BRITISH RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN

THE MIDDLE EAST

A: BRITISH TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FIRST

HALF OF 19TH CENTURY TO EARLY 20TH CENTURY

From 1830s onward, the import of British goods particularly

textile manufacture, increased into the Middle East considerably. The

main reason behind this rapid development was the rapid

improvement in transport and communication which enabled the

British to import their commodities into the Middle East.1 After the

opening of the Suez Canal (1869), telegraph concession (1863-64) and

the development of steam communication, with Bushire and Basra,

increased the foreign trade of southern Persia and Arabia. The British

also linked the western and southern Persian provinces with railways.2

In 1888, Great Britain obtained concession for the establishment

of regular commercial navigation on the Karun river. It greatly

increased quantity of the British export and import. The real

achievement in connection with the Karun river was Ahwaz-Isfahan

road. This route shortened the distance to Isfahan as compared to the

steamer journey to this place. The shortened route was just about half of

the distance between Bushire and Isfahan.3

Great Britain also tried to acquire a concession for the

construction of railway from the upper Karun to Tehran. But Russia

prevented the construction of this or any other railway in Iran. British

faced main commercial threat from Russia. In 1889, Russia was satisfied

1 British Parliamentary papers (1 public), Vol. VI, op. cit., p. 297. 2 The Persian Problem- An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in

Persia with some Account of the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway, op. cit., p. 144. 3 Ibid., p. 149.

170

with the promise made by Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) that Iran

would not grant railway concession to any power except Russia (This

promise was renewed in 1899 to last until 1910).4 However Britain tried

to increase her trade. The whole trade of Bushire which in 1889 was ₤

1,325,898 had risen to ₤ 2,030,000 in 1900.5 The total trade of the Gulf

ports in 1901 was estimated at ₤ 3,600,000 of which 3,300,000 were

accounted for by the British Empire (about 91%). Thus, at Basra, in the

beginning of twentieth century, Britain and India took some 90 percent

of the export and supplied three quarters of the imports. In Bahrain in

1903, 85 percent of export went to the British Empire, which supplied 66

percent of imports.6 Russia’s share of total trade probably also rose

appreciably over this period. It grew from 45 percent of the total in

1901-2 to 63 percent in 1912-13.7

On the political front, by Anglo-Persian treaty of 1841 the British

secured the right to open consulate in Tehran and Tabriz. The

establishment of consulate, according to Palmerston, could be used to

guarantee British political influence at provincial level and promote

British products and provide safeguard against Russian advance.8

PERSIAN GULF TRADE (EARLY 20TH CENTURY)

At the beginning of 20th century, an important change took place

in the distribution of foreign trade in Persia. Russia and Britain had

almost equal share in the trade of Persia in 1907. Russia practically

controlled 60% of its trade, being about three times more than that of

4 Rouhallah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, op.cit., pp. 16-17. 5 Ibid., p. 74. 6 Eugene Staley, ‘Business and Politics in the Persian Gulf: International Economic Rivalries in

the Persian Gulf’, in Charles Issawi, op. cit., p. 350. 7 Charles Issawi, ‘Middle East Economic Development, 1815-19: The General and Specific’, in

M.A. Cook, op. cit., p. 402. 8 Cities and Trade: Consul Abbott in Economy and Society of Iran 1847-1866, op. cit., p. 8.

171

Britain.9 The deficits in the trade balance persisted despite the total

reduction in commerce during the war year to 2-3, 4-5 of its previous

level.10

By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 between Britain and

Russia, two zones of influence were created in Persia. The one in the

north was the Russian zone of influence and the other in the south was

the British zone of influence with a neutral land between them was

roughly the central Persia. One country was not to engage in economic

or political activities in the zone of the other. The Russian got, including

all of north and central Persia upto Isfahan and Yazd, while the British

were content with south-eastern Iran, including Kirman and Bandar

Abbas. The new oil field was in the neutral zone.11 The idea behind the

partition of Iran into the spheres of influence in 1907 was to prevent or

stop the commercial expansion of Russia towards southern Persia. In

addition to it Anglo-Russian convention recognized the freedom of

international commerce.12

In the beginning of the 19th century, France and Britain and

Russia were more influential countries in Persia. From the second

decade of the 19th century France ceased to be an influential country.

There was an open and hidden struggle between Britain and Russia.

Germany arrived on the scene with the Baghdad railway scheme. The

scheme posed a threat to the British position in southern Persia. The

British tried to keep control over the market of the region in face of

foreign competition.13

9 Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 142. 10 Ibid., p. 142. 11 Richard N. Frye, Iran, op. cit., p.68. 12 British Foreign Department Documents, June 1912 (External–B, Secret Programs), Nos. 1-83,

NAI, New Delhi, p. 27. 13 British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, op. cit., p. 53.

172

In 1907 Britain’s predominance in the carrying trade to Basra was

still unchallenged. The volume of the cargo of British ships which called

at the port rose from 135,000 tons in 1904 to 218,000 tons in 1906.

However, the value and weight of “Manchester” cotton goods exported

to the region showed a disturbing decline because of an influx of

German goods into Mesopotamia which resulted in boost up of local

German prestige. Proportionally Britain was likely to lose her influence

among the inhabitants of the area.14

The condition of Britain’s existing Persian trade and the prospect

of British control over the navigation, irrigation and petroleum of the

region, had similarly affected the British government attitude towards

Baghdad Railway. It was simply because the government continued to

impose limitations upon Britain’s Mesopotamia policy by the

circumstances of European diplomacy and the needs of Indian strategy.

Actually British policy was limited to the protection of British

commerce and its strategies concentrated on commercial expansion.15

Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was conditioned by commercial

considerations. Britain and India continued to control 67 to 70 percent

of the trade from Baghdad. The number of British trading companies

registered in Mesopotamia increased between 1910 and 1914. British

government attempted to compensate for its exclusion from the

Baghdad railway by confirming its interest in Mesopotamian irrigation

and concession in petroleum industry.16

In 1912 Britain had withdrawn her earlier demand of

participation in construction and control of the railway project between

Baghdad and Basra. This concession did not, however, imply that she 14 Ibid., p. 53. 15 Ibid., p. 58. 16 British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, op. cit., p. 58.

173

was prepared to abandon her interests in Mesopotamia. Admittedly, in

the negotiations towards a settlement, priority was given to the Persian

Gulf. Britain not only kept a watchful eye on her interests in

Mesopotamian navigation and irrigation but also cultivated a growing

interest in the oil fields of the Mosul and Baghdad provinces.17

But, economically the Great Britain had always differed a good

deal from other imperialist countries. The growth of capitalist economy

such as industrial financial trusts and capitalist monopolies has been

the chief feature of British imperialism. Its take off period began, first of

all, along the line of growth of immense and powerful monopolies over

sources of raw materials and in shipping.18

The general trend in Persia’s foreign economic relations during

the period 1890 and 1903 showed a sign of increase by 80% in trade

with Russia and a reduction of 15% in trade with Britain. Britain, just at

that time, managed to get a foothold in one of Persia’s main economic

sectors, namely oil.19

The whole line of argument presupposes the trade in Persia from

the British point of view. By changing the perspective and looking the

matter from the Persian point of view there is a skewed economic

development. Britain in Persia developed transport and

communication, and required various concessions as well as invested

her capital in various ways for the development of trade. However, the

British on their part did not do much for the people of Persia. So there

remained various lacunas in economic sectors in Persia – of which

agricultural sector was one of them.20

17 Joseph Heller, British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914, London, 1983, p. 90. 18 Ralph Fox, The Colonial Policy of British Imperialism, London, 1933, p. 9. (This book is

preserved at the Sapru House Library, New Delhi). 19 Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 146. 20 Ibid., p. 146.

