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BRAZIL, JAPAN, AND TURKEY

With articles by Marcos C. de Azambuja Matake Kamiya Henri J. Barkey Edited By

Barry M. Blechman September 2009

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Copyright ©2009 The Henry L. Stimson Center

Cover design by Shawn Woodley

Photograph on the front cover from the International Atomic Energy Agency

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form

or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center.

The Henry L. Stimson Center

1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org

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PREFACE I am pleased to present Brazil, Japan, and Turkey, the sixth in a series of Stimson publications addressing questions of how the elimination of nuclear weapons might be achieved. The Stimson project on nuclear security explores the practical dimensions of this critical 21st century debate, to identify both political and technical obstacles that could block the road to “zero,” and to outline how each of these could be removed. Led by Stimson's co-founder and Distinguished Fellow Dr. Barry Blechman, the project provides useful analyses that can help US and world leaders make the elimination of nuclear weapons a realistic and viable option. The series comprises country assessments, published in a total of six different monographs, and a separate volume on such technical issues as verification and enforcement of a disarmament regime, to be published in the fall. This sixth monograph in the series, following volumes on France and the United Kingdom, China and India, Israel and Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, and Russia and the United States, examines three countries without nuclear weapons of their own, but which are nonetheless key states that would need to be engaged constructively in any serious move toward eliminating nuclear weapons. The paper on Turkey was prepared by Dr. Henri J. Barkey, a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor at Lehigh University. The analysis of Japan’s views on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament was written by Professor Matake Kamiya of the Japanese National Defense Academy. Ambassador Marcos C. de Azambuja, formerly Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament and now vice president of the Brazilian Center for International Relations, prepared the paper on Brazil. This series makes an important contribution to the new and renewed debate about how to rid the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons. This enduring strategic issue has been a central concern of the Stimson Center since its founding twenty years ago. I hope that this new publication will provide insights and pragmatic ideas to facilitate wise policymaking, in keeping with Stimson tradition. Sincerely,

Ellen Laipson

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the twin threats of proliferation and terrorism have led to a growing chorus of world leaders calling for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Thousands of individuals from around the world and across political lines have come together in a project called Global Zero. Combining policy research with broad-based public outreach, the project seeks to encourage governments to negotiate an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons through phased and verified reductions. In support of Global Zero and the many other ongoing efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, and in collaboration with the World Security Institute, the Stimson Center has commissioned a series of papers examining the strategic obstacles that block the achievement of zero nuclear weapons world-wide. Written from the perspectives of individual countries that either possess nuclear weapons or have the potential to develop them relatively quickly, the papers describe those nations’ official views on, and plans for, nuclear weapons, as well as how the prospect of wide-spread proliferation and the possibility of nuclear disarmament might change those perspectives. The primary purpose of each paper is to identify the policies and international developments that would encourage decision-makers in each nation to look favorably on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons by a date certain. Published together in this volume are the sixth and final set of papers in the series, Brazil, Japan, and Turkey. The first two possess advanced nuclear technologies, yet have foregone acquiring nuclear weapons. Because any regime to eliminate nuclear weapons must also include tight controls on civilian nuclear facilities in order to safeguard against the surreptitious diversion of nuclear materials into weapon programs, countries with commercial interests in civilian programs, like Brazil and Japan, will be critical actors in any future multinational negotiations. Turkey will also influence negotiations as it is the beneficiary of the United States’ “extended deterrent” guarantee and hosts US short-range nuclear weapons on its soil. Critics of President Obama’s goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, warn that US reductions could cause these allies to grow concerned about their security and even lead them to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This series of papers has been made possible by grants from the World Security Institute (with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York) and the Ploughshares Fund, as well as by gifts from individual donors. The Stimson Center and the series’ editor are grateful for their generosity. Barry M. Blechman Distinguished Fellow, The Stimson Center and Research Coordinator, Global Zero

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A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Marcos C. de Azambuja*

Brazil enjoys a comfortable geopolitical situation. Its policy concerns and priorities should always be seen against this backdrop. Brazil identifies no actual or potential rivals or adversaries in South America or in the South Atlantic basin. Further south, the Antarctic may be the most peaceful and well regulated region in the world. Even the Malvinas/Falklands conflict in 1982 was an isolated episode that did not alter the fact that, compared with other areas of the globe, the American shore of the South Atlantic remains a quiet and largely uneventful strategic backwater. This peaceful prospect can be understood from an even wider perspective. The southern hemisphere is free from weapons of mass destruction, being entirely covered by treaties establishing nuclear-free zones. It is not the stage for any major international confrontation—be it ethnic, religious, territorial, ideological, or primarily economic and commercial—in which weapons of mass destruction or nuclear deterrence could play a significant role. This has been true for nearly 20 years, since South Africa dismantled its nuclear program in 1990–91 after it became unnecessary when, with the abolition of apartheid, South Africa no longer felt threatened by its neighbors. Indeed, South Africa became the friend and loose partner of those same neighbors. South America thus presents a paradox: its states have shown a significant degree of domestic volatility since independence, but they have been able to keep up a tradition of restraint and peaceful relations with each other. The political map of South America has remained essentially unchanged for over a century and a half; the last war among neighbors to result in significant territorial changes took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. The more recent and limited conflicts between Paraguay and Bolivia (1931–l935) and between Peru and Ecuador (1941) illustrate the trend of border permanence. It is striking to note how infrequently, in the last 60 years, questions relating to South America have been brought to the attention of the UN Security Council as matters of grave and urgent concern to the international community.† LIMITS TO BRAZIL’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS It was easy and almost natural, therefore, for Latin America to become the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world.‡ The immediate impulse to ban such weapons in the

* Marcos C. de Azambuja is vice president of the Brazilian Center for International Relations. The views expressed in this chapter are his and do not necessarily represent those of the Center. † On the paradox between the domestic turbulence and international stability of the South American region, see Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 154. ‡ All weapons are banned from Antarctica, which is inhabited only by researchers.

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region sprang from the Cuban missile crisis in October l962. For a few frantic days, diplomats sought a way in New York to provide the Soviet Union with a face-saving excuse for withdrawing the weapons it had placed, or was in the process of placing, on the island and to recall the Russian ships that were headed toward Havana. The first UN resolution proposing the denuclearization of Latin America was introduced in those perilous days by Brazil, seeking as its immediate goal to defuse what was certainly the Cold War’s moment of greatest global risk. The Brazilian initiative did not ultimately play a role in the solution of the Cuban crisis—a different way was found to secure the Soviet withdrawal and guarantee Cuba’s protection from invasion—but that draft resolution was the starting point of a process that would lead to the 1972 signing in Mexico City of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which denuclearized Latin America.1 The rare pursuit of nuclear military capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean has been either an extension of extraregional conflicts or an expression of the desire to attain greater international influence and prestige by joining the global group of nuclear-weapon states. Real or potential threats to the security of the aspiring nuclear-weapon state from any other regional actor were negligible or nonexistent. Nor were targets for attack identified. In other words, the nuclear aspirations of Latin American nations have been more symbolic than strategic. Because of this lack of grounding in real security concerns, military nuclear programs never obtained real national support or funding and, when an appropriate moment arrived, they were relatively easy to discredit and dismantle. Only four countries in the whole of Latin America could have pursued nuclear military programs with any credibility: Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Cuba’s nuclear project did not spring from its own scientific and technological capabilities or strategic needs, but from its close strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, which for a number of reasons wished to install nuclear weapons in Cuba with delivery systems for them that would threaten the United States. The agreement reached between the United States and the USSR in 1962 ended that project. Mexico had the economic and technological capacity to develop a military nuclear program, but its proximity to and relationship with the United States made this option a nonstarter. Mexico from the beginning has consistently presented itself as the great promoter of Latin American nuclear disarmament. Today, it hosts the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which was created to ensure adherence to the Latin American Treaty for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.2 Thus, only two countries in the region would have been able to sustain to some degree a nuclear arms race: Brazil and Argentina. Even in these two countries, motives for nuclear rivalry were tenuous. More than seeking to threaten one another, each country sought to enhance its position on the world scene. Moreover, their leaders believed that, if the

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programs proved successful, they would gain additional legitimacy for their largely unpopular military regimes.3 Under those military regimes, for the better part of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, both countries kept alive a rivalry that, in one way or another, had endured since their independence early in the nineteenth century. With the return of civilian rule and democracy to both countries more or less at the same time in the later 1980s, one of the priorities of their newly elected civilian leaders was to get rid of what were then euphemistically called “parallel nuclear programs.” In particular, they each wished to differentiate military and civilian nuclear activities. The latter were fully compatible with the principles and objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and were maintained in compliance with the full scope of safeguards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even when the two military regimes were at the height of their power, the rivalry between them was largely rhetorical and never really threatened to get out of control. The military leaders of both countries were on the same side of the Cold War, were staunchly anticommunist, and shared similar doctrines of national security. Moreover, there were no conflicting territorial claims between them, as there were in the more serious disputes between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel and Patagonia. The only substantial clash of interests between Buenos Aires and Brasilia was over use of the water resources of the Paraná River, a matter that was largely resolved with the building of the Itaipu hydroelectric project by Brazil and Paraguay, followed downstream a few years later by the Yacireta dam, in which Argentina and Paraguay were partners. Brazil under President José Sarney and Argentina under President Raul Alfonsin undertook largely symmetrical efforts in the late 1980s to dismantle their countries’ military nuclear programs. They also set in motion a confidence-building process that led to the so-called Quadripartite Agreement, signed in Vienna in l991 by Argentina, Brazil, the IAEA, and the Argentine Brazilian Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. The process of defusing the apparent competition between military-controlled nuclear programs took about six years—from the signing of the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu in l985 to the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1991.4 The confidence-building process is still active today. This work was reinforced by progress in economic relationships between the two countries. Beginning in earnest in l99l with signature of the Treaty of Asunción, and running parallel with the dismantling of nuclear and missile programs, the two states began to build MERCOSUR (Mercado Comum do Sul), a regional trade agreement. This growing economic relationship played a major role in replacing a sterile relationship, based to a large extent on mistrust and rivalry, with one in which cooperation and trust are essential components. Soon it became incongruous that two countries working to establish not only a free trade zone but also a common market and a close political union should preserve projects and attitudes that no longer corresponded to the realities of their relationship. Key sectors in both countries promoted MERCOSUR, not only because of its intrinsic commercial and economic merits, but also because it was seen as an antidote to attitudes that

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had been rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War, the triumph of democracy on the continent, and ever closer physical and economic integration between the two neighbors. During this same period, the Treaty of Tlatelolco finally came fully into force, with all countries within its geographical perimeter but Cuba subscribing to it,§ as well as outside powers that accepted limitations on their deployment of nuclear forces within the zone. In 1994, Brazil fully accepted the obligations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but it took three years more for Brazil to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Brazilian reservations about the NPT are major and deeply rooted in the national mindset. Brazilians assume that sooner or later—preferably sooner—Brazil will emerge as a major power and that nothing should be done that limits or jeopardizes its expectations or hinders its access to that status. Given that the NPT identifies two classes of states—the five declared nuclear-weapon states and the rest, who are all non-nuclear-weapon states—Brazil was reluctant to accept its grouping into the latter category.5 Developments in the last 15 years have strengthened Brazil’s self-confidence. Its membership in the group of emerging powers along with China, India, and Russia has added a new dimension to a pervasive feeling in some sectors that by joining the NPT, Brazil had fulfilled its responsibilities for nonproliferation and that it should not give up the possibility of developing and acquiring civilian nuclear technologies allowed by the treaty. A concern that has been frequently and emphatically expressed is that Brazil signed the NPT without any real negotiation or compensation. Brazilians by and large view the NPT as discriminatory and profoundly flawed. The results—or more precisely the lack of results—of the most recent NPT review conferences in 2000 and 2005, and the long paralysis of multilateral disarmament initiatives in Geneva and New York, reinforced the conviction held in many quarters in Brazil that the nuclear powers have not lived up to their pledges to promote meaningful negotiations toward nuclear disarmament and have failed to fulfill their commitments under Articles V and VI of the NPT. More broadly, many Brazilians believe that the policy of the nuclear-weapon states is, in fact, to impose more constraints and extract further concessions from the non-nuclear powers while failing to accomplish—or even to try to accomplish—what was expected from them when the NPT bargain was struck. From a Brazilian perspective, the 2010 NPT Review Conference will be a test of whether the attitude of the nuclear powers has become more flexible and constructive or whether the impasses of the two most recent reviews will prevail. The results of the preparatory conference held at the United Nations in New York from May 4 to 15, 2009 suggest that the prospects for the 2010 NPT Review Conference are much brighter than the results of the previous two reviews. A new mood is easy to identify and this change in attitude and expectations has already been reflected in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, where after long years of virtual paralysis there is now an agreed agenda that will allow that body to begin productive work.

§ Cuba finally joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 2002.

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The Prague speech by President Obama in April 2009 has to be seen as a landmark. While expressing his long-term vision for a nuclear-weapons-free world, the President suggested a road map of practical steps beginning with a new US-Russia arms control treaty to replace the current START agreement that expires on December 5th. Among other goals, President Obama announced that his administration will work towards American ratification of the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty and that he plans to convene a Global Summit on Nuclear Security in 2010. The joint statement by Presidents Obama and Russian President Medvedev of April 1st expressing their joint commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons is equally relevant. In short, after a long period of neglect, disarmament issues are back on the agenda and even if progress is difficult and slow, there is an encouraging prospect for the long run. These renewed prospects aside, and despite Brazilian concern about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, Brazil is unlikely to go back on its commitment to nonproliferation. That commitment was entered into by a legitimate government, acting in good faith after a mature weighing of options, and will be honored by future Brazilian governments. Brazil, after all, is bound not to develop nuclear weapons by a many-tiered arrangement. First of all, it has treaty obligations with Argentina and the IAEA and cannot ignore the cooperative nature of ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and MERCOSUR. It must also uphold its regional commitments under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and comply, on a global scale, with the NPT. Furthermore, the Brazilian Constitution in Articles 21 and 177 expressly prohibits the pursuit of non-peaceful uses of atomic energy. And, as important as all these cumulative legal obligations and constraints are, the central fact remains that Brazil has always lacked the military motivation to develop weapons of mass destruction and only ever did so half-heartedly—tempted not by defensive or aggressive security goals but by a desire not to renounce certain scientific and technological gains and the prestige and major-power status that it associates with them. While there is a lingering feeling of regret, among sectors of the military establishment and in some nationalistic groups, that Brazil failed to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems during the more than 40 years when it was free to do so, this sentiment is in fact residual and nostalgic and limited in its rhetoric and militancy to groups that remain to a greater or lesser degree attached to the objectives and values of the largely discredited military regime. BRAZIL’S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR GOALS Brazil’s commitment to the nonproliferation regime thus appears irrevocable unless circumstances change dramatically. But its determination to go forward with its long-established and successful uranium enrichment program is no less firm. To the Brazilian government, scientific establishment, and broad segments of public opinion, the trade-off that the country made is clear. Brazil joined the NPT with the explicit understanding that nuclear activities allowed under the treaty would be pursued. Brazil already has the fifth or sixth largest uranium reserves in the world, and a substantial part of its territory remains to be

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prospected.6 It also has an ambitious and long-standing program to master the complete nuclear fuel cycle, plans to build several more nuclear power plants besides the two already in operation, and seeks to develop nuclear-powered naval turbines. Brazil has no intention to abandon any of these projects. Currently, the Brazilian government is reluctant to adhere to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol for more intrusive safeguards. The president of Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission has claimed to be “studying the thing” for several years, and says Brazil’s reluctance is based on “issues about other countries’ compliance with the traditional NPT. For example, about disarmament.”7 Even so, there is arguably no major substantive obstacle to its eventual adherence; the timing of such a move, however, will depend on a favorable negotiating environment. Brazil is unlikely to take any additional steps with regard to the NPT or to make further concessions, such as adhering to the Additional Protocol, in the absence of meaningful concessions from the nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, should the United States (or the nuclear-weapon states collectively) put pressure on Brazil to abandon its nuclear projects, including enrichment, there would be a very robust, probably insurmountable, resistance. Brazil’s earlier attempts to develop a largely autonomous nuclear capacity have been costly and marked, more often than not, by disappointment and failure. The most glaring example of this was the German-Brazilian Nuclear Agreement, which was signed in 1975 and operated fully for 10 years. The original agreement called for a vast transfer of technology and also had a very important industrial component as it envisaged, in the short and medium term, the construction in Brazil of eight nuclear power plants. Not only would this agreement have benefited Brazil, but it would have provided a great boost to German industry and technology. But the agreement raised major international resistance, especially from the United States, and both Germany and Brazil were under considerable pressure to revoke or at least to modify the agreement. Thus, the enrichment process, which was originally to be based on the well-tested centrifuge technology, was modified in favor of the so-called “jet nozzle” approach, an experimental alternative which up until now has not produced economically viable results. In support of the agreement, and in pursuit of somewhat grandiose nationalistic objectives, the Brazilian government spent an enormous amount of money setting up facilities subsidiary to its NUCLEBRAS (Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S.A.) agency. These facilities proved to be over-sized and later had to be scaled down so that they could be utilized at all, albeit in a modified way. 8 A modified version of the agreement still exists, but its scope has been sharply scaled down, and the current version is not only devoid of any objectionable provisions, but is also very strong in its environmental focus.

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The agreement with Germany came near the end of the military phase in Brazilian politics and at a moment when two decades of accelerating economic growth were faltering, primarily because of the first oil shock of 1973–74. It became obvious to Brazil at that time that it would be extremely difficult to find reputable external help for its nuclear projects as long as the country remained outside the NPT and while some activities were still being carried out with military objectives. NUCLEBRAS, the Brazilian agency responsible for coordinating efforts in the nuclear field, was designed to act as the counterpart for Brazil’s German partners. It has since been replaced by new agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Science and Technology. NUCLEBRAS had many of the characteristics of the Brazilian institutions of that period. It was too big, too heavy in its administrative structure, and rather weak in the qualifications of its scientists. Its recruiting methods lacked transparency. It was essentially unconcerned about costs and largely insensitive to social and environmental concerns. Despite these shortcomings, NUCLEBRAS was a turning point in the history of Brazilian nuclear development, and many of its personnel remain active in Brazilian nuclear projects, particularly in Brazilian Nuclear Industries (Industrias Nucleares Brasileiras or INB), based primarily in Resende, a city halfway between Rio and São Paulo. Some other units function in different parts of Brazil, but most derive from NUCLEBRAS as well. Besides the cluster of plants and other units assembled around and under INB, uranium enrichment takes place under naval supervision in the Aramar center in Iperó in the state of São Paulo.9 Today, three separate ministries have jurisdiction over the Brazilian nuclear program: the Ministry of Science and Technology; the Ministry of Mines and Energy, which oversees the National Commission for Nuclear Energy and INB; and the Ministry of the Environment, with the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources as its executive agency. Nuclear policies in their broadest scope fall under the supervision of the president’s office, and the Ministry of External Relations has an influential role on issues with international implications. There are deep divisions within Brazil about what nuclear policies the country should follow. A substantial number of environmentally oriented NGOs oppose the construction of more nuclear plants and express concern about the safety and environmental impact of those already in operation. They also express anxiety about the final disposal of nuclear waste. Some Brazilian nuclear physicists also have indicated their misgivings about plans to expand Brazil’s nuclear capabilities. There are divisions within the scientific community on virtually every aspect of the current program and on its future expansion. Some experts believe that Brazil should further develop its hydroelectric capabilities, move forward with biofuel projects, explore the inland and offshore reserves of oil and natural gas that are continuing to be discovered, and utilize wind and solar energy in a much more robust way. They argue that nuclear energy is particularly expensive to develop and hazardous to

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the environment, and that Brazil has a range of less costly and less risky alternatives at its disposal. Although their numbers are not negligible, they remain a minority.** The majority of the Brazilian scientific and administrative establishment, on the other hand, supports the completion of Angra 3, a partially built nuclear plant.†† Plans to build six or eight new nuclear plants over the next few years fluctuate according to the rate of growth of the Brazilian economy, the cost of oil in the international market, and the ability of Brazilian reservoirs to supply enough water to existing hydroelectric turbines during years of low rainfall. These and other variables interact in many complex equations. Until the fourth quarter of 2008, before the current global credit crunch and financial crisis had fully settled in, projections indicated the need to go forward with a vigorous nuclear program. Since then, however, projections have changed drastically and the case to move forward in the short term appears far less compelling. In September 2008, Brazil and Argentina signed an agreement to set up a binational nuclear enterprise—operating within the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which Brazil and Argentina are both members—that will enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop new applications for agriculture, and design and construct research reactors. The agreement is the result of work by the Binational Committee on Nuclear Energy, a body that was set up to move nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil forward from the early arrangements in the 1980s. The latter were primarily designed to generate trust and transparency; the new projects are geared to respond to the present and future nuclear needs of South America. It is estimated that beyond the projected expansion of existing nuclear facilities in Argentina and Brazil, new plants will also be built over the next few years in Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Venezuela. 10 The hope is that the new binational venture will be able to bid competitively to supply these future plants with equipment, technology, and fuel, and thus become an effective player in a field for which impressive growth and substantial profits are projected in the coming years. Although the situations are not exactly the same, one potential model is the URENCO Group in Europe. ** The Brazilian Association for the Advancement of Science frequently reports in its periodical, Jornal da Ciência, on the divisions within the Brazilian government regarding the further development of nuclear power. Generally, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the president’s staff are in favor of an expanded program, while the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Ministry of the Environment oppose it. But even within each agency opinions are divided. Opponents of expansion cite economic factors, saying Brazil can produce cheaper energy in other ways, and argue that nuclear power poses inherent ecological risks. Proponents argue that nuclear power is a clean source of energy and that Brazil has the technology to produce it and an abundant fuel supply. †† Angra 3 is expected to begin operation in late 2013. After prolonged discussions, the National Commission on Nuclear Energy, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment, and the municipal authorities of Angra dos Reis have agreed to restart construction of the plant, for which the site and the foundation already exist, as well as nearly 50 percent of the equipment, which was bought quite a few years ago from the Siemens group and has been stored at considerable expense. Angra 3 will have the same generating capacity as Angra 2—1,350 megawatts. See “Angra 3 pode abrir caminhos para novas usinas atômicas no país,” Problemas Brasileiros, January 10, 2008.

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BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT Brazilians cannot identify any grounds for optimism on the prospects for significant progress by the nuclear-weapon states toward arms control and nuclear disarmament. In the Brazilian assessment, the years immediately following the end of the Cold War provided a favorable environment for progress on a number of stalemated negotiating fronts, but that window of opportunity was not used. Today, with Russia reasserting its power, an ambitious and vigorous China more active on the world stage, and India and Pakistan as new players, the nuclear weapons game appears more complicated than ever. Furthermore, with the rise of international terrorism, preventing Iran from carrying out its weapon plans appears to be the only urgent and realistic goal now being pursued. Even this rather limited goal may be beyond reach unless intense negotiations are soon set in motion. However, even if Iran is not prevented from acquiring a military nuclear capability (either by creative diplomacy or by preemptive military attacks from the United States or Israel), Brazil is not likely to withdraw from its NPT commitments. Brazil does not see the adoption of a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons on a global scale as a realistic goal. Brazilian leaders are even doubtful that gradual and modest steps in that direction will be taken in the foreseeable future. The prevailing opinion in Brazil is that the nuclear-weapon states are satisfied with the indefinite extension of the NPT and would rather tackle one by one the specific national cases that threaten the integrity and stability of that instrument, rather than to set in motion the vast and extremely complex machinery of disarmament negotiations. This case-by-case approach appears to have worked so far with Libya and it is hoped that combined and sustained pressure against Iran and North Korea might succeed in finally convincing these countries to stop short of acquiring a nuclear weapon capability or to dismantle its small arsenal, respectively. It is not easy to identify other countries that might seek to develop nuclear weapons in the short term. But the possibility that extremist groups could acquire nuclear weapons poses an entirely different set of questions and many additional difficulties. Brazilian experts do not anticipate complete nuclear disarmament. While they do not expect a new nuclear arms race, they do not see any political, economic, or scientific indication that any of the nuclear powers is prepared to contemplate a radical global solution such as disarmament. Brazil’s conviction is that, rather than the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals, all serious efforts should be focused on an accommodation that essentially respects and manages the status quo and perhaps places limits on weapon development and expansion based on what is possible to achieve given the prevailing political and strategic realities. If, nonetheless, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons—with all the immense strategic changes that this would entail—were to be accomplished, Brazil’s options would obviously have to be reconsidered. Under a disarmament regime, there would likely be a limited number of suppliers of enriched uranium—perhaps one or two each in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East—operating under the licensing and control of a global authority.

