Auctions and Bidding: A Primer Paul Milgrom The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 3-22. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28198922%293%3A3%3C3%3AAABAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V The Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently published by American Economic Association. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/aea.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Mon Oct 22 11:23:36 2007
Transcript
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer
Paul Milgrom
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 3. (Summer, 1989), pp. 3-22.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently published by American Economic Association.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/aea.html.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.
The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.
[Footnotes]
8 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value AuctionsJohn H. Kagel; Dan LevinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 5. (Dec., 1986), pp. 894-920.Stable URL:
9 Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English AuctionsDaniel A. Graham; Robert C. MarshallThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 1217-1239.Stable URL:
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English AuctionsDaniel A. Graham; Robert C. MarshallThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, No. 6. (Dec., 1987), pp. 1217-1239.Stable URL:
An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric InformationKenneth Hendricks; Robert H. PorterThe American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5. (Dec., 1988), pp. 865-883.Stable URL:
Information, Returns, and Bidding Behavior in Ocs Auctions: 1954-1969Kenneth Hendricks; Robert H. Porter; Bryan BoudreauThe Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 35, No. 4, The Empirical Renaissance in IndustrialEconomics. (Jun., 1987), pp. 517-542.Stable URL:
The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value AuctionsJohn H. Kagel; Dan LevinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 5. (Dec., 1986), pp. 894-920.Stable URL:
Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental EconomicsCharles R. PlottJournal of Economic Literature, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Dec., 1982), pp. 1485-1527.Stable URL:
Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental StudyAlvin E. Roth; Francoise SchoumakerThe American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 3. (Jun., 1983), pp. 362-372.Stable URL:
Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric InformationRobert B. WilsonManagement Science, Vol. 13, No. 11, Series A, Sciences. (Jul., 1967), pp. 816-820.Stable URL:
