Atlantic Voices, Vol. 3, No. 2

7/28/2019 Atlantic Voices, Vol. 3, No. 2

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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2 1

Volume 3 - Issue 2, February 2013

Contents:

Implications of Broken Promises on NATOs 2% Rule

Quint Hoekstra examines the consequences of the ongoing inequality between the financial

commitments of NATO members and the impact this will have on future operations. He

analyzes how NATOs goals of attaining greater interoperability and new capabilities are ef-

fected by ongoing budget constraints and that these goals can be jeopardized if defense spend-

ing between European nations and the US is not rebalanced.

Engaging Young Thinkers on the Euro-Atlantic Security Debate

The ATA hosted a one-day workshop with Masters Students in Political Science and Interna-

tional Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy and its implications for the Alliance. A group

of selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on the future of Euro-Atlantic secu-

rity. Together with ATA experts, they outlined a new vision and set of priorities for the

Transatlantic community to ensure that NATO remains prepared for future challenges.

NATO Interoperability andNew Capabilities

NATOs strategic objectives over the past

everal years have been to enhance and better

oordinate its operational capabilities to ad-

dress emerging threats while adhering to the

rowing fiscal constraints of its members and

he need to downsize military budgets.

The key goals have been to acquire new

apabilities that can maintain NATOs strate-

ic edge while increasing interoperability

mongst its members in order to maximize

ooperation and efficiency. Essential to

chieving these goals is coordinating military

nd technical specializations between mem-

er states that seek to capitalize on each

members area of expertise within the Alli-

nce.

The rapidly changing international securi-

y environment brings added emphasis to

NATOs need to ensure that its goals are not

eopardized in the face of emerging threats

nd financial crisis. Accomplishing these ob-

ectives rests heavily on effectively coordinat-

ng future NATO campaigns and facilitating

etter cooperation in acquiring new capabili-

ies that are critical, sustainable, and rapidly

deployable.- Jason Wiseman

F35 Joint Strike Fighter (Photo - A-A Military Aviation News and Media)


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NATO utilizes peer-pressure by reporting annually on member

states military spending. Using NATOs own definition and

report, in 2011 only three members Greece, the United King-

dom, and the United States spent more than two percent of

their GDP on their armed forces.3 Nearly three quarters of

NATO member states spent between one and two percent.

There are two outliers: At the low end is Iceland, which has no

armed forces; at the high end is the United States, contributing

nearly five percent. As will be explained later, this discrepancy

has caused friction between member states.

Theory

Scholars of international relations have a long history of ex-

plaining the difficulty of international cooperation. There are

three relevant theories to the NATO case: The prisoners dilem-

ma, which expects no cooperation; Olsons

theory, which expects small states to bene-

fit the most; and the hegemonic stability

theory, which expects great powers to gain

most from cooperation. Each theory will

first be examined and then tested in an analysis of the develop-

ment of military budgets.

The first theory is the prisoners dilemma4 (PD) and is

the one most commonly used. In this scenario, each member

state is portrayed as a player seeking to maximize relative gains

over all others. The situation shows how individual rationality

leads to collective irrationality. All states pursue the same strate-

gy: they want all others to cooperate with the regime whilst

defecting themselves. Applied to the NATO case, this means

that all states want the others to stick to the two percent bench-

mark whilst spending a lot less themselves. The Pareto-optimum

would be if all states chose to cooperate, as this way they would

form the best deterrence. PD theorists expect states not to end

here but with a more likely scenario called the Pareto-deficient

Nash equilibrium. This is the situation where no player has the

incentive to defect. In the NATO case, this equilibrium meansall states choose to defect and ignore the benchmark.

The second relevant theory comes from the late Ameri-

by Quint Hoekstra

For decades, NATO member states have pledged to

commit at least two percent of their gross domestic

product (GDP) to their armed forces. Unfortunately,

this promise has often been broken. In fact, in 2011, only

three out of 27 members complied.1 This article investigates

the implications of non-compliance with these self-determined

rules and opens the debate on whether the old rule should be

modified. It consists of fiveparts: observations on the current

size of member states budgets; a theoretical approach to ex-

plaining member states behaviour; a short overview of histori-

cal developments around this issue; implications for the grow-

ing gap between US and European defence spending; and final-

ly, conclusions on how to proceed. This

article argues that interoperability pro-

grammes should be limited to areas where

all parties benefit; that it is in the interest

of NATO and its members to lower the

spending rule to one-and-a-half percent of

GDP; that Europe is likely to focus on security in the greater

European area only; and that the US might find itself without

its European allies should it get into a conflict in the Far East.

