................ 9-10

Summary................................................................................................................ 9-10

Chapter 10 IN-TRANSIT SECURITY........................................................................................ 10-1In-Port Cargo.......................................................................................................... 10-1Rail Cargo .............................................................................................................. 10-4Pipeline Cargo........................................................................................................10-6Convoy Movement ................................................................................................. 10-7

Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART ........................................................................... A-1

Appendix B SAMPLE INSTALLATION CRIME-PREVENTION HANDBOOK........................... B-1Section I Installation Crime-Prevention Programs .........................................B-1Crime-Prevention Working Groups ......................................................................... B-1Crime-Prevention Officers ...................................................................................... B-2Crime-Prevention Program Development ................................................................B-2Training ....................................................................................................................B-5Civilian Crime-Prevention Organizations..................................................................B-5Section II Criminal Analysis .............................................................................B-5Sources of Information .............................................................................................B-6Individual Criminal Analysis .................................................................................... B-9Criminal-Analysis Procedures ............................................................................... B-15Criminal-Analysis Summary .................................................................................. B-17

Section III Command and Law-Enforcement Countermeasures ................ B-17Crime Hot Lines .................................................................................................... B-17Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design ................................................ B-18Specialized Patrol Tactics and Surveillance ..........................................................B-25Publicity Campaigns...............................................................................................B-30Residential-Security Surveys .................................................................................B-31Juvenile Crime Prevention .....................................................................................B-34Fraud......................................................................................................................B-47Internal Theft ..........................................................................................................B-52Pilferage .................................................................................................................B-53Section IV Army Property at the Local Level ................................................B-61Motor Vehicles .......................................................................................................B-61Consumer Outlets ..................................................................................................B-63Arson......................................................................................................................B-66Section V Community Crime-Prevention Programs .....................................B-67Neighborhood Watch Program...............................................................................B-67Operation ID...........................................................................................................B-71Neighborhood Walks..............................................................................................B-74Vigilantism..............................................................................................................B-75Mobile Patrols ........................................................................................................B-76Project Lock ...........................................................................................................B-76Section VI Evaluation ......................................................................................B-79
http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


5/315

iv

Page

FM 3-19.30

Crime-Prevention Programs...................................................................................B-79Crime Rates ...........................................................................................................B-83Measures of Effectiveness.....................................................................................B-84

Internal Measures ..................................................................................................B-85

Appendix C INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND THREAT ANALYSIS ............C-1Information Sources .................................................................................................C-1Responsibilities of US Government Lead Agencies.................................................C-2Information Requirements........................................................................................C-4Threat Analysis and Assessment.............................................................................C-5Determination of the Threat Level............................................................................C-6

Appendix D CRISIS-MANAGEMENT PLAN ...............................................................................D-1

Appendix E OFFICE SECURITY MEASURES ...........................................................................E-1Physical-Security Survey .........................................................................................E-1

Security-Engineering Assessment ...........................................................................E-1Technical Assessment of Responses ......................................................................E-2Physical-Security Enhancement Measures..............................................................E-2

Appendix F PHYSICAL-SECURITY PLAN................................................................................ F-1Annexes ..................................................................................................................F-6Tactical-Environment Considerations ......................................................................F-7

Appendix G PERSONAL-PROTECTION MEASURES ............................................................. G-1Personal Protection................................................................................................. G-1Working Environment.............................................................................................. G-2Home Environment ................................................................................................. G-4

Appendix H BOMBS....................................................................................................................H-1General ....................................................................................................................H-1Concealing Bombs...................................................................................................H-1Damage and Casualty Mechanisms ........................................................................H-1Telephonic Threats ..................................................................................................H-3Evacuation Drills ......................................................................................................H-3Searching for a Suspected IED................................................................................H-6

Appendix I EXECUTIVE PROTECTION ..................................................................................... I-1Supplemental Security Measures ............................................................................. I-1Executive Protection Goals....................................................................................... I-1Residential Security Measures.................................................................................. I-2

Transportation Measures .......................................................................................... I-4Individual Protective Measures ................................................................................. I-7Combating-Terrorism Training for Executives......................................................... I-10Travel to Potential Physical-Threat Risk Areas....................................................... I-10Protective Security Details ...................................................................................... I-10Executive-Protection System Integration ................................................................ I-12

Appendix J RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.................................................................................. J-1Funding Programs.................................................................................................... J-1
http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


6/315

v

Page

FM 3-19.30

Projected Requirements........................................................................................... J-1Obligation Plan......................................................................................................... J-1Types of Appropriations ........................................................................................... J-2

Appendix K VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT...........................................................................K-1Assessment Considerations.....................................................................................K-1THREATCON Levels ...............................................................................................K-2Assessing Vulnerability ............................................................................................K-3

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ Glossary-1

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... Bibliography-1

INDEX ...................................................................................................................................... Index-1


7/315

vi

PrefaceThis field ma nua l (FM) sets forth g uida nce for a ll personnel responsible for physica l security. It is

t h e b a sic r e f er e n ce fo r t r a in in g se cu r it y p e r so n n e l . I t is in t e n d e d t o b e a o n e -st o p p h y sica l-

se cu r it y so u r ce f or t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f en se ( D O D ), t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y ( D A), a n d

other proponents and agencies of physical security.

P r e v en t i o n a n d p r ot e c t i on a r e t h e t w o p r i m a r y c on c er n s of p h y s i c a l s e c u r it y . B o t h s e r v e t h e

security interests of people, equipment, and property. These interests must be supported at all

s t a f f a n d c o m m a n d l e v e l s ; a n d t h i s s u p p o r t m u s t b e u n i f i e d i n j oi n t , m u l t i n a t i o n a l , a n d

interagency operat ions.

Support to joint , multinational, and interagency operations relies on the fact that the Army will

not conduct operations alone. Additionally, force-projection operations conducted by the military

w il l in vo lve t h e in t e g r a t io n o f w a r - f ig h t in g ca p a b il i t ie s w it h st a b il i t y a n d su p p o r t o p e r a t io n s.

This ma nua ls prima ry focus is t he ar t iculation of a ba lanced understa nding of physica l security

for joint , multinational, and interagency operations throughout the environments of peacetime,

conflict , and war (whether in the continental United States [CONUS] or outside the continental

Un ited Sta tes [OCONUS ]).

Physical security must integrate the various capabilit ies of joint , multinational, and interagency

o pe r a t ion s in p u r su it of a se a m le ss con n e ct ion b e t w e e n t h e st r a t e g ic, o pe r a t io n a l , a n d t a ct ica l

levels of wa r. P hysical security must also address a n expanded ra nge of threa ts th at embraces not

o n l y t r a d i t i o n a l t h r e a t c om p o n e n t s o f w a r , b u t a l s o n o n t r a d i t i o n a l t h r e a t s g e n e r a t e d b y

g u e r r i ll a s , t e r r or i s t s , c r i m in a l s , a n d n a t u r a l o r m a n -m a d e d i s a s t e r s . I n a d d i t i o n , p h y s ic a l

security m ust a ddress the concept of Homeland Defense due to the aforementioned threat s.

Homeland Defense is t he military s role in t he U nited S ta tes (US) governments principa l ta sk ofp r o t e c t i n g i t s t e r r i t o r y a n d c i t i z e n s . Th i s i s a c c om p l i s h e d b y j o i n t , i n t e r a g e n c y , a n d

multijurisdictiona l organ izat ions. Homeland Defense includes

S u p por t in g d om e st ic a u t h or it ies f or cr isis a n d con se q u en ce m a n a g em e n t w it h r e g a r d

to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

P r ot e ct in g n a t ion a l-se cu r it y a sse t s (su ch a s in st a l la t io n s) a n d d e ploy in g f or ce s a n d

ensuring the availability , integrity, and adequacy of other crit ical assets.

D e t er r in g a n d d ef en d in g a g a i n s t s t r a t e gi c a t t a ck s w h i le m a i n t a i n in g f r ee dom o f

action through antiterrorism and force-protection operations.

W i t h t h i s i n m i n d , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o a d d r e s s t h e f i v e p i l l a r s o f f o r c e p r o t e c t i o n c o m b a t i n g

t e r r o r i s m , p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y , p e r s on a l s e c u r i t y , l a w e n f or c em e n t , a n d o pe r a t i on s s e cu r i t y

(OPS EC ). P hysical security is a centra l component of force protection a nd provides a n integrat ed

v e n u e t o e xp r e s s s u p p or t f or o p er a t i o n s . P h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y i s a p r i m a r y -l e a d e r t a s k a n d a ninherent pa rt of all opera tions to protect soldiers, family members, civilia ns, a nd resources. This

function directly supports the Armys universal ta sk list .

