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CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER
BASIC PRINCIPLES
Difference between substantive and remedial
law
SUBSTANTIVE LAW REMEDIAL LAW
It creates, defines
and regulates rights
and duties
concerning life,
liberty or property,
which when violated
gives rise to a cause
of action.
It prescribes the
methods of
enforcing those
rights and
obligations created
by substantive law
by providing a
procedural system
for obtaining
redress for the
invasion of rights
and violations of
duties and by
prescribing rules as
to how suits are
filed, tried and
decided upon by the
courts.
Civil actions, criminal actions, and special
proceedings
(1) Civil actions
It is one by which a party sues another forthe protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. Its primary purpose is
compensatory. Civil actions may be:
(a) Ordinary, or
(b) Special.
Both are governed by rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for special civil actions.
(2) Criminal actions
It is one by which the State prosecutes a
person for an act or omission punishable by
law. Its primary purpose is punishment.(3) Special proceedings
It is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
GENERAL PROVISIONS (Rule 1)
Rule-making power of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to
promulgate rules concerning:
(1) Pleading,
(2) Practice, and(3) Procedure.
Three (3) limitations on the SCs rule-making power:
(1) The rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases;
(2) shall be uniform for courts of the same
grade; and
(3) shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
Article 6, Sec. 30, ConstitutionNo law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Procedural and substantive rules
Substantive law creates, defines, regulates, and
extinguishes rights and obligations, while remedial or
procedural law provides the procedure for the
enforcement of rights and obligations.
Force and effect of Rules of Court
TheRules of Court have the force and effect of law,unless they happen to be inconsistent with positive
law.
Power of Supreme Court to suspendthe Rulesof Court
Whenever demanded by justice, the Supreme Court
has the inherent powerto
(a) suspend its own rules or
(b) exempt a particular case from the operation
of said rules.
May parties change the rules of procedure?
General rule: They may not. This is because these
are matters of public interest.
Exceptions:
Matters of procedure which may be
Agreed upon by the parties Venue may be
changed by written agreement of the parties
(Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])
Waived Venue may be waived if not
objected to in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer. (Rule 16, Sec. 6); judgment in default
may be waived by failure to answer within 15
days.
Fall within the discretion of the court The
period to plead may be extended on motion
of a party. (Rule 11, Sec. 11); rules of
procedure may be relaxed in the interest of
justice.
JURISDICTION
It is the power and authority of a court to hear, try
and decided a case.
1. Generally
The statute in force at the time of thecommencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.
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Before looking into other matters, it is the
duty of the court to consider the question of
jurisdiction withoutwaiting for it to be raised.
If court has jurisdiction, such must be
exercised. Otherwise, it may be
enforced by a mandamus
proceeding.
If court has no jurisdiction, the court
shall dismiss the claim and can do so
motu proprio.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The courts will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.
Doctrine of continuing jurisdiction
Once jurisdiction has attached to a court, it
retains that jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case. Hence, it is not lost by
The passage of new laws transferring
the jurisdiction to another tribunal
except when expressly provided by
the statute;
Subsequent filing of a notice of
appeal;
The mere fact that a party who is a
public official ceased to be in office;
or
Finality of judgment (the court still
has jurisdiction to enforce and
execute it)
Elements of a valid exercise of jurisdiction
(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the case;
(2) the parties;
(3) the res if jurisdiction over the defendant
cannot be acquired;
(4) the issue of the case; and
(5) Payment of docket fees.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is a matter of
substantive law.
Jurisdiction over the parties, the res and the
issues are matters of procedure. Jurisdiction over the
parties and the res are covered by the rule onsummons, while jurisdiction over the issues is
subsumed under the rule on pleadings.
(a) As to subject matter
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
the Constitution or by law.
Therefore, jurisdiction over the subject
matter cannotbe conferred by
(1) Administrative policy of any court;
(2) Courts unilateral assumption of jurisdiction;
(3) Erroneous belief by the court that it hasjurisdiction;
(4) By contract or by the parties;
(5) By agreement, or by any act or omission of
the parties, nor by acquiescence of the court;
or
(6) By the parties silence, acquiescence or
consent
General Rule: It is determined by the material
allegations of the initiatory pleading (e.g., the
complaint), not the answer of the defendant.Once acquired, jurisdiction is not lost because of
the defendants contrary allegation.
Exception: In ejectment cases, where tenancy is
averred by way of defense and is proved to be
the real issue, the case should be dismissed for
not being properly filed with the DARAB.
It is determined by the cause of action alleged,
not by the amount substantiated and awarded.
Example: If a complaint alleges a recoverable
amount of P1M, RTC has jurisdiction even if
evidence proves the only P300k may berecovered.
Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter CANNOT be
waived, enlarged or diminished by stipulation of the
parties.
(b) As to res or property
Jurisdiction over the res refers to the courts
jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is
the subject of the action.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by(1) Custodia legisplacing the property or thing
under the courts custody (e.g., attachment)
(2) Statutory authoritystatute conferring the
court with power to deal with the property or
thing within its territorial jurisdiction
(3) Summons by publication or other modes of
extraterritorial service (Rule 14, Sec. 15)
(c) As to the issues
Issue a disputed point or question to which parties
to an action have narrowed down their several
allegations and upon which they are desirous of
obtaining a decision. Thus, where there is no
disputed point, there is no issue.
Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred or
determined by
(1) Examination of the pleadings
Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is
determined by the pleadings of the parties.
(2) Pre-trial
It may be conferred by stipulation of the
parties in the pre-trial, as when they enter
into stipulations of facts and documents orenter into an agreement simplifying the
issues of the case (Rule 18, Sec. 2)
(3) Waiver
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Failure to object to presentation of evidence
on a matter notraised in the pleadings. Said
issues tried shall be treated as if they had
been raised in the pleadings.
