MORAN-Case # 1: VIRGINIA CALANOCvs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.G.R. No. L-8151, December 16, 1955BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.SUBJECT MATTER: Petition for ReviewFACTS:Melencio Basilio, a watchman of the Manila Auto Supply, secured a life insurance policy from the Philippine American Life Insurance Company in the amount of P2,000 to which was attached a supplementary contract covering death by accident. He then died of a gunshot wound on the occasion of a robbery committed in the house of Atty. Antonio Ojeda which is just a block away from Basilio's station. Virginia Calanoc, the widow, was paid by the company the sum of P2,000, face value of the policy, but was denied of the additional sum of P2,000 representing the value of the supplemental policy, alleging that the deceased died because he was murdered by a person who took part in the commission of the robbery and while making an arrest as an officer of the law which contingencies were expressly excluded in the contract and have the effect of exempting the company from liability.ISSUE:Was Melencio Basilios death, which is caused by a gunshot on the occasion of a robbery, an accident and therefore covered by the insurance contract?RULING:Yes.The happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim. There is no proof that the death of Basilio is the result of an assault or murder for the record is barren of any circumstance showing how the fatal shot was fired. Nor can it be said that the killing was intentional for there is the possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot merely to scare away the people around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit the victim. The victim could have been either the policeman or Atty. Ojeda for it cannot be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the deceased precisely because he wanted to take his life.The circumstance that he was a mere watchman and had no duty to heed the call of Atty. Ojeda should not be taken as a capricious desire on his part to expose his life to danger considering the fact that the place he was in duty-bound to guard was only a block away. When he joined Atty. Ojeda and the policeman, he might have thought, rightly or wrongly, that to know the truth was in the interest of his employer it being a matter that affects the security of the neighborhood. Also, he cannot be considered as making an arrest as an officer of the law simply because he went with the traffic policeman, for certainly he did not go there for that purpose nor was he asked to do so by the policeman.Moreover, the case of the victim does not fall under any of the enumerated risks in the supplementary contract making the company liable. Pursuant to Article 1377 of the new Civil Code, if the terms of an insurance contract are doubtful or obscure, the same must of necessity be interpreted or resolved against the one who has caused the obscurity DISPOSITIVE PORTION:Wherefore, reversing the decision appealed from, we hereby order the company to pay petitioner-appellant the amount of P2,000, with legal interest from January 26, 1951 until fully paid, with costs.

MORAN-Case # 2: EMILIA T. BIAGTAN, JUAN T. BIAGTAN, JR., MIGUEL T. BIAGTAN, GIL T. BIAGTAN and GRACIA T. BIAGTAN,plaintiffs-appellees,vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-25579 March 29, 1972MAKALINTAL,J.SUBJECT MATTER: Appeal by Defendant-appellant from the decision of the Court of First Instance of PangasinanFACTS:A band of robbers entered the house of Juan S. Biagtan who was insured with defendant Insular Life Assurance Company. The robbers met Biagtan near the door of one of the rooms in the second floor and the latter received thrusts from sharp-pointed instruments, causing 5 mortal and 4 non-mortal wounds on his body resulting in his death. The insurance company paid the basic amount of P5,000.00 to the beneficiaries of the insured namely, Emilia, Juan, Miguel, Gil and Gracia, all surnamed Biagtan, but refused to pay the additional sum of P5,000.00 under the accidental death benefit clause, on the ground that the insured's death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by third parties and therefore was not covered. ISSUE:Are the wounds inflicted by the robbers intentional thereby exempting the insurance company from paying the additional sum of P5,000.00 under the accidental death benefit clause of the Insurance Policy?RULING:Considering that 9 wounds were inflicted upon Biagtan, all by means of thrusts with bladed weapons at close range, it cannot be said that there was no intent to kill or injure. The manner of execution of the crime permits no other conclusion. The act itself of inflicting the injuries repeatedly was intentional. In the present case the wounds did prove fatal, and the robbers have been convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide.American jurisprudence reveals that "intentional" as used in an accident policy excepting intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person, etc., implies the exercise of the reasoning faculties, consciousness and volition.Where a provision of the policy excludes intentional injury, it is the intention of the person inflicting the injury that is controlling.If the injuries suffered by the insured clearly resulted from the intentional act of a third person the insurer is relieved from liability as stipulated.DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

MORAN-Case #3: FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA,respondents.G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992NOCON,J.:Subject matter: petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction FACTS:Carlie Surposa, who was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master Policy, died as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three unidentified men without provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were waiting along the street for a ride on their way home after attending the celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival." Private respondent Julia Surposa and the other beneficiaries namely Carlos, Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed Surposa, of said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with Finman General Assurance Corporation which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.ISSUE:Is the death of Carlie Surposa which resulted from murder and assault covered by the personal accident insurance policy when said circumstance of death is not included in the enumeration of circumstances which exempts the company from liability?RULING:Yes.The happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim, Carlie Surposa. The record is barren of any circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted, or that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the killer wanted to take his life. The insured died from an event that took place without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. It cannot be said that there was a capricious desire on his part to expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival.Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury from accident.Also, the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius"- the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing- is applicable in this case. The failure of Finman General Assurance Corporation to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks in the insurance policy leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that: The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.Moreover, contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.7WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition for certiorariwith restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

JIMENEZ-7:FIGURACION VDA. DE MAGLANA, et.al. vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION and AFISCO INSURANCE CORPORATIONG.R. No. 60506 August 6, 1992ROMERO,J.Petition forcertiorariFACTS: Lope Maglana, while driving a motorcycle, was bumped by the PUJ jeep driven by Pepito Into, operated and owned by Destrajo The accidentt resulted in Magalonas death. Consequently, the heirs of Lope Maglana, Sr., filed an action for damages and attorney's fees against operator Patricio Destrajo and the Afisco Insurance Corporation (AFISCO). An information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was also filed against Pepito Into, to which he was found guilty. Likewise, Destrajo was made to pay the heirs of Maglana in the civil case. The court ordered the insurance company to reimburse Destrajo whatever amounts the latter shall have paid only up to the extent of its insurance coverage. The heirs of Maglana, in a motion for the reconsideration, contended that AFISCO should not merely be held secondarily liable because the Insurance Code provides that the insurer's liability is "direct and primary and/or jointly and severally with the operator of the vehicle, although only up to the extent of the insurance coverage." ISSUE:Is AFISCO primarily liable (not secondarily), on the insurance policy and if so, is it solidarily liable with Destrajo?HELD:The liability of AFISCO based on the insurance contract is direct, but not solidary with that of Destrajo. The particular provision of the insurance policy on which the heirs base their claim provides "SECTION 1 LIABILITY TO THE PUBLIC 1. The Company will, subject to the Limits of Liability, pay all sums necessary to discharge liability of the insured in respect of. (a) death of or bodily injury to any THIRD PARTY; xxx 3. In the event of the death of any person entitled to indemnity under this Policy, the Company will, in respect of the liability incurred to such person indemnify his personal representatives in terms of, and subject to the terms and conditions hereof." The above-quoted provision leads to no other conclusion but that AFISCO can be held directly liable by the heirs. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that "While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the insurer, however, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on tort." While in solidary obligations, the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the solidary debtors, in an insurance contract, the insurer undertakes for a consideration to indemnify the insured against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event." Based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the heirs have the option either to claim the P15,000 from AFISCO and the balance from Destrajo or enforce the entire judgment from Destrajo subject to reimbursement from AFISCO to the extent of the insurance coverage.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The award of P28,800.00 representing loss of income is INCREASED to P192,000.00 and the death indemnity of P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.SO ORDERED.

