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1CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

/glaizamasaoy

CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Difference between substantive and remedial

law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW REMEDIAL LAW

It creates, defines

and regulates rights

and duties

concerning life,

liberty or property,

which when violated

gives rise to a cause

of action.

It prescribes the

methods of

enforcing those

rights and

obligations created

by substantive law

by providing a

procedural system

for obtaining

redress for the

invasion of rights

and violations of

duties and by

prescribing rules as

to how suits are

filed, tried and

decided upon by the

courts.

Civil actions, criminal actions, and special

proceedings

(1) Civil actions

It is one by which a party sues another forthe protection of a right or the prevention or

redress of a wrong. Its primary purpose is

compensatory. Civil actions may be:

(a) Ordinary, or

(b) Special.

Both are governed by rules for

ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules

prescribed for special civil actions.

(2) Criminal actions

It is one by which the State prosecutes a

person for an act or omission punishable by

law. Its primary purpose is punishment.(3) Special proceedings

It is a remedy by which a party seeks to

establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

GENERAL PROVISIONS (Rule 1)

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to

promulgate rules concerning:

(1) Pleading,

(2) Practice, and(3) Procedure.

Three (3) limitations on the SCs rule-making power:

(1) The rules shall provide a simplified and

inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases;

(2) shall be uniform for courts of the same

grade; and

(3) shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights.

Article 6, Sec. 30, ConstitutionNo law shall be passed increasing the appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this

Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Procedural and substantive rules

Substantive law creates, defines, regulates, and

extinguishes rights and obligations, while remedial or

procedural law provides the procedure for the

enforcement of rights and obligations.

Force and effect of Rules of Court

TheRules of Court have the force and effect of law,unless they happen to be inconsistent with positive

law.

Power of Supreme Court to suspendthe Rulesof Court

Whenever demanded by justice, the Supreme Court

has the inherent powerto

(a) suspend its own rules or

(b) exempt a particular case from the operation

of said rules.

May parties change the rules of procedure?

General rule: They may not. This is because these

are matters of public interest.

Exceptions:

Matters of procedure which may be

Agreed upon by the parties Venue may be

changed by written agreement of the parties

(Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])

Waived Venue may be waived if not

objected to in a motion to dismiss or in the

answer. (Rule 16, Sec. 6); judgment in default

may be waived by failure to answer within 15

days.

Fall within the discretion of the court The

period to plead may be extended on motion

of a party. (Rule 11, Sec. 11); rules of

procedure may be relaxed in the interest of

justice.

JURISDICTION

It is the power and authority of a court to hear, try

and decided a case.

1. Generally

The statute in force at the time of thecommencement of the action determines the

jurisdiction of the court.


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Before looking into other matters, it is the

duty of the court to consider the question of

jurisdiction withoutwaiting for it to be raised.

If court has jurisdiction, such must be

exercised. Otherwise, it may be

enforced by a mandamus

proceeding.

If court has no jurisdiction, the court

shall dismiss the claim and can do so

motu proprio.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

The courts will not resolve a controversy

involving a question which is within the

jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.

Doctrine of continuing jurisdiction

Once jurisdiction has attached to a court, it

retains that jurisdiction until it finally

disposes of the case. Hence, it is not lost by

The passage of new laws transferring

the jurisdiction to another tribunal

except when expressly provided by

the statute;

Subsequent filing of a notice of

appeal;

The mere fact that a party who is a

public official ceased to be in office;

or

Finality of judgment (the court still

has jurisdiction to enforce and

execute it)

Elements of a valid exercise of jurisdiction

(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature

of the case;

(2) the parties;

(3) the res if jurisdiction over the defendant

cannot be acquired;

(4) the issue of the case; and

(5) Payment of docket fees.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is a matter of

substantive law.

Jurisdiction over the parties, the res and the

issues are matters of procedure. Jurisdiction over the

parties and the res are covered by the rule onsummons, while jurisdiction over the issues is

subsumed under the rule on pleadings.

(a) As to subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by

the Constitution or by law.

Therefore, jurisdiction over the subject

matter cannotbe conferred by

(1) Administrative policy of any court;

(2) Courts unilateral assumption of jurisdiction;

(3) Erroneous belief by the court that it hasjurisdiction;

(4) By contract or by the parties;

(5) By agreement, or by any act or omission of

the parties, nor by acquiescence of the court;

or

(6) By the parties silence, acquiescence or

consent

General Rule: It is determined by the material

allegations of the initiatory pleading (e.g., the

complaint), not the answer of the defendant.Once acquired, jurisdiction is not lost because of

the defendants contrary allegation.

Exception: In ejectment cases, where tenancy is

averred by way of defense and is proved to be

the real issue, the case should be dismissed for

not being properly filed with the DARAB.

It is determined by the cause of action alleged,

not by the amount substantiated and awarded.

Example: If a complaint alleges a recoverable

amount of P1M, RTC has jurisdiction even if

evidence proves the only P300k may berecovered.

Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter CANNOT be

waived, enlarged or diminished by stipulation of the

parties.

(b) As to res or property

Jurisdiction over the res refers to the courts

jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is

the subject of the action.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by(1) Custodia legisplacing the property or thing

under the courts custody (e.g., attachment)

(2) Statutory authoritystatute conferring the

court with power to deal with the property or

thing within its territorial jurisdiction

(3) Summons by publication or other modes of

extraterritorial service (Rule 14, Sec. 15)

(c) As to the issues

Issue a disputed point or question to which parties

to an action have narrowed down their several

allegations and upon which they are desirous of

obtaining a decision. Thus, where there is no

disputed point, there is no issue.

Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred or

determined by

(1) Examination of the pleadings

Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is

determined by the pleadings of the parties.

(2) Pre-trial

It may be conferred by stipulation of the

parties in the pre-trial, as when they enter

into stipulations of facts and documents orenter into an agreement simplifying the

issues of the case (Rule 18, Sec. 2)

(3) Waiver


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Failure to object to presentation of evidence

on a matter notraised in the pleadings. Said

issues tried shall be treated as if they had

been raised in the pleadings.

(d) As to the parties

The court acquires jurisdiction over the

Plaintiffwhen he files his complaint

Defendant

i. Valid service of summons upon him, or

ii. Voluntary appearance:

The defendants voluntary appearance

in the action shall be equivalent to

service of summons. The inclusion in a

motion to dismiss of other grounds aside

from lack of jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant shall not be deemed a

voluntary appearance. (Rule 14, Sec. 20)

Examples:

When defendant files

The necessary pleading;

A motion for reconsideration;

Petition to set aside judgment o f

default;

An answer;

Petition for certiorari without

questioning the courts jurisdiction

over his person; or

When the parties jointly submit acompromise agreement for approval

BUT the filing of an answer should notbe

treated automatically as a voluntary

appearance when such answer is

precisely to object to the courts

jurisdiction over the defendants person.