174

B: BRITISH INFLUENCE AND HER CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA

IN PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

During nineteenth century both, Russia and Britain, had imperial

interests in Persia. The first half of the 19th century witnessed Russia

advancing southward from the Caucasus and extending her influence

in Persia. By the latter part of the century, the centre of pressure had

shifted from Azerbaijan in the west to Khorasan in the East.21

Britain’s interest in Afghanistan was based on strategic

consideration. Britain had a vital interest in preventing any hostile

power from dominating the great barrier – Afghanistan. Unlike Iran, in

Afghanistan it was Britain who was on the offensive whereas Russia

either stood apart or, at most, tried to use the Iranians as her spearhead.

Britain’s overbearing policy led to two Afghan wars, the first in 1839-

1842 and the second in 1878-1879. Both were caused by the pro-Russian

policies of the Afghan rulers who were unwilling to subject themselves

to British interest. During the first war, the British conquered Kabul and

captured Dost Mohammad, the ruler of Afghanistan (1826-1863).22

Britain secured the new Afghan rulers Abd-er-Rahman Khan

(1881-1901) and his son Habibullah’s (1901-1911) neutrality in the

conflict between the British and Russian interest. But the principle, on

which the war was fought, was the exclusion of Russian influence from

the vicinity of India.23

In 1856, in order to defend her possession Britain embarked on

pre-emptive war and began to capture strategic places and ports in

21 Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and Defence of India 1884 to 1892 – A Study in the Foreign Policy

of the third Marquis of Salisbury, London, 1959, p. 10. 22 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Historical, Vol. 1, Part A, op.cit., p.

224. 23 Ibid.

175

Persia and Persian Gulf. British troops captured Bushire, Mohammerah,

and Ahwaz and forced Persia for peace. The Anglo-Persian treaty of

Paris (1857) provided for evacuation of Afghanistan and the recognition

of Afghan independence.24 In 1864, Britain made arrangements with the

Shah of Persia and extended her influence in Kermanshah, Hamadan,

Tehran and Bushire.25

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1873 delimited Amu Darya as

southern Russian frontier and excluded Afghanistan completely from

its sphere of influence. The dominance of Russia in the Balkans

resulting from Russian-Ottoman war within four years from this

convention was counter balanced by the intervention of other European

powers.26

During the Turko-Russian war of 1877-78, the Turks were hopeful

of the British aid whereas the Russians were fearful of the British

interference. After a desperate and valiant resistance at Plerna, the

Turks were defeated and Russian troops reached the gates of

Constantinople at its famous suburb, San Stefano, where a Russo-

Turkish treaty was signed on March 3, 1878.27

The Russian-Turkish war led to deterioration of relations between

Britain and Russia. As noted above, however, preliminary peace

settlement was made at San Stefano. On the other hand, in order to

restore European unity, Bismark invited Russia and other signatories to

the treaty of Paris (1856) at Berlin. After getting the informal assurance

of annexing Cyprus by the Turkish Government to Britain, in return for

British guarantee to protect Asiatic Turkey from Russian aggression,

24 The Middle East in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 32. 25 Middle East: Past and Present, op. cit., pp. 225-226. 26 A Short History of Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, op.cit., pp. 87-88. 27 William, Yale, The Near East – A Modern History, America, 1958, reprint 1968, pp. 89-90.

176

Disraeli (Prime Minister of England, 1868 and 1874 to 1880) agreed for

this assembly at Berlin. This resulted in successful settlement of

territorial disputes between Russia and Ottoman. It was later on

formalized.28 After this settlement, Russia turned her attention towards

Persian Gulf ports.

In pursuance of the expansionist policy, Britain also resorted to

extend her influence on the southern part of Persia and the Persian

Gulf. Actually, British interests were intimately involved in the

maintenance of free communication between England and India. But

Russia was trying to increase her influence on the shores of the Persian

Gulf. This clash of interest between Britain and Russia posed direct

menace to British possession in India. It is on this ground that the latter

wanted their supremacy in the Persian Gulf at any cost.29 For this

endeavour, Britain tried to counter commercial competition from other

imperial powers like Russia in Persia. Along with this, she was

prompted by the political interest in the Gulf region to protect India

from other European rivals.30

In 1884, the importance of Iran as ever was increasing for Britain

from the point of India. Russia threatening advancement towards

central Asia and Afghanistan alarmed Britain about India’s security

since Afghanistan and Persia had long been regarded as part of India’s

hinterland. This led to the shift of interest from Eastern question to Iran.

Hence geographical situation of Persia and its proximity to India gave

rise to political consideration of Iran for Britain.31

28 J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535-1914,

London, 1956, Vol. 1, pp. 189-190. 29 Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914- A Study in Imperialism, op. cit., p. 30. 30 Ibid., p. 441. 31 Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892, op. cit., p. 5.

177

During 1885-87, the motives of Russian trade advances were not

clear to British. Many speculations regarding the trade motives of

Russia in Persia were put forward by British. First, some observers

believed that Russia wanted to have control over the ports and the

entire Gulf. Secondly, some thought that by annexing Northern

provinces of Persia, she wanted to seek economic gains. Thirdly and the

most important of all of them, it appeared that she wanted to make

conquest of India. The view given by Grant Duff about Russian motive,

however, was that she wanted a southern outlet to establish an

unobstructed communication with great seas.32

Apparently the motives of British and Russia seemed different

but the policies to advance their motives were similar. Both of them

wanted to establish hegemony in Persia by influencing the Persian Shah

and his chief ministers. They wanted to acquire as much part of Persia

as possible whereas denying it to others.33

During 1887, in view of the new situation after incorporation of

Merv and the scheme of Trans-Caspian railway, Russia felt a serious

and greater task ahead to increase its influence at Russian frontiers in

order to counter-balance her influence with other European countries

entering Persia.34

For this purpose, therefore, Russia wanted one of the stations of

Trans-Caspian region to be connected with the Persian railway system

to bring it under the control of Russian Government.35 Russia wanted to

build her influence in Persia as the execution of Persian railway system

largely depended upon Russia’s capital. On the other hand, from

32 Ibid., p. 11 33 Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914- A Study in Imperialism, op. cit., p. 148. 34 British Foreign Department Documents, June 1887 (secret F pros.), Nos. 340-468, NAI, p. 1. 35 Ibid. p. 1.

178

military, strategic and commercial point of view Russia was bound to

construct railways in Persia or help her in the execution of the project.36

Some proposals were put forward by Russia before Persia. The

main points of the proposals are as under:

1. Persia should allow Russia the right of navigation in the lagoon at

Enzelli.

2. Persia should give Russia the right of navigation in all other rivers

flowing from Persia into Caspian Sea.

3. The Persian Government should construct road from Enzelli to

Tehran and from Ardebil to Astara.37

4. The last point that Russia proposed was an undertaking from

Persian Government allowing a concession for railway

construction within five years period in which Russia could freely

draw a plan and choose favourable railway lines all by her, thus

Persia being free to give concession for remaining railway line to

others.38

Regarding these proposals, Persian government had certain

objections, especially regarding the five years concession for railway

construction that was to be given to Russia. It objected that in the event

of the French and the American also coming to Persia and without their

cooperation the advancement of Persia would be hampered. To this

effect, Persia desired that the British should be informed about the

proposal and sought their advice.39

36 Ibid. pp. 1-2. 37 It is situated in the north west of Iran on the Caspian sea. 38 British Foreign Department Documents, 1889 (Secret E Programs), Nos. 548-552, NAI, p. 1. 39 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

179

In accordance with the proposal, the rivers (Atrak, Shur) were

opened to Russian trading vessels in which water flowed all years. The

navigation was to be under some restriction as applied to the Karun.40

The road from Ardebil to Astara was included in construction

programme whereas the road from Resht to Tehran might be

constructed by the Russians. The Shah of Persia would allow Russia

four years during which she might select one line from the north to

Tehran. After this period, the Shah of Persia could give concession to

other countries.41

With the improvement of communication from 1900-01, Russian

trade increased in Persia from the south of Tehran to the Gulf. But

Russian advancement had to be checked by Britain for the security of

her hold in Persia.42 In 1902 the best way to counter Russian advances

in Persia was to construct railways from Constantinople to Baghdad as

it would bring the Turks in force to oppose the Russian and get proper

share in control of railway and its outlet in the Persian Gulf.43

On the other hand, Russia increased her commercial interest

rapidly in Tabriz, Tehran and Mashhad and serious inroads were being

made in Isfahan and the central districts of Persia. The British were

apprehensive that Russia possibly would threaten British trade in

Southern Persia.44

40 Ibid. p. 2. 41 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 42 The Persian Problem- An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in

Persia with some Account of the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway Persian Problem, op. cit., p. 363.

