Atr VIII Cases

7/28/2019 Atr VIII Cases

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Spouses Badua vs Cordillera Bodong AdministrationConstitutional LawJudicial Power

Spouses Badua were occupying a parcel of land in Abra. The said land isbeing claimed by Quema. Quema said he sold the land to a certain Dra.Valera but then he was able to repurchase the land later from the samedoctor. The Baduas however contend that they were the ones who boughtthe land from Valera but that they cannot produce the deed of sale

because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued the Baduas notbefore the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal Court. TheMTC is composed of elders respected in the community and that it isalleged that their decision is likewise respected. It is likewise a branch ofthe Cordillera Bodong Administration. Non-compliance to the MTCdecision would result to community ostracism. The MTC resolved theissue by granting the land to Quema. The Baduas were then ordered tovacate the land. The Baduas refused. Thereafter the Baduas received awarning order from the CPLA the military branch of the MTC. This

brought fear t the couple which led to Leonors running away and Rosasarrest. They were threatened by the CPLA hence they appeal before theSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.

HELD:No, the MTC is not a competent court. The CordilleraAUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence. Hence, theCordillera Bodong Councilwhich would have received judicial power,granted CARs autonomy never possessed judicial power. Hence, theMTC its supposed branch likewise never received judicial power.Therefore, it cannot validly decide on cases neither can it enforce itsdecision.

Josue Javellana vs Executive SecretaryConstitutional LawPolitical QuestionValidity of the 1973ConstitutionRestriction to Judicial Power

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjointhe Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the saidconstitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void becausethe same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President isw/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the

proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify suchconstitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majorityof the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by theascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise ofhis political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence toshow such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumedthat the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. Thequestion of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political questionwhich was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Theirratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

De La Llana vs AlbaConstitutional LawPolitical Questionif there is no question of law

involvedBP 129In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was p assed. Dela Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one ofthe judges that would be removed because of the reorganization andsecond, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provisionwhich provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averredthat only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed bythe legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court isempowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of atleast eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses thecompetence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the

President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to bedistinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, thereis in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with anoccupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that

from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment ofsecurity of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents ofinferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.

Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member ofthe judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore,it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional

construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest


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consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure toaccord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render

advisory opinions. No question of law is invol ved. If such were the case,certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken byeither of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by wayof deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither isthere any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positionscreated by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executiveto whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from thetried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to beachieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility tothe charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing theinferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested inthis Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thusbe free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernibleexcept to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a

construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in thechoice of alternatives between one which would save and another whichwould invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Almario vs AlbaPolitical LawAmendment to the Constitution

As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate willgo to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or rejectamendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105,110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposedamendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered

by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin thesubmission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (grant as anadditional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and asocial reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the

people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been nofair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentinov. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the

plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaningand implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature andeffect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the peopleon a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposedamendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely,whether or not grant of public land and urban land reform are unwiseor improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments areunnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questionsare presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or somemembers of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode ofdisposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy isto vote NO in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion tothe proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters anopportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us hasnothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, theirdesirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue iswhether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or thedangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that theaverage voter does not know the meaning of grant of public land or of

urban land reform.

Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC

Political LawAmendment to the ConstitutionOn 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a nationalreferendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) toresolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interimassembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period ofits existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President ofhis present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued anotherrelated decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, bydeclaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner ofvoting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the nationalreferendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submittedto the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. TheDecree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continuedopposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evincestheir desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru aconstitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-

plebiscite of October 16.On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with PreliminaryInjunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding


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and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declarewithout force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofaras they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PresidentialDecree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections tosupervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscitescheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President toexercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the newConstitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that thequestion is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance ofit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to theConstitution.

HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raisesa judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power ofthe Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals ofamendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, isseriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the powerto propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim

National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, TransitoryProvisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in itsactive session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the

prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 ofArt. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed.Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself intoa constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposalof amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thruPresidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite onOctober 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure foramendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to

be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing PresidentialDecree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have theforce and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of thevalidity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within thecompetence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of thenew Constitutionprovides: All cases involving the constitutionality of atreaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by theSupreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may

be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten

Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the constructionnot only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. Theamending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in forma delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court isvested with that authority to determine whether that power has beendischarged within its limits.This petition is however dismissed. The President can proposeamendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those

proposals to the people in sufficient time.

Josue Javellana vs Executive SecretaryConstitutional LawPolitical QuestionValidity of the 1973

ConstitutionRestriction to Judicial PowerIn 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjointhe Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the saidconstitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void becausethe same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President isw/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the

proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify suchconstitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majorityof the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by theascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise ofhis political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence toshow such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumedthat the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. Thequestion of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political questionwhich was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Theirratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

Taada and Diosdado Macapagal vs CuencoConstitutional LawPolitical Question

After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. TheSenate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. Thelone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was asenatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before theSET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members.It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices,3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority

party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SETmembers supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.


