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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Ballistic Missile Defense:
Overview and Implications
for Naval Planners
Naval War College
Non-Resident Seminar: Joint Maritime Operations
30-31 Jan 2012
CAPT Will Dossel, USN-ret.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THIS PRESENTATION IS
UNCLASSIFIED
Please Keep the Discussion At That Level
All Material is drawn from public/open sources
Program Information is Drawn From MDA’s Public Website (www.mda.mil)
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OVERVIEW
• Ballistic Missile Basics
• Essential Lexicon
• Threat
• BMD Fundamentals
• History/Background
• Doctrine & “Three Pillars”
• BMD Phases of Intercept
• BMD Elements
• BMD Planning and Execution
• BMDR
• Homeland Defense and PAA
• BMD Planning Lexicon
• BMD Ops in the Joint/Maritime
Environment
Break
• Discussion
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Part I
Ballistic Missile Basics
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Essential Ballistic Missile
Lexicon
Ballistic Missile Class Max. Range (km)
Short Range Ballistic Missile SRBM <1000
Medium Range Ballistic Missile MRBM 1,000 – 3,000
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 3,000 – 5,500
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM >5,500
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Varies
Relevant International Conventions
MTCR
(Multi-lateral)
START Treaty
(Bi-lateral; US-RU)
INF Treaty
(Bi-lateral; US-RU)
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Ballistic Missile
Composition
Warhead/RV
Tankage:
Oxidizer &
Propellant
Airframe
Guidance
SIMPLE DESIGN:
SCUD variant
Motor
COMPLEX DESIGNS:
MIRV
PBV
MaRV
Multiple
Stages with
Separating
Warhead
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Ballistic Missiles:
Propellant Types
Solid Propellant Liquid Propellant
• Basically – combustion chamber tubes packed with a propellant that contains both fuel and oxidizer blended together uniformly. For example Shuttle SRBs:
• Oxidizer -- ammonium perchlorate (69.93%)
• Fuel – Powdered aluminum (16%)
• Catalyzer -- Iron oxidizer powder (0.07%)
• Remainder is an epoxy binder that also burns
• Shape of chamber controls burn via exposed propellant surface
• Advantages: Stable, storable; simple – enables mobility;
• Disadvantages: Low tolerance for error in manufacture, cannot shut down & restart
Propellant = Fuel + Oxidizer which produces Thrust
• Combines separately stored liquid
chemicals, a fuel and an oxidizer, to
produce thrust.
• May be either cryogenic or hypergolic:
• Cryogenic Propellant : very cold,
liquefied gases as fuel and oxidizer;
Typical uses: SLV
• Hypergolic Propellant: fuel and oxidizer
ignite on contact with each other. No
spark is needed.
• SCUD B/Shahab/No Dong: Inhibited
Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA)
(oxidizer) + Unsymmetrical
Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)(fuel)
• Advantages: highest energy per unit of
fuel mass, variable thrust, and a restart
capability
• Disadvantages: Complex storage/plumbing;
Precise injection metering; High capacity
pumps; Limited mobility and long term
storage; HIGHLY TOXIC (hypergolics)
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Ballistic Missiles:
Basing Mode - Fixed Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed
or mobile bases
• Silo: Hardened, underground shelter for security
and protection from elements
• Not immune to attack, difficult for liquid
propellant missiles for long term storage
• Elevate to Launch: Semi-buried, better access to
service missile, useful when terrain does not
permit deeply buried facilities
• More vulnerable to attack
• Roll-out to Launch: Missiles stored in hard/deeply
buried facility, rolled out to pre-surveyed launch
pad for launch
• Missiles vulnerable until launch or returned to
facility; gives away intentions (aids opponent
I&W) and may lead to preemptive strike.