JIMENEZ-8:PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMINIO LIM and EVELYN LIMG.R. No. 96452 May 7, 1992NOCON,J.:Petition for review oncertiorari. FACTS:

The Lim spouses opened achattel mortgageand bought a Ford Laser from Supercars for Php 77,000 and insured it withPerlaCompania de Seguros. The vehicle was stolen while Evelyn Lim was driving it with an expired license. The spouses requested for a moratorium on payments but this was denied by FCP, the assignee of rights over collection of the mortgage amount of the car. The spouses also called onthe insurance companyto pay thebalanceof the mortgage due to theft but this was denied by the company due to the spouses violation of the AuthorizedDriverclause stating (driving with an expired license before being carnapped): Any of the following: (a) The Insured (b) Any person driving on the Insured's order, or with his permission. Provided that the person driving is permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations, to drive the Scheduled Vehicle, or has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf.

Since the spouses didnt pay the mortgage, FCP filed suit against them. The trial court ruled in its favororderingspouses to pay. The appellate court reversed their decision. FCP andPerla appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in holding that private respondents did not violatethe insurancecontract because the authorizeddriverclause is not applicable to the "Theft" clause of said Contract?

HELD:

No. The car was insured against a malicious act such as theft. Therefore the Theft clause in the contract should apply and not the authorizeddriverclause. The risk against accident is different from the risk against theft.

The appellate court stated: The "authorizeddriverclause" in a typicalinsurance policyis in contemplation or anticipation of accident in the legal sense in which it should be understood, and not in contemplation or anticipation of an event such as theft. The distinction often seized upon by insurance companies in resisting claims from their assureds between death occurring as a result of accident and death occurring as a result of intent may, by analogy, apply to the case at bar. There was no connection between valid possession of a license and the loss of a vehicle. Ruling in a different way would render the policy a sham because the company can then easilycite restrictions not applicable to the claim.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to require private respondents to pay petitioner FCP the amount of P55,055.93, with legal interest from July 2, 1983 until fully paid. The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed as to all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

JIMENEZ-9:ARMANDO GEAGONIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATIONG.R. No. 114427 February 6, 1995DAVIDE, JR.,J.Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

FACTS: Armando Geagonia, owner of Norman's Mart, obtained from Country Bankers Insurance Corporation fire insurance policy No. F-14622 2 for P100,000.00 covering the period from 22 December 1989 to 22 December 1990. On 27 May 1990, fire of accidental origin broke out and Geagonia's insured stocks-in-trade were completely destroyed prompting him to file with Country Bankers a claim under the policy. Country Bankers denied the claim because it found that at the time of the loss, Geagonia's stocks-in-trade were likewise covered by fire insurance policies GA-28146 and GA-28144, for P100,000.00 each, issued by the Cebu Branch of the Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. (PFIC) which named Geagonia as the assured and contain a mortgage clause which reads: "Loss, if any, shall be payable to MESSRS. TESING TEXTILES, Cebu City as their interest may appear subject to the terms of the policy." Geagonia allegedly violated Condition 3 of the policy requiring him to inform it of the prior policies.ISSUE: Is the non-disclosure of other insurance policies a violation of condition 3 of the policy, so as to deny Geagonia from recovering on the policy? HELD: No. The non-disclosure then of the former policies was not fatal to Geagonia's right to recover on Country Bankers' policy. Condition 3 of Country Bankers's Policy F-14622 is allowed by Section 75 of the Insurance Code. It is commonly known as the additional or "other insurance" clause and has been upheld as valid and as a warranty that no other insurance exists. Its violation would thus avoid the policy. However, in order to constitute a violation, the other insurance must be upon the same subject matter, the same interest therein, and the same risk. The fire insurance policies issued by the PFIC name Geagonia as the assured and contain a mortgage clause which reads: "Loss, if any, shall be payable to MESSRS. TESING TEXTILES, Cebu City as their interest may appear subject to the terms of the policy." This is clearly a simple loss payable clause, not a standard mortgage clause. The Court concludes that (a) the prohibition in Condition 3 of the subject policy applies only to double insurance, and (b) the nullity of the policy shall only be to the extent exceeding P200,000.00 of the total policies obtained. The first conclusion is supported by the portion of the condition referring to other insurance "covering any of the property or properties consisting of stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories only hereby insured," and the portion regarding the insured's declaration on the subheading CO-INSURANCE that the co-insurer is Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. in the sum of P50,000.00. A double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect of the same subject and interest. Since the insurable interests of a mortgagor and a mortgagee on the mortgaged property are distinct and separate; the two policies of the PFIC do not cover the same interest as that covered by the policy of Country Bankers, no double insurance exists.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31916 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Insurance Commission in Case No. 3340 is REINSTATED.Costs against private respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.SO ORDERED.

MORAN-CASE # 13: MAPALAD AISPORNA,petitioner,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982DE CASTRO,J.Petition for CertiorariFACTS:A Personal Accident Policy was issued to Eugene S. Isidro by Perla Compania de Seguros thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, who is duly licensed by Insurance Commission. Said policy was issued with active participation of Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, who defended that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew. Mapalad was charged and was found guilty by the trial court for having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended), for acting as agent in the solicitation for insurance without securing first a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. CA affirmed the decision.ISSUE:1) Can a person like Mapalad Aisporna be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section? Or, Is the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph?2) Is receipt of compensation an essential element of the crime defined by the first paragraph of section 189 of the insurance act?RULING:1) The first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. 2) Yes. Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the section. CA has established that the Mapalad did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. The information does not even allege that the negotiation of an insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costsde oficio.

MORAN-Case # 14: WHITE GOLD MARINE SERVICES, INC.,Petitioners,vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION AND THE STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD.,Respondents.G.R. No. 154514. July 28, 2005QUISUMBING,J.PETITION FOR REVIEWFACTS:White Gold Marine Services, Inc. procured a protection and indemnity coverage for its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. Subsequently, White Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance, andPioneer issued receipts evidencing payments for the coverage. When White Gold failed to fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage and filed a case for collection of sum of money to recover White Golds unpaid balance. Meanwhile, White Gold filed a complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual violated Sections 186and 187of the Insurance Code, while Pioneer violated Sections 299, 300and 301in relation to Sections 302 and 303, thereof.The Insurance Commission dismissed the complaint, stating that there was no need for Steamship Mutual to secure a license because it was not engaged in the insurance business; that Steamship Mutual was a Protection and Indemnity Club (P & I Club); that Pioneer need not obtain another license as insurance agent and/or a broker for Steamship Mutual because Steamship Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business; and that Pioneer was already licensed, hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship Mutual was already superfluous. CA affirmed the decision.ISSUES:1) Is Steamship Mutual, a P & I Club, engaged in the insurance business in the Philippines?2) Does Pioneer need a license as an insurance agent/broker for Steamship Mutual?RULING:1) Yes. A P & I Club is "aform of insuranceagainst third party liability, where the third party is anyone other than the P & I Club and the members."By definition then, Steamship Mutual as a P & I Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business.2) Yes.Although Pioneer is already licensed as an insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for Steamship Mutual as Section 299 of the Insurance Code clearly states that: No person shall act as an insurance agent or as an insurance broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippines or any agent thereof, without first procuring a license so to act from the Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision dated May 3, 2000 of the Insurance Commission is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd., and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation are ORDERED to obtain licenses and to secure proper authorizations to do business as insurer and insurance agent, respectively. The petitioners prayer for the revocation of Pioneers Certificate of Authority and removal of its directors and officers, is DENIED. Costs against respondents.