Comparing Military Budgets

The initial goal of NATO, founded in reaction to the

Warsaw Pact, was to contain Soviet aggression and to deter

the USSR from invading Europe. In order for the deterrence

strategy to be credible, European states had to maintain large

standing armies ready to be deployed at a moments notice.

The two percent rule functioned as a means to ensure states

pulled their weight. European member states meanwhile saw

the rule as a way to make sure the US would not abandon

them. Contrary to security integration in the EU, NATOs

intergovernmental nature prohibits the secretariat from devel-

oping an autonomous mechanism to ensure state compliance.2

Furthermore, divergence between member states expendi-

ture calculations have complicated transparency. Therefore,

using what little power the NATO secretariat does have,

In 2011, only three members

Greece, the UK, and the USspent

more than two percent of their GDP

on their armed forces.

Implications of Broken Promises onNATOs 2% Rule


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can social scientist Mancur

Olson5, who illustrated how the

small powers try to exploit the

great. A way to do this would be

for small European states to defect

whilst hoping the US will keep up

its own forces for other unrelated

strategic interests. Smaller states

can also seek to free ride or band-

wagon with stronger states. After

all, defence spending by the small-

est states has no significant effect

on the total NATO military force,

although it does have an effect on

their budgets.A third and final theory is the hegemonic stability theory.6

It explains the benefit of having a powerful and dominant state to

lead the cooperation. The hegemon, in this case the US, can incur

transaction costs associated with the defence regime in return for

the privileged position of laying down the rules for all others. It

can then use its power advantage to coerce unwilling states to

comply.

Historical development

During the Cold War, the US had similar strategic inter-

ests to its European counterparts as the hegemon in the NATO

alliance. The alliance was united against the Soviet threat, seeking

to contain communism and prevent a war on European soil.

Smaller European states were safe under the nuclear umbrella of

the US, Britain and France. Some, such as the Netherlands, also

had (and still have) nuclear weapons stored on their territory.7

This functioned as an insurance policy of American assistance.

Military spending was largely similar between members, hovering

around three percent of GDP.8 This all changed dramatically after

the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the USSR as the US

took up a new role: that of the sole global superpower. With the

main threat now gone, military budgets were slashed around the

world. For example, the UKs portion of military spending as a

percent of GDP halved between the early 1980s and 2000. 9 For

the first time in over a century, Western European NATO mem-

ber states no longer had to live under the looming threat of a landinvasion from the East. Some states abolished conscription10 and

many reduced the size of their standing armies.

Using EU membership to

incorporate former communist

states in Eastern Europe into their

sphere of influence, post-

materialist Western Europe had

managed to rule out war altogeth-

er. They werent keen on getting

involved militarily either within

Europe or abroad. However, the

rest of the world didnt share that

vision. The end of hostilities be-

tween great powers unfortunately

did not mean the end of hostilities

altogether. The Cold War had

long overshadowed interstatedisputes and regional tensions, and kept the lid on many lin-

gering conflicts. These now flared up, with the war in the

former Yugoslavia serving as a prime example. The US was

subsequently charged with a new role: that of global police-

man. This required the US to maintain a large and readily de-

ployable military force which had the side benefit of discour-

aging new powers to challenge it. The result was that Europe,

dipping its average under the two percent rule for the first

time11, cut its military budgets much more than the US, mark-

ing the beginning of a US-European divide.

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan

and Iraq temporarily illustrated to some NATO members the

necessity of military spending. Yet the terrorist attacks had

complex effects on military spending. NATO data shows that

US spending went up from an average of 3.3% of GDP during

the second half of the 1990s to 5.4% at its peak in 2010. 12 In

Spain, after the Madrid bombings, the opposite happened. The

Spanish cut their spending by a quarter from 1.2% to 0.9% in

2011. Interestingly, the London bombings caused no signifi-

cant change in the United Kingdoms spending. Overall, the

European average dropped from 2.5% in the early nineties to

1.6% in 2011.13 From this data it can be said that, generally

speaking, the longer ago the terrorist attack, the less pressured

European states feel to keep up military spending. This rule

does not apply to the US, thus increasing the US-Europeandivide.