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Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that ifthe SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member ofthe Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco etal (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance ofthe issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the powerto choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and theremedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicialcourts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor ofLorenzo and Diosdado. The termPolitical Question connotes what itmeans in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers tothose questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the

people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Gonzales vs COMELEC** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC

Constitutional LawPolitical Question vs Justiciable QuestionOne of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission ofcertain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled onthe same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this wasunlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the

people who would be more interested in the issues involved in theelection. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised

before the courts because it is a political one.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there isnothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to isa special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previousamendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people forratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it

best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negateits authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in generalelections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if thecrux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or

the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a politicalone.

Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo RoxasConstitutional LawJudicial PowerDefined

Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections.Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. ThePET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall

be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be thesole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of thePhilippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appealhis loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and thePET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET isunconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also,since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other tenmembers of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed

before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PETdecision is appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested

in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by lawThis provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merelysome specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under

our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power,except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some otheragency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of theHouse of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solelyin the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,respectively.Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies ordisputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before thecourts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1)defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribingremedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with

jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the firstinstance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains thatCongress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
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jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth inthe fundamental law.The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validlylegislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additionalfunctions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because thedetermining of election contests is essentially judicial.

Ricardo Santiago vs Commissioner Bautista of ImmigrationsConstitutional LawJudicial PowerJusticiable Controversy

CitizenshipSantiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate ofregistration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipinomother and a Chinese father here in the Philippines. He was sent toChina when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in 1925 and inhis Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, hewould like to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau ofImmigrations. In his original petition however in the lower court he was

praying for a declaratory relief for him to be declared as a Filipino. Hewas favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratoryrelief is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decisionnot stating the declaratory statement but rather focusing on thecancellation of the alien certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have ajudicial declaration of citizenship.

HELD: The SC ruled against Santiago. Although amended, theproceeding initiated and originally prayed for is a declaratory relief tohave him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be noaction or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of anindividual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justifiablecontroversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and

enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an accidentonly of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, thecourt may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, forinstance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration tothe effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimatechild, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to

justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times,the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization,

by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing theinstitution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is partof our citizenry.

RADIOWEALTH, INC. VS AGREGADO (1950)FACTS:

1. A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker werebought for Pho 585 and installed in the second and third floor ofthe Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court.

2. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointedby the President) disapproved of the purchase and its installationinvoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases.

3. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not includepurchase of property.

4. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the paymentbe approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused tocountersign the warrant for payment.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the Judicial Dept can make purchases without

the prior approval of the Executive?

HELD: YES, they can.

RD:Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale

All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each isindependent from the other and cannot control or interfere witheach other in the exercise ofspecial functions.

Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and dowhatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain theirdignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of

justice.

Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under thelaw cannot deprive the courts of anything vital to theirfunctions.

Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchaseoffices or court rooms and furnish them. They also have to insurethat the character of these rooms would permit the court toexercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner.

In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officialsas they will be the ultimate judge in determining what isnecessary for its efficiency.


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Officials have the power to assign a particular room or courtroom to the Court of First Instance and change the assignments

provided that the new rooms are reasonable adequate.

Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room ifthey deem that the new room would be inadequate in theexercise of their duties.

If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then thecourt would have the power either to purchase things

directly or by proper proceedings to compel the officials to

perform their duties to the law.

Executive does not have power over the purchase of books andother office equipment needed for the convenient transaction ofits business.

Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if itexecutive could determine what the courts should have. They

are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of for

fixtures, equipment and supplies.

NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE

Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151,he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privilegesas those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan coveringcertain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title

The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas,requiring him to explain.

Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent tothat of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in thesame manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. Heclaims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court

Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES

and his abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only beinvestigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rankequivalent to a judge)?

SC: NO.If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and

privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and besuspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of

privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine

of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court withan administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,

simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executiveover such officials.There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge theJudiciary with administrative functions except when reasonableincidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it

exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentiallylegislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members shouldnot and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trustor to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with theadministration of judicial functions.As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a

judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right todemand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended orremoved only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would beviolative of the Constitution.The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.

Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT ajudicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive andbinding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves.Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean thatthey are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are buta minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.

LINA VS. PURISIMA

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil.

Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was

removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was

dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for beingnotoriously undesirable.

The RTC dismissed the petition because:o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the

President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity orlegality of said act is beyond the power of the courts toreview, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of theexpress limitations upon the power of the Courts inGENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.


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o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule uponthe validity or legality of any decree order or act issued byPresident Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC:The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTCinvoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarrantedabdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware thatthe Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically

inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimityamong Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive todetermine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given caseinvolving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under theauthority of martial law proclamations.Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there wasmartial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over thecase. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried onthe merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justiceare inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it

appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to beheard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interestof justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedureof remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, andinstead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final

judgment on the merits.SC reinstated Lina to work.