Wh ile t h e e f f e ct s o f t h e se ch a n g e s ( w h e n v ie w e d in d ivid u a lly ) a p p e a r r e volu t io n a r y , t h e b a sic

a c t i v i t i e s r e m a i n r e l a t i v e l y u n c h a n g e d , t h o u g h e x ec u t e d u n d e r d i f f e r e n t c on d i t i o n s a n d

sta nda rds. Another component t ha t rema ins unchan ged is our reliance upon qua lity soldiers and

leaders w ell versed in physical-security funda menta ls. Leaders w ill be cha llenged to ensure tha t

t h e y a r e f u n ct ion a lly p r o ficie n t ; p o ssess a n u n d e r st a n d in g o f p h y sica l-se cu r it y op er a t io n s; a r e


8/315

vii

FM 3-19.30

e d u ca t e d i n j oi n t , m u l t i n a t i o n a l , a n d i n t e r a g e n cy o p er a t i on s ; a n d h a v e t h e a b i li t y t o p er f or m

physical-security functions in support of full-dimension operat ions.

Ap p en d i x A c on t a i n s a n E n g l i s h -t o -m e t r i c m e a s u r e m e n t c on v e r s i on c h a r t . Ap p en d i x B i s a

sa mple insta llat ion crime-prevention h an dbook. This h an dbook is designed to a ssist comma ndersin developing crime-prevention programs for their installation and units.

The proponent of t his publicat ion is HQ TRADOC. S end comments an d recommenda tions on DA

Form 2028 directly to C omman da nt , U S Army Militar y P olice School (US AMP S), ATTN: ATSJ -

MP -TD, Directora te of Tra ining, 401 Eng ineer Loop, S uite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Miss ouri

65473-8926.

U nless this publication sta tes otherwise, ma sculine nouns a nd pronouns do not refer exclusively

to men.


9/315

Physical-Security Challenges 1-1

Chapter 1

Physical-Security Challenges

P h y s i c a l s e cu r i t y i s d e f i n e d a s t h a t p a r t o f s e c u r i t y c on c e r n e d w i t h

p h y s i c a l m e a s u r e s d e s i g n e d t o s a f e g u a r d p e r s o n n e l ; t o p r e v e n t

una uth oriz ed a ccess to equipment, insta llations, ma terial , a nd documents;

a n d t o s a f e gu a r d a g a i n s t e s pi on a g e, s a b ot a g e, d a m a g e, a n d t h e f t . As s u c h ,

a ll mili ta ry operat ions fa ce new a nd complex physica l-security cha llenges

a c r os s t h e f u l l s p ec t r u m o f op e r a t i on s . C h a l l en g e s r e l a t i v e t o p h y s i ca l

s e c u r i t y i n c l u d e t h e c o n t r o l o f p o pu l a t i o n s , i n f o r m a t i o n d o m i n a n c e ,

m u l t i n a t i on a l a n d i n t e r a g e n cy c on n e ct i v i t y, a n t i t e r r o r is m , a n d t h e u s e o f

physical-security assets as a versatile force multiplier.

OVERVIEW

1-1. Reductions in manpower and funding are crit ical challenges to physical

se cu r it y. M a n p ow e r f or su pp or t in g p h y sica l-se cu r it y a ct ivit ie s is r e d uce d

through deployments an d cutbacks. The r a pid evolution of physical-security-

equipment technology also lends to physical-security challenges, which are

exponentially multiplied by the introduction of the information age.

1-2. P hysical-security cha llenges must be understood, a nd m easures must be

t a k e n t o m in im iz e t h e m t o e n h a n ce f o r ce p r o t e ct io n . L e a d e r s m u st cr e a t e

order when coming upon a situation; and when they depart , some semblanceof t h a t or d er m u s t r em a i n . Th ey m u s t b e a w a r e of t h e h u m a n -d im e ns ion

f a ct or s a n d e ns u r e t h a t t h e ir s ol d ie rs d o n o t b ecom e com p la c en t . I t w a s

huma n error rat her tha n m odern technology tha t t ook lives in t he bombings of

t h e Af r ica n e m b a ssy. Wa r n in g w a s g iven , b u t n o t h e ed e d . C om p la ce n cy

became a physical-security challenge.

AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1-3. Success on pa st bat t lefields ha s resulted not so much from technological

a d va n ce s, b u t f r om in n ova t ive w a y s of con sid er in g a n d com b in in g a va ila b le

and new technologies as they apply to war fighting. Some of these technologies

d ea l t w i t h d is s em i n a t i ng a n d pr oce ss i ng i n for m a t i on . F or e xa m p le, t h e

telegra ph, the telephone, the r adio, and now t he computer ha ve redefined thefire-support paradigm.

1-4. As the a rmed forces move into t he t echnological age, a greater need for

physical-security measures is required. The risks associated with automated

information systems (AISs) are widespread because computers are used for

e ve r y t h in g . Ar m y Re g ula t ion (AR) 380-19 ou t l in es t h e r e q u ir e m en t s t h a t

com m a n d e rs a n d m a n a g e r s n e e d f or p r ocessin g u n cla ssi fied a n d cla ssi f ie d

i n for m a t i on a n d f or s ecu r in g m e di a , s of t w a r e, h a r d w a r e , a n d d if fe re nt

systems.


10/315

FM 3-19.30

1-2 Physical-Security Challenges

1-5. Th e t h r e a t t o AI S s a n d in f or m a t ion sy st e m s se cu r it y (I S S ) in volves

deliberate, overt , a nd covert acts. This includes the physical t hreat to ta ngible

property, such as the theft or destruction of computer hardware. Also included

is the threa t of electronic, electromagn etic-pulse, ra dio-frequency (RF), orcomputer-based at tacks on the information or communications components

t h a t con t rol or m a ke u p cr it ica l Ar m y com m a nd a n d con t rol (C2)

in f r a st r u ct u r e s. I n m ost ca ses, t h e t h r e a t s t a r g et is t h e in f or m a t ion i t self

r a t h e r t h a n t h e sy st e m t h a t t r a n sm it s i t . T h e t h r e a t co m e s f r o m a r a n g e o f

sources, including t he follow ing:

U n a u t h o riz ed u se r s (su ch a s h a ck er s) a r e t h e m a in so ur ce of t o d a y s

a t t a ck s, p r im a r ily a g a in st com p u t er -b a se d sy st e m s. Th e t h r e a t t h e y

pose to AIS networks a nd ma inframe computers is growing.

I n sid er s a r e t h o se in d ivid u a ls w it h leg it im a t e a cce ss t o a n AI S . Th e y

pose the most difficult threat to defend against . Whether recruited or

s el f-m ot i v a t ed , t h e AI S i n si de r h a s a c ce ss t o s y s t em s n or m a l ly

p r ot e ct e d b y I S S a g a in st a n a t t a ck .

Te r r or ist s on ce h a d t o op er a t e in t h e im m ed ia t e vicin it y o f a t a r g e t t o

gain access to or collect intelligence on that target . The proximity to

t h e t a r g e t r i sk ed e xp os u re a n d d et e ct i on . Tod a y, a t e r ror i st ca n

a c com p li s h m os t t a r g e t s el ect i on , i n t el li gen ce col le ct i on , a n d

p reop er a t i on a l p la n n i n g b y g a i n in g a c ce ss t h r ou g h a com p ut e r

network. H e can increas e his probability of success by using computer

systems t o reduce his t ime on ta rget . Terrorist a ccess to an AIS also

i n cr ea s e s t h e t h r ea t of cr i t ica l -d a t a d es t r u ct i on or m a n i pu la t i on .

A lt h o u g h h is p r e se n ce w o u ld b e vir t u a l , t h e p o t e n t ia l f o r d a m a g e t o

Army C 2 sy st e m s co u ld b e e q u a l t o o r g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t a ch ie ve d b y

p h ys i ca l i n t ru s ion , e sp eci a l ly w h e n u s ed a s a f or ce m u lt i pl ie r i n

con ju n ct i on w i t h a t r a d i t i on a l t e rr or i st a t t a c k. Th er ef or e, w h i le

t r a d it ion a l p r even t ive m e a su r e s a r e st i l l n e ed e d t o p r ot e ct u n w a n t e da cces s t o i nf or m a t ion , t h e i nf or m a t ion a g e h a s a d d ed a d d it i on a l

con cer n s f or t h e com m a n d e r a n d n e w op por t u n it ies f or t h o se w it h

hostile intent.