La Naval v. CA: A defendant should be

allowed to put up his own defenses

alternatively or hypothetically. It should

not be the invocation of availableadditional defenses that should be

construed as a waiver of the defense of

lack of jurisdiction over the person, but

the failure to raise the defense.

Note: Jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant

cannotbe acquired if the action is in personam.

2. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)

Since the deceased defendant participated

in all stages of the case before the trial

court, he is estopped from denying the

jurisdiction of the court. The petitioners

merely stepped into the shoes of their

predecessor and are effectively barred by

estoppel from challenging RTCs

jurisdiction.

FACTS: Bertuldo Hinog allegedly occupied and built a

small house on a portion of a property owned by

respondents Balane for 10 years at a nominal annual

rental. After 10 years, Bertuldo refused to heed

demands made by respondents to return said portion

and to remove the house constructed thereon.

Respondents filed a complaint against him. Bertuldo

filed his Answer, alleging ownership of the disputed

property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during

the direct examination. Bertuldos original counsel

was replaced by Atty. Petalcorin who entered his

appearance as new counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the

complaint from the record and nullify all court

proceedings on the ground that private respondents

failed to specify in the complaint the amount of

damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket

fees; and that under Manchester doctrine, non-

payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred by

estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC

YES. The petitioners are barred fromquestioning jurisdiction of the trial court. Although

the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the

proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is

nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from

raising it on the ground of estoppel. After the

deceased Bertuldo participated in all stages of the

case before the trial court, the petitioners merely

stepped into the shoes of their predecessor and are

effectively barred by estoppel from challenging RTCs

jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction at the time of filing of action

PEOPLE v. CAWALING(293 SCRA 267, 1998)

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal

case is determined by the law in force at

the time of the institution of the action.

Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may

not be ousted from the case by any

subsequent events, such as a new

legislation placing such proceedings under

the jurisdiction of another tribunal.Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1) there

is an express provision in the statute, or (2)


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FACTS: Brothers Vicente and Ronie Elisan were

drinking tuba at the kitchenette of one of the

accused, Fontamilla. When they were about to leave,

they were warned by Luz Venus that the six (6)

accused consisting of Mayor Cawaling, four (4)

policemen and a civilian, had been watching and

waiting for them outside the restaurant.

Nevertheless, the two went out and were chased bythe armed men. Vicente successfully ran and hid

behind a coconut tree while Ronie unfortunately went

to the ricefield and was shot to death there.

An Information alleging murder was filed in

the RTC against the 6 accused. RTC convicted them

of murder. On appeal, the appellants questioned the

jurisdiction of the RTC over the case, insisting that

the Sandiganbayan was the tribunal with jurisdiction

since the accused were public officers at the time of

the killing.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdictionNO. The jurisdiction of a court to try a

criminal case is determined by the law in force at the

time of the institution of the action. Once the court

acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the

case by any subsequent events, such as a new

legislation placing such proceedings under the

jurisdiction of another tribunal. Exceptions to this rule

arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the

statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply

to actions pending before its enactment.

Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD

1861 lists two requisites that must concur before the

Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original

jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was

committed by the accused public officer in relation to

his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is

higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for

six (6) years, or higher than a fine of P6,000.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder

or homicide may be committed both by public

officers and by private citizens, and that public office

is not a constitutive element of said crime. The

relation between the crime and the office

contemplated should be direct and not accidental.

The Information filed against the appellantscontains no allegation that appellants were public

officers who committed the crime in relation to their

office. The charge was only for murder.

In the absence of any allegation that the

offense was committed in relation to the office of

appellants or was necessarily connected with the

discharge of their functions, the regional trial court,

not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and

decide the case.

REGULAR COURTS (MTC, RTC, CA, SC)

(See San Beda Reviewer)

SPECIAL COURTS (Sandiganbayan)

(See San Beda Reviewer)

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

Securities and Exchange Commission (Sec. 5.2,

RA 8799)

The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over

Pending cases involving intra-corporate

disputes submitted for final resolution whichshould be resolved within one (1) year from

the enactment of this Code, and

Jurisdiction over pending suspension of

payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30

June 2000 until finally disposed.

Civil Service Commission

MAGPALE v. CSC (215 SCRA 398, 1992)

Under Section 47 of the Administrative

Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all

administrative disciplinary cases involving

the imposition of (d) removal or

dismissal from office.

The MPSB decision did not involve

dismissal or separation from office, rather,

the decision exonerated petitioner and

ordered him reinstated to his former

position. The MSPB decision was not a

proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

FACTS: Magpale, port manager of Philippine Ports

Authority-Port Management Unit (PPA-PMU) of

Tacloban, was found by the Secretary of DOTC guilty

of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure

to account for the 44 units of equipment and (b) for

failing to render the required liquidation of his cash

advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of 4

yrs. He was also found guilty of frequent and

unauthorized absences. He was meted the penalty of

dismissal from the service with the corresponding

accessory penalties.

He appealed to the Merit System and

Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). The MSPB reversed the decision.PPA filed an appeal with the Civil Service

Field Office-PPA, which indorsed the appeal to CSC.

Magpale moved for the implementation of the MSPB

decision which was opposed by the PPA. MSPB

ordered the immediate implementation of its

decision, which became final and executory.

Respondent CSC reversed MPSBs decision

and held Magpale guilty.

ISSUE: Whether the law authorized an appeal by the

government from an adverse decision of the MSBP

NO. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,decisions of the MPSB shall be final, except only

those involving dismissal or separation from the

service which may be appealed to the Commission


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While it is true that the CSC does have the

power to hear and decide administrative cases

instituted by or brought before it directly or on

appeal, the exercise of the power is qualified by and

should be read together with Sec. 49 of Executive

Order 292, which prescribes, among others that (a)

the decision must be appealable.

Under Section 47 of the Administrative Code,

the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrativedisciplinary cases involving the imposition of:

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than 30

days;

(b) fine in an amount exceeding 30 days salary;

(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or

separation from office, rather, the decision

exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to

his former position. The MSPB decision was not a

proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, orofficer exercising judicial functions acts without

jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law

to hear and decide the case.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB)

SANDOVAL v. CAEBA(190 SCRA 77, 1991)

It is not the ordinary courts but the

National Housing Authority (NHA) whichhas exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide cases of (a) unsound real estate

business practices; (b) claims involving

refund and any other claims filed by

subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer

against the project owner, developer,

dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases

involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed

by buyers of subdivision lot or

FACTS: Estate Developers and Investors Corporation(Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval

(Sandoval) in the RTC for the collection of unpaid

installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to a

promissory note, plus interest. Sandoval alleges that

he suspended payments thereof because of the

failure of the developer to develop the subdivision

pursuant to their agreement. The RTC ruled in favor

of Estate, and ordered Sandoval to pay. A writ of

execution was issued which thereafter became final

and executory.

Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment

and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that theRTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. A

motion for reconsideration of the writ of execution

was also filed by petitioner. Estate opposed both

motions. RTC denied the motion to vacate for the

reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the

court to do so. A new writ of execution was issued.

Sandoval filed a petition alleging that the

RTC committed grave abuse of discretion since the

exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject-

matter thereof is vested with the Housing and Land

Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction

over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a

subdivision lot

NO. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree

No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was

given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide

certain cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices:

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims

filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit

buyer against the project owner, developer,

dealer, broker or salesman; and(c) Cases involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit

against the owner, developer, dealer, broker

or salesman.

The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the

petitioner and private respondent is vested not on

the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and

thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land

Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

KINDS OF ACTION

1. As to cause or foundation

The distinction between a real action and a personal

action is important for the purpose of determining

the venue of the action.

(a) Personal

Personal actions are those other than real actions.

(Sec. 2, Rule 4)

Examples

Action for specific performance

Action for damages to real property

Action for declaration of the nullity of

marriage

Action to compel mortgagee to accept

payment of the mortgage debt and release

the mortgage

(b) Real

An action is real when it affects title to or possession

of real property, or an interest therein. (Sec. 1, Rule

4)

To be a real action, it is not enough that itdeals with real property. It is important that the

matter in litigation must also involve any of the

following issues:


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(a) Title;

(b) Ownership;

(c) Possession;

(d) Partition;

(e) Foreclosure of mortgage; or

(f) Any interest in real property

Examples

Action to recover possession of real propertyplus damages (damages is merely incidental)

Action to annul or rescind a sale of real

property

2. As to object

The distinctions are important

(a) to determine whether the jurisdiction of the

defendant is required, and

(b) to determine the type of summons to be

employed

(a) In rem

An action is in rem when it is directed against the

whole world. It is for the determination of the state or

condition of a thing.

Examples

Probate proceeding

Cadastral proceeding

(b) In personam

A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforcepersonal rights and obligations brought against the

person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person.

Its purpose is to impose some responsibility

or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.

In an action in personam, no one other than the

defendant is sought to be held liable.

Examples

Action for sum of money

Action for damages

(c) Quasi in remAn action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is

named as defendant and the purpose of the

proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the

obligation or lien burdening the property.

Such action deals with the status, ownership

or liability of a particular property, but which are

intended to operate on these questions only as

between the particular parties to the proceedings,

and not to ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests

of all possible claimants.

NOTE: These rules are inapplicable in the following

cases:

(1) Election cases;

(2) Land registration;

(3) Cadastral;

(4) Naturalization;

(5) Insolvency proceedings;

(6) Other cases not herein provided for, except

by analogy or in a suppletory character, and

whenever practicable and convenient.

(Sec. 4, Rule 1)

COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION (Sec. 5, Rule 1)

A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court,

or

on the date of the filing of the later pleading

if an additional defendant is impleaded

irrespective of whether the motion for its

admission, if necessary, is denied by the

court.

(with respect only to the defendant later

impleaded)

1. Condition precedent

matters which must be complied with before acause of action arises.

When a claim is subject to a condition

precedent, compliance must be alleged in the

pleading.

Failure to comply with a condition precedent

is an independent ground for a motion to

dismiss. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule 16)

Examples:

Tender of payment before consignation

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Prior resort to barangay conciliationproceedings

Earnest efforts towards a compromise

Arbitration proceedings, when contract so

provides

Katarungang Pambarangay (RA 7160)

Purpose: To reduce the number of court litigations

and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice

which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of

cases in the courts.

Only individuals shall be parties to KB

proceedings, no juridical entities. Parties must personally appear in all KB

proceedings and without assistance of

counsel or representatives, exceptfor minors

and incompetents who may be assisted by

their next-of-kin, not lawyers.

Conciliation proceedings required is not a

jurisdictional requirement.

NOTE: Failure to undergo the barangay

conciliation proceedings is non-compliance of

a condition precedent. Hence, a motion to

dismiss a civil complaint may be filed. (Sec. 1

[j], Rule 16). BUT the court may notmotu proprio dismiss

the case for failure to undergo conciliation.


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Initiation of proceedings

(1) Payment of appropriate filing fee

(2) Oral or written complaint to the Punong

Barangay(chairman of the Lupon)

(3) Chairman shall summon respondents to

appear the next working day

(4) Mediation proceedings for 15 days

(5) Should the chairman fail in his mediation

efforts within said period, he shall constitutethe Pangkat Tagapagkasundo,

(6) If no amicable settlement is reached, the

chairman shall issue a certification to file

action.

All amicable settlements shall be

(1) In writing;

(2) In a language or dialect known to the parties;

(3) Signed by them; and

(4) Attested to by the lupon chairman or the

pangkat chairman, as the case may be.

Effect

The amiable settlement and arbitration award shall

have the effect of a final judgment of a court upon

expiration of 10 days from date thereof, unless:

(1) Repudiation of the settlement has been

made, or

(2) Petition to nullify the award has been filed

before the proper city or municipal ourt

Execution shall issue upon expiration of 10 days from

settlement.

LUMBUAN v. RONQUILLO(489 SCRA 650, 2006)

While admittedly no pangkat was

constituted, the parties met at the office of

the Barangay Chairman for possible

settlement. The act of Lumbuan in raising

the matter to the Katarungang

Pambarangay and the subsequent

confrontation of the lessee and lessor

before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat

is sufficient compliance with the

precondition for filing the case in court.

FACTS: Lumbuan (lessor) leased a lot to respondent

Ronquillo (lessee) for 3 years at a rental of

P5000/month. They agreed that: (a) there will be an

annual 10% increase in rent for the next 2 years; and

(b) the leased premises shall be used only for

lessees fastfood business. Ronquillo failed to abide

by the conditions, and refused to pay or vacate the

leased premises despite Lumbuans repeated verbal

demands.

Lumbuan referred the matter to the

Barangay Chairmans Office but no amicable

settlement was reached. The barangay chairman

issued a Certificate to File Action. Lumbuan filed an

action for Unlawful Detainer with MeTC of Manila

which ordered respondent Ronquillo to vacate the

leased premises and to pay P46,000 as unpaid

rentals.

RTC set aside the MeTC decision and directed

the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or

Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to

comply strictly with the condition that should the

parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the

entire case will be remanded to the MeTC for it todecide the case anew.

The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the

dismissal of the ejectment case, ruling that when a

complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the

mandatory mediation and conciliation in the

barangay level had not been complied with, the court

should dismiss the case and not just remand the

records to the court of origin so that the parties may

go through the prerequisite proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the CA properly dismissed complaint

for failure of the parties to comply with themandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in

the barangay level

NO. It should be noted that although no

pangkat was formed since no amicable settlement

was reached by the parties before the Katarungang

Pambarangay, there was substantial compliance with

Section 412(a) of R.A. 7160.

