The 82 probably genuine maxims of Kautilya are here presented in what we believe to be their originalthematic order, for consecutive reading. They may be accessed individually from the Overview (whichserves as the detailed Contents page for the maxims), or by their Arthashâstra (ArS) number from theInventory.
IntroductoryPrefaceArgument for a Kautilya core in the ArthashâstraArrangement of Material in the ArthashâstraOverview of the Kautilya Maxims in the Arthashâstra
The MaximsKautilya's Maxims for Consecutive ReadingInventory of Kautilya Quotations in ArthashâstraOrder of Citation of Authorities in Arthashâstra
Comments and AppendicesEpitome of Kautilya in the Early Indian Statecraft TraditionChinese Statecraft Passages Mentioned in the CommentaryWorks Cited
Kautilya is renowned as the architect of the Indian Maurya dynasty (established in c0317), and at thesame time, is often condemned as the author of the statecraft text Arthashâstra (ArS). The "Kautilya"maxims, which are cited in the third person in ArS (there is thus no question of his authorship of ArS)do suggest a consistent point of view, implying that they might reflect a single person, and notimplausibly a person of Chandragupta's time. Here are some points in favor of that view:
Most of the maxims are not primary pronouncements. They are reactions to earlier opinions inareas such as law and diplomacy. They also address questions of palace intrigue and dynasticsuccession. They do not deal with custom or piety as such. The Kautilya of the maxims thusappears to be a synthesist rather than a specialist, but a synthesist with a special interest inmaintaining rulership and giving it effect in the real world. As far as it goes, that mental horizonwould not be inappropriate for the general advisor of a dynastic aspirant.The maxims imply a court of only modest size and complexity. This agrees well with theobservations of Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to the court of the first Maurya ruler,Chandragupta.By contrast, the portions of the ArS which do not contain Kautilya maxims imply a moredeveloped bureaucracy, and thus a later period. They comment on areas such as battle tactics,with which the Kautilya maxims do not deal. They go far beyond the situation implied by theKautilya maxims, and that described by Megasthenes. Instead, they suggest the more advancedsituation implied by the Ashokan inscriptions, or by other evidences for the late Maurya state.In particular, the many Pali-isms and such other presumptively late features as the mention ofCina [China] do not occur in the Kautilya maxims. They occur only in the surrounding text, orin chapters which contain no Kautilya maxims at all.
This suggests to us that the maxims are plausible as representing the thought of Kautilya, and mighthave been written down not long after his death in c0300. The rest of the book, by contrast, seems toreflect the later Maurya period. We believe these parts of the book were added subsequently.
The ArS maxims seem to reflect a consistent and early body of Indian statecraft thought, schematicallyexpressed, but in their content probably referring to the end of the 04th century. From those maxims,historians will get a glimpse of India at a moment of transition, and students of modern administrationwill often find their science anticipated. To both, and to readers in general, they offer a more focusedvignette of Kautilya and his predecessors than does the larger, but later, remainder of the Arthashâstra.
We here present those maxims in a slight adjustment of their present ArS order, to reflect what webelieve was the arrangement of their first compiler. The philological argument for our order, and for ourconclusion that the maxims themselves reflect Kautilya, is given at various points in the commentary,and is summarized on the Argument page. Our commentary to each maxim takes up points of historicalinterest as well as relevant philological details. We have sometimes added references to analogouspassages in the Chinese statecraft texts, mostly from the late 04th and early 03rd centuries. India andChina were very different societies in this period, but they were also going through somewhat analogousprocesses. Not much detailed information is available on either side, but we offer these parallel extractsas perhaps suggestive.
On the philological side, our debt to the annotated translations of Shamasastry (1957) and especiallyKangle (1972), on which we have largely relied in place of the Sanskrit original and much of itsassociated scholarship, is obviously profound. For helpful advice and correction, we are further gratefulto Michael Witzel and Patrick Olivelle, and to other members of the collaborative Sindhic Joint Seminarfrom the year 2000 onward. Further suggestions from readers of this on-line version will be muchappreciated, as we continue to study the text and to sharpen our own responses to it.
During his years in Berlin, Fu Sz-nyen briefly studied Sanskrit. He never became fluent in Sanskrit, buthis sense of the importance of Indian history for Chinese history is one we share. We think that theKautilya fragments, with their scholarly interest and political importance, would have pleased Fu Sz-nyen, whose own career combined the scholarly and the political. We have dedicated these pages to
Kautilya's MaximsOverview of Kautilya Sayings in ArS
Kautilya sayings occur in ten of the fifteen books of the Arthashâstra, but they cluster in only five ofthem: ArS 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9. It is those five topics - statecraft, law, diplomacy, strategy, and war - thatseem to have defined the range of Kautilya's statecraft thought. In this reconstruction, we haverearranged the Kautilya sayings to put them wholly under those rubrics. On the Evolution page we showhow that beginning was thematically expanded in the later layers of the Arthashâstra, and how someKautilya maxims were redistributed to legitimize that expansion at key points.
