Bioethics-Introductiontomoralphilosophy
Inthenextthreeclassesweshallfocuson:
1. 15February-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism;2. 17/19February-HistoryofethicsI:fromvirtuetheorytoreligious
ethicstothesocialcontract;3. 22February-HistoryofethicsII:consequentialismanddeontology.
DavideVecchi-CentrodeFilosofiadasCiênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa(CFCUL),FaculdadedeCiênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa-4.3.16
Bioethics-Introductiontomoralphilosophy
1. Thechallengeofculturalrelativism(chapters1&2);
2. Historyofethics:fromvirtuetheory(chapter13)toreligiousethics(chapter4)tothesocialcontract(chapter10);
3. Historyofethics:thebigclashbetweenconsequentialism(chapters7&8)anddeontology(chapters9&10).
Referencetochaptersofthisbook:Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).
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JamesW.Rachels
1941-2003
Bioethics-Introductiontomoralphilosophy
Today:1. Whatisethics;2. Thechallengeofculturalrelativism;3. Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theis-oughtproblem(or
naturalisticfallacy);4. Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theexistenceofsuper-cultural
moralstandards;5. Debunkingculturalrelativism:introducingconsequentialismand
deontology;6. Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough.
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1.1-Whatisethics?
Inthelastclassyouweregivenadefinitionofbioethics:“….thesystematicstudyofhumanconductintheareaofthelifesciencesandhealthcare,insofarasthisconductisexaminedinthelightofmoralvaluesandprinciples.”Reich,W.T.1978.Encyclopediaofbioethics.NewYork:FreePress.p.xix
Somehistoricalreasonswereillustratedinordertounderstandtheemergenceofthediscipline,amongthemthedevelopmentofnewtechnologies(startingwithantibioticsandmedicalventilators,butthinkmoregenerallyaboutanybiotechnology,forinstancegeneeditingetc.)andthegrowingconcernfortheenvironmentandfuturegenerations.Inbrief,theconcernabouttheimpactofthelifesciencesonthemoralcommunityandtheenvironment.
Butwhatisethics?4
1.2-Whatisethics?
Ethics=thebranchofphilosophythatdealswithmoralprinciples(Iwillconsiderethicsandmoralphilosophyasthesamething)
Ethicsisamajorpartofphilosophy(withmetaphysics,epistemologyandaesthetics)Metaphysicsorontology=whatexists?Epistemology=whatisknowledge?Aesthetics=whatisbeauty?Ethics=whatisgood?
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1.3-Whatisethics?
Whatmakesacourseofactiongood?Isittheconsequencesofacourseofactiononthemoralcommunity?IsitthefactthatIactaccordingtoamaximthatIwishwerefollowedbyeverymoralagentatalltimes?Aremoralstandardsobjective?Aremoralstandardssubjectiveorcultural-dependentor,rather,supra-culturalorevenobjective?Whoaretherelevantmoralagents?Asubsetofthehumanpopulation,orallhumans,oralsohumansoffuturegenerations,non-humananimals,embryosandfoetusesetc.?
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1.4-Whatisethics?
Theseareallextremelycomplicatedquestions.Somuchsothatwecanaskwhether“progress”canbemadeinethics,inanalogytoscientificprogress.Itisclearthatethicshasevolvedandthatsomeethicaljudgementsareculturallyrelative:-Anhistoricaltourwillshowthatphilosophershaveapproachedthecentralquestion“whatisgood?”indifferentways(focusofnexttwoclasses).-Giventhatdifferentcultureshavedifferentmoralcodes,theassumptionthatmoralityisobjectivebecomesdubious(focusoftoday’sclass).
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Shouldabortionbeallowed?Shouldeuthanasiabelegalised?Shouldantibioticsbeprescribedforviralinfections?Shouldweallbecomevegan?Shouldmodificationsofthehumangenomebeallowed?Shouldpubertyblockersbeprescribedtochildrenfromage12?Shouldwemaintainbiodiversity?Shouldwestartfromvaccinatingtheoldestduringthecurrentpandemic?
Fact:thereissubstantialdisagreementonanyoftheseissuesbetweenpeopleandculturaltraditions.Doesthismeanthatmoralstandardsaresubjectiveorculture-dependent?
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2.1-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism
Infanticide(especiallyfemale)hasbeenandisstillcommonamongmanycultures.Forinstance,Inuiteskimos(Rachels2003,p.17+pp.24-5)practiceditbythrowingbabiesintowater.Isthisbehaviourimmoral?Andwhyisitso?Youcaninventyourownexample:istheChineseone-child(actuallytwo-children)policy,orinfibulation,orabortionupto24weeks,oreatinganimals,orprivateeducationorrefusingvaccinationagainstSars-CoV-2immoral?
Culturalrelativism:giventhatdifferentcultureshavedifferentmoralcodes,isitpossibletojudgeobjectivelywhethertheyarecorrectorincorrect?Isthereavantagepointfromwhichtomakesuchajudgement?Everyoneofusbelongstoaculture;everymoralstandardfromwhichtojudgewhetheranactionisrightorwrongisculture-dependent.Hence,therearenoobjectiveanduniversalmoraltruths.
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2.2-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism
10Rachels2003,p.18-9
2.3-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism
Moralpracticesshouldbebetterthoughtofasculturalproducts.Therefore,fromthevantagepointofaparticularculture,weshouldnotassumethatourculturalpracticesarebasedonabsolutemoralstandardsandimposethemforcefullyonothercultures.Fromthis,culturalrelativismextrapolatesauniversalgeneralisation:anymoralpracticeisequallyadmirableandnoneisbetterthantheother;inbrief,therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards.
Implicationsofculturalrelativism:1.Wecannotsaythatthemoralpracticesofsomeculturesaresuperiororinferiortoothers;2.Theonlyfeasiblewaytoevaluatethemoralityofanactisbyreferringtothemoralstandardsofthatspecificculture;3.Theideaofmoralprogressbecomesmeaningless.
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2.4-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism
Istheargumentfromculturalrelativismsound?Notifthereisanunjustifiedjumpfromquestionsoffacttoquestionsofmoral,committingwhathasbeencalledthe“naturalisticfallacy”(derivingOUGHTfromIS).
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);
2.Therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards;thismeansthattheonlymoralstandardforjudgingthemoralityofanacmonisinternaltotheInuitculture(FACTUALpremise);
Hence,infanmcidewithinInuitcultureisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
3.1-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theis-oughtproblem
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP ?
Istheargumentfromculturalrelativismsound?Notifthereisanunjustifiedjumpfromquestionsoffacttoquestionsofmoral,committingwhathasbeencalledthe“naturalisticfallacy”(derivinganOUGHTfromIS).
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.Therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards;thismeansthattheonlymoralstandardforjudgingthemoralityofanacmonisinternaltotheInuitculture(FACTUALpremise);
Hence,infanmcidewithinInuitcultureisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
1. DavidekilledJorgeincircumstancez(FACTUALpremise);
2.Davidehascerebralcondimonx(observableFACTUALpremise);3.Peoplewithxincircumstancezkill(inferencesupportedbyevidence,henceFACTUALpremise);
Hence,Davideshouldnotbeconvicted(MORALconclusion)
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED
JUMP ?
3.2-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theis-oughtproblem
Inordertoavoidthenaturalisticfallacy,amoralpremiseisneededtojustifytheinferenceofamoralconclusionfromfactualpremises.
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1.DavidekilledJorgeincircumstancez(FACTUALpremise)2.Davidehascerebralcondimonx(FACTUALpremise)
3.Peoplewithxincircumstancezkill(FACTUALpremise);4.GiventhatDavidecannot,givenhiscondiFonx,choosehowtoactin
circumstancez,hisbehaviouriscompelled,notfree,automaFc(FACTUALpremise);5.AutomaFcbehaviourisamoralbecausemoralresponsibilityrequiresfreedom
(MORALpremise).