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Brazil would likely try to become one of these suppliers and the leading partner in any Latin American arrangement that emerged from such a dramatically changed environment. Although I doubt that this scenario could become reality in the foreseeable future, if substantive progress were nonetheless made toward this objective, Brazil could be counted on to be a leader in the negotiations, just as it has been since the creation of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee in l962, from which the current Conference on Disarmament evolved. Brazil made important contributions to the three special sessions that the United Nations dedicated to disarmament in l978, 1982, and 1988, and will do so again if a fourth session is convened. In short, Brazil and Latin America will not develop nuclear weapons and will remain active and constructive partners in the establishment of a world safe from weapons of mass destruction. Not even if undesirable developments were to occur in other parts of the world would Brazil or its neighbors be tempted to enter a nuclear arms race that they have wisely avoided so far. But Brazil is equally unlikely to give up its goal of being a key player in the important nuclear fuel market. There are virtually no limits to what Brazil would do to reassure others of its transparency and good faith in these areas, and I believe Brazilian leaders could accept a global authority regulating this field. What Brazil would not accept is to be left out of the highly selective and profitable club of nuclear fuel suppliers, to which it feels fully entitled to belong.

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ENDNOTES 1 Atomic Archive, Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1967),

www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty5.shtml; Arms Control Association, Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco), www.armscontrol.org/documents/tlatelolco.

2 Embajador Alfonso Garcia Robles, México y el Desarme, vol. 4, Política Exterior de Mexico—175

Años de Historia, ed. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (1985). 3 David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, “Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement” (summary of the

seminar “Argentina and Brazil: The Latin American Nuclear Rapprochement,” sponsored by the Shalheveth Freier Center for Peace, Science and Technology and the Institute for Science and International Security, May 16, 1996), www.isis-online.org/publications/israel96/exsum.html.

4 Everton Vieira Vargas, “Atomos na Integração: a aproximação Brasil Argentina no campo nuclear e a

construção do MERCOSUL,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 40 (January–June 1997). 5 Jorge Castañeda de la Rosa, La No Proliferación de armas nucleares en el orden universal (Mexico:

El Colegio de Mexico, 1969). 6 Industrias Nucleares do Brasil, Reserves—Brazil and World,

www.inb.gov.br/inb_eng/WebForms/Interna2.aspx?secao_id=48. 7 Miles A. Pomper and William Huntington, “Interview with Odair Gonçalves, President of Brazil’s

Nuclear Energy Commission,” Arms Control Association, September 28, 2005, www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050928_Goncalves.asp.

8 Christian Lohbauer, Brasil-Alemanha fases de uma parceria, 1964–1999 (São Paulo, SP, Brasil:

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2000). 9 Programa Nuclear Brasileiro INB, Senado Federal Agosto de 2007, Ciclo do Combustível Nuclear,

Audiência Pública (senado.gov.br. AP 20070809-INB). [This is the record of a hearing in the Brazilian senate.]

10 “Argentina, Brazil to Team Up on Nuclear Power,” ABC News, February 23, 2008,

www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/23/2170606.htm?site=news (accessed July 28, 2009); Geraldo Lino, “Acordo nuclear Brasil-Argentina: grande passo na integração regional,” Alerta em Rede, September 2, 2008, www.alerta.inf.br/integracao/1377.html; Pedro Aguiar, “Brasil e Argentina saem na frente,” Revista Brasil Nuclear 14, no. 34.

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REALISTIC PROACTIVISM: JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD GLOBAL ZERO

Matake Kamiya*

US President Barack Obama’s speech in Prague on April 5, 2009 declared “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” and was warmly received by Japan. The very next day, Prime Minister Taro Aso expressed his support for Obama’s speech to reporters by saying, “[i]t was a wonderful speech. It is a very positive trend that the United States, who possesses nuclear weapons, addresses [the issue of nuclear elimination] seriously.”1 Obama’s recognition that “[a]s the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act” was particularly esteemed in Japan as a courageous remark.2 Moved by the speech, Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba of the city of Hiroshima, where the first atomic bomb used in war was detonated on August 6, 1945, launched the “‘Obamajority’ campaign” to expand international support for the goal of a “world free of nuclear weapons.”3 In Japan, it has been generally understood that President Obama’s declaration about the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons is closely related to the Global Zero movement. For instance, an article in the May 29 issue of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission magazine discussed the launch of Global Zero at a conference in December 2008 and its announcement of a plan for the next 25 to 40 years leading to the phased elimination of nuclear weapon. The magazine said that, “President Obama’s speech in Prague was indeed the declaration that the United States will assume leadership to take the first step to that direction.”4 One of Japan’s largest national daily newspapers, Asahi Shimbun, reported that President Obama, despite North Korea’s nuclear test only several hours before his historic speech, delivered his planned speech on nuclear disarmament5 Taken together, Global Zero and Obama’s speech have been received in Japan as indications that issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear abolition, which had historically been dominated by idealists, are now led by realistic security thinkers, as well as political leaders, all over the world.6 Despite an initial warm reception, however, the overall Japanese reaction to Global Zero and Obama’s speech in Prague has been cautious and modest. Many mainstream security thinkers in Japan have pointed out the importance of observing the backdrop of such developments carefully. They have pointed out that the motivations behind such movements include fear of accelerating nuclear proliferation and increasing fear of nuclear use.7 Given the realities of the early 21st century, it will be necessary to construct a totally new mechanism of world order and international security to realize a world free of nuclear weapons. Such a total transformation of the world will surely take time, which may explain *Matake Kamiya is a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan. The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not represent those of the National Defense Academy or of Japan's Ministry of Defense.

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why President Obama said that a world free of nuclear weapons would perhaps be unattainable during his lifetime.8 Obama’s speech on April 5 demonstrated his determination to achieve the goal of nuclear abolition. In reality, however, a world with nuclear weapons will, as Obama himself admits, last for many more years. In this situation, the president’s seriousness about nuclear disarmament has to be buttressed by sober consideration of the world order during the period when the world is moving to a world free of nuclear weapons but will still have (a decreasing number of) such weapons. A particularly vital question with regard to Japan’s security during this period is: Is there any realistic security mechanism that can substitute for extended US nuclear deterrence and, if there is, how can it be achieved?9 Former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi also emphasized the necessity to demonstrate a “realistic alternative” to the US nuclear umbrella in order to change the minds of those who believe it to be a necessary part of Japan’s security.10 In short, although welcoming the growing momentum behind nuclear disarmament in the international community, Japan finds itself in a difficult gap between the ideal and reality. Observing Japanese cautiousness toward Global Zero and Obama’s speech, some foreign observers have started to express concerns about the possibility that Japan might develop its own nuclear weapons, particularly after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. For Japan, however, facing a dilemma between the non-nuclear ideal and the nuclear reality is not new at all. Throughout the post-World War II period, Japan has consistently been the earnest advocate of nuclear disarmament as the only country ever to have experienced nuclear devastation. At the same time, however, Japan has faced the nuclear arsenals of two giant neighbors, Russia and China, for many decades. Firmly maintaining its non-nuclear policy in a troubled security environment, Japan has relied upon the US extended nuclear deterrence within the framework of the US-Japan alliance. Simultaneously facing the first opportunity to bring the world closer to its long-cherished ideal of nuclear elimination and the increasing danger of nuclear proliferation and even nuclear use, particularly in the area surrounding Japan, what changes have (or have not) taken place in Japan’s threat perceptions? Have these changes brought about any alterations in Japan’s nuclear plans and/or Japan’s non-nuclear policy? What is Japan’s perception of Global Zero? This paper attempts to answer these questions. FACTORS THAT CONCEIVABLY COULD LEAD TO A NUCLEAR JAPAN Foreign observers have often pointed out that both the continuing development of military, and especially nuclear, capabilities by Japan’s neighbors and growing doubts about the US security commitment and nuclear umbrella might lead Japan at some future point to reconsider its non-nuclear weapon status.

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Security Concerns Three states in Japan’s immediate vicinity – North Korea, China, and Russia – are modernizing and extending their military and nuclear capabilities, causing growing concern among Japanese officials and ordinary citizens. Of the three, North Korea is perceived as an immediate threat, China as a longer term danger, and Russian nuclear forces are barely mentioned.

North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development A series of provocative actions by North Korea could be considered nuclear brinksmanship, including underground nuclear detonations in October 2006 and May 2009. These have escalated tensions in Northeast Asia, but did not create panic among the Japanese, already inclined to think the worst of Pyongyang. The Japanese, of course, were outraged by North Korea’s behavior. On May 25, 2009, the day when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, Japanese TV and radio news programs were filled with on-the-street interviews with Japanese people, each of them expressing anger, anxiety, and words of condemnation against the despicable action taken by Pyongyang. Japanese government and political leaders wasted no time to condemn the test. Immediately afterwards, the Japanese government protested to North Korea through the “embassy route” in Beijing.11 On the same day, Prime Minister Taro Aso issued an official statement to condemn North Korea and said:

A nuclear test by North Korea is totally unacceptable, as it constitutes a grave threat to Japan’s security as well as seriously undermines the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community when taken together with North Korea’s enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.12

On May 26 and 27, both Lower and Upper Houses of Japan’s Diet passed unanimously respective resolutions that condemned the test and called on the Japanese government to, “take resolute measures, such as a strengthening of sanctions,” against North Korea.13 On the international scene, the Japanese government moved quickly to formulate a wide international coalition against the nuclearization of North Korea. The test took place on the very day that the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was about to start in Hanoi. The Japanese government pressed for and received a joint statement condemning the test; separate from the conference’s normal closing statement. The joint statement described the test as “a clear violation of the Six-Party agreements and the relevant UNSC [United Nations Security Council] resolutions and decisions.”14 Prime Minister Aso convened Japan’s Security Council within nine hours of the test and requested a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution against Pyongyang.15 On June 12, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution

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1874, which “condemned [the test] in the strongest terms” and tightened sanctions against Pyongyang.16 In addition, the Japanese government unilaterally approved additional sanctions which go beyond those listed in UNSC Resolution 1874, including a total export ban to North Korea.17 Japan had already imposed unilateral sanctions after North Korea’s missile-launch in July 2006 and its first nuclear test in October of the same year, including a total ban on imports from North Korea and port calls by North Korean ships. Moreover, reacting to Pyongyang’s Taepodong-II missile test in April 2009, Japan had just tightened its sanctions.. The additional measures taken by Tokyo, therefore, are largely symbolic and can be expected to do only marginal economic damage to Pyongyang. Japanese leaders have long seen North Korea as a serious threat to Japan’s security, well before the country conducted nuclear tests. Such a threat perception was explicitly stated in the current “National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG)” of Japan, which was adopted in December 2004. In contrast to previous NDPGs, dating back to 1976 and which referenced an unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula but refrained from candidly indicating that North Korea posed a security threat to Japan, the 2004 NDPG called North Korea a “major destabilizing factor to regional and international security.”*

North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.18

The government’s threat perception is shared almost identically by its successor, the long-time opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which handily won the August 31st election this year. On February 26, 2003, the Project Team on North Korea of the DPJ issued a document which explained the party’s North Korea policy, and called North Korea’s nuclear program “a grave problem that has influence on our nation,” and insisted that ballistic missile tests by Pyongyang “may invite a serious threat to the security of our nation” and “a firm response will have to be taken.”19 The two nuclear tests by North Korea have certainly strengthened such threat perceptions among Japanese leaders. For instance, in a * The Japanese government has formulated three “Boei Keikaku no Taiko (National Defense Program Outlines)”, beginning in 1976. In 1995, the entirely new “National Defense Program Outline in and after 1996” was formulated in response to the drastic changes in the international security environment after the end of the Cold War. In 2004, the third of such documents, “National Defense Program Guideline in and after FY2005,” was adopted so that Japan's security policy could meet the challenges of the post-9/11 era. (Although the English translation of the title of the document was changed from “outline” to “guideline,” the title in Japanese remained the same as before: “Boei Keikaku no Taiko.”) In this paper, the abbreviation “NDPG” is used for simplification. Currently, preparations to update the 2004 Guideline are underway. (The English translations of each of the three documents can be found at: “National Defense Program Outline” [http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html ]; “National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996” [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/6a.html]; and “National Defense Program Outline, FY2005-” [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html].)

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press conference held the day after the May 2009 test, Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada was asked if he believed the test had heightened the military threat posed to Japan and replied:

Of course, I do. If they improve the accuracy [of their nukes] by conducting nuclear tests, since they have recently shown a certain level of things with regard to delivery vehicle [by the Taepodong-II test in the previous month], certainly it is natural to think of them as threat.20

Japanese leaders’ anger against, and sense of threat from, North Korea are real, and are widely shared by the general public. Public opinion polls have clearly shown that the sentiment of the Japanese people has become stronger following each of the two nuclear tests conducted by Pyongyang. In a public opinion survey conducted by the Japan Association for Public Opinion Research only four weeks before North Korea’s first nuclear test, 38 percent of the respondents felt the threat of North Korea “very much,” and 46 percent felt it “to some extent.”21 In a poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun immediately after the test, 81 percent of the respondents said that his/her threat perception of the North had become stronger. (Fifty-three percent chose the answer “has become stronger very much,” and 28 percent chose “has become stronger to some extent.”) In the same poll, 74 percent “support[ed]” tough UNSC sanctions resolution against North Korea, and 17 percent were “generally favorable” with regard to such a resolution. Nearly 70 percent also “support[ed]” the Japanese government’s unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang, and 18 percent were “generally favorable” for such measures.22 Another poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun also revealed that the test raised the level of concern among the Japanese about Pyongyang. In the poll, 44 percent of the respondents felt a “strong threat” from North Korea, and 38 percent felt “some level of threat.” In comparison, an earlier poll in July that year conducted by the same newspaper company found that 38 percent felt a “strong threat” and 39 percent felt “some level of threat.” In the Asahi October poll, 62 percent of the respondents said that the international community should put more emphasis on sanctions than on talks with North Korea.23 The nuclear test in May 2009 has further hardened public sentiment against North Korea. In a poll taken by the semi-national Japan Broadcasting Corporation, known as NHK, from June 5-7, 65 percent of the respondents said that Japan should strengthen its unilateral sanctions against North Korea, while only eight percent said it did not need to do so.24 In another poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun during the same period, 88 percent of the respondents said the international community should strengthen sanctions against Pyongyang, while only six percent said it did not need to do so. Only 46 percent of the respondents, however, believed that international sanctions would actually lead to termination of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development program. Forty-five percent believed that sanctions were unlikely to have such an effect.25 Despite their heightened anger and threat perception, it is noteworthy that the Japanese public has by and large reacted calmly to North Korea’s brinkmanship. For example, on

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May 25, stock prices in Japan rebounded after three consecutive business days’ of decline, “shrugging off jitters over North Korea’s claimed nuclear test which unnerved some other key Asian markets.”† In the previous month, North Korea’s demonstration of its delivery vehicle capacity by the launch of the Taepodon-II missile (which Pyongyang claimed to be an Unha-II rocket carrying a Kwangmyŏngsŏng-II satellite) also triggered a sharp but calm response from Japan. Prime Minister Aso, with a stern face, said to reporters that, “The launch by North Korea is an extremely provocative act and Japan absolutely cannot ignore it.”26 Japanese TV and radio stations immediately broadcast special reports about the launch. However, NHK TV’s “News at Noon,” which was broadcast only a half an hour after the launch, was extended by only 15 minutes. The calm response by the Japanese public to the May 2009 test has been clearly reflected in the rapid decline of media coverage of the topic. For instance, Japan’s largest national daily Yomiuri Shimbun carried 218 articles including the keywords “Kita-Chosen (North Korea)” and “kaku-jikken (nuclear test)” during the first week after the test. The number of articles, however, dropped to 47 for the second week, and continued to decline to 33, 29, and 18 for the third, fourth, and fifth weeks, respectively. In contrast, during the same five weeks, Yomiuri consistently maintained high coverage of the 2009 swine flu pandemic. The number of articles including the keyword “shingata-infuruenza (new type influenza)” that appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun for the same five weeks, respectively, were: 338, 225, 238, 251, and 220.27 Japanese security experts Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa observed that the reaction in Japan to North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006 was similarly “much more restrained than predicted by some foreign experts, particularly in the United States.” The Japanese public was concerned about the development, as shown in the public opinion polls. However, “in general [the Japanese public] did not demonstrate active interest in taking any specific measures, such as establishing underground shelters,” and “the Japanese media focused primarily on the radioactive contamination risks the test might pose to Japan.” “Having recognized that such risk was almost nonexistent, the public interest on this issue faded away promptly,”28 In a public opinion survey on “public consciousness about risks” conducted by the Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc. from Jun 9-10, 2009 which asked each respondent to name three developments between January and May 2009 which he or she found “most frightening,” 32 percent chose “the new type influenza” as the most frightening, while 22 percent chose “the missile shooting and the nuclear test by North Korea.”29

† "Tokyo Stocks Rise Despite N. Korea Nuclear Test," Kyodo News on the Web, May 25, 2009, http://home.kyodo.co.jp/?%253Fid=1564 (accessed on May 25, 2009).

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The relatively calm Japanese reaction to North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship reflects the perception that North Korea’s nuclear weapons development is not an isolated issue, but part of a broader “North Korea problem” centered around nuclear weapons development, ballistic missiles development, and abductions. Deep suspicions and misgivings about North Korea had already been growing in Japan since the early 1990s. During the Cold War, strong leftist orientation among Japanese media encouraged reporting that was sympathetic to Pyongyang.‡ Influenced by such reports, the Japanese people held a relatively benign image of North Korea through the late 1980s. But since the end of the Cold War, Japanese media reports about North Korea have become more objective. Consequently, the Japanese have become much more familiar with the strange belief system shared among North Korean leaders, the extremely oppressive nature of the regime in Pyongyang, and the history of North Korea’s anti-Japan activities, including the abduction of Japanese citizens to advance its espionage efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1993 to 1994, when Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development programs were first disclosed, the Japanese began to recognize North Korea as a potential threat to their security. In 1997, an ex-North Korean agent who had defected to Japan confirmed the kidnapping of a 13-years-old girl, Megumi Yokota, two decades earlier.§ That was followed by the launch of the first Taepodong missile on August 31, 1998. The shock of the launch to the Japanese was arguably comparable to the one received by the Americans at the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957. For most Japanese, the launch was the first occasion in the postwar period in which they felt their country was immediately threatened by a hostile external power. Although Japan had confronted Russian (Soviet) and Chinese military power, including their nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals, most Japanese had actually never perceived these threats as immediate, given their protection by the US military umbrella. In the case of the Taepodong launch, however, the fact that North Korea launched a missile that actually flew over the main island of Japan and splashed down into the Pacific Ocean was enough to send shivers up just about every Japanese spine. The possibility that North Korea, viewed by most Japanese as the most enigmatic and the most unpredictable country in the region, had the capability to attack Japan with ballistic missiles was horrifying. The

‡ Fuji Kamiya, Japan's leading Korea expert since the 1960s, recalled: “T]he Japanese media eagerly praised North Korea, while treating South Korea as a bad guy. As was typically observed in the case of the Chollima movement, they consistently overestimated and admired them [what North Korea did]. In contrast, with regard to South Korea, their reports exaggerated the negative aspects [of what South Korea did] due to their preoccupation with biases and prejudices [toward South Korea].” Fuji Kamiya Kokusai Seiji no Han-seiki: Kaiko to Tenbo [The Half Century of the International Politics: Retrospect and Prospect] (Tokyo: Sansei-do, 2001), page.179. § At the first summit meeting between Japan and North Korea in September 2002, at which it was revealed that North Korea actually had abducted thirteen Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s, Megumi Yokota was included among the eight abductees who were claimed by North Korea to have already died.

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North Korean spy ships incidents that took place in March 1999 and in December 2001 further intensified the perceived threat from Pyongyang.** Kim Jong-Il’s handling of the abduction issue at and after the first Japan-North Korea summit meeting badly damaged the perception of North Korea among the Japanese. When Kim admitted that his country had abducted thirteen Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s and made a verbal apology for doing so, the majority of the Japanese public actually accepted Kim’s words and supported Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s decision to resume normalization talks with North Korea.†† Kim’s deeds that followed, however, outraged the Japanese. The Japanese were particularly upset at Pyongyang’s negative response to Tokyo’s demand for detailed information about the eight abductees whom North Korea claimed to have had died, including information on the causes of their deaths. Most Japanese believed that North Korea tried to deceive Japan by providing obviously fake information. According to North Korea, many of the eight people died due to unnatural causes, such as car accidents, drowning, carbon monoxide poisoning, and suicide.30 The family members of Shuichi Ichikawa, for example, who North Korea claimed to have drowned while swimming in the ocean, argued that he was actually unable to swim and rarely went swimming while he was in Japan.31 Moreover, many errors with regard to birth dates and home addresses in Japan were found on the death certificates that were given to Tokyo, and coincided with misinformation that the Japanese side had mistakenly given to North Korea several years earlier.32 In a public opinion survey conducted by the Asahi Shinbun in October 2003, 88 percent of the respondents said that they did not trust North Korea’s explanations with regard to the abduction issue, while only three percent answered affirmatively.33 Pyongyang’s attitude toward the five surviving abductees added fuel to the fire. North Korea’s decision in October to allow them to return to their homeland almost a quarter century after being kidnapped by North Korean agents was welcomed by the Japanese. When they expressed their desire not to return to North Korea again and to live in Japan with their family members permanently, Pyongyang demanded that Tokyo send them back to North Korea. Japanese anger toward North Korea grew even stronger when Pyongyang declared at the normalization talks, which were resumed in late October after two years of suspension, that the abduction issue had already been solved; it was and still is widely

** Even before these incidents, it is believed that North Korean ships frequently intruded into Japan's territorial waters and extended economic zone (EEZ) in order to gather information, replace spies stationed in Japan, smuggle drugs into Japan, and even to abduct Japanese citizens. At the first Japan-North Korea summit meeting, Kim Jong-Il admitted that spy ship activities had actually been carried out by “certain military officers” in waters near Japan and pledged that such incidents would not take place again. †† In a public opinion survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on September 18, the day after Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang, 81 percent of the respondents said that they evaluated the outcome of the summit meeting positively, while only 16 percent said that they evaluated the outcome negatively. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents said they endorsed Koizumi's decision to resume normalization talk with North Korea in October. Asahi Shinbun (September 19 and 20, 2002).

