Atlantic voices, vol. 4, no. 2

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 2 1

The recently concluded Geneva II confer-

ence made apparent that the warring parties have

solidified their positions and that any form of ne-

gotiation has turned into a strenuous effort.

Having missed the opportunity for a mili-

tary engagement of Western forces in the conflict

over pressure from Moscow and capitulating in

the face of the inability to bring the opposing par-

ties to the negotiation table , it is now up to the

Western community to contemplate the effective

implementation of the Chemical Weapons Dis-

armament initiative.

In light of the first delays in the disman-

tling process and the continuously rising death toll

throughout the country, the question of to what

extent the CW disarmament has any actual po-

tential to reduce the suffering of the Syrian people

is at the forefront of everyone’s mind.

As the war continues, the European intelli-

gence community is considering the potential

threat that returning foreign fighters may pose

after hostilities have ended.

- Leonard Rauch and Klaudia Tani

Contents:

A Syrian Solution: Chemical Weapons Disarmament & The

Hopes of Geneva II

Jozef Kosc interviews Amb. Prof. Bolewski on the situation in Syria

prior to Geneva II with regards to the effect of NATO, EU and UN

actions and gives a brief analyses of the current state of affairs and what

to expect.

Coming Home: The Syrian Civil War and Europe’s Jihadi

Fighters

Alexander Corbeil examines the migration of European fighters to the

Syrian theatre and the implications of their potential return to their

former home countries.

Syria: 3 Years of Civil War Chemical Weapons Disarmament, Geneva II and the

Threat of Foreign Fighters

Volume 4- Issue 2 February 2014

Rebel fighter in close urban combat (Photo: The Guardian)


The Security Council resolution 2118 sets out the

deadline of June 30th, 2014 for the destruction of production

facilities and the removal of chemical weapons through

transportation out of Syrian territory. With the exception of

a few armaments to be destroyed within Syrian borders, the

then removed chemical weapons are to be destroyed at sea,

with maritime secu-

rity for the mission

provided by Russia,

China, Denmark and

Norway. In January

2014, the OPCW

announced its first

major success in the

transportation and

destruction of chem-

ical weapons. Alt-

hough ample support

for the project has

come in the form of

financial assistance from the European Union and the Cana-

dian government, amongst other sovereign state partners,

the project is not expected to finish by the aforementioned

deadline. By late January 2014, merely 4 percent of the

chemical weapons stock had been handed to the UN-OPCW

mission by Syrian authorities, giving rise to calls of incom-

petence and unclear motives from US officials. On their

part, Syrian authorities blame slow progress on technical

issues arising from the violent instability of the region. Oth-

ers suggest an intentional slowdown on the part of the al-

Assad regime, desperate to secure itself as a key and legiti-

mate partner in the eyes of the world throughout the Gene-

I n the weeks following a chemical weapons attack on

civilians in Damascus on August 21st 2013, US Presi-

dent Barrack Obama considered a US-led military

missile strike against al-Assad’s regime, with the allied

assistance of UK and French forces. Although Obama’s

deliberation was lauded by independent policy experts and

humanitarian pro-

ponents of the

“Responsibility to

Protect”, diplomatic

opposition from

Russia swiftly fol-

lowed suit. After

Russian Foreign

Minister Sergei

Lavrov accused re-

bel forces for the

attack, US Secretary

of State John Kerry

and Minister Lavrov

began an intense

series of negotiations over alternative methods of interven-

tion and protection in the region. Eventually, the US and

Russia agreed to opt for an ambitious project of chemical

weapons disarmament across the Syrian state as an alterna-

tive to military intervention. This decision was solidified in

a UN Security Council resolution on September 28th 2013,

and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons (OPCW) has been on the ground in Syria since

October 1st. The destruction of some of the chemical

weapons production facilities in Syria began shortly after-

wards on October 6th.

A Syrian Solution

Chemical Weapons Disarmament & The Hopes of Geneva II

Geopolitical Map of Syrian Civil War (Photo: ACAPS)


va II rounds of negotiation over peaceful settlement.

The presence of the OPCW since last October, howev-

er, has not deterred conventional weapons violence in the re-

gion. More than 5000 people have been killed each month, on

average and without stop, since July 2012. The official death

count now includes over 7000 children and 5000 women. Be-

tween October 2013, and February 2014, an additional 25,000

people have perished as a result of cross-fire between insur-

gents, rebels and Syrian state military forces. These official

figures do not account for over 7000 detained or kidnapped

persons, nor for the countless unreported

victims—their names intentionally undis-

closed as both rebel and government forces

attempt to keep casualty numbers artificial-

ly low. Such rampant violence continues to

give rise to great humanitarian concerns; as

the number of internally displaced persons continues to in-

crease, tens of thousands of fugitives continue to seek shelter in

refugee camps as far away as Northern Kurdistan and Turkey.