While admittedly nopangkatwas constituted,

the parties met at the office of the Barangay

Chairman for possible settlement. Thereby, the act of

petitioner Lumbuan in raising the matter to the

Katarungang Pambarangay and the subsequent

confrontation of the lessee and lessor before the

Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient

compliance with the precondition for filing the case in

court. This is true notwithstanding the mandate of

Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay

Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his

mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be

construed together with Section 412, as well as the

circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.

On this score, it is significant that the Barangay

Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the

Chairman of the Lupon under the Local Government

Code.

2. Payment of filing fee

Payment of the prescribed docket fee vests a trial

court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or

nature of the action. The court acquires jurisdiction

upon paymentof the correct docket fees.

All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar

pleadings must specify the amount of

damages being prayed for, both in the body

of the pleadings and in the assessment of the

filing fees.

Manchester v. CA: Any defect in the originalpleading resulting in underpayment of the

docket fee cannot be cured by amendment,


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and for all legal purposes, the court acquired

no jurisdiction in such case.

BUT nonpayment of filing fees does not

automatically cause the dismissal of the

case. The fee may be paid within the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary

period.

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)

Non-payment at the time of filing does not

automatically cause the dismissal of the

case, as long as the fee is paid within the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary

period, more so when the party involved

demonstrates a willingness to abide by the

rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when

insufficient filing fees were initially paid by

the plaintiffs and there was no intention to

defraud the government, the Manchester

rule does not apply.

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against

Bertuldo for recovery of ownership of the premises

leased by the latter. Bertuldo alleged ownership of

the property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during

the direct examination. Atty. Petalcorin replaced the

original counsel and filed a motion to expunge the

complaint from the record and nullify all court

proceedings on the ground that private respondents

failed to specify in the complaint the amount of

damages claimed as needed to pay the correct

docket fees, and that under Manchester doctrine,

non-payment of the correct docket fee is

jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the nonpayment of the correct

docket fee is jurisdictional in the present case

NO. While the payment of the prescribed

docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its

non-payment at the time of filing does not

automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long

as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive orreglementary period, more so when the party

involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the

rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when

insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the

plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the

government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE v. ASUNCION(170 SCRA 274, 1989)

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is

not accompanied by payment of the docket

fee, the court may allow payment of the fee

within a reasonable time but in no case

beyond the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period. Where the trial court

acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the

filing of the pleading and payment of

prescribed filing fees but the judgment

awards a claim not specified in the

pleading, or if specified the same has been

left for the courts determination, the

additional filing fee shall constitute a lien

on the judgment. It shall be the

responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his

FACTS

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint

against Uy for the consignation of a premium refund

on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for thejudicial declaration of its nullity. Uy was declared in

default for failure to file the required answer within

the reglementary period. Uy filed a complaint in the

RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a

writ of preliminary attachment initially against

petitioner SIOL, but thereafter included Philipps and

Warby as additional defendants. The complaint

sought the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,

exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,

expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although

the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the

amount of damages sought said amount may be

inferred from the body of the complaint to be about

P50,000,000.

Uy paid only P210.00 as docket fee, which

prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection

for under-assessment of docket fees.

Petitioners allege that while Uy had paid

P182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering that the

total amount sought in the amended and

supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70, the

docket fee that should be paid by private respondent

is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the

same, petitioners contend that the complaint should

be dismissed and all incidents arising therefromshould be annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction

over case when the correct and proper docket fee

has not yet been paid

YES. Where the filing of the initiatory

pleading is not accompanied by payment of the

docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee

within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a

claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading andpayment of the prescribed filing fee but,

subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not

specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has


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been left for determination by the court, the

additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien

on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the

Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to

enforce said lien and assess and collect the

additional fee.

The same rule applies to permissive

counterclaims, third party claims and similar

pleadings, which shall not be considered filed untiland unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid.

CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)

Cause of Action

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a

party violates the rights of another. (Sec. 2, Rule 2)

Every ordinary civil action must be based on

a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2)

Elements:(1) A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(2) A correlative obligation on the part of the

named defendant to respect or to not violate

such right; and

(3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in

violation of the right of the plaintiff, or

constituting a breach of the obligation of the

defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter

may maintain an action for recovery of

damages or other appropriate relief.

Distinguished from right of actionCause of action is the reason for bringing an action,

the formal statement of operative facts giving rise to

a remedial right, and is governed by procedural law.

A right of action is the remedy for bringing an action

and is solely dependent on substantive law.

Right of action, elements

(1) There must be a good cause;

(2) A compliance with all the conditions

precedent to the bringing of the action; and

(3) The action must be instituted by the proper

party.

Splitting a cause of action

Splitting of cause of action is the act of dividing a

single or indivisible cause of action into several parts

or claims and bringing several actions thereon.

A party may notinstitute more than one suit

for a single cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 2)

If two or more suits are instituted on the

basis of the same cause of action, the filing

of one or a judgment upon the merits in any

one is available as a ground for the dismissal

of the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 2)

Applies also to counterclaims and cross-claims.

Examples

Single cause of action (Cannot be filed separately)

A suit for the recovery of land and a separate

suit to recover the fruits

Action to recover damages to person and

action for damages to same persons car

Action for recovery of taxes and action to

demand surcharges resulting from

delinquency in payment of said taxes

Action to collect debt and to foreclose

mortgage

Action for partition and action for the

recovery of compensation on the

improvements

Action for annulment of sale and action to

recover dividends

Distinct causes of action(separate filing allowed)

Action for reconveyance of title over property

and action for forcible entry or unlawful

detainer

Action for damages to a car in a vehicular

accident, and another action for damages for

injuries to a passenger other than the owner

of the car

Action to collect loan and action for rescission

of mortgage

Action based on breach of contract of

carriage and action based on quasi-delict

JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA(170 SCRA 540, 1989)

Where there is only one delict or wrong,

there is but a single cause of action

regardless of the number of rights that may

have been violated belonging to one person.

Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted

from several wrongful acts, only one cause

FACTS: Joseph, petitioner, boarded Perezs cargotruck with a load of livestock. At the highway, the

truck driver overtook a tricycle but hit a mango tree

when a pick-up truck tried to overtake him at the

same time. This resulted to the bone fracture of the

petitioners leg.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages

against Perez, as owner, based on a breach of

contract of carriage, and against Sioson and

Villanueva, the owner and driver of the pick-up truck,

based on quasi-delict. Petitioner impleaded

Pagarigan and Vargas, since he could not ascertain

who the real owners of the pick-up truck and the

cargo truck were. Perez filed a cross-claim against

the other respondents for indemnity, in the event

that she is ordered to pay.