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believed in Japan that at least tens of more Japanese had actually been kidnapped by the North in the past. The resurgence of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, triggered by the North Korean acknowledgement to the US envoy that it was conducting a uranium-enrichment program, took place at a time when the reputation and credibility of North Korea among the Japanese public had already hit rock bottom. For almost a decade before the current nuclear crisis started, the Japanese had lived with “North Korea problems.” Having faced a series of provocative moves by Pyongyang, the Japanese were surely irritated, but such experiences ironically and unintentionally had given them confidence that Pyongyang, despite its harsh rhetoric and confrontational postures, was effectively deterred by the US-Japan alliance. The Japanese had grown accustomed to the harsh way Pyongyang spoke and behaved. In other words, they had acquired immunity from North Korean provocations. Consequently, even the explicit warning issued by Pyongyang in April 2003 that Japan should recognize that it is “within the striking range of the DPRK” and should behave well was almost ignored by the Japanese media and barely induced any reactions from the Japanese public.34 The relatively calm reactions of Japan and its people to the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis do not mean that Tokyo has taken a soft policy stance toward Pyongyang. Since the crisis resumed in the fall of 2002, Tokyo has consistently taken “a hard-line approach toward North Korea similar to that of the Bush administration” and “[t]he Japanese public has come to support” it.‡‡ Such a tendency has been clearly observed in Tokyo’s immediate responses to the Taepodong-II test and the nuclear test in the spring of 2009. For the Japanese, the renewed nuclear brinkmanship by Pyongyang represents only an additional episode in the long list of “North Korea problems” they have been forced to face since the early 1990s. Being deeply concerned and angered by North Korea’s repeated missile and nuclear tests, and being totally disillusioned about the trustworthiness of that country as a negotiating partner, the Japanese tend to see wicked North Korea as being up to its old tricks.35

Growing Anxiety about China’s Nuclear Arsenal Not many in Japan perceive an immediate threat to its security from China. However, China’s rapidly growing military strength, particularly its nuclear and missile capabilities, has gradually aroused anxiety among the Japanese. The results of the annual “Japan-US Joint Public Opinion Polls,” conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Inc., have demonstrated this trend eloquently: In November 1997, in answer to the question, “Please choose as many countries or regions from the following that you think will possibly become a military threat to Japan,” only 25 percent of the Japanese respondents chose “China/Taiwan.” In November 2008, 59 percent chose “China” and six percent “Taiwan.”36

‡‡ Katsu Furukawa, "Japan's View of the Korea Crisis," http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm (accessed on September 15, 2003).

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At the governmental level, the 2000 edition of Japan’s annual defense White Paper explicitly stated, for the first time, that China’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles would cover Japan. Until that year, the White Paper, entitled, Defense of Japan traditionally refrained from using terms which could imply that Japan perceived China as a threat.37 The 2000 edition, however, maintained that “with regard to intermediate-range ballistic missile, China possesses a total of approximately 70 missiles whose ranges cover the Asian region including Japan [emphasis added by the author].”38 Since then, similar expressions of concern have repeatedly appeared in Defense of Japan. The 2008 edition states that China’s intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs/MRBMs) are “covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan” and “[t]hese missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.”39 It also says that, “there is concern about how China’s military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security,” particularly because, “China does not show a clear, specific future vision.”40 Besides IRBMs and MRBMs, China’s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in the vicinity of Taiwan constitute a source of security concern for Japan, because such missiles are within range of the Okinawa (Ryukyu) Islands. The increasing sense of unease among the Japanese about China’s military buildup is also reflected in Japan’s current NDPG. The 2004 NDPG,, for the first time since 1976, explicitly named China as a major security concern for Japan, with particular attention to its nuclear and missile capabilities. It maintains:

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.41

China’s military buildup has loomed particularly large because of the long-time stagnation of Japan’s own defense spending. While China’s defense budget has seen two-digit growth for 21 consecutive years, Japan’s defense budget decreased for the seventh consecutive year in fiscal 2009 to a 14-year low.42 Hisayoshi Ina, a political columnist and the vice chair of the editorial board of Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei), has pointed out that while China’s defense budget has increased nearly five-fold from 1997 to 2007, Japan’s defense budget has increased less than two percent during the same decade. Ina named this stagnation of Japan’s defense spending the “Koizumi Disarmament” and said that it irritated the US government while pleasing China.43 In fact, on May 20, 2008, in an address to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, the US Ambassador to Japan, J. Thomas Schieffer said:

…it is troubling to note that the ratio of defense spending [of Japan] to gross domestic product has been steadily shrinking. This year that number will be less than 1%, 0.89% to be precise, a ratio lower than any NATO or developed country in the OECD [emphasis added].44

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The relationship between China and Taiwan, which the current NDPG says “remains unpredictable,” adds another source of anxiety for Japan. Shortly after the issuance of the NDPG, on February 19, 2005, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) issued a joint statement which included, as a “common strategic objective of Japan and the US, the need to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.”45 Since it was the first time that Tokyo and Washington have ever issued a joint statement concerning the Taiwan Strait in the more than fifty year history of the US-Japanese alliance, it was widely perceived as a signal that the two allies view the Taiwan Strait issue as a mutual security concern.46 Many also called the move “a demonstration of Japan’s willingness to confront the rapidly growing might of China.”47 On April 29, in an address given in New York, Japan’s Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, talked about making the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue a common strategic objective for Japan and the United States, and said that Taiwan has been included in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.48 In recent years, an increasing number of Japanese politicians, both in the ruling and opposition parties, have become more candid about expressing their anxiety over China’s military buildup, particularly of its nuclear arsenal.49 For example, on December 9, 2005, in an address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, the former head of the DPJ, Seiji Maehara, who is widely recognized as a promising candidate to be a future prime minister, said:

As an undeniable reality, a situation has come into being in which China has become increasingly powerful both economically and militarily. China, against the background of its economic development, has maintained double digit growth of its military expenditures for nearly twenty years, and has advanced the expansion and modernization of its military force. Some have pointed out that the real military spending of China is twice or three times larger than the officially announced figure by the Chinese government. This represents a realistic threat [for Japan] [emphasis added].50

Thirteen days later, in a regular press conference, Foreign Minister (an later) Prime Minister) Taro Aso commented on Maehara’s remark and was summarized in the government minutes:

Double-digit growth of defense expense, for 17 consecutive years. And if its content is unclear, in terms of transparency, it may breed distrust. They would not need to say it isn’t a threat, if it were visible from outside, like Japanese one is. They might not have to say what was better left unsaid, only if it were clearly visible. Since this is my impression, it can be said the remark of Mr. Maehara, that it is breeding a threat or anxiety, is a fair one.51

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In response to a question if he also felt China a threat, Aso replied:

A neighbor with one billion people, possessed of nuclear bombs and its military budget growing by double digits for 17 consecutive years. And if its content is unclear, as a consequence my feeling is that it is on the course to constitute a considerable threat [emphasis added].52

Most recently, during his visit to the Czech Republic and Germany in early May 2009 to attend the 18th Japan-EU Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Aso said that the security environment in Northeast Asia is increasingly hostile due to North Korea’s missile launch in April and China’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal [emphasis added].53 On June 25, 2009, at the working dinner of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Trieste, Italy, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone also expressed concern about China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. According to a Japanese official, Nakasone said that China “is the only country in the P-5 that has not worked on nuclear disarmament and is instead beefing up its strategic arms.” After the session, the foreign minister told reporters that, “[i]n particular, I pointed out the need to work toward nuclear disarmament by all nuclear states, including China and others who remain outside the framework of the NPT, and other (G-8) countries expressed similar understanding (about the need).”54 Despite this growing displeasure at China’s military buildup and, particularly, its expanding nuclear arsenal, Japan’s response has been modest at best. There is a widespread view in the Japanese security and foreign policy community that China represents a more serious and longer-term threat to Japan’s security than North Korea. Some officials and commentators go so far as to argue that North Korea’s provocations provide Japan with legitimate reason to build up defense capabilities to meet the threats and uncertainties related to China.55 However, not much has been done by the Japanese government so far. In fact, as mentioned above, Japan’s defense budget decreased for the seventh consecutive year in fiscal 2009 to a 14-year low. Japan’s most conservative national daily, Sankei Shimbun, complained in September 2008 that “Japan’s build-up of the defense capabilities [against China’s military expansion] has remained too restrained to be sufficient for a response to the realistic threat [of China],” despite the fact that the 2008 edition of the defense White Paper emphasized concern about the impact of China’s military strength on regional and Japanese security.56 A well-known political commentator and president of Japan’s Institute for National Fundamentals, Yoshiko Sakurai, who has staunchly advocated for Japan’s reconstruction as a normal country, also raised a question: “Do Japanese politicians recognize how severe the current state [of China’s threat is for Japan]?”57 The limited nature of Japan’s reaction to China’s military expansion can be mainly attributed to the following three factors: First is the socio-psychological influence of Japan’s modern history with China. Since the end of the World War II, Japan’s posture toward China has been “reactive rather than active,” and “remarkably less confrontational than that of the United States.” Many Japanese believe that maintenance of reasonably good relations with their giant neighbor is essential both for Japan’s security and its economic interests. In

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addition, the pacifist orientation among the post-war Japanese generations has led to a desire to avoid involvement in political and military confrontations with their neighbor. Moreover, a sense of guilt resulting from the pre-war history has restrained Japanese attitudes toward China even more.58 Second, sober analyses of China’s military strength have been widely shared among mainstream thinkers of Japanese security and foreign policy community. They have worried increasingly about China’s rapidly expanding military power. At the same time, the majority believe that China does not pose an immediate military threat to Japan. For instance, in a paper published in February 2004, commissioned by the Ministry of Finance to review Japan’s provision of official development assistance to China despite China’s military expansion, a leading China expert in Japan, Junichi Abe, maintained:

…If we place China’s military strength in the international security mechanism in East Asia, which is structured around the Japan-US alliance at the core and [other bilateral] defense networks between the United States and South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia, the level of its “threat” is relatively low. At least in Japan, there are few who seriously consider China’s “military threat” as a realistic problem (apart from [the possibility in] the distant future)…It is highly unlikely that China will challenge the security mechanism in East Asia, which is supported by the military power of the United States…It must be concluded that use of force [by China] against our country, who represents the key to the US military presence in Asia, is not a rational option [for China].59

Finally, the security threat posed by North Korea looms much larger and more immediate than that posed by China. For instance, in an address given at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC on April 17, 2009, Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, “[a]t any rate, for its neighbors, China poses great uncertainties.” Immediately after that, however, Abe maintained that “North Korea remains the biggest threat to security in our part of the world.”60

Russia In the latest 2008 edition of the defense White Paper, a short section entitled “Russian Forces in the Far East Region” says that Japan needs to continue to pay attention to Russian nuclear forces in the region:

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. . . . It is necessary to continue to monitor the positioning and trends of Russian forces in the Far East region in the future while taking into consideration that the overall forces tend to focus on maintaining combat

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readiness of the strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts by inter-theater mobility of its permanent combat-ready troops.61

The “Overview” section of the “Security Environment Surrounding Japan,” however, does not mention Russian nuclear forces at all.62 Similarly, the 2009 edition of East Asian Strategic Review, written by the researchers at the National Institute for Defense Studies, says no more than the following about the impact of Russian nuclear forces on Japan:

…[i]n terms of strategic nuclear weapons, its arsenal remains the second largest after the United States’ and it has begun to modernize its outdated conventional forces. Thus, Japan and other neighboring nations are obliged to keep an eye on trends in the Russian Armed Forces.63

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in a speech at the Sophia University in Tokyo on November 9, 2007, said that “the Northeast corner of the Pacific remains one of the last places on earth with the potential for a nuclear confrontation.”64 Quoting his remark, Yomiuri Shimbun insisted that “we cannot escape from the reality [which Secretary Gates mentioned], because we have to face to nuclear weapons of not only North Korea but also of China and of Russia. The ‘Nuclear threat’ confronting Japan has grown bigger than we realize [emphasis added].”65 Still, Japan’s current NDPG pays only modest attention to nuclear weapons in the Russian Far East:

…although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces.66

In fact, since the end of the Cold War, discussions in Japan about the impact of Russian nuclear force on its security have been lukewarm at best. Most of the concerns expressed in Japan with regard to Russian nuclear arsenal have been about insufficient controls on nuclear weapons and materials. The Role and Credibility of the US Nuclear Umbrella Surrounded by nuclear neighbors, Japan has maintained its non-nuclear weapons policy despite its latent technological capabilities. It is widely agreed among mainstream security thinkers in Japan that the alliance with the United States and the US commitment to defend Japan in case of enemy attack, including the provision of extended nuclear deterrence, has reassured the Japanese people.

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The current NDPG puts it simply: “To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the US nuclear deterrent.”67 A comprehensive national security policy proposal published by the National Security Research Project of the Tokyo Foundation on October 8, 2008, which is widely considered among the security and foreign policy community in Japan as one of the most important non-governmental inputs to the ongoing preparation of the next NDPG by the Japanese government, emphasizes the indispensability of the US extended nuclear deterrent for Japan’s security:

…the BMD system alone is not sufficient to suppress the threat of ballistic missiles [against Japan]. A system of deterrence by punitive measures is also necessary. Given the current situation of North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, Japan-U.S. joint efforts to effectively maintain the deterrence system including conventional and nuclear weapons are crucially important. Such a system requires American commitment to resolutely responding to armed attacks against Japan. In addition to the nuclear extended deterrence, Japan and the U.S. should make joint efforts to establish a system of operational cooperation so that a thorough counteroffensive using conventional weapons alone can be carried out [emphasis added].68

In the most recent “Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues,” conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office in January 2009, to the question “[W]hat way do you think Japan should adopt to defend it security?”, 77 percent of the respondents said that “Japan should, as it currently does, defend its security by the US-Japan Security System [i.e., alliance] and the Self-Defense Forces.” Sixty-five percent of the respondents believed that the strength of the Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) “should be as it is at the present,” and only 14 percent said it “should be strengthened.” Seventy six percent of the respondents believed that the alliance with the United States is “contributing” to peace and security of Japan, while only 16 percent answered “not contributing.”69 Although this poll did not specifically ask respondents about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella, taking into consideration the fact that there is a widely shared, if vague, understanding among Japanese citizens that their country is protected by American nuclear weapons against the nuclear weapons of other countries, these results strongly indicate that the vast majority of the Japanese people still trusted the US nuclear umbrella at the beginning of 2009, and desired that the umbrella should be maintained. It is true, however, that there is a growing uneasiness among Japanese political elites about the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis China and North Korea. For instance, an article carried in Yomiuri Shimbun on June 16 maintained, “In the face of North Korea, who repeats missile shootings and nuclear tests despite dissuasions from the international society, credibility of the strategy [of US extended deterrence] has been considerably shaken.”70 On June 23, 2009, Mainichi Shimbun carried an editorial titled, “Viewpoint: Nuclear Umbrella.” It starts with the sentence, “An English word ‘vulnerable’

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may best describe the current state of Japan.” Taking a clear position that Japan’s nuclearization would be “irreparably harmful” for Japan, the editorial maintains that “the role of the United States is indispensable, in order to give the Japanese citizens a sense of being protected,” and raises a question for the readers: “[W]ill the US forces retaliate with nuclear weapons in case North Korea shoot a nuclear missile against Japan?”71 On July 3, Sankei Shimbun carried an article which insisted:

What is important for Japan now is a multi-partisan discussion in a calm manner about how the U.S.-Japan Security System and the [US] extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) should be to deal with new threats such as North Korea’s nuclear development…In the recent US-ROK summit meeting, South Korea demanded the United States to reconfirm the guarantee of the US extended deterrence for it, and the two leaders documented the guarantee. As is clear from this development, we are in the era in which credibility of US “nuclear umbrella” over its allies are questioned again. For Japan, too, there is an increasing necessity of thorough discussion about Japan’s own deterrence posture including the pros and cons of acquiring a capability to attack enemy’s bases and of possession of nuclear weapons, as well as about the extent to which nuclear deterrence through the US-Japan Alliance are actually functioning.72

Such anxiety about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella was quite common among West Europeans during the Cold War period, as well, due to the inherent difficulties of “extending” deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence is a threat of nuclear retaliation by one state on behalf of its allies, and such a threat “implies that the US is willing to risk its own destruction in the interest of deterring an attack on an ally which does not possess a basic deterrent of its own.”73 In order to make extended deterrence credible, and therefore effective, the United States must convince the targeted states that there is a real likelihood of US nuclear retaliation in case of attacks on US allies. At the same time, the United States must reassure its allies of the continuing trustworthiness of US promises to retaliate. A difficulty for extended deterrence is that the reassurance of allies often requires “a greater degree of certainty that nuclear retaliation will be forthcoming [in case of enemy attacks] than the degree of certainty that is sufficient to deter an adversary in a crisis.”74 The credibility of US nuclear deterrence was one of the central themes of the security debate among Europeans throughout the Cold War. Many doubted whether the United States would dare to risk destruction of its own cities if the Soviet Union attacked only Europe. And the US worked hard to clear these doubts through repeated declarations, by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, some of which would be delivered by the forces of the allies, and by developing war plans that would have made nuclear use virtually automatic in the event of war. In Japan, however, the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella was rarely discussed until recent years. Japan’s defense posture during the Cold War was based on the assumption that any nuclear attack on Japan would be part of a total nuclear exchange

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between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was so unlikely that the Soviet Union would attack Japan alone that the Japanese had little reason to worry about the possibility of “decoupling.” Today, however, there is growing concern among Japanese about the future possibility that North Korea, armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, may find an incentive to attack Japan alone, or that Japan might become the sole target of a Chinese nuclear attack in a Sino-Japanese conflict. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, an increasing number of Japanese have come to realize that they now have to face up to the famous question raised by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s: Would a US president actually trade New York for Paris?75 Of course, it should be remembered that the “supposedly dangerous situation” in Europe depicted by de Gaulle actually continued for three decades until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US extended nuclear guarantee to Europe “worked” even during a time of strategic parity between the two superpowers. Obviously, “[m]ost American and European leaders realized that in practice the issue was not what the American President could be assumed to do but how the Soviet Union assessed its risk, if it would want to take initiative.”76 This difference is widely appreciated among mainstream security thinkers in Japan. It is therefore groundless to argue that increasing concern among the Japanese about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella automatically will lead to it being dysfunctional. Besides, Japan has a long history of being protected under the US extended nuclear deterrence. As a leading Japanese expert of nuclear strategy Shinichi Ogawa argues,

The US-Japan alliance is intact today, and no significant event has occurred that might lead a third party to conclude that the alliance is on the verge of collapse. It is improbable that the Japanese public has suddenly lost confidence in the U.S. nuclear commitment.77

One more point should be added, however: If Japanese confidence in the US commitment was shaken in the foreseeable future, distrust would more likely be caused by political, rather than military, reasons. In recent years, despite the widespread perception among the Japanese that the United States is “contributing” to peace and security of Japan (as was shown above), a sense of distrust of the United States has also been growing. According to the annual “Japan-US Joint Public Opinion Polls,” conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Inc., in November 2002, 49 percent of the respondents trusted the United States (eight percent chose the answer “trust very much” and 40 percent chose “trust to some extent”), while 39 percent did not (9 percent chose the answer “do not trust at all,” and 30 percent chose “have some distrust”).78 Six years later, in November 2008, these figures had changed greatly: only 32 percent trusted the United States (six percent chose “trust very much,” and 26 percent chose “trust to some extent”), while nearly 60 percent did not (21 percent chose “do not trust at all,” and 39 percent chose “have some distrust”).79 One major reason for this change in Japanese perceptions was, of course, US unilateralism during the Bush Administration and the Iraq War. In the 2008 poll, the vast majority of the respondents (83 percent) believed that credibility of the United States decreased during the eight years of the Bush Administration.80

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There is, however, another important reason for declining trust in the United States. There is a widespread sentiment among the Japanese that the United States has failed to give them satisfactory reciprocation for their efforts to help the US after the 9/11 terrorist attack and during the Iraq War, with the latter being particularly important. Although many countries, even close allies, condemned the United States for starting an illegitimate war against Iraq, the Japanese government not only refrained from criticizing its ally, but tried to screen it from international blame. Although the majority of the Japanese public was critical of the Iraq War, Tokyo dispatched SDF troops to Iraq to help US reconstruction efforts. It was not an easy decision for the Japanese government, since this deployment of troops was the very first time Japan had sent its armed forces to the territory of a country in which military conflicts were still in progress since WWII. It marked a “historic watershed in Japan’s policies on international contributions, which had centered mostly around cooperation for UN peacekeeping operations” and the “opening of a new era for the role of the SDF.”81 The reaction of the Japanese public to this deployment was very noteworthy. Despite a deep pacifist orientation embedded in post-war Japanese society, and notwithstanding the fact that a majority in Japan did not support the US-led war against Iraq and exhibited a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the US handling of the post-war situation there, the SDF deployment to Iraq won acceptance among the Japanese people. In a poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun on April 17 and 18, 2004, about three months after the SDF troops were sent to Iraq, a full 60 percent of the respondents were supportive of the deployment, as opposed to 37 percent who were not.82 The Japanese government, as well as its people, expected that such a show of goodwill, friendship, and partnership would ensure the US reciprocated by supporting Japan against North Korea. Immediately after Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, however, the Bush Administration replaced its original policy of not rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior with a new, conciliatory policy line, including direct bilateral talks with Pyongyang and reopening of the Six-Party Talks. Although this policy change was received favorably by the majority of the international community as a sign of a shift from unilateralism to multilateralism, it was a profound shock to Japan. The Japanese were particularly deeply disappointed to see the United States make such a fundamental policy shift on the most vital issue for Japan’s security unilaterally, without sufficient consultations with Japan. When the Bush Administration rescinded the designation of North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in October 2008, going against Japan’s insistence that the delisting should not be implemented until Pyongyang took concrete actions to resolve the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens, the Japanese were disappointed even further. Such unilateral policy changes by the United States have created a sense that the US is not willing to pay sufficient respect even to Japan’s most vital security interests. If it continues to remain so neglected, such sentiments could raise voices in Japan questioning Washington’s sense of solidarity with Tokyo, and undermine the security alliance itself. If, on the other hand, this political nightmare is avoided by closer consultations between the two allies, there will not be much reason, at least for the time being, to worry about Japan’s loss of faith in the US nuclear umbrella.

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JAPAN’S NUCLEAR PLANS AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY Since Japan launched a nuclear energy development program in the mid-1950s, the government—as well as political leaders—has repeatedly declared that the country will never possess nuclear weapons. In 1955, the Diet adopted the Atomic Energy Basic Law that strictly limits the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. During deliberations on the bill, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Lower House member Yasuhiro Nakasone, one of the sponsors of the bill, maintained that “weapons which utilize atomic energy to kill and wound people,” would be excluded from Japan’s atomic energy research and utilization program.83 In April 1958, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi declared at an Upper House session that Japan would choose not to possess any nuclear weapons, though its postwar “Peace Constitution” did not prohibit the possession of strictly defensive nuclear weapons.§§ In April 1960, he maintained at a Lower House session that “Japan will not arm itself with nuclear weapons, nor will it allow the introduction of nuclear weapons [into its territory].”84 It should be noted that Nakasone and Kishi were generally considered to be among the most hawkish nationalists within Japan’s political circles at that time. In May 1967, the Director General of the Defense Agency (currently the Ministry of Defense), Kanehichi Masuda, told the Upper House that “the government has maintained the principles of not manufacturing, possessing, or allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan since the Kishi cabinet.”85 Formulated as the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Hikaku San-Gensoku)” by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at Lower House sessions in December 1967 and January 1968 and formalized in a resolution by the Diet in November 1971, these principles were subsequently upgraded to the status of “national principles” (kokuze), and each subsequent administration, LDP or non-LDP, has repeatedly reaffirmed its unwavering support for these principle as national policy.*** The Japanese government signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 and the Diet ratified it in 1976. The current “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy,” which was adopted by the Japan Energy Commission in 2005 to define the basic principles of Japan’s nuclear energy policy, maintains:

The goals of research, development and utilization of nuclear energy in Japan, according to the Atomic Energy Basic Law, are to secure energy

§§ “Dai-23-kai Kokkai, Sangi-in, Shoukou-Iinkai-Kaigi-roku, Dai-5-gou (The 23th Session of the Diet, the House of Councilors, Commerce and Industry Committee, Proceedings, No.5)” (December 15, 1955), page 8. See also, Akira Sakuragawa, “Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko (Japan's Disarmament Diplomacy)” Kokusai Seiji 80 (October 1985), page 64. During the 1950s, when Kishi made this remark, it was expected that very small nuclear warheads which could be used for strictly defensive purpose might come into being as a consequence of advance of science and technology. Since “strictly defensive nuclear weapons” have never been invented, possession of any existing nuclear weapons by Japan would be unconstitutional. *** Sato was Kishi's younger brother.