Hence,Davideshouldnotbeconvicted(MORALconclusion)
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP
3.3-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theis-oughtproblem
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.Therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards;thismeansthattheonlymoral
standardforjudgingthemoralityofanacmonisinternaltotheInuitculture(FACTUALpremise);
3.InfanFcideisawaytocontrolpopulaFongrowthinaregimeofextremelylimitedresourceswhilefemaleinfanFcideisawaytocontrolsexraFobalanceinaregime
wheremaleprematuredeathiscommon(FACTUALpremise);4.MeasurestocurbpopulaFongrowthandsexraFocontrolaregoodinaharsh
environmentliketheArcFc(MORALpremise).
Hence,infanmcidewithinInuitcultureisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP
Inordertoavoidthenaturalisticfallacy,amoralpremiseisneededtojustifytheinferenceofamoralconclusionfromfactualpremises.
3.4-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:theis-oughtproblem
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.Therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards;thismeansthattheonlymoralstandardforjudgingthemoralityofanacFonisinternaltotheInuitculture
(FACTUALpremise);3.Infanmcideisawaytocontrolpopulamongrowthinaregimeofextremelylimitedresourceswhilefemaleinfanmcideisawaytocontrolsexramobalanceinaregime
wheremaleprematuredeathiscommon(FACTUALpremise);4.Measurestocurbpopulamongrowthandsexramocontrolaregoodinaharsh
environmentliketheArcmc(MORALpremise).
Hence,infanmcideisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP but…..
Howispremise2justified?Morethanafactualpremise,itisanontologicalassumptionorpostulationconcerningtheexistenceofmoralstandards.
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP ?
4.1-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:dosuper-culturalmoralstandardsexist?
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Considerthisanalogy:1.Peoplexbelievetheearthisflatwhilepeopleybelievetheearthisroughlyspherical;2.Therearenosuper-culturalepistemologicalstandardstoadjudicatewhethertheearthisflatorspherical;thus,theonlyepistemologicalstandardforjudgingisinternaltoculturexory;Hence,peoplexshouldbelievethattheearthisflatwhilepeopleyshouldbelievethattheearthisspherical,wherethesebeliefsaregoingtobethebasisoftheirbehaviour.Whatiswrongwiththisargument?
4.2-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:dosuper-culturalmoralstandardsexist?
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Considerthisanalogy:1.Peoplexbelievetheearthisflatwhilepeopleybelievetheearthisroughlyspherical;2.Therearenosuper-culturalepistemologicalstandardstoadjudicatewhethertheearthisflatorspherical;thus,theonlyepistemologicalstandardforjudgingisinternaltoculturexory;Hence,peoplexshouldbelievethattheearthisflatwhilepeopleyshouldbelievethattheearthisspherical,wherethesebeliefsaregoingtobethebasisoftheirbehaviour.Whatiswrongwiththisargument?Fromtheexistenceofculturalvariationdonotfollowontologicalimplicationsconcerningtheexistenceofsuper-culturalepistemologicalstandards:thereareseveralwaystoevaluateobjectivelythattheearthisspherical(e.g.,lunareclipseobservation).
4.2-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:dosuper-culturalmoralstandardsexist?
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.Therearenosuper-culturalmoralstandards;thismeansthattheonlymoralstandardforjudgingthemoralityofanacFonisinternaltotheInuitculture
(ONTOLOGICALassumpFon);3.Infanmcideisawaytocontrolpopulamongrowthinaregimeofextremelylimitedresourceswhilefemaleinfanmcideisawaytocontrolsexramobalanceinaregime
wheremaleprematuredeathiscommon(FACTUALpremise);4.Measurestocurbpopulamongrowthandsexramocontrolaregoodinaharsh
environmentliketheArcmc(MORALpremise).
Hence,infanmcideisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
LOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP but…..
Whatiswrongwithpremise2?Fromtheexistenceofculturalvariationdonotfollowontologicalimplicationsconcerningtheexistence(orlackthereof)ofsuper-culturalmoralstandards.
MORALLY UNJUSTIFIED JUMP
4.3-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:dosuper-culturalmoralstandardsexist?
Themoregeneralquestioniswhethertheacknowledgementthatmoralcodesandcustomshavechangedthroughhistoryandthatthatthereexistsabundantculturalvariationconcerningmanyhumanethicalpracticesindeedshowsthatthereisnocommoncoreinthevarietyofexistingethicalculturalpractices.Alternative:thereismuchmoreincommonbetweenculturesthantheculturalrelativistassumes:noteverymoralstandardvariesfromculturetoculture,butsomearetrans-culturalorevenpossiblyuniversal.Indeed,somenormsarebasicandnecessaryforsocietytoexist,sothattheycanbeconsidered“moralculturaluniversals”(Rachels2003,p.26).Letmegiveyoutwogeneralexamples.
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4.4-Analysingculturalrelativistarguments:dosuper-culturalmoralstandardsexist?
Amoralstandardthatapproachesamoralculturaluniversalistheevaluationofcoursesofactionintermsoftheireffectsonthemembersofthemoralcommunity.MeasurestocurbpopulationgrowthandsexratiocontrolaregoodinaharshenvironmentliketheArcticbecausethechild’sfamilyandtheentirepopulationwillbenefitfromthispractice.Thelogicofthisjustificationisthat,incircumstancex,courseofactionyisgoodbecauseithas,everythingconsidered,anetpositiveconsequenceforthemoralcommunity.Therefore,acourseofactionisgoodifitgeneratesconsequencesonthemoralcommunitythatare,onthebalance,betterthanalternativecoursesofaction.Thisistheessenceofconsequentialism(22thFebruaryclass).
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5.1-Debunkingculturalrelativism
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.ConsequenFalismprovidessuper-culturalmoralstandardsofevaluaFon
(ONTOLOGICALassumpFon);3.Infanmcideisawaytocontrolpopulamongrowthinaregimeofextremelylimitedresourcesandfemaleinfanmcideisawaytocontrolsexramobalanceinaregime
wheremaleprematuredeathiscommon(FACTUALpremise);4.MeasurestocurbpopulaFongrowthandsexraFocontrolaregoodwhenthey
generateconsequencesthatare,onthebalance,beneficialforthemoralcommunity(MORALpremise).
Hence,infanmcideisgoodandmoral(MORAL)
Premise4canbeinterpretedfromaconsequenFalistperspecFve(premise2)thatmakestheconclusionjusFfied.
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMPLOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP &
5.2-Debunkingculturalrelativism
Anothermoralstandardthatisatleasttrans-culturalistheevaluationofcoursesofactionintermsofuniversalmaximsofconduct.Childrenarepersonswithindependentinterestsandpersonscannotbeusedasmeansorinstrumentsforthebenefitofothers.Anyevaluationintermsofconsequencesmissesthiscrucialpoint.Children,likeallpersons,areendsinthemselves.Thus,killingchildrenisalwayswrong.Inordertoevaluateanypossiblecourseofactionx,youshouldaskyourselfwhetheryouwouldbewillingthatxischosenbyeveryoneallthetime.Whatwouldhappenifeveryonepracticedinfanticideallthetime?Infanticide,fromthisperspective,isnotmorallypermissible.Extrapolation:acourseofactionisgoodifitisperformedinaccordancetouniversalmaximsofconduct.ThisistheessenceofKantianethicsordeontology(22thFebruaryclass).
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5.3-Debunkingculturalrelativism
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1.Inuitpracmceinfanmcide(FACTUALpremise);2.Deontologyprovidessuper-culturalmoralstandardsofevaluaFon(ONTOLOGICAL
premise);3.Infanmcideisawaytocontrolpopulamongrowthinaregimeofextremelylimitedresourcesandfemaleinfanmcideisawaytocontrolsexramobalanceinaregime
wheremaleprematuredeathiscommon(FACTUALpremise);4.MeasurestocurbpopulaFongrowthandsexraFocontrolarealwaysbadbecausechildrenareendsinthemselvesandbecausethesepracFcescannotbeuniversalised
(MORALpremise).
Hence,infanmcideisbadandimmoral(MORALconclusion)
Premise4canbeinterpretedfromadeontologicalperspecFve(premise2)thatmakestheconclusionjusFfied.