U.S. Naval Ship (Photo: US Department of Defense)


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The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 to oust Colonel

Gaddafi served as a wake-up call to NATO members for two

reasons. First, it showed that European budget cuts have weak-

ened their operational capabilities. The Asia-oriented US felt

that it should only lead from behind in missions with more

European than American relevance, leaving Europe to do the

job.20 However, military chiefs of staff soon realized Europe

was unable to carry out this relatively small mission without

US assistance. Not wanting to see the mission fail, eventually

the US reluctantly agreed to take up a larger role. What this

shows is that by 2011, the US-European divide had grown so

large that this inhibited their willingness to cooperate.

The second wake-up call is that the divide has severe

consequences for NATOs much emphasized interoperability

goals. The idea of interoperability is that making national mili-taries more compatible with each other can yield significant

benefits in the battlefield. For example, interoperability in-

volves synchronizing communication systems or installing the

same air-to-air refueling systems. In

an era with increased threats and

shrinking budgets the goal is to be

able to do more with less. Not only

can NATO use this to improve its

operations, but it can also reduce costs by collective bargain-

ing. A crucial way to improve interoperability is to freely ex-

change information relevant to other allies, allowing them to

streamline their adaptation to new systems. In Libya however,

the US, leader in military technology, was unwilling to share

some of its new cyber capacities with its European counter-

parts out of fear that Europe would free-ride on its technologi-

cal achievements. Indeed, the US considered mounting a cyber

attack on Libya, but the problem with deploying cyber weap-

ons is that they can only be used once.21 As soon as cyber

weapons are exposed, other states have relatively easy access

to knowledge on how these systems work and how to build

their own protection systems for them. The US chose not to

deploy the system out of fear that their unique capabilities

would end up in European states for free. Coming back to

interoperability, NATO should not overestimate the willing-

ness of its members to exchange information if they feel othermilitaries gain an unfair advantage out of it. Rather than boost-

ing the overall level of knowledge and capabilities, interopera-

A contributing factor to the growth of the divide may have

been the recent global financial crisis (GFC).14 With govern-

ments seeking to remedy large deficits incurred by bank bailouts

and a shrinking economy, military budgets have come under

pressure once more. Worryingly, Brookings Institution research

fellow Clara Marina ODonnell remarks that this happens with-

out consultation with allies.15NATO has responded with smart

defence strategies where member states seek to cooperate to

boost efficiency in an attempt to maintain operational capabilities

with reduced budgets. However, results are likely to be modest

due to states unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty in the field

of security for economic gains.16 The GFC also announced the

rise of China as a global player in the security sphere. In 2009,

US President Barack Obama responded on this by proclaiming

himself the first Pacific President.

17

European states have fewerstrategic interests in that region, again causing an increase in the

US-European divide.

Implications of the US-European Divide

The US and Europe have

long disagreed on whether

NATO should stick to the pro-

tection of their member states

or if it should operate globally.

The US, which favours a global NATO, has kept up their mili-

tary budgets and now accounts for 41% of the worlds military

spending.18 It rightfully views itself as a global actor, able to in-

tervene anywhere in the world. Europe, taking on a more re-

gional focus, favours a more modest role for the military alli-

ance. European countries have much smaller budgets, constrain-

ing the scope and breadth of their intervention options. It has no

interest in pursuing large scale missions in faraway places. Ra-

ther, it seeks to undertake limited missions in the greater Euro-

pean area, such as the current mission in Turkey. The deploy-

ment of Patriot missiles to the Syrian border shows that, contra-

ry to Western European public opinion, security in Europe still

is not a given and remains a top priority for European states.

With limited aspirations, European member states are reluctant

to maintain forces to the two percent rule, despite public prom-

ises. The American economist and Research Fellow at the U.S.

Business and Industry Council Alan Tonelson even goes as far tosay that Europe has been breaking these promises for over 50

years.19

In an era with increased threats and shrink-

ing budgets the goal is to be able to do more

with less.


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bility programmes can lead to states seeking to free-ride on each

other, as the cyber example shows.