Garcia vs Macaraig JrPolitical LawSeparation of Powers

Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and SanPablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newlycreated CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1,1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the dutiesand functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be

properly established due to problems as to location and as toappropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraigrealized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside overhis court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he hadworked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure ofduties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all theleave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed

by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed uponrespondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being

extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending tothe needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaintalleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted inviolation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has notsubmitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And thatMacaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that hehas not been performing the duties of a judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence anddishonesty as Judge.

HELD: Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under thecircumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the

bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma ofbeing a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond hiscontrol prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the otherhand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks withfavor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed

in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection withhis work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line

between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating orworking with other offices or officers under the other great departmentsof the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lestthe principle of separation of powers on which our government rests bymandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by

practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of thepublic service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of theindependence of said three departments from each other, limited only bythe specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and

among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than theserving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences orexigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our

present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even thelowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where hisactuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would besubject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before theycan have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals orthe Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feelsvery strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC


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Facts:During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing theannual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a cityfrom P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush ofmunicipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in theInternal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable offiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood

bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood billsduring the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adoptedJoint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However,the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving JointResolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentionedin the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November andDecember of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall

be exempted from the income requirement prescribed underRepublic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from

March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed tosign them.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the CityhoodLaws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of theConstitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalitiesinto cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal RevenueAllotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal

revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the LocalGovernment Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article Xof the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and theequal protection clause

Ratio:

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitutionprovides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantiallyaltered, except in accordance with the criteria established inthe local government code and subject to approval by amajority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unitsdirectly affected. (Emphasis supplied)The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units

must follow the criteria established in the Local Government

Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local GovernmentCode. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LocalGovernment Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannotwrite such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:Section 450.Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or acluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if ithas a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by

the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million

pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive yearsbased on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of thefollowing requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100)square kilometers, as certified by the Land ManagementBureau; or(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fiftythousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the

National Statistics Office.The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, populationand income of the original unit or units at the time of said

creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribedherein.(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be

properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement onland area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created iscomposed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not becontiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruingto the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, andnon-recurring income.Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion

of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section


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450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does notprovide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits avalid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditionsonly; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of thesame class.Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the

requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalitiescannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protectionclause.

VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the PeoplesCourt Act.

Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court whoheld any office or position under the Philippine ExecutiveCommission or under the government called Philippine Republic

may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under sectionthirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any officeor position under either or both the Philippine Executive

Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch,instrumentality and/or agency thereof.

"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of thegrounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section I of theRules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporarydisability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute aquorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the

President may designate such number of Judges of FirstInstance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges,having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section onehereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of saidCourt, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case isreached."

They claim that:

(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court,other than those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the PhilippineConstitution."(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Courtwho do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 4, ArticleVIII, of the Philippine Constitution."(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court bymeans of a procedure other than impeachment, contrary to

Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution."(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its

constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to theSupreme Court."(e) It creates two Supreme Courts."(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court,

contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution."(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualificationmembers of the Supreme Court who rendered said public serviceduring the Japanese occupation."(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws

"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation."(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned byArticle XV, of the Philippine Constitution."(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the'packing' of the Supreme court in certain cases, either by Congress or

by the President."

The Solgen countered that:"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act

No. 682."2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is notintended to provide an additional qualification :for members of theSupreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, ofthe Constitution of the Philippines."3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed insection 6, Article Vill of the Constitution 'apply to permanent"appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable totemporary designations under section 14, commonwealth Act No.682."5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of theSupreme Court affected to sit and vote in the particular class of casestherein mentioned.


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"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court

but merely supplements the Rules of Court."8. It is not a bill of attainder."9. It is not an ex post pacto law."10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to theJustices of the Supreme Court affected or to the treason indictees;concerned.

"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision."12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtailthe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."

ISSUES:1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground fordisqualification of a Justice.2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been dulyappointed by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only asDESIGNEE3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can

constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC.

SC:1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court whoheld any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission,would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, becausethe accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under thePEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and aduty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, thechallenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. INshort, what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a

clear repugnancy to the fundamental law.

Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravenethe provisions of the constitution.Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing atthe time of the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational andviolative of the constitution.

2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent ofthe CA, may act as Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An additional

disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation

or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in thedeliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualificationsof regular members of the SC.

NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution.The phrase unless otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorizeany legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no matter how

brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the

length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition ofthe Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitutionso long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent andunaltered.

3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge,there is no escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations ofthe the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any regularJustice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a

position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear thatthe CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the

President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, doesnot satisfy said requirement.

The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that theyhave not been appointed nor confirmed.SEC 14. NULL AND VOID.

VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRCFacts:Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month

period. Some three months after thecommencement of their employment,the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and

benefits. Theseamen demanded this increase while their vessel was onroute to a port in Australia controlled by the InternationalTransportFederation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid itsseason ITF rates.The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25%increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, theseamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated.Twomotions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied bysaid Division. Another motion forreconsideration was filed with theSupreme Court en banc which gave its due course, after finding thatthere was aneed to reconcile the decision of the Second Division withthat of the First Division with the Wallen Decision. In thatdecision, theFirst Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.


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Issue:Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Held:The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manningcontract involves the interests not only of the signatories thereto, such asthe local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the

Filipinoseamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably tothe power vested in the NSB, the law requires that allmanning contractsshall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipinoseamen abroad foreignships are dictated by national interest.

GREGORIO JANDUSAY, EUSEBIO JANDUSAY, DEMETRIAJANDUSAY and LEONILA FABRO,petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA SALVA, ESPERANZA

SALVA, PEDRO LAZO, PAULA LAZO BRIGIDO LAZO, JULIOLAZO, ARCADIA LAZO, and MACARIA LAZO, respondents.Vicente M. Macabidang, Sergio Angeles & Associates for petitioners.

R. Estrella and P. Funelas for respondent Macaria Lazo.

NARVASA, J.:The controversy at bar concerns the ownership of one of two pieces ofland embraced in a Torrens title: Parcel No. 1 of Original Certificate ofTitle No. 61 of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro, issued onAugust 7, 1911 in the name of Jorge Lingon, married to Arcadia GaniboThe lot is situated in Barrio Catiningan Pola Oriental Mindoro and has anarea of 84,964.25 square meters, more or less. 1 [As regards the other

parcel covered by the certificate of title, the record shows that Lingonhad been selling portions thereof to different individuals from 1938 to1947, a period of nine years, all said sales having been annotated on thetitle .] 2 The protagonists are1) on the one hand, the collateral relatives of Jorge Lingon, herein privaterespondents, whoafter the death of Lingon on February 16, 1949without issue (his wife, Arcadia Ganibo having died earlier) adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No. 61 invirtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed on January 14, 1956and thereafter caused cancellation of said title and the issuance of a newone in their names, TCT No. T-5420 ; 3 and2) on the other, the petitioners herein, the heirs of Dominga Marquez,who claim that in January, 1915 Jorge Lingon had sold the land

embraced in OCT No. 61 to a certain Mariano Lontok for P500 by a deedallegedly thumb-marked by Lingon before the Justice of the Peace ofPola, Oriental Mindoro, which deed was not however registered; that bya deed entitled "Escritura de Compraventa" executed on April 30, 1917and another entitled "Transfer of Real Property" executed on July 24,1918, Mariano Lontok had conveyed the same property to DomingaMarquez; and that Dominga Marquez and her children had thereaftertaken possession of the land and declared it for taxation purposes since

1918. 4Litigation over said Parcel No. 1 of OCT NO. 61 began with the filing ofa complaint for recovery of possession thereof in the Court of FirstInstance of Oriental Mindoro by herein private respondents, the heirs ofJorge Lingon, hereafter collectively referred to simply as theSALVAS. 5 The petitioners, hereafter collectively referred to simply asthe JANDUSAYS, instituted their own separate action in the same Court,for annulment of title and reconveyance of property. 6 The cases wereconsolidated and jointly tried and decided. The verdict of the TrialCourt 7 went against the SALVAS, the dispositive portion thereof beingas follows:

WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in favor ofthe JANDUSAYS and against the SALVAS:1. Dismissing the action of the SALVAS against theJANDUSAYS in Civil Case No. R-667, with costsagainst the former in favor of the latter;2. Declaring the annulment and the consequentcancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420in the name of the SALVAS over the land in question, asto Parcel No. 1 described therein which is the land inlitigation;3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro to

issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title on the sameParcel No. 1 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420in the name of JANDUSAYS, specially, GregorioJandusay, Demetria Jandusay, Eusebio Jandusay andLeonila Fabro,pro-indivisoin equal parts; and4. Condemning the SALVAS in Civil Case No. R-668 to

pay the costs thereof to the JANDUSAYS in said case.No pronouncement as to damages in both cases, R-667 and R668.Both the SALVAS and the JANDUSAYS appealed to the Court ofAppeals. 8 There, their appeals ran an uncertain course; there was nolittle divergence of views among the magistrates regarding the merits of


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their appeals; first, judgment was rendered in favor of the JANDUSAYS;but in the end, the SALVAS prevailed.The three (3) justices of the division to which the appeal was initiallyassigned could not agree on a unanimous verdict; 9 hence, a specialdivision of five (5) had to be constituted. The special division's joint

judgment on the appeals was pronounced on November 8, 1976, on avote of three to two: the ponente was Agcaoili,J., with whom concurredFernandez and Domondon,JJ., and San Diego and Melencio-