43 Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914, op. cit., p. 404. 44 The Persian Problem- An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in

Persia with some Account of the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway Persian Problem, op. cit., p. 347.

180

C: EXTENSION OF TELEGRAPHS

Being apprehensive of the Russian advances in Persia, Britain

tried to search some viable means to secure her position in Persia.

Furthermore, she also resorted to various policies like getting hold of

strategic places, building of railways and developing Nushki-Seistan

route, extension of telegraph etc. To begin with, Britain’s aim behind

installing the Persian Gulf telegraph was to make its use more efficient

for her administration in the various regions of Persia. The installation

also meant to benefit Britain for communication between England and

Persia45 and in untoward events, for the deployment of military forces

etc., and protection of trade.46 The discussion below, thus, aims to bring

out the various measures Britain adopted to develop her interests in

Iran and neighbouring regions.

In this connection, the Directors of the Red Sea and Indian

Telegraph Company were said to have received guidelines from Sir

Mac Donald Stephenson (Managing Director of East India Company) to

establish a new company in order to restore communication with India

through cables by aforesaid company in 1861.47 The proposal regarding

the formation of new company, the dispatch of a vessel with cable,

instruments or other appliances for the immediate re-instatements of

telegraphic communication with India through the Red Sea was

represented by several parties.48

45 Report from the select committee on East India finance with proceedings minutes of evidence

appendix and index, 9 February 21 August 1871 (Colonies East India Session), British Parliamentary Papers (1 public), Shannon, Ireland, 1970, Vol. 19, pp. 400, 408 cf. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Historical, Vol. 1, Part II, op. cit., p. 2400.

46 Russia and Britain in Persia, op. cit., p. 412. 47 Mr. Buchanan, East India (Parliamentary Papers) annual lists and General Index of the

Parliamentary Papers relating to the East Indies, Published during the years 1801 to 1907, inclusive, return to an address of Honourable the House of Commons, dated 30 March 1909, ordered by the House of Commons, to be printed 31 March 1909, London, p. 1.

48 Ibid., p. 2.

181

The Capital needed for the formation of new company to restore

telegraph communication between the Suez and India, connecting Aden

and Karachi in the first phase, was expected to be raised by the British.

But it carried certain terms and conditions regarding material transfer

from the an old company possession, over the repair of line, profit in

term of dividends as well as the transfer of ownership of the company

from private hands to the government in wake of loss incurred by the

company.49

In 1859, the British constructed the first telegraph line in Iran. Till

this period the British government was desperately looking for

establishing a system of telegraphs from Europe all the way across the

near East to India. In 1864 and even later the Indo-European telegraph

company was granted the right of building telegraph lines across Iran,

with the provision that they were to serve internally. These lines

entered Iran through her western frontier and divided at a point on the

central plateau, with one section joining the submarine cable at Bushire

on the Persian Gulf and the other line continuing overland through

Balochistan to India.50

In Oman, the British obtained installation of telegraph rights from

the Sultan in two treaties (the first dated 17th November 1864 and the

second 19th January 1865). They related not only to their proper control

in Arabia and Makran, but also to territories which they then held on

lease from the Persian monarch.51

In 1863, the Porte opposed the construction of Baghdad-Basra line

by British agency and decided to undertake the construction on its own.

49 Ibid., p. 9. 50 Donald N. Wilber, Iran, Past and Present, New Jersey, 1958, p. 159. 51 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, op. cit.,Vol.1. Part-B, op. cit. p. 2411.

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On 20 October 1863, however, a contract was executed between Great

Britain and Turkey under which Ottoman government was supposed to

construct a railway line at its own expense from Baghdad to Khanaqin

near western frontier of Persia while the government of India on its part

took responsibility of carrying a submarine cable to Basra or at same

point near the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab to meet the Baghdad-Basra

land line.52 (Also see Map-3).

From 1870 onwards, the third phase of imperialism known as

New Imperialism started with flow of capital from imperial countries to

their respective colonies. Now the economic and financial dominance

was being replaced by the military role. The new game of concession

hunting had begun. Iran, lying on the direct route between Europe and

India, was an essential link in the new international chain of

communications that was growing up, and inheritably speculators

turned their attention to telegraphs and railways first. In a few years,

the telegraph line from Europe to Baghdad and Tiflis were linked

through Tehran with the line running down the Persian Gulf to India.53

In 1901, at a convention, the British tried to remove the difficulty

of extending the telegraphic communication between Europe and India

through Persia. It was signed at Tajrish near Tehran on behalf of the

British and Persian governments. Ratification took place in January

1902. By this, it was settled that in addition to the present line of

telegraph from Tehran to Bushire (on the western fringes of Persia) and

the submarine cable from there to India, three wire lines of telegraph

should be carried by the Persian government from Kashan via Yazd and

Kirman to the Balochistan frontier.54 (See map-4).

52 Ibid., p. 24003. 53 L.P. Elwell Sutton, Modern Iran, London, 1941, pp. 58-59. 54 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Vol. 1, Part-B, op. cit., p. 2432.

183

The following cables and land lines were at that time controlled

and worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the

Persian Gulf and its environs:

1. A cable from Karachi to Jask was initiated in 1868 of a length of 528

nautical miles.55 Its main stations were at Karachi and Jask.

2. A two-wire land line from Karachi to Jask opened from Karachi to

Gwadar in 1864 and from Gwadar to Jask in 1869. Its length was

699.85 nautical miles and its stations were at Karachi, Ormarah,

Pasni, Gwadar, Chahbar and Jask.56

3. A cable from Jask to Muscat opened in 1901 whose length was 219

nautical miles. It had stations at Jask and Muscat. (See map-5).

4. A Cable from Jask to Hanjam opened in 1904; its length was 136

nautical miles. Its stations were at Jask and Hanjam. This cable was

originally laid in 1869 as part of a direct cable between Jask and

Bushire.

5. A cable and land line from Hanjam to Bandar Abbas crossing

Qeshm island was completed in 1905. The total length of the cable

was 17.491 nautical miles and of land line 30.75 miles, its stations

being at Hanjam and Bandar Abbas. Actually this line was

constructed on behalf of the Persian government; but the

management of this line remained in the hands of Indo-European

Telegraph Department owing to the non-payment of the cost of

construction.57 Foreign Department document throws much light

over this matter. The Persian government had agreed to the

Hanjam-Bandar Abbas extension which they aimed at building by

55 Knot = 1 nautical mile = a unit of distance of approximately 2,025 yards or 1,852 meters. 56 Ibid., p. 2434. 57 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, Vol. 1, Part-B, op. cit., pp. 2434-2435.

184

themselves with the aid of the Indo-European Telegraph

Department. It would have been delayed probably in view of the

poor economic condition of the government.58

6. A cable from Hanjam (it is an island situated at the mouth of the

Persian Gulf near Bandar Abbas) to Rishehr (it is situated in the

western part of Persia), opened in 1904. Its length was 3785 nautical

miles, and its stations were at Hanjam and Rishehr (in Iran).

Rishehr was connected with Tehran (it is situated in the northern

part of Persia) via Shiraz (it is situated in Southern part of Persia)

and Isfahan (central part of Persia) by a three-wire line, of which

one was in possession of the Persian Telegraph administration.