MORAN-Case # 15: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,Petitioner,vs. SUNLIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,Respondent.G.R. No. 158085 October 14, 2005PANGANIBAN,J.Petition for Reviewunder Rule 45 of the Rules of CourtFACTS:Sun Life, which is a mutual life insurance company organized and existing under the laws of Canada, and duly registered and authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Insurance Commission to engage in business in the Philippines, filed with the CIR its insurance premium tax return for the third quarter of 1997 and paid the premium tax in the amount ofP31,485,834.51. For the period covering August 21 to December 18, 1997, petitioner filed with the CIR its documentary stamp tax (DST) declaration returns and paid the total amount ofP30,000,000.00. Considering the decision inInsular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. CIR, which held that mutual life insurance companies are purely cooperative companies and are exempt from the payment of premium tax and DST, Sun Life filed with the CIR an administrative claim for tax credit of its alleged erroneously paid premium tax and DST for the aforestated tax periods.ISSUES:1) Is Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada a cooperative?(Or is respondent a purely cooperative company or association under Section 121 of the National Internal Revenue Code and a fraternal or beneficiary society, order or cooperative company on the lodge system or local cooperation plan and organized and conducted solely by the members thereof for the exclusive benefit of each member and not for profit under Section 199 of the National Internal Revenue Code?)2) Is registration with the Cooperative Development Authority asine qua nonrequirement to be entitled to tax exemption?3) Is Sun Life exempted from payment of tax on life insurance premiums and documentary stamp tax?RULING:1) Yes.The Tax Code defines a cooperative as an association "conducted by the members thereof with the money collected from among themselves and solely for their own protection and not for profit."Without a doubt, respondent is a cooperative engaged in a mutual life insurance business.2) No. Under the Tax Code although respondent is a cooperative, registration with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)is not necessary in order for it to be exempt from the payment of both percentage taxes on insurance premiums, under Section 121; and documentary stamp taxes on policies of insurance or annuities it grants, under Section 199.First, the Tax Code does not require registration with the CDA. No tax provision requires a mutual life insurance company to register with that agency in order to enjoy exemption from both percentage and documentary stamp taxes.Second, the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippinesdo not apply. Cooperative insurance under the Cooperative Code is limited in scope and local in character. It is not the same as mutual life insurance.Third, not even the Insurance Code requires registration with the CDA. The provisions of this Code primarily govern insurance contracts; only if a particular matter in question is not specifically provided for shall the provisions of the Civil Code on contracts and special laws govern. 3) Yes. Having determined that respondent is a cooperative that does not have to be registered with the CDA, it is entitled to exemption from both premium taxes and documentary stamp taxes (DST).The Tax Code is clear. Section 121 of the Code exempts cooperative companies from the 5 percent percentage tax on insurance premiums. Section 199 also exempts from the DST, policies of insurance or annuities made or granted by cooperative companies. Being a cooperative, respondent is thus exempt from both types of taxes.WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

JIMENEZ-19:RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ vs. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADAG.R. No. L-15895 November 29, 1920

MALCOLM,J.

AppealFACTS: September 24, 1917:Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun LifeAssurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity 2 days later:he paid P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt according to the provisional receipt, 3 things had to be accomplished bythe insurance companybefore there was a contract:(1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; -check(2) there had to be approval ofthe applicationby the head office of the company; and - check(3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant - ? November 26, 1917: Thehead officeat Montreal, Canadagave notice ofacceptanceby cable to Manila but this was not mailed December 4, 1917:policy was issued at Montreal December 18, 1917:attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application December 19, 1917:local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to thenotificationof November 26, 1917 December 21, 1917morning:received by Mr. Torres December 20, 1917:Mr. Herrer died Rafael Enriquez, as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer filed to recover fromSun LifeAssurance Companyof Canadathrough its office in Manila for a life annuity RTC: favored Sun Life Insurance

ISSUE:Did Mr. Herrerreceived notice ofacceptanceof his application, thereby perfecting his life annuity?HELD:No, because it has not been proved satisfactorily that theacceptanceofthe applicationever came to the knowledge of the applicant.

The law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of Art. 1319. (formerly Art. 1262) of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. Also, that according to the provisional receipt, three things had to be accomplished bythe insurance companybefore there was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval ofthe applicationby the head office of the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. The further admitted facts are that the head office in Montreal did acceptthe application, did cable the Manila office to that effect, did actually issue the policy and did actually writethe letterofnotificationand place it in the usual channels for transmission to the addressee.

The fact as tothe letterofnotificationthus fails to concur with theessential elementsof the general rule pertaining to the mailing and delivery of mail matter asannouncedby the American courts, namely, when a letter or other mail matter is addressed and mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mails. But if any one of these elemental facts fails to appear, it is fatal to the presumption. For instance, a letter will not be presumed to have been received by the addressee unless it is shown that it was deposited in the post-office, properly addressed and stamped.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:Judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff shall have and recover from the defendant the sum of P6,000 with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.

JIMENEZ-20:GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANYvs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. L-31845 April 30, 1979

DE CASTRO,J.

Petition for certiorari by way of appeal FACTS:

Ngo Hing filed an application with the Great Pacific for a twenty-year endowment policy in the amount of P50,000.00 on the life of his one-year old daughter Helen. He supplied the essential data which petitioner Mondragon, theBranch Manager, wrote onthe form. The latter paid the annual premium the sum of P1,077.75 going over to the Company, but he retained the amount of P1,317.00 as his commission for being a duly authorized agent of Pacific Life.

Upon the payment of the insurance premium, the binding depositreceiptwas issued Ngo Hing. Likewise, petitioner Mondragon handwrote at the bottom of theback pageof theapplication formhis strong recommendation for the approval of the insurance application. Then Mondragon received a letter from Pacific Life disapproving the insurance application. The letter stated that the said life insurance application for 20-year endowment plan is notavailablefor minors below seven years old, but Pacific Life can consider the same under the Juvenile Triple Action Plan, and advised that if the offer isacceptable, the Juvenile Non-Medical Declaration be sent to the company.

The non-acceptance of the insurance plan by Pacific Life was allegedly not communicated by petitioner Mondragon to private respondent Ngo Hing. Instead, on May 6, 1957, Mondragon wrote back Pacific Life again strongly recommending the approval of the 20-year endowment insurance plan to children, pointing out that since the customers were asking for such coverage.

Helen Go died of influenza. Ngo Hing sought the payment of the proceeds of the insurance, but having failed in his effort, he filed the action for the recovery before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which ruled against him.

ISSUES:

1. Does the binding depositreceiptconstitute a temporary contract of the life insurance in question?

2. Did Ngo Hing concealed the state of health and physical condition of Helen Go, which rendered void the policy?

HELD:

1. No. Thereceiptwas intended to be merely a provisional insurance contract. Its perfection was subject to compliance of the following conditions: (1) that the company shall be satisfied that the applicant was insurable on standard rates; (2) that if the company does not acceptthe application and offers to issue a policy for a different plan, the insurance contract shall not be binding until the applicant accepts the policy offered; otherwise, the deposit shall be refunded; and (3) that if the company disapprovesthe application, the insurance applied for shall not be in force at any time, and the premium paid shall be returned to the applicant.

Thereceiptis merely an acknowledgment that the latter's branch office had received from the applicant the insurance premium and had acceptedthe applicationsubject forprocessingbythe insurance company. There was still approval or rejection the same on the basis of whether or not the applicant is "insurable on standard rates." Since Pacific Life disapproved the insurance application of respondent Ngo Hing, the binding depositreceiptin question had never become in force at any time. The binding depositreceiptis conditional and does not insure outright. This was held in Lim v Sun.

The deposit paid by private respondent shall have to be refunded by Pacific Life.

2. Ngo Hing had deliberately concealed the state of health of his daughter Helen Go. When he supplied data, he was fully aware that his one-year old daughter is typically a mongoloid child. He withheld the fact material to the risk insured.

The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith uberrima fides meaning good faith, absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or demotion, however slight.