Herrera,JJ., dissented. Said judgment affirmed the decision of the TrialCourt in toto. The SALVAS moved for reconsideration on November 29,1976. 10Their motion remained unresolved for about eight (8) months. Inthe interim Mr. Justice Fernandez was appointed to the Supreme Courtand Mr. Justice Domondon retired; and Messrs. Justices Hugo Gutierrez,Jr. and Ricardo C. Puno were selected to take their place, by a re-raffle. 11 Thereafter the special division ("Former Special FourthDivision") deliberated on the SALVAS' motion for reconsideration. Mr.Justice Agcaoili voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. However,the four (4) others, Mme. Justices San Diego and Melencio-Herrera, andMessrs. Justices Gutierrez and Puno, voted to grant the motion. On this

basis, a Resolution was drawn up by the Justice Melencio-Herrera; but atthe time of its promulgation on February 28, 1978, Messrs. JusticesAgcaoili and Puno had already presented their candidacies for theInterim Batasang Pambansa and consequently ceased to be members ofthe Court of Appeals; hence, the Resolution was signed only by the three(3) remaining Justices composing the special division of five, it being

pointed out that this number was, by the way, sufficient for thepronouncement of a judgment in accordance with Section 2, Rule 51 ofthe Rules of Court. 12The Resolution overturned the Decision of November 8, 1976 anddisposed of the appeals as follows:

WHEREFORE, granting the Motion forReconsideration, the judgment appealed from is herebyset aside, and another one entered 1) dismissing CivilCase No. 668-R, the suit for Annulment of Title; and 2)ordering Gregorio Jandusay et al. to surrender

possession of Parcel No. I covered by TCT No. T-5420,to Emeterio Salva et al., upon this Decision becomingfinal. No costs in both instances.

A motion for reconsideration was in due time submitted by theJANDUSAYS, and one for amendment of the resolution, by theSALVAS. The motions were disposed of by a Resolution dated August

3, 1978, 13 as follows:

WHEREFORE, 1) the Motion for Reconsideration filedby the JANDUSAYS is hereby denied for lack of merit;2) In respect of the Motion for Amendment of ourResolution dated February 28, 1978, Bled by theSALVAS, the Court resolves:a) The SALVAS are hereby authorized to withdraw theowner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420 attached to the records of this case, under proper

receipt;b) The petition to include compensatory damages infavor of the SALVAS is denied, their entitlement tothem not having been indubitably established.

The JANDUSAYS are now before this Court, having timely filed apetition for review on certiorari, 14 seeking review and reversal of theAppellate Court's aforementioned Resolutions of February 28, 1978 andAugust 3, 1978. Their appeal was given due course by Resolution dated

November 27, 1978. Withal, their appeal must fail.The JANDUSAYS argue that the challenged resolutions should be setaside because they are tainted by several serious errors.

Their first contestation is that the resolutions reversing, and sustainingreversal of, a special decision of five (5)having been rendered whenthere were only three (3) members of that special division, the other two(2) having in the meantime ceased to be members of the Court ofAppealsare "contrary to the letter and spirit of Paragraph 3, ofSection 2, Article X of the 1973 Constitution" which in part states that"no decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified orreversed except by the Court sitting en banc." The theory is palpablyunmeritorious. A reading of the cited paragraph in the context of theothers in the Section at once discloses that it can have no referenceexcept to the Supreme Court, and that indeed it cannot possibly apply to

the Court of Appeals since, in the exercise of adjudicatory powers, thatCourt never sits en bancbut only in divisions of three justices (or specialdivisions of five).The next point that the JANDUSAYS try to make is that the resolutions(a) wrongly concluded that they had failed to establish by preponderanceof evidence: (i) the due execution and delivery of the deed of sale of thelot in question by Jorge Lingon in 1915 in favor of Mariano Lontok, andthe deed of sale by the latter in 1917 of the same property to DomingaMarquez; and (ii) "the loss and contents of the deed of sale executed in1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok over the litigated

property," and (b) wrongly applied "the survivorship disqualification rule

and .. (disregarded) the rules on admission by privy and declaration


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against interest made by Jorge Lingon" testified to by DemetriaJandusay. 15In the proceedings before the Trial Court the JANDUSAYS could not

present in evidence the original of the deed of sale allegedly executed in1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok (from whom, in turn,the Jandusays' predecessor-in-interest had acquired the land in question).It apparently had been lost. They therefore submitted secondary evidenceto establish the sale, consisting of the sworn declarations of Mariano

Lontok, Severo Geronimo (bilas of Lingon), Enrique Morente, DemetriaJandusay and Gregorio Jandusay. 16 Whether or not this evidencesatisfactorily proved the existence of the deed of sale, its due execution,loss, and contents has been subject of considerable disagreement andextensive analysis among the parties, of course, as well as the Trial Courtand, as already narrated, the Honorable Justices of the Court of Appealsthemselves. The correctness of those conclusions has also still beensubject of debate among the parties before this court. What is not subjectof disputation is the proposition that whatever deductions are drawn fromthe evidence are conclusions of fact, and not of law.