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The other respondents paid petitioner's claim

for injuries, so they were released from liability. They

also paid Perez for her claim of damages. They

thereafter filed a Motion to Exonerate and Exclude

themselves since theyve already paid Joseph by way

of amicable settlement and Perezs claim for

damages. Perez filed an Opposition to the motion

since the release of claim executed by petitioner in

favor of the other respondents allegedly inured to hisbenefit. RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment on the compromise

agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-

delict is a bar to the cause of action for breach of

contract of carriage

YES. A single act or omission can be violative

of various rights at the same time, as when the act

constitutes a juridical a violation of several separate

and distinct legal obligations. However, where there

is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single

cause of action regardless of the number of rightsthat may have been violated belonging to one

person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from

several wrongful acts, only one cause of action

arises.

There is no question that petitioner sustained

a single injury on his person, which vested in him a

single cause of action, albeit with the correlative

rights of action against the different respondents

through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.

Only one cause of action was involved although the

bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the

defendants therein were not necessarily identical

since the respondents were not identically

circumstanced.

DEL ROSARIO v. FEBTC(537 SCRA 571, 2007)

It is well established, however, that a party

cannot, by varying the form of action or

adopting a different method of presenting

his case, or by pleading justifiable

circumstances as herein petitioners are

doing, escape the operation of the principle

that one and the same cause of action shall

not be twice litigated.

FACTS: PDCP extended a P4.4 million loan to

DATICOR, which that DATICOR shall pay: a service

fee of 1% per annum (later increased 6% per annum)

on the outstanding balance; 12% per annum interest;

and penalty charges 2% per month in case of default.

The loans were secured by real estate mortgages

over six (6) parcels of land and chattel mortgages

over machinery and equipment.

DATICOR paid a total of P3 million to PDCP,

which the latter applied to interest, service fees and

penalty charges. This left them with an outstanding

balance of P10 million according to PDCPs

computation.

DATICOR filed a complaint against PDCP for

violation of the Usury Law and annulment of contract

and damages. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The

IAC set aside the dismissal and declared void and of

no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan

agreement. PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to SC.In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its

receivables from DATICOR to FEBTC for of P5.4 M.

FEBTC and DATICOR, in a MOA, agreed to P 6.4

million as full settlement of the receivables.

SC affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC,

nullifying the stipulation of interests. DATICOR thus

filed a Complaint for sum of money against PDCP and

FEBTC to recover the excess payment which they

computed to be P5.3 million. RTC ordered PDCP to

pay petitioners P4.035 million, to bear interest at

12% per annum until fully paid; to release or cancel

the mortgages and to return the corresponding titlesto petitioners; and to pay the costs of the suit.

RTC dismissed the complaint against FEBTC

for lack of cause of action since the MOA between

petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to SC decision,

FEBTC not being a party thereto.

Petitioners and PDCP appealed to the CA,

which held that petitioners' outstanding obligation

(determined to be only P1.4 million) could not be

increased or decreased by any act of the creditor

PDCP, and held that when PDCP assigned its

receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR

was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,

irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC

might have provided in the Deed of Assignment,

DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not

bound by its terms.

By the principle ofsolutio indebiti, the CA

held that FEBTC was bound to refund DATICOR the

excess payment of P5 million it received; and that

FEBTC could recover from PDCP the P4.035 million

for the overpayment for the assigned receivables.

But since DATICOR claimed in its complaint only

of P965,000 from FEBTC, the latter was ordered to

pay them only that amount.

Petitioners filed before the RTC anotherComplaint against FEBTC to recover the balance of

the excess payment of P4.335 million.

The trial court dismissed petitioners'

complaint on the ground ofres judicata and splitting

of cause of action. It recalled that petitioners had

filed an action to recover the alleged overpayment

both from PDCP and FEBTC and that the CA Decision,

ordering PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages

and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest became

final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether FEBTC can be held liable for thebalance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus

interest which petitioners previously claimed against

PDCP in a previously decided case


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NO. A cause of action is the delict or the

wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant

in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. In the

two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same

alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and

refusing to return an amount in excess of what was

due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same

facts and evidence presented in the first case were

the very same facts and evidence that petitionerspresented in the second case.

A party cannot, by varying the form of action

or adopting a different method of presenting his

case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as

herein petitioners are doing, escape the operation of

the principle that one and the same cause of action

shall not be twice litigated.

SC held that to allow the re-litigation of an

issue that was finally settled as between petitioners

and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of

a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under

Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.This rule proscribes a party from dividing a

single or indivisible cause of action into several parts

or claims and instituting two or more actions based

on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds

for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first

action every ground for relief which he claims to exist

and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to

rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to

recover for the same wrong or injury.

Both the rules on res judicata and splitting of

causes of action are based on the salutary public

policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits

interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Re-litigation of

matters already settled by a court's final judgment

merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers,

creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes

valuable time and energy that could be devoted to

worthier cases.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. CA(301 SCRA 367, 1991)

When a single delict or wrong is committed

like the unlawful taking or detention of

the property of another there is but one

single cause of action regardless of the

number of rights that may have been

violated, and all such rights should be

alleged in a single complaint as constituting

one single cause of action. In a forcible

entry case, the real issue is the physical

possession of the real property. The

question of damages is merely secondary or

incidental, so much so that the amount

thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of

the court. In other words, the unlawful act of

a deforciant in taking possession of a piece

of land by means of force and intimidation

against the rights of the party actually in

possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a

cause of action that gives rise to two (2)

remedies, namely, the recovery of

possession and recovery of damages arisingfrom the loss of possession, but only to

one action. For obvious reasons, both

remedies cannot be the subject of two

(2) separate and independent actions,

FACTS: PDC leased to Westin a parcel of land with a

commercial building for 9 years and 3 months, with a

monthly rental of approximately P600,000. Westin

failed to pay rentals despite several demands. The

arrearages amounted to P8,6M. PDC repossessed the

leased premises, inventoried the movable propertiesfound within and owned by Westin, and scheduled a

public auction for the sale of the movables, with

notice to Westin.

Westin filed a forcible entry case with the

MeTC against PDC for with damages and a prayer for

a temporary restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction. A TRO enjoined PDC from

selling Westin's properties.

At the continuation of the hearing, the parties

agreed, among others, that Westin would deposit

with the PCIB (Bank) P8M to guarantee payment of its

back rentals. Westin did not comply with its

undertaking, and instead, with the forcible entry case

still pending, Westin instituted another action for

damages against PDC with the RTC.

The forcible entry case had as its cause of

action the alleged unlawful entry by PDC into the

leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs arose:

(a) the restoration by PDC of possession of the leased

premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual

damages due to losses suffered by Westin; and, (c)

the claim for attorneys fees and cost of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for

damages prays for a monetary award consisting of

moral and exemplary damages; actual damages andcompensatory damages representing unrealized

profits; and, attorney's fees and costs, all based on


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the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises

by PDC.