The concealment entitles the insurer to rescind the contract of insurance.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and in lieu thereof, one is hereby entered absolving petitioners Lapulapu D. Mondragon and Great Pacific Life Assurance Company from their civil liabilities as found by respondent Court and ordering the aforesaid insurance company to reimburse the amount of P1,077.75, without interest, to private respondent, Ngo Hing. Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED.

JIMENEZ-21:DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. DANSG.R. No. L-109937 March 21, 1994

QUIASON,J.

Petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of CourtFACTS:Juan B. Dans, 76 years of age, is the principal mortgagor of a loan, in the reduced amount of P300,000.00, duly approved by DBP on August 4, 1987 and released on August 11, 1987. Dans obtained a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) with the DBP Mortgage Redemption Insurance Pool (DBP MRI Pool) as advised by DBP. From the proceeds of the loan, DBP deducted the amount of P1,476.00 as payment for the MRI premium. On August 15, 1987, Dans accomplished and submitted the "MRI Application for Insurance" and the "Health Statement for DBP MRI Pool." On August 20, 1987, the MRI premium of Dans, less the DBP service fee of 10 percent, was credited by DBP to the savings account of the DBP MRI Pool. Accordingly, the DBP MRI Pool was advised of the credit.On September 3, 1987, Dans died of cardiac arrest. The DBP, upon notice, relayed this information to the DBP MRI Pool. On September 23, 1987, the DBP MRI Pool notified DBP that Dans was not eligible for MRI coverage, being over the acceptance age limit of 60 years at the time of application. The DBP offered to refund the premium of P1,476.00 which the deceased had paid, but Candida Dans refused to accept the same, demanding payment of the face value of the MRI or an amount equivalent to the loan. She, likewise, refused to accept anex gratiasettlement of P30,000.00, which the DBP later offered.On February 10, 1989, respondent Estate, through Candida Dans as administratrix, filed a complaint with against DBP and the insurance pool for "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages." Respondent Estate alleged that Dans became insured by the DBP MRI Pool when DBP, with full knowledge of Dans' age at the time of application, required him to apply for MRI, and later collected the insurance premium thereon. Respondent Estate therefore prayed: (1) that the sum of P139,500.00, which it paid under protest for the loan, be reimbursed; (2) that the mortgage debt of the deceased be declared fully paid; and (3) that damages be awarded.ISSUE: Is the contract of insurance between Dans and the DBP Mortgage Redemption Insurance Pool already considered to be perfected so as to hold the latter liable together with DBP?

HELD: No. When Dans applied for MRI, he filled up and personally signed a "Health Statement for DBP MRI Pool" (Exh. "5-Bank") with the following declaration:I hereby declare and agree that all the statements and answers contained herein are true, complete and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and form part of my application for insurance. It is understood and agreed that no insurance coverage shall be effected unless and until this application is approved and the full premium is paid during my continued good health (Records, p. 40).Under the aforementioned provisions, the MRI coverage shall take effect: (1) when the application shall be approved by the insurance pool; and (2) when the full premium is paid during the continued good health of the applicant. These two conditions, being joined conjunctively, must concur.Undisputably, the power to approve MRI applications is lodged with the DBP MRI Pool. The pool, however, did not approve the application of Dans. There is also no showing that it accepted the sum of P1,476.00, which DBP credited to its account with full knowledge that it was payment for Dan's premium. There was, as a result, no perfected contract of insurance; hence, the DBP MRI Pool cannot be held liable on a contract that does not exist.DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.-CVNo. 26434 is MODIFIED and petitioner DBP is ORDERED: (1) to REIMBURSE respondent Estate of Juan B. Dans the amount of P1,476.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; and (2) to PAY said Estate the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees. With costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Digested by: Joseph I. Delovieres23Case Title: Gulf Resorts, Inc. vs. Phil. Charter Insurance CorporationDocket No. and Date: G.R. No. 156167, 16 March 2005Ponente: PUNO,J.Nature of the Case: Petition forcertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court

FACTS:

Petitioner Gulf Resorts, Inc. (Gulf Resorts) offered Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) to cover their properties against damages caused by earthquake. Gulf Resorts originally had their Plaza resort Properties insured with American Home Assurance Company (AHAC-AIU) but Gulf Resorts agreed to insure with PCIC provided that the policy wording are the same from the policies issued by AHAC-AIU. The property of Gulf resorts was struck by an earthquake, thus, Gulf resorts manifested that they will claim under policies issued by PCIC, consequently, PCIC denied its claim that the insurer must pay the damages to all its properties and contended that their policy only covers the two (2) swimming pools, Gulf Resorts resorted to filing of a complaint with the RTC of Pasig which ruled in favor of PCIC and Petitioners Motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed in Toto the decision of the lower court, hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Is the policy made by PCIC in favor of Gulf resorts only covers two (2) swimming pools owned by the insured (Gulf Resorts) and does not cover all the properties of the insured?

HELD:

Yes. The policy only covers two (2) swimming pools owned by the insured and not the whole damaged property. The Court held that, Gulf resorts only paid the premiums of the swimming pools and in order for a contract of insurance to be perfected, Section 2(1) of the Insurance Code defines a contract of insurance as an agreement whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. In the subject policy, no premium payments were made with regard to earthquake shock coverage, except on the two swimming pools. There is no mention of any premium payable for the other resort properties with regard to earthquake shock. This is consistent with the history of petitioners previous insurance policies from AHAC-AIU. The petitioner also cannot invoke the fine print rule, as the court stated, where the stipulations of the policy are clear and unambiguous, there is no more room for interpretation but only application.

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The petition for certiorari is dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Digested by: Joseph I. Delovieres24Case Title: Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of AppealsDocket No. and Date: G.R. No. L-36413, 26 September 1988Ponente: PADILLA, J.Nature of the Case: Review on certiorari

FACTS:

Sio Choy insured a Willys Jeepney to Petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., the insured jeep, while being driven by one Juan P. Campollo an employee of the respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc., collided with a passenger bus belonging to the respondent Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. As a result, Martin C. Vallejos filed an action for damages against Sio Choy, Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and the PANTRANCO before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The CFI of Pangasinan absolved PANTRANCO of any liability and ruled that Sio Choy, owner of the ill-fated Jeepney, San Leon rice mill, employer of the driver during the accident and Malayan Insurance company, insurer of Sio choy are Solidarily liable, this ruling was also affirmed by the Court of appeals which also ruled that the insurer is not entitled to reimbursement on the ground that respondent is not privy to the contract of insurance existing between petitioner and respondent Sio Choy, hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:1. Is the insurer, Malayan Insurance Co. Solidarily Liable with Sio Choy and San Leon rice mill?2. Is Malayan Insurance entitled to reimbursement by San Leon rice mill?HELD:1. No. The insurer cannot be held solidarily liable with the owner of the jeepney and the employer of the driver driving during the accident. The court held that the liability of Malayan Insurance is only up to the extent of it being the insurer or only up to the extent of the insurance contract with Sio Choy. Thus, the parties Solidarily liable to Vallejos is Sio choy, being the owner of the Jeepney, and San Leon Rice mill, being the employer of the driver which was within the scope of his work during the accident.2. Yes. Malayan is entitled to reimbursement. The court held that, under the principle of principle of subrogation Malayan is entitled to reimbursement. Although many policies including policies in the standard form, now provide for subrogation, and thus determine the rights of the insurer in this respect, the equitable right of subrogation as the legal effect of payment inures to the insurer without any formal assignment or any express stipulation to that effect in the policy" (44 Am. Jur. 2nd 746). Stated otherwise, when the insurance company pays for the loss, such payment operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of the property and all remedies which the insured may have for the recovery thereof. That right is not dependent upon , nor does it grow out of any privity of contract (emphasis supplied) or upon written assignment of claim, and payment to the insured makes the insurer assignee in equity (Shambley v. Jobe-Blackley Plumbing and Heating Co., 264 N.C. 456, 142 SE 2d 18). It follows, therefore, that petitioner, upon paying respondent Vallejos the amount of riot exceeding P20,000.00, shall become the subrogee of the insured, the respondent Sio Choy; as such, it is subrogated to whatever rights the latter has against respondent San Leon Rice Mill, Inc. Article 1217 of the Civil Code gives to a solidary debtor who has paid the entire obligation the right to be reimbursed by his co-debtors for the share which corresponds to each.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification above-mentioned. Without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