(d) As to the parties
The court acquires jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffwhen he files his complaint
Defendant
i. Valid service of summons upon him, or
ii. Voluntary appearance:
The defendants voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (Rule 14, Sec. 20)
Examples:
When defendant files
The necessary pleading;
A motion for reconsideration;
Petition to set aside judgment o f
default;
An answer;
Petition for certiorari without
questioning the courts jurisdiction
over his person; or
When the parties jointly submit acompromise agreement for approval
BUT the filing of an answer should notbe
treated automatically as a voluntary
appearance when such answer is
precisely to object to the courts
jurisdiction over the defendants person.
La Naval v. CA: A defendant should be
allowed to put up his own defenses
alternatively or hypothetically. It should
not be the invocation of availableadditional defenses that should be
construed as a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person, but
the failure to raise the defense.
Note: Jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
cannotbe acquired if the action is in personam.
2. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)
Since the deceased defendant participated
in all stages of the case before the trial
court, he is estopped from denying the
jurisdiction of the court. The petitioners
merely stepped into the shoes of their
predecessor and are effectively barred by
estoppel from challenging RTCs
jurisdiction.
FACTS: Bertuldo Hinog allegedly occupied and built a
small house on a portion of a property owned by
respondents Balane for 10 years at a nominal annual
rental. After 10 years, Bertuldo refused to heed
demands made by respondents to return said portion
and to remove the house constructed thereon.
Respondents filed a complaint against him. Bertuldo
filed his Answer, alleging ownership of the disputed
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during
the direct examination. Bertuldos original counsel
was replaced by Atty. Petalcorin who entered his
appearance as new counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo.
Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents
failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket
fees; and that under Manchester doctrine, non-
payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred by
estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC
YES. The petitioners are barred fromquestioning jurisdiction of the trial court. Although
the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from
raising it on the ground of estoppel. After the
deceased Bertuldo participated in all stages of the
case before the trial court, the petitioners merely
stepped into the shoes of their predecessor and are
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging RTCs
jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction at the time of filing of action
PEOPLE v. CAWALING(293 SCRA 267, 1998)
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action.
Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may
not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under
the jurisdiction of another tribunal.Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1) there
is an express provision in the statute, or (2)
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FACTS: Brothers Vicente and Ronie Elisan were
drinking tuba at the kitchenette of one of the
accused, Fontamilla. When they were about to leave,
they were warned by Luz Venus that the six (6)
accused consisting of Mayor Cawaling, four (4)
policemen and a civilian, had been watching and
waiting for them outside the restaurant.
Nevertheless, the two went out and were chased bythe armed men. Vicente successfully ran and hid
behind a coconut tree while Ronie unfortunately went
to the ricefield and was shot to death there.
An Information alleging murder was filed in
the RTC against the 6 accused. RTC convicted them
of murder. On appeal, the appellants questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case, insisting that
the Sandiganbayan was the tribunal with jurisdiction
since the accused were public officers at the time of
the killing.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdictionNO. The jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. Once the court
acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the
case by any subsequent events, such as a new
legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another tribunal. Exceptions to this rule
arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the
statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply
to actions pending before its enactment.
Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD
1861 lists two requisites that must concur before the
Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original
jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to
his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or higher than a fine of P6,000.
Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder
or homicide may be committed both by public
officers and by private citizens, and that public office
is not a constitutive element of said crime. The
relation between the crime and the office
contemplated should be direct and not accidental.
The Information filed against the appellantscontains no allegation that appellants were public
officers who committed the crime in relation to their
office. The charge was only for murder.
In the absence of any allegation that the
offense was committed in relation to the office of
appellants or was necessarily connected with the
discharge of their functions, the regional trial court,
not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case.
REGULAR COURTS (MTC, RTC, CA, SC)
(See San Beda Reviewer)
SPECIAL COURTS (Sandiganbayan)
(See San Beda Reviewer)
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sec. 5.2,
RA 8799)
The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
Pending cases involving intra-corporate
disputes submitted for final resolution whichshould be resolved within one (1) year from
the enactment of this Code, and
Jurisdiction over pending suspension of
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30
June 2000 until finally disposed.
Civil Service Commission
MAGPALE v. CSC (215 SCRA 398, 1992)
Under Section 47 of the Administrative
Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of (d) removal or
dismissal from office.
The MPSB decision did not involve
dismissal or separation from office, rather,
the decision exonerated petitioner and
ordered him reinstated to his former
position. The MSPB decision was not a
proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
FACTS: Magpale, port manager of Philippine Ports
Authority-Port Management Unit (PPA-PMU) of
Tacloban, was found by the Secretary of DOTC guilty
of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure
to account for the 44 units of equipment and (b) for
failing to render the required liquidation of his cash
advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of 4
yrs. He was also found guilty of frequent and
unauthorized absences. He was meted the penalty of
dismissal from the service with the corresponding
accessory penalties.
He appealed to the Merit System and
Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The MSPB reversed the decision.PPA filed an appeal with the Civil Service
Field Office-PPA, which indorsed the appeal to CSC.
Magpale moved for the implementation of the MSPB
decision which was opposed by the PPA. MSPB
ordered the immediate implementation of its
decision, which became final and executory.
Respondent CSC reversed MPSBs decision
and held Magpale guilty.
ISSUE: Whether the law authorized an appeal by the
government from an adverse decision of the MSBP
NO. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,decisions of the MPSB shall be final, except only
those involving dismissal or separation from the
service which may be appealed to the Commission
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While it is true that the CSC does have the
power to hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, the exercise of the power is qualified by and
should be read together with Sec. 49 of Executive
Order 292, which prescribes, among others that (a)
the decision must be appealable.
Under Section 47 of the Administrative Code,
the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrativedisciplinary cases involving the imposition of:
(a) a penalty of suspension for more than 30
days;
(b) fine in an amount exceeding 30 days salary;
(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
(d) removal or dismissal from office.
The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or
separation from office, rather, the decision
exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to
his former position. The MSPB decision was not a
proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, orofficer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law
to hear and decide the case.
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)
SANDOVAL v. CAEBA(190 SCRA 77, 1991)
It is not the ordinary courts but the
National Housing Authority (NHA) whichhas exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of (a) unsound real estate
business practices; (b) claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases
involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lot or
FACTS: Estate Developers and Investors Corporation(Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval
(Sandoval) in the RTC for the collection of unpaid
installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to a
promissory note, plus interest. Sandoval alleges that
he suspended payments thereof because of the
failure of the developer to develop the subdivision
pursuant to their agreement. The RTC ruled in favor
of Estate, and ordered Sandoval to pay. A writ of
execution was issued which thereafter became final
and executory.
Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment
and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that theRTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. A
motion for reconsideration of the writ of execution
was also filed by petitioner. Estate opposed both
motions. RTC denied the motion to vacate for the
reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
court to do so. A new writ of execution was issued.
Sandoval filed a petition alleging that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion since the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject-
matter thereof is vested with the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.
ISSUE: Whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction
over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot
NO. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was
given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
certain cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices:
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and(c) Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman.
The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the
petitioner and private respondent is vested not on
the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and
thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
KINDS OF ACTION
1. As to cause or foundation
The distinction between a real action and a personal
action is important for the purpose of determining
the venue of the action.
(a) Personal
Personal actions are those other than real actions.
(Sec. 2, Rule 4)
Examples
Action for specific performance
Action for damages to real property
Action for declaration of the nullity of
marriage
Action to compel mortgagee to accept
payment of the mortgage debt and release
the mortgage
(b) Real
An action is real when it affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. (Sec. 1, Rule
4)
To be a real action, it is not enough that itdeals with real property. It is important that the
matter in litigation must also involve any of the
following issues:
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(a) Title;
(b) Ownership;
(c) Possession;
(d) Partition;
(e) Foreclosure of mortgage; or
(f) Any interest in real property
Examples
Action to recover possession of real propertyplus damages (damages is merely incidental)
Action to annul or rescind a sale of real
property
2. As to object
The distinctions are important
(a) to determine whether the jurisdiction of the
defendant is required, and
(b) to determine the type of summons to be
employed
(a) In rem
An action is in rem when it is directed against the
whole world. It is for the determination of the state or
condition of a thing.
Examples
Probate proceeding
Cadastral proceeding
(b) In personam
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforcepersonal rights and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person.
Its purpose is to impose some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.
In an action in personam, no one other than the
defendant is sought to be held liable.
Examples
Action for sum of money
Action for damages
(c) Quasi in remAn action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.
Such action deals with the status, ownership
or liability of a particular property, but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as
between the particular parties to the proceedings,
and not to ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests
of all possible claimants.
NOTE: These rules are inapplicable in the following
cases:
(1) Election cases;
(2) Land registration;
(3) Cadastral;
(4) Naturalization;
(5) Insolvency proceedings;
(6) Other cases not herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a suppletory character, and
whenever practicable and convenient.
(Sec. 4, Rule 1)
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION (Sec. 5, Rule 1)
A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court,
or
on the date of the filing of the later pleading
if an additional defendant is impleaded
irrespective of whether the motion for its
admission, if necessary, is denied by the
court.
(with respect only to the defendant later
impleaded)
1. Condition precedent
matters which must be complied with before acause of action arises.
When a claim is subject to a condition
precedent, compliance must be alleged in the
pleading.
Failure to comply with a condition precedent
is an independent ground for a motion to
dismiss. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule 16)
Examples:
Tender of payment before consignation
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Prior resort to barangay conciliationproceedings
Earnest efforts towards a compromise
Arbitration proceedings, when contract so
provides
Katarungang Pambarangay (RA 7160)
Purpose: To reduce the number of court litigations
and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice
which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts.
Only individuals shall be parties to KB
proceedings, no juridical entities. Parties must personally appear in all KB
proceedings and without assistance of
counsel or representatives, exceptfor minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by
their next-of-kin, not lawyers.
Conciliation proceedings required is not a
jurisdictional requirement.
NOTE: Failure to undergo the barangay
conciliation proceedings is non-compliance of
a condition precedent. Hence, a motion to
dismiss a civil complaint may be filed. (Sec. 1
[j], Rule 16). BUT the court may notmotu proprio dismiss
the case for failure to undergo conciliation.
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Initiation of proceedings
(1) Payment of appropriate filing fee
(2) Oral or written complaint to the Punong
Barangay(chairman of the Lupon)
(3) Chairman shall summon respondents to
appear the next working day
(4) Mediation proceedings for 15 days
(5) Should the chairman fail in his mediation
efforts within said period, he shall constitutethe Pangkat Tagapagkasundo,
(6) If no amicable settlement is reached, the
chairman shall issue a certification to file
action.
All amicable settlements shall be
(1) In writing;
(2) In a language or dialect known to the parties;
(3) Signed by them; and
(4) Attested to by the lupon chairman or the
pangkat chairman, as the case may be.
Effect
The amiable settlement and arbitration award shall
have the effect of a final judgment of a court upon
expiration of 10 days from date thereof, unless:
(1) Repudiation of the settlement has been
made, or
(2) Petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal ourt
Execution shall issue upon expiration of 10 days from
settlement.
LUMBUAN v. RONQUILLO(489 SCRA 650, 2006)
While admittedly no pangkat was
constituted, the parties met at the office of
the Barangay Chairman for possible
settlement. The act of Lumbuan in raising
the matter to the Katarungang
Pambarangay and the subsequent
confrontation of the lessee and lessor
before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat
is sufficient compliance with the
precondition for filing the case in court.
FACTS: Lumbuan (lessor) leased a lot to respondent
Ronquillo (lessee) for 3 years at a rental of
P5000/month. They agreed that: (a) there will be an
annual 10% increase in rent for the next 2 years; and
(b) the leased premises shall be used only for
lessees fastfood business. Ronquillo failed to abide
by the conditions, and refused to pay or vacate the
leased premises despite Lumbuans repeated verbal
demands.
Lumbuan referred the matter to the
Barangay Chairmans Office but no amicable
settlement was reached. The barangay chairman
issued a Certificate to File Action. Lumbuan filed an
action for Unlawful Detainer with MeTC of Manila
which ordered respondent Ronquillo to vacate the
leased premises and to pay P46,000 as unpaid
rentals.
