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Bibliography of ETHICS
1. The Paper
2. Basic Reading
o Introductory Texts
o Collections
3. Central Historical Texts
o Ancient
Plato
Aristotle
Hellenistic Ethics
o Medieval Ethics
o Modern Moral Philosophy
Thomas Hobbes
David Hume
Immanuel Kant
J.S. Mill and J. Bentham
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ethics
Recent Approaches to Ethics—Overviews
4. Contemporary Problems
o Central Themes
Egoism and Altruism
The Goldern Rule
Theories of Normativity and Impartiality
Respect and Dignity
Maximisation and the Good
Act vs. Rule
Integrity & the Demands of Morality
Theories of the Good
Morality and Truth
o Further Themes
Authority and Excellence
Moral Law & Duty
Virtue & Well-Being
Action and Accountability
Moral Resposibility
Act, Motive & Consequence
Deliberation and Decision
Reason, Desire and Decision
Moral Dilemmas
Weakness of Will
Standards and Agreement in Values
Moral Relativism
Plurality of Values
Incommensurability
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o Practical Ethics
Anthologies
Killing and Letting Die
The Sacredness of Life
Humans and Other Animals
Environmental Ethics
1. The Paper
Ethics is the study of theories of how we ought to live, and what is of value or concern in life.
These theories form a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle leading up to the (in some ways
very different) concerns of recent philosophy. It is important to realise that the general form that
these theories have taken has varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so one cannot approach the
general questions posed within ethics without an appreciation of that history.
Amongst the problems considered are the relation between the happiness of the individual and
concern for others or the common good; the relation between rationality and the claims of
morality; to what extent morality requires impartiality of us, and what form that impartiality
should take; what is the nature of the good, and what is the relation between the good and the
right; whether there are ethical truths, and whether facts of value obtain independently of us and
our feelings.
To what extent do ethical theories do justice to, or provide convincing critiques of, our natural
moral thinking? These questions have arisen for ethical theories throughout history, and
sometimes past ethical theories may appear to do more justice to common sense practical
thinking than any contemporary school of thought.
In this area of philosophy there is a particular concern with its practical application or
consequences. In recent years, issues in applied or practical ethics have come more to the fore,
including the issues of abortion, euthanasia, concern for other animals and for the environment.
2. Basic Reading
Introductory Texts
Reading a few introductory texts, particularly towards the beginning of the course, will greatly
help you in getting a view of the areas of concern and in orienting yourself in relation to more
central material. Here are some suggestions
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Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford
University Press .
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Norman, R. 1983. The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Williams, B. 1976. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Collections
Singer, P. ed. 1994. Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, J. ed. 1969. Moral Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. ed. 1967. Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. ed. 1978. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, P. W. ed. 1967. Problems of Moral Philosophy: an introduction to ethics.
Belmont, California: Dickenson.
3. Central Historical Texts
Ancient
Greek philosophy looks at the problems of ethics in terms of how one can lead a happy life, or
living well. Questions that arise include, ‘What role do the virtues play in an admirable life?',
‘How far is a good life subject to luck?', ‘What role does reason play in living well?', and
particularly in Stoicism, ‘Does living well involve conforming to some form of law?'
Plato
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Republic.
Republic , I, II, X. Use the new translation of Republic by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993); otherwise Clarendon Plato for canonical edition of Gorgias , translated
by Terence Irwin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
Commentaries
Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic . London: Routledge.
Kraut, R. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato . Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Includes an exhaustive bibliography.
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Irwin, T. 1995. Plato's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.1.
Price, A. W. 1989. Love & Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics (& Eudaemian Ethics ). N 1, 3, 5, 6; for the Nicomachean translation by
Irwin, Hackett with useful glossary; also Ross Oxford translation; for Eudaemian Clarendon
Aristotle trans. with commentary Woods.
Commentaries
Rorty, A. O. ed. 1980. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kraut, R. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good . Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press.
Cooper, J. 1986. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle . Indianapolis: Hackett.
Hutchinson, D. S. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.2.
