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Bottleneck Routing Games on Grids
Costas BuschRajgopal KannanAlfred Samman
Department of Computer ScienceLouisiana State University
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Talk Outline
Introduction
Basic Game
Channel Game
Extensions
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2-d Grid:
Used in:• Multiprocessor architectures• Wireless mesh networks• can be extended to d-dimensions
n
n
nnnodes
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Each player corresponds to a pair of source-destination
EdgeCongestion
3)( 1 eC
2)( 2 eC
Bottleneck Congestion: 3)(max
eCCEe
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A player may selfishly choose an alternativepath with better congestion
ii CC 31
PlayerCongestion
i
3iC
1iC
Player Congestion: Maximum edge congestion along its path
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Routing is a collection of paths, one path for each player
Utility function for player :i
ii Cppc )(
p
congestionof selected path
Social cost for routing :
CpSC )(p
bottleneck congestion
We are interested in Nash Equilibriumswhere every player is locally optimal
Metrics of equilibrium quality:
p
Price of Stability
)()(min *pSCpSC
p
Price of Anarchy
)()(max *pSCpSC
p
*p is optimal coordinated routing with smallest social cost
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Bends :number of dimension changes plus source and destination
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Price of Stability:
Price of Anarchy:
)1(O
)(n
even with constant bends )1(O
Basic congestion games on grids
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Better bounds with bends
Price of anarchy: nO log
Channel games:
Optimal solution uses at most bends
Path segments are separated accordingto length range
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There is a (non-game) routing algorithmwith bends and approximation ratio
nO log nO log
Optimal solution uses arbitrary number of bends
Final price of anarchy: nO 3log
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Solution without channels: Split Gameschannels are implemented implicitly in space
Similar poly-log price of anarchy bounds
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Some related work:
Arbitrary Bottleneck games [INFOCOM’06], [TCS’09]:
Price of AnarchyNP-hardness
Price of Anarchy DefinitionKoutsoupias, Papadimitriou [STACS’99]
Price of Anarchy for sum of congestion utilities [JACM’02]
1O
|| EO
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Talk Outline
Introduction
Basic Game
Channel Game
Extensions
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],,,,,[)( 21 Nk mmmmpM
number of players with congestion kCi
Stability is proven through a potential functiondefined over routing vectors:
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PlayerCongestion
3iC
1iC
In best response dynamics a player move improves lexicographically the routing vector
)()( pMpM ]0,...,0,0,3,1,0[]0,...,0,0,0,2,2[
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],,,,,,,[)( 11 Nkkk mmmmmpM
Before greedy move kCi
],,,,,,,[)( 11 Nkkk mmmmmpM
After greedy move
ii CkkC
)()( pMpM
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Existence of Nash Equilibriums
Greedy moves give lower order routings
Eventually a local minimum for every playeris reached which is a Nash Equilibrium
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minp
Price of Stability
Lowest order routing :
)()( *min pSCpSC
• Is a Nash Equilibrium
• Achieves optimal social cost
1)()(Stability of Price *
min pSCpSC
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Price of AnarchyOptimal solution Nash Equilibrium
1* C 2/nC
)(2/* nnCC
Price of anarchy: High!
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Talk Outline
Introduction
Basic Game
Channel Game
Extensions
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Row:
channelsnlog
Channel holds path segments of length in range:
jA]12,2[ 1 jj
0A1A2A3A
]1,1[]3,2[
]7,4[]15,8[
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1eC
2eC
different channels
same channel
Congestion occurs only with path segmentsin same channel
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Path of player
Consider an arbitrary Nash Equilibriump
i
iCmaximum congestionin path
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must have a special edge with congestion
Optimal path of player
In optimal routing :*p
i
iC1 iCC
)(111*)( ppcCCCppc iiii
**)( CpSC
Since otherwise:
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C
00
0
edges use that Players: Congestion of Edges :ECE
In Nash Equilibrium social cost is: CpSC )(
0 0
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C 1C1C
0 0
Special Edges in optimal paths of 0
First expansion
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C 1C1C
0 01 1
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1
edges use that Players:1least at Congestion of Edges Special :
ECE
First expansion
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C 1C1C 2C 2C2C2C
0 01 1
Special Edges in optimal paths of 1
Second expansion
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C 1C1C 2C 2C2C
0 01 1
2C
2 2
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2
edges use that Players:2least at Congestion of Edges Special :
ECE
Second expansion
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In a similar way we can define:
jj
j
E
jCE
edges use that Players:
least at Congestion of Edges Special :
,,,,
,,,,
3210
3210
EEEE
We obtain expansion sequences:
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jj
j
E
jCE
edges use that Players:
12 :rin far ly sufficient are edges and
r channel somein majority thearech whi
least at Congestion of Edges Special :
1-r
Redefine expansion:
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*1
||||
aCE jj
*1
||)(||
CaE
jCE jj
||
)(|| jj
EjC
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*1
||)(||
CaE
jCE jj
If then )log( * nCC
|||| 1 jj EkE
2|| nE Contradiction
constant k
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)log( * nCOC Therefore:
Price of anarchy:)log()log(* nOnO
CC
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Optimal solutionNash Equilibrium1* C)()( 2 nC
)()( 2* nCCPrice of anarchy:
Tightness of Price of Anarchy
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Talk Outline
Introduction
Basic Game
Channel Game
Extensions
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0A
1A
2A3A
Split game
0A
1A
2A3A
Price of anarchy: )log( 2 nO
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d-dimensional grid
Price of anarchy:
nd
O logChannel game
nd
O 22 log
Price of anarchy:Split game