ATINER's Conference Paper Series PHI2015-1443 · period of time, part of which coincided with his...

ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: LNG2014-1333

1

Athens Institute for Education and Research

ATINER

ATINER's Conference Paper Series

PHI2015-1443

Barbara Botter

Professor

Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES) - Vitória

Brazil

Scientific Knowledge in

Aristotle’s Biology

ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2015-1443

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Botter, B., (2015) "Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle’s Biology”, Athens:

ATINER'S Conference Paper Series, No: PHI2015-1443.

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Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle’s Biology

Barbara Botter

Professor

Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES) - Vitória

Brazil

Abstract

Aristotle was the first thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific

knowledge, which he set out in Posterior Analytics. Furthermore, the “special

sciences”, i.e., biology, zoology and the natural sciences in general, originated

with Aristotle. A classical question is whether the mathematical axiomatic

method proposed by Aristotle in the Analytics is independent of the special

sciences. If so, Aristotle would have been unable to match the natural sciences

with the scientific patterns he established in the Analytics. In this paper, I reject

this pessimistic approach towards the scientific value of natural sciences. I

believe that there are traces of biology in the Analytics as well as traces of the

Analytics’ theory in zoological treatises. Moreover, for a lack of chronological

clarity, I think it’s better to unify Aristotle’s model of scientific research, which

includes Analytics and the natural sciences together.

Keywords: Aristotle, Scientific Knowledge, Zoology, Demonstration.


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Introduction

Aristotle was one of the greatest philosophers of biology. He devoted part

of his life to the systematic investigation of animals. Before him, many of his

predecessors wrote reflections about nature, but nobody developed a science of

living beings.

This fact, together with the fact that Aristotle was the first to articulate a

model of scientific investigation, raises the question about the relationship

between science of biology and the model of science established in the

Analytics.

This uncertainty remains, regardless of the chronology assigned to the

Aristotelian canon for three reasons. First, though it is likely that the Analytics

is among Aristotle’s early writings, it is difficult to believe that he could have

produced the Analytics after having finished his biological studies. Second,

evidence from Aristotle’s discussions of animals and places indicates that at

least a portion of his biological studies may have been written soon after the

death of Plato, but it is unlikely that all of them were written at that time. It is

more reasonable to assume that his biological works were written over a long

period of time, part of which coincided with his composition of the Analytics.

Finally, if the Analytics were drafted after the biological writings, why did

Aristotle propose a mathematical axiomatic method after conducting a different

type of scientific inquiry? Do the Analytics represent a rejection of the work he

did in his biological studies? The crux of the question is not why there are no

traces of the Analytics in Aristotle’s biology, but why there are no traces of

biology in the Analytics. Though the problem is inverted, the terms are the

same.

I want to soften this picture. I believe that there are elements of biology in

the Analytics and elements of Analytics in natural treatises. In natural treatises

Aristotle states that he aims at generating demonstrations and shows the

differences with the type required in theoretical sciences1. On the other hand, in

the Posterior Analytics Aristotle uses examples drawn from meteorology2,

botanic3 and zoology

4 together with mathematical examples. Moreover, in

Posterior Analytics II 12, the philosopher explicitly introduces the

demonstration of events that come to be usually rather than universally5.

1Aristotle, Parts of Animals I 1, Physics II 9, Generation of Animals II 6 and Generation and

Corruption II 11. 2See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 89b27-31; 90a1-5; 90a14-25; 93a22-25; 93a30-35; 93b8-

15; 94a3-4; 94b31-37; 95a15-22; 98a30-35. 3See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 98a37-98b16; 98b34-99a1; 99a24-30.

4See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 89b43-35; 91a25-30; 91a37; 91b5-8; 91b18-20; 92a1-3;

92a30-35; 94b10-25; 96b33-97a5; 97a35; 98a3-23. 98a37-98b25; 99b5-7. 5Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 12, 96a12-19: “If A is predicated universally of B, and B

universally of C, A must also be predicated of C, and of all C [...]. But ex hypothesi A is

predicated for the most part of C, then the middle term B must also be for the most part. Thus,

the immediate premises of for the most part events must also describe states or processes

which are for the most part”.