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMPLOGICALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP &
5.4-Debunkingculturalrelativism
Theexistenceofsuper-culturalmoralstandardslikethoseendorsedbyconsequentialismanddeontologyshowsthatculturalrelativismcanberesistedandthatmoralprogressispossible.Rachelsarguesthatthereisacommoncoreanda“minimumconception”ofmoralitysharedbyallethicaltheories(chapter1).Thisissurelypartiallytrue.Rachelsisrighttosaythatmoraljudgementsmustbesupportedby“goodreasons”ratherthanbymereexpressionsoftasteandculturally-relativecustoms(sections3,4and5aimtoshowthis).Itmightalsobeaddedthattheconceptionofmoralagentbelongingtothemoralcommunityhasbeen,throughouthistory,progressivelywidened,probablytheclearestinstanceofmoralprogress.
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6.1-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
Atthesametime,theexistenceofthe“minimumconception”ofmoralitydoesnotpreventsystematicethicaldisagreements.Oneproblemthatshouldalreadybeobviousisthatsuper-culturalmoralstandardsoftenclash:asI’veshown(slides5.2and5.4),consequentialismmightjustifyinfanticidebutdeontologydoesnot.Moregenerally,whyendorsingconsequentialismratherthandeontology?Theclashbetweensuper-culturalmoralstandardsissystematic.Considerthiscase:
POLICY:shouldnationalbordersbeclosedduringthispandemic?
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6.2-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
Factualconsiderations:evidentialbasisinsupportoragainstthepolicy
A. closingborderslimitstheintroductionofmoretransmissibleand/orlethalSars-CoV-2variantsoriginatingabroadandhenceprotectsthelocalpopulation;
B. closingbordersprotectsthesuccessofthelocalvaccinationprogramme;
C. closingbordersnegativelyaffectsthelivesofmanypeopleaswellaseconomicactivity;
D. closingborderspotentiallyeradicatesinfectionlocally,butnotglobally;E. ……
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6.3-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
Moralconsiderations:ethicalrationaleunderlyingthepolicy
Culturalrelativistswouldarguethateverycultureapplieslocalandculturally-specificmoralstandardstodecidewhethertopursuethispolicy.Ineffect,bordercontrolpolicyisveryidiosyncraticaroundtheglobe.Rachelswouldarguethat,asamatteroffact,super-culturalmoralstandardsareinevitablyappliedwhenthemoraljustificationofthepolicyisatissue.IthinkRachelsisright,butofcoursetheexistenceofsuper-culturalmoralstandardsisinsufficienttodeterminewhetherthepolicyismoral.
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6.4-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
POLICY:shouldnationalbordersbeclosedduringthispandemic?
Theexistenceofsuper-culturalmoralstandardsisinsufficienttodeterminewhetherthepolicyismoral.Thedeeperproblemisthatthepolicymightbejustifiedaccordingtosomemoralstandardsandnotothers.
Howcanthepolicybeethicallyjustified?Examples?
Tips:consequentialistjustificationintermsoftheeffectofthepolicy?Deontologicaljustificationintermsofwhatgovernmentshavethedutytodo?
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6.5-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
POLICY:shouldnationalbordersbeclosedduringthispandemic?Examplesofethicaljustificationbymeansofsuper-culturalmoralstandards:1.consequentialism:ifthenegativeconsequencesofclosingbordersoutweighsthepositiveconsequences,thepolicyisimmoral,otherwiseitismoral;2.deontology:iftheobligationofgovernmentsistosavelivesratherthanlivelihoods,thepolicyismoral;3.globalethics:localeradicationshouldbeaccompaniedbyaglobalefforttoeradicatecontagionevenincountrieswithnoresources;ifthiscannotbedone,thenclosingbordersaimingatlocaleradicationisimmoral;ifitcanbedone,itismoral.Isthereanywayinwhichwecanshowthatanethicaltheoryisbetterthantheothers?We’llseeinthenexttwoclasses.
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6.6-Overcomingculturalrelativismisnotenough
Primaryresources:
1.Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).Chapters1and2.
2.Rachels,J.2004.ElementosdeFilosofiaMoral,Gradiva,Lisboa.Capítulos1e2.
Secondarysources
1.Reich,W.T.1978.Encyclopediaofbioethics.NewYork:FreePress.
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Bioethics-IntroductiontomoralphilosophyII
Threeclasses:1. 15February-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism;2. 17/19February-fromvirtuetheory(chapter13)toreligiousethics(chapter
4)tothesocialcontract(chapter10);3. 22February-HistoryofethicsII:consequentialismanddeontology.
ReferencetoRachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).
DavideVecchi-CentrodeFilosofiadasCiênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa(CFCUL),FaculdadedeCiênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa-4.3.16
Inthelastclasswesawthatculturalrelativismdeniestheexistenceofsuper-culturalmoralstandardsofevaluationofcoursesofaction.Weanalysedoneofitsarguments,showingthat:1.Logicallyspeaking,amoralargumentmustpossessatleastonemoralpremise,otherwiseitderivesamoralconclusionfromfactualpremises,whichisafallacy;2.Morallyspeaking,culturalrelativistargumentsarenotsoundiftheyderiveanegativeontologicalclaim(i.e.,thenon-existenceofsuper-culturalmoralstandards)fromaclaimaboutwhatpeoplebelieve;3.Intheend,beneathculturalvariation,thereexisttrans-culturalorevenmoralculturaluniversals,i.e.,super-culturalmoralstandardsofevaluationofcoursesofaction,suchastheevaluationofacourseofactionintermsofitseffectsorintermsofuniversalmaximsofconduct.
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Summinguplastclass
Thechallengeofculturalrelativismcanthusberesisted.Indeed,Rachelsarguesthatallethicaltheoriesandculturessharea“minimumconception”ofmorality(chapter1):1.Moraljudgementsmustbesupportedbygoodreasonsandsoundmoralprinciples;2.Moralargumentsrequiretheimpartialconsiderationofeachmoralagent’sinterests.Rachelsmightberight,butthisisirrelevantwhenweconsiderthatthedeeperprobleminethicsisthatthemoralprinciplesatthebasisofdifferentethicaltheoriesclash.Whatethicaltheoryshouldwechoosethen?Andwhy?
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Summinguplastclass
TodayIshallbrieflyexposetherudimentsofthreeethicaltheories:religiousethics,virtuetheoryandcontractualism(i.e,socialcontracttheory).Ishallshow-moreorlessfollowingRachels’argument-thatthesethreetheoriesareeitherincoherentorsomehowincompleteandneedtobecomplementedbymoregeneralmoralprinciplessuchas,forinstance,thoseatthebasisofconsequentialism(e.g.,utilitarianism)ordeontology(e.g.,Kantianethics).Inthenextclassweshallgobacktoconsequentialismanddeontology,whichwehaveintroducedinclass1(slides5.1-5.4).
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Planforthisclass
Divinecommand’stheory(forananalysis,seesection4.2inRachels)Godhasgivenusaseriesofmoralrulesandstandards.Theserulesandstandardsareobjective.Whatisgood/rightandbad/wrongisdeterminedbyGod.Problem:iscourseofactionxrightbecauseGodcommandsitordoesGodcommanditbecausexisright?IfitisarguedthatacourseofactionxisrightbecauseGodcommandsit,thenGod’scommandsseemmorallyarbitrary.WhatifGodtoldustokillandlie?Killingandlyingwouldbecomegood/right.IfitisarguedthatGodcommandsacourseofactionxbecauseitisgood/right,thenweareacknowledgingthatthereisamoralstandardthatispriortoandindependentofGod’sjudgement.ItisbecauseofsuchimplicationsthatDivineCommandTheoryhasbeenlargelyabandoned. 36
1.1-Religiousethics
TheTheoryofNaturalLawElementsofthetheoryofNaturalLaw:1.Everythinginnaturehasapurpose.Natureisaarationalsystemwhereeverypartofit-everynaturalthingandobject-hasaspecificpurpose.Intheend,theultimatepurposeisanthropocentric.ThisviewhasitsrootsinAristotle(Rachelsp.54):
37
1.2-Religiousethics
The difference is that Aristotle did not considerGod part of the picture(e.g.,hisethicsdoesnotmakeanyappealtoGod).ChrismanityaddedGodthecreatoroftheramonalordertothispicture.