RTC set aside the MeTC decision and directed
the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or
Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to
comply strictly with the condition that should the
parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the
entire case will be remanded to the MeTC for it todecide the case anew.
The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the
dismissal of the ejectment case, ruling that when a
complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the
mandatory mediation and conciliation in the
barangay level had not been complied with, the court
should dismiss the case and not just remand the
records to the court of origin so that the parties may
go through the prerequisite proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the CA properly dismissed complaint
for failure of the parties to comply with themandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in
the barangay level
NO. It should be noted that although no
pangkat was formed since no amicable settlement
was reached by the parties before the Katarungang
Pambarangay, there was substantial compliance with
Section 412(a) of R.A. 7160.
While admittedly nopangkatwas constituted,
the parties met at the office of the Barangay
Chairman for possible settlement. Thereby, the act of
petitioner Lumbuan in raising the matter to the
Katarungang Pambarangay and the subsequent
confrontation of the lessee and lessor before the
Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient
compliance with the precondition for filing the case in
court. This is true notwithstanding the mandate of
Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay
Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his
mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be
construed together with Section 412, as well as the
circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.
On this score, it is significant that the Barangay
Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the
Chairman of the Lupon under the Local Government
Code.
2. Payment of filing fee
Payment of the prescribed docket fee vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. The court acquires jurisdiction
upon paymentof the correct docket fees.
All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
pleadings must specify the amount of
damages being prayed for, both in the body
of the pleadings and in the assessment of the
filing fees.
Manchester v. CA: Any defect in the originalpleading resulting in underpayment of the
docket fee cannot be cured by amendment,
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and for all legal purposes, the court acquired
no jurisdiction in such case.
BUT nonpayment of filing fees does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the
case. The fee may be paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)
Non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the
case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by
the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester
rule does not apply.
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against
Bertuldo for recovery of ownership of the premises
leased by the latter. Bertuldo alleged ownership of
the property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during
the direct examination. Atty. Petalcorin replaced the
original counsel and filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents
failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed as needed to pay the correct
docket fees, and that under Manchester doctrine,
non-payment of the correct docket fee is
jurisdictional.
ISSUE: Whether the nonpayment of the correct
docket fee is jurisdictional in the present case
NO. While the payment of the prescribed
docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive orreglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE v. ASUNCION(170 SCRA 274, 1989)
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Where the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the pleading and payment of
prescribed filing fees but the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for the courts determination, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
FACTS
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint
against Uy for the consignation of a premium refund
on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for thejudicial declaration of its nullity. Uy was declared in
default for failure to file the required answer within
the reglementary period. Uy filed a complaint in the
RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment initially against
petitioner SIOL, but thereafter included Philipps and
Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although
the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about
P50,000,000.
Uy paid only P210.00 as docket fee, which
prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection
for under-assessment of docket fees.
Petitioners allege that while Uy had paid
P182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering that the
total amount sought in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70, the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent
is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should
be dismissed and all incidents arising therefromshould be annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction
over case when the correct and proper docket fee
has not yet been paid
YES. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading andpayment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
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been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed untiland unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid.
CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)
Cause of Action
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates the rights of another. (Sec. 2, Rule 2)
Every ordinary civil action must be based on
a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2)
Elements:(1) A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) A correlative obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or to not violate
such right; and
(3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff, or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.
Distinguished from right of actionCause of action is the reason for bringing an action,
the formal statement of operative facts giving rise to
a remedial right, and is governed by procedural law.
A right of action is the remedy for bringing an action
and is solely dependent on substantive law.
Right of action, elements
(1) There must be a good cause;
(2) A compliance with all the conditions
precedent to the bringing of the action; and
(3) The action must be instituted by the proper
party.
Splitting a cause of action
Splitting of cause of action is the act of dividing a
single or indivisible cause of action into several parts
or claims and bringing several actions thereon.
A party may notinstitute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 2)
If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 2)
Applies also to counterclaims and cross-claims.
Examples
Single cause of action (Cannot be filed separately)
A suit for the recovery of land and a separate
suit to recover the fruits
Action to recover damages to person and
action for damages to same persons car
Action for recovery of taxes and action to
demand surcharges resulting from
delinquency in payment of said taxes
Action to collect debt and to foreclose
mortgage
Action for partition and action for the
recovery of compensation on the
improvements
Action for annulment of sale and action to
recover dividends
Distinct causes of action(separate filing allowed)
Action for reconveyance of title over property
and action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer
Action for damages to a car in a vehicular
accident, and another action for damages for
injuries to a passenger other than the owner
of the car
Action to collect loan and action for rescission
of mortgage
Action based on breach of contract of
carriage and action based on quasi-delict
JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA(170 SCRA 540, 1989)
Where there is only one delict or wrong,
there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may
have been violated belonging to one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted
from several wrongful acts, only one cause
FACTS: Joseph, petitioner, boarded Perezs cargotruck with a load of livestock. At the highway, the
truck driver overtook a tricycle but hit a mango tree
when a pick-up truck tried to overtake him at the
same time. This resulted to the bone fracture of the
petitioners leg.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages
against Perez, as owner, based on a breach of
contract of carriage, and against Sioson and
Villanueva, the owner and driver of the pick-up truck,
based on quasi-delict. Petitioner impleaded
Pagarigan and Vargas, since he could not ascertain
who the real owners of the pick-up truck and the
cargo truck were. Perez filed a cross-claim against
the other respondents for indemnity, in the event
that she is ordered to pay.
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The other respondents paid petitioner's claim
for injuries, so they were released from liability. They
also paid Perez for her claim of damages. They
thereafter filed a Motion to Exonerate and Exclude
themselves since theyve already paid Joseph by way
of amicable settlement and Perezs claim for
damages. Perez filed an Opposition to the motion
since the release of claim executed by petitioner in
favor of the other respondents allegedly inured to hisbenefit. RTC dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the judgment on the compromise
agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-
delict is a bar to the cause of action for breach of
contract of carriage
YES. A single act or omission can be violative
of various rights at the same time, as when the act
constitutes a juridical a violation of several separate
and distinct legal obligations. However, where there
is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rightsthat may have been violated belonging to one
person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises.