During that time, it was the Department’s main line between India

and Europe. Signalling was carried on direct between Karachi and

Tehran, the electric current being automatically reinforced at the

intermediate stations of Jask and Rishehr.59

In 1905 the British had already drawn a scheme for Koh-e-Malik

Siah, Nastrabad, Hanjam, Bandar Abbas extension. They further

planned to include the extended line under their domain.60

Sir Arthur Hardings (British Minister in Tehran) had put strong

objection to the appointment of the Russian signallers on the Kuchan –

Trans-Caspian frontier telegraph line, and for British right to enforce for

the linking up of Nastrabad with Koh-e-Malik Siah as a counter

concession. Nasir al Din (1848-96), the Shah of Persia, verbally admitted

that their demand (i.e. the demand of the British) was reasonable.61

58 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret – F proceedings),

Nos. 143-237, NAI, p. 8. 59 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabial, Vol. 1, Part B, op. cit., pp 2434-2435. 60 British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret – F), op. cit., p. 5. 61 Ibid, p. 22.

185

According to Captain McPherson62 and Major P.M. Sykes’s63

proposals, one signallers should be sent to Birjand and one to Turbat. In

their opinion, the British should have sent a complete staff of inspectors

and linesmen, but would involve much expense without any material

benefit. But it would be better alternative as the British and the Russian

repairing parties could not be successfully employed jointly.64 The

British preferred to ask Persia to open British office at Turbat and

Birjand instead of Mashhad and Nastrabad to counterbalance the

Russian signallers. The British also desired for the linking up of the line

from Koh-e-Malik Siah to Nastrabad.65 The British wanted to have

telegraph extension to Koh-e-Malik Siah whereas the Russian wanted to

extend their telegraph to Khorasan.66

The Marquis of Lansdowne proposed to appoint two more

English signallers for Mashhad-Nastrabad line as soon as weather

permitted – one to be posted at Turbat, the other at Birjand. The British

considered it of greatest importance not to recede from the fulfillment

of Harding’s warning to Persian government that the British should

claim concession identical with those given to the Russian.67

The Persian government wanted to connect Bojnurd with

Bajgiran, on the Perso-Russian frontier between Mashhad and

Astrabad. If the proposal had been approved it would have provided to

the British a good opportunity to reopen the question of the Koh-e-

Malik Siah–Seistan extension to which the government of India had

attached so much importance.68

62 McPherson was British consul for Seistan and Kain in 1905. British Foreign Department

Documents, 1905 (Secret – F), op. cit. p., 22. 63 British Acting Consul General and Agent of the Government of India in Khorasan. Ibid., p. 29. 64 British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret – F), op. cit., p. 17. 65 Ibid., p. 6. 66 Ibid., p. 29. 67 Ibid., p. 54. 68 Ibid., p. 47.

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D: DEVELOPMENT OF NUSHKI-SEISTAN ROUTES

Besides installation of telegraphs, other steps were taken by the

British to maintain their position in Persia by developing Nuskhi-

Seistan route. Britain observed the over- whelming Russian interest in

the North of Persia, whereas the British had special interest in Southern

Iran especially Siestan. Actually the British were afraid that Russia

could move towards the Gulf with a plan of railway connection within

the interior of Persia.69 The British opposed the Russian control of

northern Persia due to following reasons. First, Britain was afraid that

Persia would serve as a base for Russia to advance towards India and

Balochistan. It was quite likely that Russia could develop the railway

line for this purpose in Persia. It was also expected that Russia could

establish a naval base in the Gulf. This threat was to be avoided, first by

maintaining Persian integrity and secondly, no construction of railway

in Seistan was to be allowed by Britain so as to make it less attractive.

Thirdly, it was to be insured that Chahbar, the only port, should not be

fortified by British rivals for use against India.70 The British policy in

Persia to counter Russia could be operative and possible only after

Russia had moved in the north. The British planned to make a move in

the south, making Seistan as the possible theatre of operations.71

From the commercial point of view, Seistan and Nushki were less

important, but they were strategically significant for Britain. It was

apprehensive that Russia would proceed towards India through this

route. So the British wanted to develop this route in order to keep those

regions secure. The British were trying to develop this route through

69 Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1940, op. cit., pp. 257-119. 70 Ibid., p. 264. 71 Ibid., p. 252.

187

the extension of telegraph in Seistan by establishing imperial bank and

providing trade facilities on the Quetta-Nushki-Seistan-Mashhad Trade

route through the new camel contract.72 (See map-6).

The Government of India suggested that besides Tehran, a

telegraph line between Seistan and Koh-e-Malik Siah and Hanjam and

Bandar Abbas should be installed. For the execution of this task, Britain

desired to send more British signallers to be appointed on the Mashhad-

-Seistan line.73 But it just disagreed with Hardinge’s (British Minister at

Tehran) view that the men could not make the journey in the great heat

of Nushki.74

Meanwhile Russia also tried to establish her influence in Seistan

telegraph office as mentioned earlier. The British consuls at Mashhad

and Seistan, informed Sir A. Hardinge that under the pressure of

Russia, Mushir-ud-Dawlah, the Shah of Persia, allowed Russian

telegraphists’ “provisional” access to the office on the Seistan-Mashhad

line. Under the circumstances, the Persian government could not refuse

equal rights to England.75

Finally, the Russian succeeded in obtaining the Shah’s (Mushir-

ud-Dawlah’s) permission for their telegraphists’ access to the office on

the Seistan line and also their entry in Seistan line telegraph

department. As a counter-move, the British sent two European

signallers of the Indian Telegraph Department to Seistan and Khorasan

with the proposal that their pay be fixed on a scale similar to those

already employed there.76

72 British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret - F Proceedings), Nos. 143-237, op. cit.,

p. 1. 73 Ibid., pp. 5-16. 74 Ibid., p. 17. 75 Ibid., p. 13. 76 Ibid., p. 23.

188

If all went on well as thought out by the British, the position of

the Russian could be greatly weakened. The British expected to gain the

active cooperation of the Persian staff on the Seistan line against the

Russians, as the latter were very unpopular at that time and much

discredited.77

During 1905, Persian ruler, Shah Mushir-ud-Dawlah informed

that the Russian ministers at Tehran had agreed to recommend to his

government for the withdrawal of all the signallers from Khorasan and

Seistan. But the Russian Government to this effect informed that they

were sending an expression of their views on the whole question in a

dispatch which was expected to arrive at the Persian capital shortly.78

Although a number of Russian signallers had recently arrived on the

Mashhad -Seistan line, Russia appeared to be making no attempt to

obtain instruments for the Seistan office as ordered. Mr. Churchill79

informed Macpherson (the British Consul for Seistan and Kain) to see it

that no new Russian telegraphists were employed on Mashhad-Seistan

line.80

The British Government had no objection to Russian to

connecting a telegraph line of Kuchan with that of trans-Caspian

frontier. They also had no objection to the construction of a new line of

telegraph connecting Mashhad with the Russian frontier, in case a

similar facility was afforded to English consular officers and English

77 British Foreign Department Documents, 1905, Nos. 143-237, op. cit., p. 26. 78 Ibid., p. 38. 79 Sir Winston Churchill (Leonard Spencer) (1874-1965) British conservative statesman and Prime

Minister (1940-5 and 1951-5). He served as Home Secretary (1910-11) under the liberals and first Lord of the Admiralty (1911-15) but lost this post after the unsuccessful Allied attack on the Turks in the Dardanelles. He was only to rejoin it in 1939 under Neville Chamberlain whom he replaced as Prime Minister in 1940.Philip W. Goetz (Editor in Chief), The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 3, pp. 307-308.

80 British Foreign Department Documents, 1905, Nos. 143-237, op. cit., p. 38.

189

merchants for direct telegraphic connection between Seistan and Indian

frontier.81

The British were of the view that only by using their commercial

and political ascendancy, they could construct a line to be drawn across

Persia from Seistan eastward via Kirman and Yazd to Isfahan and

westward to Burjurd and Hamadan, Kermanshah, making the south of

it as the sphere of British influence.82

The British also established a branch of imperial Bank of Persia in

Seistan, and loans and cash credits were offered by the Bank. The

Government of India did not advance over financial assistance to the

merchants and traders in Seistan and Eastern Persia. But if the bank

approached the secretary of state on the issue, the issue would be

resolved.83

The only option left was to get some prosperous British firm to

take up trading operations on a large scale in Seistan and Eastern Persia,

on some guarantee against any odds in form of losses that he meant in

context of the Bank. The Bank as is evident could take only those

operations which would be of some material help to the trading firm.84

The Third and the last step taken by the British to develop

Nushki-Seistan routes were in 1904. H.R.C. Dobbs (The British political

agent on Deputation to Russo-Afghan frontier) informed to L.W. Dane

(Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department) about the

growing Russian activities in eastern Persia. It is believed he was in

81 Ibid., p. 81. 82 Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 83 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, February 1905 (Secret F

proceedings), Nos. 229-234, NAI, p. 13. 84 Ibid., p. 9.