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Ballistic Missiles:
Basing Mode - Mobile Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or
mobile bases
• Rail: Permits dispersal across broad area; organic support;
deployment of “heavy” missiles
• Unique identifiers of train set, maintenance shelters a
weak point, costly infrastructure to build/maintain
• TEL/MEL: Most mobile of land-based modes, self-sufficient
for solid propellant missiles; easier for CCDD
• Limitations on size/weight of missile and supporting
road infrastructure/terrain
• SHIP-BASED: Asymmetric threat concept but on the
margins
• Vessel size/stability vs. sea state directly impacts ability
to successfully elevate, service, launch missile
• SLBM: Most survivable, assured 2nd strike. Employed by
US, Russia, with China and India in development
• Very expensive to develop, build and operate
• ALBM: Allows launch closer to threat territory decreasing
flight and warning times
• Limited by carrier aircraft size
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Ballistic Missiles Defined
• Guided only during boost phase
of flight
• Once powered flight is
complete, only gravity affects
remainder of trajectory
• Plus a little drag on reentry
• “Guided” has historically implied
a relatively gentle means of
controlling the state vector at
thrust termination (Vbo)
• To a static target
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Ballistic Missiles Defined:
Reality In reality, ballistic missiles are not “ballistic” . . . there are many ways to change trajectory
during and after boost
• Endo-atmospheric maneuvers
• Maneuvers in the atmosphere using aerodynamic surfaces on the booster or RV
• Used during boost, after boost or both
• Exo-atmospheric maneuvers
• Maneuvers outside the atmosphere using small liquid propellant thrusters or solid propellant motors
• Used after boost
• Generalized energy management system maneuvers
• Used on boosters that allow all stages to burn to depletion (i.e., solid fuel); missile pitches and yaws during boost phase to waste energy to control range
• Can result in a much less “gentle” guidance during boost phase
Complicates Missile Warning And BMD Missions
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Endo-Atmospheric
Maneuvers Booster Mounted
• Uses aerodynamic surfaces for lift
• Takes advantage of atmosphere and missile’s
velocity to “fly” further down range
• Can increase range by 100s of km over “basic”
ballistic missile
RV Mounted (MaRV)
• Ballistic missile performance and accuracy decrease
as ranges >500 km if payload remains attached to
booster
• Booster needs to be strengthened for re-entry
• Easier to separate payload after boost
• To make a MaRV, add moveable fins to separating
payload
• Then maneuver in atmosphere during re-entry to:
Avoid defenses; aero range extensions; add terminal
guidance maneuvers
• All at large ranges
MaRV
Booster
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Boost-Phase Maneuvering
Generalized Energy Management Steering
(GEMS)
• Many solid propellant missiles don’t shut
down to control range, instead their motors
burn to depletion
• Since thrust is constant, boosters pitch/yaw
during powered flight to “waste” energy as
required to make planned range.
• Examples: Trident I C4 SLBM and THAAD
• May be as simple as corkscrews or more
complex maneuvers
This is an example of
GEMS (THAAD launch)
…and this is not
(failed BULAVA SLBM launch)
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Exo-Atmospheric
Maneuvers Post-Boost Vehicles (PBVs)
• Use a small (typically restartable liquid
propellant) upper stage motor
• Deploy MIRVs from a single booster
• Targets may be 100s of kms apart
• Deploy BMD countermeasures
• Correct boost phase errors during mid-
course flight
Inflatable decoy
for Minuteman III
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Ballistic Missile Threat
• Ballistic missile threat will continue to proliferate and grow in capacity and capability
• Increasingly seen as both an asymmetric threat and economical log-range/deep strike alternative to manned aircraft
• Threat countries are pursuing WMD warheads despite international sanctions and counter-proliferation efforts
• Future systems will incorporate active and passive countermeasures and a reduced logistical footprint
• Mobility and underground facilities will protect deployed missiles
• Growing mobile force using deception and denial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures which complicate I&W and counter-targeting
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Worldwide Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: 1990
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Worldwide Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: 2009
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Ballistic Missile Threat:
North Korea • Nation “of the greatest concern” according to
2010 BMDR
• Nuclear ambitions + long-range missiles
• Nuclear tests Oct 2006 and May 2009
• Three attempted space launches, none
successful
• 1998, 2006, 2009