Now, the findings in the Resolution of February 28, 1978to the effect

that the evidence had not satisfactorily established "the loss of the deedof sale between JORGE and LONTOK," 17 or the contents of the lostdocument,18 or that it was "the LITIGATED PROPERTY (which) was,indeed, sold by JORGE to LONTOK, and that it was the (same)LITIGATED PROPERTY which the latter had sold toDOMINGA," 19 and that, "(i)n the last analysis," the body of proofsadduced by the JANDUSAYS was not so clear and convincing as todefeat the rights of the registered owner20are conclusions of fact.These findings are quite clearly reasoned conclusions, reached only afterstudy and assessment of the proofs, an appraisal of testimonial credibilityof witnesses, and a weighing of probabilities regarding the conduct and

reaction of the parties to the alleged sales on the basis of proven past actsand in light of human experience. They cannot thus be said to begrounded "entirely on speculation or conjecture," or to have been arrivedat whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily. Therefore, by establisheddoctrine, they are binding on this Court and may not be reviewed by it, asthe petitioners would wish, absent, as here, any of the recognizedexceptions to the doctrine. 21The appealed Resolution correctly applied the so-called Surviving Party

Rule or the Dead Man's Actto exclude the testimony of DemetriaJandusay relative to the statement ascribed to Jorge Lingon that theJandusays should "not .. insist in having the deed of sale registered or

annotated .. as according to him before he dies he would sell his property

and that in all probability we might as well but his remainingproperty." 22 The rule is found in Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt and reads as follows:

SEC. 20.Disqualification by reason of interest orrelationship.The following persons cannot testify asto matters in which they are interested, directly orindirectly, as herein enumerated:(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in

whose behalf a case is prosecuted against an executor oradministrator or other representative of a deceased

person, .. upon a claim or demand against the estate ofsuch deceased person .. cannot testify as to any matter offact occurring before the death of such deceased person.. ;

xxx xxx xxxThere can be no doubt that the JANDUSAYS' suit in the Trial Court hadfor its essential object the enforcement of a deed of sale allegedlyexecuted by the deceased Jorge Lingon during his lifetime; so that intruth, and adapting the language of the Dead Man's Act, the

JANDUSAYS were parties or persons in whose behalf a case was beingprosecuted upon a claim or demand against the estate of Jorge Lingon.For that sale, supposedly executed about 40 years prior to the institutionof the action, was the definitive foundation of the JANDUSAYS'asserted cause of action, i.e., the cancellation of the title of the collateralheirs of the vendor and the reconveyance of the property to them by saidheirs, the theory obviously being that at the time of the vendor's death,the property no longer formed part of his estate and therefore could not

possibly have been inherited by his heirs. Nor can there be any doubt thatthe suit was being prosecuted against representatives of the deceased

person, i.e., Lingon's collateral relatives, who had adjudicated the

property to themselves as intestate heirs and who, in the action wereasserting a defense (denial of the sale) which the deceased might havehimself set up if living. 23 The heirs of Lingon were not asserting theirstatus as such heirs to defeat the JANDUSAYS' action, that not being thechief issue, but were basically contending that the property in questionstill formed part of the estate of the decedent at the time of his death andhad not been segregated therefrom by sale to the JANDUSAYS'

predecessor-in- interest.It is not amiss to state in this connection that the challenged Resolutionrefusal to accord veracity to the statement attributed to Jorge Lingonsupposedly asking for deferment of registration of the sale in favor of the

JANDUSAYS because it "runs counter to the fact that the partial sales


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made by JORGE of Parcel No. 2 were all registered," and because thefailure of the JANDUSAYS for an unreasonably long period to resort toreadily available legal remedies to compel the delivery of the certificateof title and have the sale to them annotated thereon militated against theiraverment that Lingon had indeed sold the land to them had refused tolend them the title so that the sale could be registered. 24The JANDUSAYS also argue that the failure of Jorge Lingon todispossess them and their predecessors-in-interest from the litigated

property for a period of thirty-four (34) years, and a like failure by theSALVAS to do so for seven (7) years, justify the application of theequitable doctrine of laches in their (the JANDUSAYS') favor, as well asthe ruling inMejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277;Pabalate v.