Clicking on a reference will take you to that saying. See also the parallel list of Chinese Statecraftpassages cited in the notes.
1. The Statesman (ArS 1-2)The Place of Our Science: 01, The Sage King: 02Civil Order: 03, 04The Heir Apparent: 05, 06Succession and Usurpation: 07Choosing Ministers: 08, 09Consulting Ministers: 10, 11Dishonesty of Ministers: 12, 13
2. The Judge (ArS 3)Family Law
Marriage: [not represented]Divorce Through Abandonment: 14, 15Inheritance: 16, 17
Addendum: 16a "Usanas"Civil Law
Witnesses: 18Contracts for Labor: 19Robbery: 20, 21
This is a consecutive overview of the considerations which lead us to conclude that the Kautilya maximswithin Arthashâstra (ArS) may be earlier than the admittedly late date of most of that text, and, morespecifically, may come from a source close to the historical Kautilya. In effect, we argue for a several-layered ArS, in which the Kautilya maxims occur only in the earliest layer. The argument is long. Itproceeds backwards, from the latest to the earliest material. Some points are further investigated onassociated pages, which are linked below as they occur in the argument. Here are the subdivisions ofthe main argument:
We should note at the outset that the ArS is divided into 15 "books," each in one or more chapters, andthose in turn into 180 sections (150 sections, if continuations are counted as one). The chief fact onwhich the present argument is based is that the Kautilya maxims do not occur evenly distributed withinArS, but are confined to certain books and chapters. It can then be verified that the linguistic featureswhich have often been pointed out as signs of late date for the ArS as a whole are clustered in the ArSbooks and chapters which do not contain Kautilya maxims. The implication is that the Kautilya maximscomprise a linguistically early stratum within ArS, and that the rest of ArS represents an expansion(perhaps in several installments) beyond that original stratum.
It will be easiest to follow the process in reverse, starting with certain elements which have been widelyrecognized as either late in content or extraneous in form.
Latest Additions
Kautilya. The next to last line of the text reads "Seeing the manifold errors of the writers ofcommentaries on scientific treatises, Vishnugupta himself composed the sutra and the bhasya."Kautilya's personal name Vishnugupta is mentioned nowhere else in the work; indeed, the supposedauthor is called Kautilya in the Book 15 ending formula directly preceding this line, and in the whole-textending formula directly following that. Kangle 2/516 calls the Vishnugupta attribution "clearly a lateraddition." It would seem to have been added after the work was otherwise formally complete. Its intentmay have been to temper the then-negative implications of the name or epithet Kautilya (etymologically"The Devious One"), for a later age which held deviousness in less esteem. The variant nameKautalya, preferred by some scholars, but attested only later, may be a similar attempt by an interestedposterity to mitigate a previous reputation,. Kangle (3/109-113) argues that the Kautilya form is earlierattested, in the texts, in the commentaries, and in the echoes in other works. We find that argumententirely sufficient.
Framing Structures
At the outer edges of the text are two framing elements. The first section of Book 1, exceptionally, isunnumbered. It summarizes the 180 following sections of ArS. It can only have been written when thework had reached that total size, and when its sections had been numbered from 1 to 180. The framing
statement respects this number 180 by not renumbering itself as section 1.
The last of those 180 sections (a single section, which makes up all of Book 15) is the other framingitem. It lists the rhetorical devices used in the preceding 179 sections. This too is outside the work assuch, though within its numbering system.
These two lists could have been added at any time after the completion of the ArS proper. Theunnumbered introductory overview is obviously the later of the two, and section 180 itself need be onlyslightly earlier. In what follows, we will ignore both, and consider that ArS, for our purposes, consists of14 books divided into a total of 179 sections.
Verse Portions
ArS is largely in prose, but includes about 380 slokas or verse passages (Kangle 2/5 n18). These arenot randomly placed. They occur at the end of every book and every chapter within each book; somealso interrupt the prose sections. The chapter-final verses are sometimes summary in character, butsometimes they simply continue the preceding exposition. The interruptive verses typically elaborate thepreceding lines. Some of them begin with transition words like "Therefore" (1/15:17). Literarily, theycannot stand without the prose text which they interrupt or conclude, whereas the prose text continuesto make sense if these non-final verses are removed. The verses are thus clearly later than the prosetext. Olivelle Dharma xxv notes that slokas began to replace the earlier sutra style in the administrativewritings "around the beginning of the common era." The presumption is that, to update ArS stylistically,the ends of all its chapters were at some point rewritten as slokas, and some explanatory slokas werealso added within the text. This might have happened as early as c100. In visualizing the text as itwould have appeared at an earlier period, we should then consider the interruptive verses as not beingpresent, and regard the chapter-final verses as having been originally written in prose. On thisassumption, the content of the chapter-final slokas remains part of the text, whereas the content of theinterruptive slokas is eliminated from further consideration. This affects our inventory of presumptivelyoriginal Kautilya maxims.