Hellenistic Ethics
Long, A. A. 1974. Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth. (2
nd ed. 1986). See section 1 on Stoic and Epicurean ethics.
Commentaries
Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Sorabji, R. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate.
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Inwood, B. 1995. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Price, A. W. 1995. Mental Conflict. London: Routledge.
Striker, Gisela. 1996. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology & Ethics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
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Medieval Ethics
Medieval ethics combines elements of Pagan thought from antiquity with the particular concerns
of the three monotheistic traditions of the West: Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Central themes
in Medieval thought concern: the role of free choice in ethical life; how this individual freedom
is best to be understood; the connection between free choice and rationality. Medieval ethics
strives to adapt models of ethical life as involving the practice of the virtues, which they derive
from Greek thought, to the ideas central to Western monotheism, in particular that we arrive at
moral worth and salvation through obedience to the law that comes from God.
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will . Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1993.
Abelard, Ethical writings: his Ethics or „Know yourself' and his Dialogue between a
philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian . Translated by Paul Vincent Spade. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1995.
Aquinas, On law, Morality, and Politics . Edited by William P. Baumgarth and Richard J.
Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988.
Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues . Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Aquinas, The Treatise of Law , 1a, 2a, Questions 94-97.
Duns Scotus, Scotus on Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an introduction
by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.
Commentaries
On Augustine
Rist, J. M. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Ch.5.
On Abelard
Marilyn McCord Adams introduction to Hackett edition of Abelard, Ethics.
On Aquinas
McInerny, Ralph, M. 1982. Ethica Thomistica: the Moral Philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas. Washington, DC.: Catholic University of America Press.
Westberg, D. 1994. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
On Ockham
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Adams, M. M. 1995. ‘Ockham's Moral Theory'. In James F. Keenan, and Thomas A.
Shannon, eds., The Context of Casuistry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press.
Spade, P. V. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. See the essays by M. M. Adams, P. King and A. S. McGrade.
On Scotus
Scotus, Duns. ca. 1266-1308. On the Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an
introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press,
1986. See Wolter's introduction.
Other Themes
Kent, B. 1995. The Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late
Thirteenth Century . Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press.
Pink, T. ‘Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory'. In The Will and
Human Action: from Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. T. Pink and M. Stone. London:
Routledge, 2004.
Pink, T. 'Action, will and law in late scholasticism'. In Moral Philosophy on the
Threshold of Modernity , eds. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005
Modern Moral Philosophy
Modern moral philosophy has gradually detached ethical thought from specifically religious
traditions, giving increasing attention to the role played in ethical life of rationality or, by
reaction to this, human sentiments. In this period we see formed, though not always very clearly,
the outlines of many of the general positions examined by contemporary moral philosophers,
such as: in Hobbes, an ethics developed out of rational self-interest; in the Utilitarian movement,
consequentialism; in Hume, non-cognitivism concerning moral judgement; and in Kant, a
reason-based non-consequentialist ethics. Despite the continuities in these traditions, it is
important to realise, nevertheless, that many of these philosophers had interests very different
from those of their self-proclaimed modern disciples.
Collections
Raphael, D. D. ed. 1969. The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . 2 Vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schneewind, J. B. ed. 1990. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: an Anthology . 2
Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
General Commentaries
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Darwall, S. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640-1740.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity . Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Haakonssen, K. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan . See the Curley edition; or the Tuck edition:
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668.
Edited, with introduction and notes by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity. L. Pt.1, Chs.5-16, reprinted in D. D. Raphael,
ed., The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Vol.1.
Commentaries
Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kavka, G. S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press.
Oakeshott, M. 1962. ‘Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan'. In Rationalism in Politics and
other essays . London: Methuen.
Sorrel, T. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Pink, T. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chs. 2 & 3.
David Hume
A Treatise of Human Nature , edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2 nd
ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Bk.3 (plus Bk.2).
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals
, edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3 rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Commentaries
Norton, D. F. 1993. ‘Hume, Human Nature and the Foundations of Morality'. In D. F.
Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Baier, A. 1991. The Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
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Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume's Moral Theory . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Livingston, D. 1984. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Baillie, J. 2000. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge.