ADRIANO-26-Pan Malayan vs. CAGR. No. 81026April 30, 1990CORTES, J.Petitioner for reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:Pan Malayan filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against private respondent Erlinda Fabie and her driver. Pan Malayan insured a vehicle registered in the name of Canlubang. Due to recklessness of the unknown driver ofa pick up owned by Fabie,the insured vehicle was damaged in the amount of Php 42,052. Pan Malayan defrayed the cost of the repair of the insured car and was subrogated to the rights of Canlubang against the driver and his employer Fabie. Defendants refused to pay the claim of Pan Malayan. Pan Malayan clarified that the damage caused to the insured car was settled under the own damage coverage of the policy and the release of claim and subrogation receipt executed by Canlubang in favor of Pan Malayan. RTC dismissed Pan Malayans complaint. CA up held RTC its decision.ISSUE: WON, the insurer Pan Malayan may institute an action to recover the amount it had paid its assured in settlement ofan insurance claim against private respondents.HELD: YES. Art. 2207 of the New Civil Code provides for the principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, the insurer, upon payment to the assured will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer. Subrogation accrues upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer. The own damagecoverage implies damage to the insured vehicle being repaired, the costs of which are assumed by the insurer.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the present petition is GRANTED. Petitioner's complaint for damages against private respondents is hereby REINSTATED. Let the case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.

ADRIANO-27Cebu Shipyard vs. William Lines306 SCRA 762 GR. NO.132607May5, 1999PURISIMA, J.Petition for Review onCertiorariFACTS:Petitioner CSEW is engaged in the business of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels. William Lines insured its vessel to respondent Prudential for Php 45 million for hull and machinery. The hull policy included an Addition Perils clause containing loss or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship repairman. William Lines brought its vessel to CSEW for repair but it caught fire and sank, resulting to its total loss. William Lines sued CSEW alleging that the fire that broke out was caused by CSEWs negligence and lack of care. Prudential was impleaded as co-plaintiff, after it paid William Lines, Prudential was subrograted to the claim of Php 45 million. ISSUE:WON, Prudential is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of William Lines.HELD:YES. Pursuant to Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, when Prudential, after due verification of the merit of the insurance claim of William Lines, paid the latter the amount covered by its policy, it was subrogated to the rights of the latter to recover the insured loss from the liable party, CSEW. WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision, dated September 3, 1997, and Resolution, dated February 13, 1998, of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

LUNA-Case #29FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION VS. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, ET. AL.G.R. No. 150094August 18, 2004Ponente: PanganibanNature of Case: Subrogation of rights

FACTS: Shipper SMITHKLINE USAdelivered tocarrier BurlingtonAir Express, an agent of herein petitioner, a cargo shipment, insured with respondent which consists of 109 cartons of veterinary biologicals for delivery toconsignee SMITHKLINEand French Overseas Company in Makati City with the words, REFRIGERATE WHEN NOT IN TRANSIT and PERISHABLE stamp marked on its face however12 days after the cargoes arrived in Manila it was found out that the same were stored only in a room with 2 air conditioners running in the warehouse of Cargohaus Inc., to cool the place instead of a refrigerator.As a consequence of the result of the veterinary biologics test, SMITHKLINE abandoned the shipment and, declaring total loss for the unusable shipment, filed a claim with AHAC through its representative in the Philippines, the Philam Insurance Co., Inc. (PHILAM) which recompensed SMITHKLINE for the whole insured amount. Thereafter, PHILAM filed an action for damages against the FEDEX imputing negligence on either or both of them in the handling of the cargo where it was decided that FEDEX is solidarily liable with Cargohaus Inc.ISSUE:Is FEDEX liable for damage to or loss of the insured goods?HELD:No. Upon receipt of the insurance proceeds, the consignee (Smithkline) executed a subrogation Receipt in favor of respondents authorizing them to file claims and begin suit against any such carrier, vessel, person, corporation or government. Undeniably, the consignee had a legal right to receive the goods in the same condition it was delivered for transport to petitioner and if that right was violated, the consignee would have a cause of action against the person responsible therefor.In the exercise of its subrogatory right, an insurer may proceed against an erring carrier and to all intents and purposes, it stands in the place and in substitution of the consignee. WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED,and the assailed DecisionREVERSEDinsofar as it pertains to Petitioner Federal Express Corporation. No pronouncement as to costs.

LUNA-Case # 30ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION VS. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICAGR No. 168402August 6, 2008Ponente: Reyes, R. T.Nature of case: Subrogation of rights

FACTS:MSAS Cargo International Limited and/or Associated and/or Subsidiary Companies (MSAS) procured an "all-risk marine insurance policy from ICNA UK Limited of London for its cargo, consisting of wooden work tools and workbenches purchased by consignee Science Teaching Improvement Project (STIP)which was later on received by Aboitiz and shipped to Cebu however upon arrival, the checker noted that the crates were slightly broken or cracked at the bottom causing the cargo to be withdrawn by the representative of the consignee, STIP and delivered toDonBoscoTechnicalHigh School, Punta Princesa,CebuCity where it was received by Mr. Bernhard Willig who later on reported the damage to Aboitiz.Consignee filed a claim against ICNA who then paid consignee and asubrogation receipt was duly signed by Willig. ICNA then advised Aboitiz of thereceiptsigned in its favor but received no reply so it filed for collection at the RTC.ISSUE: Whether or not ICNA can claim under the right of subrogationHELD: YES. Only when that foreign corporation is "transacting" or "doing business" in the country will a license be necessary before it can institute suits. It may, however, bring suits on isolated business transactions, which is not prohibited under Philippine law. The policy benefits any subsequent assignee, or holder, including the consignee, who may file claims on behalf of the assured.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDand the appealed DecisionAFFIRMED.

OROLFO-39: Sunlife Assurance v. Court of Appeals245 scra 268, June 22, 1995QUIASON, JPetition for Review

FACTS:

Bacani procured a life insurance contract for himself from Sunlife Assurance. Specifically, the policy included a double indemnity in case of accidental death, designating his mother as beneficiary. After investigation, Sunlife rejected the claim on ground of non-disclosure of material facts. The trial court ruled that the facts concealed by the insured were made in good faith and under the belief that they need not be disclosed. Also, it held that the health history of the insured was immaterial since the insurance policy was non-medical.

The CA affirmed, stating that the cause of death was unrelated to the facts concealed by the insured.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the concealment made by Bacani warranted the rejection of the insurance claim.