Late Material
As may be seen in the Inventory, the Kautilya maxims are not distributed evenly over the fifteen books(or as we have concluded above, actually fourteen books), as we would expect them to be if they werea mere authenticating gesture used by the author of a late work to connect it with a respected earliername. In that case, we would expect the sayings to be as well distributed as the chapter-final attributionstatements mentioned above. Instead, the maxims cluster. Most of them occur in only five books (ArS 1,3, 7, 8, 9). The few which occur elsewhere can easily be related to the themes of those five groups. Forexample, 5/6:23 and 5/6:32, on the subject of the transition to the heir apparent, might be thought tobelong thematically with the comments on preparing the heir apparent in 1/17:22 and 1/17:30. Book 5contains no other Kautilya maxims than these two. In fact, if we mentally relocate these two maxims toBook 1, thus placing them with the other ArS maxims on the same subject, Books 4-6 include noKautilya citations at all. Further, the nine books with few or no Kautilîya maxims (ArS 2, 4-6, and 10-14,and of course 15) do not cite any other authorities either (a reference to the Puranas in 3:7 is part of apassage which has other difficulties as well; Kangle 2/215 calls it "a late marginal comment that has gotinto the text"). They read like contemporary descriptions, not like authority statements. This is a differentstrategy altogether.
There is a further point. In general, the topics of the ten ArS books which contain few or no Kautilyacitations imply a later stage of political evolution than the other five. Among other things, they containminute specifications for the operation of a large state bureaucracy (ArS 2), they describe elaboratepolice mechanisms (ArS 4), they expound the highly ramified system of secret agents for which the ArSis notorious among modern readers (ArS 5), and they expound the mandala or "circle of kings" theory(ArS 6), another favorite of later readers, but on its face a suspiciously schematic view of internalrelations in a multi-state system. These books, then, may well be a later stratum than the books whichinclude groups of Kautilya citations.
Additionally, Hartmut Scharfe's vocabulary arguments for a c0150 date for the entire ArS turn out toapply not to the whole work, but essentially to material in this apparently later stratum. Scharfe's c0150date may be accepted as the earliest at which these late ArS extensions could have been compiled.
Whether they were added at one time or over an extended period does not affect the Kautilya question,and can be left to be clarified by future research. We do confidently identify them as late material. Weput them aside, and will not discuss them further.
Middle Material
Even in the ArS books where the Kautilya maxims cluster, they cluster unevenly within those books. InArS 8, for instance, which as a whole abounds with Kautilya maxims, all such maxims are found in thefirst four chapters, with none in the fifth. ArS 8 in general deals with a series of problems andemergencies encountered by the state. Only its fifth and final chapter discusses military problems. TheKautilya maxims themselves consider political and diplomatic matters, but not specifically military ones.In the late Book 10, a more extended consideration of military matters, it is conspicuous that two ancientauthorities are cited (in 10:6) on the makeup of the basic battle group, but without the usual final citationfrom Kautilya. It then seems likely that the last chapter in ArS 8 and other such chapters in thegenerally early books have been added to extend the range of those books into areas beyond thespecific "Kautilya" prototype. Since the addition of chapters to existing books is a different and lessdrastic structural device than the creation of whole new books, the chapters without citations (withinbooks which do contain citations) may be assumed to define a middle layer. That layer would consist ofthe last chapter of Book 8 and similar material: the first thematic ventures beyond the limits of the earlyArS, and of Kautilya himself. The addition of whole books on the same new topics would be a secondand later strategy, and the military Book 10 would belong to that later layer.
Early Material
Removing from consideration, as irrelevant to our present purpose, both the middle and later material asdefined above, it follows that the early layer of ArS must then comprise approximately the chapterscontaining significant numbers of Kautilya citations. But even these chapters do not wholly consist ofthose citations; they normally continue with statements further developing the position attributedto Kautilya, or else they precede the Kautilya citations by other material on the same general topic.These more developed statements are presumably the original voice of the Arthashâstra compiler, asdistinct from the quoted voice of Kautilya. It would then be a relevant and interesting task to defineexactly how far the original Arthashâstra theorist (apart from the later writer who expanded the ArS farbeyond the five chapters which were probably its original compass) had progressed beyond the positiondefined by the Kautilya citations.
Law. This early but non-Kautilyan material should thus probably be thought of as added to the core ofKautilya sayings on a given subject. In some chapters, that expansion process can be partly tracked,and a relative dating can be suggested. See for example the separate Law page, which discusses insome detail the expansion process as it can be seen exemplified in the early part of ArS 3.