190

Seistan.85 As Russians maintained a rapport with camel owners who

were Afghans of Anardarra, he proposed for the regular camel contract

for Nushki-Seistan-Mashhad trade route.86 Colonel C.E. Yate, a British

agent informed about the desirability of increasing camel

accommodation on that route. It was also informed to L.W. Dane

(Secretary to the government of India) about the improving supply of

camels for transport in Nushki-Seistan route.87 From February to July,

108 camels were hired privately by the merchants for carrying goods for

Seistan and Mashhad as against 672 required by the Government of

India as it was of utmost significance for military purposes.88 The

Government of India in turn was said to have made a deal with

Sillahdar camel party for transport at cheaper prices along the said

route. In 1904 in view of growing trade and transport suggestion was

advanced to improve supply of camels on Nushki-Seistan route.89 The

contractors had supplied 339 camels on government service between

Quetta and Nushki at a rate of Rs 5 per camel. It was in total 1,690 for 4

months, an average of Rs. 5,070 per annum with a total of Rs. 42,795.90

A local camel corps was employed for facilitating trade. British

government could not afford to supply camels to traders on Seistan

route at lower rate than the existing prices of the contract. Out of that

the camels supplied for British Government purposes, 672 were

employed for Seistan-Arbistan Commission and the Telegraph

Department. The same opportunity would not occur in future, but

could be used in other work, for example, as the trade flourished on the

85 Ibid., p. 15. 86 Ibid.p. 15. 87 Ibid., p. 17. 88 Ibid., p. 28. 89 Ibid., p. 17. 90 Ibid., p. 32.

191

line.91 In another agreement of 11th February 1904 with the British agent

certain camel contractors promised to supply camels for trade purposes.

The contractors received Rs. 250 as subsidy on the condition that they

agreed to provide regular supply of camels at fixed prices for trade to

Seistan and Mashhad.92

Special officers or a British vice-consul was appointed at Koh-e-

Malik Siah to look after the interest of the traders. This would help the

traders in their customs formalities. It should also be notified that the

new contract on freight charges from Quetta to Mashhad were

equivalent to those from Bandar Abbas to Mashhad and it could also be

reduced if camels were engaged for the return journey.93 Captain A.D.

Macpherson wrote in his confidential diary that the new camel contract

was not working satisfactorily as the traders were upset with scarcer

transport at that time. Their goods were lying at Quetta and Dalbandin

(a town and union council in Balochistan).94 As far as the problem of the

supply of transport was concerned a new contract came into existence.

This contract was for the supply of transport on the Quetta-Nushki-

Seistan-Mashhad trade route. The contract was signed for one year with

the agreement of Mauladad Khan, Mainkel, Khazal Khan, Shawani of

Karani, Rasul Bakhsh, Lango of Mamgachar and Rai Bahadur Bhik

Chand and Co. of Quetta.95

A feature of the new contract was the sum of money which the

contractors would give for the hire of camels.96 Another feature of the

contract was that the contractor was to be held responsible for the delay

91 Ibid. p. 32 92 Ibid., p. 50. 93 Ibid., p. 1. 94 Ibid. p. 5. 95 Ibid., p. 7. 96 Ibid.

192

in journey if not constrained by the interruption of weather. As a token

of penalty he had to pay 8 annas per day per camel. In case of detention

a report of every 12 hours would be made by the Jamadar of the Caravan

and handover to the nearest Thana. Anyhow, if there was a delay in the

submission of the report, the contractor had to give Rs. 5 for each camel

comprising the Caravan.97 If the goods were damaged in transit, the

contractor would be held responsible for that. But he would be at liberty

of refusing the delivery if the goods were not packed properly. It would

be counted as camel men’s fault. If there would be any raids, the

contractor would not be responsible for the loss.98 The contractor shall

have to ask for the fees before the departure of any Caravan from

Nushki, because after that he could have no right to claim the fee.99

A first class customer bureau had been established at Koh-e-

Malik Siah to avoid the difficulties experienced by the traders

proceeding to Khorasan by the Nushki route. This bureau would enable

the Kafilas (Caravans) to proceed directly to Kainat (situated in

Afghanistan) and Khorasan via the Palan-Koh (hills range in

Afghanistan) route, and to avoid the detour through Seistan. In addition

to it, a British consular agent had been deputed to Koh-e-Malik Siah to

look after the interests of British traders travelling on road.100

97 Ibid., p. 8. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., p. 9.

193

E: BRITISH DESIGN TO ESTABLISH NAVAL BASE IN

THE PERSIAN GULF, 1903

The British policy towards the Persian Gulf, particularly their

designs to establish a naval base in the gulf, was motivated by various

factors. First, the foremost aim of Britain was to protect and promote

her trade in these waters. In order to maintain peace and security of her

ships in the Persian Gulf waters, Britain endeavoured to suppress

piracy and slave trade.101 To achieve these objectives, the system of

Maritime trade, introduced in 1835 continued to develop. Lorimer is of

the view that in 1873 effective naval measures were taken by Britain in

East Africa and the Persian Gulf for the suppression of trafficking in

slaves.102 It is yet another matter that Britain herself retained a liberal

share of that commerce till 1901. Moreover, the British considered the

establishment of a naval base in Persian Gulf by any other power as a

dangerous move to British interests.103 British Rear Admiral, Day H.

Bosanquent’s (Commander-in-chief, East Indian Station) opinion was

that there were two primary considerations which governed the

selection of points for British occupation as naval bases in the Gulf. The

first was the danger to India from the establishment of a Russian naval

base or fortress at Bander Abbas. The second was the danger posed to

the East Indies squadron by any maritime power establishing a base in

commanding position (such as the Mosandam promontory) at the

entrance to the Gulf.104

101 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, August 1905 (Secret E

proceedings), Nos. 280-307, NAI, p. 7. 102 Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia,Vol. 1, Part A, op. cit., P. 271. 103 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret E pros.), op. cit., P.

17. 104 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents,November 1902 (Secret E

proceedings), Nos. 7-21, NAI, p. 15.

194

In order to overcome the first danger, the British realized that it

was necessary to occupy Qeshm and Hormuz, to secure the line of

communication between Qeshm, Karachi and Bombay. The British

wanted to occupy the area of the Persian gulf from the Isthmus of

Maklab to Mosandam point, together with the harbour of Duhat Haffa

(in Oman), which would be required as an advanced base for small

ships employed for scouting between Muscat and Jask.105 From strategic

view-point, the Mosandam promontory was most important for naval

purposes in the Persian Gulf and could never be allowed to fall into the

hands of an enemy.106 (See map-7).

On the other hand, Duhat Haffa, Mosandam, Kuwait, Qeshm and

Hormuz would then form India’s strategic frontier on the Persian Gulf.

(Rear Admiral Day Bosanquent believed that even on strategic frontier

only certain points could be occupied by force). And as these places

were all capable of being defended by ships only, so long as Great

Britain could afford to keep a sufficiently strong naval squadron in and

near the Gulf, it would be unnecessary to fortify them.107 If any foreign

power like Russia ventured to establish a naval base, the British

probably would take a similar measure at the nearest point on (above

mentioned group) the island of Qeshm.108 As to the establishment of the

naval base, the British had into consideration that Russian wanted to

occupy the island, which would enable them to control, or at any time,

to seize, Bandar Abbas. So the British were fully aware of the Russian

105 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, November 1902 (Secret E

Proceedings), op. cit., p. 15. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid.