Most recent reports from the UN Office for the Coordination

of Humanitarian Affairs suggest that approximately 9.3 million

people are in desperate need of humanitarian relief, including

access to water, adequate sanitation and health care.

Sectarian-Regional Violence: The Role of Iraq, Leba-

non & Emerging Security Issues

Even worse, violence in Syria is now spilling over sov-

ereign borders. The context of civil war has provided uncon-

tested cover for the free movement of terrorist cells between

Syria and neighbouring countries. The al-Qaeda affiliated Is-

lamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) operating across West-

ern Iraq and the Eastern provinces of Syria, is attempting to

unite radical Sunni opposition forces under the banner of a new

and unified Islamic Emirate. Unsurprisingly, ISIS militants are

the largest cause of terrorist attacks in both states. As violence

continues to tear apart the Western Iraqi province of Anbar,

raising the black flag of al-Qaeda from Falluja to Ramadi for

the first time since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2007,

NATO’s former top military commander, James Stavridis, has

warned of an escalating wave of sectarian violence in the re-

gion. Last year witnessed the bloodiest loss of life in Iraq

since 2007: nearly 9000 deaths as a result of sectarian at-

tacks and suicide bombings. The Western-backed Free Syri-

an Army has seen recent violent confrontation with ISIS and

other al-Qaeda-backed militias in northern Syria, with

fighting centered in-and-around the city-stronghold of Alep-

po. Merely one month into the New Year, fighting between

moderate and radical Sunni groups has claimed almost 700

lives.

The Sunni-Shia struggle, lately manifest as an under-

current to the Syrian civil war, has long

divided the Middle East on ideological and

political grounds. NATO-friendly coun-

tries including the Gulf States and Saudi

Arabia have pledged their support of rebel

Sunni forces in Syria, whereas Shiite Iran,

Iraq and Lebanon have henceforth strongly backed the al-

Assad regime. A wave of greater sectarian violence is also

not out of the question in Lebanon—where the radical Shi-

ite terrorist group Hezbollah is engaged in a small civil war

w i t h t h e S u n n i N u s r a F r o n t .

Recent European intelligence reports confirm that

Hezbollah has amped its recruiting efforts across Europe,

facilitating the travel of hopeful militants from Lebanon into

contested Syrian territory. More than 5000 European citi-

zens have joined militant groups and jihadist networks in the

struggle for Syria. No doubt, European countries now face

the dual-dilemma of protecting their citizens abroad, and

dissuading them from potential radicalization upon their

return home.

NATO’s Response

In an attempt to protect NATO and NATO-allied

powers from spillover violence, the alliance provided the

south of Turkey with Patriot missiles in 2012. The possibil-

ity of NATO military intervention in Syria under the

“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine of international rela-

tions is not presently on any diplomatic negotiation table.

Nevertheless, as the world looks to the Geneva II series of

negotiations for a resolution to civil strife, Western powers

ought to consider the security concerns of Turkey and its

Near Eastern allies in the Gulf—if violence does not cease

Merely one month into the New Year, fighting between moderate and radical Sunni groups has

claimed almost 700 lives.


to escalate. Other geopolitical concerns such as increas-

ing security efforts alongside regional borders ought to

remain a secondary—yet nevertheless crucially im-

portant—task, alongside the primary drive to open

access for refugees and increase humanitarian aid across

the region.

Interview with Ambassador Bolewski

I had the privilege of asking former Ambassador

and now Professor Wilfried Bolewski about his per-

spectives on the ongoing Syrian civil war, the legality of

foreign military intervention, and the process of chemi-

cal weapons disarmament in the context of peace nego-

tiations. Ambassador Bolewski has led a long and varied

career in international law and diplomacy. He gained

practical experience in International Security Policy at

the UN Conference on Disarmament – including

Chemical Weapons –,

NATO’s Nuclear Planning

Group, NATO Defense Col-

lege and at the NATO desk of

the German Foreign Ministry.

Ambassador Bolewski now

teaches diplomacy and interna-

tional law at the American

Graduate School in Paris and

the Institut d'Études Politiques

de Paris (Sciences Po).

Thank you very much for

your time Ambassador; it has been

a busy past few weeks in the world of international relations,

and with an array of various media perspectives, it helps to

have some clarity from an expert.

My first question. When Obama proposed a coalition

armed strike against the Syrian regime in early September,

sentiments were mixed—both within the domestic sphere of the

United States, and at the international level of diplomacy. In

the context of international law, was there ever a legal justifi-

cation for military intervention?

Ambassador Bolewski: The pre-conditions for a

military intervention in Syria under the Responsibility to

Protect (crimes against humanity) were and still remain

fulfilled: more than 100,000 people killed by the Assad

regime in conventional civil strife, 4 million internally

displaced, 2 million trans-border refugees, more than

1,400 people killed through attacks by Government activi-

ties, recognizable in the UN Inspectors Report by the

origin of weapons and ballistic trajectory.

The (limited) legitimate aims of such an interven-

tion would be to neutralize or destroy the infrastructure

and organs of the regime responsible for the commitment

of the said atrocities and to prevent, deter and incapacitate

any future use of Chemical and Conventional Weapons,

preferably against 3 C installations – Command, Control,

Communication.

Do you think that the deadline for

foreign military intervention has passed? What

if Damascus fails to comply with OPCW re-

quests?

Ambassador Bolewski: Con-

trary to the immediacy of a reaction in

the case of self-defence there is no time

limit to the duty to protect civilians as

long as the threat to their lives persists.

Since the UN-SC Resolution of

September 28, 2013 does not include any

automatic sanctions in case of non-compliance any new

UN-SC Resolution would be faced with the same veto

unless the recent French proposal of self-restraint in case

of mass crimes would apply to the P 5.

What makes the use of chemical weapons so much more

grievous than other forms of violence? Is there an international

law outlining strict prohibition?

Ambassador Bolewski: Syria ratified in 1968

the 1025 Geneva Protocol on the Protection of the Use of

Chemical Weapons in war and it recently signed the

US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov agree to push for chemical weapons

disarmament process in Syria. (Photo: Getty Images)


Chemical Weapons Convention of 1003. The use of

Chemical Weapons has been recognized as a Crime Against

Humanity in International Customary Law.

The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition

Forces criticized the US-Russian decision on disarmament, noting

that “Chemical weapons use is just one

of the many crimes against humanity

Assad is committing against the Syri-

an people...” General Salim Idris,

head of the Supreme Military Council

of the rebel Free Syrian Army, also criticized the resolution for

failing to hold al-Assad accountable for any crime. Do you think

that chemical weapons disarmament will do anything to stop the

ongoing civil war?

Ambassador Bolewski: The political criticism

against this CW Disarmament initiative is based on the

following:

The Assad regime is elevated to a partner in dis-

armament and it thus regains a new legitimacy for

at least one year.

The International Community seems more con-

cerned about weapons than the protection and assis-

tance for civilians under continuous attack,

Disarmament seems to take priority over crisis

management of underlying causes and expectations.

In fact, the disarmament initiative as a shield against

military intervention is seen as a deceptively attractive

manoeuvre of diversion and a diplomatic pipe dream in

relation to the need for the topical crisis management be-

cause it is:

Technically impracticable to destroy CW stocks in

war-time,

Inefficient to stop conventional as well as chemical

war crimes.

Recent reports indicate that as many as 19 rebel groups

are actively opposing political negotiations with al-Assad at the

proposed upcoming Geneva II peace talks. Are you optimistic?

Ambassador Bolewski: The success of future

Geneva II negotiations will depend on:

A cease-fire,

Inclusive participation of

all regional fractions,

Protection of minorities and

Eventually, an out-of-the-box, innovative approach,

including a rethinking of the State in the Middle

East along ethnic, linguistic and sectarian communi-

ties. This could lead to new sovereign states build-

ing transnational stability among neighbours in re-

gional groupings.

Final question. Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani,

has called for the expulsion of terrorist groups from Syria, along-

side the destruction of chemical weapons. Would Western leaders

benefit from including Iran in the upcoming negotiations?

Ambassador Bolewski: The inclusion of Iran

and its recognition as a leading regional power seems to be

a condition sine qua non to any sustainable solution of the

regional conflict.

Thank you once again for your time and for your assis-

tance.