The Kautilya Core
We come at last to the Kautilya citations themselves. These are almost always given in response to oneor more opinions by other and presumably earlier authorities. They often supply a corrective orrevisionist "last word" to them. Some of the non-Kautilya names cited are identified with known schoolsof interpretation, though there are difficulties in matching their content to that of the works whichsupposedly preserve the traditions of some of those schools. Is it possible that the Early Arthashâstraauthor has quoted the opinions of those schools in order to refute them by his own position, which hespeciously presents under the respected name of Kautilya? In that case, the motive for the ArS wouldbe controversialist, and its position, and that of the cited "Kautilya" which validates it, might relate to alater century, and thus be irrelevant to Kautilya in the late 04c.
Manu. The easiest test of this possibility is with the ArS citations of "Followers of Manu." There was alater school of legal interpretation identified with Manu; its text is the Laws of Manu (Manu Smrti). Thisis a wholly versified text (in sloka rather than sutra form), and thus, by Olivelle's canon, cannot be fromthe BC centuries. Do the Manu citations in ArS define a position which is recognizably that of theManu Smrti? There are points of similarity, and thus possible continuity, but on the whole they do notappear to define the same position. Kangle notes (2/6, 3/80) that the "Manu" citations in ArS largelydiverge from the views of the Manu Smrti. The same seems to be generally true of other ArS quotes
that can be compared with later school doctrines associated with those names. Then the evidentcontroversial intent of the earliest ArS cannot as a whole be referred to the substantially later periodfrom which the Manu Smrti and other extant representatives of those schools must (for other reasons)be dated. It is more plausible to conclude that the Kautilya quotes are arguing with predecessors of theknown schools, and of course also with some other viewpoints of that time which happen not to havelater successors.
We conclude that the later schools identified with some of the Kautilya opponents had diverged, atsome points substantially, from the ideas of their founders, and that the early ArS is reflecting them atan earlier stage in their development. It remains also possible that some of these schools were notreally in lineal descent from their claimed founder, but were borrowing an early name to authenticatelater doctrines. Into these complications we have not ventured. We have left them for future research bythose properly equipped.
The Authority Citations
What, then, is the nature of the authority citations as a whole? We may dismiss the possibility that theyare themselves a text, accumulated in a line leading from the earliest cited authority to Kautilya (thelatest), and representing doctrinal evolution in that series of thinkers within one tradition which wassimply codified or continued by the earliest ArS writer. For one thing, there is no one succession of suchthinkers in the ArS citations (Bharadvaja is the earliest name in one sequence, and the followers ofManu stand at the head of another), and many Kautilya positions are given in opposition to a morevaguely attributed opinion of "the teachers." Thus, several different traditions, some of them not very welldefined except as traditional wisdom, would seem to be represented. For another, some of thosecitations are more than a little implausible on their face, and may have been distorted or evenconcocted for the purposes of the ArS core compiler. The non-Kautilya positions as a whole have theappearance of being assembled for Kautilya to refute, or, more rarely, to homogenize or approve.
Unanswered Sayings. But we cannot dismiss all of them as invented, since some non-Kautilyamaxims are quoted without a concluding Kautilya wrap-up, apparently for their own value as earlyopinions. In the absence of a Kautilya opinion, we must assume that they were themselves authoritativefor the Early ArS compiler. Two such maxims are the statements of Usanas (10/6:1) and Brhaspati(10/6:2) on the standard battle array of the chariot army of the time. These disagree with each other,but they are not followed by a capping or harmonizing comment from Kautilya. Kautilya in general hasnothing to say about battle (as distinct from war), and ArS 10, which is concerned with battle, apparentlyrespects this fact by citing other authorities instead. Here, at least, the other authorities are not strawmen set up for Kautilya to improve on.
Dialogue. A third point is that the successive authority positions, as expressed in ArS, convey aneffect of dialogue among the authorities, which is unlikely if those positions were quoted from theseparately preserved maxims of their respective schools. It is more likely that they were rephrased bywhoever assembled them. Here again, but on different grounds, we reach the suspicion that the groupof citations did not exist as a text prior to its use by the early ArS. It then seems likely that the early ArScompiler himself did the assembling and rephrasing of these pre-Kautilya maxims, and structured themso as to maximize the force of the Kautilya maxims themselves.
The Kautilya School
There seems to be no ground in the ArS material, or in traditions reported elsewhere, to assume thatKautilya at any point wrote down his own maxims, or founded his own school of law or statecraft. Evenin the ArS 15 "Vishnugupta" addendum, he is remembered as a doer rather than a teacher. At thesame time, there is no doubt that he is the focal point of the ArS assemblage of citations, and that thecore ArS text continues past Kautilya's contribution in what seems to be the same spirit. The simplestconjecture that will cover this situation is that the ArS core author was a political theorist of theearly Maurya period, acquainted with the principles of Kautilya, and concerned to formulate them in textform, and that he may have done so shortly after the death of Kautilîya, in order to fill the gap left bythe fact that Kautilya did not write his own text, or found his own school. He set Kautilya's positions inthe context of previous opinions, gathered from the whole range then available, and connected andexpounded them. The core ArS, on this understanding, is not exactly a text of the Kautilya school, therebeing no Kautilya school in the strict sense, but a functional substitute for it: a systematic and
eponymous attempt to preserve Kautilya's statecraft as subsuming and replacing earlier contributions tothat science.