• 2006: Simultaneous with 6 x SRBM & MRBM
launches
• 2009: Closest to success; demonstrated
potential ICBM capabilities in 3-stage variant to
reach CONUS
• Mobile IRBM under development and may be
operational
• Extensive hardened/deeply buried supporting
infrastructure and garrisons complicate I&W
• “Serial proliferator” of nuclear and ballistic missile
technology and whole systems
Toksa SCUD
B/C
No Dong Musudan Musudan
ER
Taepo
Dong 2 120-
140 km
300-
500 km
1300 km 3000 – 4000 km (est) 15000 km
(3-stage)
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Ballistic Missile Threat:
Iran • Active indigenous program 2nd only to China in
size/scope; nuclear program strongly condemned
in 2011 IAEA report
• Majority of inventory – liquid propellant SRBMs
• Mobile force supported by growing
hardened/deeply buried infrastructure
• Aggressive solid propellant effort
• Fateh-110 SRBM and Ashura MRBM
• Two ASBM development programs
• Recently demonstrated as part of naval
exercise
• Safir SLV – 2 successful on-orbit deliveries in
three attempts
• Knowledge and technology developed would
aid IR/ICBM program
• “Serial proliferator” – to other state and non-state
actors
Fateh-110 SCUD A/B/C
Shahab-3 Shahab-3
ER BM-25
Ashura/ Sejil
Safir (SLV)
200 km 300-
600 km 1300 km 2000 km 2500 km 2000 km
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Ballistic Missile Threat:
China • Largest, most active and diverse ballistic
missile program in the world
• Ballistic missile force developed and
deployed for range of missions from nuclear
deterrence to conventional precision strike
• Key part of A2/AD capabilities ICW large
ASCM/LACM force
• 2010 BMDR notes an imbalance of forces
across Taiwan Straits primarily because of
numbers of SRBM/MRBM deployed
• Est. 1,000 – 1200
• ASBM in development or early deployment
specifically to counter US CVBGs
• Non-signatory to MTCR but verbal pledge
to some provisions
Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM
Coverage. This map depicts
notional coverage based on
the range of land and sea
based missile systems,
including advanced SAMs that
China would likely employ in a
Taiwan conflict.
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Ballistic Missile Threat:
Other Notables • India: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons
• Active, indigenous program to build/deploy a range of ballistic
missiles
• Ranges cover all of Pakistan and eventually all of China
• Pakistan: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons
• Not nearly as extensive as India – requires significant
outside help
• Focused primarily on India
• Israel: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons (undeclared)
• SRBM to IRBM (Jericho II/III)
• Focused on Iran but able to range other regional threats
• Syria: Ballistic missiles & WMD program
• Primarily SRBM from Russia, North Korea and/or Iran
• Reports of sharing weapons and training with Hezbollah
• Russia: Treaty limited (INF) to weapons of 500km or less;
party to MTCR which limits transfer of technology,
materials, systems and knowledge
• Broad hints and statements since 2002 over possibly
breaking with INF Treaty
• Extensive use of SRBMs in Georgian conflict (2008)
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Part II
BMD Fundamentals
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BMD Timeline
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BMD Doctrine
Guiding Pub: “Countering Air and Missile Threats” (JP 3-01, 5 Feb 2007)
BMD included under Counterair Mission:
“The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, to
counter the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining air superiority” (Chp 1)
Counterair mission consists of Offensive Counterair (OCA) and Defensive Counterair (DCA) missions.
Offensive Counterair: “The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by
destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive
action against an adversary”
As applied to BMD – Attack Operations to include “attacks on missile sites,…,command and control (and)
infrastructure”
Defensive Counterair: “(A)ll defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate
enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace” Includes active and passive measures
As applied to BMD:
Active Defense: “…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and
missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile
defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW), sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.”
Passive Defense: “…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air
and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning,
camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.”
Sometimes Referred To As “The Three Pillars of Missile Defense
UNDER RE-WRITE
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BMD: Attack Operations
In Theory: Preferred method of countering missile threats by reducing level of threat defensive forces face; AO range
throughout enemy territory, are conducted at initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority.