Immanuel Kant
Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and
edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949.
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an
introduction by Andrews Reath Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of
Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy . Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1949.
The Metaphysics of Morals . Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction
by Roger J. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
All three can also to be found in:
Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general
introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter
Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone . In Allen Wood and George diGiovanni,
eds., Religion & Rational Theology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Commentaries
Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
Univsrsity Press.
Allison, H. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Neill, O. 1989. The Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical
Philosophy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
J. S. Mill & J. Bentham
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Mill, J. S., and Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism & Other Essays . Edited by Alan Ryan.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987.
Commentaries
Harrison, R. 1983. Bentham. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Skorupski, J. 1989. Mill. London: Routledge.
Berger, F. 1984. Happiness, Justice and Freedom: the Moral and Political Philosophy of
John Stuart Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lyons, D. 1994. Rights, Welfare and Mill's Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Crisp, R. 1997. Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Century Ethics
In these writers we see the development of a recognisably academic form of ethics—Sidgwick
and Moore were both professors in Cambridge, Bradley was a life fellow at Merton College,
Oxford, Ross professor in Oxford. Like us, they had an interest in the existence of competing
ethical theories, and consequently in the relation between ethical theory and everyday ethical
thinking.
Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Commentaries
Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Nicholson, P. 1990. The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1.
Baldwin, T. 1990. G. E. Moore. London: Routledge.
Recent Approaches to Ethics—Overviews
Various authors have been inspired, often in a critical frame of mind, to attempt to frame an
historical overview of recent developments within ethics.
Hampshire, S. 1949. ‘Fallacies in Moral Philosophy'. Mind 58: 466-482.
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Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted
in >From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford:
Blackwell, 1981.
Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton. 1992. ‘Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics:
Some Trends'. Philosophical Review 101: 115-189.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.
4. Contemporary Problems
Central Themes
Egoism & Altruism
Can ethical action be justified in terms of the rational pursuit of one's own interests, and does it
need to be? Do we have special reason to be concerned with our own interests as opposed to
those of others?
Plato, Republic , Bk.II.
Hume, D. Treatise concerning Human Nature . Bk.III, Pt.2.
—. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals . Sec. 3, Appendices 2 & 3.
Williams, B. A. O. 1973. ‘Egoism & Altruism'. In Problems of Self: Philosophical
Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Further Reading
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.
Gauthier, D. 1967. ‘Morality & Advantage'. Philosophical Review 76: 460-475.
Reprinted in J. Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral . Oxford: Clarendon
Press. Ch.8.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1, secs.1-9, 20; Ch.2,
secs. 32-5.
Paul, E. F., Fred Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. eds. 1993. Altruism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
The Golden Rule
‘Do unto others only what you would have them do unto you.' In this form the principle is
closely associated with Christian ethics, although equivalent formulations of the principle can be
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found in Confucius. What does this principle really involve? Can it be used to provide a rational
basis for ethics?
Essential Reading
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and
trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy , Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated
and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong . Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.4.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth'. In Needs, Values, Truth:
Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998.)
—. 1987. ‘Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements'. In Needs, Values, Truth.
Further Reading
Kolnai, A. 1970. ‘Moral Consensus', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 93-120
Reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone
Press, 1977.
Winch, P. 1965. ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements'. Monist 49: 196-214.
Reprinted in Ethics and Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
Korsgaard, C. 1993. ‘The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values'. Social Philosophy and Policy 10: 24-51.
Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996.
—. 1985. ‘Kant's Formula of Universal Law'. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 24-47.
Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends.
Hare, R. 1981. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method, and Point . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ch.4.
Gibbard, A. 1988. ‘Hare's Analysis of Ought and its Implications'. In D. Seanor and N.
Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics.
Theories of Normativity & Impartiality
It is often claimed that morality involves impartiality. There are two main competing conceptions
of impartiality. One says that impartiality involves showing all persons the same respect, treating
them, in some sense, as ends in themselves. The other tradition says that impartiality involves
maximising good—whether conceived of as happiness or in other terms—over a whole
population, the happiness of each person to count equally with the happiness of any other.