TheTheoryofNaturalLawElementsofthetheoryofNaturalLaw:2.Therearelawsofnaturegoverningnaturalphenomena:everynaturalobjectbehavesinaccordancetoitspurpose.Therearealsomorallawsthat,ultimately,derivefromthelawsofnaturethatGodcreated.Somemoralbehavioursarethusnaturalandpurposeful,otherunnaturalandwithoutpurpose.3.GodcreatedarationalorderandwearecreaturesofGod,sowecanunderstandthemoralnaturalorder.Thismeansthatthecorrectcourseofactioncanberationallyevaluated(ineffectmakingmoralityindependentofreligion).St.ThomasAquinasinfactsaid,“TodisparagethedictateofreasonisequivalenttocondemningthecommandofGod”(Rachelsp.57).Thisrendersthetheoryofnaturallawpartiallyconsistentwiththeminimumconceptionofmorality(e.g.,theappealtogoodreasonsandsoundprinciples). 38
1.3-Religiousethics
Arethereanydistinctivelyreligiouspositionsonmajormoralissues?AsRachelsargues,religiousethicsiseitherlogicallyincoherent(DivineCommandtheory,slide1.1)orparasiticonindependentmoralconsiderationsandprinciples(NaturalLawtheory,slides1.2and1.3).Thismightbeperceivedasamisinterpretationofactualreligiouspractice,whichisbasedontheteachingsoftheScripturesandthedictatesofreligiousinstitutions.However,Rachels(p.58)askswhetherthereareany“distinctivelyreligiouspositionsonmajormoralissues”?Considerabortion.Isthereadistinctivelyreligiouspositiononthisissue?1.Religiouspracticesdiffer(JewishvsoldChristiantraditionvscontemporaryCatholicposition);2.ItisdifficulttofindsupportforthepositionoftheCatholicChurchintheBible;3.Religiouspositionshistoricallychange; 39
1.4-Religiousethics
Arethereanydistinctivelyreligiouspositionsonmajormoralissues?3.Religiouspositionshistoricallychange:“PopePiusIXchallengedthecanonicaltraditionaboutthebeginningofensouledlifesetbyPopeGregoryXIVin1591.Hebelievedthatwhileitmaynotbeknownwhenensoulmentoccurs,therewasthepossibilitythatithappensatconception.Believingitwasmorallysafertofollowthisconclusion,hethoughtalllifeshouldbeprotectedfromthestartofconception.In1869heremovedthelabelsof‘animated’fetusand‘unanimated’fetusandconcludedthatabortionsatanypointofgestationwerepunishablebyexcommunication.”Fromhttps://embryo.asu.edu/pages/pope-pius-ix-1792-1878
40
1.5-Religiousethics
Arethereanydistinctivelyreligiouspositionsonmajormoralissues?3.Religiouspositionshistoricallychange:“PopePiusIXchallengedthecanonicaltraditionaboutthebeginningofensouledlifesetbyPopeGregoryXIVin1591.Hebelievedthatwhileitmaynotbeknownwhenensoulmentoccurs,therewasthepossibilitythatithappensatconception.Believingitwasmorallysafertofollowthisconclusion,hethoughtalllifeshouldbeprotectedfromthestartofconception.In1869heremovedthelabelsof‘aminated’fetusand‘unanimated’fetusandconcludedthatabortionsatanypointofgestationwerepunishablebyexcommunication.”Fromhttps://embryo.asu.edu/pages/pope-pius-ix-1792-18784.ThisalsoshowsthattheoriginalrationaleofthepositionoftheCatholicChurchtodaywasmotivatedbya-religiousmoralstandards,thatis,theadoptionoftheprecautionaryprinciple(i.e.,inthelightofabsenceofscientificevidencethatacertainirreversibledamagemightoccur,assumetheworsecasescenario). 41
1.5-Religiousethics
Arethereanydistinctivelyreligiouspositionsonmajormoralissues?Considerthe“appealtonature”arguments.Basicallytheirpointisthatwhatisnaturalisgood.Godisbenevolentandcreatednature,sonatureisgood.EveryhumansharesanaturegivenbyGod.Everyhumanmustbehaveinaccordancetowhatourcommonnaturerequires.Somebehavioursarethusnaturalandpurposeful,otherunnaturalandwithoutpurpose.Isthemoralprinciplethatwhatisnaturalisgoodsound?
42
1.6-Religiousethics
43
1.Homosexualbehaviourcanbeobservedinnatureandalsointhehumanpopulamon(factualpremise);
2.Humanhomosexualbehaviouris,however,stamsmcallyuncommon(factualpremise);
3.Humanhomosexualbehaviourisnotreproducmvelyadvantageousandhencenotadapmve(factualpremise);
4.Thereisnogenemcbasisforhomosexualbehaviourbecauseitreducesfitness(factualpremise);
5.Whatisnotnaturalisbad(MORALpremise);
Hence,homosexualbehaviourisimmoral(MORALconclusion)RELIGIOUSETHICSRATIONALE:Humanhomosexualbehaviourisunnatural
becauseuncommon,contrarytofixedhumannatureandwithoutreproducFvepurpose.
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP ?
1.7-Religiousethics
44
1.Homosexualbehaviourcanbeobservedinthecaseofmanyanimals,includingbonobos,thespeciesphylogenemcallynearesttous(factualpremise);
2.Thereisagenemcbasisforhomosexualbehaviourbecauseitincreasesthefitnessofthesocialgroup(factualpremise);
3.Homosexualbehaviourisnatural(factualpremise);4.Whatisnaturalisgood(MORALpremise);
Hence,homosexualbehaviourisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)ALTERNATIVERATIONALE:Thereisnofixedhumannature,notallbehaviours
evolvebecauseofreproducFveadvantageandsexualreproducFonisnottheonlypurposeofsex.
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP ?
1.8-Religiousethics
45
1.Rapingbehaviourcanbeobservedinthecaseofmanyanimals(factualpremise);2.ThereisagenemcbasisforrapingbehaviourbecauseitincreasesDarwinian
fitness(factualpremise);3.Rapingbehaviourisnatural(factualpremise);4.Whatisnaturalisgood(MORALpremise);
Hence,rapingbehaviourisgoodandmoral(MORALconclusion)
(SeeThornhill,R.&Palmer.2000insecondaryliterature)
MORALLY JUSTIFIED JUMP ?
1.9-Religiousethics
Giventhat it ispossibletoconcoctavarietyofargumentswith incoherentand counterintuiFvemoral conclusions from the applicaFon of themoralprinciplethatwhatisnaturalisgood,theprincipleisnotsound.Intheend,thereisnotadisFncFvelyreligiousposiFononmajormoralissues.
Virtuetheoryis-withcontractualism,utilitarianismandKantianethics-oneofthefourmajoroptionsincurrentmoralphilosophy(Rachels2003,p.155).Aristotle“NicomacheanEthics”:centralethicalquestionconcernscharacter,i.e.,whatisavirtuousperson?Whattraitsofcharactermakeoneagoodperson?Virtuouslifeisinseparablefromthelifeofreason.Inthissense,virtueethicssharespartiallythefirstcommitmentwiththeminimumconceptionofmorality(i.e.,moraljudgementsmustbesupportedbygoodreasons).GoddoesnotplayaroleinAristotelianethics.Incontrastwiththeethicaltheoriestryingtoanswerthequestionofwhatmakesacourseofactiongood.
46
2.1-Virtueethics
Whatisavirtue?Aristotle:atraitofcharactermanifestedinhabitualaction.Virtuesarenotmanifestedonanoccasionalbasis,butalways.Butevenvicesmightbetraitsofcharactermanifestedinhabitualaction.Sowhatdistinguishesvirtuefromvice?Wecanasaconsequencedefineavirtueasatraitofcharacter,manifestedinhabitualaction,thatitisgoodforapersontohave.Butthenthequestionofwhatmakesthevirtuegoodremainspending(slide1.5).