195

activities in the Persian Gulf.109 At last, in 1894, Britain established her

naval base at Bandar Abbas.110

From October 1902 to 1904, Britain seriously saw to it that no

foreign powers, particularly Russia, should establish a commanding

position at the entrance of the Persian Gulf.111 The British Government

could not tolerate the intrusion into any part or territory in the Persian

Gulf by any other imperial power. The British regarded the

establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by

any other power as a great menace to British interests. For all interests

and purposes, the Britain certainly was prepared to resist it with all her

means at her disposal.112

109 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, 1902 (Secret E Programs), op.

cit., p. 11. 110 The Persian Problem- An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in

Persia with some Account of the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway, op. cit., p. 72. 111 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, 1905 (Secret E), op. cit., p. 25. 112 Ibid.

196

F: ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907

During the first decade of twentieth century, Persia witnessed

intense political upheaval. Russia supported reactionary113 rulers in

Tehran, whereas Britain was in favour of Democratic Party in 1905. In

1906, the crisis precipitated when five thousand Persian merchants,

representing the democratic bourgeois class, demonstrated against their

ruler. They asked for a favour of British government to help establish a

parliamentary form of government in Persia under a limited royal

authority. Their success antagonized Russia – even though this entire

event that led to success had been engineered by the British for their

own ascendancy. In 1907, taking advantage of their alliance with

Britain, they instigated Shah to recapture power and declare the

constitution.

But this was a short-lived affair. The Democratic Party again

regained its power. However, the 1907 agreement between Russia and

Britain antagonized the Democratic Party which treated the agreement

as encroachment upon Persia’s independence.114

Foreign domination in Persia reached its climax with the signing

of Russian-British convention in 1907. Apparently, it seemed favourable

for Russia but in reality it prevented the southern expansion of Russian

frontiers as it was already being weakened by the defeat at the hand of

Japan (Russian-Japanese war 1904-05). The British also suffered loss of

prestige because contrary to the expectation, there was an utter

disregard of Persian interest in this convention. Iranian regarded this as

113 The political group in Persia who preferred the status quo, meaning thereby they were against

the reform and the modernization of the Iranian institution. They were mainly supported by the Czarist Russia, For details, Middle East: Past and Present, op. cit., p. 347.

114 The Middle East in the World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

197

partition of their country and along with Russia considered British as

their enemy.115

By the agreement of Russian-British convention of 1907, two

zones of influence were created – Russian “sphere of influence” in the

North and the British “sphere of influence” in the south with a neutral

sphere in the middle between the zones of influence. Powers other than

Russia and Britain were not permitted to carry on any political activities

in Iran. Besides northern zone Russians also got some parts of central

Persia upto Isfahan and Yazd. The British got south eastern Iran

including Kirman and Bandar Abbas and a new oil field116 (South West

of Iran) was deemed as neutral zone.117

The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 contains other provisions

as well such as

“Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support

in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of the third

power, any concessions of a political or commercial nature – such as

concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads transport, insurance,

etc. – beyond a line starting from Qasr-e-Shirin (is a city in Kermanshah

province in Iran), passing through Isfahan, Yazd, Kakhk (is small town

in Khorasan province in Iran) and ending at a point on the Persian

frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not

to oppose, directly or indirectly, the demands for similar concessions in

this region which are supported by the Russian Government”.118

115 Modern Iran, op. cit., p. 60. 116 In 1908 oil was discovered by the D’Arcy concessionaries at Masjid-i-Sulaiman in south-west

Iran (north coast of Ahwaz), Keith Mclachlan, ‘Oil in the Persian Gulf Area’, in Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., The Persian Gulf States, London, 1980, p. 119.

117 Richard N. Frye, Iran, op. cit., p. 68. 118 Government of India British foreign Department Documents, July 1912 (Secret E proceedings),

567-638, op. cit., p. 53.

198

This accord of 1907 resulted in some calculated advantages in

favour of Britain. Britain succeeded in avoiding the danger of Russo-

German cooperation and gained Russia as an ally in the Gulf. Though

the treaty seemed unworkable over the issue of Persia but in a view of

impending European war, it proved advantageous for Britain. She

considered this treaty a lesser evil among existing alternatives available

for Britain. Further, Britain got guarantee of control over Seistan.119

Russia realized, after the conclusion of the treaty of 1907 that her

influence in Persia had considerably declined. Russia imposed great

restriction upon Persia, thereby antagonizing the monarch of Persia and

thus, favouring Britain. It occurred to the Russian government that after

this treaty Russia would suffer a loss. She feared a general outburst of

hatred of the Muslims against her in wake of European war.120

The most important point of the convention was the renunciation

of Persia’s own independence as Britain and Russia were empowered to

engage themselves in maintaining the integrity and independence of

Persia. As a result of these conditions Perso-German commercial treaty

became illusory as in reality Germany lost its claim of status as a

favoured nation.121

Russia did not like other powers to participate in the negotiations

conducted jointly by England and Russia. She viewed this act as

objectionable and detrimental to the idea of establishing friendly

relations of reciprocal confidence.122

119 Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914, op. cit., p. 368. 120 Arnold T. Wilson, Persia the Modern World- A survey of Historical Forces, op. cit., pp. 132-

133. 121 Government of India British foreign Department Documents, July 1912 (Secret E proceedings),

Nos. 1-83, NAI, p. 60. 122 Ibid., p. 61.

199

Regarding the revision of the proposal designed to stabilize the

relations between Persia and the two powers, the British government

came up with some proposals and tried to make it acceptable to the

powers concerned.123

In course of discussion on these proposals the expression “small

army” gave some difficulty. According to the British, on one hand this

expression gave apprehension to Persian government as it conveyed the

impression that the two powers wished to limit the size of the army. On

the other hand, the British suspected that the discussion on this (small

army) was intended to lead to the engagement of Russian officers for

the north (of Iran) and British officers in the south (of Iran). But it was

also revised before submission to the Persian cabinet.124

On the other hand, taking advantage of the situation Germany

penetrated into Persia commercially and intensified its political

influence over Democratic Party. But Russia kept pressurizing Persia in

Northern zone (after 1907 as Northern sphere of influence). The

differences between Germany and entente powers deepened. Finally, to

resolve it Germany and Russia made an agreement in 1910 at St.

Petersburg. Germany accordingly recognized the north Persian region

as the northern zone of influence of Russia in Persia, whereas Germany

itself was given the right to extend the Baghdad Railway system in

northern Persia under certain circumstances. Great Britain viewed this

agreement as unilateral appeasement policy of Russia. But the inherent

incompatibility of Germany and Russia led them to war with each other

123 British Foreign Department Documents, June 1912, (External B Secret), op., cit., p. 73 124 Ibid.

200

in 1914. When the war broke out Persia’s independence was extremely

curtailed.125

As a result of Russo-British co-operation, both the countries made

military arrangement to protect their interest in Persia. They preferred

to maintain neutrality but later on these two powers engaged in their

military operations.126

125 Middle East in World Affairs, op., cit., pp. 35-36. 126 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

201

G: CURZON AND BRITISH STRATEGY FOR THE

PERSIAN GULF

During Lord Curzon’s127 viceroyalty (1898-1905) differences of

opinion arose among British Officials, over the policy to be pursued

towards Persian Gulf. There was severe friction between London and

Calcutta. In this controversy, Curzon supported a forward policy in

most instances, occasionally even undertaking aggressive measures

without Home approval.128

Lord Curzon’s arrival in India as Viceroy in 1899 coincided with

the commencement of a period of unprecedented international activity

in the Middle East, especially in Persia and the Persian Gulf. As

Viceroy, Lord Curzon pursued a vigorous policy directed against not

only towards Russia but also towards any power which sought to

encroach upon British paramountcy in the Gulf. Russia was steadily,

consolidating her influence in Northern Persia. Russian Commercial

interest therefore appeared to threaten the British position in Persia.129

Britain was aggressively and quite openly developing her schemes for

the construction of a railway in South Persia and for the establishment

of a fortified sea base.130 France was on the point of securing a suitable

coaling station in the Gulf of Oman as well as trying to establish her

influence over Bandar Jissech.131

British were simultaneously suspicious about Germany, which

was assiduously pressing forward the Baghdad Railway in Ottoman

127 Under Secretary for India, 1891-92; for Foreign Affairs, 1895-98; Viceroy, 1898-1905; Foreign

Secretary, 1919-1924, David Dilks, Curzon in India, London, 1969, p. 13. 128 Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914, op. cit., p.387. 129 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, July 1912 (Secret-E

Proceedings), Nos.567-638, NAI, p.85. 130 Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, London, 1911, pp.5, 86. 131 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, August 1905 (Secret-E

Proceedings), Nos.288-307, NAI, p.26.