PDC filed a motion to dismiss the damage

suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum

shopping. The RTC, instead of ruling on the motion,

archived the case pending the outcome of the

forcible entry case.

Westin filed with the RTC an amended

complaint for damages, which was granted. It alsofiled an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a

TRO and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary

Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,

which were all granted. PDCs motion to dismiss was

denied.

Thus, PDC filed with the CA a special civil

action for certiorari and prohibition. But the CA

dismissed the petition. It clarified that since the

damages prayed for in the amended complaint with

the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-

handed manner with which PDC reacquired

possession of the leased premises and the sale ofWestin's movables found therein, the RTC and not

the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of

damages.

ISSUE: Whether Westin may institute a separate suit

for damages with the RTC after having instituted an

action for forcible entry with damages with the MeTC

NO. Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

provides that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful

detainer shall be filed before the MTC which shall

include not only the plea for restoration of possession

but also all claims for damages and costs arising

therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for

damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful

detainer may be filed separately and independently

of the claim for restoration of possession.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules

of Court, as amended, a party may not institute more

than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec.

4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are

instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,

the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any

one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the

other or others.

Westin's cause of action in the forcible entrycase and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal

retaking of possession of the leased premises by PDC

from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the

restoration of possession and demand for actual

damages in the case before the MeTC and the

demand for damages with the RTC both arise from

the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by

PDC into the least premises. The other claims for

moral and exemplary damages cannot succeed

considering that these sprung from the main incident

being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence says that

when a single delict or wrong is committed like theunlawful taking or detention of the property of the

another there is but one single cause of action

regardless of the number of rights that may have

been violated, and all such rights should be alleged

in a single complaint as constituting one single cause

of action. In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the

physical possession of the real property. The

question of damages is merely secondary or

incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does

not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words,

the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession

of a piece of land by means of force and intimidationagainst the rights of the party actually in possession

thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that

gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery

of possession and recovery of damages arising from

the loss of possession, but only to one action. For

obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the

subject of two (2) separate and independent actions,

one for recovery of possession only, and the other,

for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably

lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause

of action.

What then is the effect of the dismissal of theother action? Since the rule is that all such rights

should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes

without saying that those not therein included cannot

be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are

barred forever. If a suit is brought for a part of a

claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes

the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the

residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second

form of action is not identical with the first or

different grounds for relief are set for the second suit.

This principle not only embraces what was actually

determined, but also extends to every matter which

the parties might have litigated in the case. This is

why the legal basis upon which Westin anchored its

second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation

to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, not otherwise raised

and cited by Westin in the forcible entry case, cannot

be used as justification for the second suit for

damages.

CGR CORP. V. TREYES(522 SCRA 765, 2007)

Petitioners filing of an independent action

for damages grounded on the alleged

destruction of CGRs property, other than

those sustained as a result of dispossession

in the Forcible Entry case could not be

considered as splitting of a cause of action.

FACTS: CGR Corporation, Herman Benedicto and

Alberto Benedicto, petitioners, claim to have

occupied 37 ha. of public land in Negros Occidental,

pursuant to a lease agreement granted to them by

the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of 25 years

(to last October 2000 to December 2024). On

November 2000, however, respondent Treyes

allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased

premises and barricaded the entrance to the


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fishponds of the petitioners. Treyes and his men also

harvested tons of milkfish and fingerlings from the

petitioners ponds.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for Forcible

Entrywith the MTC. Another complaint to claim for

damages was also filed by the petitioners against the

same respondent Treyes grounded on the allegations

that Treyes and his men also destroyed and

ransacked the Chapel built by petitioner CGRCorporation and decapitated the heads of the

religious figures.

ISSUE: Whether during the pendency of a separate

complaint for Forcible Entry, the petitioner can

independently institute and maintain an action for

damages which they claim arose from incidents

occurring after the forcible entry of Treyes and his

men

YES. The only recoverable damages in the

forcible entry and detainer cases instituted first by

the petitioners with the MTC are the rents or fairrental value of the property from the time of

dispossession by the respondent. Hence, other

damages being claimed by the petitioners must be

claimed in another ordinary civil action.

It is noteworthy that the second action

instituted by the petitioners (complaint for damages)

have NO direct relation to their loss of possession of

the leased premises which is the main issue in the

first action they instituted. The second action for

claim of damages had to do with the harvesting and

carting away of milkfish and other marine products,

as well as the ransacking of the chapel built by CGR

Corp. Clearly, the institution of the two cases is not a

splitting of a cause of action, since both are

concerned with entirely different issues.

ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS(7 SCRA 265, 1963)

An examination of the first complaint filed

against appellant in CFI showed that it was

based on appellants' having unlawfully

stopped payment of the check for

P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of

appellees; while the complaint in the

second and present action was for non-

payment of the balance of P96,000.00

guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for

P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt

not covered by the security. The two

causes of action being different, section 4

of Rule 2 does not apply.

FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the Dizon spouses sold

to Socorro Ramos 11 parcels of land for P101,000.

Ramos paid P5,000 downpayment, P2,500 in cash,

and with a P2,500.00 check drawn against PNB, and

agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within 90

days. To secure the said balance, Ramos, in the same

deed of sale, mortgaged the 11 parcels in favor of

the vendors. Ramos mortgaged a lot on Malinta

Estate as additional security, as attorney-in-fact of

her four children and as judicial guardian of her

minor child.

Ramos failed to comply with the conditions of

the mortgage, so an action for foreclosure was filed

by the vendors-mortgagees. Ramos moved to

dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously hadfiled action against her in the CFI of Manila for the

recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the

down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands;

that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage

debt was already accrued and demandable; that

plaintiffs were guilty of splitting a single cause of

action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of

Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a

defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the

second suit.

CFI of Quezon City denied the motion to

dismiss. Defendant Ramos re-pleaded the avermentsas a special defense in her answer. The CFI ruled

against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay

P96,000.00, with 12% interest, attorney's fees, and

the costs of the suit; and further decreed the

foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case

of non-payment within 90 days. Ramos appealed

directly to SC,

ISSUE: Whether there was splitting of cause of action

NO, there is no splitting of cause of action in

this case. An examination of the first complaint filed

against appellant in CFI showed that it was based on

appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the

check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of

appellees, while the complaint in the second and

present action was for non-payment of the balance of

P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim

for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not

covered by the security. The two causes of action

being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

Remedy against splitting a single cause of

action

(a) Motion to dismiss (Sec 1 [e] or [f], Rule 16)Within the time for but before filing theanswer to the complaint or pleading

asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be

made on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(e) That there is another action pending

between the same parties for the same

cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a

prior judgment or by the statute of limitations

xxx

(b) Answer alleging affirmative defense (Sec. 6,

Rule 16)


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Ifno motion to dismiss has been filed, any of

the grounds for dismissal provided for in this

Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative

defense in the answer and, in the discretion

of the court, a preliminary hearing may be

had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had

been filed.