47
2.2-Virtueethics
Whichcharactertraitsarevirtues?
48
2.3-Virtueethics
Rachelsp.176
Whatdovirtuesconsistin?Aristotle:virtuesarethemeanbetweentwocharactertraits,excessanddeficiency.Inmediostatvirtus.Courageisbetweentheextremesofrecklessnessandcowardice.Generosityisbetweentheextremesofextravaganceandstinginess.Honestyisbetweentheextremesofnaivetyanddeception.Loyaltyisbetweengeneralisedbenevolenceandbetrayal.(Notethatloyaltytofriendsandfamilyseemstocontravenetherequirementofimpartialityoftheminimumconceptionofmorality,Rachelsp.186-7).
49
2.4-Virtueethics
Whyarevirtuesgoodforapersontohave?
50
2.5-Virtueethics
Aristotle:thereissomethinggeneralaboutthesevirtues:theyareneededtoliveasuccessfullife.Giventhekindsofsociallifeweliveashumans,thevirtuesareallqualimesneededtobesuccessfulinlife.Thevirtuouspersonwillfarebeuerinlife.
Arevirtuesuniversal?Isasinglesetofvirtuesapplicabletoallpersonsinalllifecircumstances,inallsocietiesandallcultures?Shouldwespeakofthevirtuouspersonas“thegoodperson”?Aristotlewasmakingageneralclaimaboutthekindofsociallifeweliveashumans.Isthisclaimjustified?Ontheonehand,itmightbesaidthathewasmerelytalkingaboutthelifeofaphilosopherinclassicalAthens,averypeculiarkindoflife.Ontheother,Aristotlewasproposinganargumentagainstculturalrelativism:themajorvirtues(i.e.,courage,generosity,honesty,loyalty)willbeneededbyallpeopleatalltimesandthusarenotmeresocialconventionsorculturalvalues,butbasicfactsaboutourcommonhumancondition.
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2.6-Virtueethics
LimitsofvirtuetheoryHowdoesvirtuetheoryapproachthequestionofwhatmakesacourseofactiongoodandhowshouldwebehave?Moral(especiallybioethical)problemsareoftenaboutwhatweshoulddo:shouldIabort?ShouldIrelievemyillfatherfromsuffering?ShouldIprescribepubertyblockerstochildren?ShouldIbecomevegan?Etc.Theanswerofvirtuetheoryisthatthecorrectcourseofactionistheoneavirtuouspersonwouldchoose.Doesthishelp?Consideramoralconflictcase.
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2.7-Virtueethics
LimitsofvirtuetheoryConsiderthiscase:myfatherisextremelyillandhisconditionisgettingworsebytheday.Heisinextremepainandthedoctorssaythathecannotimprove.Heisalsosemi-consciousanditisalmostimpossibletocommunicatewithhim.However,inthepasthetoldmethatheharboursstrongfeelingsagainsteuthanasia.ShouldIrelievehimfromhispainandactcourageouslyorshouldIactloyallybyupholdinghisbeliefsagainsteuthanasia?Whatwouldavirtuouspersondoincasethevirtuesofcourageandloyaltyclash?AsRachels(2003,p.189)argues“Theadmonitiontoactvirtuouslydoesnot,byitself,offermuchhelp”incasesofconflict.
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2.8-Virtueethics
LimitsofvirtuetheoryWhatwouldavirtuouspersondoincasethevirtuesofcourageandloyaltyclash?AsRachels(2003,p.189)argues“Theadmonitiontoactvirtuouslydoesnot,byitself,offermuchhelp”incasesofconflict.Virtueethicsis,atbest,incomplete.Consequentialismanddeontologyoffermoralguidanceinthiscase.Consequentialism:relievingmyfatherfrompainwillhave,inthiscase,anetpositiveeffectonthemoralcommunity,thusactingcourageouslyisthemoralcourseofaction.Deontology:respectingtherationality,dignity,autonomyandfreedomtochooseofhumansisadutyanduniversalmaximofconduct,thusactingloyallytowardsmyfatheristhemoralcourseofaction.
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2.9-Virtueethics
Supposewestartourethicalanalysisfromastandpointthatisoppositetothatofreligiousethics.Moreprecisely:1.fromtheontologicalassumptionthatthereisnoGodanddivinesourceofmorality;2.andfromaparticularhypothesisabouthumannature:humansarenaturallyself-interestedandaltruismiswishfulthinking(i.e.,psychologicalegoism,cf.chapter5Rachels).WheredoesmoralitycomefromifthereisnoGodandifweareselfish?Fromthesocialcontractthatself-interestedhumanbeingssigninordertosolveapracticalproblem:avoidingthestateofnatureandliveapeacefulandcooperativeexistence.
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3.1-Thesocialcontract
Thestateofnatureisafictioninaway.Butitremainsanimportantanalyticaltool(Rachelsp.156-7).ThomasHobbes(Leviathan,1651)asksustothinkwhatitwouldbelikeiftherewerenosocialcontractandnosocialinstitutions(nogovernmentwithitslaws,policeandcourts).Hobbesnonethelessbasedhisfictiononhistoricalconsiderations:whatwouldhappenifaviralinfectionwithahighmortalityrateengendersapandemic?ThisthoughtexperimentleadsHobbestopostulatetheexistenceofastateofnature,asituationinwhichthereis:“….continualfear,anddangerofviolentdeath;andthelifeofman,solitary,poor,nasty,brutish,andshort”(Rachelsp.142).
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3.2-Thesocialcontract
TherationaleofHobbesargumentisthefollowing:1.Equalityofneed:allhumansneedthesameresourcestosurvive;2.Scarcityofresources:theresourcesarescarce;3.Essentialequalityofhumanpower:nohumanissuperiortoeveryoneelse;4.Limitedaltruism:wecannotcountonspontaneouscharityandgenerositybecausepeopleareessentiallyself-interested.Scarcityofresourcesandequalityofneedmeansthathumanswillbeincontinuouscompetitionfortheacquisitionofresources;butgiventhatweareessentiallyequalandthatnoonewilleverprevailinthecompetition,andgiventhatself-interestandlimitedaltruismcannotbeabasisforsocialcooperation,thenthestateofnatureisastateof“constantwar,ofonewithall”(Rachelsp.143).
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3.3-Thesocialcontract
Thesocialcontractisthustheinstrumenttoescapethestateofnature.Thesocialcontractisbasedon:1.rulesguaranteeingthathumanswillnotharmoneanother;2.rulesthatenforcecooperationandtherespectoftheiragreements.Hobbes’mainpointisthatonlyGovernmentanditssocialinstitutions(itssystemoflaws,itspolicingauthorityanditsjudiciary)canestablishandensurethatthesekindsofrulesarerespected.Itisonlywithinthecontextofthesocialcontractthatwecanbecomealtruists,cooperative,beneficentor,asRousseauputit“differentkindsofcreatures”(Rachelsp.144-5).
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3.4-Thesocialcontract
ThesocialcontractexplainstheroleoftheGovernmentandalsowhatmoralityconsistsin,namely,thesetofrules,governinghowpeoplearetotreatoneanother,thatrationalpeoplewillagreetoaccept,fortheirmutualbenefit,ontheconditionthatothersfollowthoserulesaswell(principleofreciprocity).Contractualismthusmakessenseofmoralbehaviourandconduct:1.WhatmoralrulesshouldIfollow?Thosethatarenecessaryforsocialliving;2.Whyarethesemoralrulesjustified?Becauseotherwisetherewouldbenopossiblecooperationwithotherhumans;3.Whyisitreasonabletofollowthesemoralrules?Becauseitistoourownadvantageand,afortiori,mutuallybeneficialtoallmembersofsociety;4.Doesmoralityhaveanobjectivebasis?No“special”factsbutobjectivebasis:agreementbetweenrationalpeopleformutualbenefit.
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3.5-Thesocialcontract
Hence,contractualismhasseveraladvantages.Italsopartiallysharesthecommitmentsoftheminimumconceptionofmorality:1.Moraljudgementsmustbesupportedbygoodreasons(thesocialcontractisanagreementbetweenrationalpeople)andsoundmoralprinciples(justifiedwithintheframeworkofthesocialcontract);Butconsidertheothercommitment:2.Moralargumentsrequiretheimpartialconsiderationofeachmoralagent’sinterests(Rachels-2003,pp.157-9-arguesthatcontractualismisflawedbecauseitdoesnotcomplywiththisprinciple).Hobbesstartedfromtheassumptionthatallhumansareequalintermsofneedandpower(slide3.3).Butweknowthat,historicallyspeaking,notallhumanshavebeenandareconsideredequalmoralagents.Thehistoryofhumanityisahistoryofdiscrimination.
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3.6-Thesocialcontract
Considerasituationinwhichagroupofmoralagentsisdiscriminatedorisnotevenconsideredasapartofthecontract,aspartofthemoralcommunity.Arethemembersofsuchgroupsallowedtobreaktherulesofthecontract?Oneansweristhatthiswouldbeallowedwhenreciprocityisviolated.ReciprocityinthissensemeansthatIacceptthemoralrulesofthesocialcontract(henceforthacceptinglimitationstomyfreedom)ontheconditionthatothersdothesame.Forinstance,wepunishcriminalsbecausetheyviolatethereciprocityrule.Anotheransweristhateventheviolationofreciprocityisinsufficientforcivildisobedience.
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3.7-Thesocialcontract
A-CivildisobedienceismoralWithintheframeworkofthesocialcontractracialsegregationruleshavebeenformulated.Thereisaninfringementoftheimpartialitycommitmentoftheminimumconceptionofmoralitybecausesomegroupsofpeoplearediscriminated.Thesepeopledonotenjoythesamebenefitsofthesocialcontractasothers.Thetermsofthesocialcontractarenotbeinghonouredbecausereciprocityisnotrespected.Hence,civildisobedienceandbreakingracialsegregationlawsisallowed.
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3.8-Thesocialcontract
B-CivildisobedienceisimmoralWithintheframeworkofthesocialcontractracialsegregationruleshavebeenformulated.Moralitymeanscomplyingwiththerulesofthesocialcontractindependentlyoftheirobjectionablenature.Legalisequivalenttomoral.Allmoralagents,eventhosewithlessrights,shouldthusobeyalllawsandcannotpickandchoose.Otherwisethesocialcontractwouldbedestroyedfromwithinandwewouldbebacktothestateofnature.Hence,civildisobedienceandbreakingracialsegregationlawsisneverallowed.
Thepossibilityofdiscriminationposesageneralproblemforcontractualism:whatisthebasisforthemoraljustificationoftherulesofthecontract?Forinstance,howcandiscriminationlegislationbemorallyjustified?Ifitisdonebyreferringtotheinternalstandardsofthesocialcontract,it’sequivalenttoculturalrelativism.Toarguethatwhatislegalismoralseemsanabomination.Legislationcanbeasarbitraryanddiscriminatoryasyouwishanditwillinevitablybejustified.Thus,theonlyalternativeisthatlegislationisjustifiedbyreferringtomoralstandardsthatareexternaltothecontract.Butifthisisthecase,thenthesocialcontractisanethicaltheorywithlimitationsbecauseitmakesreferencetomoregeneralmoralstandards.
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3.9-Thesocialcontract
Considerthisexample:privateeducationisaconsistentfeatureofmanynationaleducationalsystems.Someprivateeducationinstitutions(Eton,UK,establishedin1440;annualfeeover£40,000)areolderthantheUniversityofPorto(establishedin1836)and,moregenerally,predatetheStateeducationsystem.Supposethesocialcontractallowsprivateeducation.Supposealsothatgovernmentpossessesevidencethatprivateeducationcreatessocialfragmentationandclassinequality.Shouldgovernmentchangethetermsofthesocialcontractandbanishprivateeducation?Whatisthebasisforthemoraljustificationofthedecisiontheytake?Anyideas?
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3.10-Thesocialcontract
Whatisthebasisforthemoraljustificationofthedecisiontakenbygovernmentswhentheyconsiderchangingthetermsofthecontract?1.Privateeducationcreatesanunfairadvantagetothefewwhocanaffordit.Itisaviolationofthemoralprincipleofequalopportunitiesforall.Itshouldthusbebanned.2.Privateeducationhas,basedontheevidenceavailable,anegativeeffectonsociety.Itshouldthusbebanned.3.Manytransnationallegislativeframeworks(e.g.,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)Article26(3))allowparentstochoosethekindofeducationtheywanttheirchildrentohave(e.g.,inaccordancewithreligiousviews).Thus,therighttooptforprivateeducationshouldbeprotectedbylaw.Itisinevitablybyappealingtogeneraloruniversalmoralstandards(e.g.,equality,consequentialism,humanrights)externaltothecontractthatgovernmentscanmorallyjustifyeducationalpolicies. 65
3.11-Thesocialcontract
Primaryresources:
1.Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).Chapters4,11and13.
2.Rachels,J.2004.ElementosdeFilosofiaMoral,Gradiva,Lisboa.Capítulos4,11e13.
Secondaryresources
1.Fromhttps://embryo.asu.edu/pages/pope-pius-ix-1792-1878
2.Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).Chapters5.
3.Thornhill,R.&Palmer,C.T.2000.ANaturalHistoryofRape:BiologicalBasesofSexualCoercion.MITPressThornhill,R.&Palmer.2000.WhyMenRape?https://www.csus.edu/indiv/m/merlinos/thornhill.html
4.OnHobbesandthesocialcontractseeforinstance:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/#StaNatTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyisanexcellentresourcefordeepeningyourknowledgeandunderstandingofphilosophyandethics.
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Bioethics-IntroductiontomoralphilosophyII
Threeclasses:1. 15February-Thechallengeofculturalrelativism;2. 17/19February-fromvirtuetheory(chapter13)toreligiousethics(chapter
4)tothesocialcontract(chapter10);3. 22February-HistoryofethicsII:consequentialism(chapters7and8)and
deontology(chapters9and10).
ReferencetoRachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).
[email protected]ênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa(CFCUL),FaculdadedeCiênciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa-4.3.16 67
InthelastclassIexposedRachels’argumentsagainstthreeethicaltheories:1.virtuetheoryisatbestincompletebecausewhenIcanactvirtuouslyinaccordancetoconflictingvirtuesitdoesn’tprovideclearguidance;2.religiousethicsdoesnotprovideadistinctivelymoralpositiononmoralissuesbutreliesonmoregeneral,a-religious,moralstandards;3.thesocialcontractisanethicaltheorywithlimitationsbecauseitmakesreferencetomoregeneralmoralstandardsthatarenotspecifictothecontractitself.Inallsuchcases,theargumentwasthatallsuchtheoriesultimatelyrelyon……super-culturaldeontologicalorconsequentialistconsiderations.
68
Summingup-Incompleteethicaltheories
Deontology:ethicsbasedondutyandobligationratherthananevaluationoftheirconsequences.Somemoralrulesareabsoluteandholdwithoutexceptionineverypossiblecircumstance.Somecoursesofactionareforbiddenwhateverconsequencestheyhaveonthemoralcommunity.Buthowisitpossibletoevaluatecoursesofactionwithoutconsideringconsequences?Kantgavearationalistargument(withnoappealtoGod’scommand).
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1.1-Deontology
Analysingthenatureofmoralobligation,Kantfirstdistinguishesbetweenhypotheticalandcategoricalimperatives.Hypotheticaloughts:givendesiredaimx,courseofactionywillbeinstrumentaltoachievex;hence,IOUGHTtodoy.E.g.:mydesiredaimistocontainCovid-19infections;restrictingtripsabroadisinstrumentaltoachievethisaim;hence,IOUGHTtorefrainfromtripsabroad.Thisistheepitomeofinstrumentalthinking:givendesirableaimx,courseofactionyisameanstoachievex.