Respect & Dignity
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Essential Reading
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , in L. W. Beck, ed., and
trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other writings in moral philosophy , Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated
and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism'. In A. Sen and B. Williams, eds.,
Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, T. 1973. ‘Servility & Self-Respect'. Monist 57: 87-104. Reprinted in Autonomy &
Self-Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Further Reading
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Kamm, F. M. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 2,
part 3.
Darwall, S. L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Railton, P. 1984. ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality'.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 134-171. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed.,
Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Korsgaard, C. 1992. ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends'. Reprinted in her Creating the
Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Maximisation & the Good
Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.4 & 5.
Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics . London: Macmillan. Bk.IV.
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge
University Press.
Foot, P. 1985. ‘Utilitarianism & the Virtues'. Mind 94: 196-209. Reprinted in S.
Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism & its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Sen, A., and B. Williams. eds. 1982. Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Introduction.
Scheffler, S. ed. 1988. Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Act vs. Rule
If impartiality does involve maximising good, how do we maximise it? In the performance of
particular actions, as act-utilitarians recommend? Or, as rule-utilitarians claim, in the moral rules
or principles that we adopt or seek to follow?
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Glover, J. ed. 1990. Utilitarianism & its Critics . London: Collier Macmillan.
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge
University Press. See the section by Smart.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.6,
secs.1-4.
Rawls, J. 1955. ‘Two Concepts of Rules'. Philosophical Review 64: 3-32. Reprinted in P.
Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Integrity & the Demands of Morality
The demand to maximise good, or similarly impersonal moral demands can conflict with the
projects and principles and feelings to which individuals are deeply committed. What are the
implications of such conflict?
Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge
University Press. See the section by Williams.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Persons, Character and Morality'. In Moral Luck:
Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1995. ‘Moral Incapacity'. In his The Making Sense of Humanity: and
other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scheffler, S. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism: a Philosophical Investigation of
the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wolf, S. 1997. ‘Meaning & Morality'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 299-
315.
Theories of the Good
The nature of goodness is a central concern in most ethical theories, but such theories differ both
in what they conceive goodness to be, and how they take goodness to be related to notions such
as duty and right. Is goodness to be explained prior to the notions of duty and virtue, and then to
be used in their explanation; or is its explanation to be derived from an account of them? Is
goodness an irreducible and ‘non-natural' property; or is it to be identified with properties
naturally possessed by good things? Can we explain goodness by reference to the desires of
people? Is there an irreducible variety of kinds of good, or is there only one kind of good?
Essential Reading
Kant, Foundations of Morals.
Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.1 & 2.
Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Korsgaard, C. 1983. ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness'. Philosophical Review 2: 169-196.
Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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Geach, P. 1956. ‘Good and Evil'. Analysis 17: 33-42. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories
of Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Appendix: ‘What
Makes Life go Best?'
Further Reading
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Paul, E. F., F. Miller Jr., and J. Paul, eds. 1992. The Good Life and the Human Good.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2.
Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.4.
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2.
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3.
Foot, P. 2002. Natural Goodness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morality & Truth
Is morality a matter of belief or feeling? If it is a matter of belief, are there moral properties in
the world entirely independent of our sentiments; or do values depend on the feelings and
responses of particular individuals or groups. Subjectivists claim that there is such a dependency,
while moral objectivists deny this.
How does this issue connect with questions about the nature and function of moral judgement
and moral language? Cognitivists claim that such judgements are apt for assessment as true or
false, non-cognitivists deny this. Ethical nihilists or ‘error theorists' are cognitivists who claim
that because there are no moral properties, all moral claims are false. Some theorists maintain
cognitivism by endorsing only a minimal conception of truth or truth-aptness. (For further
reading about issues concerning truth and realism in general see the relevant sections under
Logic & Metaphysics.)
Further Themes
Authority & Excellence
Moral Law & Duty
How far does morality involve obeying laws and fulfilling duties? And what is the source of
these laws and duties?
Essential Reading
Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals , Pt. II, The Doctrine of Virtue.