The Libyan intervention and the European military con-

straints have furthered the Pentagons doubts on European

capabilities and intentions further from home. This is particu-

larly important considering the rise of China. Chinas leaders

might insist on a peaceful rise, but the security dilemma of

the growing Chinese armed forces puts this optimistic vision

in doubt. An inherent problem with growing armies is that

for outsiders it is unclear if they serve a defensive or offensive

purpose. Faced with uncertainty, militaries work based on

worst-case scenarios. The US would therefore be tempted to

increase its presence in the South China Sea, threatening Chi-

nas dominance there. Making matters worse, NATO mem-

bers are deeply divided on policy towards China. The US has

the capacity to engage China while European members are

much more hesitant to engage in such an adventure, leading

one to the aforementioned ODonnell to conclude that Eu-

ropes military strength might become irrelevant.22

The US-European divide on China, as well as on mili-

tary missions and budgets in general, threatens NATO unity.

It comes then as no sur-

prise that the US has long

tried to convince Europe

to broaden its horizon

and increase military

spending. In 2011, then

US Secretary of Defence

Robert Gates even

warned NATO that it

would have a dim if not

dismal future if defence

spending didnt in-

crease.23 At last years

Chicago summit, the

decline of military budg-

ets was mentioned as one

of the most important

challenges to NATO.24

Meanwhile, the NATO

secretariat is attempting to resolve the issue, with Secre-

tary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen repeatedly urging

member states to comply with the two percent rule and

increase military budgets.25 Europe however, hasnt been

receptive to such calls and insists on making its own strate-

gic decisions.

Conclusions

From this study, there are two discernible conclu-

sions. The first concerns the three theories, while the sec-

ond concerns NATOs options to resolve the US-European

divide and enhance greater interoperability. Regarding the

theories, the prisoners dilemma does not apply well to the

Cold War scenario, in which the Soviet threat was para-

mount and was deemed more significant than another state

getting a relative gain over an ally. States largely followed

the two percent rule. However, with the disappearance of

this existential threat, European states started their race to

the bottom, per the theorys provisions.Therefore, the prisoners dilemma theory is applicable

only in situations where there is no existential threat. The

second theory, that of Olson that the small exploit the great,

seems plausible. Indeed, the US has

incurred the vast majority of defence

costs; however, because the US spends

at a rate far above two percent, it seems

they may have alternative motives for

this. Thus, US defence spending is likely

more of the USs own volition rather

than exploitation by smaller members.

Finally, hegemonic stability theory ex-

plains how the US has been successful in

leading and shaping NATO, despite

failing to coerce European members to

spend more. Further investigation is

necessary to see whether this was be-

cause European states were unable to

spend more or were simply unwilling to

do so. Moreover, there is a growing rift

due to the inability of the US to preventthe US-European divide from overlap-

ping into different military strategies.US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (Photo: US Department of De-

fense


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About the authormilitary operations in the area will be conducted without its

European allies.

Quint Hoekstra is Political Science Major with a specializa-

tion in International Relations at Leiden University (the Neth-

erlands) and writes about global security issues.

1. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence (Brussels:NATO, 2012).

2. Jolyon Howorth, Decision-making insecurity and defense policy: Towards su-pranational inter-governmentalism? Coop-eration and Conflict 2012 : 433-453.3. NATO, Data, 2012.4. Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theoryand Cooperation. World Politics 1988 (3):317-3195. John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, TheTheory of Collective Action and NATODefense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,Political Research Quarterly 1994 (2): 373-

3966. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981).7. Kernwapens Tijdlijn [Nuclear weapons timeline], NOS,April 22, 2010, http://nos.nl/artikel/152354-kernwapens-tijdlijn.html.8. Ibid9. Ibid10. Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden. The End of Conscrip-tion in Europe? (paper presented at the Western EconomicAssociation International Annual Meeting, July 5-8, 2002).

NATO, Data, 2012.11. Ibid12. Ibid13. Clara Marina ODonnell, The Implications of MilitarySpending Cuts for NATOs Largest Members. Brookings Cen-tre on the United States and Europe (2012), 3.14. Ibid15. Jakob Henius and Jacopo Leone McDonald, Smart De-fence: A Critical Appraisal (paper presented at the NATO De-fence College Forum, Rome, March 2012).16. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, TheWhite House, last modified November 14, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-

barack-obama-suntory-hall.17. Recent trends in military expenditure, SIPRI, accessedFebruary, 20 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends.