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1.2-Deontology
Categoricaloughtsarenothypothetical.Theyhaveanotherlogicalform:“IOUGHTtodox”.Nofinalityisconsideredandnoanalysisininstrumentaltermsisrequired.But,howcanwebeobligatedtofollowcourseofactionxregardlessoftheendwewishtoachieve?Whilehypotheticaloughtsarejustifiedinstrumentallyasmeanstoachieveourdesiredaims,categoricaloughtsarejustifiedbyreason,derivedfromaprinciplethateveryrationalagentmustaccept,thefamouscategoricalimperative:“Actonlyaccordingtothatmaximbywhichyoucanatthesametimewillthatitshouldbecomeauniversallaw”(Kant,I.1785.GroundworkoftheMetaphysicofMorals,cf.Rachelsp.121).
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1.3-Deontology
“Actonlyaccordingtothatmaximbywhichyoucanatthesametimewillthatitshouldbecomeauniversallaw”(Kant,cf.Rachelsp.121).
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1.4-Deontology
Notlyingisanabsolutemoralrulebecause:1.therule“Itispermissibletolie”would,ifadopteduniversally,beself-defeating;2.wemightthinkthat,inparticularcircumstances,theconsequencesofhonestymightbebad,butKantarguesthatthisconsequentialistwayofthinkingisflawedbecausewecanneverknowwithcertaintythatgoodconsequenceswillensuebylying;furthermore,evenlyingforaltruisticmotives(e.g.,savingsomeone’slife)mighthavenegativeunpredictableconsequences;3.thus,thebestpolicyisalwaystoavoidtheknownevilbecause,evenincaseourhonestywillgeneratenegativeconsequences,itwillnotbeourfaultaswehavedoneourduty.
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1.5-Deontology
ConsiderasituationwherebylyingImightsavesomeone’slifeandbybeinghonestImightfacilitatethemurderofaninnocentperson.Isn’tinsuchcircumstancesmoraltolie?ShouldwebesopessimisticasKantandagreethatwecannotknowatallwhatconsequencesanactionwillhave?Canwerefrainfromevenconsideringthepotentialconsequencesofourconduct?Andisitacceptabletoconsidersomeoneresponsibleforthenegativeconsequencesoflyingbutnotforthenegativeconsequencesofhonesty?Kant’sdeontologyisextremelydemanding.
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1.6-Deontology
AnotheraspectofKantianethicsisthathumansarespecialbecauseonlyhumanscanbetreatedasrational,consciousandfreeagents.Rationalityiskeybecausewithoutrationalitythereisnomorality:themorallawisthelawofreasonandwithoutrationalbeingsthemoraldimensionoftheworldwoulddisappear.Humansinthissensehaveanintrinsicworthasendsinthemselves.Humansaretheonlylivingbeingsforwhommere“things”havevalue.Butthevalueofahumanisabsolute.Thuswehaveadutytothepromotionoftheirwelfare:
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1.7-Deontology
Thisisasecondversionofthecategoricalimperative(Kant,I.1785.GroundworkoftheMetaphysicofMorals,Rachelsp.131).Howdoesitrelatetothefirstformulation?Andwhatdoesthismean?Thecrucialideaisthattreatinghumansasendsinthemselvesmeansrespectingtheirrationality.Considertheissueofhowweshouldtreatcriminals.ForKant,rehabilitationisincompatiblewithhumandignity;thetreatmentofcriminalsdependsontreatinghumansasrational,consciousandfreeagents,ontreatingthemasagentswhoactinaccordancetotheuniversalisationmaxim(thefirstformulationofthecategoricalimperative,slides1.3-1.4).
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1.8-Deontology
Punishmentshouldthusworkaccordingtotwoprinciples:1.peopleshouldbepunishedonlybecausetheyhavecommittedcrimesratherthanbeingconducivetotherehabilitationoftheindividualorthereparationofthesocialdamagetheyhavecaused,asthiswouldtreatthemasmeanstoanend;ifwetreatpeopleasneedingrehabilitation,wewouldviolatetheirstatusasrational,consciousandfreeagents;2.punishmentshouldbeproportionaltotheseriousnessofthecrime;forinstance,capitalpunishmentismoralbecause“ifyoukillanother,youkillyourself”(Rachelsp.137);executionistheonlywaytorespectamurdererasarational,conscious,freeagentwho,asamoralagent,hasdignityandresponsibility;onlyinthiswaywearetreatingmurderersasmoralagentswhocomplywiththefirstversionofthecategoricalimperative.Somewillfindthislineofreasoningobjectionable.
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1.9-Deontology
JeremyBentham:themoralityofanyactionorsocialpolicydoesnotdependonpleasingGod(cf.religiousethics)orfollowingabstractrules(cf.Kant),butontheadoptionofthemostgeneralmoralprinciple,the“principleofutility”(Bentham,J.ThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation.ChapterI.2,cf.Rachelsp.92):
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2.1-Utilitarianism
JohnStuartMill:imaginethestateofaffairsthatwewouldliketoseecomeabout.Whatwouldthisbe?Astateofaffairsinwhicheverymoralagent’sexistenceisasfreeaspossiblefrompainandasrichaspossibleinenjoyments.Moralactionaimstobringaboutthisstateofaffairs(Mill,J.S.1861.Utilitarianism.Chapter2,cf.Rachelsp.93):
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2.2-Utilitarianism
Consequentialism:evaluationofacourseofactionintermsofitsconsequencesonthemoralcommunity.Notethatthereisnoreferencetothedesiredgoalofthecourseofaction.Utilitarianism:consequentialismwithaspecificdesiredgoal:promotingthegreatesthappinessforthegreatestnumberofmoralagents.Utilitarianismisahedonistmoraltheory.Hedonism=theonlyfundamentalgoodispleasure(andtheonlyfundamentalbadispain);hence,themoralityofanactionismerelymeasuredintermsofthepleasuresandpainsgenerated(asopposedtoothersupposedgoods,suchasfreedom,equalityetc.).Actionsaremoralinsofarastheypromotehappiness(definedaspresenceofpleasureandabsenceofpain).
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2.3-Utilitarianism
Promotingthehappinessofwhom?Themoralityofacourseofactiondependsontheconsequencesforallsentientbeings(asopposedtoonlytheindividualagentoranyotherlimitedgroup).Thereasonisthatsentientbeingsarethosebeingsthatcanexperiencepainandpleasure(cf.classesonanimalethics).Thisformofuniversalismimpliesimpartiality,i.e.,thesubordinationofpersonalinteresttothepromotionofthehappinessofallsentientbeingsofthemoralcommunity.AsMill(Mill,J.S.1861.Utilitarianism.Chapter2)said(Rachelsp.102):
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2.4-Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism:1.providesapowerfulalternativetoreligiousethicsandKantianethics;2.clarifiesinsimpletermsunderstandabletoeveryonewhattheendofmoralactionis;3.iseasilyapplicabletoavarietyofethicaldilemmas,providingpossiblesolutions;4.providesasuper-cultural(indeeduniversal)standardofmoralevaluation,complyingwiththefirstrequirementoftheminimumconceptionofmorality;5.complieswiththeimpartialitycriterionoftheminimumconceptionofmorality:allsentientbeingsareequalmembersofthemoralcommunity.
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2.5-Utilitarianism
Ofcourse,utilitarianismcanbecriticisedformanydifferentreasons:1.Hedonisticprinciple=onlypleasureisintrinsicallygood?2.Impartialitycriterion=happinessofallsentientcreationshouldbeimpartiallyconsidered:woulditbereallyimmoraltoprivilegethewelfareofyourselfandyourfamilywhenyouact?3.Consequentialism=coursesofactionandsocialpoliciesaretobeevaluatedmerelyintermsofconsequences:butisthisenough?4.EstimationProblem:thecalculationofthepainandpleasuregeneratedbyanactionorsocialpolicyonthemoralcommunityisfraughtwithinsurmountabledifficulties.Letusconsidercriticisms3and4.