5

My study consists in three parts: in the first section, I present the reasons

that support doubts about the scientific character of natural treatises; in the

second section, I focus on the model of science and on the place of natural

science within this model; in the final section, I discuss the demonstration of

processes in natural treatises.

Status Quaestionis

There are strong arguments that support doubts about the natural treatises’

scientific character1. The position defended by the scholars is that a) in natural

treatises there isn’t demonstration of the type Aristotle has exemplified from

geometry in the Analytics2; b) Aristotle’s natural works do not include

definitions capable of becoming premises in a syllogistic structure of

demonstration.

The arguments for the natural treatises’ limited scientific value have

acquired many proponents since the early twentieth century and have been the

subject of lively debate, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s with the works of

David Balme, Robert Bolton, David Charles, Wolfgang Detel, Allan Gotthelf,

Wolfgang Kullmann, Pierre Pellegrin and James G. Lennox. These scholars

think that Aristotle’s zoological treatises reflect scientific ideas and

explanations expressed in the Analytics, but they introduce also a variety of

concepts that the Analytics ignore.

The differences between the canonical model of demonstration proposed

by the Analytics and the inquiries in the natural sciences are evident. In the

Analytics, Aristotle demands that the behaviour of the scientific object be

without variation (ANGIONI 2002, 2)3; and he never mentions “conditional

necessity”, even in his short discussion of natural processes4. Additionally, in

Generation and Corruption II 11, 338b6-11, Aristotle explains that contingent

relations pertain to the natural processes that are rectilinear and concern

perishable substances. In this case, the inference necessitates the effect only in

a conditional way and the nature of the causal inference is modal5.

Because natural entities are composed by matter, which is, by definition, a

principle of movement and accidental change, natural entities do not exhibit

absolutely an unchanging behaviour6. Therefore, it is impossible to understand

them scientifically because only in that “which cannot be otherwise”, which is

1LLOYD 1990 provides an overview of experts’ positions on this problem. Important

contributions have also been made by LENNOX 2001 and BOLTON 1987. 2See LLOYD 1996, 7-37.

3See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 4, 73a21; I 6, 74b5; I 8, 75b24.

4Aristotle , Posterior Analytics II 11, 94b27-95a9.

5The expression “modal notion of necessity” concerns with the nature of causal inference,

when the cause necessitates the effect only in the general run and contingently. Cfr. Aristotle,

Partibus of Animals I 1, 639b29-640a9; Physics II 9, 200a15-30; Generation and Corruption II

11, 337b14-25; II 11, 338b10-11. For the modal nature of causal inference, see LEUNISSEN

2010, p. 46-48. 6Aristotle, Metaphysics VII 5, 1032a20-21; VII 14, 1039b27-1040a2.


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eternal and necessary, does science exists. Other entities are beyond science’s

purview: “Though there are things which are true and real and yet can be

otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern them”1.

Other important argument supporting the incompatibility of scientific

theory and natural science addresses the part that causality plays within

demonstration. For Aristotle, scientific knowledge is knowledge of causes

achieved through demonstration2. Such demonstrations rely on premises that

are undeniable, true, universal and necessary3. Thus, “science” is, for Aristotle,

equivalent to apodictic or causal syllogism4. However, as Angioni (ANGIONI

2002, 9-10) observes, the theory of the four causes established in Physics II 3

and present also in Metaphysics I, On the Soul and in the biological works is

unsatisfactorily discussed in the Posterior Analytics5. Moreover, according to

Barnes, the two examples in Posterior Analytics II 11 94a36-b8 involving

change hardly look like scientific demonstrations at all (BARNES 1993, 228-

229)6. Finally, the philosopher does not clarify how final causes fit into a rigid

structure in which the cause is the middle term of a sillogism7.