18. Alan Tonelson, NATO Burden

sharing: Promises, promis-es,Journal of Strategic Studies 2000 (3): 29-58, 52.19. Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Tactics in LibyaMay Be a Model for Other Efforts, The New York Times, August28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/world/africa/29diplo.html?pagewanted=all.20. Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfarein Attack Plan on Libya, New York Times, October 17, 2011,http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0. 21. ODonnell, Spending Cuts, 2012, 6.22. Thom Shanker, Defense Secretary Warns NATO of DimFuture, New York Times, June 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html?

_r=0.23. Lisa Aronsson and Molly ODonnell, Smart Defense and theFuture of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the

Twenty-First Century? (paper presented at the NATO ChicagoConference, March 28-30, 2012).24. Why we need to invest in defence, NATO, last modifiedNovember 13, 2012, http://nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/news_91256.htm.

There are two considerations for NATO as it determines a

course of action to resolve this divide. First, the imbalance of

military spending in the Alliance can harm interoperability

goals, as states are tempted to free-ride on others. It is there-

fore recommended to only pursue it in those areas where all

parties benefit, rather than a select few.

Second, the disagreement concerning the appropriate

size of the national armed forces currently undermines

NATO unity. Decisions must be made in funding and opera-

tions. In terms of funding, the first option is to encourage all

members to adhere to the two per-

cent rule. This generates the money

for European states to independently

execute operations in the European

neighbourhood, leaving the US to

focus on containing China. This out-

come is unlikely to occur considering popular European re-

sistance to large military spending, especially in an age of

austerity. The second option is to maintain the current spend-

ing structure. The US will keep spending more than other

members but in return Europe has to support the US in the

Far East with what little capacity they have. The difficulty

here is that sovereign states are unlikely to operate outside of

their strategic interest. The third and best option is to lower

the currently ignored benchmark to one-and-a-half percent of

GDP. Each member is free and encouraged to stay above it,

but this would at least stem the decline of military budgets.

Having attainable goals makes states considerably more likely

to pursue them. This way, NATO can remain relevant, se-

cure peace in the greater European area, and engage in small-scale missions globally.

With the end of two ground wars in the Middle East

and a new focus on cyber and drone technology, NATO has

already begun to reduce its footprint. Adapting to a change in

military budgets, NATO can show its strength by acknowl-

edging and managing the difference of US and European in-

terests. Europe can be expected to focus primarily on bring-

ing security to the greater European area, while the US is

likely to continue its Asian focus under the pretext that any

NATO can show its strength by ac-

knowledging and managing the differ-ence of US and European interests.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0


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The ATA hosted a one day workshop with Mas-

ters Students in Political Science and Interna-

tional Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy

and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance. A group of

selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on

the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Their proposals and

priorities for a renewed transatlantic partnership have been

discussed with ATA experts and are being presented to

NATO officials.These are the students

own ideas, developed on the basis of

materials (NATO Manuals + NATO

history videos) provided beforehand by

the ATA.

This workshop represents an active contribution by the

Post-Cold War Generation to the strategic thinking cur-

rently in place amongst Allied countries over the future of

NATO.

Green Military (by Alon Gilboa)

In light of the global need to adopt sustainable policies

and reduce the use of fossil fuels, NATO, as a leading In-

ternational Organization and military alliance, should en-

courage Member and Partner states to reduce their energydemands; aspire for renewable supplies; and, most im-

portantly, constrain the energy consumption in their mili-

taries. This shall be done by adopting educational and R&D

programs that aim to develop new energy-efficient solu-

tions in their militaries. Investment in green military

solutions will not only serve Members and Partner states,

but the international community as

a whole.

NATO members are among some of

the most advanced countries when it

comes to green technology. This

puts NATO at a prime position to work with its Science

and Technology Organization (STO) to invest in furthering

green technology research.