HELD:

Yes, the Court held that the information which the insured failed to disclose was material and relevant to the approval and issuance of the insurance policy. Good faith is not a defense in determining the materiality of the information to be disclosed. Waiver of medical examination by insured is not a defense for such information necessarily constitutes an important factor which the insurer takes into consideration in deciding whether to issue the policy or not. Cause of death is immaterial in case of concealment. His non-disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risks of the proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

OROLFO-40:Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs Serafin Feliciano (1943)G.R. No. L-47593, December 29, 1943OZAETA, JMotion for Reconsideration

FACTS:

From the courts decision rendered in the case of Insular Life Assurance vs Feliciano (1941), Insular Life filed a motion for reconsideration. Insular avers that Feliciano is not entitled to the claim because the insurance policy is void ab initio; that he connived with the insurance agent and the medical examiner; and that at best, Feliciano is only entitled to refund or the reimbursement of what he has paid in premium.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Insular Life is correct.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that Insular Lifes contention is correct. When Evaristo Feliciano signed the application in blank and authorized the soliciting agent and/or medical examiner of Insular to write the answers for him, he made them his own agents for that purpose, and he was responsible for their acts in that connection. If they falsified the answers for him, he could not evade the responsibility for the falsification. He was not supposed to sign the application in blank. He knew that the answers to the questions therein contained would be the basis of the policy, and for that very reason he was required with his signature to vouch for truth thereof.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is sustained and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed. Let another judgment be entered in favor of the respondents and against the petitioner for the refund of the premiums amounting to P1,389, with legal interest thereon from the date of the complaint, and without any finding as to costs.

AVANZADO-CASE # 41THELMA VDA. DE CANILANG,petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION,respondents.G.R. No. 92492 June 17, 1993FELICIANO,J.:FACT:Canilang consulted a doctor and was diagnosed suffering from sinus tachycardia. He consulted the same doctor and this time found to have acute bronchitis. On the next day Canilang Jaime Canilang applied for a "non-medical" insurance policy with respondent Great Pacific Life Assurance Company ("Great Pacific") naming his wife, Thelma Canilang, as his beneficiary. Year after the effectivity of the contract he then died due to congestive "congestive heart failure," "anemia," and "chronic anemia."Petitioner, widow and beneficiary of the insured, filed a claim with Great Pacific which the insurer denied upon the ground that the insured had concealed material information from it.Petitioner then filed a complaint against Great Pacific with the Insurance Commission for recovery of the insurance proceeds.

ISSUEl:

Was canilang guilty of misrepresentation?

Held: Yes Canilang failed to disclose was material to the ability of the insurer to estimate the probable risk he presented as a subject of life insurance. If canilang disclose his twice visit to the doctor and the medicines prescribed in the insurance application. The insurer maybe reasonably refused to issue nonmedical insurance policy or higher premium for the same coverage. The materiality of the information withheld by Great Pacific did not depend upon the state of mind of Jaime Canilang. A man's state of mind or subjective belief is not capable of proof in our judicial process, except through proof of external acts or failure to act from which inferences as to his subjective belief may be reasonably drawn. Neither does materiality depend upon the actual or physical events which ensue. Materiality relates rather to the "probable and reasonable influence of the facts" upon the party to whom the communication should have been made, in assessing the risk involved in making or omitting to make further inquiries and in accepting the application for insurance; that "probable and reasonable influence of the facts" concealed must, of course, be determined objectively, by the judge ultimately.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1989 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 08696 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to the costs.SO ORDERED.Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

AVANZADO-CASE # 42PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and ASSURANCE INC.,petitioner,vs. TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.,Respondent.GR NO 151890 June 20, 2006CHICO-NAZARIO,J:

This is a consolidation of two separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. in G.R. No. 151890 and Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. in G.R. No. 151991, assailing the Decision dated 6 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 68278, which reversed the Judgmentdated 6 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-20709. The 29 January 2002 Resolutionof the Court of Appeals, denying PRUDENTIALs Motion for Reconsideration and TRANS-ASIAs Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the 6 November 2001 Decision, is likewise sought to be annulled and set aside.

FACT:

M/V Asia Korea vessel is owned by TRANS-SIA. In consideration of payment of premiums, PRUDENTIAL insured M/V Asia Korea for loss/damage of the hull and machinery arising from perils, inter alia, of fire and explosion for the sum of P40 Million. While, the policy was in force, a fire broke out while M/V Asia Korea was undergoing repairs at the port of Cebu. TRANS-ASIA filed its notice of claim for damage sustained by the vessel. This is evidenced by a letter/formal claim of even date. TRANS-ASIA reserved its right to subsequently notify PRUDENTIAL as to the full amount of the claim upon final survey and determination by average adjuster Richard Hogg International of the damage sustained by reason of fire. An adjusters report on the fire in question was submitted by Richard Hogg International together with the U-Marine Surveyor Report.PRUDENTIAL denied the material allegations of the Complaint and interposed the defense that TRANS-ASIA breached insurance policy conditions.

ISSUE: Does Trans-Asia breach the warranty stated in the insurance policy?

Held:

NO. It ruled that a determination of the parties liabilities hinged on whether TRANS-ASIA violated and breached the policy conditions on WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED. It interpreted the provision to mean that TRANS-ASIA is required to maintain the vessel at a certain class at all times pertinent during the life of the policy. According to the court a quo, TRANS-ASIA failed to prove compliance of the terms of the warranty, the violation thereof entitled PRUDENTIAL, the insured party, to rescind the contract. Further, citing Section 107of the Insurance Code, the court a quo ratiocinated that the concealment made by TRANS-ASIA that the vessel was not adequately maintained to preserve its class was a material concealment sufficient to avoid the policy and, thus, entitled the injured party to rescind the contract. The court a quo found merit in PRUDENTIALs contention that there was nothing in the adjustment of the particular average submitted by the adjuster that would show that TRANS-ASIA was not in breach of the policy.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for its failure to prove a cause of action.

LONTOK-(CASE 45)SHERMAN SHAFER vs. HON. JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF OLONGAPO CITY, BRANCH 75, and MAKATI INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.G.R. No. 78848 November 14, 1988PADILLA,J.Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: Sherman Shafer (petitioner) obtained a private car policy from Makati Insurance Company, Inc. for third party liability (TPL). The policy was in effect when the car hit and bumped a Volkswagen car owned and by Felino llano causing damage in the amount of P12,345.00 and injured one Jovencio Poblete, Sr. who was on board the car that suffer physical injuries.Felino Ilano filed a separate civil action against Shafer for damages, while Jovencio Poblete, Sr did not file a separate civil action for damages. Instead he testified on his claim for damages for the serious physical injuries which he claimed to have sustained as a result of the accident. Upon motion, Shafer file a third party complaint against Makati Insurance Company, Inc, and the company move to dismiss. The court dismissed the third party complaint and contended that it was premature because the third party complaint is without cause of action. The court further stated that the better procedure is for Shafer to wait for the outcome of the criminal aspect of the case to determine whether or not the accused has a cause of action against the third party defendant for the enforcement of its TPL under the insurance contract. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Is the third party complaint of the petitioner premature?

HELD: NO,the action of the petitioner is not premature. Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance or TPL is primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result of a negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The victims and/or their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners.The liability of the insurance company under the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is for loss or damage. Where an insurance policy insures directly against liability, the insurer's liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the injury or event upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on the recovery of judgment by the injured party against the insured.The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer. The general purpose of statutes enabling an injured person to proceed directly against the insurer is to protect injured persons against the insolvency of the insured who causes such injury, and to give such injured person a certain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be liberally construed so that their intended purpose may be accomplished. It has even been held that such a provision creates a contractual relation which inures to the benefit of any and every person who may be negligently injured by the named insured as if such injured person were specifically named in the policy.In the event that the injured fails or refuses to include the insurer as party defendant in his claim for indemnity against the insured, the latter is not prevented by law to avail of the procedural rules intended to avoid multiplicity of suits. Not even a "no action" clause under the policy-which requires that a final judgment be first obtained against the insured and that only thereafter can the person insured recover on the policy can prevail over the Rules of Court provisions aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits.In the instant case, the court a quo erred in dismissing Shafer's third party complaint on the ground that he had no cause of action yet against Makati Insurance. There is no need on the part of the insured to wait for the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of reckless imprudence. The occurrence of the injury to the third party immediately gave rise to the liability of the insurer under its policy.A third party complaint is a device allowed by the rules of procedure by which the defendant can bring into the original suit a party against whom he will have a claim for indemnity or remuneration as a result of a liability established against him in the original suit. Third party complaints are allowed to minimize the number of lawsuits and avoid the necessity of bringing two (2) or more actions involving the same subject matter.In the instant case, the civil aspect of the offense charged, i.e., serious physical injuries allegedly suffered by Jovencio Poblete, Sr., was impliedly instituted with the criminal case. Shafer may thus raise all defenses available to him insofar as the criminal and civil aspects of the case are concerned. The claim of Shafer for payment of indemnity to the injured third party, under the insurance policy, for the alleged bodily injuries caused to said third party, arose from the offense charged in the criminal case, from which Jovencio Poblete, Sr. has sought to recover civil damages. Hence, such claim of Shafer against the insurance company cannot be regarded as not related to the criminal action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned order dated 24 April 1987 is SET ASIDE and a new one entered admitting petitioner's third party complaint against the private respondent Makati Insurance Company, Inc. SO ORDERED.