Non-sta te- and sta te-sponsored groups provide addit ional challenges.

I n m a n y ca se s, i t is d i f f icu lt t o co n f ir m st a t e sp o n so r sh ip o f t h r e a t

a ct ivi t y a g a in st a n A I S , n o m a t t e r h o w a p p a r e n t t h e a f f i l ia t io n m ig h t

seem. Activists of all persuasions are increasingly taking advantage of

informa tion-age t echnology. Neither AISs n or ISS ar e immune from a n

adversarys interest in exploit ing US military information systems or

disrupting communicat ion infrast ructures. The a vaila bility of low-cost

t e ch n olog y a n d t h e p r oli fe r a t ion of a n AI S in cr e a se t h e r isk t o t h e

Army by potentia l a dversaries.

F or ei gn -i n t el li ge nce s er v ice s (F I S ), b ot h ci vi l a n d m i li t a r y, a r e

con t in u a lly a ct ive a n d a r e a n o t h e r sou r ce of con t e n t ion con cer n in g

in f or m a t ion sy st e m s. I n p ea cet im e, t h e y a r e in cr e a sin g ly t a r g et e d

a g a in st U S co m m e r cia l a n d scie n t i f ic in t e r e st s , r a t h e r t h a n m ili t a r y

in f or m a t ion . Wit h l i t t le e ff or t , t h is p ea ce t im e in t r u siven e ss cou ld

easily be refocused on AIS s a nd I SS using a wide ra nge of informa tion

operations tactics.


11/315

FM 3-19.30

Physical-Security Challenges 1-3

Po li t ica l a n d r e l ig iou s g r ou p s a r e ot h e r p ot e n t ia l a d ve r sa r ies t o AI S s

a n d I S S . Th e w o r ld s p olit ica l cl im a t e is d iver se a n d com p lica t e d . I t

e m b r a ce s t r a d it io n a l m a in st r e a m p o li t ica l va lu e s, a s w e ll a s r a d ica l

religious fundamentalism and polit ical extremism. When polit ical orr el ig iou s v iew p oi nt s a l s o i ncor por a t e a n t i -U S s en t im en t , U S

informa tion infrast ructures (including AISs) are increas ingly at r isk of

penetra tion or exploita t ion by t hese potentia l a dversaries.

1-6. Wh en con s id er in g a n AI S , ph y si ca l s ecu ri t y i s m or e t h a n ju st

safeguar ding th e equipment. I t includes the following elements:

S o ft w a r e is m a r k e d for e a ch sy st e m a n d secur e d w h en n ot in u se.

Init ia l logon is passw ord-protected (at a minimum).

P a s s w or d s a r e a m in im u m o f e ig h t c h a r a ct er s, u si ng a m ix t ur e of

letters and numerals.

Acce ss t o a n AI S is a l low e d o n ly t o a u t h o r iz ed a n d clea r e d p e r son n e l

(per AR 380-19).

1-7. Classified material is entered and transmitted only on approved devices

with the following considerations:

Approved classified devices are opera ted in a secured environment.

C la ssi f ie d d evice s a r e se cu r ed in a p pr op r ia t e co n t a in er s w h e n n ot in

use.

Secure telephone unitIII (STU-III) keys ar e secured in an a ppropriat e

sa fe wh en not in us e (a s outlined in AR 380-19).

1-8. Additional information regarding AISs can be found in ARs 380-5 and

380-19. Required t ra ining of personnel w orking w ith a n AIS is locat ed in AR

380-19.

OPSEC AND THE THREAT

1-9. OPS EC is a process of identifying crit ical informa tion an d subsequently

a n a l y zi ng f ri en d ly a c t ion s a t t e nd a n t t o m il it a r y op er a t i on s a n d ot h er

activities. The threat is identified using the factors of mission, enemy, terrain,

troops, t ime ava ilable, an d civilia n considerations (METT-TC). The threa t

d ef in es t h e p h y sica l-se cu r it y ch a lle n g es. I m p lem e n t in g p h y sica l-se cu r it y

m ea s u r es s u pp or t s O P S E C . P r o vi d in g s ou n d pr oof r oom s f or con d u ct i n g

briefings is a simple but inva luable measure.

1-10. Another issue to consider when evaluating physical-security challenges

i s w h a t a c t ion s t o t a k e i n ca s e of p ol it i ca l i m pl ica t i on s i n t er f er i ng w i t h

p h y sica l-se cu r it y m e a su r e s. I n t h e d e va st a t in g e ve n t a t K h o ba r Tow e r s, a

warning was given but not everyone received it . I t took too long to evacuatethe building after the warning was issued because a cohesive plan was not in

place.

1-11. Comma nders can minimize the cha llenges to physical security through

proactive measures. They should periodically change the physical-security

posture of their area of responsibility to throw off perpetrators.


12/315

The Systems Approach 2-1

Chapter 2

The Systems Approach

Comman ders must ensure tha t a ppropria te physica l-security measures a re

taken to minimize the loss of personnel, supplies, equipment, and material

through both h uma n a nd na tura l threat s. Comma nders commonly exercise

th ose protective r esponsibil it ies t hrough th e provost ma rsha l (P M) a nd/or

physical-security officer and the force-protection officer. The force-protection

o ff i ce r m u s t c oo r d i n a t e w i t h s e v er a l d i f f er e n t a g e n ci e s t o c om p l e t e h i s

m i s s i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e A r m y s I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d C o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e

P r o g r a m (s e e A p p en d i x C ) p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w i l l b e u s e d t o

complete the units crisis-management plan (see Appendix D).

PROTECTI VE SYSTEMS

2-1. The a pproach to developing protective measures for assets should be

b a se d o n a sy st e m a t ic p r ocess r e su lt in g in a n in t eg r a t e d p r ot e ct ive sy st e m .

Th e p r ot e ct ive sy st e m f ocu ses on p r ot e ct in g sp ecif ic a sset s a g a in st w e ll-

defined t hreat s to a ccepta ble levels of protection. The syst em is orga nized in-

depth an d conta ins mut ually su pporting elements coordina ted to prevent gaps

or overlaps in responsibilities and performance.

2-2. Effective protective syst ems integra te t he following mutua lly supporting

elements: P h y s ica l p rot ect i ve m ea s u res , i ncl ud in g b a r ri er s, l ig h t in g, a n d

electronic security systems (ESSs).

P rocedural security measures, including procedures in place before an

incident and those employed in response to an incident. (These include

p roce du r es e mp loy ed b y a s s et ow n e r s a n d t h os e a p pl ie d b y a n d

governing the a ctions of gua rds.)

Terrorism countera ction mea sures tha t protect assets aga inst terrorist

a t t a ck s.

2-3. Th e f ol low i n g d et e rm i n a t i on s a r e m a d e w h e n con s id er i ng s y s t em -

development procedures:

The resources ava ilable. Th e a sse t s t o b e p r ot e ct e d .

Th e t h r e a t t o t h o se a sse t s .

The risk levels applicable to those ass ets.

The applicable regulat ory requirements for protecting the assets.

The applicable level of protection for those assets a gainst the threat .

Additional vulnerabilit ies to the assets (based on the threa t).


13/315

FM 3-19.30

2-2 The Systems Approach

SYSTEMS DEVEL OPMENT

2-4. AR 190-51, DA Pa mphlet (Pa m) 190-51, an d Technical Man ual (TM)

5-853-1 are useful tools for developing protective systems using the systems

a p pr oa c h . Th e k ey t o a p pl y in g t h es e t ool s s u cces s fu ll y i s t o u s e a t e a mapproach. A t eam may include physical-security, intelligence, a nd operat ions

p er son n e l; t h e in st a l la t io n e n g in e er s; a n d t h e u se r o f t h e a sse t s . I t m a y a lso

include representatives from the multinational, host-nation (HN), and local

police as well as the regional security office from the embassy.