202

Iraq. Germany was quietly seeking an outlet in the Gulf over which she

could exercise territorial control. Turkey, on the other hand, was

endeavouring to undermine the independence of Shaikh Mubarak of

Kuwait, over whom it claimed paramountcy. Thus Russia in Persia and

Germany in Turkey seemed to be preparing to establish themselves

upon the flank of India and to undermine British predominance in Gulf

waters.132

Apart from the activities of European Imperial powers in the

Middle East, other factors also shaped the formulation of Curzon’s

policy towards Persia. In the Boer War (1899-1902) Britain incurred a

heavy burden of expenditure. Keeping this situation in mind, the British

Foreign secretary Lansdowne and General Hamilton instructed Curzon

to formulate a policy towards the Middle East under certain guidelines.

Curzon was directed to maintain a passive, non-aggressive policy like

making treaties with other Imperial powers for their containment and

their own defence. But Lord Curzon, after becoming viceroy took an

engrossing interest in Gulf affairs, and was not persuaded by the Home

Government’s cautious stance.133

Russia tried to increase her influence as well in order to contain

British influence in South Persia. This could be realized with

construction of a railway line running from Kermanshah to Seistan.

Lord Salisbury (Secretary of State for India in 1874 and Foreign

Secretary in 1878) thought that Russia would not march towards

Tehran, which would entail the risk of a British stroke in the Gulf. Until

Russia had finished the Siberian railway, and completed her task in

Manchuria, she would not be disposed to exert any pressure on Persia.

132 India under Curzon and After, op. cit., pp.5, 86. 133 British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914, op. cit., p.50.

203

The departure of Salisbury from foreign office prompted Curzon,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1895-98)134 to engineer, a more

spirited extension of British interests in Persia. The new Foreign

Secretary Lansdowne cared little for such a division of spheres of

influence as would keep the British out of the North but would not

prevent Russia and other intriguer in the South. Russia must not be

allowed a footing in the Persian Gulf for naval or military purposes.

Lansdown warned Persia that no outside interference in Seistan would

be tolerated; rather he refused to draw a line beyond which Russia’s

southward progress would be opposed.135

The British had special interest in the South of the Gulf and

Seistan. Actually the British were afraid that Russia could advance more

towards the Gulf even through railway connection within the interior of

Persia.136 Curzon realized that British influence had declined and they

had no definite policy towards Persia. On the other side the Russian

grip was constantly increasing towards South of Persia through

construction of railways and introduction of steamers in the Gulf.137

Russia was also interested in the proposal to construct a trans-Persian

railway. These steps forced Curzon to think about a forward policy

towards Persia, which would be suitable for Britain’s own strategic

interests as well as acceptable to the British Government at London.138

First of all, in 1901 Curzon set about analyzing the nature and

progress of Russian ambitions in Persia. His finding was that Russian

interests there had so far been purely commercial, giving Britain no

134 Curzon, Under Secretary for India, 1891-92; Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1895-98;

Viceroy of India, 1898-1905. 135 Curzon in India - Achievement, op. cit., p.141. 136 India under Curzon and After, op. cit., p.81. 137 Curzon in India - Achievement,, op. cit., p.157. 138 Government of India, British Foreign Department Document, July 1912 (Secret -E), op. cit.,

p.157.

204

cause for apprehension. He thought that if Russia for once obtained a

part of the Gulf, France and Germany would also enter it. On the other

hand, a Russian rail link to the Indian Ocean would mean the loss of

Seistan.139

In 1889 he had recognized that Seistan war was not of small

strategical importance. It was the meeting point of the spheres of British

and Russian influence.140 British government wanted exclusively to

keep Seistan for itself. So exclusion of foreign control from Seistan now

became definite part of British policy.141 To attain this objective the

British developed Seistan-Nushki route. It served two purposes: First it

secured British interest in the area. And secondly under Anglo-Russian

convention, Seistan was declared to be within the British sphere.142

Elsewhere in Southern Persia active steps were taken to

consolidate and develop British influence and to extend British trade.

The number of consular officers was considerably increased. The

system of Communication was also improved. Curzon introduced some

special new posts in southern Persia and along the Afghan frontier and

also supplied to each consulate suitable military escorts.143 Additional

telegraph cables were laid, and improved steamer and postal facilities

were obtained in return for increased subsidies given by Lord Curzon’s

government. Another subject of importance dealt with during Lord

Curzon’s viceroyalty was that of the Persian customs administration.144

139 Curzon in India - Achievement, op. cit., p.157. 140 Rouhallah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, op. cit., p.89. cf. India under Curzon and

After, op. cit., p.116. 141 India under Curzon and After, op. cit., pp.122, 123. 142 Curzon in India, op. cit., p. 143 cf. India Under Curzon and after, op. cit., p. 123. 143 Ibid., p.123. 144 The operations of breaking such bales and cases and converting them into packages of

dimensions and weights suitable for animal transport takes place under customs supervision, and merchants are further allowed to store such merchandise in certain rooms for which a rent is charged -inside the customs buildings until transport was available and the goods can be cleared

205

As a result of Curzon’s tour in the Gulf as viceroy at the end of

1903, the Government of India recommended the selection of suitable

naval base or coaling station at the entrance to the Gulf. This was

proposed out of fear that Germany and Russian fleet might enter the

Gulf.145

Moreover, the British Government of India considered the

establishment of a naval base in Persian Gulf by any other power as a

move dangerous to British interest.146 Active steps were taken by Lord

Curzon in order to maintain peace and security of British ships in the

Gulf.147

The naval importance of Elphinstone Inlet148 was recognized by

Curzon.149 The British secured certain advantages here, first, by using

this place for telegraphic purposes to prevent the entry of any other in

the neighbourhood and then utilizing Elphinstone Inlet for naval

strategy.150

Curzon inspected the inlets of the Musandom peninsula which he

considered of vital strategic importance in guarding the entrance to the

Gulf. The Musandom promontory for naval war purposes was most

important and he held that it could never be allowed to fall into the

hands of an enemy.151

for transit. Government of India. British Foreign Department Documents, July 1912 (Secret-E), op. cit., p.63.

145 K.H. Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates An Economic and Social Survey, Second edition, London, 1973, p.29. cf. Sir Thomas Raleigh (with an Introduction) Lord Curzon in India being a Selection from His Speeches as a viceroy Governor-General of 1ndia 1898-1905, London, 1906, Vol.II, p.232.

146 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, August 1905 (Secret-E Proceedings), Nos.280-307,NAI, p.17.

147 Ibid., p.17. 148 Elphinstone Inlet is situated near Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf of Oman (or near the entrance of

Persian Gulf). 149 India Under Curzon and After, op. cit., p.98. 150 British Foreign Department Documents, August 1905 (Secret-E), op. cit., pp.7, 8. 151 Government of India, British Foreign Department Documents, November 1902 (Secret-E

proceedings), Nos. 7-21, NAI, p.15.