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resources for the future, to promote academic progress and industrial advancement and thereby, to contribute to the welfare of society and the improvement of people’s living standard, based on the premise of safety assurance, while strictly limiting the activities involved to peaceful purpose.86

As the only country to have suffered nuclear attack, Japan takes these commitments seriously. It promotes research, development, and utilization of nuclear energy strictly for peaceful purposes, while setting the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons and adhering to the “Three Non-nuclear Principles” of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. In addition to ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and signed the “Additional Protocol” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, it has developed and improved corresponding domestic safeguards systems.87 As of March 31, 2009, Japan had 53 nuclear reactors in operation, 4 reactors under construction, and 12 additional reactors planned.88 The total number of Japan’s reactors (69) is the second largest in the world, next to the United States (113 reactors, as of January 1, 2009). According the 2007 edition of Japan’s White Paper on Nuclear Energy, published in March 2008:

Japan’s basic policy of back-end of nuclear fuel cycle has been to reprocess spent fuel, to dispose of only non-recyclable fission products and transuranic elements as high-level radioactive waste, and to effectively utilize collected plutonium and uranium, etc.”89

An important part of Japan’s nuclear energy policy is the “Pluthermal Program,” the program to utilize MOX fuel (fuel consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides) in light water reactors. Although Japanese electric utilities announced in 1997 that they would start using MOX fuels in 16 to 18 light water reactors by 2010, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan announced on June 12, 2009, that many of the electric power companies will have to postpone the program by up to five years, mainly because discussions are still under way with the local governments and citizens.90 However, Japan has maintained a basic policy of promoting nuclear fuel cycle activities for “the reprocessing of spent fuel and effective utilization of recovered plutonium and uranium improve such characteristic of nuclear power generation as excellent supply stability,” and enhance the energy security of Japan, which is poorly endowed with energy resources.†††

††† White Paper on Nuclear Energy 2007 (Summary), p.15. According the 2008 edition of Japan's White Paper on Energy, as of 2006, Japan imported 99.6 percent of its oil consumption, 96.4 percent of natural gas consumption, 74 percent of LP gas consumption, and "almost all (more than 99%) of coal consumption. Energy Hakusho 2008 (White Paper on Energy 2008) (Tokyo: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2008), pages 137, 138, 140, and 141. Japan also imports all of the uranium necessary for its nuclear power plants.

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Being the only non-nuclear weapons state that implements a full, closed nuclear fuel cycle, Japan has achieved a high level of nuclear technology. Technologically, Japan would be capable of developing nuclear weapons if it invested considerable money, resources, and time. The Japanese government, however, has carefully limited Japan’s nuclear activities within the realm of peaceful uses, while setting the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. On November 30, 2006, at a session of the Committee on Security of the House of Representatives, Foreign Minister Taro Aso described this situation by saying. “…it is certain that we [i.e., Japan] have technologies to produce them [i.e., nuclear weapons]. However, we have never said that we would use them to possess nuclear weapons immediately.”‡‡‡ Japan has taken various specific measures to guarantee that its nuclear program would not be diverted from peaceful purposes. As noted, Japan has concluded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, it has developed domestic safeguards systems. Since 1994, Japan disclosed specific figures for the quantities of plutonium in its stocks to further promote the transparency of its nuclear fuel recycling program. In recent years, Japan has established the means for the implementation of large-scale safeguards activities at the new Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in cooperation with the IAEA. Japan has also introduced various proliferation resistant technologies in its nuclear activities. For instance, for reprocessing spent fuel from light water reactors, Japan developed a technology called “PU-U co-conversion,” which eliminates the need to handle pure plutonium oxide powder. This technology has also been used in the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.91 Japan has intentionally avoided possessing weapons-grade plutonium. Nearly all the plutonium stockpile in Japan consists of reactor-grade plutonium. It may be possible to produce small-scale nuclear “bombs” with reactor-grade plutonium. However, as Professor Tetsuo Sawada, an expert on nuclear engineering and nuclear nonproliferation at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, points out, producing bombs with reactor-grade plutonium involves an extremely dangerous process technologically, and such bombs should be too unstable and too unreliable militarily to be deployed as actual warheads.92 In fact, no country has ever tried to produce nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium. Were Japan to decide to develop its own nuclear weapons, it would surely choose to do so with weapons-grade plutonium, because it would be much easier, safer, and cheaper. However, the amount of weapons-grade plutonium that Japan could obtain by running existing nuclear power plants would be limited. For a major power like Japan, possessing only a small number of nuclear warheads would be militarily meaningless.93 In order to obtain a militarily-meaningful nuclear arsenal, Japan must produce hundreds of warheads. In order to do so, however, Japan would have to spend many years to construct new facilities to extract a large amount of weapons-grade plutonium from its existing stocks.94

‡‡‡ "Dai-165-kai Kokkai, Shuugi-in, Anzenhoshou-Iinkaigi-roku, Dai-11-gou (The 165th Session of the Diet, the House of Representatives, Security Committee, Proceedings, No.11)" (November 30, 2006), page 16.

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As for uranium, despite having the technological capability to produce weapon-grade, highly-enriched uranium, Japan has refrained from generating such materials. In the past, Japan purchased a limited amounted of highly-enriched uranium from the United States and retained it for use in peaceful research reactors. Since 1996, however, Japan has agreed to return that highly-enriched uranium to the US in order to remove the risks of proliferation to third countries and terrorists, and by the summer of 2008, 579.7 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium, which represented “almost all of highly enriched material in Japan’s principle research reactors,” was actually transferred to nuclear research facilities in the United States.95 According to Andrew Beineawski, an official of the US Department of Energy, the repatriation operation was initiated by the US as part of a counter-proliferation project called the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Beiniawski said, “Japanese research reactors have been very successful in shipping their spent HEU fuel to the United States. These shipments contribute to HEU minimization efforts worldwide.” The remaining ten-odds kilograms of highly-enriched uranium still in Japan is scheduled to be returned to the United States by 2012.96 As Ambassador Yukiya Amano, newly-elected Director General of the IAEA, maintained, the Japanese government judged by the end of 1970s that “using highly enriched uranium is a matter of concern from the security point of view, is not a necessity, and is not helpful to ensure the confidence of the international community, as far as Japan is concerned,” and “decided and has been reducing the enrichment level” since then.97 Japan’s attitude toward highly-enriched uranium demonstrates that Japan has not entertained any idea of diverting such materials for weapon purposes. In their detailed study published in 2003 on Japan’s nuclear energy program and its implications for Japan’s potential nuclearization, Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self concluded that “Japan’s nuclear energy program would not support the development of a nuclear arsenal.”98 In fact, on June 14, 2004, Director-General of the IEAE Mohamed El Baradei officially announced at the organization’s board of governors meeting that a four-year investigation of nuclear power use had revealed that Japan’s nuclear program was limited to peaceful purposes, and there was no reason to suspect that it would be diverted to nuclear weaponry. This was the very first time that the IAEA had reached such a conclusion for a non-nuclear state that has promoted the use of nuclear energy on a significant scale. As a result, Japan has joined the group of countries to which “Integral Safeguards” are applied, requiring only half the previous number of inspections. Before they were granted to Japan, “Integral Safeguards” had been applied only to Australia, Norway, and Indonesia. These three countries, however, possessed only research reactors, so this was the very first time that they had been granted to a state which possesses numerous nuclear reactors for commercial purposes. The IAEA’s decision to give such exceptional treatment to Japan represents the Agency’s conviction that Japan has no intention of producing nuclear warheads. It is also noteworthy that Japan has intentionally refrained from developing key technologies that would permit it to obtain delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. For Japan, tactical nuclear weapons would

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be nearly useless, because, as an island country, it would find few meaningful targets for such weapons. In order to obtain a militarily-meaningful nuclear arsenal, Japan would have to possess ballistic missiles. Although the country has advanced rocket production and space-launch capabilities, it would take many years before the country would actually be able to deploy ballistic missiles for military purposes. Japan has developed the solid-fuel M-V rocket, which is capable of launching probes for interplanetary missions. However, the rocket which the Japanese government has positioned as its “primary large-scale launch vehicle” has been the H-II, not the M-V99. In fact, production of the M-V series was discontinued after the launch of M-V-7 in September 2006 for cost and other reasons.100 As the Federation of American Scientists simply put it, the H-II is “ENTIRELY unsuited for conversion to ballistic missile applications [emphasis in the original]” because it is powered by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.101 According to Thompson and Self, “Japan has invested heavily in rockets that would not make effective ballistic missiles.” They also note:

To the extent that technical consideration of military applicability entered into the engineering context . . . it seems that the civilian rocket programs at ISAS [the Institute for Space and Aeronautical Sciences] and NASDA [the National Space Development Agency] steered away from rather than toward, such capabilities. Military rocketry research at the Technology Research and Development Institute (TRDI), inside the Defense Agency, has been restricted to small rockets for tactical use, such as surface-to-air missiles.102

In addition, Japan has not developed an accurate inertial guidance system and reentry mechanisms that would be essential for ballistic missiles. Even if Japan acquired all the technologies to produce ballistic missiles, it would still face another technological obstacle to obtain a reliable nuclear deterrent. Due to its geographical narrowness, if Japan introduced long-range, land-based ballistic missiles, they would inevitably be vulnerable to a first strike. Japan would have to deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to have a credible second-strike capability, but that would require a considerable fleet of nuclear submarines to carry them. For that purpose, Japan would have to build naval nuclear reactors, as well as an extensive terrestrial or satellite communications grid to support their activities. Japan currently does not possess any nuclear-powered ships, due mainly to the accidental radiation leaks that accompanied its first nuclear-powered ship, “Mutsu,” off the coast of Aomori Prefecture during its experimental voyage in 1974, and the consequent deep public distrust of nuclear vessels. Japan also would have to conduct research on launching ballistic missiles from submarines. The time required for Japan to be able to acquire all these technologies would probably be measured in decades, not years. None of the necessary development programs have been ever started by Japan. In conclusion, Japan’s nuclear infrastructure has been oriented exclusively to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to guarantee that its nuclear program would not be diverted from

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peaceful purposes, Japan has taken various specific measures. Consequently, despite all its latent nuclear know-how and potential, Japan is not capable of acquiring a militarily significant nuclear arsenal in a short period of time. Because Japan is an open society and all of its nuclear power activities are subject to IAEA safeguards, it would be impossible for the country to start a project in secret to obtain all the necessary technologies described above and to build covertly a militarily-meaningful nuclear arsenal of its own. Moreover, there is very little support for nuclearization in Japan. Indeed, until the late 1990s, it was a near taboo in Japanese society and particularly for Japanese politicians to discuss even the hypothetical possibility of Japan obtaining nuclear weapons. Since the turn of the century, the prohibition against such discussions have gradually declined, due mainly to the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. On the one hand, there is an emerging, but still limited, group of people who believe that Japan should acquire its own nuclear deterrent to deal with North Korea. On the other hand, there is a growing number of the mainstream security thinkers who argue that the Japanese need to discuss the pros and cons of Japan’s acquisition of a weapons’ capability in order to gain a clearer understanding among themselves as to why their country chooses to maintain a non-nuclear policy, and to show such an understanding to the international community, as well.103 When North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promptly declared that Japan would maintain its non-nuclear policy:

… yesterday, in a telephone conversation with the US President Bush, President and I agreed that the alliance relationship between Japan and the United States will remain firm to the future, and that we will securely maintain deterrent power, and that such a relationship will keep standing firm. On the basis of these facts, with regard to an option for our nation to possess nuclear weapons, I, of course, do not have any intention to change our position that we do not have such an option at all to the future. I would like to state clearly that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles will not be changed at all.104

Some Japanese lawmakers, however, openly advocated discussing the rights and wrongs of nuclearization, and surprised outside observers. For example, on October 15, 2006, Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council Shoichi Nakagawa appeared on the “Sunday Project,” a nationally broadcast news and discussion program, and said that “discussion [about Japan’s nuclear acquisition] should be allowed,” because “it could be logical to argue that the existence of nuclear weapons would lower the probability of being attacked.”105 Two days later, at a session of the Committee on Security, the House of Representatives, Foreign Minister Taro Aso said that, “Rather than remaining ignorant [on the matter of Japan’s nuclear acquisition], one viable option is to choose not to possess such weapons after sufficient studies [about the matter].”106 On the next day, at a session of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House of Representatives, Aso made another remark on the issue. While repeatedly maintaining that there was no change in the policy of the

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Japanese government to maintain the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the foreign minister said that various discussions about Japan’s nuclear possession was important for Japan’s security:

…at the moment when the country next to us comes to possess [nuclear weapons], it is not good that we are not allowed to even discuss about it, that we are not allowed to even talk about it, and we are not allowed to do anything about it. As a way of thinking, it might be possible to say that even exchanges of various ideas should not be allowed. But as another way of thinking, doing various discussions [about Japan’s nuclear possession] is important. I belong to the latter way of thinking.107

On October 22, former Director General of the Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba, a well-know opponent to Japan’s nuclearization, also insisted that “discussion about nuclear possession should be done publicly.”108 These politicians did not advocate that Japan should go nuclear. In fact, results of surveys of Diet members’ opinions on this issue demonstrated overwhelming objection to Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In a survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun with the cooperation of Professor Ikuo Kabashima of the University of Tokyo from November to December 1998, Japanese legislators were “in almost total agreement across party lines” on the issue of Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons. Among 431 respondents (59 percent of all the Diet members), only 17 were “in favor” or “somewhat favor” of the idea.109 In another survey conducted jointly by the Asahi Shimbun and Professor Kabashima in 2003, which covered the House of Representatives, the more powerful chamber of the Diet, among 394 respondents (83 percent of the Lower House members), only one said that he or she was “somewhat receptive” to nuclear armament of Japan, while 36 said “neither yes nor no” and the remaining 357 said “no.” In their analysis of these results, the Asahi Shimubn and Professor Kabashima concluded that “although talking about Japan’s nuclearization has become topical in and out of Japan these days against the background of the nuclear development of North Korea, it is proper to say that the consensus ‘against nuclear possession [by Japan]’ has been formed across party lines in the House of Representatives.”110 Shoichi Nakagawa and some other politicians insisted that Japan should study and discuss the costs and benefits of going nuclear. A large segment of the Japanese lawmakers, however, seemed to be intolerant of such a discussion. According to the Asahi Shimbun, severe criticism immediately erupted from the ruling coalition over the remark by Shoichi Nakagawa. LDP leaders such as Director General of the Defense Agency Fumio Kyuma and former Secretary General of the LDP Koichi Kato said that such a statement might “send a wrong message” to the world. LDP’s Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa expressed openly his displeasure with Shoichi Nakagawa’s remark. Chairman of Policy Research Council of another member of the ruling coalition, the New Komei Party, Tetsuo Saito, also insisted that “even a discussion [on this topic] is not acceptable because it will invite

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international suspicion [against Japan].”111 Consequently, on October 16, the day after his appearance on the “Sunday Project,” Shoichi Nakagawa had to make a follow-up remark: “Of course, I am also against the argument that Japan should go nuclear.”112 On October 27, Prime Minister Abe declared that he would not let the government or the LDP discuss the issue, although personal discussion by politicians could not be suppressed.113 After the test of the Taepodong-II by Pyongyang on April 5, 2009, nuclear debate resurfaced among Japanese lawmakers. On the day of the launch, Shoichi Nakagawa said, “How to give damages to [North Korea’s] missile base, [and] how to counter nuclear delivery system [of North Korea] if it is completed. Our discussions may include a talk about nuclear weapons.114 On April 7, Lower house member and Chairman of the Party Organization Headquarters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Goji Sakamoto, also said that it should be OK for Japan to discuss nuclear possession, although he later explained that he “does not advocate Japan’s nuclear possession,” and “made a hypothetical remark to show the firm stance [of Japan] to North Korea.”115 On April 19, Nakagawa insisted again that the Japanese should discuss the nuclearization of their country, adding that “actual possession of nuclear weapons and discussion about nuclear weapons are totally separate issues.”116 Again, however, not many Japanese political leaders reacted favorably to such arguments. In a regular press conference on April 7, 2009, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura reacted to the earlier remark by Nakagawa and simply stated that “such an option is out of the question for Japan, who has maintained the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.” LDP’s Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda said on the same day that “no one believes that Japan can go nuclear.”117 In that evening, former Director General of the Defense Agency and former Vice President of the LDP Taku Yamasaki criticized Nakagawa by saying, “such is an argument that could, if you use an extreme expression, lead to the destruction of the human species.”118 Such attitudes of Japanese politicians reflect the state of public opinion in Japan with regard to nuclear options. Ambassador Tetsuo Kawato, a highly respected strategist and Visiting Professor at Waseda University, reported:

In the recent ado about North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, in Japan, discussion about acquisition of nuclear weapons has not gained momentum, to an inexplicable degree. My students say: “Such weapons are unnecessary. We think that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has not been torn yet, and Japan is in the NPT and has promised to the world not to go nuclear.” I basically agree with them. In the world, the idea that nuclear weapons are unusable and obsolete has been gradually spreading (except for terrorists)…119

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At the time this paper was written, no public opinion survey with regard to Japan’s nuclear option had been conducted after North Korea’s 2009 missile and nuclear tests. In the Mainichi Shimbun survey conducted from November 25 to 26, 2006, shortly after Pyongyang’s first nuclear test, 78 percent of the respondents were against Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, while 14 percent supported the idea. In the same poll, 69 percent of the respondents said that discussion of the issue was OK (61 percent of the respondents said that Japan should not go nuclear but discussion should be allowed).120 In a survey conducted by the Fuji TV’s news program “Shin-Houdou 2001” on April 2, 2009, 73 percent of the respondents were against Japan’s nuclearization, while 19 percent were for the idea.121 These results were identical to the results of earlier polls. In polls conducted in June 1969, April 1978, and April 1981, the Yomiuri Shinbun posed the same question: “Do you want Japan to possess nuclear weapons?” In the 1969 poll, 72 percent of respondents answered “no,” while 16 percent answered “yes.” In 1978, the percentage of those who answered “no” rose to 74 percent, whereas the percentage of those who answered “yes” dropped to 10 percent. In 1981, the percentage of those who answered “yes” remained at 10 percent, but the percentage of those who replied “no” leapt to 82 percent.122 Another poll conducted by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in October 1999, which targeted 2,000 members of the Japanese public, as well as 400 “informed Japanese people,” produced an even more striking outcome. Asked what policy option Japan should adopt to protect itself from other nations’ nuclear weapons if the US-Japanese Security Treaty were dissolved or rendered meaningless for some reason, only seven percent of the general public and less than fifteen percent of “informed people” responded that they believed that Japan should possess its own nuclear weapons.123 Taken together, these results show the consistency and persistency of public attitudes in Japan against nuclearization, a result which rests on two major factors: strong anti-nuclear sentiment and sober cost-benefit calculations. To put it in other words, Japan is not willing, nor interested in becoming a nuclear power.124 Shared Aversion to Nuclear Weapons The Japanese share a deep-seated aversion to nuclear arms, a feeling that transcends differences in political ideology and beliefs. An almost instinctive dread of, and hatred for, nuclear weapons widely held across the spectrum of Japanese society is both one of the most fundamental roots of Japan’s non-nuclear stance and an extremely powerful deterrent against Japanese nuclear proliferation. The origin of such strong anti-nuclear attitudes lies in Japan’s tragic experience as the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack. The two bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 killed about 140,000 in Hiroshima and about 70,000 in Nagasaki. In the years that followed, tens of thousands more died from so-called atomic bomb disease—various illnesses caused by exposure to radiation. Even today, many Japanese suffer the after-effects of this exposure. Naturally, Hiroshima and Nagasaki have greatly influenced post-war Japanese culture. Over the past half-century, countless books, nursery tales, television and radio programs, movies, comic books, animated features and other forms

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of communication about the bombs have exposed later generations to the horrors of nuclear war.§§§ Another factor often overlooked by outsiders, but no less important in shaping Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment than Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was the harm done to Japanese fishermen by US nuclear testing in the South Pacific in March 1954. The radioactive fallout from the first US hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll severely contaminated the Fukuryu-maru No. 5, a Japanese tuna-fishing boat known as the Lucky Dragon outside Japan, and its crew of 23, even though the boat was located 35 kilometers from the danger zone declared by the United States at the time of the explosion. The entire crew suffered from atomic bomb disease; one crew member died, and the rest were hospitalized for more than a year. The Japanese were both horrified and outraged to see that their compatriots were victims of nuclear weapons yet again, particularly because the tragedy occurred in peacetime.125 The Fukuryu-maru incident left a deep and lasting impression among the Japanese population that one could become a victim of nuclear weapons anywhere or anytime. Shortly afterward, the first nation-wide grassroots movement against nuclear weapons sprang up in Japan and, by the end of 1954, more than 20 million Japanese had signed the Suginami Appeal for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.126 In April 1954, both houses of Japan’s Diet unanimously passed resolutions that called for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear energy. Japan’s non-nuclear policy has consistently reflected this profound hatred for nuclear weapons, which has been deeply embedded in post-war Japanese culture and society. Costs and Benefits of Nuclearization As vigorous and ingrained as anti-nuclear sentiment may be, it is not the sole factor behind Japan’s non-nuclear stance. Japan’s decision to remain non-nuclear is also based on its national interests. In Japan, sober perceptions of the costs and benefits of going nuclear have been widely shared. First, it is generally understood that Japan’s decision to go nuclear would surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a resource-poor country, friendly international relations are Japan’s only hope to maintain its security and prosperity. According the 2008 edition of Japan’s White Paper on Energy, as of 2005,

§§§ Many Japanese often feel that people in other countries, particularly those in nuclear weapon states, do not have sufficient understanding of nuclear devastation. For instance, in his recent address on Japan's approach to global nuclear disarmament, Japan's Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said: “In one scene of a blockbuster movie released last year [i.e., Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull], the hero survived a nuclear blast by hiding inside a refrigerator. I was surprised at the soft image about nuclear blasts that was indicated by this scene. A nuclear blast would destroy everything in an instant. I was worried that such a naive perception could spread worldwide.” “Conditions towards Zero—‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament,’” Statement by Mr. Hirofumi Nakasone, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html (accessed on June 1, 2009). See also “Japan FM says Indiana Jones Trivializes Nuke,” FOX 40 News (by AFP) (April 28, 2009), http://www.fox40now.com/news/entertainment/43850047.html (accessed on May 3, 2009).