If the core ArS, though not by Kautilya, is a Kautilyan text, as this suggestion supposes, one detail ofthe final ArS becomes perhaps more intelligible. This is the "mandala" theory developed in ArS 6 (for adiagram, see Spellman 157), of the pattern of enmities and allegiances among the successively moredistant kingdoms surrounding the one with which the text is concerned. Such a multi-state systemwould have been eliminated by the Maurya unification, and the mandala theory would thus have beenobsolete, or at any rate less compelling, for any writer after Kautilya (Spellman, noting this difficulty,dates the mandala theory to c0500). That a late book of the ArS develops the diplomacy of Kautilya inthat direction shows, in our opinion, that Kautilya's own world continued to be "classical" for the authorof that book, just as the Han-dynasty (02c) chapters of the Gwandz still speak in terms of the multi-statesystem which was the context of that work's early layers, but which the Chin unification of 0221 hadeliminated as a political fact. The late ArS is then not exclusively based on the world of its own time; itis also concerned to elaborate in theory the world still embodied in the perceptions of its eponymousfigure, Kautilya. Keeping Kautilya's heritage alive will then have ranked with keeping it current, as amotive for extending the text. This suggests that the Arthashâstra, over the period during which it grewas a text, regarded itself as the definitive repository of Kautilyan statecraft.
Conclusion
Pending further results from study of the text and archaeological evidence, we feel that it is plausible onpresent evidence to conclude that the Kautilya maxims of the ArS represent him and his predecessors,not indeed in their own words, but in a formulation that may be close to them in substance.
This is an inventory of all statements quoted in the Arthashâstra (ArS) as from Kautilya or any otherauthority. Kautilya is nearly always quoted as the last in a series, giving him, in effect, the final word inthe discussion. In a very few cases, he or another authority is quoted alone. The pattern of occurrenceof these names, when they appear in a series of quotations, is summarized on a separate overviewpage.
In this index, we have ignored the name "Kautilya" in the authorship formulas which conclude eachchapter and each book, and the ArS text as a whole. Otherwise, this list is a complete index to the word"Kautilya" in the Arthashastra. Note that the numbering in this reference list (given in the first column) isnot identical with that of our final version of the Kautilya Maxims (given in the third column).
Quotations #1-26 (ArS 1-6)Quotations #27-50 (ArS 7)Quotations #51-78 (ArS 8)Quotations #79-87 (ArS 9-14)Order of Citation of Authorities in ArS
Kautilya's MaximsArS Kautilya Inventory 1These are the citations of Kautilya and others in ArS 1-6, numbered as they occur in the present ArS.Note that our final selection of Kautilya maxims (given in the "Tr" column) has a different numbering,since we reject one "Kautilya" saying, and do not include, in that numbering, citations of otherauthorities but omitting Kautilya. In the "Cited Against" column, below, Kautilya's name is understood tofollow the names here given (in which f/ means "followers of") unless we specify "only Kautilya." TheArS reference for a group of sayings is to the section containing the last cited authority, which is usuallyKautilya. The translation of any passage may be accessed by clicking on the sequence number in the"Tr" column.
#5 (ArS 1/10:17) is the only Kautilya citation in the entire work to be contained in a sloka verse. Sincethat verse is part of a chapter-final sequence (and thus was presumably an early saying recast, ratherthan a saying added later), that saying has been retained in the inventory.
The crux in Book 5, where it appears that Kautilya is cited first, is opposed by Bharadvaja, and then hasa final maxim of his own refuting Bharadvaja, is here treated for counting purposes as two Kautilyamaxims (#25-26, below). As will be seen by our note, we have included only one of those maxims inour translation, namely #26, regarding the anomalous #25 as a later addition.
Kautilya's MaximsArS Kautilya Inventory 2These are the citations from Kautilya and others in ArS 7. Kautilya's name follows those here given (inwhich f/ means "followers of") unless "only" is specified. The ArS reference is to the section containingthe last cited authority. Our translation may be clicked from the sequence number in the third column.
It will be noted that in this topically distinct section (Diplomacy), Kautilya is not cited as against aspecified earlier tradition, as is the case with the law sayings, but simply as differing from unspecifiedcurrent doctrine. These sayings may thus have a different history than the previous ones.