In Practice: Not very successful where ballistic missile forces are concerned:
• Operation CROSSBOW (Dec 43 – Jun 44): Allied bombing campaign against V-1 and V-2
• >25,000 sorties with > 36,000 tons of bombs dropped against production and support facilities including fixed launch pads
• Net result – V-1 strikes continued and V-2 strikes began against London summer ’44
• Operation DESERT STORM (1991): Dedicated A-10 & SOF assigned to seek/destroy SCUD MEL/TEL
• 1/3 of the 2,000 daily sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting
• Net result – SOF team captured, 0 MEL/TEL struck, launches continued against Israel and single largest US casualty
event of DS was via SCUD strike
Major challenges to AO: ROE and real-time, actionable intelligence.
“…to prevent the launch of enemy . . . missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting
infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary”
Peenemunde V-2 test site
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BMD: Passive Defense
• Passive BMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection
and targeting of friendly assets and thereby minimizing the potential effects of
adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack.
• Passive measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment,
deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.
• Treaties and export control regimes may also be considered a form of
passive defense
“…all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile missile
threats against friendly forces and assets.”
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BMD: Active Defense
• Active BMD includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic
warfare sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.
• Missile defense is defined as “defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles,
or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.”
• Integration of systems enables defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that
increase the probability for success.
• AMD assets normally provide overlapping coverage, however, not all anti-air DCA assets have
organic capability against BM; likewise, not all anti-BM DCA have anti-air and CM defense
capabilities.
• Offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations use many of the same sensors, weapons,
and command and control systems.
“…direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missile threats
against friendly forces and assets.”
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BMD: Intercept Phases
Boost Phase
Mid-Course
Phase
Terminal
Phase
Vbo
Apogee
(times for ICBM flight ( >10,000 km from launch site)
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BMD By Flight Phase:
Boost • In theory – most vulnerable part of flight
• Missile thrusting to gain acceleration
• Highly visible exhaust plume aids
detection/tracking
• 3-5 minutes travel in Earth’s Atmosphere
• Damage to aerodynamic surfaces or
airframe breach may induce fatal
aerodynamic loads
• Challenges
• Compressed launch notification to
intercept timeline/sensor challenges
• BMOA may be geographically too far to
successfully complete endo-atmospheric
intercept
• Countermeasures (hardening, counter-
intercept platform defenses, GSM, TTP)
All Active Boost Phase Intercept Programs are Proof of Concept Only
Note: As of Dec 2011,
ALTB to be mothballed
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BMD By Flight Phase:
Ascent
Boost Phase + Ascent Phase = “Early Intercept”
ASCENT PHASE: begins right after the missile’s
powered flight and ends just prior to apogee. Benefits
include:
• Earlier intercept in the battle space
• Optimizes a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic to defeat threat
before countermeasure deployment
• Enables debris mitigation
• Reduces number of interceptors required to defeat a
raid of threat missiles
• Reduces loading on remainder of BMDS architecture
by not eliminating need to track and kill a threat
reentry vehicle and associated objects,
• Reduces costs of maintaining significant number of
expensive interceptors to destroy advanced
countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missile’s
flight
• Places a premium on early launch detection and
tracking, emphasis on launch/engage on remote and
need for longer-range interceptors
• Mostly PPT and paper CONOPS – if funded, capability
won’t be fielded until late this decade/early 2020’s
• Significant technical, engineering, C2 and fiscal
challenges
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BMD By Flight Phase:
Midcourse • Offers longest decision space over course of
flight – up to 20 to 30 min for ICBMs
• Missile coasting to apogee
• Exoatmospheric intercept
• Debris mitigation for WMD
• Challenges
• Detection/tracking:
• Non-thrusting cold body presents IR
detection/tracking challenges;
• Radar affected by horizon and position relative
to flight path
• Discrimination: warhead(s) obscured by debris
cloud and/or deployed PENAIDS
• PBV maneuvering, MiRV
• Salvage fusing effects
• Nuclear weapons effects from an offensive
warhead fuzed to detonate when attacked
Majority Of Current BMD Effort Focused In This Area
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BMD By Flight Phase:
Terminal • Missile re-enters atmosphere
• Atmosphere acts as a screen to strip away debris cloud/PENAIDS
• Challenges:
• RV free-falling at extremely high speeds (+22,500 KPH for ICBM RVs)
• High-g maneuvering by MaRVs
• Limited engagement space owing to speeds, fuzing and warhead altitude detonation or dispersion of submunitions
• Lower tier engagements must deal with debris mitigation from upper tier intercepts
Most Demanding Environment On BMD
Systems And Supporting C2 And C4I
Infrastructures
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BMDS: System of Sensors
and Shooters The Ballistic Missile Defense
System is an integrated,
“layered” architecture that
provides multiple opportunities to
destroy missiles and their warheads
before they can reach their targets.