Jozef Kosc is a Junior Research Fellow at the NATO

Council of Canada, and Lead Editor of The Paris Globalist

Foreign Affairs Magazine. He has represented Canada at

UNESCO and at the NATO Post-2014 Conference. While

studying at the University of Toronto and Sciences Po Par-

is, he is co-authoring a book on international development

policy with the International Association for Political Sci-

ence Students and Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

“The inclusion of Iran and its recognition as a leading regional power seems to be a condi-tion sine qua non to any sustainable solution

About the author


Coming Home

The Syrian Civil War and Europe’s Jihadi Fighters

I n Syria, nearly three years of violence has transformed

a protest movement for democracy into a protracted

civil war. As is common with many drawn-out con-

flicts, issues of identity have replaced the initial causal fac-

tors; obscuring the conflict’s true nature. Into the vacuum

created by violence, a lack of central authority and com-

munal hatred, there have emerged

a number of radical Islamic groups.

Better disciplined, armed, financed

and more experienced than their

moderate and secular counterparts

they aim to create an Islamic cali-

phate in or including Syria. To do

so they must first topple the gov-

ernment of Bashar al-Assad, a task

for which they have increasing en-

listed the help of foreign fighters, a

shockingly significant amount of

which are from Western Europe.

According to The International Centre for the

Study of Radicalization (ICSR) there are between 396 and

1,937 Western Europeans fighting in Syria, representing

18% of the 3,000 to 11,000 foreign combatants. This

three-fold increase in the number of Western European

fighters since the ICSR’s first estimate in April has primari-

ly fed the ranks of al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate, Jabhat

al-Nusra; the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), a

now disavowed al-Qaeda spinoff; and to a lesser extent,

the Syrian Salafist alliance the Islamic Front. Not only do

these fighters present a security threat to the Syrian people

and an affront to their struggle for democracy, some Euro-

pean jihadists may return home to carry out domestic ter-

rorist operations.

To understand the threat posed by Europeans

fighting in Syria it is important to evaluate their motiva-

tions for fighting overseas and the transformative process

of participating in a foreign jihadist conflict. By doing so it

becomes clear that preventative measures, both in terms of

social outreach and policing, are best suited to both curtail

the flow of Europeans to Syria and to thwart experience

fighters from carrying out attacks on European soil.

Joining the Mujahedeen

“I didn’t travel across the

world, spend a lot of money and leave

my comfortable life style just to come

here and blow up some kids. I could

have done that back home.” – Ibrahim

al-Mazwagi, now deceased British

national with the Katiba al -

Muhajireen.

One of the main questions that

continually plague those researching foreign fighters is why

some Muslim men chose to participate in conflicts overseas

instead of perpetrating attacks at home. Given increased

monitoring and more vigilant techniques of security ser-

vices, in addition to the West’s post-9/11 obsession with

securitizing travel, domestic attacks would seem to be the

easiest way in which to target the “enemies of Islam”.

Instead, analysts such as Thomas Hegghammer,

Director of terrorism research with the Norwegian De-

fence Research Establishment, have noted that an over-

whelming number of jihadists prefer to take their struggle

to foreign battlefields. According to Hegghammer, out of

the 689 Islamist fighters from Europe between 2001 and

2010, 500 took to participating in conflicts overseas.

While this 3:1 ratio of foreign to domestic fighters repre-

sents a drastic reduction from the 1990-2001 level of 13:1,

estimates of Western Europeans fighting in Syria have

pushed the ratio further in favor of foreign fighters.

Foreign Fighters in Syria (Photo: alalam.ir)


While Hegghammer’s analysis precedes the beginning

of the Syrian uprising many of his conclusions remain relevant

and can be built upon to partially explain the popularity of Syr-

ian conflict among Western European fighters. As alluded to

previously, the expansion of anti-terrorism units, increased

technological oversight and the quick reaction of security ser-

vices to terrorist attacks do play a role. Though, in a manner

that would surprise many. The opportunity for multiple at-

tacks is greatly reduced when perpetrated in Europe, given the

competence of security officials and a variety of technological

advancements and tracking mechanisms.

In comparison, participation in a foreign

conflict where there is an absence of

central authority and in many cases jihadi

groups present the only governing struc-

ture that allows participants to fight for a

much longer period of time. For many fighters martyrdom is

the end goal, though they would rather make their name on

the battlefield—a process that takes time—and die as heroes

among their mujahedeen brethren. Viewed in this light, Syria

presents an immeasurable opportunity for European fighters to

participate in a perceived holy war for an extended period.