# ArS Tr Cited Against / [One authority only]
27 7:1:5 25 The Teachers, Vatavyadhi28 7:1:31 The Teachers29 7:4:9 The Teachers30 7:5:4 The Teachers31 7:5:13 The Teachers32 7:6:31 The Teachers33 7:9:10 The Teachers34 7:9:14 The Teachers35 7:9:19 The Teachers36 7:9:23 The Teachers37 7:9:27 The Teachers38 7:9:32 The Teachers39 7:9:51 The Teachers40 7:10:13 The Teachers41 7:11:14 The Teachers42 7:11:38 The Teachers43 7:12:10 The Teachers44 7:12:15 The Teachers45 7:12:19 The Teachers46 7:12:23 The Teachers47 7:13:32 The Teachers48 7:15:11 [Kautilya only]49 7:15:16 The Teachers50 7:17:4 The Teachers
Kautilya's MaximsArS Kautilya Inventory 3These are the citations from Kautilîya and others in ArS 8. Kautilîya's name follows those here given (inwhich f/ means "followers of") unless "only" is specified. The ArS reference is to the section containingthe last cited authority. Our translation may be clicked from the sequence number in the third column.
# ArS Tr Cited Against / [One authority only]
51 8:1:12 The Teachers, Bharadvaja52 8:1:22 Visalaksha53 8:1:28 f/Parasara54 8:1:37 Pisuna55 8:1:46 Kaunapadanta56 8:1:55 Vatavyadhi57 8:2:6 The Teachers58 8:2:10 The Teachers59 8:2:14 The Teachers60 8:2:22 The Teachers61 8:3:13 [Unattributed], Bharadvaja62 8:3:27 Visalaksa63 8:3:34 f/Parasara64 8:3:42 Pisuna65 8:3:52 Kaunapadanta66 8:3:58 Vatavyadhi67 8:4:3 The Teachers68 8:4:6 The Teachers69 8:4:10 The Teachers70 8:4:14 The Teachers71 8:4:17 The Teachers72 8:4:22 The Teachers73 8:4:25 The Teachers74 8:4:28 The Teachers75 8:4:32 The Teachers76 8:4:35 The Teachers77 8:4:39 The Teachers78 8:4:42 The Teachers
Kautilya's MaximsArS Kautilya Inventory 4These are the citations from Kautilya and others in ArS 9-14. Kautilya's name follows those here given(in which f/ means "followers of") unless "Kautilya only" (etc) is specified. The ArS reference is to thesection containing the last cited authority. Our translation may be clicked from the sequence number inthe third column.
We have not listed the repetition of #7 (ArS 1/15:47-50) at ArS 15/1:22, where it is cited to illustrate oneof the text's rhetorical modes.
# ArS Tr Cited Against / [One authority only]
79 9:1:6 The Teachers80 9:1:13 The Teachers81 9:1:32 Some, Others82 9:1:43 The Teachers83 9:2:22 The Teachers
The implication is that the ArS (1) originally had a smaller subject compass, with Kautilya sayings onseveral topics which (2) were later expanded by the addition of other material. Still later, (3) new topics(chapters) were added, beyond the compass of the topics actually addressed by Kautilya. To give aslightly Kautilyan color to these new areas, a few Kautilya sayings were removed from their originallocation and placed here. We have relocated them to what we think were their probable originallocations, leaving the latter part of the ArS entirely devoid of Kautilya material. It is very conspicuousthat authorities (Usanas, Brhaspati) whom Kautilya elsewhere contradicts have here no Kautilyaresponse.
The resulting pattern of Kautilya's range of comment, and his reshaping by later tradition to includedifferent subjects within his range, is also seen elsewhere.
The way in which previous authorities do or do not form sequences of constant order, as they are citedin ArS, is explored on the following Order of Citation page.
Kautilya's MaximsArS Order of CitationWe here give the order in which earlier authorities are cited in ArS, to see how many strands of traditionmay lie behind the ArS Kautilya citations. The result is apparently three, with a fourth case consisting ofKautilya himself as cited independently of other opinion. There is only one name common to the threestrands: that of [the followers of] Parasara). The double membership rests on ArS 2/7:12, whereexceptionally they appear in the Manu line. We assume that "the teachers," very frequent from ArS 3onward, are the same as the "ancient teachers" who are cited only in ArS 1.
In column 1, the name Bahudantiputra occurs only in ArS 1/8:24. Of all the authorities cited in additionto Kautilya, only "the followers of Parasara" occur in more than one sequence. They are normally part ofcolumn 1, whose subject tends to be political and diplomatic theory, though as "followers" they areunique in that column, which otherwise consists of founders. In ArS 2/7:12 (on fines formismanagement) they appear in the Manu sequence, column 2, which tends to be involved with legaland procedural questions. In the above table, we have parenthesized that one occurrence asexceptional. It is possible that these were different branches of the Parasara school specializing indifferent things. Another possibility is that there was a single Parasara school, which had a wider rangeof concerns than rival traditions.