206

Curzon harped on the danger to India by the establishment of a

Russian naval base or fortress at Bandar Abbas. On the other hand it

would threaten the safety of the Suez route to India and would also be

helpful in improving Germany’s communication with East Africa.152

This led the British to expand their sphere in Persian Gulf. The British

sphere must include the whole entrance to the Gulf, including islands

like Hormuz, Larak, Hanjam, Qeshm and Lingah.153

Turkey was another pioneer which caused a great deal of worry

to British in the Gulf during Lord Curzon’s viceroyalty. She repeatedly

endeavoured to obtain possession of Kuwait and claimed suzerainty

over it. The Turks for long sought to make fresh conquests in the Gulf

and tried to secure the allegiance of Bahrain. There was reason to

suppose, however, that their eagerness to seize Kuwait during Curzon’s

rule in India was due to the belief that the harbour was the only

possible terminus for the Baghdad railway. During the term of Midhat

Pasha (Wali of Baghdad) in 1869- 70, the people of Kuwait had

successfully resisted Turkish attempts to bring Kuwait within the

latter’s control, and maintained their “practical independence”.154

In Curzon’s view the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan over

Kuwait was never more than a “politic fiction”.155 Great Britain had

never recognized the Turkish seizure of AI-Qatar. For Britain the best

thing that could happen to Eastern Arabia was that the Turks withdrew

from that region altogether.156

152 Ibid., p.15. 153 India Under Curzon and After, op. cit., p.131. 154 Ibid., p.98. 155 Kuwait’s ruler Shaikh Mubarak wished to preserve his own independence, and to enjoyed the

protection of British Worships in case of need, and also preferred to keep on good terms with his Turkish neighbour so far as was possible. He therefore thought it good policy to have a foot in each camp.

156 India Under Curzon and After, op. cit., p.102.

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Curzon wanted to give the status of a protectorate to Kuwait,

which however was vetoed by British Cabinet. The Cabinet was also not

averse to Germany having her railway outlet at Kuwait. The

negotiations to reach an agreement to this effect were held in 1913 and

1914 between Ottoman Turkey and Germany. However, the Basra -

Kuwait section was ultimately to be constructed by the British.157

Foreign domination in Persia reached its climax with the Russo-

British convention of 1907. Curzon thought it worth while to attempt in

collaboration with Russia, a demarcation of both power spheres of

influence in Persia. British political, commercial and strategic interests

were concentrated in Southern and Central Persia. Russian interests, on

the other hand, concerned the North. A line drawn from Khanaqin (in

Iraq) through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Kerbin and Yazd to Seistan was

to represent the boundary between the English and the Russian spheres

of interest.158 According to Anglo-Russian convention both the powers,

intended to have an army in the North under Russian officers, and in

Southern Persia an army under British officers.159 Curzon admitted that

the arrangement he had made suffered from certain imperfections. For

instance, Tehran, the Persian capital, was in the Northern zone, giving

Russia an advantage over England. More concretely, access to the Gulf

through Mesopotamia still remained open to Russia yet in the balance;

the advantages of the arrangement outweighed its disadvantages. In

fact, this agreement was intended to eliminate the basic point of friction

between England and Russia in Asia.160

157 Malcolm Yapp, ‘British Policy in the Persian Gulf,’ in Alvin J. Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 83, 84. 158 India and the Persina Gulf Region 1858-1907- A Study in British Imperial Policy, op. cit., p.219. 159 British Foreign Department Documents, June 1912 (External -B Secret Proceedings), Nos. 1-

83, NAI, p.77. 160 India and the Persina Gulf Region 1858-1907- A Study in British Imperial Policy, op. cit.,

pp.219, 33.

208

Opinion in official circles in India was not in concurrence with

this agreement to divide Persia into British and Russian spheres of

influence, though for the wrong reasons. Colonel K. Gardiner, a

member of the viceroy’s Executive council, protested against the

passive tone of agreement. He wanted the absorption of the Southern

and Central regions of Russia as a policy to get better dividends. No

doubt such an orientation would entail an increase in commitments, but

it would also reduce Russian pressure on the frontiers of India.161

The Anglo-Russian convention achieved a privileged diplomatic

position for Britain in the European arena. It may be said that Britain

gained an ally against Germany, in general and specifically in the Gulf,

or at least the danger of Russo-German cooperation against Britain was

temporarily removed. Anglo-Russian understanding, according to

British Cabinet members, was in Britain’s vital interests.162

The Persian Gulf was left in the neutral sphere, but in practice the

danger of Russia’s acquisition of a Gulf port, now practically

disappeared. As Grey was later to write, “The cardinal British object in

those negotiations was to secure ourselves for ever, as far as a treaty

could secure us, from further Russian advance in the direction of the

Indian Frontier.”

Lord Curzon, however, was not in agreement with the British

Government regarding this treaty which, he considered, would not

secure the Persian Gulf. As a result of this treaty Russia expanded its

influence in the West to Qasr-e Shirin on the Turkish frontier and,

through Isfahan, Yazd arid Khak, to the point where the Russian and

161 Ibid., p. 219. 162 British Foreign Department Documents, October 1912 (External-B Proceedings) Nos.31-117,

NAI, p.64.

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Afghan frontiers intersect.163 The province of Arbistan as also Bushire,

Shiraz and Isfahan and the region along the Karun River was of

paramount interest to Britain. Curzon felt that the treaty had led them

to dissociate themselves voluntarily from these interests and to abandon

that preferential position for Britain which represented its position of

supremacy, “a Fruit of many decades.”164

A more cogent objection was advanced by General Sir Edwin

Collen, a military member of the Executive Council. Collen questioned

the wisdom of dividing Persia into spheres of influence on strategic

grounds. He argued that immediately after a demarcation had been

effected, Russia would concentrate her energy in the sphere allocated to

her and convert Northern Persia into a strong military zone. It would be

futile to hope for a corresponding degree of British activity in the South.

The result would be the military entrenchment of Russia along the

Khanaqin-Seistan line, a couple of hundred miles to the South of the

present position held by her. The only favourable policy therefore

should have been to maintain the integrity of Persia and push Russian

influence as much to the north as possible.165

Another disadvantage for Britain was the loss of control over

land covering important trade route through Khanaqin to Baghdad. It

now fell within the sphere of influence of Russia. As a result Britain

would weaken her position in Southern Persia.

The severest criticism in the British political circle against

convention (1907) related to political fall-out upon British interest in

163 British Foreign Department Documents, July 1912 (Secret-E Proceedings), op. cit., p.53. 164 India Under Curzon and After, op. cit., pp.130-131. 165 India and the Persian Gulf Region 1858-1907- A Study in British Imperial Policy, op. cit., p.220.

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Southern Persia. This convention would allow other powers to enter

into this region hurting British supremacy.166

Curzon’s ideas were opposed to Hamilton (Secretary of State of

India 1895-1903) on certain other grounds. It was apprehended by him

that this new understanding between Russia and Britain would

necessitate Britain convincing the Shah of Persia that dividing his

territory was the immediate object of present policy of Britain. This

situation would jeopardize the established policy of Britain to keep

other foreign powers away from Southern Persia.167 Curzon came to

realize that Persia and other countries were apprehensive that this

convention was an effort to partition Persia. He further realized that

Russia would take advantage of self denying clauses of the preamble

(which recognized the freedom of international commerce) of the

convention. Curzon’s apprehension proved correct as Russia made an

agreement in 1911168 with Germany by extending its Northern Persian

railway for a link with the Baghdad railway at Khanaqin. Further

Russia made a secret agreement with Germany in 1915 to encroach

upon the neutral zone of Persia, as was subsequently exposed by

Russian Bolsheviks government after the October Revolution of 1917.

In comparison with the authorities in London Curzon’s policy

may certainly be called “forward” for the Home officials tended to

temper their concern for the protection of British interests in the Gulf to

their diplomatic needs in Europe. For such contradictions in the

interests of Imperialism there could be no “perfect” solutions.

166 India Under Curzon and After, op. cit., pp.131-132. 167 Ishtiaq Ahmad, Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905-1914, New Delhi, 1974, p.43. 168 Harold Nicolson, Curzon the Last Phase 1919-1925 A Study in Post War Diplomacy, London,

1934, pp.128-129.