The system’s architecture includes:
• Networked sensors and
ground- and sea-based radars
for target detection and tracking;
• Ground- and sea-based
interceptor missiles for
destroying a ballistic missile
using either the force of a direct
collision, called “hit-to-kill”
technology, or an explosive blast
fragmentation warhead;
• A Command, Control, Battle
Management, and
Communications Network
providing the warfighter with the
needed links between the
sensors and interceptor missiles.
The BMDS Is Designed To Counter Ballistic Missiles Of All Ranges
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Ground-Based:
Midcourse Defense • GMD: “Engage and destroy limited intermediate- and
long-range ballistic missile threats in the midcourse battle space to protect the United States”
• Elements:
• Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): Three-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle)
• Ground Systems: Includes redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a complex communications network for planning, directing and controlling GMD element
• Current Configuration:
• GBIs: emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A total of 30 interceptors were deployed at the end of 2010.
• Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking and threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-in-control interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska (49th MD Battalion) and Colorado Springs, Colorado (100th MDBE)
• GND C2 via GMD communications network, a secure data and voice communications system using both SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul communications.
Cue & track
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Ground-Based: Terminal
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a globally
transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and
destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere
during their final, or terminal, phase of flight.
• Land-based, capable of shooting down a ballistic missile
inside and just outside the atmosphere w/hit-to-kill
technology.
• Procurement: First two Batteries fielded at Fort Bliss, TX.
Total hardware for Battery #1 & #2 include:
• 6 Launchers, 2 Fire Control & Communications
components, 2 AN/TPY-2 Radars, and 48 Interceptors.
Delivery of first production interceptors began in March
2011. Batteries 3 and 4 on contract March 2011 with
delivery and fielding to start in 2013.
• Dec 2011: Agreement to sell battery to UAE
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): Operational and
fielded by the U.S. Army.
• Procurement: The Army is responsible for production and
further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended
Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains
responsible for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and
PAC-3 interoperability and integration efforts.
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Sea-Based BMD:
Aegis BMD • Aegis BMD: Describes the entire program of sea-based
BMD but primarily focused on the mid-course intercept of
SRBMs, MRBMs some IRBMs and in latter versions, a
limited capability against certain ICBMs
• Modifications and upgrades to the Aegis Weapons
System (sensors, hardware and software – currently
ver. 3.6.1) and the SM-3 BLK 1A interceptor.
• 24 Deployed/forward-based CG/DDGs currently
configured (includes one developmental ship, USS
LAKE ERIE)
• Missions:
• Aegis LRS&T: Forward deployed Long Range
Surveillance & Tracking support to GMD for Homeland
Defense
• Aegis BMD: Exo-atmospheric, mid-course intercept
and endo-atmospheric, terminal intercept
• First Aegis BMD Patrol (EUCOM AOR): 2011
• Aegis Ashore: Shore-based program to support PAA
derived from the Aegis BMD ship-based program, using
the SM-3 BLK IIA and a land-based only version for
long-range intercept of ICBMs.
FY
11
FY
12
FY
13
FY
14
FY
15
FY
16
FY
17
FY
18
FY
19
FY
20
BMD-cap.