The order of citation of authorities is on the whole constant throughout ArS. Exceptions are thefollowing, all from column 2: (1) The followers of Usanas are in one case (ArS 3/11:44) listed at thehead and not the tail of the sequence as here given. (2) As against the standard sequence f/Brhaspati> f/Usanas (three times in ArS 1-2), the reverse order of the founders, Usanas > Brhaspati, occurs inArS 10/6:1-2. In each case, the opinion cited first appears to reflect an earlier condition of things,whether administrative or military. We cannot exclude the possibility that, at some points, the order ofcitation in ArS does not reflect a clear chronological sequence, but is calculated for maximum dramaticeffect by the compiler of ArS, and that some or all of the various implied schools may have been moreor less contemporary with each other, or even with Kautilya.
Curiosity naturally attaches to the rogue-elephant school of Ambhi in column 3, mentioned only in ArS1/17:28. Kangle 2/41 informs us that nothing whatever is known of it beyond this one citation. Itsmention of secret agents may put it relatively late in the time covered by these citations (the topic isgreatly expanded in the later layers of the ArS). As conjectured above, it seems possible that Ambhi, ormore precisely his followers, should be thought of as roughly contemporary with Kautilya.
The comments attributed to the earliest names on these lists do not imply a fundamentally earlier stageof society than do the latest names. They address the same questions, albeit in different ways, and asa group they appear to represent at most early and late stages within a period of transition, rather thanearly and late phases in the evolution of society or the state.
[Traditional View]: The four sciences are Philosophy, the Triple Veda, Economics, andGovernment.
Followers of Manu: There are only three sciences: the Triple Veda, Economics, and Government.Philosophy is just a branch of Vedic learning.
Followers of Brhaspati: There are only two sciences: Economics and Government. Vedic learningis just a cloak to be worn by one wise in the ways of the world.
Followers of Usanas: There is only one science: Government. It includes all the others.
Kautilya: There are indeed four sciences (vidya), so called because from them can be known what isright and what is profitable.
The ArS compiler proceeds (in 1/2:10-12, continuing through all of 1/3) to elaborate on the content ofthe four sciences, which embraced the entire learning of the period. But Kautilya's gloss on "vidya"better embodies his utilitarian stance toward that learning: what is right (dharma) and what pays (artha).It will be seen that his maxims range within those limits. He is not a purveyor of Vedic learning, thoughhe makes a point here of not distancing himself from Vedic learning. At the other end of the scale, hedoes not subscribe to the cynical view of the Usanas school: that power gives, or can compel, all othergoods. See also the Epitome.
The progression among the previous authorities, where the number of branches of knowledge moves insteps from four down to one, suggests that they may have been at least in part composed or revised bythe ArS compiler, for the purpose putting Kautilya's sayings into sharper relief. Linguistically, these priorsayings show somewhat greater leakage from contemporary Pali into their basic Sanskrit than do theKautilya maxims themselves. At the same time, there are differences in the treatment of prior sayings indifferent parts of ArS which forbid the conclusion that they were freely invented by the ArS compiler. Weconclude that the prior sayings are liable to a higher level of restatement than those of Kautilya, so thatit might be perilous to reconstruct (for instance) the views of the Brhaspati school of the 04c from theBrhaspati citations in ArS, but that the prior sayings at least sometimes may have a basis in reality, andat their most schematic, they will still reflect the ArS compiler's idea of the content of statecraft beforeKautilya.
[One Opinion]: He should enjoy sensual pleasures but without compromising his spritual good andmaterial well-being. He should not deprive himself of pleasures.
[Another Opinion]: He should devote himself equally to the three goals of life, which interdepend.If any of them - spiritual good, material well-being, or sensual pleasure - is indulged to excess, it willharm not only itself, but the other two.
Kautilya: Material well-being is primary. Spiritual good and sensual pleasure both depend on materialwell-being.
This further locates Kautilya within the thought of his time. Comments like this are probably the sourceof the suggestion that Kautilya had intellectual affinities with the Lokayata, an early group of Indianmaterialists.
Ancient Teachers: The King who wishes to bring about civic order should keep the rod raised tostrike. There is no better means than the rod to bring people under control.
Kautilya: No. A King who is severe with the rod is feared by the people; a King who spares the rodis despised by the people. It is one who is just with the rod who is respected.
A concept of public justice is gaining ground against a previously autocratic ethos.
Just this position - that the King's power depends in part on how he is viewed by those to whom thatpower applies, and that severity alone will not make his position as ruler secure - was reached in theChinese statecraft debates of the middle and late 04c. See for example the Confucian view ofexcessively draconic punishments in LY 12:19.
Kautilya: For there is no country without people, and no kingdom without a country.
In the ArS as we have it, this maxim concludes some lines of advice about resettling the population of acountry whose fortress the King is about to besiege. The maxim itself seems to have a larger scope,and we assume it was moved from its original context, and placed in Book 13 to legitimate that lateaddition as having the authority of Kautilya. Our best suggestion is that this maxim was originally locatedamong the early theoretical sayings of ArS 1.