The Method of the Scientific Knowledge

In this paper, I try to show that the theory of science outlined by Aristotle

in the Posterior Analytics is compatible with the investigative and definitional

method that the philosopher prescribes in his writings on the natural sciences,

particularly zoology, and that behind certain biological inquires lie principles

enunciated in the Analytics.

Two points should be emphasized to prevent the biological works from

being considered a form of weak knowledge inferior to the strength of

mathematic axiomatic method.

The first point is that the theory of deduction offered in the Analytics

should not be reduced to an abstract method for the ideal systematisation of

science but should be thought as the form of scientific knowledge itself. The

Aristotelian idea that the science is a type of demonstrative knowledge implies

1Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 33, 88b32-34.

2Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b 9; b16-19; cf. Prior Analytics I 4, 25b26-31 and

Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b9-19; I 6, 74b26-32; I 13, 78a22-79a16; I 14, 79a17-24; 85b23-27;

I 31, 87b33-88a11; II 2, 89b36-90a11; II 7, 92a34-37; 3For a discussion of true premises, see Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b 19-33; I 2, 72a6-7; I 3,

72b18-25; I 4, 73a21-74a2; I 6, 74b5-75a32. About primitive and immediate premises, see

Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b26-27; 72a6-7; 72a7-8; I 15, 79a33-36; 79a38; I 23, 84b31-85a1.

About universal premises see Posterior Analytics I 4, 73a21-74a2. About necessary premises

see Posterior Analytics I 6, 74b5-75a32. 4Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b16-19; cf. Prior Analytics I 4, 25b26-31; Posterior

Analytics II 7, 92a34-37. Aristotle illustrates causal syllogism in Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b9-

19; I 6, 74b26-32; I 13, 78a22-79a16; I 14, 79a17-24; 85b23-27; I 31, 87b33-88a11; II 2,

89b36-90a11. 5Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 11, 940a36-b8.

6See LEUNISSEN 2010, 36-37.

7See BARNES 2005, 92.


7

that it should be presented in the form of a systematic exposition of chains of

syllogisms. However, it is clear that this is not the case in either the sciences

upon which Aristotle modelled his arguments, such as mathematics, or in

Aristotle’s scientific practice. Greek geometry is demonstrative, but its

demonstrations cannot be reduced to chains of syllogisms. In the Corpus

Aristotelicum undisputed examples of syllogistic demonstrations are even rarer

both in the more abstract sciences and in the special sciences. The classic

solution suggested by Jonathan Barnes (BARNES 1993, XII) is that Aristotle

conceived the Analytics as a paradeigma, i.e., an ideal and abstract model of a

complete and finished science, and that the zoological writings record the

philosopher’s research efforts.

I believe that this solution is unnecessary and even impossible. In the

opening passage of the Posterior Analytics, the philosopher says: “knowledge

comes through demonstration. By “demonstration” I mean a scientific

syllogism, and by “scientific syllogism” I mean a syllogism by virtue of which,

by having it, we know scientifically”1. The syllogism is the specific form of

scientific knowledge. Through demonstration, the entities, the form and the

order of nature can be scientifically known. The syllogism is more than an

ideal form, although abstract, of scientific knowledge, it is its cause. Believing

that syllogistic demonstration is only a paradigmatic example of scientific

discovery is like stating that no knowledge of this type yet exists or, if

scientific knowledge does exist, there is little of it. However, such pessimism is

not expressed in Aristotle’s writings; the opposite is true2. The philosopher

offers more scientific contributions (as opposed to philosophical contributions)

when the discussion turns to zoology (ANGIONI 2002, 1), and in the

biological works, History of Animals, Parts of Animals and Generation of

Animals, “states explicitly that he aims at generating demonstrations of same

sort” (LEUNISSEN 2010, 32)3. It thus seems more reasonable to inquiry the

extent of the relationship between the demonstrative science and the natural

inquiries than to question this relationship.

Two Misunderstandings

I think that the pessimistic approach to the natural treatises’ scientific

value is based on two misunderstandings. The first is about the epistemological

statute of zoological treatises; the second relates to the biological treatises’

position within the unified edifice of science.

1Aristotle Posterior Analytics I 1, 71b16-19.

2See CRUBELLIER & PELLEGRIN 2002, 51-52.

3See Aristotle, History of Animals I 6, 491a7-13; Parts of Animals IV 10, 689a9-13;

Generation of Animals II 6, 742b23-36; II 8 and IV 9, 769a14-25.


8

The First Misunderstanding

As Berti (BERTI 1998, 48) noted, the distance between the Analytics and

the biological and zoological works is created by the more “relaxed”1 form of

rationality of natural sciences, although this does not indicate an inferior degree

of scientific knowledge. In Book VI of Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies the

object of natural science as “that substance that is for the most part2 according

to form, but is not separated”3. Natural substance is, therefore, determined by

form; however, because its form is deep-rooted in matter and involved with

change and movement, a natural substance is not “always” determined by the

form, as in the case of mathematical entities, but only in the general run and

not universally. To use a contemporary expression, we can attribute to natural

science a “weak rationality” and to the science described in the Analytics a

“strong rationality” (BERTI 1998, 49 and 54), but the intent of this

terminology is not to deny the scientific value of zoology. This weakness is

justified by the object of the natural sciences and allows to natural substance to

be more closely and deeply known.

The Second Misunderstanding

The second misunderstanding concerns the biological treatises’ position

into the scientific knowledge. It is unreasonable to expect the zoological

treatises to present first and definitive definitions of phenomena capable of

acting as premises in a chain of scientific inferences. The philosopher was

inaugurating a new science: zoology. A substantial amount of information was

to be collected, selected, recorded and systematised (BARNES 2005, 27; see

also 22). All of these elements constitute preliminary data for developing the

science that justify why what is known is true. Angioni (ANGIONI 2002, 8)

observes that Aristotle’s zoological writings are located in the ascending phase

of the research, rather than the descending one, where conclusions are

progressively demonstrated from their own principles and, ultimately, from

first definitions4. In Book II of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle recognises

that there are different types of definitions that reflect the distinction between

different levels of knowledge5. Preliminary definitions correspond to the results

of preliminary inquiries, and real definitions determine what something is and

explain why it must be so. Both types of definitions have scientific value and

are part of scientific development.

In the next part I briefly talk about demonstration in biological treatises.

1The Greek word is malakoteron. See Aristotle, Metaphysics V 1, 1025b13. At the lines

1025b6-13, Aristotle distinguishes the rationality of physics from mathematics’ rationality. 2The Greek expression is hos epi to poly, that means ‘in the general run’ and not universally.

3Aristotle, Metaphysics VI 1, 1025b26-28.

4See BALME 1987 and LENNOX 2001.

5Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 8-10.


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Demonstration in Zoology1

In Parts of Animals I 1, Aristotle introduces the model of demonstration at

work in natural treatises. The sublunary phenomena involve movement,

processes and change over time and hold only for the most part2.

The processes can be simultaneous, when the cause and the effect occur in

the same time; or can occur at different instances in a sequence, as in the case

of embryogenesis. The two processes are similar but not identical. The most

important difference is that in processes that occur at different instances of

time, there will be a moment when the cause has occurred but not yet the

effect3.

Aristotle argues about the demonstration of processes that occur in

simultaneous time in Generation of Animals book V, where he indicates the

parts of animals by which the animals differ4.

Let me give an example. The eye-colour changes simultaneously with the

level of water in the eyes5. Schematically we get:

A: colour; B level of water; C: eye

A (aC) ≈simultaneous B (aC)

When the natural level of water is low the eye-colour is blue; when the

natural level of water is high the eye-colour is brown or black. As Leunissen

suggests, Aristotle distinguishes the demonstration of being from the

demonstration of processes that occur simultaneously in Posterior Analytics II

12, 95a10-246. In the Posterior Analytics, the Aristotle’s example is the process

process of eclipsing, that occur simultaneously (hama gignetai)7 with

“obstructing by the earth”. In the Analytics, the demonstration of processes

justifies the presence of an attribute belonging to a certain subject and is

formally the same as demonstration of being. However, “the terms in the

former [in demonstration of processes] get tensed” (LEUNISSEN 2010, 38).