Ships 23 28 32 36 38 41 42 43 43 43
SM-3
Inventory 111 129 155 201
263
+TBD
341
+TBD
428
+TBD
500
+TBD 513 515
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Sea-Based BMD:
Ship Mods
NFIC-CA has critical role in IAMD (cruise- and TBM) mission
The caveat: These plans all depend on outcome of major program cuts
and revisions DoD-wide
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Sea-Based BMD: SBT
Sea-based Terminal: Provides a
sea-based, endo-atmospheric
intercept capability for a limited
threat set.
• Initially comprised of 72 modified SM-
2 Blk IV deployed on BMD configured
ships with the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
system.
• Blast frag warhead, not HTK
• Increasingly capable versions of SBT
will be fielded beginning with
Increment I SBT (IOC 2014) which
uses the SM-6 with BMD 5.0 and
Increment II SBT (IOC 2018) which will
debut with BMD 5.1
SBT: Sea-Based Terminal Kill vs. SRBMs
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Part III
BMD Planning and
Execution
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UNCLASSIFIED
Navy BMD Pedigree
October 2007:
A Cooperative
Strategy for
21st Century
Seapower
National guidance and policy:
DOD/JCS guidance:
Navy guidance:
22 July 1999:
National Missile
Defense Act of
1999
(Public Law 106-
38)
16 Dec 2002:
NSPD-23 -
National Policy
on Ballistic
Missile
Defense
March 2006:
NSS – “Field
BMD to protect
US from rogue
states”
17 Sept 2009: “Field
more of most
capable theater MD
systems to protect
our forces and
those of allies.”
June 2008:
NDS – “Missile
defenses can
defend against
attack should
deterrence
fail”
MDA
CHARTER
January
2002 –
MDA
Charter
15 March 2007 –
Missile Defense
Executive Board
(MDEB)
Established
15 Dec 2008 –
NAVY BOD
Membership
Memo
Navy
Strategic
Guidance PR-11
Classified
Naval
Operating
Concept
(NOC)
Guide/Influence
Sept 2009: CNO Guidance
2010 – “Issue NOC that
links CS21 to operations
and force structure with
guidance from QDR 10
and BMDR 10”
Fleet
TACPRO
TACMEMOs
“…preventing
wars is as
important as
winning wars.”
• Deterrence
• Sea Control
• Power Projection
• Forward Presence
• HA/DR
• Maritime Security
CS-21
Core
Capabilities
Guide/Influence
• Limit Regional Conflict
• Deter major Power War
• Win our nation’s Wars
• Homeland defense
• Cooperative Relationships
• Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions
CS-21
Strategic
Imperatives
DIRECTS
2010 2012
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR) The BMDR - Congressionally mandated and guided by Presidential directive, released in Feb 2010 for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive review of US BMD policies, strategies, plans and programs.
Established Policy Priorities:
1. U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
2. U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to US forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.
3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.
4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
5. US BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.
6. US will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.
“This review. . . will result in an enhanced defense of
the United States and its forces, allies, and partners
from the danger of ballistic missiles wherever and
whenever they threaten us.”
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Defense of the Homeland
“The United States will…”
• Maintain readiness…develop capabilities at
Fort Greely, AK (FGA) and Vandenberg AFB,
CA (VAFB)
• Complete the 2nd field of 14 silos at FGA as a
hedge
• Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve
cueing for missiles launched at the US from
Iran or elsewhere in Middle East
• Invest in further development of the SM-3 for
future land-based use as ICBM threat matures
• Increase investments in sensors and early-
intercept kill systems to defeat
countermeasures
• Pursue new enhancements…and other
hedging strategies including continued
development of a two-staged ground-based
interceptor
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UNCLASSIFIED
Phased Adaptive Approach
“A key objective (for regional defense) is to leverage recent successes in regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low risk.”