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Japan’s energy self-sufficiency rate was only 4 percent (18 percent when nuclear power is included).127 In fiscal year 2006, Japan was self-sufficient for only 39 percent of its calories, which was the lowest among major industrialized countries. In fact, Japan is the world’s largest food importing country.128 As an island nation, Japan depends on sea-lanes for imports and exports. Thus, the Japanese are not merely speaking rhetorically when they say that peace and stability of the international community is indispensable to achieve peace and prosperity for Japan, that world and regional peace are inseparable from the country’s security and prosperity, or that Japan cannot promote its national interests without peace and stability of the international community, as the government’s Diplomatic Bluebooks recently emphasized.129 Since the end of World War II, Japan has used every opportunity to show the international community and especially its East Asian neighbors that it has been reborn as a “heiwa kokka (nation of peace).” Japan’s post-war, exclusively defense-oriented policy has played a particularly large role in restoring the trust of other East Asian countries by providing clear evidence of Japan’s resolve not to become militaristic again. In abiding by this policy, Japan has voluntarily limited the resources and missions of its SDFs to the minimum necessary to maintain national self-defense. It has refrained from acquiring offensive weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers, and has imposed strict conditions on when and how the SDFs can mobilize lawfully. Were Japan to go nuclear, almost sixty years of abiding by such conditions would immediately go up in smoke. Japan’s defense authorities soberly recognize this reality. The final report of an unofficial study conducted from 1994 to 1995 by Defense Agency officials and SDFs officers at the behest of Administrative Vice-Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama maintained that even under the worst case scenarios, i.e. a breakdown of the US-Japan alliance, a collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and/or the drift of other countries toward nuclearization, possession of its own nuclear arsenal would not be beneficial for Japan:

Even in these cases, it must be questioned to what degree it could be meaningful for the trading country [i.e., Japan] which depends on the stability of the international society to possess its own nuclear weapons in order to secure its survival and to protect its interests.130

The report also insisted that “the Japanese military side” should express their position not to support any nuclear option because “from the perspective of security policy of our country, suspicions about [Japan’s] nuclear possession will be detrimental to trust building with the neighboring countries.”131 According to the author’s conversations with anonymous high-ranking officials of the SDFs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such views are still widely shared among Japan’s military leaders as well as its foreign and defense policy elites.

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Second, contrary to what most foreign observers as well as those who advocate Japan’s nuclearization believe, going nuclear would actually threaten Japan’s military security. A decision to build a nuclear arsenal might trigger an arms race in Northeast Asia, possibly prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to accelerate their nuclear development or go nuclear as well, ultimately reducing regional and global security. Japan’s defense authorities soberly recognize this reality, too. The above-mentioned report prepared by Defense Agency officials and SDFs officers in 1995 concluded that Japan’s possession of its own nuclear arsenal had little if any strategic merit.132 In a 1996 presentation, Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi of the Japanese Ground SDF (reportedly a participant in the 1994-95 study group) asserted that even without the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, Japan would be worse off with its own nuclear arsenal.133 He emphasized that, as an island country with a large part of its population living in a small number of densely populated cities, nuclear armament would not suit Japan because of its inherent vulnerability to nuclear attack. As a result, Japan is better off in a world in which just a few states possess nuclear weapons capability. Consequently, going nuclear would only endanger Japan because such a move would motivate numerous other currently non-nuclear states to pursue proliferation, while bringing only minimal military benefits to Japan. In 2003, Shinichi Ogawa, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies and also reportedly another participant in the 1994-95 study group, argued in The National Institute for Defense Studies News that, “the political and security repercussions of Japanese nuclear weapon development would be very negative.” According to Ogawa,

[M]ost worrisome would the reaction of Japan’s neighboring countries…Japanese nuclear weapon development, even if its intention were totally defensive, would be likely to invite caution and countermeasures from China, Russia, and South Korea even in its early stages. As a result, Japan might face a serious security problem before it succeeded in attaining the necessary SSBN/SLBM force…Japan’s nuclearization may invite a serious security threat well before a strategically meaningful nuclear force can be built and deployed.134

Third, Japan’s decision to develop nuclear weapons would inevitably have a detrimental effect on the country’s relationship with the United States—Japan’s most important bilateral relationship. It is clearly understood among the security and foreign policy community in Japan that most US political leaders, as well as its security and foreign policy elites, do not want to see Japan become a major military power, much less a nuclear power. The Japanese have observed that every major advance of North Korea’s nuclear and/or ballistic missile programs—in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2009—triggered, with disturbing regularity to their eyes, suspicion among American elites of Japan’s intention to go nuclear. The most recent statement to that effect came from Joseph S. Nye at a hearing by the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment.135 Nye, who is well-known in Japan, not only as an advocate of the concept of soft power but also as a key decision-maker on the US side when the US-Japan Alliance was

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“redefined” in the mid-1990s, testified that “North Korea’s detonation of a second nuclear device and launching of rockets over Japan has created anxieties that lead some observers to wonder whether Japan will reverse its long standing decision not to seek a national nuclear deterrent capability.”136 Fourth, contrary to the views of many foreign observers, the decision to go nuclear would only weaken Japan’s political power internationally. In fact, Japan has won the respect of other nations with its decision to forego nuclear weapons, despite its advanced nuclear technological capability. The phrase a “world free of nuclear weapons,” did not originate with President Obama. As the only country to have experienced the devastation caused by the use of atomic bombs, Japan has consistently made efforts “to take a leading role to bring about a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons as soon as possible [emphasis added].”137 Since 1994, Japan has submitted a resolution to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly every year, resolutions which have won the overwhelming support of the international community, despite objections from the United States since 2001.**** In July 2009, when Japanese Ambassador Yukiya Amano was elected to be the new Director-General of the IAEA, the Japanese media, almost in unison, stressed the significance that the leader of the “nuclear watchdog” would be from Japan, the only nation ever to suffer nuclear devastations.138 After his election, Amano himself said that “Japan can be called a model country that carries out both peaceful use of nuclear energy and nonproliferation. I’d like to put Japan’s experience in this area into good use for the world.139 In short, Japan has built considerable soft power as a promoter of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Nuclearization would only undermine Japan’s international position and the reputation it has built for itself thus far. As the second largest economic power in the world, Japan, unlike India, does not need to acquire nuclear weapons to assert its prestige in the world. JAPAN’S POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION American researchers, who conducted an extensive review of articles on Japan’s security policy published in Japan in recent years, as well as a series of interviews with Japanese political leaders, government and military officials, and security experts, reported that “prominent Japanese opinion-makers and experts revealed a near-consensus of opposition to

**** From 1994 to 1999, the resolution was called, “Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”; from 2000 to 2004, the resolution was titled, “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”; and from 2005 to 2008, the resolution was termed “Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.”

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the development of nuclear weapons.”140 The central reason for such attitudes among Japanese elites is the widely-shared understanding that going nuclear would bring more harm than good to the country. In fact, Japanese security experts who examined the pros and cons of Japan’s going nuclear in the past came to that conclusion almost unanimously. Consequently, most political leaders, as well as almost all of mainstream security thinkers in Japan, share the understanding that even in the face of growing nuclear threats in the region, acquiring nuclear weapons does not represent a sound strategy for Japan. It is widely believed that Japan, which has imposed various constraints on its own defense capabilities under article 9 of the constitution, as well as through the policy of an exclusively non-offensive defense (senshu bouei), can do a great deal in the realm of improving its conventional forces before thinking about nuclear weapons. In recent years, the importance of developing and deploying an effective missile defense system in cooperation with the United States has been emphasized in order to enhance deterrence by denial, and to mitigate the consequences of an attack if deterrence failed. For example, in his address given only two days after North Korea’s first nuclear detonation, the LDP’s Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa said, “For us, rather than to acquire nuclear weapons, it will be more beneficial realistically to concentrate Japan’s strategy and resources on building a missile defense system to neutralize nuclear missiles.”141 It is also believed that strengthening the alliance with the United States including the US extended nuclear deterrent over Japan should be sufficient to deter North Korea. Shinichi Ogawa represents the majority view among Japanese security experts on the latter point:

If there were any scenario in which US nuclear forces could not deter a North Korean nuclear strike against Japan, it would be North Korea’s “final blow”… Such a “final blow of a loser about to die” could not be deterred by any means, including American or Japanese nuclear weapons. Likewise, if it is held that US nuclear forces cannot deter North Korea because its leadership has a peculiar and irrational way of thinking, then Japanese nuclear forces cannot either.142

Based on such perceptions, the author predicted in 2002 that “[e]ven an acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear program would not likely cause Japan to follow suit.”143 The prediction stands today, even after the two nuclear tests by North Korea. As demonstrated above, Japan has many reasons to remain non-nuclear. The strategic implication of the nuclearization of North Korea in the narrow military sense is limited. North Korea is a weak country in almost all indicators of national power. The economy of North Korea has been in a miserable condition for years. Its people have suffered from food and energy shortages during that period, and their average life expectancy has declined significantly. Even militarily, North Korea is weak. American military and security experts have been quite confident that, if the North attacked the South, the US-ROK alliance would easily defeat the North in several weeks or shorter. Pyongyang’s nuclear detonations have not given North Korea any real military strength. Given the credible US nuclear deterrent,

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Pyongyang’s nuclear bombs will remain weapons that cannot be used unless the North Korean government is willing to commit suicide. Here, however, one caution is in order. It is incorrect and dangerous for the international community to take Japan’s non-nuclear stance for granted. Despite the extremely strong desire of Japan to remain non-nuclear, Japan would have to make new cost-benefit calculations when international developments force it to reevaluate important foreign and security policy decisions, as every nation does, and the decision with regard to nuclear weaponry is no exception. In other words, Japan’s current decision to remain non-nuclear would not be continued automatically, but would be affected by the international environment. From this point of view, two areas deserve special attention. First, the political implications of Japan going nuclear (and remaining non-nuclear) should be seriously reconsidered by the international community. Non-nuclear major powers, like Japan, should not be regarded as politically inferior to nuclear-armed major powers, and, for example, excluded indefinitely from having a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There has been frustration among the Japanese that countries like China and Russia do not treat Japan as an equal politically because Japan has refrained from possessing a full-fledged military and developing a nuclear arsenal. Such frustration, if left neglected, could lead to an overestimation by Japanese leaders of the benefits of going nuclear. Second, if the international community does not respond strongly to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries other than Japan, it could also have an undesirable effect on Japanese perceptions of the cost-benefit equation of becoming a nuclear weapons state. Up to the present, such a calculation by Japan has been based on the assumption that any country which develops nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear norm shared by the international community would face tough reactions by the international community. In 1998, the Japanese were shocked and disappointed to see that only a very few countries, including Japan, undertook tough and substantial sanctions against India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests. In 2006, international reaction to North Korea’s first nuclear test served to deepen the frustration of the Japanese. In their eyes, the reaction from China and the United States was particularly indecisive. Although the Japanese welcomed China’s vote for the UN Security Council Resolution 1718 to impose sanctions against North Korea, they were irritated by China’s repeated urge “to the countries concerned to adopt a prudent and responsible attitude in this regard and refrain from taking any provocative steps that may intensify the tension.”144 The typical Japanese reaction was, “If you want to preach that way, don’t do it to ‘the countries concerned’ (obviously including Japan), but to North Korea, with whom you have had special relationship for a long time.” The US reaction was even more disappointing than China’s from a Japanese viewpoint. Observing that Washington abandoned its opposition to bilateral talks with Pyongyang shortly after the nuclear detonation by North Korea, many in Japan wondered whether nuclearization would invite international punishment or international reward. After the

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United States and North Korea held talks on the normalization of their diplomatic relations in New York in March 2007, former Director General of the Defense Agency Kazuo Aichi expressed his regret at the US policy flip-flop by saying:

In short, North Korea, without doubt, has benefited from expressing clearly its possession of, or its willingness to possess, nuclear weapons. This means that the result completely opposite to what the United States desired has been brought about. That is to say, although the United States has accepted direct talks with North Korea due to fears of nuclear proliferation, it [i.e., the US acceptance of such talks] has actually made the world recognize how beneficial the acquisition of nuclear weapons could be. The consequence [of North Korea’s nuclearization] could lead to emergence of other countries who would attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. It is a truly ironic consequence. The United States should have demonstrated that anyone who tried to acquire nuclear weapons would be taught a lesson.145

The conclusion of the US-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was disturbing to the Japanese, too. Although the Japanese government accepted the deal, the Japanese people were generally upset because they perceived it as another case of the United States rewarding behavior that went against the international non-nuclear norm. While the United States tried to treat India as an exception to its nuclear non-proliferation policy, many in Japan saw that as unrealistic and worried that the conclusion of the agreement would set a precedent that going nuclear could pay. To convince the public that developing nuclear weapons will do more harm than good, mainstream security experts in Japan point to the expected harsh reaction from the international community as a central premise of their calculation. These experts, including this writer, have felt since North Korea’s first nuclear test that an increasing number of people have started to express at least some skepticism about such explanations. Although the vast majority of people in Japan remain anti-nuclear today, the results of the nuclear cost-benefit calculation are less obvious than it had been. Repeated failures by the international community to demonstrate firm resolve to stand united against nuclear proliferators could undermine Japan’s incentives to remain non-nuclear. For example, suppose Japan found itself in a situation in which all of its neighbors—North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan, in addition to China and Russia—had acquired significant nuclear arsenals, or in a situation in which there were twenty or thirty or even more nuclear weapon states. In either situation, no one could predict confidently that the Japanese would still find convincing reasons for their country to maintain a non-nuclear-weapons policy. From this standpoint, the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, placing tighter sanctions on North Korea following its second nuclear test, was an encouraging sign. Many in Japan, however, felt that it took too much time for China and Russia to reach agreement with Japan, the United States, South Korea, and other countries with regard to the contents of the

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sanctions, and that the sanctions themselves were not quite sufficient to teach Pyongyang a lesson. PROACTIVE BUT CONDITIONAL: JAPAN’S APPROACH TO MOVING TO ZERO On April 27, 2009, Japan’s Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone delivered a major address entitled “Conditions towards Zero—11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament” at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Forum in Tokyo.146 As he mentioned in the address, the Japanese have recently sensed “a momentum building toward nuclear disarmament for the first time in many years,” beginning with the article, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” published in The Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007 by the so-called “Gang of Four”—George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn.147 Japan, which has seen itself as the champion of nuclear disarmament and has proposed a resolution for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly every year since 1994, naturally welcomed this momentum, which was strengthened by the launching of the “Global Zero” movement in December 2008 and US President Obama’s speech in Prague on April 5, 2009. In fact, even before these latest developments, together with Australia, Japan had established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament co-chaired by Japan’s former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Australia’s former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in September 2008 with the aim of “reinvigorat[ing] international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”148 When the commission held its first meeting in Sydney in October 2008, the Japanese government issued a statement which expressed its hope that “the International Commission will be able to present a path toward a peaceful world free of nuclear weapons.”149 The address by Nakasone eloquently demonstrated the proactive attitude of the Japanese government to “take advantage of the growing momentum” toward global nuclear disarmament. Expressing his strong support of US President Obama’s commitment to taking realistic and concrete steps toward the realization of a peaceful, safe, nuclear-free world, Foreign Minister Nakasone proposed “eleven benchmarks” for promoting global nuclear disarmament, categorized under “three major pillars.”

Pillar I: nuclear disarmament by all states holding nuclear weapons;

Pillar II: disarmament and non-proliferation measure to be taken by the entire international community;

Pillar III: measures to support countries seeking to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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As part of the first pillar, all nuclear weapon states, including those countries that are not signatories of the NPT but actually possess nuclear weapons, would take “concrete measures to significantly reduce” their nuclear arsenals. Nakasone proposed five benchmarks as part of this pillar:

i) “Leadership of and cooperation between the United States and Russia,” including promotion of a comprehensive bilateral strategic dialogue to conclude a successor treaty to the START I Treaty;

ii) “Nuclear disarmament by China and the other states holding nuclear weapons,” with particular emphasis on the vital importance of reducing all nuclear arsenals;

iii) “Transparency over nuclear arsenal,” including “regular and sufficient information disclosure concerning their own nuclear arsenals,” by all nuclear weapons states;

iv) “Irreversible nuclear disarmament,” including dismantlement of nuclear warheads, nuclear testing sites, and facilities to produce fissile material for weapon purposes by all nuclear weapon states;

v) “Study on future verification,” to which Japan is ready to contribute by utilizing its own advanced science and technology.

As part of the second pillar, the entire international community would adopt and comply with “universal norms for disarmament and non-proliferation.” Nakasone proposed three benchmarks for this pillar:

a) “Ban on nuclear tests,” for which “Japan will work with China, India, Pakistan and other countries” whose ratifications are necessary for the CTBT to enter into force, to help gain their early ratification of the treaty, and would draw up, “a program to promote the early entry-into-force of the CTBT,” which is to “make demarches on early ratification” and to “contribute to the establishment of a global verification system.”

b) “Ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes,” including the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the declaration by all countries of a moratorium to freeze the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the conclusion of the treaty.

c) “Restrictions on ballistic missiles” for which “Japan supports the globalization of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and Russia, and the EU’s move to propose a treaty to ban short- and intermediate-range-ground-to-ground missiles.”

Finally, as part of the third pillar, peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear weapons states would be promoted, while ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and nuclear safety. Under this pillar, three more benchmarks were proposed by the Japanese Foreign Minister:

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a) “International cooperation for civil nuclear energy,” for which Japan has taken “an approach, called ‘3S,’ referring to safeguards, nuclear safety, and nuclear security.” Japan “intends to help countries in newly introducing nuclear power plants to do so in a way that ensures the 3S,” and “has been supporting human resource development and capacity building,” particularly in Asia.

b) “IAEA safeguards,” with regard to which Japan has been actively working towards universal acceptance of the NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Model Additional Protocol.

c) “Prevention of nuclear terrorism,” for which Japan welcomes President Obama’s proposal to make a new international efforts to strengthen the control of nuclear material and host a “Global Summit on Nuclear Security,” and will cooperate with the United States for this summit meeting to be held successfully.

Foreign Minister Nakasone also declared that Japan would “do its utmost” to accomplish the eleven benchmarks, and would host an international conference, tentatively entitled “The 2010 Nuclear Disarmament Conference” in early 2010 “to encourage concerted actions by the international community to promote global nuclear disarmament.” Nakasone concluded his address by saying:

As the Foreign Minister of the only country to experience the devastation of nuclear bombings, I would be most delighted if the outcome of this conference, together with the 11 benchmarks that I proposed, led to a successful conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and helped us take a great step toward nuclear disarmament.150

The Japanese government officially proposed the eleven benchmarks to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York in May 2009.151 The central purpose of Nakasone’s address was to educate and encourage the Japanese people to support him and his government in playing a leading role in promoting global nuclear disarmament and seeking a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as to demonstrate to the world Japan’s proactive stance on these issues. In the same address, however, the Foreign Minister also emphasized the importance of facing up to the reality of the international security environment when tackling nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In this portion of his speech, Nakasone particularly stressed the significance of US extended nuclear deterrence for the security of Japan:

When we advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is of course necessary to take into consideration the security environment that we face in reality. In light of the situation in East Asia that I mentioned earlier, it goes without saying that the extended deterrent including nuclear deterrence under the Japan-US security arrangements is of critical importance for Japan.152

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In fact, the logic of this argument by Nakasone is identical to the logic expressed by President Obama in Prague.

Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies [emphasis added].153

In his JIIA address, Japan’s foreign minister responded to this well-known phrase by declaring that Japan would maintain a stance that considered the US extended deterrent significant for its security, as long as nuclear weapons exist. “I believe that the world has now arrived at a stage where it should consider more specifically a realistic approach to nuclear disarmament whereby international stability will be preserved both in establishing the goal of the world free of nuclear weapons as well as in the process of attaining it,” said Nakasone.154 In the article explaining the eleven benchmarks, Nakasone expressed his belief that “there is no contradiction whatsoever between fulfilling the most important obligation [of the state] of national security and advocating nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation to all the countries in the world.”155 Many Japanese mainstream security thinkers seem to agree with Nakasone. For instance, in his keynote paper to a round-table discussion among security experts, entitled “Path to ‘Global Zero,” which appeared in the Asahi Shimbun, Associate Professor Toshihiro Nakayama of Tsuda College stated:

…“A world free of nuclear weapons” is “the world it ought to be.” However, the distance between “the world it ought to be” and the reality is so grave…The Japanese share a special sentiment toward nuclear issues. However, if we take the Obama initiative seriously, we have to talk not only about “the world it ought to be,” but also about a path to “the world it ought to be.” That is to say, we will have to talk and think about the global nuclear order which will stay around for some time yet.”156

Based on such thinking, Nakayama argued at the round table that if the Japanese are willing to take Global Zero as a realistic, not merely idealistic, issue, “it is indeed necessary to start our thinking from the ‘nuclear umbrella.’”157 Associate Professor of Keio University Ken Jimbo agreed with Nakayama by saying, “The understanding should be shared in Japan that [US] nuclear forces are ready today to respond to various developments, though the United States is reducing the roles of nuclear weapons. Such is the healthy situation, I think.”158 In another round-table discussion arranged by the monthly foreign policy journal Gaiko Forum, entitled “Between Disarmament and Security,” a political columnist of the Asahi

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Shimbun, Fumihiko Yoshida, emphasized the necessity to reassure Japan by a “redefinition” of extended nuclear deterrence into a new form that could be consistent with President Obama’s scenario of nuclear disarmament. The president of Japan Association of Disarmament Studies, Mitsuru Kurosawa, while welcoming the growing momentum toward nuclear disarmament, expressed his belief that extended nuclear deterrence will remain necessary as long as nuclear weapons exist. Director of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department of the Foreign Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Toshio Sano emphasized that Japan’s quest for nuclear disarmament will have to be compatible with Japan’s efforts for national security.159 Since the early Cold War period, Japan has long coexisted “peacefully” with its nuclear neighbors, Russia (Soviet Union) and China, without arming itself with nuclear weapons. This peaceful coexistence, however, has never meant that Japan had abandoned its efforts to protect itself from the nuclear weapons of these neighboring countries. Firmly maintaining its non-nuclear policy, Japan has maintained its security by the combination of a limited build-up of its own conventional forces (with various self-imposed restraints) and the security alliance with the United States, including the US nuclear umbrella. In light of North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, China’s growing nuclear and missile arsenals, and Russia’s remaining nuclear forces, non-nuclear Japan will have to promote its security by improving its conventional weapon capabilities, including missile defense capabilities, and strengthening the alliance with the United States, including reassurance from US that it continues to extend its nuclear umbrella over Japan. That is why a Japanese signatory to Global Zero, former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Ambassador Yukio Satoh, who believes that “[e]liminating the threat of nuclear weapons is critically important for the future of all humanity,”160 said that: The argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal ... was received with mixed reactions in Japan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As depending upon the US’ extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan’s only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.”161 Thus, Japan’s attitude toward Global Zero is identical to that of President Obama’s. First, both are highly proactive in promoting global nuclear disarmament, and are willing to take concrete measures for that purpose. Second, although both believe in the desirability of a world free of nuclear weapons, both acknowledge the difficulty of realizing such a world. “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence,” said President Obama in his address in Prague.162 The Japanese government has often used the phrase “ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,” recognizing that it will take a long time to achieve elimination. Third, despite their proactive stance to promote the ideal of a nuclear-free world, both President Obama and Japan have

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made it clear that both have no intention of jeopardizing the security of their respective nations for the sake of global nuclear disarmament. President Obama’s initiative has been recognized by the world as “realistic” because he made it clear that the United States will maintain a credible basic and extended deterrent until all other nuclear weapon states follow his initiative to reduce and eventually eliminate the role of nuclear weapons. Japan has also followed a realistic policy with regard to nuclear disarmament. Strongly committed to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and to the maintenance of its own non-nuclear policy, Japan works hard to maintain the US guarantee to defend Japan, including its nuclear umbrella. The Japanese have learned the degree of patience and persistence required to inch toward the goal of global nuclear disarmament through their own experiences. A Japanese diplomat, who prefers to remain anonymous, said:

Japan has tried hard to promote nuclear disarmament. But how often Japan has had to be chagrined at not being listened to by nuclear weapons states, including the United States. Due to its non-nuclear status, and due to the reality of its reliance on the US nuclear umbrella, Japan has lacked an effective leverage to move nuclear weapons states. Now, because of the ‘Gang of Four,’ the Global Zero movement, and President Obama’s speech in Prague, nuclear weapons states have finally became somewhat serious about nuclear disarmament. I believe Japan can utilize this opportunity to get closer to the Japan’s long-cherished dream of nuclear abolition.163

Both houses of the Japanese Diet, which on May 26 and 27, 2009, respectively, adopted resolutions condemning North Korea’s second nuclear test and calling on the Japanese government to “take resolute measures, such as a strengthening of sanctions,” against Pyongyang, also adopted unanimously, on June 16 and 17, respectively, for the first time in the history of the Japanese Diet, another set of resolutions requesting the Japanese government strengthen its efforts toward the abolition of nuclear weapons.164 The contrast between these resolutions represents a clear manifestation of the nature of Japan’s realistic approach toward Global Zero.