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Wiggins, D. 1991. ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty'. The
Monist 83-106.
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted
in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford:
Blackwell, 1981.
Pink, 'Moral obligation'. In Modern Moral Philosophy , ed. Anthony O'Hear. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004
Further Reading
Wolf, S. 1982. ‘Moral Saints'. Journal of Philosophy 79: 419-439.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.10.
Virtue & Well-Being
Is the point of a worthwhile life that the individual achieves virtue or moral goodness?
Essential Reading
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bks.8 & 9.
Hume, D. An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals . Appendix 4.
Hutchinson, D. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Chs.1
& 2.
Crisp, R., and M. Slote. eds. 1997. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘Virtues and Vices'. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Further Reading
Crisp, R. ed. 1996. How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Slote, M. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind,
Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Pt.I.
Hurka, T. 1993. Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Action & Accountability
Moral Responsibility
16
Does participating in ethical life involve a special moral responsibility for one's actions and if it
does what does this responsibility come to: does it involve a capacity for rationality; for self-
determination; or an independence from external determination?
Essential Reading
Nagel, T. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume 50: 137-152. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979.
Williams, B. A. O. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 50: 115-136. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers
1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1962. ‘Freedom and Resentment'. Proceedings of the British Academy 48.
Reprinted in Freedom and Resentement and Other Essays . London: Methuen, 1974; and
in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. Journal of
Philosophy 66: 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About:
Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Further Reading
Fischer, J. M. ed. 1986. Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Statman, D. ed. 1993. Moral Luck. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Adams, R. M. 1985. ‘Involuntary Sins'. Philosophical Review 94: 3-31.
Wallace, R. J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Schoemann, F. ed. 1987. Responsibility, Character and Emotions: New Essays in Moral
Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Widerker D. and McKenna M. eds 2003. Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities . Aldershot: Ashgate.
Pink T. 2004. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Act, Motive & Consequence
Does the rightness of an action depend solely on its consequences, or on the way those
consequences are produced: whether by doing or allowing (killing or letting die); whether as
intended or as merely foreseen?
Essential Reading
Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James
Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper
and Row, 1971.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
17
Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect'.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
—. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing'.
Philosophical Review 98: 287-312; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Further Reading
Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.
Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol.II, Chs.1-5.
Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. Last chapter.
Kenny, A. 1995. ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect'. In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and
W. Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory . Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Bennett, J. 1995. The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thomson, J. J. 1996. ‘The Trolley Problem'. In Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in
Moral Theory , edited by William Parent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. 2000. ‘Intention and Permissibility.' Supplement to the Proceedings of The
Aristotelian Society, 74: 301-317
Deliberation & Decision
Reason, Desire & Decision
How, if at all, does reason govern our actions? Are there rational justifications for performing
one action rather than another? And, if so, where do these justifications come from? Do they take
the form of codifiable rules? Do they depend on our desires and motivations, or are they quite
independent of what we might happen to want? What form does deliberation about how to act
take? Is it merely concerned with means or also with ends?
Essential Reading
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Practical Necessity'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
——. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.
——. 1981. ‘Ought and Moral Obligation'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason'. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays
in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998.)
Further Reading
18
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
Millgram, E. 1997. Practical Induction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kolnai, A. 1962. ‘Deliberation is of Ends'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:
195-218; reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai . London:
Athlone Press, 1977.
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind,
Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Richardson, H. S. 1995. Practical Reasoning About Final Ends . Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cullity G. and Gaut B. eds. 1997. Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Shafer-Landau, R. 1997 Moral Rules. Ethics 107: 584-611
Dancy, J. 2004. Ethics without Principles . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral Dilemmas
Can there be situations in which one must act, but whichever way in which one acts, one acts
wrongly? If so, what is the significance of this—e.g. for the nature of good or for moral truth?
Gowans, C. W. ed. 1995. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford Uiversity Press. Papers by
Ross, Williams, Foot, Marcus, Donagan, and Nagel.
Mason, H. E. ed. 1996. Moral Dilemmas & Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Gowans, C. W. 1994. Innocence Lost: an Examination of Inescapable Moral
Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Ch.7.