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2.6-Utilitarianism
Thelimitsofutilitarianism:isconsequentialismenough?Supposethataseriesofcrimeshasbeencommittedandthat,asaresult,socialupheavalandriotsensue.Thepoliceislookingforthecriminalbuthavenoclue.Eventually,theytargetmyneighbour,anoldandsolitarypersonwithminorcriminalprecedentsasachildmolester.Idon’tknowthissocialoutcastwellatall,butwhatIdoknowisthathe’sinnocent.IameventuallyaskedbythepoliceandprosecutionwhetherIhaveanyelementstoconvicthim.Aftermuchthought,giventhatriotshavebeencontinuingforseveraldaysandmanypeoplehavediedinthemeantime,Idecideto“frame”myneighbourbybearingfalsewitness.Ismyactionmoral?
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2.7-Utilitarianism
Fromaconsequentialistperspective,theactionis“good”ifitgeneratesanincreaseinsocialhappiness;preventingsocialchaosincreasessocialhappinesswhileframingasocialoutcastdecreasesit;however,onthebalance,socialhappinessincreases,soframingthenon-guiltypersonisgood.Fromadeontologicalprospective,lyingisimmoral(slide1.5);framingsomeoneevenmoreso(thinkaboutuniversalisingthisbehaviour).Framingsomeoneisalsoincompatiblewiththeprincipleofjustice(i.e.,treateveryoneequallyaccordingtothesameimpartialmoralstandards):itisobscenetoheldsomeoneresponsibleofacrimethathe/shehasnotcommitted.Consequentialismthusclasheswithdeontologyandothermoralintuitions(e.g.,theprincipleofjustice).Thus,dowereallyevaluateactionsmerelyaccordingtotheirconsequences?
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2.8-Utilitarianism
Asimilarkindofclashisattherootofthedifferencebetweentheconsequentialistdefenceandthedeontologicalcondemnationofinfanticidepractices.Fromaconsequentialistperspective,ifinfanticidepromoteshappinessinthemoralcommunity,itisgood(seeclass1slide5.2).Fromadeontologicalperspective,theinfantisamoralagentwithrightstoliveandflourish,anendinhim/herself,amoralagentthatcannotbetreatedasameansforfamily’sandcommunity’sbenefit(seeclass1slide5.4).Consequentialismthusclasheswithdeontologyandtheideathatmoralagentshavenaturalrights.Wedonotseemtoevaluateactionsmerelyaccordingtotheirconsequences,butalsoaccordingtoothermoralstandards.
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2.9-Utilitarianism
Utilitarianismseemswrongbecauseitviolatessomeofourdeep-rootedmoralintuitions.Butwhyshouldwetrusttheseintuitionsinthefirstplace?Considertheexampleoffalsetestimony.Theintuitionisthatframinganinnocentisunjustifiable.Butautilitarianconsidersalsotheotherinnocentpeoplekilledduringtheriots.So,doestheintuitionholdwhenthealternativesaresacrificingoneinnocentpersonforthebenefitofseveralotherinnocentpeoplewhomightbesavedintheriots?Intheinfanticidecase(class1,slides5.1-5.4),amoralintuitionisthateverychildhastherighttoliveandflourish.Butwhatabouttherightstoliveandflourishofthechildren’sfamilyandsocialgroup?Doestheintuitionholdwhenthealternativesaresacrificingachildforthebenefitofseveralmembersofthemoralcommunityofinterest?
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2.10-Utilitarianism
WhatshouldIdointhecaseofthe“trolley”problem(Thomson,J,J..1976.Killing,LettingDie,andtheTrolleyProblem.TheMonist59:204-17)?1.pulltheleverandbeingresponsiblefor1death?Atwhichpointwouldyouacceptautilitarianstance(peopleontrackA=n=10,100,1.000…)?2.donothing?Buthowcanitbemoralnottoact?
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TrackA
TrackB
2.11-Utilitarianism
WhatshouldIdo?
Thelimitsofutilitarianism:theestimationproblemItisextremelydifficulttoestimatethehappinessgeneratedbyactionsandsocialpoliciesbecause:a.sometimestheestimaterequiresthecomparisonbetweenincommensurableunitsofanalysis;forinstance,governmentsintroducelockdownpolicieswiththeaimofreducingthenumberofCovid-19infections;thepolicyontheonehandsaveslivesbut,ontheother,hashealthcosts(e.g.,onnon-Covid-19patients)andsocialcosts(e.g.,jobloss);howcanthebenefits(e.g.,livessaved)andcosts(e.g.,joblosses)ofthepolicybecompared?b.short-term,medium-termandlong-termconsequencesonthemoralcommunityaredifficulttocompare;forinstance,lockdownshaveshort-termbenefits;butwhataretheirsocietalcostsinthelongterm?
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2.12-Utilitarianism
March2020:aviralinfectionwithanexpectedinfectionfatalityrateof0.7%emerges;wedoneitherhaveknowndrugsnorvaccinestofightit;mortalityisaffectingmainlytheoldergenerations;vaccineswillneedalongtimetobedevelopedandwehavenoideahoweffectivetheywillbe.Shouldpopulationimmunitythroughnaturalinfectionbepursuedbygovernments(whathasbeencalled“herdimmunity”)?Howmightdeontologyandutilitarianismdirectgovernments’policyinsuchcircumstances?
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Casestudy1
Deontology:savinglivesshouldbethedriverofgovernments’policies;lockdownisbesttosavelives;anindefinitelockdownuntildrugsorvaccinesareavailableisneeded;anherdimmunitypolicyishardlyjustifiable.Utilitarianism:savinglivesisnotenough;sustainablesocialpoliciesshouldbethedriverofgovernments’policies;thebestpolicyistokeeptheinfectionlevellowenoughasnottoleadtocollapseofhealthsystem;somepeoplewillinevitablydie,butclosingsocietyuntiltheavailabilityofvaccinesanddrugsisnotfeasiblebecausetheymightnotarrivesoon;someformofherdimmunitypolicyisthusjustifiable.Wheredoyoustand?
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Casestudy1
Supposethat,followingavirusoutbreak,youhave1.000peopleneedingintensivecarebutonly500intensivecareunits.Inwhichwayshouldaccesstointensivecareunitsberegulated?Howmightdeontologyandutilitarianismsolvethisproblem?
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Casestudy2
Deontologyarguesthatallhumansareendsinthemselvesandthatwecannotuniversaliseanydiscriminatorycourseofaction.Onthisbasis,wegiveaccesstointensivecareunitsonarandombasis,lottery-style.Utilitariansthinkintermsofhappinessoftheentiremoralcommunity;inthisrespect,considerationsconcerningthesocialroleofpatientsareimportantinmoralevaluation.Utilitariansalsothinkintermsoflong-termhappiness,soconsiderationsoflife-expectancyareimportantinmoralevaluation.Onthisbasis,wegiveaccesstointensivecareunitsonaprioritybasis(firsttopregnantwomenandparentsofchildren…..onlyafterwordstopatientswithlowerlifeexpectancy).Wheredoyoustand?
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Casestudy2
Primaryresources:
1.Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).Chapters7,8,9and10.
2.Rachels,J.2004.ElementosdeFilosofiaMoral,Gradiva,Lisboa.Capítulos7,8,9e10.
Secondaryliterature
Thomson,J,J..1976.Killing,LettingDie,andtheTrolleyProblem.TheMonist59:204-17
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Summingup:theexaminationquestions(inEnglish)relativetothesethreeclassesontheintroduction(extremelyquick)tomoralphilosophywillbebasedonRachels’book:
Rachels,J.2003.TheElementsofMoralPhilosophy.4thedition.McGrawHillInternationalEditions,NewYork(1sted.1986).
Rachels,J.2004.ElementosdeFilosofiaMoral,Gradiva,Lisboa.
Thequestionswillbebasedon:1.thepdfsofthepresentationsoftheclassesand2.onchapters1,2,4,7,8,9,10,11,13ofRachels’bookthatIhavepartiallyexplainedintheclasses.
Youcancontactmebyemailforanydoubtandissueat:[email protected]
Ishallalsoteachyoutheclassesonabortion,euthanasiaandanimalsentiencefromtheendofMarch.
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