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ENDNOTES 1 “Obama Daitouryou: Kaku-Haizetsu Enzetsu, Yuiitsu no Kaku-Shiyou-koku, 'Dougi-teki Sekinin’ ni Genkyuu

(President Obama: Address on Nuclear Abolition, Referred to ‘Moral Responsibility’ of the Only Nuclear Power to Have Used Nuclear Weapons),” Mainichi Shimbun (April 7, 2009).

2 Ibid. 3 “2009-nen 6-gatsu 10-ka Kisha Kaiken: Obamajority Campaign ni Tsuite (Press Conference [of Mayor], June 10,

2009: On Obamajority),” website of the City of Hiroshima, http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1244613195105/index.html (accessed on July 19, 2009).

4 Genshiryoku Iinkai Mail Magazine, No.31 (May 29, 2009). 5 “Kaku-Naki Sekai he (Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons),” Asahi Shimbun (May 20, 2009). 6 “‘Kaku-Naki Sekai’ ha Genjitsu-ron, Obama Bei-Seiken Tanjou ga Hakusha (‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’

Is Discussed Realistically, Spurred by the Inauguration of the Obama Administration in the US),” Kyodo-tsushin (Kyodo News) (January 19, 2009); https://contents.nifty.com/member/service/g-way/mmdb/aps/RXCN/main.jsp?ssid=20090626152809649acropolis02 (accessed on January 22, 2009).

7 Yukio Satoh, “Kaku-Gunshuku Jidai no Nippon no Anzen-hoshou: Kakudai-Yokushi no Shinnraisei Koujou ga

Kagi (Japan’s Security in the Era of Nuclear Disarmament: Enhancement of Credibility of Extended Deterrence Is the Key),” Gaiko Forum, Vol.22, No.8 (August 2009), p.47; Toshihiro Nakayama, “‘Arubeki Sekai’ made Tsuzuku ‘Kaku no Chitsujo’ Kangaeyo (Think about the ‘Nuclear Order’ That Will Last Unitil ‘the World It Ought to Be’ Is Realized),” submitted to the round-table discussion: “Path to 'Global Zero,” Asahi Shimbun, (July 17, 2009).

8 Satoh, “Kaku-Gunshuku Jidai no Nippon no Anzen-hoshou,” page 47. 9 For typical examples of this line of argument, see Fumihiko Yoshida, “Obama Daitouryou ga Tou Wareware no

'Honki' (President Obama Has Raised Questions about Our 'Seriousness'),” concluding remark to the round-table discussion: "Path to 'Global Zero,'" Asahi Shimbun (July 17, 2009); and Toshihiro Nakayama's remark in this round-table discussion.

10 "'Kaku-Naki Sekai' ha Genjitsu-ron." 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan Protests against North Korea’s Nuclear Test Announcement,” May 25, 2009,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2009/5/1192257_1134.html (accessed on May 26, 2009). 12 “Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan,” (May 25, 2009),

http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/asospeech/2009/05/25seimei_e.html (accessed on May 26, 2009). 13 “Lower House Condemns North's Nuke Test,” Asahi Shimbun (May 27, 2009),

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200905270006.html (accessed on May 30, 2009); “Upper House Adopts Resolution Condemning North Korean Nuclear Test,” Kyodo News on the Web (May 27, 2009), http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=441025 (accessed on May 30, 2009); “Kita-Chosen Kaku-Jikken Jisshi ni Taisuru Kougi Ketsugi (A Resolution to Protest against the Conduct of the Nuclear Test by North Korea)” House of Representatives website, http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/ketugi090526.html (accessed on June 15, 2009); “Kita-Chosen Kaku-Jikken Jisshi ni Taisuru Kougi Ketsugi (A Resolution to Protest against the Conduct of the Nuclear Test by North Korea)” House of Councilors website, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/ugoki/h21/090527-3.html (accessed on June 15, 2009).

14 “Statement of the ASEM 9th Foreign Ministers Meeting on the Nuclear Test Conducted by the DPRK on May 25,

2009,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/asem9/state0905.html (accessed on June 19, 2009). 15 “Aso Shushou no Ichinichi: 5-gatu 25-nichi (How Prime Minister Aso Spent the Day: May 25),” Yomiuri Shimbun

(May 26, 2009); “Kita-Chosen Kaku-Jikken: Seifu ga Kougi, Kokuren Anpori ni Seisai-Ketsugi wo Motomeru (North Korea's Nuclear Test: The Government Made a Protest, Requested UNSC a Sanctions Resolution),”

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Mainichi Jp (May 25, 2009), http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20090526k0000m010122000c.html (accessed on May 26, 2009).

16 “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions,” SC/9679, June 12, 2009; “Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/RES/1874 (2009), June 12, 2009.

17 “Waga-Kuni no Tai-Kita-Chosen Sochi ni tsuite (Kanbo-Chokan Danwa) (On Measures Taken against North

Korea by Our Country [Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary])” (June 16, 2009), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyokan/aso/2009/0616happyou.html (accessed on June 22, 2009).

18 “National Defense Program Outline, FY2005-” [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html]. 19 The Project Team on North Korea of the DPJ, “Kita-Chosen Mondai ni Kan-suru Genjou no Kangae-kata (How

the DPJ Currently Views the North Korea Problems)” (February 26, 2003). 20 “Daijin Kaiken Gaiyou (The Outline of the Minister’s Interview)” (May 26, 2009, 8:48 to 8:53AM), Ministry of

Defense Website, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/kisha/2009/05/26.html (accessed on June 6, 2009). 21 Kyodo-tsushin (Kyodo News), September 17, 2006, https://contents.nifty.com/member/service/g-

way/mmdb/aps/RXCN/main.jsp?ssid=20090701071740717acropolis04 (accessed on June 7, 2009). 22 “Kita no Kyoui "Tsuyomaru” 81%, Seisai “Shiji” 90%, Kaku-Jikken uke: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha Yoron-Chousa

(81% Say Threat of the North "Has Become Stronger, 90% “Support” Sanction, in Response to Nuclear Test: Yomiuri Shimbun Co. Public Opinion Survey)," Yomiuri Shimbun,(October 17, 2006).

23 “Kita-Chosen Kaku-Jikken, ‘Taiwa’ yori “Seisai”62%: Asahi Shimbun-sha Yoron Chousa (“On North Korea’s

Nuclear Test, 62% Says ‘Sanctions’ rather than ‘Dialogue’: Asahi Shimbun Co. Public Opinion Survey),” Asahi Shimbun (October 11, 2006).

24 “Kita-Chosen heno Dokuji-Seisai, ‘Kyouka-subeki’ ga 65%: NHK Yoron-Chousa (65% Say Unilateral Sanctions

against North Korea Should be Strengthened: Public Opinion Survey by NHK),” NHK News, https://contents.nifty.com/member/service/g-way/mmdb/aps/RXCN/main.jsp?ssid=20090701070313040acropolis04 (accessed on June 16, 2009).

25 “Tai-Kita-Chosen Seisai “Tsuyomeru bekida” 88%: Yomiruri Shimbun-sha Yoron Chousa” (88% Say Sanctions

against North Korea “Should Be Strengthened: Yomiuri Shimbun Co. Public Opinion Survey), Yomiuri Shimbun, June 8, 2009.

26 “North Korean Launch Draws Japan's Anger,” Asahi Shimbun (April 6, 2009),

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200904060008.html (accessed on April 6, 2009). 27 The numbers are based on the data preserved at the “Shinbun Zasshi Kiji Oudan Kensaku (Cross-Searchable

Database of Newspaper and Magazine Articles),” a database service powered by the G-Search Limited and provided by the Nifty Corporation at http://www.nifty.com/RXCN/ (accessed on June 30, 2009).

28 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test,”

Arms Control Today (June 2007), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory (accessed on February 18, 2009).

29 "Mitsubishi Sougou Kenkyu-jo, Dai-3-kai Shimin no Risk Chousa wo Jisshi (The Mitsubishi Research Institute

Conducted the 3rd Survey on Public Consciousness on Risks), on the website of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc., http://www.mri.co.jp/NEWS/press/2009/2010059_1435.html (accessed on July 12, 2009); The Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc., “The 3rd Survey on Public Consciousness on Risks: Data” (July 10, 2009), http://www.mri.co.jp/NEWS/press/2009/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2009/07/08/pr090710_ssu00.pdf (accessed on July 12, 2009); “Ichiban Kowai News, Shingata-infuru: Kotoshi Zenhan (The Most Frightening News Was the New Type Influenza: In the First Half of This Year)," Yomiuri Shimbun, evening edition, (July 11, 2009). Sixteen percent and nearly ten percent of the respondents, respectively, chose “the new type influenza” as the second and the third most frightening developments, while 20 percent and nearly 12 percent chose “the missile shooting and

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the nuclear tests by North Korea” as the second and the third. In total, 57 percent of the respondents chose the new type influenza, while 54 percent chose North Korea.

30 Yomiuri Shinbun, evening edition (October 2, 2002). 31 Yomiuri Shinbun, Western edition (October 3, 2002); Yomiuri Shinbun, evening edition (October 7, 2002). 32 Yomiuri Shinbun, evening edition (October 10, 2002). 33 Asahi Shinbun (October 7, 2003). 34 “KCNA Urges Japan to Behave with Discretion,” Korean News: News from Korean Central News Agency of the

DPRK, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed on April 15, 2003). 35 Matake Kamiya, "A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea," Arms Control Today, (May 2003). 36 The results of these polls were printed in Yomiuri Shimbun (December19, 1999 and December 18, 2008). 37 Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Japanese Assessments of China's Military Development,” Asian Perspective, Vol.31, No.3

(2007), page 188. 38 Defense of Japan 2000, (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2000), Ch.1, available online at

http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2000/honmon/frame/at1201030402.htm (accessed on April 9, 2009); “‘Nihon ha Chugoku no Misairu Shatei-nai’ Bouei Hakusho, Hatsu no Shiteki (‘Japan Is within the Range of China’s Missiles’: Defense White Paper Points out for the First Time),” Asahi Shimbun (July 2, 2000); “The Defense Agency Warns That North Korea Continues to Pose a Threat,” Asahi Evening News (July 28, 2000).

39 Defense of Japan 2008, (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2008), page 51, available online at

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2008.html (accessed on April 9, 2009). 40 Ibid., page 49. 41 National Defense Program Outline, FY2005-. Op.cit.

42 “Japan's Defense Budget to Fall for 7th Straight Year,” Kyodo World News Service (December 20, 2008). 43 Hisayoshi Ina, “Bei Iradataseru ‘Koizumi Gunshuku’ (‘Koizumi Disarmament’ Has Irritated the United States),”

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) (August 31, 2008). 44 Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, “Address to The Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan: 'The Price of Security

in a Changing World” (May 20, 2008), Tokyo, Japan, http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20080520-72.html (accessed on June 19, 2009).

45 “Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” Washington, DC

(February 19, 2005), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html (accessed on June 19, 2009).

46 Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan: Growth of China Seen Behind Shift,” Washington Post

(February 18, 2005), page A5; J. Sean Curtin, “The Dragon Roars over US-Japan Accord,” Asia Times Online (February 23, 2005), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GB23Dh01.html (accessed on June 20, 2009); and “US-Japan Statement on Taiwan Opposed,” China Daily (online), (February 20, 2005), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/20/content_417717.htm (accessed on June 20, 2009).

47 Faiola, op.cit. 48 “Taiwan ha Nichibei-Anpo no Taishou (Taiwan Is Included in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty),” Asahi Shimbun

(April 30, 2005). 49 Matsuda, “Japanese Assessments of China's Military Development,” op.cit., page 186.

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50 Seiji Maehara, “Minshu-tou no Mezasu Kokka-zou to Gaikou Bijon (DPJ's Vison of Japan and Japanese

Diplomacy),” the transcript of an address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 9, 2005, http://www.maehara21.com/kiji/kiji051209.html (accessed on December 15, 2009).

51 “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso” (December 22, 2005),

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2005/12/1222.html (accessed on December 15, 2009). 52 Ibid. 53 “Beijing Hits Aso for Threat Rhetoric,” The Japan Times (online), (May 8, 2009),

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090508a5.html (accessed on May 12, 2009). 54 Daisuke Yamamoto, “G-8 Urges N. Korea to Abandon Nukes, Expresses Concern about Iran,” Kyodo News on the

Web (June 26, 2009), http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=446388 (accessed on June 26, 2009); “Nakasone-shi, Chugoku no Kaku-gunbi ni Kenen - G8 Gaishou Kaigou ga Kaimaku (Mr. Nakasone Expressed Concern with Chin's Nuclear Arsenal: G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Has Begun,” Jiji.com (June 26, 2009), http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20090626-00000043-jij-int (accessed on June 26, 2009); “Nakasone-Gaishou, Chugoku wo Nazashi-Hihan (Foreign Minister Nakasone Criticized China by Name),” Kyodo-tsushin (Kyodo News), http://news.nifty.com/cs/domestic/governmentdetail/kyodo-2009062601000352/1.htm (accessed on June 26, 2009).

55 Izumi and Furukawa, op.cit. 56 "Shuchou: Bouei Hakusho, Takamaru Chugoku no Kyoui Chokushi wo (Opinion: Defense White Paper - Face up

to the Growing Threat of China), Sankei Shimbun (September 6, 2008). 57 Yoshiko Sakurai, “Chugoku no Kyoui wo Mitsumeyo, Jieitai (Self-Defense Force, You Must Face up to China’s

Threat),” Shukan-Shincho (October 9, 2008), reproduced in Sakurai’s blog, http://yoshiko-sakurai.jp/index.php/2008/10/09 (accessed on January 6, 2009). See also the website of Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, http://en.jinf.jp/ (accessed on August 15, 2009).

58 Matake Kamiya, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain, eds.,

Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pages 246-248. 59 Junichi Abe, “Chugoku no Gunji-ryoku to Nippon no ODA (China's Military Power and Japan's ODA,)” Japan

Center for International Finance, ed., Chugoku Shintaiseika ni Okeru Shomondai: Tai-Chu-Shien no Arikata ni tuite (Various Problems under the New Leadership of China: On Japan's Assistance to China) (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Finance, 2004), page 67.

60 “A New Era Requires New Political Will: An Address by the Honorable Shinzo Abe, Former Prime Minister of

Japan,” proceedings prepared from a tape recording, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 17, 2009), page 7.

61 Defense of Japan 2008, op.cit., page 65. 62 Ibid., pages 1-4. 63 The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2009 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2009),

page 204. 64 "Secretary of Defense Robert Gates - Speech and Q&A Session with Students, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan

(November 9,2007)," http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20071109-73.html (accessed on December 15, 2008). 65 Kakusan Fusegeruka, “6 (Can the Proliferation Be Prevented?: Part 6),” Yomiuri Shimbun (online) (November 16,

2007). 66 “National Defense Program Outline, FY2005-” op. cit. 67 Ibid.

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68 The National Security Research Project of the Tokyo Foundation, “New Security Strategy of Japan: Multilayered

and Cooperative Security Strategy,” The Tokyo Foundation Policy Recommendations, The Tokyo Foundation (October 8, 2008), http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/New%20Security%20Strategy%20of%20Japan.pdf (accessed on February 4, 2009).

69 Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office, “Jieitai, Bouei-Mondai ni Kansuru Yoron-Chousa (Public Opinion Survey

on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues)” (January, 2009), http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-bouei/index.html (accessed on March 19, 2009).

70 “Kita no Kaku, Takamaru Kyoui (North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Increasing Threat,)” Yomiuri Shimbun (June

16, 2009). 71 Hiroshi Fuse, “Viewpoint: Nuclear Umbrella” (editorial), Mainichi Shimbun (June 23, 2009). 72 “Kaku ‘Mitsuyaku’ Rongi, Tou-bekiha Kaku-no-Kasa no Shinrai (Debate over the ‘Secret Agreement’ on Nuclear

Introduction: What Should Be Discussed Is the Credibility of Nuclear Umbrella),” Sankei Shimbun (July 3, 2009). In Japan, there has been a debate whether Japan and the United States reached a secret agreement with regard to port calls by US naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons to Japanese ports in negotiations in the late 1960s over the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

73 Schuyler Foerster, “Theoretical Foundations: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age,” Schuyler Foerster and Edward N.

Wright, eds., American Defense Policy, sixth edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), page 46.

74 Ibid. 75 The author’s argument along this line is quoted in the article written by Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa,

“Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), page 356.

76 Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, The Nuclear Revolution and the End of the Cold War: Forced Restraint

(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan in association with the Institute of Social Studies, 1992), page 193. 77 Shinichi Ogawa, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited,” The National Institute for Defense Studies News, No.64 (April

2003), page .3. 78 The results of the poll were printed in Yomiuri Shimbun (December 5, 2002). 79 The results of the poll were printed in Yomiuri Shimbun (December 18, 2008). 80 Ibid. 81 Sankei Shimbun (January 10, 2004); Yomiuri Shimbun, editorial (January 10, 2004). 82 Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 2004. 83 “Dai-23-kai Kokkai, Sangi-in, Shoukou-Iinkai-Kaigi-roku, Dai-5-gou (The 23th Session of the Diet, the House of

Councilors, Commerce and Industry Committee, Proceedings, No.5)” (December 15, 1955), page 8. See also, Akira Sakuragawa, “Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko (Japan's Disarmament Diplomacy)” Kokusai Seiji 80 (October 1985), page 64.

84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., page 65. 86 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy (Tentative Translation)” (October 11,

2005), page 4. 87 Ibid., page 7.

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88 The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF), Inc., “World’s Nuclear Generating Capacity Down about 1,800MW,

Waits to Grow”: JAIF Annual Report, World Nuclear Power Plants 2009, Atoms in Japan Focus (April 22, 2009), page 5.

89 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, White Paper on Nuclear Energy 2007 (Summary) (March 2008), page.9. 90 "Power Firms Delay Start of MOX Fuel up to 5 yrs," The Daily Yomiur, (June 13, 2009). 91 “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy (Tentative Translation),” op.cit.. page 7. In this method, the plutonium

extracted in the form of nitric acid solution [PuNH] is mixed with solution of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate [UNH, UO2(NO3)2_6H2O] before denitration into powder form.

92 Tetsuo Sawada, “Plutonium Heiwa Riyou to Gunji Tenyou Mondai (Peaceful Use of Plutonium and the Issue of

Military Diversion),” Kaku-Fukakusan Taiou Kenkyu-kai (Study Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation), ed., Plutonium Heiwa Riyou to Kaku-Kakusan Mondai (Peaceful Use of Plutonium and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation) (Tokai-mura: Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, 2003), page 80.

93 This line of argument was first made by the author in Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming

Soon,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.1 (Winter 2002-2003), page 70. 94 Interview with Ryukichi Imai, April 25, 1995. 95 “Bei, Kaku-Heiki 20-patsu-bun Hanshutu, Kou-noushuku Uran 580-kilo (The United States Has Carried out 580

Kilograms of Highly-Enriched Uranium, Sufficient to Make 20 Nuclear Weapons),” Kyodo-tsushin (Kyodo News) (December 27, 2008); “Kou-noushuku Uran: Nippon no Kenkyu-you Genshiro kara Bei he 580-kilo (Highly Enriched Uranium: 580 Kilograms from Japanese Research Reactors to the United States),” Mainichi Shimbun (December 28, 2008); “Bei, Nippon kara Kou-noushuku Uran 580-kilo Hanshutsu (The United States Has Carried out 580 Kilograms of Highly-Enriched Uranium from Japan),” Sankei Shimbun (December 28, 2008); “Japan Sent Uranium to the United States,” The Japan Times (December 28, 2008). The quotation is from the articles in Mainichi Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun.

96 “Bei, Kaku-Heiki 20-patsu-bun Hanshutu. ” Kyodo-tsuhin. 97 Yukiya Amano, “Reducing the Enrichment Level of Uranium Fuel (Japan’s Experience),” paper presented at the

international symposium on “Minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in the Civilian Nuclear Sector,” Nobel Peace Center, Oslo (June 19, 2006), page 3.

98 Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced

Technology: Japan’s Prospects for Nuclear Breakout,” Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, eds., Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), page 148.

99 “H-IIA Launch Vehicle,” in the website of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA),

http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/index_e.html (accessed on January 6, 2009). 100 “M-V Satellite Launch Vehicles,” in the website of the JAXA,

http://www.isas.jaxa.jp/e/enterp/rockets/vehicles/m-v/index.shtml (accessed on January 6, 2009). 101 “Missile Program,” in the website of the Federation of American Scientists,

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/missile/index.html (accessed on January 6, 2009). 102 Thompson and Self, op.cit., page 173. 103 As a typical example, see Takashi Kawakami, “‘Fuuin’ Sareta Nihon-Kakubuso-ron wo Tokihanate (Liberate

“Sealed” Discussions on Japan’s Nuclearization)”, Sekai Shuho (January 16, 2007). 104 “Dai-165-kai Kokkai, Shuugi-in, Anzenhosho-Iinkaigi-roku, Dai-4-gou (The 165th Session of the Diet, the House

of Representatives, Budget Committee, Proceedings, No.4)” (October 9, 2006), page 5. 105 “Jimin Seichou-Kaichou ‘Kaku-Hoyuu no Giron Hitsuyou,' Shushou ha San-Gensoku Kyouchou (Chairman of

LDP'S Policy Research Council Says 'Discussion on Nuclear Posession Necessary,’ Prime Minister Emphasizes

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the Three Principles),” Asahi.com (October 15, 2006), http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1015/002.html (accessed on October 19, 2006).

106 “Dai-165-kai Kokkai, Shuugi-in, Anzenhosho-Iinkagi-roku, Dai-1-gou (The 165th Session of the Diet, the House

of Representatives, Security Committee, Proceedings, No.1)” (October 17, 2006), page 24. 107 “Dai-165-kai Kokkai, Shuugi-in, Gaimu-Iinkaigi-roku, Dai-1-gou (The 165th Session of the Diet, the House of

Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Proceedings, No.1)” (October 18, 2006), page 21. 108 Shigeru Ishiba, “Discussion about Nuclear Possession Should Be Done Publicly,” Nihonkai Shimbun (October 22,

2006). 109 Ikuo Kabashima, “A Nuclear Japan?” Japan Echo, Vol.30, No.4 (August 2003),

http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2003/300411.html (accessed on December 21, 2008); Yomiuri Shimbun (December 25, 1998).

110 Asahi Shimbun (August 27, 2003). 111 “Nakagawa Seichou-Kaichou ‘Kaku-Hoyuu no Giron Atteii’ Hatsugen, Hikeshi ni (Soothing the Impact of

Chairman of Policy Research Council Nakagawa's Remark that ‘Discussion about Nuclear Possession Should Be Allowed’),” Asahi.com (October 16, 2006), http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1016/019.html (accessed on October 19, 2006).

112 “Kaku-Hoyuu Meguru Hatsugen, Nakagawa Seichou-Kaichou ga Shakumei (Chairman of Policy Research

Council Offered Clarification on His Remark on Nuclear Posession),” Asahi.com (October 16, 2006), http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1016/006.html (accessed on October 19, 2006).