Echavari, Jr., 37 SCRA 518; andHeirs of Lacamen vs. Heirs ofLaruan, "65 SCRA 605." 25 The argument is effectively confuted by thefollowing disquisition in the Resolution of February 28, 1978 to whichthis Court hereby confers sanction:

If JORGE's inaction in dispossessing the JANDUSAYSof the LITIGATED PROPERTY can be alleged againsthim in a question of title, the inaction of the

JANDUSAYS or their predecessors-in-interest in notcompelling JORGE to formally transfer the title to theLITIGATED PROPERTY to them for several years canalso be alleged against the JANDUSAYS in thiscontroversy over title. Further, if, as alleged, inaction ofthe SALVAS from 1949 when JORGE Lingon died, upto 1956 when they executed the extrajudicial partition,

betrayed their hesitancy in taking such step knowing toowell the weakness of their claim by the same token, thelegal inaction, the failure to take remedial steps of theJANDUSAYS from 1930 when they learned of the

existence of the title, up to JORGE Lingon's death in1949, and thence up to 1956 when they filed theircounter-suit against the SALVAS only after the latterhad instituted their action for recovery of possession,could also be interpreted as an awareness on their part ofthe weakness of their claim of title. In other words,'Laches' and inaction imputed to the SALVAS maylikewise be laid at the feet of the JANDUSAYS. The'laches' of one nullifies the 'laches' of the other. One whoseeks equity must himself be deserving of equity. When

parties are in culpability similarly situated in eodem loco

it is a general principle of law that one may claim no

advantage over the othera principle consistentlyapplied in the 'pari delicto'rule imbedded in our legalsystem (Arts. 1411, 1412, 100, 453, Civil Code).The cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277(1956), that ofPabalate v. Echavari, Jr., .. 37 SCRA518, which applied it, as well as that of Heirs ofLacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, .. 65 SCRA 605 cannot beinvoked herein to justify a judgment in favor of the

JANDUSAYS on the ground of laches, due tofundamental differences: 1) the first two cases involvedthe prohibition against the sale of free patents whereunder the pertinent law, an original patentee is givenseven years from conveyance within which to bring anaction to recover the property. Plaintiffs therein failed toexercise that right within the reglementary period butallowed 37 years (in the Mejia Case) and 32 years (in thePabalate Case) to lapse; hence, the Supreme Court rulingthat the original owners' right to recover the possessionof the property and the title thereto from the defendants

had, by patentee's inaction and neglect, been convertedinto a stale demand. In contrast, an action to recover

possession of aregisteredland, such as that brought bythe SALVAS, never prescribes in view of Section 46 ofthe Land Registration Act to the effect that no title toregistered land in derogation of that of the registeredowner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse

possession. In fact, as held inJ.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs.Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA938, the right to file an action to recover possession

based on a Torrens Title is imprescriptible and is not

bared under the doctrine of laches. And even if lacheswere invocable, and that plaintiffs had 'slept on theirrights', with equal vigor can it be said that defendantsthemselves are chargeable with 'Laches. 2) In the threementioned cases, the fact of sale of the litigated

properties was admitted unlike in this case where suchsale has been challenged, nor has it even been proven. 3)In addition, the sale in this case to the JANDUSAYSwas not made by the original registered owner himself. Itis merely alleged that he had sold it to LONTOK who, inturn sold it to the JANDUSAYS.


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The JANDUSAYS next attack the very title of the SALVAS. Theycontend that the property covered by OCT No. 61 was conjugal propertyof the spouses Jorge Lingon and Arcadia Ganibo that upon the latter'sdeath, the widower, Jorge Lingon, inherited only one-half thereof inusufruct "while the naked ownership could be inherited" by thedecedent's collateral relatives; that the SALVAS are "not collateralrelatives by blood of Jorge Lingon," and could not therefore have validlyinherited from him and in truth acquired nothing by their execution of a

deed of extrajudicial partition of Lingon's estate, the execution thereofbeing, in addition, attended by fraud. 26 The attack is pointless. Even ifconsistent with the demonstrated facts, a doubtful proposition at best, itwould not enhance the petitioners' cause one whit Absence of title overthe property in question in Jorge Lingon, or substantial defect thereof,would not in any manner whatever show valid acquisition of ownershipof said property by the JANDUSAYS. On the contrary, it woulddemonstrate invalidity or defect in their own claim of title. Similarly,absense of the status of heirship in the SALVAS vis-a-vis Jorge Lingonis utterly inconsequential as far as concerns the JANDUSAYS' claim ofconveyance by Lingon to their predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, being

heirs of neither Jorge Lingon nor Arcadia Ganibo they have nopersonality or standing to question the succession to the state of either. Inany event, the Court is satisfied that the Appellate Court has properlyupheld the SALVAS' title to the property in question.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Resolutions subject of appeal,dated February 28, 1978 and August 3, 1978, the same are herebyAFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Maniago v. CAFacts:Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which wereused in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc.from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export ProcessingAuthority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident witha passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As aresult of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resultingin damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitionersdriver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages wasfiled by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitionermoved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case againsthim, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and

because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had

been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitionersmotion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could

proceed independently of the criminal action.

Issue:whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondentmay nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under thefollowing provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act oromission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is

obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there isno pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. Theobligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for onesown acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one isresponsible.