ASSETS

2-5. Protective systems should always be developed for specific assets. The

goal of security is to protect facilit ies and buildings and the assets contained

in sid e. Th e r isk -a n a ly sis p r oced u r e in D A Pa m 190-51 is u se d t o id en t i f y

assets. This procedure is a pplied to a ll mission-essential or vulnerable a reas

(MEVAs) according to AR 190-13. It represents the majority of assets with

which DOD is commonly concerned. These assets include

Air cr a f t a n d com p on e n t s a t a via t io n fa ci li t ies.

Veh icl e a n d ca r r ia g e-m ou nt e d or -t ow e d w e a pon s s y st em s a n d

components a t motor pools.

Pe t r o le u m , oi l, a n d lu b r ica n t s (P O L ).

Controlled medica l substa nces an d other medically sensit ive items.

C o m m u n ica t ion a n d e lect r on ics e q u ipm e n t ; t e st , m e a su r em e n t , a n d

diagnostic equipment (TMDE); night-vision devices (NVDs); and other

high-value precision equipment and tool kits.

O r g a n iz a t ion a l clot h in g a n d in d ivid u a l e q u ip m en t st o r ed a t cen t r a l-

issue facilities.

S u b s is t en ce i t em s a t com m i ss a r i es , com m i ss a r y w a r e h ou s es , a n dtroop-issue facilities.

Re pa ir p a r t s a t in st a l la t ion -leve l su pp ly a ct ivi t ies a n d d ir e ct -su pp or t

(DS ) units with aut horized stockage lists.

Facilit ies-engineering supplies and construction ma terials.

Audiovisual equipment, tra ining devices, and subcaliber devices.

Miscella neous pilferable assets (not included above) a nd money.

Mission-crit ica l or high-risk personnel.

G e n er a l m ili t a r y a n d civil ia n p op u la t ion s.

I n d u st r i a l a n d ut i li t y eq u i pm e nt .

C o n t r olle d cry p t og r a p h ic i t e m s.

Sensit ive informa tion (included in TM 5-853-1, but not included in DAP a m 190-51).

Arms, amm unition, an d explosives (AA&E).

I n st a l la t ion ba n k s a n d fin a n ce of f ice s.

RISK L EVELS

2-6. D A Pa m 190-51 p r o vid es a p r oce d ur e f or d e t er m in in g r isk leve ls

a s s es s in g t h e v a lu e of t h e a s s et s t o t h ei r u ser s a n d t h e l ik el ih ood of


14/315

FM 3-19.30


compromise. These factors a re a ssessed by a nswering a series of q uestions

leading to va lue and likelihood ra tings.

2-7. Asset value is determined by considering the following three elements:

The crit icality of the asset for its user a nd the Army a s a whole.

Ho w ea si ly t h e a sse t ca n b e r e pla ced .

S o m e m e a su r e of t h e a sse t s r ela t ive va lu e.

2-8. Th e r e la t ive va lu e d if f er s f or e a ch a sse t . F or som e a sset s , t h e r e la t ive

value is measur ed in terms of monetar y cost .

2-9. The likelihood of t he t hreat is a ssessed for each applicable aggressor

ca t e g or y b y con sid er in g t h e a sse t s va lu e t o t h e a g g r e ssor, t h e h ist or y o f o r

pot en t ia l f or a g gr es sor s a t t e mp t in g t o com pr om is e t h e a s s et , a n d t h e

vulnerability of the a sset ba sed on existing or plann ed protective measures.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

2-10. Th e r isk leve l is t h e b a sis f or d e t er m in in g t h e r e q u ir e d p r ot e ct ive

measures for assets covered in AR 190-51. For each as set t ype, t here ma y be

physical protective measures, procedural security measures, and terrorism

cou n t e r a ct ion m e a su r es. Th e se m e a su r es a r e sp ecif ied b y r isk level . Th e

measures identified in AR 190-51 are the minimum regulatory mea sures tha t

m u st b e a p plied f or t h e id en t i f ie d t h r e a t level . Th e m in im u m r e g u la t o r y

mea sures for AA&E a re ba sed on t he risk ca tegory est a blished in AR 190-11.

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE-PROTECTION CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS

2-11. In a ccorda nce with DOD Inst ruction 2000.16, the commanders in chief

(CI NCs) have developed st a nda rds for new construction a nd existing fa cilit ies

t o co un t e r t e r r or ism t h r e a t ca p a b ili t ies w it h in t h e a r e a of r e spon sib il it y.

These construction standards have specific requirements for such measures as

sta ndoff dist an ce, perimeter barr iers, building construction, a nd parking. The

D O D co n st r u ct io n st a n d a r d p r o vid e s f o r m in im u m st a n d a r d s t h a t m u st b e

in cor p or a t e d in t o a l l in h a b it ed D O D st r u ct u r e s r e ga r d le ss o f t h e id en t i f ie d

threat . These standards provide a degree of protection that will not preclude

t h e d ir ect e f f ect s o f b la st b u t w il l m in im iz e colla t e r a l d a m a g e f or b u ild in gs

a n d p eop le a n d w i l l l im i t t h e p rog r es s iv e col la p s e of s t r u ct u r es . Th es e

st a n d a r d s a d d r e la t ive ly l i t t le co st , m a y f a ci l i t a t e f u t u r e u p g r a d e s, a n d m a y

d et e r a ct s of a g g r e ssion . (All se r vice s h a ve a d op t ed com m o n cr it e r ia a n d

m in im u m st a n d a r d s t o cou n t e r a n t i t e rr or ism /f or ce-p r ot e ct ion [AT/F P ]

vulnerabilit ies a nd t errorism t hreat s.) P rotection to identified t hreat levels is

described in the following paragraphs. Physical-security personnel must be

familia r w ith th e CINC an d DOD AT/FP construction sta nda rds beca use thesestandards may affect elements of physical-security plans and how individual

facilities are secured.

THREAT IDENTIFICATION

2-12. The threat must be described in specific terms to help determine the

assets vulnerabilit ies or to establish protective measures. This description

sh ou ld in clu d e t h e t a ct ics t h a t a g g r e ssor s w il l u se t o com p r om ise t h e a sse t

(w e a p on s, t ools , a n d e xp losive s a r e l ik ely t o b e u se d in a n a t t e m pt ). F or


15/315

FM 3-19.30


example, the threat might be described as a moving vehicle bomb consisting of

a 4,000-pound vehicle conta ining a 500-pound explosive. Another example

would be a forced-entry threat using specific hand, power, or thermal tools.

These types of threat descriptions (called the design-basis threat) can be usedto design d etailed protective syst ems t o mitiga te the at ta cks. TM 5-853-1 a nd

D A Pa m 190-51 con t a in p r oce d u r es f or e st a b lish in g d e sig n -b a sis t h r e a t

descriptions in the forma t described a bove. These procedures ca n be used

together or separately. Threats listed in the TM will be summarized later in

this chapter. When using the TM a s a lone source or in conjunction w ith DA

Pa m 190-51, t he followin g a ctions occur:

When the TM process is used alone, the user goes through an identical

process t o tha t in D A Pa m 190-51 up to the point where t he risk level

would be determined. In TM 5-853-1, the value and likelihood ratings

are used differently than in DA Pam 190-51. The likelihood rating is

used to determine th e wea pons, tools, and explosives tha t will be used

b y a p a r t icu la r a g g r es s or i n ca r r y i ng ou t a s pe ci fi c t a c t i c. I n t h i s

procedure, higher likelihood rat ings result in more severe mixes of

weapons, tools, and explosives. The assumption is that the more likely

the a t ta ck, the m ore resources th e aggressor is likely to use in carrying

ou t t h e a t t a ck.

When th e procedure in TM 5-853-1 is used in conjunction w ith t he

r e su lt s o f t h e D A Pa m 190- 51 r isk a n a ly sis , t h e l ik e lih o o d r a t in g is

ta ken directly from t he risk ana lysis and applied a s described above.

LEVEL OF PROTECTION

2-13. The level of protection applies to the design of a protective system

a g a i n s t a s peci fi ed t h r ea t (f or e xa m p le, a b om b , b r e a k in g a n d e nt e ri n g,

pilfering, and so forth). The level of protection is based on the asset s value

rating from either DA Pam 190-51 or TM 5-853-1. The level increases as the

asset s va lue ra t ing increa ses. There a re separa te levels of protection for each

tactic. TM 5-853-1 provides detailed guidance on how to achieve the levels of

protection, and Chapter 3 of this manual provides a summary of the levels of

protection a s th ey a pply to va rious t actics.