In biological works, explanations that pick out causes that not occur

simultaneously with the effect are more common than simultaneous processes.

1My discussion is greatly indebt to LEUNISSEN 2010, who offers an excellent analysis of

Posterior Analytics II 11 and 12 and suggests the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of

demonstration in these chapters for his theory os demonstrations in natural treatises. 2Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 1, 639a12-15; 640a1-9; 640a33-b3; 642a32-b2.

3Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, Posterior Analytics II 12 95b13-15, b 19-20, b 24-25, b

31-37. See LEUNISSEN 2010, 54-48 and Kupreeva, forthcoming, apud Leunissen 2010. 4Aristotle uses the Greek verb symmetaballo to indicate that cause and effect occur

simultaneously. In Generation of Animals V 4, 784b25- 31, for instance, Aristotle explains the

cause of grey hair: “There are many instances of people having grown grey hair as an aftermath

of desease, but later on [...] when health is restored, people accomplish a change [...] and, in

consequence, the condition also accomplish a corresponding change (symmetaballousi). See

also V 3, 783 b 30, where Aristotle explains the cause of high-pitched voice or deep voice. 5Aristotle, Generation of Animals V 1, 779b2; V 3, 784a4-5; V 6, 785b16-22; V 6, 786a4; V 2,

781a33-34; V 3 783a11-32; V 3, 784a12-20; V 6, 786a303-34. 6See LEUNISSEN 2010, 38-42.

7See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 12, 95a22-25.


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The syllogistic structure of demonstration diverges to demonstration of

mathematical objects for three reasons: first, the nature of causal inference: the

relationship between the cause and the effect is modal1; second, the direction of

the inference: the syllogism is possible only from the effect to the cause, that is,

from the posterior to the prior; third, the chronological order of causal

sequence: the order and the time of processes are important to determine the

causal priority of factors.

I’ll examine in the following the three factors.

First, Aristotle uses a modal notion of necessity in Partibus Animalium I 1

and Physics II 92, where he distinguishes the nature and the direction of causal

inference in theoretical demonstration and in demonstration of natural

processes. The expression “modal notion of necessity” concerns with the

nature of causal inference, when the cause necessitates the effect only for the

most part and contingently3. In Generation of Animals V 3, 783a16-18, for

instance, Aristotle argues that the reason of hard hair is the cold temperature of

environment. The cold air, a material external cause, congeals the hair and

dries them. In other words, hard and earth hair is due to the cessation of heat in

the environment. The relation between the cessation of heat and the

solidification of the hair is not necessary, because we cannot infer the effect

from the presence of the cause, but we can infer from the presence of the effect

the occurrence of the cause.

Second, the philosopher explains that in linear sequences in which the

cause precedes the effects and does not occur in simultaneous time with the

effect, the sillogism in possible only from the posterior to the prior4. The

inference is one-directional, as in theoretical and mathematical sciences, but

the inference’s direction is different: in eternal and cyclical phenomena, the

cause is the prior, from which the effect is derived, and the relationship

between cause and effect is necessary. In sciences that deal with natural

perishable substances, the inference is only from the effect to cause, because it

will not necessary follow that because it is true to say that X happened, it is

also true to say that Y will happen. Other factors can prevent the effect from

happening5.

Third, in natural teleological processes, the demonstration must not only

determine the primary middle term of syllogism, but also specify the

sequence’s order of process. In Physics II 6 Aristotle says: “For with regard to

generation it is mostly in this way that people investigate into the explanation –

1For “modal use of necessity” see Kupreeva (forthcomig) apud LEUNISSEN 2010, 45-47.

According to Leunissen, Aristotle uses a model necessity in Posterior Analytics II 12. See II

12, 95a24-b1; 95b13-17. 2Aristotle, Physics II 9, 200a15-30; Parts of Animals I 1, 639b29-40a9.