Held:No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code mustbe reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should bedismissed. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservationmust be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of

civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted withthe criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arisefrom the offense charged. In other words the right of the injured partyto sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arisingfrom crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the CivilCode must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with thecriminal action.On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civilliability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action,except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission,which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to

bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted priorto the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was

brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of theaccused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is

based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arisedid not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga, 2004)

Facts:

On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM).Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanaodel Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.

In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino


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on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the powerof the DPWH.

On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. Itcreated a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office whichshall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projectsand facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanaodel Sur.

On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new EngineeringDistrict in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres.Estrada.

On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 waspassed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted tojoin ARMM through said law.

Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity asOIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering Districtof DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioningthe constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on theground that they contravene the constitution and the organic actsof the ARMM.

Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid andconstitutionally infirm.

Held and Ratio:

On RA 8999

RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded orrepealed by a RA 9054. By creating an office with previouslydevolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a

plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended byan ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law needsto be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the caseof RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH toARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.

Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 whichis a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy bydetailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among othersLanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to reestablisht he

National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure

programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistentwith RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of

devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy ofthe Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authenticregional autonomy.

On DO 119- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has

jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanaodel Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements thetransfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line

with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially thesame powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur ascreated under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back

powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfercontrol and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.

FERNANDEZ VS. TORRESFACTS:Petitioners seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain theSecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") andthe Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing AdditionalRequirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment ofPerforming Artists."

The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by publicagitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, inresponse to the growing number of documented reports and complaintsfrom entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative workingconditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape andeven death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers

abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection ofOverseas Entertainers was convened on 18 November 1991 to evaluate aGovernment proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deploymentof Philippine entertainers and performing artists. At the end of theConference, the consensus among the management and laborrepresentatives which emerged was that Government should adopt a

policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition ofdeployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverseeffects which complete prohibition would impose on the country'smanpower export program. The labor representative recommended thatthe minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment beraised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years.


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Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1of DOLE Circular No. 01-91.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners have an actual cause or controversy tochallenge the constitutionality of the DOLE Circular.

HELD:The Court finds that the petition does not present a justiciablecontroversy. In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settledrule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by thecourts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;(2) the party raising theconstitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in theresolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliestreasonable opportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutionalissue must be indispensable for the final determination of thecontroversy.

In the first place, Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does notestablish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deploymentabroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for

justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coveragehereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretarydoes not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary,fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular

performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of"Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91."

Secondly, petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained fromalleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officialsfor exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also donot allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied theirapplications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or fromany other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have

petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened todeny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create areasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and

arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that

the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically uselessand [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted tosupport this assertion.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that publicrespondent would deny any and all applications for exemption fromcoverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptionsare here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations

are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. The second is thatofficial duty has been or will be regularly performed.

Santos vs Northwest AirlinesJudicial ReviewWarsaw Convention

Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he boughta round trip ticket from NOA in San Francisco. His flight would be fromSan Francisco to Manila via Tokyo. His scheduled flight was inDecember. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOAsaid he made nor reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year,due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila.

NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter

pursuant to the Warsaw Convention w/c provides that complaints againstinternational carriers can only be instituted in:1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;2. the court of its principal place of business;3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contracthad been made;4. the court of the place of destination.The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippinecourts have jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the

matter to conduct judicial review.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC isbound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratifiedby the Senate. Until & unless thered be amendment to the WarsawConvention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the placeindicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA. It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional questiononly if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry intosuch a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case orcontroversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial

determination; the constitutional question must have been opportunely


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raised by the proper party and the resolution of the question isunavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.

Angara vs Electoral CommissionJudicial ReviewElectoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, PedroYnsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the

National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. OnOct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the

said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly againstwhom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed

before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against theelection of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests againstthe election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara fileda Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC

proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the electionprotest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from theSC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in takingcognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that incases of conflict between the several departments and among theagencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only

constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict andallocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual andappropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see thatno one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,which is the source of all authority.That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creationwith specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for

purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other twodepartments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating tothe election, returns and qualifications of members of the NationalAssembly.

Dumlao vs COMELECJudicial ReviewRequisites

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired fromhis office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. Hefiled for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the

other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes ofDumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislationhence uncons titutional. His petitioned was joined by Atty. Igot andSalapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igotand Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other

provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials,the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged forcrimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaintsagainst them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualifythem from office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for thiscase would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different fromIgots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all therequisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standardsthat have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personaland substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the

plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) thenecessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to

decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruledhowever that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may notrun for public office and that the filing of complaints against them andafter preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from officeas null and void.

National Economic Protectionism Association vs OngpinJudicial ReviewRequisites

After the lifting of martial law in 1981, Marcos issued PD 1789 andsome other PDs. The said PD was issued in order to suspend for one yearthe requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in thecountry it must be compose of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA assailed thesaid PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be greatly

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