• Near-term capabilities
• Increase procurement of proven systems (SM-3, THAAD, An/TPY-2)
• Improve already developed technology
• “Aegis Ashore” – 2015 epoch: land-based Aegis BMD weapons system including land-based SM-3 variant
• SM-3 BLK IB, BLK IIA, BLK IIB/NGAM
• Develop/deploy enhanced C2BMC
• Long-term Capabilities
• Develop SM-3 BLK IIA/IIB with higher Vbo and divert, providing greater regional coverage
• BLK IIB will have some early-intercept capability against long-range missiles
• “Engage on remote” – enables interceptor engageability at greater ranges using off-board sensors
• Develop persistent overhead sensors to detect/ track large raid sizes over entire trajectories from space
“Ballistic missile defenses help support U.S. security
commitments to allies and partners. They provide
reassurance that the United States will stand by those
commitments despite the growth in the military
potential of regional adversaries.”
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PAA Implemented: Europe
Sep 2009 decision followed SECDEF/JCS recommendation to revise Sept 2007 deployment plan
• Phase 1 (2011): Existing missile defense systems
deployed to defend against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles.
• Protection of portions of southern Europe with sea-
based BMD supported by new TPY-2 site in Turkey
• Phase 2 (2015): Fielding enhanced capabilities -- SM-3
Block IB and additional sensors.
• Phase 2 will include land-based SM-3s in southern
Europe expanding coverage to additional NATO allies.
• Phase 3 (2018): Coverage against medium- and
intermediate-range threats improved with 2nd land-
based SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, and
deployment of SM-3 BLK IIA
• Extends coverage to all NATO allies in Europe.
• Phase 4 (2020): adds capability against a potential
ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United
States.
• Deploys SM-3 BLK IIB/NGAM will be available.
2009 Concept
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BMD:
International Participation
Per the BMDR, international cooperation is focused on:
• Development and deployment of joint and/or complementary capabilities
• Technological and industrial cooperation
Current Initiatives:
• Europe: implement PAA in a NATO context
• East Asia and Middle East: strengthen cooperative relationships in bilateral frameworks
• Arrow development program w/Israel
• THAAD sale to UAE
• Renew cooperation with Russia
• Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with China
“The U.S. is committed to working intensively with
allies and partners…”
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BMD Planning Lexicon
• Defended Area (DA): Defended area is the portion of the territory protected against long-range missile
attacks;
• Critical Asset List (CAL): A list compiled by the JFC w/input from components of assets requiring theater
level protection
• Organized by phase of operations and prioritized
• Defended Asset List (DAL): a list of those assets on the CAL that receive theater level asset protection.
• Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active air defense or appropriate
passive measures if that is all that is available.
• Launch Area Denied (LAD): Refers to the collection of threat countries from which the DA is protected;
• Probability of Engagement Success (Pes): The probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed,
derived from the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and
hit-to-kill;
• Raid size breakpoint: The maximum number of warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single
engagement. This metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.
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BMD Planning Lexicon
Point Defense
(PAC 3)
Area Defense
(Aegis BMD/THAAD)
Launch Area Denied
Critical Asset List
DEFENDED AREA
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BMD & Joint Doctrine for
C2 Architecture • The JFACC / Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is the
supported commander for Counter-Air operations to include
BMD – The JFMCC has a supporting role (JP 3-01)
• In mature theaters, the JFC will normally designate the JFACC
as the AADC and Airspace Control Authority (JP 3-01)
• Decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint
operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature
of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and
the associated comfort level of the CDR. (JP 1)
• BMD engagement timelines may dictate that engagement
authority be held by the ship’s CO for optimal employment
of BMD-capable ships
• Strategic considerations may drive engagement authority to be
held at the highest level in some situations (JP 1)
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Navy C2 Architecture
Planning Factors
Multi-mission Ships Are Most Effectively Controlled By Maritime Commander