NOTE: As to which action should be dismissed (thefirst or second one) would depend upon judicial

discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the

case.

Joinder of causes of action

Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as many

causes of action as a party may have against another

in one pleading. It is the process of uniting two or

more demands or rights of action in one action. This is merely permissive, NOT compulsory,

because of the use of the word may in Sec.

5, Rule 2.

It is subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall

comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

i. The right to relief should arise out of

the same transaction or series of

transaction, and

ii. There exists a common question of

law or fact. (Sec. 6, Rule 3)

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil

actions or actions governed by special rules;

Example: An action for claim of

money cannot be joined with an

action for ejectment, or with an

action for foreclosure.

(c) Where the causes of action are between the

same parties but pertain to different venues

or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in

the RTC provided

i. one of the causes of action falls

within the jurisdiction of said court,

and

ii. the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action

are principally for recovery of money, the

aggregate amount claimed shall be the test

of jurisdiction. (Sec. 5, Rule 2)

Misjoinder of causes of action

Misjoinder of causes of action is NOT a ground for

dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action

may be severed and proceeded with separately:

(a) on motion of a party, or

(b) on the initiative of the court. (Sec. 6, Rule 2)

FLORES v. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS

(144 SCRA 277, 1986)

Application of the Totality Rule under Sect.

33(l) BP129 and Sect. 11 of the Interim

Rules is subject to the requirements for the

Permissive Joinder of Parties under Sec. 6

of Rule 3.

In cases of permissive joinder of

parties, the total of all the claims shall be

the first jurisdictional test. If instead of a

joinder, separate actions are filed by or

FACTS: Binongcal and Calion, in separate

transactions, purchased truck tires on credit from

Flores. The two allegedly refused to pay their debts,

so Flores filed a complaint where the first cause of

action was against Binongcal for P11, 643, and the

second was against Calion for P10, 212. Binongcal

filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction since under Sec. 19(8) of BP129 RTC shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount

of the demand is more than P20, 000, and that the

claim against him is less than that amount. He

averred further that although Calion was also

indebted to Flores, his obligation was separate and

distinct from the other, so the aggregate of the

claims cannot be the basis of jurisdiction. Calion

joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint

during the hearing of the motion. Petitioner opposed

the Motion to Dismiss. RTC dismissed the complaint

for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case

following the Totality Rule

YES. The Totality Rule (under Sec. 33 of

BP129 and Sec. 11 of the Interim Rules) applies not

only to cases where two or more plaintiffs having

separate causes of action against a defendant join in

a single complaint, but also to cases where a plaintiff

has separate causes of action against two or more

defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the

said causes of action should arise out of the same

transaction or series of transactions and there should

be a common question of law or fact, as provided inSec. 6 of Rule 3.

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, the

total of all the claims shall be the first jurisdictional

test. If instead of joining or being joined in one

complaint, separate actions are filed by or against

the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint

shall be the second jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly

held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the Rules

on Joinder of Parties pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 2 and

Sec. 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, after

a careful scrutiny of the complaint, It appears thatthere is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the

claims against Binongcal and Calion are separate and


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distinct and neither of which falls within its

jurisdiction.

UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC. v. CRUZ(529 SCRA 664, 2007)

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a

contract restricts or confines parties

thereto when the suit relates to breach of

said contract. But where the exclusivity

clause does not make it necessarily

encompassing, such that even those not

related to the enforcement of the contract

should be subject to the exclusive venue,

the stipulation designating exclusive

FACTS: Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI) granted Cruz, a

5yr. franchise to adopt and use the "Uniwide Family

Store System" for the establishment and operation of

a "Uniwide Family Store" in Marikina. The agreementobliged Cruz to pay UHI a P50,000 monthly service

fee or 3% of gross monthly purchases, whichever is

higher, payable within 5 days after the end of each

month without need of formal billing or demand from

UHI. In case of any delay in the payment of the

monthly service fee, Cruz would be liable to pay an

interest charge of 3% per month.

It appears that Cruz had purchased goods

from UHIs affiliated companies FPC and USWCI. FPC

and USWCI assigned all their rights and interests

over Cruzs accounts to UHI. Cruz had outstanding

obligations with UHI, FPC, and USWCI in the total

amount of P1,358,531.89, which remained unsettled

despite the demands made.

Thus UHI filed a complaint for collection of

sum of money before RTC of Paraaque Cruz on the

following causes of action: (1) P1,327,669.832 in

actual damages for failure to pay the monthly

service fee; (2) P64,165.96 of actual damages for

failure to pay receivables assigned by FPC to UHI; (3)

P1,579,061.36 of actual damages for failure to pay

the receivables assigned by USWCI to UHI; (4)

P250,000.00 of attorneys fees.

Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

of improper venue, invoking Article 27.5 of theagreement which reads:

27.5 Venue Stipulation The Franchisee

consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of

Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving any other

venue.

Paraaque RTC granted Cruzs motion to

dismiss. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether a case based on several causes of

action is dismissible on the ground of improper

venue where only one of the causes of action arises

from a contract with exclusive venue stipulationNO. The general rule on venue of personal

actions provides actions may be commenced and

tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal

plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of

the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a

nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at

the election of the plaintiff. The parties may also

validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue. The

forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue

of an action does not, however, preclude parties from

bringing a case to other venues.

Where there is a joinder of causes of actionbetween the same parties and one action does not

arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue

was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at

bar, may be brought before other venues provided

that such other cause of action falls within the

jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.

Based on the allegations in petitioners

complaint, the second and third causes of action are

based on the deeds of assignment executed in its

favor by FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no

exclusive venue stipulation with respect to the

causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general ruleon venue applies that the complaint may be filed in

the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

It bears emphasis that the causes of action

on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach

of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are

based on separate, distinct and independent

contractsdeeds of assignment in which UHI is the

assignee of Cruzs obligations to the assignors FPC

and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds

of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive

venue stipulation embodied in the agreement.

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a

contract restricts or confines parties thereto when

the suit relates to breach of said contract. But where

the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily

encompassing, such that even those not related to

the enforcement of the contract should be subject to

the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating

exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the

specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the

basic principles of freedom to contract might work to

the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who

ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.

What is the totality rule?Where the claims in all the causes of action are

principally for recovery of money, the aggregate

amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Sec.

5, Rule 2)

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3)

Parties (Sec. 1, Rule 3)

(1) Plaintiff

The plaintiff is the claiming party or the originalclaiming party and is the one who files the

complaint.


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It may also apply to a defendant who files

a counterclaim, a cross-claim or a third

party complaint.