113 “Kaku Giron, Kojin Hyoumei ha Younin, Mondai no Shinkoku-ka Sakeru: Seifu, Jimin (Discussion on Nuclear

Issue, Personal Expressions [of opinions] Would Be OK, to Avoid the Problem from Becoming More Serious: Government and LDP),” Yomiuri Shimbun (October 29, 2006).

114 “‘Kaku no Giron Attemo-ii’: Nakagawa Zen-Zaimu-shou (‘Nuclear Discussion May Be Included,’ Said Ex-

Finance Minister Nakagawa),” Jiji.com (April 5, 2009), http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=200904/2009040500112, accessed on April 9, 2009.

115 “Jimin, Sakamoto-shi, ‘Nihon mo Kaku wo,’ Tou Yakuin Renraku-kai de Hatsugen (Sakamoto of the LDP Said at

Extraordinary Meeting of the Board or the Party: ‘Japan Should Also [Discuss] Nuclear [Possession],’” Asahi.com (April 8, 2009), http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0408/TKY200904080166.html (accessed on June 19, 2009); "Jimin, Sakamoto Soshiki Honbucho, 'Nihon mo Kakuhoyuu, Kokuren Dattai' (LDP Chairman of the Party Organization Headquarters Sakamoto: 'Japan's Nuclear Possession, Withdrawal from the UN')," Yomiuri Shimbun (online) (April 7, 2009), www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20090407-OYT1T01011.htm (accessed on July 4, 2009).

116 “‘Kaku ni Taikou Dekirunoha Kaku,’ Kita-chosen Jousei de Nakagawa Zen-Zaimu-shou (‘What Can Counter

Nuclear Are Nuclear,’ Said Ex-Finance Minister Nakagawa on the North Korea Issues), Kyodo-tsushin (Kyodo News) (April 19, 2009); “Nakagawa Floats Sobering Option: Going Nuclear,” Japan Times (April 20, 2009).

117 Jimin, Sakamoto-shi, “Nihon mo Kaku wo. ” op. cit. 118 “Nippon no Kaku-busou Jinrui Hametsu ni, Tai-Kita Reisei Taiou wo, Jimin, Yamasaki-shi (Japan’s

Nuclearization [Could Lead to] Destruction of Human Species, Cool-Headed Reaction to North Korea Is Needed, Said LDP's Yamasaki, ” Jiji.com (April 7, 2009), http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=200904/2009040700776 (accessed on April 11, 2009); “Jimin, Sakamoto Soshiki Honbucho, 'Nihon mo Kakuhoyuu, Kokuren Dattai”, op. cit.

119 Tetsuo Kawato, “Kaku-Busou ni Oikomareru Maeni Mada Yareru Koto (What Can Be Done Before Being

Forced to Go Nuclear),” at Tetsuo Kawato’s blog (June 8, 2009), http://www.tkfd.or.jp/blog/kawato/2009/06/post_117.html (accessed on June 12, 2009).

120 Mainichi Shimbun (November 27, 2006). 121 http://www.fujitv.co.jp/b_hp/shin2001/chousa/2008/090405.html (accessed on May 26, 2009).

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122 NHK Broadcasting Poll Research Institute, ed., Zusetsu Sengo Yoron-shi (Postwar opinion polls illustrated),

second edition (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1982), pages 170-71. 123 Japan’s Proactive Peace and Security Strategies, NIRA Research Report No. 20000005 (Tokyo: National

Institute for Research Advancement, 2001), page 270. 124 Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan,” op.cit., page 63. 125 For details of the Fukuryu-maru incident, see Kazuya Sakamoto, “Kaku-Heiki to Nichi-Bei Kankei: Bikini Jiken

no Gaiko Shori” (Nuclear weapons and the Japanese-U.S. relationship: The Diplomatic Settlement of the Bikini Incident), Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 16 (November 1994), pages 243–271; Shigemichi Hirota, Dai-go Fukuryu-maru (The Fukuryu-maru No. 5) (Tokyo: Shiraishi Shoten, 1989).

126 Sakamoto, “Kaku-Heiki to Nichi-Bei Kankei,” p. 251; Hiroshi Iwadare, Kaku-Heiki Haizetsu no Uneri (The surge

of movement to abolish nuclear weapons) (Tokyo: Rengo Shuppan, 1982), pages 11-13; Susumu Wada, Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki (Public opinion on peace issues in postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997), page 93.

127 Energy Hakusho 2008 (White Paper on Energy 2008), page 127; see also footnote 100. 128 Statistical Research and Training Institute, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistical Handbook

of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2008), page 62 and 64. 129 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko Seisho, 2005 (Diplomatic bluebook, 2005),

http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2005/index1.html (accessed on January 6, 2009); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko Seisho, 2002 (Diplomatic bluebook, 2002) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 2002) page 88.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko Seisho, 2009 (Diplomatic bluebook, 2009) (Tokyo: Jiji Gahou-sha, 2009) page 11.

130 “Tairyou Hakai Heiki no Kakusan Mondai ni Tuite (On the Issue of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction)” (May 29, 1995), page 27. Because of the unofficial nature of the study, this final report was not intended for publication and has not been available to the public. A portion of the contents of the report were leaked in, “Anpo Minaoshi: Nichibei Sessho no Uchimaku (Reviewing Japanese-U.S. Security Relations: The Inside Facts About the Bilateral Negotiations),” Shukan Toyo Keizai (December 2, 1995).

131“Tairyou Hakai Heiki no Kakusan Mondai ni Tuite,” op.cit., page 30. 132 Ibid., pages 24-29. 133 Noboru Yamaguchi, “Japan’s Nonnuclear Policy in a Post–Cold War Era: A Military Perspective,” paper

presented at the International Studies Association–Japan Association of International Relations Joint Convention, Makuhari, Japan (September 20–22, 1996).

134 Ogawa, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited,” op. cit., pages 4-5. 135 “Kita no Kyoui ha Shinkoku, Bei Gikai Kouchoukai deno Nihon Kaku-busou Rongi (Threat of North Korea Is

Serious: Discussion on Japan's Nuclear Acquisition at the Hearing of the U.S. Congress),” Sankei Shimbun (online), http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20090703-00000635-san-int, July3, 2009.

136 Testimony by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Hearing on Japan’s Changing Role,” House Foreign Affairs Committee

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment (June 25, 2009),page 1; http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/nye062509.pdf (accessed on June 28, 2009).

137 This phrase appeared in the preface by Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi to the first edition of Japan’s White

Paper on Disarmament in March 2003. Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Preface to the Publication of ‘Japan’s Disarmament Policy,’” Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Disarmament Policy (Tokyo: The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2003). Similar expressions repeatedly appeared in subsequent editions of the White Paper on Disarmament, published every two years since fiscal year 2002. The first edition was officially titled Japan's Disarmament Policy, and from the second edition, the title was changed to Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy.

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138 “Japan Brief, July 9, 2009” on the website of the Embassy of Japan in Austria gives a concise summary of

editorials in Japan's five major newspapers on Amano’s election. http://www.at.emb-japan.go.jp/English/japaninfo.htm (accessed on July 12, 2009).

139 Toru Tamakawa, “Amano Elected IAEA Chief,” Asahi.com (July 4, 2009), http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-

asahi/TKY200907040077.html (accessed on July 12, 2009). 140 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S.

Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, RL34487 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2009), page 7.

141 “Nakagawa Seichou-Kaichou ‘Kaku-Hoyuu no Giron Atteii’ Hatsugen, Hikeshi ni.” Op.cit. 142 Ogawa, “A Nuclear Japan Revisited,” page 2. 143 Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan,” op. cit., page 73. 144 For example, see “UN Imposes Sanctions on N.Korea for Nuclear Test,” China Daily.com.cn, (October 15,

20060, http://www.chinadaily.net/world/2006-10/15/content_708287.htm (accessed on January 20, 2009). 145 “Kaku-Hoyuu Koku ni Natta houga Toku nanoka ('Is It More Beneficial to Become a Nuclear Weapons State?'),”

Opinion Letter, No. 277 (March 22, 2007), in the Website of Kazuo Aichi, http://www.aichi-kazuo.net/004/ (accessed on June 27, 2009).

146 “Conditions towards Zero—‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament,’” Statement by Mr. Hirofumi

Nakasone, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html (accessed on June 1, 2009); "Zero heno Jouken—Sekai-teki Kaku-Gunshuku no tameno 11-no Shihyou (Conditions towards Zero—11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament, Japanese version), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/21/enks_0427.html (accessed on June 1, 2009); and http://www2.jiia.or.jp/report/kouenkai/090427-nakasone.html (the summary in Japanese) (accessed on June 1, 2009). See also Hirofumi Nakasone, “‘Zero heno Jouken’ wo Totonoeru tame (In Order to Fulfill the ‘Conditions toward Zero’),” Gaiko Forum, Vol.22, No.8 (August 2009).

147 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The

Wall Street Journal (January 4, 2007). 148 http://www.icnnd.org/ (accessed on April 8, 2009). Besides Kawaguchi and Evans, thirteen other Commissioners

from thirteen countries, including William Perry from the United States, are serving on the commission. In addition, the Commission’s Advisory Board includes Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and George Shultz.

149“The First Meeting of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” (October 17,

2008), on the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2008/10/1183965_944.html (accessed on April 8, 2009).

150 “Conditions towards Zero—'11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament,” op.cit. 151 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/jyunbi/03_gh.html (accessed on July 13, 2009); Nakasone, “Zero

heno Jouken' wo Totonoeru tame,” op. cit., page 13. 152 “Conditions towards Zero—‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament.’” Op. cit. 153 “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic”(April 5, 2009), Office of the

Press Secretary, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ (accessed on April 10, 2009).

154 “Conditions towards Zero—‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament,’” op. cit. 155 Nakasone, "”Zero heno Jouken' wo Totonoeru tame,” op. cit., page 12.

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156 Toshihiro Nakayama, “‘Arubeki Sekai' made Tsuzuku 'Kaku no Chitsujo’ Kangaeyo (Think about the ‘Nuclear

Order’ That Will Last Unitil the World It Ought to Be Is Realized),” submitted to the round-table discussion: “Path to ‘Global Zero,’”Asahi Shimbun (July 17, 2009).

157 The round-table discussion: “Path to ‘Global Zero,’” Asahi Shimbun (July 17, 2009). 158 Ibid. 159 “Between Disarmament and Security, A Round-table Discussion,” Gaiko Forum, Vol.22, No.8 (August 2009),

pages 20-29. 160 http://www.globalzero.org/en/who/yukio-satoh (accessed on July 5, 2009). 161 Yukio Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear

Disarmament,” AJISS-Commentary, No.57 (February 3, 2009), http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200902/03-1.html (accessed on February 8, 2009).

162 “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,” op. cit. 163 This statement was made by a Japanese diplomat, who prefers to remain anonymous, to the author. 164 “Kaku-Haizetsu, Shuuin, Hatsu no Ketsugi, Seifu ni Issou no Doryoku Youkyuu (On Nuclear Abolition, Lower

House Passed Its First Resolution, Requested the Government to Strengthen Its Efforts),” Mainichi Shimbun (online), June 16, 2009, http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20090616k0000e010080000c.html (accessed on June 18, 2009); “Kaku-Haizetsu Ketugi, Sanin mo Zenkai-icchi de Saitaku (Resolution on Nuclear Abolition, Adopted Also Unanimously by Upper House),” Asahi.com, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0617/TKY200906170094.html (accessed on June 18, 2009); http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_gian.htm (accessed on July 17, 2009); and http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/ketsugi/171/090617.pdf (accessed on July 17, 2009).

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TURKEY’S PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT

Henri J. Barkey

In principle, Turkey would welcome the global elimination of nuclear weapons. For the current government, the possession of nuclear weapons by other states is a factor that, indirectly at least, reduces Turkey’s regional (if not global) aspirations and power. However, in the medium term, it remains deeply ambivalent on the future of nuclear weapons and its own plans regarding nuclear energy and weapons development. Turkey lacks a coherently articulated national policy vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. This is partly due to the fact that as a member of NATO it is a direct beneficiary of the US nuclear umbrella and because the United States maintains a number of nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Force base in southern Turkey.1 The absence of such a policy is also the result of the unclear demarcation of lines of authority between civilian and military leaders on issues of national defense. While this may not have been a problem in the past, civil-military relations have been strained under the current ruling government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Until recently, when it came to setting national priorities, the military establishment’s role could best be described as primus inter pares. The AKP’s preoccupation with expanding Turkey’s role in the region and its push to reform Turkish state structures, including the military’s prerogatives, are radically challenging the military’s control of the national security agenda. WHAT FACTORS MIGHT MOTIVATE TURKEY TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? Any discussion of Turkey’s approach to nuclear weapons—whether it is to support an initiative such as “Global Zero” or to acquire them—has to be studied in the context of the transformation it is undergoing: Turkey is not just a dynamic emerging market economy, but one that contains deep divisions among domestic political forces that are battling for the very essence of the country, its identity, and future direction. Aggravating the current divide between arch-secularists and a coalition of liberals and more religiously conservative groups is a deepening ethnic cleavage—Kurds against majority Turks. For some or all protagonists involved, the issues at hand are existential in nature and compromise is difficult to achieve. Parallel to these is the fact that Turkey’s immediate security environment has been, and continues to be, in a state of flux. The war in Iraq has had a direct impact on Turkey, in part due to Turkey’s past policies with regards to its own Kurdish minority. Ankara feels threatened by the emergence of a federal (if not bi-national) Iraq that contains a robust Kurdish component. Most Turkish military thinking has been dominated by the threat posed by Kurdish developments and the domestic Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-led insurgency

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which, after 20 years, shows few signs of dying out. In fact, until a new foreign policy was formed by the AKP government, much of Turkey’s foreign policy considerations were dominated by the Kurdish question and the need to combat the PKK. Another important transformational development is Turkey’s ongoing application to join the European Union (EU). The EU membership process has already forced Turkey to make significant changes to its domestic institutions, including on issues of the rule of law and minority rights. However, Ankara has a long road ahead to comply fully with EU requirements including, perhaps most importantly, far more sweeping changes to Turkey’s organizational structure, including civil-military relations. The EU membership process, with close scrutiny of Ankara’s behavior, is one of several factors acting as a constraint on potential Turkish nuclear ambitions. Security Concerns As a NATO member and US ally, Turkey has enjoyed the protection extended by US nuclear guarantees—the so-called “nuclear umbrella.” Extended nuclear deterrence was primarily designed to protect Turkey from the Soviet Union, and with the collapse of the Soviet state, the nuclear issue lost its relevance. In fact, even before the end of the Soviet Union, the US had begun to progressively reduce its nuclear weaponry in Europe and to withdraw from installations that had housed these weapons. Turkey, along with four other European countries, maintain US nuclear weapons; some 90 tactical weapons are stored at the Incirlik Air Force base near the southern city of Adana pursuant to the 1999 NATO strategic concept that envisaged a “minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.”2 How credible today are the US and NATO’s nuclear guarantees to Ankara? After the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s security threat perceptions shifted away from the Cold War calculations of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to its immediate neighborhood and specifically the Middle East. Even Turkey’s age-old conflict with Greece has eased as Athens made a strategic choice to support Turkey’s EU application as a means to contain, if not eliminate, the perceived Turkish threat. Ironically, Ankara sees its primary threat to be an internal one with foreign linkages. The possibility of Kurdish secession, as difficult as this may be to imagine, is the primary threat that drives Turkey’s security policies. This has become even more pronounced in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, as Iraqi Kurds, who had already enjoyed a de facto quasi-independent status since the 1991 crisis with Iraq over Kuwait, gained official recognition within Iraq with the creation of a federal Iraqi state. In recent years, some Turks have begun to question the effectiveness of the NATO/US security umbrella. In part, this is due to the reluctance and sluggishness with which some NATO members responded to Turkey’s request for military deployments during the 1991 Iraq/Kuwait crisis. Then “some NATO allies questioned the need to deploy even token reinforcements to Turkey.”3 Growing anti-Americanism in Turkey has also exacerbated the

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general lack of confidence in Western (specifically American) security guarantees.* Some leading Turkish military officials have even suggested that Turkey ought to rethink its alliance commitments.4 Anti-Western sentiment is also reinforced by the constant drumbeat of reports that Europeans and Americans are not doing enough to combat the PKK. In contemplating conventionally armed foes, the Turkish armed forces are quite competent. For example, the first post-Cold War demonstration of Turkish military prowess occurred in 1998 when the Turks threatened Syria with military intervention unless it stopped providing the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, with refuge in Damascus and Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. With most of its divisions facing south against Israel, Syria quickly capitulated and sent Öcalan on his way—a decision that ended with his capture and imprisonment by Turkish officials. With the capture of Öcalan and further political changes in both Turkey and Syria, relations between the two governments have improved significantly.5 However, in the absence of any nuclear weapons of its own, when it comes to contemplating threats from nuclear-armed nations, Turkey has little else to rely on other than NATO’s guarantees. This might be relevant in considering the possibility of a revanchist Russia, or scenarios in which Iran and/or Syria acquire nuclear weapons. Hence, despite the discordant voices emanating from various groups, Turks continue to rely on the American security umbrella. Ankara has always stressed the importance of its NATO commitments. Moreover, as will be discussed below, there is no easy way for Turkey to obtain such weapons, even assuming it was willing to forsake its alliance and treaty pledges. It currently has no nuclear power plants and only the beginnings of a research/technical infrastructure. What has made the Turkish military a potent force has been its NATO links. The combination of NATO, a robust army, and a willingness to take security seriously has served effectively as Turkey’s primary form of deterrence. In considering the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey has often stressed that it has enjoyed a peaceful border with Iran dating back to the Qasr-i Shirin Treaty of 1639. Although Ankara routinely complained in the 1990s that Tehran was aiding and abetting the PKK’s activities in Turkey, the two nations actively collaborated politically to contain the de facto Kurdish entity in northern Iraq that the Gulf War allies protected. In more recent years, moreover, Turkey and Iran claim to have made common cause against both the PKK and its Iranian affiliate, The Party of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK), occasionally even coordinating artillery strikes.† Unlike Israel and Saudi Arabia, no one in Turkey perceives

* A Pew poll in 2007 had found that with only 12 percent of the respondents in favor, Turkish support for America was the lowest among most countries. http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252. † Turkey’s willingness to acknowledge such cooperation publicly is designed to send Washington a message that even the military is willing to deal with the much-disliked regime in Tehran when it comes to the Kurdish question. The Turkish military had been frustrated until the end of 2007 by American unwillingness to allow Turkish forces to target PKK encampments in northern Iraq. The PKK has been fighting the Turkish authorities since 1984; it reached its zenith in 1991. Based initially in Syria, the PKK also established rear bases in Iran and Iraq. While its effectiveness has been severely curtailed by years of Turkish counterinsurgency operations, it remains a potent force able to harass security forces. PJAK, the Iranian offshoot of the PKK, is far smaller and extremely dependent on the PKK. It has benefited from the absence of other Kurdish insurgent groups in Iran, but it too has faced a growing Iranian military counterinsurgency campaign. For a detailed analysis of the Turkish-Kurdish relations please see

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Iran as representing an existential threat to Turkey. As Turkish columnist Cüneyt Ülsever argued, Turkey and Iran are two imperial powers with leadership ambitions in the Middle East, but if they have not fought much between them, it is because neither can decisively defeat the other.6 Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, of course, could alter this deterrent balance and the Turkish secular establishment harbors serious reservations about Iran’s intentions. The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was an eye opener for many in Turkey who feared that their own Islamists would emulate this path. Indeed, Turkish authorities accused Iran of trying to foment domestic unrest by encouraging Turkish Islamic groups to even engage in violent activities. The advent of AKP and the election of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as Turkey’s Prime Minister, however, have dramatically changed the relationship. The current government in Ankara, as opposed to establishment Turks, has a more benign view of Tehran. It has gone out of its way to accommodate Iranian concerns and sought to increase trade and deepen bilateral relations. As a result, Turkish-Iranian relations are enjoying their best period since 1979.7 AKP’s self-confidence has also manifested itself in a desire to become an intermediary between the West and Tehran on all matters, but especially on the nuclear file.‡ That said, Turkey is opposed to a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran would be likely to upset the regional balance of power. Already, by removing one of Tehran’s most bitter enemies, Saddam Hussein, and by bringing to power a Sh’ia regime in Baghdad, the war in Iraq has drastically improved Iran’s geopolitical standing in the region. Because Iran is a revisionist power, some Turks fear that its acquisition of nuclear weapons would be likely to make it far more self-confident and, therefore, adventurous in its regional relations.§ There is, however, a division between the government and the security establishment regarding Iranian intentions. The government and most of the Turkish public do not perceive the Iranian nuclear program as a serious threat to Turkey. This, in large measure, is due to the fact that the US has taken the lead in admonishing Iran and trying to force it to comply with IAEA regulations and NPT agreements. Both the government and public are completely opposed to an American (or possibly Israeli) strike on Iranian nuclear installations.** One other factor bearing on Turkish decision-making and policy formulation is the absence of independent Turkish capabilities to collect, analyze, and assess intelligence Henri J. Barkey, Preventing Conflict over Kurdistan (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). ‡ In seeking support for Turkish diplomatic overtures towards Iran, a high-ranking Turkish foreign policy official has often stressed in private communications to his American interlocutors that “no one knows Iran better than Turkey.” § Three Turkish parliamentarians told a Congressional staff delegation visiting Turkey that were Iran to go nuclear, Turkey would follow suit. How representative this sample might be, however, is debatable. See: Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Committee on the Foreign Relations of the United States, Senate, February 2008), page 41. ** Interestingly, the Turkish government took a very low-key approach to the September 2007 Israeli raid on Syria’s nuclear installation. In part because the Syrians decided to underplay the event themselves, and despite stories that Israeli jets had ditched their empty fuel tanks over Turkish territory, when asked about it Prime Minister Erdogan simply said, “we talked to both sides and they both denied that there was a violation of our airspace,” HaberX (April 26, 2008).

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on nuclear issues. As a result, Turkey is dependent on outside sources, namely the US, IAEA, and NATO for its information. This both helps and constrains US influence; to the degree that the US provides the information, Turks develop an aversion to the US agenda on the issue. Moreover, the United States’ credibility problem following the WMD debacle in Iraq and the general lack of sympathy for the US in Turkey has made it difficult for the government, assuming it is alarmed by developments in Iran, to assume a vocal and pro-American stance in this issue. The AKP and much of its leadership rose through the ranks of more hard-line Islamist movements. Even though Prime Minister Erdogan and company broke with the old guard, represented by Necmettin Erbakan, a former prime minister and father of the Islamist movement in Turkey, the current AKP leadership still perceives the world through a religiously tinted lens. Erbakan, during his short stint as prime minister, tried very hard to create a grouping of Islamic states, called the D-8, which was intended to rival the G-8 assemblage of economically advanced Western nations. Erbakan and his lieutenants extolled the virtues of an Islamic NATO and Islamic Union, complete with its own currency. Not surprisingly, Erbakan and his supporters, though much diminished in size and influence, fully support Iran’s quest for nuclear power and weaponry. While this justification is couched in the form of Iran’s need to deter the United States, underlying this wish is also their perception of a civilizational struggle between East and West.†† Current Turkish political leaders often respond to concerns expressed about Iran with a similar refrain: Iran has the right to access nuclear technology provided it is for peaceful purposes.‡‡ Often, Turkish political leaders raise the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons; in 2006 then foreign and deputy prime minister, Abdulah Gül, in his party’s annual meeting, argued that if Iranian nuclear weapons are dangerous, then so are the Israeli ones.8 When asked about the Iranian nuclear effort, Prime Minister Erdogan, on a visit to Washington in late 2008, responded by being as critical of the United States as he was of Iran. He said that “those who counsel Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons, should themselves not have these weapons in the first place.”9 On the other hand, Turkey wants a quiet and stable neighborhood in order to accomplish its developmental goals— after decades of economic ups and downs it has finally managed to put together a consistent record of economic growth—and EU accession. Turkey has tried hard to become an energy (especially gas) conduit between the energy-rich producers of Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Russia, on the one hand, and an energy-hungry Europe, on the other. Its own domestic needs are being supplied in part by Iran.