VULNERABILITIES

2-14. Vulnerabilities are gaps in the assets protection. They are identified by

considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection

that are associated with those tactics. Some vulnerabilit ies can be identified

by considering the general design strategies for each tactic described in TM

5-853-1 and as summarized in Chapter 3 of this manual. The general design

st r a t e g ie s id e n t i fy t h e b a sic a p pr oa ch t o p r o t ect in g a sse t s a g a in st sp ecif icta ctics. For exam ple, t he general design stra tegy for forced entry is to provide

a w a y t o d e t ect a t t e m p t ed i n t r us ion a n d t o p r ov id e b a r r i er s t o d e la y t h e

a g g r es s or s u n t il a r es pon s e f or ce a r r i ve s. Vu ln er a b i li t ie s m a y i n vol v e

in a d e q u a cie s in in t r u sio n-d e t ect ion sy st e m s (I D S s) a n d b a r r ie rs. S im ila r ly,

the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as

f a r f r om t h e f a c il it y a s p os s ib le a n d t o h a r d en t h e f a c il it y t o r e s is t t h e

ex pl os i ve a t t h a t d is t a n ce. Vu ln er a b i li t ie s m a y i n vol ve l im i t ed s t a n d of f


16/315

FM 3-19.30


d ist a n ces, in a d e q u a t e b a r r ier s, a n d b u ild in g con st r u ct ion t h a t ca n n o t r e sist

explosive effects at the applicable standoff distance.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES2-15. Where vulnerabilit ies have been identified, protective measures must

be identified to mitigate them. AR 190-13, AR 190-51, DA Pam 190-51, and

TM 5-853-1 are effective tools for developing protective measures. The key to

effective development of protective systems is a partnership between physical-

security personnel a nd t he insta llat ion engineers. Appendix E of this m anua l

d is cu s se s i n for m a t i on f or of fi ce s ecu r it y, w h i ch s h ou ld b e l is t ed i n t h e

physical-security plan (see Appendix F ). Appendix G discusses personal-

protection measures.

THE INTEGRATED PROTECTIVE SYSTEM

2-16. P rotective syst ems integra te physical protective measures a nd security

procedures to protect a ssets a gainst a design-basis threa t . The chara cterist ics

of integrated systems include deterrence, detection, defense, and defeat.

DETERRENCE

2-17. A p ot e n t ia l a g g r e ssor w h o p er ce ive s a r isk o f b ein g ca u g h t m a y b e

deterred from a tta cking a n a sset . The effectiveness of deterrence va ries with

the aggressors sophistication, the asset s at tractiveness, and the aggressors

objective. Although deterrence is not considered a direct design objective, it

may be a result of the design.

DETECTION

2-18. A detection m easure senses an act of aggression, a ssesses t he va lidity ofthe detection, and communicates the appropriate information to a response

f or ce. A d e t e ct ion sy st e m m u st p r ovide a l l t h r e e o f t h e se ca p a b ili t ies t o b e

effective.

2-19. Detection mea sures may detect a n a ggressors movement via a n ID S, or

they ma y detect w eapons a nd t ools via X-ray ma chines or metal a nd explosive

detectors. Detection measures may also include access-control elements that

assess the validity of identification (ID) credentials. These control elements

may provide a progra mmed response (a dmission or denia l), or they m ay relay

informa tion to a response force. Gu ar ds serve a s detection elements, detecting

intrusions and controlling access.

2-20. Nuclear, biologica l, an d chemical (NBC ) detection syst ems mus t be used

t o m e a su r e a n d va l id a t e a ct s o f a g g r e ssio n in vo lvin g W M D . N B C d e t e ct io nsystems should also be used to communicat e a wa rning.

DEFENSE

2-21. D e f en sive m e a su r e s p r o t ect a n a sse t f r om a g g r e ssion b y d ela y in g or

p r eve n t in g a n a g g r e ssor s m o ve m en t t o w a r d t h e a sse t o r b y sh ield in g t h e

asset from wea pons and explosives. D efensive measures


17/315

FM 3-19.30


D e la y a g g r essor s f r om g a in in g a ccess b y u sin g t o ols in a f or ce d e n t r y.

These measures include barriers along with a response force.

P r e v en t a n a g g r es s or s m ov em e n t t o w a r d a n a s s et . Th es e m e a s u res

p r ovid e b a r r ie r s t o m o vem e n t a n d ob scu r e l in e s o f s igh t (L O S s) t oa sse t s .

P rotect th e asset from the effects of tools, wea pons, and explosives.

2-22. D ef en s iv e m e a s ur es m a y b e a c t iv e or p a s si ve. Act i ve d ef en s iv e

m ea s u r es a r e m a n u a l l y or a u t o ma t i ca l l y a c t iv a t e d i n r es pon s e t o a c t s of

a g g r e ssion . Pa ssive d e fe n sive m e a su r e s d o n o t d e pe n d on d et e ct ion or a

response. They include such measures as blast-resistant building components

and fences. Gua rds ma y a lso be considered as a defensive measure.

DEFEAT

2-23. Most protective systems depend on response personnel to defea t an

aggressor. Although defeat is not a design objective, defensive and detection

sy st e m s m u st b e d e sig n ed t o a ccom m o d a t e ( or a t lea st n ot in t e r fe r e w it h )response-force activities.

SECURI TY THREATS

2-24. S ecu r it y t h r ea t s a r e a ct s or con d it ion s t h a t m a y r es ul t i n t h e

compromise of sensitive information; loss of life; damage, loss, or destruction

of property; or disruption of m ission. P hysical-security personnel an d design

t e a m s m u st u n d e r st a n d t h e t h r e a t t o t h e a sset s t h e y a r e t o p r ot e ct in o r d er t o

d e ve lop e ff ect ive se cu r it y p r og r a m s or d e sig n se cu r it y sy st e m s. Hist o r ica l

p a t t e rn s a n d t r e nd s i n a g g r es s or a c t iv it y i n di ca t e g en er a l ca t e g or i es of

aggressors and the common ta ctics they use a gainst military assets. Aggressor

ta ctics a nd t heir associat ed tools, weapons, and explosives are t he basis for t he

t h r e a t t o a sse t s.

THREAT SOURCES

2-2 5. Th er e a r e m a n y p ot e nt i a l s ou r ce s of t h r ea t i n for m a t i on . Th r ea t

a s s es s m en t i s n or m a l ly a m i li t a r y -i nt e ll ig en ce (M I ) r es pon s ib il it y. M I

personnel commonly focus on such security threats as terrorists and military

forces. Within the US and its territories, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FB I) ha s prima ry responsibility for both foreign a nd d omestic terrorists. The

F B I , t h e U S A r m y C r im in a l I n ve st ig a t io n C o m m a n d ( U S A C I D C [ C I D ] ) , a n d

loca l la w -e n for ce m en t a g e n cies a r e g ood sou r ce s f or p h y sica l-se cu r it y

p er son n e l t o ob t a in cr im in a l t h r e a t in f or m a t ion . C o or d in a t in g w it h t h e se

e le m en t s on a r e gu la r b a sis is e sse n t ia l t o m a in t a in in g a n e ff ect ive se cu r it y

program.

THREAT CATEGORIES

2-26. S ecu r it y t h r ea t s a r e cl a s s if ie d a s e it h er h u m a n or n a t u r a l . H u m a n

t h r e a t s a r e ca r r ie d o u t b y a w id e r a n g e o f a g g r e sso r s w h o m a y h a ve o n e o r

more objectives toward assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations.

Ag g r essor s ca n b e ca t e g or iz ed a n d t h e ir ob je ct ives ca n b e g e n e r a l iz ed a s

described below. (See DA Pam 190-51 and TM 5-853-1 for more information.)


18/315

FM 3-19.30


Aggressor Objectives

2-27. Four major objectives describe an aggressors behavior. Any one of the

f irst t h r e e ob je ct ives ca n b e u sed t o r e a l iz e t h e f ou r t h . Th e se o b je ct ives

include

Inflict ing injury or death on people.

Destroying or dam aging fa cilit ies, property, equipment, or resources.

S t e a l in g eq u ipm e n t , m a t e r ie l, or in for m a t ion .

C r e a t in g a d ve r se p u blici t y.