There is no question that petitioner sustained
a single injury on his person, which vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative
rights of action against the different respondents
through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
Only one cause of action was involved although the
bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
defendants therein were not necessarily identical
since the respondents were not identically
circumstanced.
DEL ROSARIO v. FEBTC(537 SCRA 571, 2007)
It is well established, however, that a party
cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting
his case, or by pleading justifiable
circumstances as herein petitioners are
doing, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated.
FACTS: PDCP extended a P4.4 million loan to
DATICOR, which that DATICOR shall pay: a service
fee of 1% per annum (later increased 6% per annum)
on the outstanding balance; 12% per annum interest;
and penalty charges 2% per month in case of default.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages
over six (6) parcels of land and chattel mortgages
over machinery and equipment.
DATICOR paid a total of P3 million to PDCP,
which the latter applied to interest, service fees and
penalty charges. This left them with an outstanding
balance of P10 million according to PDCPs
computation.
DATICOR filed a complaint against PDCP for
violation of the Usury Law and annulment of contract
and damages. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The
IAC set aside the dismissal and declared void and of
no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan
agreement. PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to SC.In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its
receivables from DATICOR to FEBTC for of P5.4 M.
FEBTC and DATICOR, in a MOA, agreed to P 6.4
million as full settlement of the receivables.
SC affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC,
nullifying the stipulation of interests. DATICOR thus
filed a Complaint for sum of money against PDCP and
FEBTC to recover the excess payment which they
computed to be P5.3 million. RTC ordered PDCP to
pay petitioners P4.035 million, to bear interest at
12% per annum until fully paid; to release or cancel
the mortgages and to return the corresponding titlesto petitioners; and to pay the costs of the suit.
RTC dismissed the complaint against FEBTC
for lack of cause of action since the MOA between
petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to SC decision,
FEBTC not being a party thereto.
Petitioners and PDCP appealed to the CA,
which held that petitioners' outstanding obligation
(determined to be only P1.4 million) could not be
increased or decreased by any act of the creditor
PDCP, and held that when PDCP assigned its
receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR
was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC
might have provided in the Deed of Assignment,
DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not
bound by its terms.
By the principle ofsolutio indebiti, the CA
held that FEBTC was bound to refund DATICOR the
excess payment of P5 million it received; and that
FEBTC could recover from PDCP the P4.035 million
for the overpayment for the assigned receivables.
But since DATICOR claimed in its complaint only
of P965,000 from FEBTC, the latter was ordered to
pay them only that amount.
Petitioners filed before the RTC anotherComplaint against FEBTC to recover the balance of
the excess payment of P4.335 million.
The trial court dismissed petitioners'
complaint on the ground ofres judicata and splitting
of cause of action. It recalled that petitioners had
filed an action to recover the alleged overpayment
both from PDCP and FEBTC and that the CA Decision,
ordering PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages
and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest became
final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether FEBTC can be held liable for thebalance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus
interest which petitioners previously claimed against
PDCP in a previously decided case
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NO. A cause of action is the delict or the
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. In the
two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same
alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and
refusing to return an amount in excess of what was
due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same
facts and evidence presented in the first case were
the very same facts and evidence that petitionerspresented in the second case.
A party cannot, by varying the form of action
or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as
herein petitioners are doing, escape the operation of
the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated.
SC held that to allow the re-litigation of an
issue that was finally settled as between petitioners
and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of
a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under
Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.This rule proscribes a party from dividing a
single or indivisible cause of action into several parts
or claims and instituting two or more actions based
on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds
for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first
action every ground for relief which he claims to exist
and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to
rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to
recover for the same wrong or injury.
Both the rules on res judicata and splitting of
causes of action are based on the salutary public
policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits
interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Re-litigation of
matters already settled by a court's final judgment
merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers,
creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes
valuable time and energy that could be devoted to
worthier cases.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. CA(301 SCRA 367, 1991)
When a single delict or wrong is committed
like the unlawful taking or detention of
the property of another there is but one
single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been
violated, and all such rights should be
alleged in a single complaint as constituting
one single cause of action. In a forcible
entry case, the real issue is the physical
possession of the real property. The
question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount
thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court. In other words, the unlawful act of
a deforciant in taking possession of a piece
of land by means of force and intimidation
against the rights of the party actually in
possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a
cause of action that gives rise to two (2)
remedies, namely, the recovery of
possession and recovery of damages arisingfrom the loss of possession, but only to
one action. For obvious reasons, both
remedies cannot be the subject of two
(2) separate and independent actions,
FACTS: PDC leased to Westin a parcel of land with a
commercial building for 9 years and 3 months, with a
monthly rental of approximately P600,000. Westin
failed to pay rentals despite several demands. The
arrearages amounted to P8,6M. PDC repossessed the
leased premises, inventoried the movable propertiesfound within and owned by Westin, and scheduled a
public auction for the sale of the movables, with
notice to Westin.
Westin filed a forcible entry case with the
MeTC against PDC for with damages and a prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. A TRO enjoined PDC from
selling Westin's properties.
At the continuation of the hearing, the parties
agreed, among others, that Westin would deposit
with the PCIB (Bank) P8M to guarantee payment of its
back rentals. Westin did not comply with its
undertaking, and instead, with the forcible entry case
still pending, Westin instituted another action for
damages against PDC with the RTC.
The forcible entry case had as its cause of
action the alleged unlawful entry by PDC into the
leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs arose:
(a) the restoration by PDC of possession of the leased
premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual
damages due to losses suffered by Westin; and, (c)
the claim for attorneys fees and cost of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for
damages prays for a monetary award consisting of
moral and exemplary damages; actual damages andcompensatory damages representing unrealized
profits; and, attorney's fees and costs, all based on
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the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises
by PDC.
PDC filed a motion to dismiss the damage
suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping. The RTC, instead of ruling on the motion,
archived the case pending the outcome of the
forcible entry case.
Westin filed with the RTC an amended
complaint for damages, which was granted. It alsofiled an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
TRO and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary
Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
which were all granted. PDCs motion to dismiss was
denied.