†† The mouthpiece of the current party established by Erbakan, the Felicity party, is the daily Milli Gazete, which published a long analytical article supporting the Iranian quest for nuclear capabilities on November 24, 2005. ‡‡ Occasionally, there are expressions to the contrary, as was the case with the AKP chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy committee, Murat Mercan, who on a trip to Israel suggested that Iran was first and foremost a threat to Turkey, Haaretz (December 12, 2008). Two days later, the Iranian News Agency, IRNA, posted a correction by Mercan on its Turkish website, http://www1.irna.ir/tr/news/view/line-6/0812128992144327.htm.

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An Iranian nuclear weapons program might stand in the way of both Turkish economic development and EU accession if the Middle East were plunged into a serious arms competition. This is why the Turks have stated their support for the UN process and in August 2005 allowed Britain, speaking on behalf of the EU, to issue a statement for Turkey, as one of the prospective member countries, at the IAEA board of governors meeting supporting the EU diplomatic initiative to contain the Iranian uranium enrichment process, known as the E-3. Iran was quite displeased by Turkey’s action.10 The security establishment, by contrast, has a more jaundiced view of Iran. In 2005, as he was about to leave his post as Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Faruk Logoglu, a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs undersecretary, pointedly argued that Iran is inexorably moving towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons and that the European efforts at containing this development would fail.11 Turkish military officials have also been blunt about their concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The Turkish General Staff perceives Iran as an ideological enemy; a theocratic state bent on undermining the secular basis of Turkey and of the region. In a speech in Washington, given while he was deputy chief of staff, the current chief of the armed forces, General Ilker Basbug, argued that Turkey, just as the United States, was following Iran’s nuclear activities with apprehension.12 In his departure speech, a former chief of staff, General Hilmi Özkök, without mentioning Iran by name, warned that “unless the crisis over nuclear weapons is not resolved diplomatically, [Turkey] would soon be faced with important strategic choices. Otherwise, we would be faced with the possibility of losing our strategic superiority in the region.”13 This sentiment is echoed by voices associated with the nationalist camp in Turkey who fret about Iran’s increased influence, not only in the Middle East but also in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and especially in Azerbaijan.14 Like the politicians, though, the security establishment opposes any military action to forcibly eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons. Of most concern to them is the possibility of a repeat of the after-effects of the Iraq War, which completely undermined the status quo in the region and gave further momentum to the Kurdish issue. Similarly, a US strike against Iranian installations is likely to upset domestic balances in Iran and unleash a series of unpredictable consequences that would likely further undermine regional stability. Hence, the Turkish military is caught between its desire to see a diplomatic initiative succeed and the very real prospect that such an endeavor will fail and Iran will ultimately achieve nuclear weapons status. This may also explain why Turkey has not experienced the public debates on the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. Of the four other non-nuclear European states—Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands—that continue to store US nuclear weapons, only Belgium and Germany have had extensive parliamentary debates on the pros and cons of maintaining them.15 The advent of an Iranian nuclear device would not automatically change Turkey’s approach to nuclear weapons. However, it would certainly unleash a brand new debate in the country

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because, to date, the discussion in Turkey has remained conjectural and, with few real specialists on the subject, has had a somewhat unreal quality to it. Two factors will determine the future course of action: first, regional development pursuant to Iran’s nuclearization and, second, which of Turkey’s domestic political parties is in power at the time. Turkey’s reaction would not be solely contingent on Iran’s behavior. After all, Turkey benefits—and presumably will continue to do so for some time in the future—from the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States. However, there are indications that an Iranian bomb would lead to a regional nuclear arms race, which could trigger a Turkish nuclear program. The Saudis, who feel the most threatened by Iran’s nuclear, conventional, and revolutionary ambitions, are likely to try to follow Iran if it develops nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has already intimated that it would seek its own warheads in the event Iran goes nuclear.16 Turkey could also be encouraged by the Saudis to seek its own path to nuclear weaponry. Even though Turkey has recently sided with the more radical elements in the region over Gaza, the Turks would also be worried about the burgeoning ‘Shia Crescent,’ stretching from the Palestinian territories to Pakistan. Turkey considers such a division dangerous for the security and stability of the region as a whole, and aims to bridge the gap between Sunni Arab states and Iran.17 Moreover, an Iranian bomb may compel Israel to come out of its nuclear closet to deter Iran. In turn, as Robert Einhorn has argued, such a development would undermine the unspoken arrangement that has ruled the Egyptian-Israeli relationship to date. Despite its boisterous denunciations of the Israeli nuclear program, Egypt has put its nuclear ambitions on a back-burner as long as Israel maintains its ambiguous stand about its program. If Israel were to go public with its arsenal in response to an Iranian bomb, it would risk reigniting Egypt’s nuclear effort.18 An Iranian nuclear weapon would certainly set back the cause of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East for decades and might even trigger a rush to emulate Tehran. Even in the event of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement, Iran’s quest would represent a sufficient shock to the system to engender such a reaction. The likelihood that Turkey would seek its own path to a nuclear capability, however long this might take, would increase in the event of such a regional nuclear arms race. Domestic political pressure and the region’s anarchic character would be sufficient to propel any Turkish government to begin its own program. In the meantime, the presence of US weapons on its soil would serve as a security bridge. On the other hand, were the United States to remove its nuclear weapons from Europe altogether, Turkish calculations would be altered drastically. Their presence, as David Yost points out, has helped Europe, especially Turkey, to connect to NATO strategy and contribute to collective decision-making.19 Their removal therefore could severely shake confidence in the concept of extended deterrence. In the eyes of experts and European

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security officials, weapons based in Europe are considered far more important to maintaining a deterrent posture than weapons on US soil or at sea.20 The second factor that could encourage Turkey to develop a nuclear capability would be its domestic politics. The AKP has tried hard to position itself as a regional leader; it takes pride in its ability to intervene in regional conflicts and offer its services as a state imbued with soft power to help resolve them. It has even offered its services to the United States and Iran. AKP’s bid for regional influence has struck a chord with the Turkish public. Prime Minister Erdogan has been its primary beneficiary and has carefully tailored these diplomatic initiatives to a rise in Turkish nationalism. He and his current government have done much to stoke and ride the nationalist wave. This was most evident in the dramatic theater he engineered over Israel’s Gaza incursion. A nuclear arms race in the region in which Turkey remained on the sidelines, lost influence, and relied on American security guarantees raises the prospect of a strong nationalist backlash. If this were coupled with disillusionment over the prospects for membership in the European Union, the government might be unable to withstand a groundswell for nuclearization. Fundamentally, predicting how Turkey would react to a future Iranian nuclear weapon depends in part in the direction Turkey takes in the near future: Will it endure the difficult transition to a modern European-like state while getting ever so close to membership in the EU, or will it be tempted by opportunities to make a bid for regional leadership? As an EU member it would have much less reason to worry about the changing regional balance of power—and the powerful constraints on its ability to break current commitments in the NPT and other agreements to remain non-nuclear. Were Iran to cross the nuclear threshold one day, what would Turkey do? On the assumption that it cannot stand still and do nothing, it has three choices:

1. Multilateral defense option: It could strengthen its ties with the US. Turkey is already part of the NATO alliance and therefore Ankara benefits from the US nuclear umbrella and already has nuclear weapons on its soil.21 In order to improve its deterrent capacities, it might seek to reinforce these ties, seeking extra diplomatic and political assurances and asking for more advanced weaponry from the US, including state-of-the-art anti-missile technology and advanced aircraft. It might also appeal to the EU to strengthen its defense-related institutions and even speed up the accession negotiations. In other words, under this option, Turkey would seek to bolster its existing defense agreements and might even push the US to declare publicly and officially the presence of nuclear weapons on Turkish soil.

2. Go nuclear option: This could not be achieved quickly. As will be described below,

Turkey does not have the technical wherewithal to produce nuclear weapons anytime soon. It can decide to make the necessary investments, but it would take time and resources to reach fruition. Moreover, Turkey does not have the possibility of pursuing this option clandestinely because of the close relationships it

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has developed with the United States and Europe over the years, making the country fairly transparent. An open nuclear endeavor would risk alienating the Europeans and Americans, but a covert program would do so even more. During the Reagan Administration, the United States was very concerned about the existence of a nuclear supply relationship between Pakistan and Turkey. President Reagan and his aides warned the Turks in a number of different settings about this relationship until means for greater cooperation between the two countries were instituted.22 Ankara is intent on being far more cautious on this front; in June 2008, Turkish officials met a visiting Syrian energy minister’s suggestion for nuclear cooperation between Turkey and Syria with silence.23

3. Regional diplomatic attack option: The Turkish ruling party has a great deal of

confidence in its own standing in the region. Hence, it may choose to pursue an active diplomatic route designed to isolate Iran. This could be done in concert with the first option. The desired goal of isolating Iran would be to help trigger a change in regime or orientation that would reverse the nuclear decision.

None of these choices are particularly appealing or realistic, which suggest that the best outcome for Turkey would be for the current multilateral effort under UN auspices aimed at convincing Iran not to proceed with nuclearization to succeed. Regional and Global Ambitions Turkey has been experiencing a wave of nationalism and prickliness. The public has become more xenophobic. The call for Turkey to be an unrivalled power in the region and beyond is often heard. An Iranian bomb is likely to galvanize and mobilize those who would like to see Turkey go nuclear. The AKP government came to power arguing that Turkey punched far below its weight in international affairs. Previous governments (with the notable exception of Prime Minister, and later President, Turgut Özal) had avoided engagement with its immediate region assiduously. The AKP, by contrast, trading on its more pious roots and opposition to Turkey’s secular establishment, decided to engage the region. While it took care to maintain good relations with Israel, a fact that provided it with clout both in the immediate region and in Europe and America, the AKP government also signaled that its foreign policy approach would be more encompassing and that it expected to have a seat at the table. Among its goals was greater representation in international institutions, including the UN Security Council, where for the first time since the early 1960s, it gained the chance to occupy one of the non-permanent seats for the two-year term. Under Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey has had several recent diplomatic ventures. The prime minister invited himself into the Russian-Georgian crisis without any consultations with the NATO allies or the EU. Following the 2006 Lebanon war, he also convinced Turkey’s military to send troops to Lebanon as part of a UN monitoring mission. Finally, Turkey became an important intermediary between Israel and Syria at a time when the Bush

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Administration seemed to have created a vacuum through its refusal to forcefully engage in the region. Underlying the AKP approach is a conceptualization of Turkey’s role as gateway between East and West. Ahmet Davutoglu, the eminence grise behind this approach, who until his recent elevation to Minister of Foreign Affairs served as an advisor to both the prime minister and the president, formulated a vision for Turkey that has its two legs anchored in Europe and America, while reaching over to Asia and beyond as a means of balancing its traditional alliances. In his vision, Turkey deserves to be, and ought to be, a global player.24 Moreover, Davutoglu has also pushed for a policy of “zero problems” with neighbors that commits Turkey to maintaining good relations at the highest levels with neighboring states. In fact, Turkey was one of the few countries to immediately congratulate Iranian President Ahmedinejad following his disputed 2009 reelection “victory.” This may prove to be a problematic relationship for Turkey if the Iranian leadership, anxious to buttress its domestic base after these tainted elections, were to decide to harden its position on the nuclear question triggering an even deeper crisis with the international community. Ironically, it is Prime Minister Erdogan’s criticisms of Israel, especially following the January 2009 Gaza operation, which elicited the greatest acclaim in the Arab street. While he and Turkey have achieved greater visibility as a result, it is not altogether clear that Turkey has limitless possibilities and that it does not make mistakes that can be costly over time. Moreover, there are limits to Turkish influence deriving from its own domestic inconsistencies and clashing ideas regarding its identity and place in the world. These will undoubtedly be accentuated both physically and psychologically by Iran becoming a nuclear power. Iran’s achievement on the nuclear front, it must be remembered, comes with a whole panoply of other military-industrial accoutrements. For the Iranian nuclear deterrent or threat to be effective, the weapon has to be accompanied by a delivery infrastructure. When it comes to long-range missiles, the Iranians, with North Korean support and advice from Russian engineers, have already built an impressive array of potential delivery means. This was demonstrated recently by Iran’s successful launch of a satellite into space. Turkey is far from achieving such capabilities. All of these developments have catapulted Iran into the forefront of a regional balance of power game. Iran’s progress on these fronts has made up for its relative weakness in the conventional weapons arena. By contrast, the Turks have no indigenous capability to manufacture missiles, much less launch satellites. For both of these, Ankara relies on the United States or the European Arianne program. One of the consequences of the Iranian nuclear program has been an increased interest in nuclear power. Although Turkey has no nuclear power plants, global concerns over climate change and the growing realization of Turkey’s dependence on imported hydrocarbons to satisfy its growing energy demands has spurred the government to seek tenders to build the first nuclear power plants. As Ilter Türkmen, a former foreign minister, pointed out, Turkey has fallen behind in nuclear knowledge and technical expertise. This, he argued, “was incompatible with Turkey’s geopolitical standing and economic potential. If neighbors were

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intent on developing nuclear weapon technology, it behooved Turkey, at the very least, to acquire peaceful forms of nuclear technology.”25 In March 2007, the government passed legislation approving the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. Strong opposition to such plants exists, however, which makes it difficult politically for the government to go forward without paying a high political price. TURKEY’S NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE Turkey is a signatory to the NPT and signed on to the Additional Protocol in 2006. Turkey has one research and two small experimental nuclear facilities. The main such installation is on the outskirts of Istanbul at Küçük Çekmece. Built in 1962 and upgraded subsequently to a 5 megawatt research reactor, it provides isotopes and other services to the medical industry. The other two experimental facilities are situated near Ankara are straightforward research laboratories.26 However, Turkey has no nuclear power plants, despite studies that were started as early as 1965 to explore building one such plant.27 Turkey has in the past expressed interest in developing a nuclear industry, but despite discussions with a variety of countries to forge a way to collaborate, it has never managed to translate these efforts into concrete action. Nuclear energy is an attractive source for Turkey given that it has to import almost all of its energy needs from abroad. It has a tiny amount of oil and can rely on hydropower for some of its needs. However, both the discussion of climate change and the potential unreliability of its energy partners, including Iraq, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, have spurred Turkey to take a new look at nuclear power. In 2006, the Turkish Prime Minister announced that Turkey would soon start building three nuclear plants that would become fully operational by 2015. However, these hopes are unlikely to materialize because of domestic opposition; the costs are high and there seems to be a lack of interest on the part of would-be investors. In September 2008, the government received only one bid for its Akkuyu tender on the Mediterranean coast. The one bid, from a Russian company undermined the very notion of reducing Ankara’s energy dependence on Russia from which it purchases most of its gas.28 The government subsequently decided to postpone its decision to whether to cancel the tender until after the March 2009 local elections. The AKP is nonetheless determined to go ahead with nuclear energy because, as Prime Minister Erdogan has argued, this is vital for Turkey’s industrial competitiveness.29 The government took a modest step in that direction in August 2009. As part of a broader set of agreements on energy projects, Turkey and Russia agreed to reopen talks on civilian nuclear cooperation. The nuclear cooperation agreement Turkey signed with the United States on June 2, 2008 is designed to enhance the exchange of information, technology, research, and nuclear power production and could give a boost to Ankara’s nascent efforts.30 President George W. Bush, when sending the bill to Congress, commented that the agreement would “serve as a strong incentive for Turkey to continue its support for nonproliferation objectives and enact future sound nonproliferation policies and practices. It will also promote closer political and economic ties with a NATO ally, and provide the necessary legal framework for US industry

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to make nuclear exports to Turkey's planned civil nuclear sector.”31 President Bill Clinton had initiated this deal; however, its consideration had been delayed by proliferation concerns. Its reemergence may be due to American concerns that Turkey, pressured by growing domestic energy demand, will increasingly be tempted to seek Iranian gas sources. TURKISH ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT There is not enough public information to evaluate Turkey’s likely stance if there were a serious effort by the United States and other nuclear weapon states to eliminate all nuclear weapons on a global basis. However, what can be surmised from the discussion above is that Turkey would welcome such an initiative precisely because, in the absence of nuclear-armed countries, its industrial and conventional military prowess would help increase its influence in its immediate region and beyond. The Turkish political leadership—as distinct from its military leadership—is far more at ease with what it perceives to be Turkey’s “soft power.” Much of Turkey’s opening to the region and its attempt at mediating international disputes comes from its conviction that it can tap its “soft power” reservoir. Provided that all countries embark on such an initiative, Turkey can rightfully calculate that it stands to benefit, especially if Iran and Israel are de-nuclearized. One of Turkey’s foremost researchers on the nuclear question has even suggested that the time had come for Turkey to rethink the presence of American nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. Mustafa Kibaroglu argues that the benefits derived from these weapons (deterrence and, more importantly, the traditional argument that they represent an investment in good relations with the United States) would be exceeded by the benefits of their removal. The weapons not only represent a hazard, he maintains, and represent a roadblock to a greater, region-wide nuclear free zone initiative, but more importantly permit the Iranian regime to use the nuclear weapons stored at the Incirlik base as a justification for their own program.32 Furthermore, in the absence of a genuine disarmament agreement, should Iran develop nuclear weapons and Turkey decided that it had to follow suit, it would face significant obstacles in the pursuit of nuclear capabilities. It not only would jeopardize relations with the United States, but it would also have a negative impact on its NATO links. Moreover, such a decision would almost certainly deal a fatal blow to Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union. Olivier Roy argued that were Iran to go nuclear, Turkey would face a hard choice: It can either rely on the EU and NATO nuclear umbrella or go for its own nuclear weapons. However, were it not to trust the Europeans, then it would also forsake its place within Europe.33 Finally, there is the question of domestic opposition. Turkish civil society groups have expanded dramatically in recent years. Many of them work in the environmental arena. Opposition to nuclear power plants has already led to the cancellation of one proposed project. The fact that Turkey spans an earthquake prone zone adds further momentum to these groups’ efforts and there is no question that they have been influential in this regard. A PIPA poll conducted in December 2008 found that in Turkey, 55 percent of the population

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was strongly in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons and another 10 percent somewhat in favor of this proposition. Comparable figures for Egypt are 39 and 43 percent; Iran has 50 and 18 percent; and a world-wide average of 50 and 26 percent respectively. While these figures for Turkey are above the mean, interestingly, the percentage of the Turkish population who are in strongly opposed to a treaty abolishing nuclear weapons (5 percent) are among the lowest in the world.34 The growing momentum around the world towards eliminating nuclear weapons is overshadowed in Turkey by the perception of declining American influence in Turkey’s immediate region. As a result, it is not evident what consequences there will be if additional countries are willing to make their own deals on nuclear power and weapons, as suggested by James Russell.35 It could prove to be an impetus for nuclearization. Turkey might also interpret the waning of American power as a reason to pursue a nuclear option, particularly in the face of an Iranian bomb and additional proliferation in the Middle East. For now, however, Turkey’s commitments to the EU and NATO and the long and costly gestation period necessary to develop nuclear technologies and related weapons, are likely to incline Turkey to favor a disarmament agreement. How long that sentiment will last remains to be seen.

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ENDNOTES

1 Hans M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Washington, D.C. Natural Resources Defense

Council, February 2005). 2 Of these 90 weapons, 50 are to be delivered by the American and 40 by the Turkish air forces, Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe, page 9. 3 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica,

CA.: RAND, 2003), page 150. 4 Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Çaglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” Middle East Policy, XV:

4 (Winter 2008), pages 68-69. 5 Melek Firat and Ömer Kürkçüoglu, “Orta Dogu’yla Iliskiler” in Baskin Oran (ed.)Türk Dis Politikasi:

Kurtulus Savasindan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), Volume II, pages 565-567.

6 Cüneyt Ülsever, “Ahmedinejad ne Yapmak Istiyor?” Hürriyet (February 8, 2006). 7 Gökhan Çetinsaya “Nükleer Kriz Eşiğinde İran ve Türkiye,” Cumhuriyet Strateji (June 5, 2006). 8 Hürriyet (March 13, 2006). 9 Radikal (November 15, 2008). 10 For the UK statement, please see http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Statements/UKforEU.pdf. 11 “Logoglu: Iran Nükleer Silah Yolunda,” NTV television channel, Istanbul (December 20, 2005). 12 Fikret Bila, “Org. Basbug’un ABD’ye verdigi mesajlar,” Milliyet (June 8, 2008). The full text of his

comments can be found at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2005/gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasi_060605.html .

13 Author’s translation. “Genelkurmay Baskani Hilmi Özkök’ün Devir-Teslim Töreni Konusmasi,” (August

28, 2006), http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/orghilmiozkokdvrtslkonusmasi_28082006.html.

14 Ümit Özdag, “Iran Nükleer Silah Sahibi Olmali mi?” Aksam (March 7, 2005). 15 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Incirlik’teki Nükleer Silahlar Yine Gündemde,” Taraf (May 6, 2009). 16 Thomas W. Lippman, “Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert J.

Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reis (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), page 129.

17 Hakki Uygur, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and Turkey,” SETA Policy Brief (February 2008, No. 7), page 5. 18 Robert J. Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but still on a Non-Nuclear Course,” in Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss,

op. cit.. pages 73-74. 19 David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence,” International Affairs 85:4 (2009), page 770. 20 Ibid., page 764.

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21 Sariibrahimoglu, op.cit. 22 Leon Fuerth, “Turkey: Nuclear Choices amongst Dangerous Neighbors,” in Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss,

op. cit.. pages 160-162. 23 Gareth Jenkins, “Syria Proposes Nuclear Cooperation with Turkey,” Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown

Foundation), June 16, 2008. 24 Ahmet Davutoglu has put forward what has become AKP’s vision foreign policy vision in Stratejik

Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2001). See also Philip H. Gordon and Omer Taspinar, Winning Turkey (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008).

25 Ilter Türkmen, “Nükleer Santrallar Meselesi,” Hürriyet (July 31, 2004). 26 Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” Nonproliferation Review (Spring-

Summer 1997), pages 33-44. 27 Erkan Erdogdu, “Nuclear Power in Open Energy markets: A Case Study of Turkey,” Energy Policy 37

(2007), page 3069. 28 Gareth Jenkins, “More Speed, Less Haste Results in Turkish Nuclear Tender Fiasco,” Eurasian Daily

Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), September 28, 2008. 29 Milliyet, (May 21, 2006). 30 Zaman, (June 4, 2006). 31“Bush pushes US-Turkey nuclear cooperation,” Reuters, January 23, 2008. 32 Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Isn’t it Time to Say farewell to Nukes in Turkey?” European Security 14:4 (December

2005), pages 450-53. 33 HaberX, (September 3, 2006). 34 World Public Opinion Poll Organization, “Publics around the World Favor International Agreement To

Eliminate All Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/577.php?nid=&id=&pnt=577&lb=btis.

35 James A. Russell, “A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and the Middle

East,” Contemporary Security Policy 29:3 (December 2008), pages 521-537.

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 225

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. Chairman

Thomas Pickering

Vice-Chairman

Linda Banton Barbara Davis Blum

Avis T. Bohlen Robert O. Boorstin Richard M. Clarke

Alton Frye William Harrop Farooq Kathwari Andrea Koppel

Norman P. Neureiter Philip A. Odeen Anne Richard

Enid C.B. Schoettle Jean-Francois Seznec

Jeffrey H. Smith General Larry D. Welch

Carroll R. Wetzel, Jr.

Charles W. Bailey, II Emeritus, 1991–2004

Barry Blechman

Emeritus, 1989–2008

Michael Krepon Emeritus, 1989–2008