Aggressor Categories

2-28. Aggressors are grouped into five broad categoriescriminals, vandals

a n d a c t iv is t s, ex tr em is t s, pr ot es t g rou ps , a n d t er r or is t s. H os t il e a c t s

performed by these aggressors range from crimes (such as burglary) to low-

in t e n sit y con f l ict t h r e a t s (su ch a s u n con ven t ion a l w a r f a r e ). Ea ch of t h e se

categories describes predicta ble aggressors who pose threat s t o milita ry a ssetsan d w ho shar e common objectives a nd t actics.

Crimina ls can be chara cterized based on their degree of sophisticat ion.

Th ey a r e cl a s s if ie d a s u n s op hi s t ica t e d cr i mi n a ls , s op hi st i ca t e d

criminals, and organized criminal groups. Their common objective is

the theft of assets; however, the assets they target , the quantit ies they

seek, their relat ive efficiency, and the sophistication of their actions

va r y sig n if ica n t ly . V a n d a ls a n d a ct ivist s m a y a lso b e in clu d e d u n d e r

this category.

Va n d a ls a n d a ct ivist s a r e g r ou p s of p r ot e st e r s w h o a r e p olit ica l ly o r

issue oriented. They a ct out of frustra tion, discontent, or anger a gainst

the actions of other social or political groups. Their primary objectives

commonly include destruction and publicity. Their selection of targetswill vary based on the risk a ssociat ed with at ta cking them. The degree

of dama ge they seek to cause w ill vary w ith t heir sophisticat ion.

Ex t r e m ist s a r e r a d ica l in t h e ir polit ica l b elief s a n d m a y t a k e ex t r em e ,

violent actions to gain support for their beliefs or cause.

P r o t es t er s a r e c on s id er ed a t h r ea t on l y i f t h e y a r e v i ol en t . L a w f u l

protesters have to be considered, but significant protective measures

and procedures are not normally needed to control their actions. The

p re se nce of e xt r em i st s or v a n d a l s/a c t iv is t s a t a pe a ce fu l p rot e st

increases the chance of the protest becoming violent.

Te rr or is t s a r e i de ol og i ca l l y, p ol it i ca l l y, or i s su e or i en t e d. Th ey

com m o n ly w o r k in sm a ll , w e ll-or g a n iz ed g r ou ps o r cel ls . Th e y a r e

s op h is t i ca t e d , a r e s k il le d w i t h t ool s a n d w e a p on s , a n d pos s es s a ne ff icien t p la n n in g ca p a b ili t y. Th e r e a r e t h r e e t y p es of t e r r or ist s

C O N U S , O C O N U S , a n d p a r a m ili t a r y O C O N U S .

C ON U S t e rr or i st s a r e t y p ica l l y r i gh t - or l ef t -w i n g ex t r em i st s

operating in dist inct a reas of the US.

O C O NU S t e rr or is t s g en er a l l y a r e m or e or g a n iz ed t h a n C O N U S

t e r r o r ist s . T h e y u su a lly in clu d e e t h n ica l ly o r r e l ig io u sly o r ie n t e d

groups.


19/315

FM 3-19.30


P a r a m i li t a r y OC O NU S t er r or is t g rou ps s h ow s om e m il it a r y

ca p a b il i t y w it h a b r o a d r a n g e o f m il i t a r y a n d im p r o vise d w e a p o n s.

Att acks by OCONU S terrorists a re typically m ore severe.

2- 29. N a t u r a l t h r e a t s a r e u su a lly t h e co n se q u e n ce o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a .They are not preventable by physical-security measures, but they are likely to

have significant effects on security s ystems and operations. They ma y require

a n in cr e a se in p r ot e ct ive m e a su r e s e it h e r t o a d d r e ss n e w si t u a t ion s or t o

compensate for the loss of exist ing security measures. They may reduce the

effectiveness of exist ing security measures by such occurrences as collapsed

perimeter fences a nd ba rriers, inopera ble protective lighting, da ma ged pat rol

veh icles, a n d p oor visib i li t y. N a t u r a l t h r e a t s a n d t h e ir e ff ect s r e la t ive t o

security include the following:

Floods may result in property dama ge, destruction of perimeter fences,

a n d d a m a g e t o I D S s. H e a vy r a in s o r sn o w f a l ls m a y h a ve sim ila r e f f ect s

even if they do not result in flooding.

S t o r m s, t o r n a d oe s, h ig h w in d s, or r a in m a y ca u se n u isa n ce a la r m s t oa ct iva t e a n d ca u se d a m a g e t o I D S s. T h e y m a y l im it t h e visib i l i t y o f

security personnel an d may affect closed-circuit television (CC TV)

sy st e m s. Win d s m a y a lso d isr u p t p ow e r or com m u n ica t io n l in e s a n d

cause safety ha zards from flying debris.

E a r t h q u a k e s m a y c a u se n u is a n ce a l a r m s t o a ct i va t e o r m a y d i sr u pt

IDS s. They ma y a lso cause broken wa ter or gas ma ins, fallen electrical

or communication lines, and weakened or collapsed buildings.

S n ow a n d i ce c a n m a k e t r a v e l on p a t r o l r oa d s d i f fi cu l t , m a y d e la y

r e sp o n se s t o a la r m s, m a y im p e d e t h e p e r f o r m a n ce o f I D S s, a n d m a y

freeze locks an d a larm mecha nisms. Heavy ice may a lso dam age power

an d communicat ion lines.

F ir es m a y d a m a g e o r d es t r oy p er im et er b a r ri er s a n d b ui ld in gs ,possibly leaving a ssets susceptible to da ma ge or theft .

F og ca n r ed u ce t h e v is ib il it y of s ecu r it y f or ce s, t h e re by r eq u ir i ng

ad dit iona l security personnel. I t may also increase t he response t ime to

a la r m s a n d r e du ce t h e e ff ect ive n ess of se cu r it y e q u ip m en t su ch a s

CCTV systems.

Aggressor Tactics

2-30. Aggressors have historically used a wide range of offensive strategies

r e flect in g t h e ir ca p a b ili t ies a n d ob je ct ives. Th e se of f en sive st r a t e g ie s a r e

categorized into 15 tactics that are specific methods of achieving aggressor

goals (see TM 5-853-1). Separating these tactics into categories allows facility

p la n n e r s a n d p h y sica l- se cu r it y p e r so n n e l t o d e f in e t h r e a t s in st a n d a r d iz e dt e rm s u s a b le a s a b a s i s f or f a ci li t y a n d s ecu r it y -s y st e m d es i gn . C om m on

aggressor tactics include

Moving vehicle bomb. An aggressor drives an explosive-laden car ortruck into a facility an d detonates th e explosives. His goal is to da ma ge

or destroy the facility or to kill people. This is a suicide attack.

Stationary vehicle bomb. An aggressor covertly parks an explosive-la d e n ca r o r t r u ck n e a r a f a ci l i t y . He t h e n d e t o n a t e s t h e e x p lo sive s

e it h e r b y t im e d e la y o r r e m o t e co n t r o l . His g o a l in t h is t a ct ic is t h e


20/315

FM 3-19.30


s a m e a s f or t h e m o v in g v eh i cl e b om b w i t h t h e a d d it i on a l g oa l of

destroying a ssets w ithin t he blast ar ea. This is commonly not a suicide

at ta ck. It is the most frequent a pplicat ion of vehicle bombings.

Exterior attack. An a g g r es s or a t t a ck s a f a ci li t y s e xt e ri or or a ne x p o se d a sse t a t c lo se r a n g e . He u se s w e a p o n s su ch a s r o ck s, clu b s,i m pr ov is ed i n cen d ia r y or ex pl os i ve d ev ice s, a n d h a n d g r en a d es .

Weapons (such a s sma ll arms ) are not included in this ta ctic, but a re

considered in subsequent tactics. His goal is to damage the facility , to

injure or kill its occupan ts, or to da ma ge or destroy assets.

Standoff weapons. An a g gr es sor fi res m ilit a r y w ea pon s orimprovised versions of milita ry w eapons at a facility from a significant

d i st a n c e. Th es e w e a p on s i n cl ud e d i re ct (s u ch a s a n t i t a n k [AT]

w e a p on s) a n d in d ir e ct L O S w e a p on s (su ch a s m or t a r s). H is g o a l is t o

d a m a g e t h e f a ci l i t y , t o in ju r e o r k i l l i t s o ccu p a n t s, o r t o d a m a g e o r

destroy assets.