Thus, PDC filed with the CA a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition. But the CA
dismissed the petition. It clarified that since the
damages prayed for in the amended complaint with
the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-
handed manner with which PDC reacquired
possession of the leased premises and the sale ofWestin's movables found therein, the RTC and not
the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of
damages.
ISSUE: Whether Westin may institute a separate suit
for damages with the RTC after having instituted an
action for forcible entry with damages with the MeTC
NO. Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer shall be filed before the MTC which shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession
but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for
damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer may be filed separately and independently
of the claim for restoration of possession.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, a party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec.
4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
other or others.
Westin's cause of action in the forcible entrycase and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal
retaking of possession of the leased premises by PDC
from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the
restoration of possession and demand for actual
damages in the case before the MeTC and the
demand for damages with the RTC both arise from
the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by
PDC into the least premises. The other claims for
moral and exemplary damages cannot succeed
considering that these sprung from the main incident
being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence says that
when a single delict or wrong is committed like theunlawful taking or detention of the property of the
another there is but one single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated, and all such rights should be alleged
in a single complaint as constituting one single cause
of action. In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the
physical possession of the real property. The
question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words,
the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession
of a piece of land by means of force and intimidationagainst the rights of the party actually in possession
thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that
gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery
of possession and recovery of damages arising from
the loss of possession, but only to one action. For
obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the
subject of two (2) separate and independent actions,
one for recovery of possession only, and the other,
for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably
lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause
of action.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of theother action? Since the rule is that all such rights
should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes
without saying that those not therein included cannot
be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are
barred forever. If a suit is brought for a part of a
claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes
the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the
residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second
form of action is not identical with the first or
different grounds for relief are set for the second suit.
This principle not only embraces what was actually
determined, but also extends to every matter which
the parties might have litigated in the case. This is
why the legal basis upon which Westin anchored its
second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation
to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, not otherwise raised
and cited by Westin in the forcible entry case, cannot
be used as justification for the second suit for
damages.
CGR CORP. V. TREYES(522 SCRA 765, 2007)
Petitioners filing of an independent action
for damages grounded on the alleged
destruction of CGRs property, other than
those sustained as a result of dispossession
in the Forcible Entry case could not be
considered as splitting of a cause of action.
FACTS: CGR Corporation, Herman Benedicto and
Alberto Benedicto, petitioners, claim to have
occupied 37 ha. of public land in Negros Occidental,
pursuant to a lease agreement granted to them by
the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of 25 years
(to last October 2000 to December 2024). On
November 2000, however, respondent Treyes
allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased
premises and barricaded the entrance to the
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fishponds of the petitioners. Treyes and his men also
harvested tons of milkfish and fingerlings from the
petitioners ponds.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for Forcible
Entrywith the MTC. Another complaint to claim for
damages was also filed by the petitioners against the
same respondent Treyes grounded on the allegations
that Treyes and his men also destroyed and
ransacked the Chapel built by petitioner CGRCorporation and decapitated the heads of the
religious figures.
ISSUE: Whether during the pendency of a separate
complaint for Forcible Entry, the petitioner can
independently institute and maintain an action for
damages which they claim arose from incidents
occurring after the forcible entry of Treyes and his
men
YES. The only recoverable damages in the
forcible entry and detainer cases instituted first by
the petitioners with the MTC are the rents or fairrental value of the property from the time of
dispossession by the respondent. Hence, other
damages being claimed by the petitioners must be
claimed in another ordinary civil action.
It is noteworthy that the second action
instituted by the petitioners (complaint for damages)
have NO direct relation to their loss of possession of
the leased premises which is the main issue in the
first action they instituted. The second action for
claim of damages had to do with the harvesting and
carting away of milkfish and other marine products,
as well as the ransacking of the chapel built by CGR
Corp. Clearly, the institution of the two cases is not a
splitting of a cause of action, since both are
concerned with entirely different issues.
ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS(7 SCRA 265, 1963)
An examination of the first complaint filed
against appellant in CFI showed that it was
based on appellants' having unlawfully
stopped payment of the check for
P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of
appellees; while the complaint in the
second and present action was for non-
payment of the balance of P96,000.00
guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for
P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt
not covered by the security. The two
causes of action being different, section 4
of Rule 2 does not apply.
FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the Dizon spouses sold
to Socorro Ramos 11 parcels of land for P101,000.
Ramos paid P5,000 downpayment, P2,500 in cash,
and with a P2,500.00 check drawn against PNB, and
agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within 90
days. To secure the said balance, Ramos, in the same
deed of sale, mortgaged the 11 parcels in favor of
the vendors. Ramos mortgaged a lot on Malinta
Estate as additional security, as attorney-in-fact of
her four children and as judicial guardian of her
minor child.
Ramos failed to comply with the conditions of
the mortgage, so an action for foreclosure was filed
by the vendors-mortgagees. Ramos moved to
dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously hadfiled action against her in the CFI of Manila for the
recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the
down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands;
that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage
debt was already accrued and demandable; that
plaintiffs were guilty of splitting a single cause of
action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a
defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the
second suit.
CFI of Quezon City denied the motion to
dismiss. Defendant Ramos re-pleaded the avermentsas a special defense in her answer. The CFI ruled
against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay
P96,000.00, with 12% interest, attorney's fees, and
the costs of the suit; and further decreed the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case
of non-payment within 90 days. Ramos appealed
directly to SC,
ISSUE: Whether there was splitting of cause of action
NO, there is no splitting of cause of action in
this case. An examination of the first complaint filed
against appellant in CFI showed that it was based on
appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the
check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of
appellees, while the complaint in the second and
present action was for non-payment of the balance of
P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim
for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not
covered by the security. The two causes of action
being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
Remedy against splitting a single cause of
action
(a) Motion to dismiss (Sec 1 [e] or [f], Rule 16)Within the time for but before filing theanswer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(e) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same
cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment or by the statute of limitations
xxx
(b) Answer alleging affirmative defense (Sec. 6,
Rule 16)
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Ifno motion to dismiss has been filed, any of
the grounds for dismissal provided for in this
Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer and, in the discretion
of the court, a preliminary hearing may be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed.