3Aristotle, Generation and Corruption II 11, 338b9-11: “For it is not necessary, if your father

came to be, that you come to be, but if you came to be, then he came to be”. 4Leunissen examines Posterior Analytics II 12, 95a29 and a32-37, where Aristotle argues about

the direction of causal order (LEUNISSEN 2010, 50-52). 5See WIELAND 1975, 232.


11

what comes to be after what? And, what was the first to act or to undergo? And

in this way at each step of the series”1.

This worry for specifying the order of generation is manifest specifically

in the discussion about embryogenesis2. In Generation of Animals II 6,

Aristotle clarifies that the “order in generation” and the “order in being” differ:

whereas the “order in being” depends from relations in nature and in definition,

the “order in generation” is depicted as a chronological order.

“Some of the early physiologers endeavoured to describe the order in

which the various parts are formed, but they were none too well acquainted

with what actually happens. As with everything else, so with the parts of body:

one is, by nature, prior to another. But the term “prior” at once comprises a

variety of meanings. E.g., take the difference between (a) that “for the sake of

which” a thing is, and (b) that thing which is “for its sake”: of these, one (b) is

prior in point of formation, while the other (a) is prior in point of being or

reality”3.

The explanation of embryological development starts from what is closest

to the present and from there infers the necessary prerequisites. When the

process is constituted with a series of following movements, the causal priority

is determined by chronological priority and we must draw inferences from the

end to what necessarily had to have occurred earlier4.

Aristotle concludes that in the cases of things which always are, we have

something eternal, yet there is a cause for them and they are demonstrable5.

With those things, the principle is the essence6. But as soon as we begin to deal

deal with those things that come into being through a process of formation,

“we find there are several first principles – principles, however, of a

different kind and not all of the same kind. Among them the source whence the

movement comes must be reckoned as one”7.

In an excellent analysis of Posterior Analytics II 12, Leunissen

(LEUNISSEN 2010, 42-57) persuasively suggests that when Aristotle wrote

this work, he had the methodological preoccupation with the chronological

order of processes that come to be in nature and, at least, a notion of modal

necessity. Thus, he provides the bases for the model of demonstration in

natural and zoological sciences.

1Aristotle, Physics II 7, 198a34-5.

2Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, especially II 6.

3Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742a16-25. See also Parts of Animals II 646a24-b2.

4We have these three things “first of all there must of necessity exist some part in which the

principle of movement resides (for of course this is a part of the End, and the supreme

controlling part of it); after that comes the animal as a whole, i.e., the End; third and last of all

come the parts which serve these as instruments for various employments” (Aristotle,

Generation of Animals II 6, 742a35-b10). 5Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b27.

6Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b35.

7Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b33-35.


12

Conclusion

With my paper, I hope to have showed that Aristotle’s scientific theory is

not an austere and formal model of demonstration. The Aristotelian science is a

single and unitary type of research, that encompasses experiences in the nature

and the scientific patterns outlined in the logical treatises.

Although the epistemological statute of the zoological treatises differs

from the epistemological method of the Analytics, the natural sciences do not

exhibit a lesser degree of scientificity. The “weak rationality” of zoology is

determined by the object of its inquiry and by its position within the structure

of science. Although the natural sublunary phenomena can be scientifically

studied, it is necessary to use a model of demonstration that incorporates into

the syllogistic structure the movement and the change over time.

It is evident that, for Aristotle, many of the entities that constitute the

domain of nature have the same structure and are subject to the same treatment

as the phenomena examined in the Posterior Analytics, but it is necessary to

think to the geometric-style of Analytics in a more flexible way.

Let’s me close with the rhetorical question of James Lennox (LENNOX

2001, 6): “It is plausible that a philosopher as systematic as Aristotle could

formulate the first rigorous theory of scientific inquiry and demonstration,

pepper the treatise in which he does so with biological examples, and then not

aim to structure his science of animals in accordance with that theory?”.

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