• JFMCC is the persistent maritime IAMD planning and execution command echelon
• IAMD ships are multi-mission platforms that are most effectively controlled by a Maritime
Commander
• A Maritime Commander will retain OPCON / TACON of multi-mission ships
• Provides most effective asset management for AADC
• Maximizes warfighting capacity and capability across all component commanders
• Optimizes logistics support
• Ensures asset protection and safety of navigation
• When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the
AADC for optimum employment of multi-mission ships
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Integrated Air & Missile
Defense C2 JFC / JTF
JFACC
AADC
CTF IAMD
DAADC
AAMDC
Land-based
Sensors and
Shooters
CRC
RADC
Airborne
Sensors and
Shooters
Maritime
Sensors and
Shooters
RADC RADC
ADAFCO
JFLCC TAAMDCOORD
JFMCC
Supporting
OPCON / TACON
Lines of Coordination
Engagement Authority
• JFMCC is a supporting commander to JFACC/AADC for IAMD
• Navy retains OPCON and TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships
• When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC
for optimum employment of multi-mission ships
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IAMD C2 Vision:
The Reality
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TF Integrated Air & Missile
Defense
CTF IAMD is JFMCC’s Tactical Execution Agent for IAMD
•JFMCC conducts operations at the Operational level from the
Maritime Operations Center (MOC)
•Commander, Task Force Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TF
IAMD) is the JFMCC’s tactical execution agent for the air and missile
defense mission
•CTF IAMD may serve as the RADC for the maritime BMD fight
• In most cases, CTF IAMD would reside at the MOC where the
supporting integrated planning and C2 resides
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What This Means For The
Joint Community • Joint Force Commanders have a consistent
path to maritime IAMD capability in every
theater
• Optimized maritime contribution to theater-
level plans and operations
• Supports JP 3-01 for IAMD C2
• Identifies maritime node to support
JFACC / AADC development and
execution of the Area Air Defense Plan
• CTF IAMD plans for maritime IAMD
• CTF IAMD, when designated as RADC
plan, coordinate, and execute
engagements
The Path to Maritime IAMD Capability is Through the JFMCC
Joint Force Commander
Theater IAMD C2 Elements
ACC MCC LCC
NORTHCOM 1st AF USFF
263rd
AAMDC
SOUTHCOM 12th AF C4F N/A
EUCOM 3rd AF C6F 357th
AMDD
CENTCOM 9th AF C5F 32nd
AAMDC
PACOM 13th AF C7F 94th
AAMDC
USFK 7th AF C7F 94th
AAMDC
UNCLASSIFIED
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BMD Challenges
Countermeasures
• PENAIDS: Chaff, decoys
• Terminal maneuvers
• Multiple warheads/HGV
• Salvage fuzing
Debris
• Upper stages, separation debris,
“chuffing,” other intercepts
Adversary TTP
• Attack BMD system
• Trajectory shaping/depressed trajectories
• Raids
• Mass launches/Timed arrival
Positional
• Location of sensors/shooters relative to
BMOA
Geo-political
• Host-nation concerns/issues
UNCLASSIFIED
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BREAK
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Discussion
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BMD Discussion
Situation: Intention to launch
“scientific research satellite” • Declares launch window and
booster drop zones/keep out areas
• Does not reveal configuration/details
of payload
• Intel has determined payload is a
RORSAT & weighs 3,800 kg, of
which 1,250 kg are made up by a
nuclear reactor and the disposal
stage. These two components are
5.3 m long. The reactor core
consists of 37 cylindrical fuel
elements with 31.1 kg of highly
enriched (90%) uranium-235
embedded in a beryllium casing
and cooled by liquid sodium
potassium.
• Projected orbital insertion track
passes just north of Hawaii
• Two previous attempts have failed –
one 4 seconds after launch and the
most recent when the third stage
failed to ignite and missile fell in the
broad ocean area. Range Fans And Locations Are For Demonstration Only And Do Not
Represent Actual Systems, Capabilities or Plans
SLV CONOPS
UNCLASSIFIED
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Backups
UNCLASSIFIED
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BMD: Tracking and Cueing
(Earth center)
Full Covariance: Space track report transmitted by a BMD
platform:
Vx
Vy
Vz
Position: X-Y-Z Cartesian
coordinate system w/origin @
Earth center
Velocity: Along X, Y & Z axes.
Predicts future BM position.
Area Of Uncertainty (AOU)
Aegis Track Covariance
Full covariance provides a more reliable AOU around
the current and future positions of the space track,
enabling construction of a search pattern that efficiently
utilizes sensor resources by limiting the search only to
the most probable area of the sky