Training and Education in the Balkans

(by Enitsa Gabrovska)

A local qualified workforce is an integral part of the

sustainable civilian-military structure necessary for NATO

accession. While NATO puts

emphasis on military capabili-

ties, a civilian workforce is

indispensable for the compre-

hensive approach towards

capacity building that the

Alliance strives for. There-

fore, NATO should partner

with the European Union on

this civilian component,

which includes strengthening

of police structures; the rule

of law and law enforcement;

civilian administration; and

NATO members are among some of

the most advanced countries when it

comes to green technology

Two US Marines discussing energy (Photo: PEW Charitable Trusts: Environmental Initiatives)

Engaging Young Thinkers on theEuro-Atlantic Security Debate


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overall monitoring capabilities. The two organizations

should invest in local capacity, in particular, by developing

educational programmes for students to receive higher

education in NATO/EU Member countries (for example,

American and European universities and academies) on

these specific topics. This way, NATO can ensure continu-

ity in the development process, while re-focusing on a

much-overlooked gap in its partnership programmes,

namely the civilian component.

Energy Security/Article 4

(by Alon Gilboa)

The temporary cut-offs of

Russian gas supply to Europe in

2006 and 2009 illustrated that

the unstable flow of energy is a

strategic weapon that can affect the lives of millions of citi-

zens in Europe. Therefore, NATO should not only assist in

diversifying its members gas supplies and aspire for alter-

native energies, but also to establish clear security mecha-

nisms that will prevent such incidents from occurring in

the future. These mechanisms should firstly emphasize

strategic cooperation and open dialogue between NATO

and the supplying states. And secondly, threats on energy

security, which go under the threshold of violence, should

invoke Article 4 of the NATO founding treaty that calls for

consultation when the security of the Parties is threatened.

Global Warming (by Fouzia Bencheikh)

In a 2011 editorial piece in the Huffington Post, NATO

Secretary General Rasmussen declared that taking the ap-

propriate steps to combat climate change is not a

choice. It is an urgent necessity. However, since 2011,

NATO has not taken the practical measures to combat this

devastating problem.

Blizzards in Northern Europe, drought in the American

Midwest, torrential rains in Central Europe and disruptive

storms along the eastern coast of the U.S are examples of

events that are becoming increasingly intense and are re-

sults of climate change. It affects all NATO nations differ-

ently and in complex ways; including food shortages,

health risks, and transnational threats to security. NATO

identified climate change as a challenge to the security of

NATO members in 2010; however, it has not taken practi-

cal measures to prevent the advancement of climate

change, due to a lack of political will. With the past decade

being the hottest on record, it is now time for NATO to

establish substantive steps to stabilize this increasingly

problematic issue. By doing so, it will galvanize other na-

tions around the world to follow NATOs lead in reducing

the damage to the environment.

In addition, NATO should begin the

process of planning for instability in

key regions caused by climate

change. The rising of the Arab

Spring was in part a result of food

scarcity from the year before. Many have attributed this

food scarcity to the droughts in the U.S. and Russia. A lack

of resources culminating into instability in regions around

the globe will become the new normal. It is imperative

that NATO members begin discussions on potential mili-

tary and political strategies that will lead to an institutional

framework to prepare for these events.

NATO should begin the process of

planning for instability in key regions

caused by climate change

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center

(EADRCC) rehearses in Croatia 2007 (Photo: NATO)


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Capacity Building in the

Balkans (by Enitsa Gabrovska)

In the process of preparing for

NATO membership, it is crucial for

the countries of the Western Balkans

to develop and modernize their mili-

tary capabilities to conform to

NATOs requirements. In achieving

this, Member and Partner (MAP)

countries might benefit substantially

by establishing topic-specific pro-

grammes not only with NATO

headquarters but within institution-

alized channels for cooperation. Indi-

vidual NATO Members and their respective military struc-

tures can be a valuable source of soft power in the process

of developing military capabilities in the West Balkan

countries. This can best be achieved through information-

sharing platforms, joint capacity-building projects, best-

practice learning, and assistance on a bilateral level. These

partnerships allow for a more bottom-up approach in ca-

pacity development within the individual aspirant states.

Partnerships Across the Globe (by Fouzia

Bencheikh)

The days of clearly identifying your enemy are long

gone. NATO members now face threats from terrorist

groups and cells from around the world. It is of strategic

importance to institutionalize bilateral relations between

NATO and countries that have contributed to missions and

exemplify NATOs core values. The idea of formalizingbilateral relationships between NATO and non-member

countries is not a new one; however, NATO has not put

forth measures to diversify its partnership programs or

provided partners with the tailor made partnership they

wish.