LONTOK-(CASE 46)Emilio Tan v Court of AppealsG.R. No. 48049 June 29, 1989J. Gutierrez Jr.petition for review oncertiorari

Facts:Tan Lee Siong, Emilio Tans father applied for lifeinsurancein the amount of P 80,000.00 with Philamlife. It was approved. Tan Lee Siong died of hepatoma. Emilio Tan then filed a claim for the proceeds. The company denied petitioners' claim and rescinded the policy by reason of the alleged misrepresentation and concealment of material facts. The premiums paid on the policy were refunded. The petitioners filed a complaint inthe InsuranceCommission. The latter dismissed the complaint.TheCourt of Appealsdismissed ' the petitioners' appeal fromthe InsuranceCommissioner's decision for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Did Philam have the right to rescindthe contractofinsurance?

Held: No,The InsuranceCode states in Section 48:Whenever a right to rescind a contract ofinsuranceis given to the insurer by any provision of this chapter, such right must be exercised previous to the commencement of an action onthe contract.After a policy of lifeinsurancemade payable on the death of the insured shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years from the date of its issue or of its last reinstatement, the insurer cannot prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindable by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent.The so-called "incontestability clause" in the second paragraph prevents the insurer from raising the defenses of false representations insofar as health and previous diseases are concerned ifthe insurancehas been in force for at least two years during the insured's lifetime.The policy was in force for a period of only one year and five months. Considering that the insured died before the two-year period had lapsed, respondent company is not, therefore, barred from proving that the policy is void ab initio by reason of the insured's fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation.The "incontestability clause" added by the second paragraph of Section 48 is in force for two years. After this, the defenses of concealment or misrepresentation no longer lie.The petitioners argue that no evidence was presented to show that the medical terms were explained in a layman's language to the insured. They also argue that no evidence was presented by respondent company to show that the questions appearing in Part II of theapplicationforinsurancewere asked, explained to and understood by the deceased so as to prove concealment on his part. This couldnt be accepted because the insured signed the form. He affirmed the correctness of all theentries.The companyrecordsshow that the deceased was examined by Dr. Victoriano Lim and was found to bediabeticand hypertensive. He was also found to have suffered from hepatoma. Because of the concealment made by the deceased, the company was thus misled into accepting the risk and approving hisapplicationas medically fit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

REYES-#47Case Title: DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and PHILIPPINE UNION REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.Docket No. and Date: G.R. No. 71360; July 16, 1986Ponente: CRUZ, J.Nature of the Case: Petition for Review Facts: A fire occurred in the building of the private respondent and it sued for recovery of damages from the petitioner on the basis of an insurance contract between them. The petitioner allegedly failed to answer on time and was declared in default by the trial court. A judgment of default was subsequently rendered on the strength of the evidence submitted ex parte by the private respondent, which was allowed full recovery of its claimed damages. On learning of this decision, the petitioner moved to lift the order of default, invoking excusable neglect, and to vacate the judgment by default. Its motion was denied. It then went to the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.Issue: Whether the amount of indemnity due to private respondent is based on the value of the property at the time of loss.Held: The actual loss has been ascertained in this case and the Court respects such factual determination in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily. There is no such showing. Hence, applying the open policy clause as expressly agreed upon by the parties in their contract as provided for in Section 60 of the Insurance Code which states that, an open policy is one in which the value of the thing insured is not agreed upon but is left to be ascertained in case of loss. This means that the actual loss as determined, represents the total indemnity due the insured from the insurer except only that the total indemnity shall not exceed the value of the face of the policy. In theis case, the Court held that the private respondent is entitled to the payment of indemnity under the said contract in the total amount of P508,867.00.Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed in full, with costs against the petitioner.

REYES-#48Case Title: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIO TAN, respondents.Docket No. and Date: G.R. No. 89741; March 13, 1991Ponente: PARAS, J.:Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorariFacts: On August 15, 1983, private respondent Tan took from petitioner a property insurance policy to cover his interest in the electrical supply store of his brother. Four days after the issuance of the policy, the building was burned including the insured store. On August 20, 1983, Tan filed his claim for the loss with petitioner, but on February 29, 1984, petitioner wrote Tan denying the latters claim. On April 3, 1984, Tan wrote petitioner, seeking reconsideration of the denial of his claim. On September 30, 1985, Tans counsel wrote the insurer inquiring about the status of his request for reconsideration and was informed in a letter on October 3, 1984 that the denial of the claim remained unchanged. Tans counsel filed a case with the RTC on November 20, 1985 but the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground that the action has prescribed. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of August 22, 1989.Issue: 1. Whether or not the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the twelve (12) months prescriptive period to contest the denial of the insurance claim.

1. When does the cause of action accrue?

Held: 1. The answer to the first issue is in the negative. There is the principle that insurance should be liberally construed in favor of the insured, yet, contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. The Court had definitely settled the rationale for the necessity of bringing suits against the Insurer within one year from the rejection of the claim. The contention of the respondents that the one-year prescriptive period does not start to run until the petition for reconsideration had been resolved by the insurer, runs counter to the declared purpose for requiting that an action or suit be filed in the Insurance Commission or in a court of competent jurisdiction from the denial of the claim. Condition 27 of the Insurance Policy, which is the subject of the conflicting contentions of the parties, reads:

27. Action or suit clause If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission or in any court of competent jurisdiction within twelve (12) months from receipt of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due notice of the award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.As the terms are very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity whatsoever, it must be taken and understood in its plain, ordinary and popular sense pursuant to the above-cited principle laid down by this Court.1. The right of the insured to the payment of his loss accrues from the happening of the loss. However, the cause of action in an insurance contract does not accrue until the insured's claim is finally rejected by the insurer. This is because before such final rejection there is no real necessity for bringing suit.

Dispositive Portion: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Civil Case No. 16817 filed with the Regional Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED.