While opportunity partially explains why Europeans are drawn

to foreign conflicts, it is not likely the driving factor. Rather,

the present narrative of the conflict allows fighters to justify

their participation. Given the ongoing atrocities committed by

the Assad government—the direct targeting of civilians; the

indiscriminate use of chemical weapons and recently, mass

starvation—it can be argued that there is a clear rational and

even morally defensible line of argument for participation in

the conflict. Furthermore, the protracted nature of this civil

war and the involvement of pro-government Shiite fighters

from Hezbollah, Iraq and Iran, allow the Syrian conflict to be

presented through the lens of sectarianism.

Islamic clerics, both within Europe and those who have

taken to social media, (particularly YouTube, Facebook and

Twitter) are keen to push this sectarian narrative. In this man-

ner the foreign fighter is not seen as a terrorist but rather a

volunteer participating in an existential battle against a defined

and importantly, armed foe, whose goal is to subjugate fellow

Sunnis. Unlike those who commit violent acts at home, foreign

fighters are praised for their protection of their coreligionists

and with this religious stamp of approval, justify their involve-

ment.

This narrative has been bolstered by the evolution of

al-Qaeda and like-minded groups. While terrorism was

once the bread and butter of radical jihadists, they have in-

creasingly become involved in warfare against state authori-

ties in the wider Muslim world in their attempts to establish

localized or global caliphates by creating facts on the

ground. The capture of territory and the overthrow of a

secular or Western-aligned regime in view of establishing an

Islamic state resonates more with these foreign fighters.

In the age of information technology the narrative is

further enforced from the battlefield.

Syria is the most video recorded conflict

in history, thanks to the proliferation of

cellphone cameras and the aforemen-

tioned social media platforms. Various

jihadist belligerents post tailored and

extremely professional videos on pro-al-Qaeda forums such

as al-Fida and al-Shamukh and on a number of Twitter ac-

counts. Within these video series, such as ISIS’s Messages

from the Land of Epic Battles, now in its eighteenth install-

ment, jihadist fighters are portrayed in a heroic manner;

combatants who have gained the support of Syria’s Sunni

polity. Absent from the carefully manufactured narrative are

the constant human rights abuses perpetrated by ISIS and

the recent widespread rejection of the group in Northern

and Eastern Syria.

The Radicalization Process In Syria

“The environment here will change the people, they will

think in a different [way], because they lived in Europe and

[Europe is safe], you don’t see the things you’ll see here.” – Abu

Abdi Rahman, a now deceased Swedish fighter in the Katiba al-

Muhajireen

Joining the fight in Syria should not be seen as synon-

ymous with the will to perpetrate attacks at home. Many of

those who enter the fray in Syria would not have taken part

in plots on home soil. A lack of religious clarity on targeting

civilians coupled with a probable moral apprehension to-

ward such acts most likely played a role in the decision to

fight overseas. It is once these fighters enter a theatre of

jihadi combat that they become more prone to perpetrating

acts of terrorism upon their return. According to Heggham-

mer, there is a one-in-nine radicalization rate, which makes,

“…foreign fighter experience one of the strongest predictors of individual

involvement in domestic opera-tions…”


“…foreign fighter experience one of the strongest pre-

dictors of individual involvement in domestic opera-

tions…” Out of these foreign-turned-domestic fighters

there have been two noticeable trends which led to

their recruitment: those that set out to fight but instead

are made central members of a foreign plot, with their

implicit consent and those who become radicalized by

their own accord.

As of the writing of this article there are no

credible indications that terrorist groups based in Syria

intend to carry out attacks in the West in the near fu-

ture. Though, as the conflict continues and radical

groups are allowed to flourish in ungoverned spaces,

the possibility of global terrorist attacks emanating in

Syria increases. For the time being, the most grave se-

curity concern is the radicalization of individual fight-

ers, who alone or in tandem with other Europeans may

seek to carry out domestic plots.

This process

occurs within Syria.

Potential foreign fight-

ers must first establish

contact with radical

groups or their repre-

sentatives, raise the

required funds and pay

for their travel to Tur-

key; the primary entry

point for jihadists.

They are then kept in

safe houses in prepara-

tion for their entrance

into Syria. Then, the combination of Turkey’s loose

border control policy and the porousness of the coun-

try’s 910 kilometer-long shared boundary with Syria

allows fighters to slip undetected into the conflict.