Foot, P. 2002. Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Weakness of Will
Can our capacity to apply reason in action go wrong because of internal weakness affecting
either a.) our capacity to act as we think we ought (in which case we deliberately perform an
action despite thinking that we shouldn't) or b.) our capacity to stick to our decisions and carry
them out over time (in which case our own desires lead us to abandon deliberately a decision for
no good reason).
Essential Reading
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bk.7.
Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?'. Reprinted in Essays on
Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
19
Elster, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2.
Further Reading
Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Weakness, Commensurability and Desire'. In Needs, Values, Truth:
Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998.)
Hare, R. 1963 Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.1, Ch.5.
Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Ch.8.
Schelling, T. C. 1984. Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Standards and Agreement in Values
There are moral conflicts about what is valuable and what ought to be done which appear to be
irresoluble. These conflicts can occur between whole societies and between individuals within a
given society (indeed, even within a single individual, see ‘Moral Dilemmas'). Are such conflicts
really irresoluble, and if so what explains this? Moral relativists claim that moral judgements are
relative to an individual or society. Note that there are different ways of developing the idea of
relativism, both the manner in which judgements may be relative and to what they relate. Value
pluralists explain the conflict in terms of there being a variety of incommensurable and
conflicting goods that societies or individuals can respond or aspire to.
Moral Relativism
Essential Reading
Williams, B. A. O. 1972. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Chapter on ‘Relativism'.
Meiland, Jack W. and M. Krausz, eds. 1982. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford
University Press . Chs.8 & 9.
Further Reading
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘The Truth in Relativism'. Reprinted in Moral Luck:
Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.9.
Harman, G. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended'. Philosophical Review 84: 3-22.
Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Pt.III, Ch.13.
20
Plurality of Values
Essential Reading
Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction.
Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Fragmentation of Value'. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Stocker, M. 1990. Plural & Conflicting Values . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.3-7.
Further Reading
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law, Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1.
Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.3.
Incommensurability
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.7 & 8.
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Ch.5.
Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chang, R. ed. 1997. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Practical Ethics
Anthologies
Singer, P. ed. 1986. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Killing and Letting Die
Does the rightness of an action ever depend on whether it counts as a doing or as an allowing?
What bearing does this question have on the permissibility of various kinds of euthanasia?
Essential Reading
21
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind;
translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Lecture on
duties towards the body in regard to life.
Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell .
Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James
Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper
and Row, 1971.
Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect'.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Further Reading
Uniacke, S. 1994. Permissible Killing: the Self-defence Justification of Homicide .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McMahan, J. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid'. Ethics 103: 250-279.
Steinbock, B. ed. 1980. Killing and Letting Die. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
The Sacredness of Life
How in general should we conceive of the debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion? Does
the issue depend on the moral status of the foetus, and how is that status to be determined? What
role do the rights and interests of the woman bearing the foetus have in settling this issue?
Essential Reading
Thomson, J. J. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47-66;
reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Feinberg, J. ed. 1973. The Problem of Abortion. 2 nd ed. Wadsworth: Belmont.
Finnis, J. 1973. ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to J. J. Thomson'.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 2: 117-145.
Further Reading
Kamm, F. M. 1992. Creation and Abortion: a Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R. 1993. Life's Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia.
London: Harper Collins.
Sumner, L. W. 1981. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press.
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22
Humans and Other Animals
Do we have duty of care towards other animals? Do non-human animals have rights? Do humans
have a special moral status simply as humans?
Singer, P. 1976. Animal Liberation. London: Cape.
Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Carruthers, P. 1992. The Animals Issue : Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Environmental Ethics
What responsibility do we have to care for the environment? Does the environment have a value
independent of human interests and concerns?
Essential Reading
Elliot, R. ed. 1995. Environmental Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Section on Environmental Ethics.
Further Reading
Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics . Princeton, N.
J.: Princeton University Press.
Attfield, R. 1991. The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Athens, Ga.: University of
Georgia Press.
Johnson, L. E. 1991. A Morally Deep World: an Essay on Moral Significance and
Environmental Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.