Ballistics. T h e a g g r e sso r f ir e s va r io u s sm a ll a r m s ( su ch a s p ist o ls ,submachine guns, shotguns, and rifles) from a distance. His goal is to

injure or kill facility occupants or to da ma ge or destroy assets.

Forced entry. The a ggressor forcibly ent ers a facility using forced-entry tools (such a s ha nd, power, a nd t hermal tools) a nd explosives. H e

uses the tools to create a ma n-passa ble opening or t o operat e a device

in t he fa cility s w a lls, doors, roof, w indows, or ut ility openings. He may

also use small a rms t o overpower gua rds. His goal is t o steal or destroy

assets, compromise informa tion, injure or kill facility occupant s, or

disrupt operations.

Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter a facility or a portion ofa f a c i l i t y b y u s i n g f a l s e c r e d e n t i a l s o r s t e a l t h . H e m a y t r y t o c a r r y

wea pons or explosives int o the fa cility. His goa ls include those listed for

forced entry. Insider compromise. A p er son a u t h o r iz ed a cce ss t o a f a cil i t y (a n

in sid e r ) a t t e m p t s t o co m p r o m ise a sse t s b y t a k in g a d va n t a g e o f t h a t

accessibility. The aggressor may also try to carry weapons or explosives

into the facility in t his ta ctic. His goals a re the sa me as those listed for

forced entry.

Visual surveillance. Th e a g g r e ssor u ses ocu la r a n d p h ot o gr a p h icd e vice s ( su ch a s b ino cu la r s a n d ca m e r a s w it h t e lep h ot o le n ses) t o

monitor fa cility or insta llat ion operations or to see assets. H is goal is t o

com p rom i se i n for m a t i on . As a p r ecu r sor, h e u s es t h i s t a c t i c t o

determine informat ion a bout t he asset of interest .

Acoustic eavesdropping. Th e a g g r e ssor u ses l ist e n in g d e vice s t o

m on it or v oi ce com m un ica t i on s or ot h er a u d ib ly t r a n s mi t t edinforma tion. His goal is to compromise informa tion.

Electronic-emanations eavesdropping. Th e a g g res s or u seselectronic-emanation surveillance equipment from outside a facility or

its restricted area to monitor electronic emanations from computers,

co m m u n ica t io n s, a n d r e la t e d e q u ip m e n t . His g o a l is t o co m p r o m ise

information.


21/315

FM 3-19.30


Mail-bomb delivery. Th e a g g r e ssor d e liver s b om b s or in ce n d ia r ydevices to th e ta rget in let ters or packa ges. The bomb sizes involved ar e

relatively small. His goal is to kill or injure people.

Supplies-bomb delivery. The aggressor conceals bombs in variouscontainers and delivers them to supply- and material-handling pointssuch as loading docks. The bomb sizes in this tactic can be significantly

larger that those in mail bombs. His goal is to damage the facility , kill

or in ju r e i t s occu p a n t s, or d a m a g e o r d e st r oy a sse t s . A pp en d ix H

add resses the actions to take w hen a bomb is suspected.

Airborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility s airsupply by introducing chemical or biological agents into it . H is goal is

to kill or injure people.

Waterborne contamination. An aggressor contaminates a facility swater supply by introducing chemical, biological, or radiological agents

into it . These agents can be introduced into the system a t a ny loca tion

w i t h v a r y in g e ff ect s , d e pe nd i ng on t h e q u a n t i t y o f w a t e r a n d t h e

contaminant involved. His goal is to kill or injure people.

2-31. Th e a f o r em e n t ion e d t a ct ics a r e t y p ica l t h r e a t s t o f ixe d f a cil i t ie s f or

w h ich d e sig n er s a n d p h y sica l-se cu r it y p er son n e l ca n p r ovid e p r ot e ct ive

measures. H owever, some common t errorist acts are beyond the protection

t h a t f a ci li t y d es i gn er s ca n p rov id e. Th ey ca n n ot con t r ol k id n a p pi n gs ,

h ija ck in g s, a n d a ssa ssin a t ion s t h a t t a k e p la ce a w a y f r om f a cil i t ie s o r d u r in g

tra vel betw een fa cilit ies. P rotection aga inst t hese threats is provided through

operational security an d persona l mea sures (see Appendices G an d I ), w hich

are covered in doctrine relat ive to those activit ies and are under the general

responsibility of the C ID.

TACTI CAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDER ATIONS

2-32. Wh e n d e t er m in in g t h e a sse t s a n d t h r e a t s , t h e sa m e con sid er a t ion s

should be given to the systems approach in the tactical environment as when

in th e cantonment a rea. The sa me process of determining the a ssets, their r isk

level, and a ny regulat ory guida nce a pply. Identifying potentia l threat s a nd the

le ve l o f p r o t e ct io n r e q u ir e d f o r t h e a sse t s a r e n e ce ssa r y . C o m m a n d e r s a n d

l ea d e r s m u s t a l s o i de nt i fy a d d i t ion a l v u ln er a b i li t ie s a n d ot h e r r eq u ir ed

protective measu res. Comma nders a re not expected to ha ve the sa me physica l

p r ot e ct ive m e a su r es d u e t o t h e im pa ct of r e sou r ce s, b u d ge t , loca t ion , a n d

situations.

2-33. Commanders must consider the various tactics used by aggressors and

u se t h e ir sold ie r s a b il it ie s t o cou n t e r a ct t h e se t a ct ics. C o n sid e r a t ion s f or

specific as sets (such a s milita ry-w orking-dog [MWD] a nd explosive-ordna nce-

d isposa l [EO D ] t e a m s a n d t h e ir a b il i t ie s t o d e t ect a n d d isa sse m ble a b om b )

m u s t b e i d en t i fi ed . U n i t s m u s t h a v e t h e a b i li t y t o i m p r ov is e i n a t a c t ica l

e nv ir on m en t . Th ei r t r a i n in g a n d r es ou r ce fu ln es s w i l l com p en s a t e f or

shortcomings in the field.

2-34. Th e sy st e m s a p p r oa ch t o se cu r it y p r ovid es f ocus a n d in t eg r a t io n of

r e sou r ce s. P r ot e ct ive sy st e m s a r e m u t u a lly su pp or t in g a n d sy st e m a t ica l ly

d ev el oped t o n eg a t e t h e t h r ea t . C om m a n der s con d uct a n i nt el li gen ce

p r ep a r a t io n o f t h e b a t t le f ie ld (I P B ) a n d vu ln er a b il it y a sse ssm en t s (VAs) t o

d e t er m in e r isk s. S e cu r it y r e sou r ce s a n d m e a su r e s a r e a p plie d t o m it ig a t e

risks and to deter, detect , defend, and defeat the th reat .


22/315

Design Approach 3-1

Chapter 3

Design Approach

D e v e l op i n g p r o t e ct i v e s y s t e m s t o p r ot e c t a s s e t s d e p e n d s o n a n e f f e ct i v e

part nership between engineers an d phys ica l-security personnel. P hysical-

security personnel need t o understa nd t he ba sic approa ches t he engineers

will take in laying out protective systems. Engineers must understand the

i s s u e s i n v o l v e d w i t h e n s u r i n g t h a t a n y t h i n g t h e y l a y o u t i s c o m p a t i b l e

w i t h s e c u r i t y o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e a s s e t u s e r s . T h e b e s t

wa y t o ensure a viable design is t hrough tea mw ork. This chapter provides

a s u m m a r y o f t h e ba s i c a p pr o a c h es t o pr o t ec t i n g a s s e t s a g a i n s t t h r e a t s

(the design strategies). Understanding these strategies is cri t ical to beingan effective team member in developing protective systems.

DESIGN STRATEGIES

3-1. Th e r e a r e se pa r a t e d esig n st r a t e gies f or p r ot e ct in g a sse t s f r om e a ch

t a ct ic d e scr ib e d in C h a p t e r 2. T h e r e a r e t w o t y p e s o f s t r a t e g ie s a sso cia t e d

w it h e a ch t a ct ict h e g e n er a l-d e sig n a n d sp ecif ic-d e sig n st r a t e g ie s. Th e

g en e r a l-d e sig n st r a t e g y is t h e g e n e r a l a p pr oa ch t o p r ot e ct in g a sse t s a g a in st

ta ctics. The specific-design stra tegy refines t he general-design stra tegy to

f ocu s t h e p er f or m a n ce of t h e pr ot e ct i ve s y s t em on a p a r t icu l a r l ev el of

protection. (S ee TM 5-853-1 for m ore inf orma tion.)