Countries like Australia and New Zealand have contrib-

uted a significant amount of troops and resources to the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghani-

stan. Additionally, Japan has donated more then 50 million

dollars in 2012 to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration

Program (APRP). These countries have shown a dedication

to the NATO mission in Afghanistan; however, NATO has

not taken the steps to formalize bilateral partnerships after

the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NATO should

begin discussions to invite nations outside of the Western

Hemisphere into the Partnerships for Peace program. This

regional forum would have political consultations on sig-

nificant security threats in that region and would put forth

practical steps to combat such threats. Therefore, as

NATO evolves in the 21st century, it should diversity its

partnerships for the sake of maintaining global security.

NATO/EU Common Security Strategy (by Da-

rio Sabbioni)

European Union foreign policy has always determined

divisions among Member States when they were dealing

with thorny issues. Since the very beginning of the Europe-

an Political Community (1970) the force of the main trans-

atlantic ally was an excuse for most of the countries to

refuse to have a common strategy and common policies.

The early forums in which foreign policy was debated were

not very structured ones and suffered from a weak focus

on how the discussed relevant issues should evolve. When

the EU began to have a stronger voice in international af-

fairs (i.e. after Maastricht and the establishment of the sec-

ond pillar, CFSP) it became clear that the previous status

quo would be reformed.

Flags bearers from 19 nations rehearse their march (Photo: US Department of Defense)


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Today, there is a new starting point for reflection on

EU issues and transatlantic security integration. The roles

of NATO and the EU have been colliding over the last

several years, as the cases of the Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina

demonstrate when the EU took over a previously estab-

lished NATO mission. In the most important strategic the-

atres for military and civilian operations of the last ten

years (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) cooperation between the

two actors has been a key factor in fostering future part-

nerships. On the institutional level, an EU cell has been

established in the NATO SHAPE HQ in Brussels in March

2006 and on the other hand, a NATO Permanent Liaison

Team has been working side by side with EU officials in

the EU Military Staff.

A truly new security environment can be created with a

simple move that nevertheless requires a very high political

consensus. The creation of a common NATO-EU strategy

upon which to create a shared view of what security means

in terms of capabilities and knowledge is necessary. This

Joint Strategy between NATO and the EU would make it

possible to tackle the same problems that plague both insti-

tutions more effectively, namely: instability of the MENA

region, post-conflict resolution and democracy building

measures in Afghanistan, improving global energy security

and creating an international cyber security strategy. The

review of the European Security Strategy which is ex-

pected this year, and the always higher number of Strate-

gies by NATO, could be combined in a joint paper aimed

at speaking with the same voice in the international arena.

Establishing a high-level panel whose task should be

dealing with the reflection of common security policies

will increase the responsibility of ambassadors and repre-

sentatives, with the focus being on cooperation rather than

allocating scarce goods amongst themselves.

Mediterranean and Middle East Partnerships/

Youth Inclusion (by Tobey Metzger)

In 1994 NATO initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue

(MD) comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauri-

tania, Morocco and Tunisia in order to promote coopera-

tion and ensure regional security and stability. Its tools

include information sharing; funding through the Trust

Fund mechanism; and joint responses to terrorism (PAP-

T) at the governmental and civil level. This initiative was

followed in 2004 by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

(ICI) which extended a similar type of dialogue to the Gulf

region, namely to Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United

Arab Emirates.

However, while improving joint training operations

and raising contributions by some MENA partners to

NATO operations (e.g. Qatar and the UAE provision of air

assets in NATOs intervention in Libya), the main objec-

tive of better mutual understandinga problem which the

EUs Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is also facing -

has not been achieved.

This is to a large extent owed to the ongoing Arab-

Israeli conflict and accusations of double-standards in

Western democracy promotion after having prominently

supported North African and Middle Eastern authoritarian

leaders in repressing their populations over the past dec-

ades. It is therefore seen as crucial by the workshop partic-

ipants to work around political restrictions at the govern-

mental levels which have oftentimes led to the calling off

of joint discussions or summits. Instead it is seen as neces-

sary to encourage dialogue among the civil society and

especially the youth to ensure that the negative rhetoric

towards NATO and its Member States is met by a realistic

perspective on NATO missions and objectives. We there-

fore suggest setting up a comprehensive forum for dialogue

including young people from NATO and MENA countries

who will then be able to further promote a realistic image

of NATO into its respective national communities. Fur-

thermore, the outcome of these workshops which may

be conducted to some extent via online communications

could be generating suggestions on improving the partner-

ship from the eyes of the youth.