(2) Defendant

The defendant refers to the original defending

party, and also the defendant in a counterclaim,

the cross-defendant, or the third party defendant.

If a counterclaim is filed against the

original plaintiff, the latter becomes the

defendant.

Who may be parties? (Sec. 1, Rule 3)

(1) Natural persons

(2) Juridical persons

(a) The State and its political subdivisions;

(b) Other corporations, institutions and entities

for public interest or purpose, created by law;

and(c) Corporations, partnerships and associations

for private interest r purpose to which the law

grants a juridical personality, separate and

distinct from each shareholder, partner or

member. (Art. 44, Civil Code)

(3) Entities authorized by law, even if they lack

juridical personality

(a) Corporation by estoppel (Sec. 21, Corporation

Code);

(b) Partnership having a capital of P3,000 or

more but fails to comply with the registrationrequirements (Art. 1768, Civil Code);

(c) Estate of a deceased person

(d) A legitimate labor organization (Art. 242 [e],

Labor Code);

(e) The Ramon Catholic Church;

(f) A dissolved corporation may prosecute and

defend in suits which:

a. Occur within 3 years after dissolution;

and

b. Are connected with the settlement

and closure of its affairs (Sec. 122,

Corporation Code)

CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES

Real party-in-interest

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or

the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Unless otherwise authorized by law or these

Rules, every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in

interest. (Sec. 2, Rule 3)

Real interesta present substantial interest

as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent subordinate or

consequential interest. It is material and

direct, as distinguished from a mere

incidental interest.

The owner of the right of violated is the real

party in interest as plaintiff, and the person

responsible for the violation is the real party

in interest as defendant.

Not real party in interest

A person who has not taken part in a

contract

Third party who has not taken part in a

compromise agreement

Mere agent in a contract of sale

Lack of personality to sue

EVANGELISTA v. SANTIAGO(475 SCRA 744)

The term "lack of capacity to sue" refers to

a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such

as on account of minority, insanity,

incompetence, lack of juridical personality

or any other general disqualifications of a

party. "Lack of personality to sue refers to

the fact that the plaintiff is not the real

party- in-interest. The first can be a groundfor a motion to dismiss based on the

ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;

whereas the second can be used as a

ground for a motion to dismiss based on

FACTS: The Subject Property was part of a vast tract

of land called Hacienda Quibiga which was

awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the

Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title.

Don Ismael Favila, claiming to be one of the heirs and

successors-in-interest of Rodriguez, and pursuant toan SPA executed by his mga kapatid, assigned

portions of the property to the petitioners in

exchange for the labor and work they and their

predecessors have done on the property.

Petitioners were informed that Santiago was

planning to evict them; two of them received notices

to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the

property was included in TCTs which originated from

OCT No. 670, and is now in the name of respondent.

Petitioners filed an action for declaration of

nullity of respondents certificates of title on the

basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.

As an affirmative defense, respondent

claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to

file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no

cause of action. He averred that since OCT No. 670


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was genuine and authentic on its face, then the OCT

and all land titles derived therefrom, are

incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against

the petitioners and the whole world.

RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground

that the action filed was in effect an action for

reversion, and therefore should have been initiated

by the OSG, not private individuals. In the end, it

concluded that the petitioners were not the owners ofthe subject property.

CA affirmed the RTC, and likewise dismissed

the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents action is properly

based on petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue

NO. The term "lack of capacity to sue"

should not be confused with the term "lack of

personality to sue." The former refers to a plaintiff's

general disability to sue, such as on account of

minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical

personality or any other general disqualifications of aparty, while the latter refers to the fact that the

plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. The first can

be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the

ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the

second can be used as a ground for a motion to

dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the

face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In

the present case, this Court may assume that the

respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the

Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial

court stated no cause of action because the

petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being

the real party-in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint stated no cause of

action since petitioners had no personality to sue

YES. Petitioners had no personality to file the

said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and

their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a

cause of action.

The action is really one for the removal of a

cloud on or quieting of title and according to Article

477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in such an action

must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in,

the real property which is the subject matter of theaction. Petitioners failed to establish any legal or

equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject

Property so as to justify their right to file an action to

remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

Also, the title to and possession of the

Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-

interest could be traced only as far back as the

Spanish title of Rodriguez. Petitioners, having

acquired portions of the Subject Property by

assignment, could acquire no better title to the said

portions than their predecessors-in-interest.

Standing to sue

DOMINGO v. CARAGUE

(456 SCRA 744, 2005)

Judicial power is the power to hear and

decide cases pending between parties who

have the right to sue in courts of law and

equity. Corollary to this dictum is the

principle of locus standi of a litigant. He

who is directly affected and whose interest

is immediate and substantial has the

standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a

personal stake in the outcome of the case

or an injury to himself that can be

redressed by a favorable decision in order

to warrant an invocation of the courts

jurisdiction and justify the exercise of

judicial power on his behalf.

FACTS: Petitioners Domingo, Gangan and Banaria are

retired Chairmen, while Ursal and Cruz are retired

Commissioners of COA (Commission on Audit) and

the other petitioners are incumbent officers or

employees of COA. All claim to maintain a deep-

seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,

especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as

concerned taxpayers.

These petitioners claim that they were

divested of their designations/ranks upon

implementation of the COA Organizational

Restructuring Plan without just cause and without

due process, in violation of Civil Service Law.

Moreover, they were deprived of their respective

Representation and Transportation Allowances

(RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.

Petitioners now invoke this Courts judicialpower to strike down the COA Organizational

Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or

illegal.

Petitioners invoke Chavez v. Public Estates

Authority, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air

Terminals Co., Inc. and Information Technology

Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on

Elections where the court ruled that where the

subject matter of a case is a matter of public concern

and imbued with public interest, then this fact alone

gives them legal standing to institute the instant

petition. Petitioners contend that the COAOrganizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere

reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA,

which will have an impact upon the rest of the

government bodies subject to its audit supervision,

thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental

importance. Consequently, petitioners legal standing

should be recognized and upheld.

The respondents, through the OSG assail

the standing of the petitioners to file the present

case. Among others, they allege that the petitioners:

(1) have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome

of the case or an actual or potential injury that can

be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court, (2)

failed to show any "present substantial interest" in

teh outcome of the case, nor (3) may the petitioenrs


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claim that as taxpayers they have legal standing

because nowhere in the petition do they claim that

public funds are spent in violation of law.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have standing to sue

NO. The Petitioners have not shown any

direct and personal interest in the COA

Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no

indication that they have sustained or are inimminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as

a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted

that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor

impute any improper or improvident act against the

respondents and are not motivated by any desire

to seek affirmative relief from COA or from

respondents that would redound to their personal

benefit or gain. Clearly, they do not have any legal

standing to file the instant suit.

Judicial power is the power to hear and

decide cases pending between parti

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