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

3-2. P r ot e ct i v e m e a s u r es a r e d ev el op ed a s a r es u lt of t h e g en er a l - a n d

specific-design strategies. These protective measures commonly take the form

of site-work, building, detection, and procedural elements.

S i t e -w o r k elem e n t s in clu d e t h e a r e a su r r o un d in g a f a cil i t y or a n a sset .

Technically, t hey a re a ssociat ed w ith everything beyond 5 feet from a

building. They can include perimeter ba rriers, landforms, an d st an doff

distances.

B u i ld i ng e le me nt s a r e p rot e ct i v e m e a s u re s d i r ect l y a s s oci a t e d w i t h

buildings. These elements include walls, doors, windows, and roofs.

D e t ect i on e le m en t s d et e ct s u ch t h i n gs a s i n t r ud er s , w e a p on s , o r

explosives. They include ID Ss, CC TV systems used t o a ssess int rusion

alarms, and weapon and explosive detectors. These elements can also

i n cl ud e t h e g u a r d s u s ed t o s u pp or t t h i s e q ui pm en t or t o p er f or m

similar functions.

P r oced ur a l elem en t s a r e t h e pr ot ect iv e m ea s ur es r eq uir ed b y

regulations, TMs, a nd sta nding operating procedures (SOP s). These

el em e nt s p r ov id e t h e f ou n d a t i on f or d ev el opi n g t h e ot h e r t h r ee

elements.


23/315

FM 3-19.30

3-2 Design Approach

VEHICLE BOMBS

3-3. Vehicle-bomb tactics include both moving and stationary vehicle bombs.

In the cas e of a moving vehicle bomb, th e a ggressor drives t he vehicle into the

t a r g et . Th is is com m o n ly k n ow n a s a su icid e a t t a ck . I n a st a t ion a r y ve hicleb om b , h e p a r k s t h e ve h icle a n d d e t on a t e s t h e b o m b r e m ot e ly o r o n a t im e d

delay.

GENERAL -DESIGN STRATEGY

3-4. Blast pressures near an exploding vehicle bomb are very high, but they

d e cr e a se r a p id ly w it h d ist a n ce f r om t h e e xp losion . Th e d e sig n st r a t e gy f or

these tactics is to maintain as much standoff distance as possible between the

vehicle bomb a nd t he facility a nd t hen, if necessary, to harden t he facility for

t h e r es u lt i n g b la s t p r es s ur es . B a r r i er s on t h e p er i me t er of t h e r es u lt i n g

sta ndoff zone ma inta in t he required sta ndoff dista nce. The difference betw een

m o vin g a n d st a t io n a r y ve h icle - b o m b t a ct ics is t h a t t h e a g g r e sso r u sin g t h e

moving vehicle bomb will at tempt to crash through the vehicle barriers; thea g g r e ssor u sin g t h e st a t ion a r y veh icle b om b w il l n ot . Th e r ef or e, ve hicle

barriers for the moving vehicle bomb must be capable of stopping a moving

vehicle at the perimeter of the standoff zone. For a stat ionary vehicle bomb,

veh icle b a r r ier s m u st m a r k t h e p e r im e t er of t h e st a n d of f z o n e, b u t t h e y a r e

not required to stop the moving vehicle. They only need to make it obvious if

an aggressor at tempts t o breach th e perimeter.

LEVELS OF PROTECTION

3-5. There a re t hree levels of protection for vehicle bombslow, medium, a nd

high. The primary differences between the levels are the degree of damage

a l l ow e d t o t h e f a ci li t y p rot e ct i n g t h e a s s e t s a n d t h e r es u lt i n g d eg r ee of

dam age or injury to the a ssets.

Low. The facility or the protected space will sustain a high degree ofd a m a g e b u t w il l n o t co lla p se. I t m a y n ot b e e con om ica lly r e pa ir a b le .

Although collapse is prevented, injuries may occur and assets may be

d a m a g e d .

Medium. The facility or t he protected space will susta in a significantd e g r e e o f d a m a g e , b u t t h e st r u ct u r e w il l b e r e u sa b le . O ccu p a n t s a n d

other assets may sustain minor injuries or damage.

High. The facility or the protected space will sustain only superficiald a m a g e . O ccu p a n t s a n d o t h e r a sse t s w il l a lso in cu r o n ly su p e r f icia l

injury or dam a ge.

SITE -WORK E LE MENTS

3-6. The two primary types of site-work elements for vehicle bombs are the

sta ndoff dista nce and vehicle barriers. The vehicles speed must a lso be ta ken

into consideration.

Standoff Distance

3-7. The standoff distance is the maintained distance between where a vehicle

bomb is allowed and the target. The initial goal should be to make that distance


24/315

FM 3-19.30

Design Approach 3-3

a s f a r f r om t h e t a r g et f a ci li t y a s p ra ct ica l. F ig ur e 3-1 sh o w s t h e d ist a n ces

required t o limit building da mage to pa rticular levels (including the levels of

protection described above) for a range of bomb weights. All bomb weights are

given in terms of equivalent pounds of tr initrotoluene (TNT), which is astandard way of identifying all explosives regardless of their composition. The

example in Figure 3-1 is a building of conventional construction (common,

unhardened construction). Buildings built without any special construction at

t h es e s t a n d of f d is t a n ces w i ll p rob a b ly w i t h st a n d t h e e xpl os iv e ef fect s .

Conventionally constructed buildings at standoff distances of less than those

shown in Figure 3-1 w ill not a dequately w ithsta nd blast effects. (Refer to TM

5-853-1 for information on hardening buildings to resist a blast.) Do not allow

vehicles to park within the established sta ndoff dista nces. Recognize tha t this

restriction can result in significant operat iona l an d la nd-use problems.

3-8. Exclusive Standoff Zone. Wh en a n e xcl us iv e s t a n dof f z on e i sestablished, do not a llow vehicles within the perimeter unless they ha ve been

se a r ch e d or clea r e d f or a cce ss. Th e z on e s p er im et e r is e st a b lish e d a t t h e

dista nce necessar y to protect the fa cility a gainst the highest t hreat explosive.

All ve hicles sh ou ld b e p a r k ed ou t sid e t h e e xclu sive st a n d o f f z on e ; o n ly

Clear zone

standoff zone

50 ft min

30 ftmin

Figure 3-1. Standoff Distance


25/315

FM 3-19.30

3-4 Design Approach

maintenance, emergency, and delivery vehicles should be allowed within the

zone after being searched. Figure 3-2 shows an exclusive standoff zone.

3-9. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone. A n on ex cl us iv e s t a n d of f z on e i s

established in a location having a mixture of cars and trucks (with relat ivelyfew t rucks). A nonexclusive sta ndoff zone t akes a dvan ta ge of aggressors being

a b le t o co n ce a l a sm a lle r q u a n t i t y o f e x p lo sive s in a ca r t h a n t h e y ca n in a

t r u ck . Th e r ef or e, a n on e xclu sive st a n d o f f z on e in clu d es in n er a n d ou t e r

p er im et e r s. Th e in n er p er im et e r is se t a t a d ist a n ce cor r e sp on d in g t o t h e

weight of explosives that can be concealed in cars. The outer perimeter is set

at a distance associated with the weight that can be placed in trucks (refer to

TM 5-853-1). With these two perimeters, cars can enter the outer perimeter

w it h o u t b ein g se a r ch e d b u t t h e y ca n n ot e n t er t h e in n er p er im et e r. Tr u ck s

cannot enter the outer perimeter, since it is established based on what they

can carry. Figure 3-3 shows a nonexclusive sta ndoff zone. The nonexclusive

st a n d o f f z on e p r ovid es t h e a d va n t a g e s o f a l low in g b et t e r u se o f t h e p a r k in g

a r e a s a n d l im it in g t h e n u m b e r o f ve h icle s t h a t n e e d t o b e se a r ch e d a t t h e

ou t er pe ri met er. .

Entry-control point

deFacility

de= exclusive standoff-zone distance

Figure 3-2. Exclusive Standoff Zone


26/315

FM 3-19.30

Design Approach 3-5

Vehicle Barriers3-10. T

Date post:	31-May-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	meowmix
View:	217 times
Download:	1 times

Army - fm3 19x30 - Physical Security

Documents