Collective Cyber Defense (by Tobias Metzger)

Since the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia and the use of


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Legislation and the question of attribution: NATO should

encourage the political and judiciary processes

necessary to shape a future legislation going be-

yond the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Warfare

which is intended as a mere expression of opin-

ions. The difficulty will be to create a frame-

work of rules which are flexible enough to cope

with the quickly evolving and somewhat unpre-

dictable technology. This process will also have

to define whether technical changes are going to

be necessary in order to ensure future attribu-

tion to clearly identify perpetrators with all of

the implications for issues of loss of anonymity

and privacy.

Pooling and sharing: The current budgetary situation

has led, within NATO as well as within the EU,

to new strategies of smart defense (NATO) or

pooling and sharing (EDA). All stages of cyber

defense from R&D to cyber investigations need

to be clearly aligned across the institutions over-

coming the jealousy and competition occasional-

ly visible in previous high level discussions.

Fouzia Bencheikh is an LLM candidate at the Universi-ty of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies in Brus-sels, Belgium.

Alon Gilboa is a graduate student of Political Scienceand International Relations at Leiden University, The Nether-lands.

Tobias Metzgeris a graduate student of InternationalConflict and Security at the University of Kent, BrusselsSchool of International Studies (BSIS) in Brussels, Belgium.

Enitsa Gabrovska is currently pursuing an MSc degreein Political Science with specialization in International Rela-tions at Leiden University, The Netherlands.

Dario Sabbioni is currently a Political Strategy andCommunication Masters student at the Brussels School ofInternational Studies of the University of Kent.

cyber attacks in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, cyber

threats have emerged as a new potential domain of warfare

next to land, sea, air and space. Since then, multiple ac-

tors, including online activists or hacktivists, have used

the internet for means of disturbance, propaganda, espio-

nage as well as acts of destruction as seen in the 2010 Stux-

net attack destroying centrifuges in Iranian nuclear facili-

ties. According to internet security provider Symantec,

more than 5 billion cyber attacks were blocked in 2011

alone. The main difficulties in countering any of these in-

trusions are on the one hand the difficulty of definite at-

tribution (although news reports have been suggested that

some of the recent acts of cyber espionage have been con-

ducted from Chinese computers) and the unclear legality

of the cyber domain. Whereas the Geneva Convention

clearly outlines the jus in bello the techniques allowed

to be used in warfare a similar cyber Geneva Conven-

tion is far from existent.

Media and political attention has increased and cyber

security and defense have been on the agenda of all NATO

Summits since 2004 in Istanbul. In addition, the European

Union has recently presented its own European Cyber

Security Strategy highlighting the need for enhanced co-

operation with the civil society and the private sector.

During the workshop discussions three areas of activityin cyber defense have emerged:

Information sharing: NATO needs to work closely

with the EU, the Member States and the private

sector to ensure an effective division of labor

each focusing on its core competencies. This

means that NATO and the EU should develop

joint approaches for intelligence sharing in order

to create a truly comprehensive approach across

the private and public sectors. The difficulties lie

in generating enough political will to ensure

sufficient transparency in every Member State

since the overall security of the internet is deter-

mined by its weakest link.

About the author


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Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the publics knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

the expansion of ATAs international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do notnecessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates orstaff.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-

able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues

of importance to the NATO Alliance.

For details of how to submit your work please see our website.

Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the

address listed below.

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and re-in the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are theperty of NATO.

Editor: Jason Wiseman

ATA Programs

From 14-15 March, the Armenian Atlantic Association togeth-

er with its youth branch Armenian Youth Atlantic Association will

host a youth conference The Black Sea Region: Bringing Future

Decision Makers Together in the Changing World.

From 4-6 April, the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association

(EATA) will host a NATO-EU Roundtable in Tallinn to discuss

various topics related to the

work and cooperation of

NATO and the EU. This

event will bring together 60

students in order to in-

crease the knowledge of

young people in foreign and security policy to discuss the working

principles of NATO.

Visit www.globsec.org/globsec2013/ to learn more about the

Slovak Atlantic Commissions upcoming Globsec Conference on

18-20 April. Dont miss the opportunity to apply for the Young

Leaders Forum and join one of the leading security and foreignpolicy forums in the world.

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