NOTE: As to which action should be dismissed (thefirst or second one) would depend upon judicial
discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the
case.
Joinder of causes of action
Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as many
causes of action as a party may have against another
in one pleading. It is the process of uniting two or
more demands or rights of action in one action. This is merely permissive, NOT compulsory,
because of the use of the word may in Sec.
5, Rule 2.
It is subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall
comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
i. The right to relief should arise out of
the same transaction or series of
transaction, and
ii. There exists a common question of
law or fact. (Sec. 6, Rule 3)
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil
actions or actions governed by special rules;
Example: An action for claim of
money cannot be joined with an
action for ejectment, or with an
action for foreclosure.
(c) Where the causes of action are between the
same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in
the RTC provided
i. one of the causes of action falls
within the jurisdiction of said court,
and
ii. the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action
are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test
of jurisdiction. (Sec. 5, Rule 2)
Misjoinder of causes of action
Misjoinder of causes of action is NOT a ground for
dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action
may be severed and proceeded with separately:
(a) on motion of a party, or
(b) on the initiative of the court. (Sec. 6, Rule 2)
FLORES v. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS
(144 SCRA 277, 1986)
Application of the Totality Rule under Sect.
33(l) BP129 and Sect. 11 of the Interim
Rules is subject to the requirements for the
Permissive Joinder of Parties under Sec. 6
of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of
parties, the total of all the claims shall be
the first jurisdictional test. If instead of a
joinder, separate actions are filed by or
FACTS: Binongcal and Calion, in separate
transactions, purchased truck tires on credit from
Flores. The two allegedly refused to pay their debts,
so Flores filed a complaint where the first cause of
action was against Binongcal for P11, 643, and the
second was against Calion for P10, 212. Binongcal
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction since under Sec. 19(8) of BP129 RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount
of the demand is more than P20, 000, and that the
claim against him is less than that amount. He
averred further that although Calion was also
indebted to Flores, his obligation was separate and
distinct from the other, so the aggregate of the
claims cannot be the basis of jurisdiction. Calion
joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint
during the hearing of the motion. Petitioner opposed
the Motion to Dismiss. RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case
following the Totality Rule
YES. The Totality Rule (under Sec. 33 of
BP129 and Sec. 11 of the Interim Rules) applies not
only to cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in
a single complaint, but also to cases where a plaintiff
has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
said causes of action should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should
be a common question of law or fact, as provided inSec. 6 of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, the
total of all the claims shall be the first jurisdictional
test. If instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint, separate actions are filed by or against
the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint
shall be the second jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly
held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the Rules
on Joinder of Parties pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 2 and
Sec. 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, after
a careful scrutiny of the complaint, It appears thatthere is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the
claims against Binongcal and Calion are separate and
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distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC. v. CRUZ(529 SCRA 664, 2007)
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a
contract restricts or confines parties
thereto when the suit relates to breach of
said contract. But where the exclusivity
clause does not make it necessarily
encompassing, such that even those not
related to the enforcement of the contract
should be subject to the exclusive venue,
the stipulation designating exclusive
FACTS: Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI) granted Cruz, a
5yr. franchise to adopt and use the "Uniwide Family
Store System" for the establishment and operation of
a "Uniwide Family Store" in Marikina. The agreementobliged Cruz to pay UHI a P50,000 monthly service
fee or 3% of gross monthly purchases, whichever is
higher, payable within 5 days after the end of each
month without need of formal billing or demand from
UHI. In case of any delay in the payment of the
monthly service fee, Cruz would be liable to pay an
interest charge of 3% per month.
It appears that Cruz had purchased goods
from UHIs affiliated companies FPC and USWCI. FPC
and USWCI assigned all their rights and interests
over Cruzs accounts to UHI. Cruz had outstanding
obligations with UHI, FPC, and USWCI in the total
amount of P1,358,531.89, which remained unsettled
despite the demands made.
Thus UHI filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money before RTC of Paraaque Cruz on the
following causes of action: (1) P1,327,669.832 in
actual damages for failure to pay the monthly
service fee; (2) P64,165.96 of actual damages for
failure to pay receivables assigned by FPC to UHI; (3)
P1,579,061.36 of actual damages for failure to pay
the receivables assigned by USWCI to UHI; (4)
P250,000.00 of attorneys fees.
Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue, invoking Article 27.5 of theagreement which reads:
27.5 Venue Stipulation The Franchisee
consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving any other
venue.
Paraaque RTC granted Cruzs motion to
dismiss. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether a case based on several causes of
action is dismissible on the ground of improper
venue where only one of the causes of action arises
from a contract with exclusive venue stipulationNO. The general rule on venue of personal
actions provides actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff. The parties may also
validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue. The
forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue
of an action does not, however, preclude parties from
bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of actionbetween the same parties and one action does not
arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue
was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at
bar, may be brought before other venues provided
that such other cause of action falls within the
jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.
Based on the allegations in petitioners
complaint, the second and third causes of action are
based on the deeds of assignment executed in its
favor by FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no
exclusive venue stipulation with respect to the
causes of action thereunder. Hence, the general ruleon venue applies that the complaint may be filed in
the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
It bears emphasis that the causes of action
on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach
of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are
based on separate, distinct and independent
contractsdeeds of assignment in which UHI is the
assignee of Cruzs obligations to the assignors FPC
and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds
of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive
venue stipulation embodied in the agreement.
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a
contract restricts or confines parties thereto when
the suit relates to breach of said contract. But where
the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily
encompassing, such that even those not related to
the enforcement of the contract should be subject to
the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating
exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the
specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the
basic principles of freedom to contract might work to
the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who
ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.
What is the totality rule?Where the claims in all the causes of action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Sec.
5, Rule 2)
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3)
Parties (Sec. 1, Rule 3)
(1) Plaintiff
The plaintiff is the claiming party or the originalclaiming party and is the one who files the
complaint.