Texon-55:American Home Assurance Co. v. Chua G.R. No. 130421 June 28, 1999Davide, Jr.: ponenteNature of the case: petition for reviewFACTS: April 5, 1990: Antonio Chua renewed the fire insurance for its stock-in-trade of his business, Moonlight Enterprises with American Home Assurance Company by issuing a check of P2,983.50 to its agent James Uy who delivered the Renewal Certificate to him.April 6, 1990: Moonlight Enterprises was completely razed by fire with an est. loss of P4,000,000 to P5,000,000April 10, 1990: An official receipt was issued and subsequently, a policy was issued covering March 25 1990 to March 25 1991Antonio Chua filed an insurance claim with American Home and 4 other co-insurers (Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. and Filipino Merchants Insurance Co)American Home refused alleging the no premium was paid.RTC: favored Antonio Chua for paying by way of check a day before the fire occurredCA: Affirmed ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid payment of premium considering that the check was cashed after the occurrence of the fire since the renewal certificate issued containing the acknowledgement receipt2. W/N Chua violated the policy by his submission of fraudulent documents and non-disclosure of the other existing insurance contracts or other insurance clause"HELD:petition is partly GRANTED modified by deleting the awards of P200,000 for loss of profit, P200,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages, and reducing the award of attorneys fees from P50,000 to P10,0001. YES. Section 77 of the Insurance CodeAn insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision appliesSection 66 of the Insurance Code - not applicable since not termination but renewalrenewal certificate issued contained the acknowledgment that premium had been paid Section 306 of the Insurance Code provides that any insurance company which delivers a policy or contract of insurance to an insurance agent or insurance broker shall be deemed to have authorized such agent or broker to receive on its behalf payment of any premium which is due on such policy or contract of insurance at the time of its issuance or delivery or which becomes due thereonbest evidence of such authority is the fact that petitioner accepted the check and issued the official receipt for the payment. It is, as well, bound by its agents acknowledgment of receipt of paymentSection 78 of the Insurance CodeAn acknowledgment in a policy or contract of insurance of the receipt of premium is conclusive evidence of its payment, so far as to make the policy binding, notwithstanding any stipulation therein that it shall not be binding until the premium is actually paid.This Section establishes a legal fiction of payment and should be interpreted as an exception to Section 77 2. NO.purpose for the other insurance clause is to prevent an increase in the moral hazardfailure to disclose was not intentional and fraudulentSection 75A policy may declare that a violation of specified provisions thereof shall avoid it, otherwise the breach of an immaterial provision does not avoid the policy.American Home is estopped because its loss adjusters had previous knowledge of the co-insurers The loss adjuster, being an employee of petitioner, is deemed a representative of the latter whose awareness of the other insurance contracts binds petitionerno legal and factual basis for the award of P200,000 for loss of profitno such fraud or bad faith = no moral damagesgrant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the ruleaward attorneys fees where it deems just and equitable that it be so grantedreduced to P10,000.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40751 is hereby MODIFIED by a) deleting the awards of P200,000 for loss of profit, P200,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages, and b) reducing the award of attorneys fees from P50,000 to P10,000.

BANADERA-57-UNION MANUFACTURING CO., INC. and the REPUBLIC BANK, plaintiffs, REPUBLIC BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE GUARANTY CO., INC., defendant-appellee.G.R. No. L-27932 October 30, 1972FERNANDO, J

In a suit arising from a fire insurance policy, the insurer, Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., defendant in the lower court and now appellee, was able to avoid liability upon proof that there was a violation of a warranty.

Facts:

Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. obtained certain loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations from the Republic Bank for P415,000.00 with interest at 9% per annum from said date and to secure the payment, Union Manufacturing executed a real and chattel mortgages on certain properties. As Union Manufacturing failed to secure insurance coverage on the mortgaged properties, Republic Bank procured from the Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. an insurance coverage on loss against fire for P500,000.00 over the properties of the Union Manufacturing with the annotation that loss or damage, if any, under is payable to Republic Bank as its interest may appear, subject however to the printed conditions of the Fire Insurance Policy Form. A fire occurred in the premises of the Union Manufacturing, Union Manufacturing filed its fire claim with Philippine Guaranty but was denied on the following grounds: (a.)When Philippine Guaranty issued Fire Insurance Policy No. 43170 ...in the sum of P500,000.00 to cover the properties of the Union Manufacturing the same properties were already covered by Fire Policy of the Sincere Insurance Company and by insurance policies of the Oceanic Insurance Agency and (b) when Fire Insurance Policy No.43170 was already in full force and effect, Union Manufacturing without the consent ofPhilippine Guaranty Co., Inc., obtained other insurance policies totaling P305,000.00 over the same properties prior to the fire.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Bank can recover its interest (as mortgagee) from the Fire Insurance Policy with Philippine Guaranty. Ruling:

NO, In as much as the Union Manufacturing has violated the condition of the policy to the effect that it did not reveal the existence of other insurance policies over the same properties, as required by the warranty appearing on the face of the policy and that said Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. represented that there were no other insurance policies at the time of the issuance of said defendant's policy, and it appearing furthermore that while the policy of the defendant was in full force and effect the Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. secured other fire insurance policies without the written consent of the defendant endorsed on the policy, the conclusion is inevitable thatboth the Republic Bank and Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. cannot recover from the same policy of the defendant because the same is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 31, 1967 is affirmed. No costs.

BANADERA-57-PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant, vs. OLIVA YAP, represented by her attorney-in-fact, CHUA SOON POON respondent-appellee.G.R. No. L-36232 December 19, 1974FERNANDEZ, JThis is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 16, 1972, in CA-G.R. No. 36669-R, affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI) in Civil Case No. 54508.Facts: Respondent Yap took out Fire Insurance Policy No. 4216 from petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation with a face value of P25,000.00 covering her stocks, office furniture, fixtures and fittings of every kind and descriptionAt the time of the insurance on April 19, 1962 of Policy No. 4219 in favor of respondent Yap, an insurance policy for P20,000.00 issued by the Great American Insurance Company covering the same properties was noted on said policy as co-insurance. Respondent Oliva Yap took out another fire insurance policy for P20,000.00 covering the same properties, this time from the Federal Insurance Company, Inc., which new policy was, however, procured without notice to and the written consent of petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation and, therefore, was not noted as a co-insurance in Policy No. 4219. A fire broke out in the building housing respondent Yap's above-mentioned store, and the said store was burned. Respondent Yap filed an insurance claim, but the same was denied.Oliva Yap filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila the present complaint.The trial court decided for plaintiff Oliva Yap; and its judgment was affirmed in full by the Court of Appeals.Issue:Whether or not petitioner should be absolved from liability on Fire Insurance Policy No. 4219 on account of any violation by respondent Yap of the co-insurance clause?Ruling:Yes, There was a violation by respondent Oliva Yap of the co-insurance clause contained in Policy No. 4219 that resulted in the avoidance of petitioner's liability. The insured has no right to complain, for he assents to comply with all the stipulation on his side, in order to entitle himself to the benefit of the contract, which, upon reason or principle, he has no right to ask the court to dispense with the performance of his own part of the agreement, and yet to bind the other party to obligations, which, but for those stipulation would not have been entered into.WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the petitioner absolved from all liability under the policy. Costs against private respondent.

TAN-59: REPUBLIC BANK vs. PHIL. GUARANTY CO., INC.,47 SCRA 271 (G.R. No. L-27932) October 30, 1972FERNANDO,J.:pFACTS:1. On January 12, 1962, the Union Manufacturing Co., Inc. obtained certain loans from the Republic Bank in the total sum of 415,000.00 and to secure the payment thereof, UMC executed real and chattel mortgage on certain properties. 1. The Republic Bank procured from the defendant Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. an insurance coverage on loss against fire for 500,000.00 over the properties of the UMC. 1. On September 6, 1964, a fire occurred in the premises of UMC and on October 6, 1964, UMC filed its fire claim with the PGC Inc., which was denied by said defendant in its letter dated November 26, 1964 on the following ground: Policy Condition No. 3 and/or the Other Insurance Clause of the policy was violated because you did not give notice to us of the other insurance which you had taken from New India for 80,000.00. Sincere Insurance for 25,000.00 and Manila Insurance for 200,000.00 with the result that these insurances, of which we became aware of only after the fire, were not endorsed on our policy.ISSUE:1. WON Republic Bank can recover from Phil Guaranty Co Inc.?HELD:1. The SC hold that in the absolute absence of such notice when it is one of the conditions specified in the fire insurance policy, the policy is null and void. If