Once in Syria, these fighters are subjected to an

intense regimen, both in terms of military training and

religious indoctrination. It is here that the radicalization

process continues, one which may hold the possibility

of inspiring fighters to return home and carry out at-

tacks within Europe. Isolation plays a large role in this

process, as fighters are constantly surrounded by other

militants. Unlike the first timers, many of the mid- to

high-ranking militants in Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS are ca-

reer jihadists. The latter have cut their teeth in a number

of conflicts, and given both groups’ Iraqi groups, fought

against American and British troops or have trained direct-

ly under those that have. Unlike their Western counter-

parts they espouse a more fundamentalist version of Islam

which views the United States and its European allies as

the, “Far Enemy”; the near enemy being secular and sup-

posedly apostate Arab regimes. Their worldviews, particu-

larly those in favour of operations against the West may

leave their mark on impressionable Western Europeans

who have joined the campaign in Syria.

Also of great importance is the religious guidance of

brigade clerics. While in the West potential fighters have

access to a variety of religious leaders in their communi-

ties—and thus opinions—in Syria they are relegated to the

religious doctrine propagated by the fighting group and its

leaders. In this context, and particularly true in the case of

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra,

militants are taught that

self-sacrifice in the form

of suicide bombing is

religiously condoned. A

suicide truck-bombing by

a British jihadist in Jabhat

al-Nusra during the siege

of Aleppo’s central pris-

on on February 6 high-

lights the issue at hand.

Known by the nom de

guerre Abu Suleiman al-

Britani, he is believed to

be the first British fighter to carry out a martyrdom opera-

tion, and is proof of the effectiveness of radical indoctrina-

tion. The worry is that these same groups will both influ-

ence and provide the operational knowhow for Western

Europeans to conduct attacks at home.

What Should Be Done?

The current focus of extremist groups on conflicts

within Muslim lands, particularly within Syria, has allowed

them to recruit fighters hesitant or unwilling to carry out

domestic attacks. A morally justifiable struggle, backed by

religious doctrine and presented in an existential light,

British suicide bomber Ibrahim al Mazwagi (Photo:Channel4 news)


Syria has been a recruiting goldmine for Jabhat al-Nusra

and ISIS. Western European fighters now flock to Syria to

defend their coreligionists, become heroes and, both im-

plicitly and explicitly, in search of adventure. While many

step on the battlefield as naïve young men it is the partici-

pation in a jihadist conflict that may set them down the

path towards participation in or masterminding of domes-

tic attacks. Viewed in this manner it is apparent that pre-

ventative methods must be employed in a robust fashion.

Required is a multi-pronged approach, one which enlists

the resources of security organizations, police, social

workers and most importantly, community and religious

leaders.

Those at risk of joining the Syrian conflict must be

educated about the reality of the Syrian civil war and the

atrocities committed by jihadists groups, not just those of

the Assad regime—a job well suited for community lead-

ers. Social workers must help Muslim families adjust to life

in Western Europe, help young men find jobs and smooth

the integration process. Police and security agencies need

to be proactive, to ensure that those who intend to fight in

Syria are dissuaded from doing so and are kept under close

watch, given the threat to domestic security. The recent

Cities Conference on Foreign Fighters in Syria held by the

European Commission showed the willingness of repre-

sentatives of 23 European cities to tackle the issue at hand

with the participation of community leaders, social work-

ers and police and security forces. While important, an

articulated common strategy, the result of a sustained mul-

ti-pronged initiative, is required to tackle the issue at hand.

Furthermore, the tracking of Western European fighters

and their detainment for evaluation and possible persecu-

tion upon return is crucial to protecting the continent

from domestic attacks.

Alexander Corbeil is a senior Middle East

analyst with The NATO Council of Canada

and a blogger with the Foreign Policy Associa-

tion. Alexander focuses on the role of radical

Islamic groups in the Syrian conflict and

neighboring Lebanon. You can follow him

@alex_corbeil.

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Sherlock, Ruth. Al-Qaeda recruits entering Syria from Turkey safehouses . October 30, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10415935/Al-Qaeda-recruits-entering-Syria-from-Turkey-safehouses.html (accessed January 30, 2014).

Zelin, Aaron Y. ICSR Insights: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria, Steep Rise Among Western Europeans. De-cember 17, 2013. http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreing-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/ (accessed December 19, 2013).

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The Norwegian Atlantic Committee hosted its 49th annual

security conference from 3-4 February at the Leangkollen Hotel in

Asker, Norway. This year’s event was titled: The Rise of East Asia:

Implications for Great Power Relations and the Transatlantic Relationship.

The conference was introduced by the Norwegian Minister of For-

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opportunity to meet with US officials, senior representatives and

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Atlantic voices, vol. 4, no. 2

News & Politics