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It may also apply to a defendant who files
a counterclaim, a cross-claim or a third
party complaint.
(2) Defendant
The defendant refers to the original defending
party, and also the defendant in a counterclaim,
the cross-defendant, or the third party defendant.
If a counterclaim is filed against the
original plaintiff, the latter becomes the
defendant.
Who may be parties? (Sec. 1, Rule 3)
(1) Natural persons
(2) Juridical persons
(a) The State and its political subdivisions;
(b) Other corporations, institutions and entities
for public interest or purpose, created by law;
and(c) Corporations, partnerships and associations
for private interest r purpose to which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from each shareholder, partner or
member. (Art. 44, Civil Code)
(3) Entities authorized by law, even if they lack
juridical personality
(a) Corporation by estoppel (Sec. 21, Corporation
Code);
(b) Partnership having a capital of P3,000 or
more but fails to comply with the registrationrequirements (Art. 1768, Civil Code);
(c) Estate of a deceased person
(d) A legitimate labor organization (Art. 242 [e],
Labor Code);
(e) The Ramon Catholic Church;
(f) A dissolved corporation may prosecute and
defend in suits which:
a. Occur within 3 years after dissolution;
and
b. Are connected with the settlement
and closure of its affairs (Sec. 122,
Corporation Code)
CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES
Real party-in-interest
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in
interest. (Sec. 2, Rule 3)
Real interesta present substantial interest
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent subordinate or
consequential interest. It is material and
direct, as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest.
The owner of the right of violated is the real
party in interest as plaintiff, and the person
responsible for the violation is the real party
in interest as defendant.
Not real party in interest
A person who has not taken part in a
contract
Third party who has not taken part in a
compromise agreement
Mere agent in a contract of sale
Lack of personality to sue
EVANGELISTA v. SANTIAGO(475 SCRA 744)
The term "lack of capacity to sue" refers to
a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such
as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality
or any other general disqualifications of a
party. "Lack of personality to sue refers to
the fact that the plaintiff is not the real
party- in-interest. The first can be a groundfor a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
whereas the second can be used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on
FACTS: The Subject Property was part of a vast tract
of land called Hacienda Quibiga which was
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the
Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title.
Don Ismael Favila, claiming to be one of the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Rodriguez, and pursuant toan SPA executed by his mga kapatid, assigned
portions of the property to the petitioners in
exchange for the labor and work they and their
predecessors have done on the property.
Petitioners were informed that Santiago was
planning to evict them; two of them received notices
to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the
property was included in TCTs which originated from
OCT No. 670, and is now in the name of respondent.
Petitioners filed an action for declaration of
nullity of respondents certificates of title on the
basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.
As an affirmative defense, respondent
claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to
file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no
cause of action. He averred that since OCT No. 670
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was genuine and authentic on its face, then the OCT
and all land titles derived therefrom, are
incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against
the petitioners and the whole world.
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the action filed was in effect an action for
reversion, and therefore should have been initiated
by the OSG, not private individuals. In the end, it
concluded that the petitioners were not the owners ofthe subject property.
CA affirmed the RTC, and likewise dismissed
the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents action is properly
based on petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue
NO. The term "lack of capacity to sue"
should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." The former refers to a plaintiff's
general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of aparty, while the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. The first can
be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the
second can be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In
the present case, this Court may assume that the
respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the
Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial
court stated no cause of action because the
petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being
the real party-in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint stated no cause of
action since petitioners had no personality to sue
YES. Petitioners had no personality to file the
said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and
their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a
cause of action.
The action is really one for the removal of a
cloud on or quieting of title and according to Article
477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in such an action
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in,
the real property which is the subject matter of theaction. Petitioners failed to establish any legal or
equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject
Property so as to justify their right to file an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Also, the title to and possession of the
Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-
interest could be traced only as far back as the
Spanish title of Rodriguez. Petitioners, having
acquired portions of the Subject Property by
assignment, could acquire no better title to the said
portions than their predecessors-in-interest.
Standing to sue
DOMINGO v. CARAGUE
(456 SCRA 744, 2005)
Judicial power is the power to hear and
decide cases pending between parties who
have the right to sue in courts of law and
equity. Corollary to this dictum is the
principle of locus standi of a litigant. He
who is directly affected and whose interest
is immediate and substantial has the
standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case
or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision in order
to warrant an invocation of the courts
jurisdiction and justify the exercise of
judicial power on his behalf.
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo, Gangan and Banaria are
retired Chairmen, while Ursal and Cruz are retired
Commissioners of COA (Commission on Audit) and
the other petitioners are incumbent officers or
employees of COA. All claim to maintain a deep-
seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,
especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as
concerned taxpayers.
These petitioners claim that they were
divested of their designations/ranks upon
implementation of the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan without just cause and without
due process, in violation of Civil Service Law.
Moreover, they were deprived of their respective
Representation and Transportation Allowances
(RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.
Petitioners now invoke this Courts judicialpower to strike down the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or
illegal.
Petitioners invoke Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. and Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections where the court ruled that where the
subject matter of a case is a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest, then this fact alone
gives them legal standing to institute the instant
petition. Petitioners contend that the COAOrganizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere
reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA,
which will have an impact upon the rest of the
government bodies subject to its audit supervision,
thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental
importance. Consequently, petitioners legal standing
should be recognized and upheld.
The respondents, through the OSG assail
the standing of the petitioners to file the present
case. Among others, they allege that the petitioners:
(1) have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome
of the case or an actual or potential injury that can
be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court, (2)
failed to show any "present substantial interest" in
teh outcome of the case, nor (3) may the petitioenrs
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claim that as taxpayers they have legal standing
because nowhere in the petition do they claim that
public funds are spent in violation of law.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have standing to sue
NO. The Petitioners have not shown any
direct and personal interest in the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no
indication that they have sustained or are inimminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted
that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor
impute any improper or improvident act against the
respondents and are not motivated by any desire
to seek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal
benefit or gain. Clearly, they do not have any legal
standing to file the instant suit.
Judicial power is the power to hear and
decide cases pending between parti