The idea that the people are the foundation of the state was common to the Chinese Legalist andConfucian theorists of the late 04c. In the Mencian school (first half of the 03c), it was taken to far moreradical levels than anything that may be read into Kautilya.
[Traditional]: [The King] should guard against them from their birth. Princes, like crabs, are apt todevour their begetters.
Bharadvaja: Before their father becomes fond of them, they should be secretly disposed of.
Visalaksha: This is cruel, involving as it does the killing of the innocent and the destruction of theruling caste. Instead, they should be confined to one place.
The Followers of Parasara: This creates the danger of the snake. The son, thinking "My fatherhas confined me through fear of my prowess," may contrive to get the father himself in his power. It isbest to locate him in a frontier fortress.
Pisuna: This creates the danger of the ram. Realizing that it is his only means of return, he mightbecome the ally of the frontier chief. It is best to locate him in the fortress of a neighboring prince, farfrom his own territory.
Kaunapadanta: This creates the danger of the calf. The neighboring prince might avail himself of thecalf to milk his father like a cow. It is best to locate him with his mother's kinsmen.
Vatavyadhi: This creates the danger of the banner. With him as their banner, his mother's kinsmenwould make demands like so many mendicants. He should leave him free to indulge in vulgar pleasuresFor sons engrossed in pleasures do not become hostile to their father.
Kautilya: This is to aim for your own death while you are still alive. For, like a piece of worm-eatenwood, a royal family with undisciplined princes would crumble when attacked. When the chief queen isin her fertile period, priests should make offering to Indra and Brhaspati. When she becomes pregnant, adoctor should direct the nourishment and delivery of the unborn. When she has given birth, the chaplainshould perform the sacraments for the son. And when he is ready, experts should train him.
Sensible rather than fearful. The King's son is not merely an asset, he is the indispensable asset: theonly means of continuing the lineage, and thus of giving ongoing "life" to the rulership. He should benurtured and trained rather than feared. This thought is continued in the following maxim.
It is said that the earlier Magadha rulers (05c-04c according to one chronology) were troubled withparricide. That milieu is evoked, perhaps in exaggerated form, in the maxims to which Kautilya herereplies. His view might be called more asset-oriented. The killing of Chinese rulers by their heirs andvice versa is abundantly documented in the centuries preceding the Warring States period. The tale ofChung-ar, the only surviving son of a ruling father, is among the most famous of these, and is probablyalso exaggerated for its emblematic value; for the story, see Watson Tso 40f.
The Followers of Âmbhi: . . . And a secret agent should tempt him with hunting and gambling,wine and women, saying "Attack your father and seize the kingdom." Another secret agent shoulddissuade him.
Kautilya: To awaken one who slumbers in this way is extremely dangerous. For an unfinished objectabsorbs whatever it is smeared with. So also this prince, being immature of mind, will take as doctrinewhatever he is told. Thus, one should instruct him in what conduces to spiritual and material good, notin what is spiritually and materially harmful.
Again, morally commonsensical. What you do to the heir is part of his education, and education shouldlead in the right direction. Do not test, rather train. Like the last maxim, this is a counsel of life. Asbetween Chinese views of life, it patterns with Mencius (Kautilya's contemporary) rather than the laterSywndz.
The absurd levels of secrecy and intrigue to which the followers of Âmbhi have evidently here attainedwere to be far exceeded by the later layers of the Arthashastra.
Bharadvaja: When the King is dying, the minister should induce members of the family, princes andprincipal officers fight against one another or against other principal officers. When any one does fight,he should bring about his death by inciting an uprising of the people. Or, getting rid of the members ofthe family, princes, and principal officers, he should seize the kingdom himself. For if the father fightswith sons and the sons with the father in order to win the kingdom, what becomes of the constitutingpower, the minister who is the one support of the kingdom? (29) He should not disdain what has cometo him of its own accord.
Kautilya: (32) This involves inciting the subject population to revolt. It is wrong, and it is alsouncertain in its outcome. He should place on the throne a prince with good personal qualities. In theabsence of such a one, he should call together the high officers and, introducing to them a prince notaddicted to vice, a princess, or the pregnant queen, he should say "Let this be a charge to you: haveregard for his father, and for your own good qualities and noble birth; he is only a symbol, and you arethe real masters. Otherwise what can be done?" When he says this, secret agents among them shouldbe prompted to respond "Who else but this King, with your guidance, will be able to protect the FourVarnas?" And replying "So be it," the minister should invest with the royal authority the prince, princess,or pregnant queen, and should introduce them to kinsmen, relations, and the envoys of allies andenemies.
This deals with the problem of the death of the King when the succession has not been securely fixedin advance. The stratagem is intended to repair the succession, artificially producing support amongthose most closely involved, and to present an orderly face to the outside world. It agrees with #6 inhaving the maintenance of legitimate succession as the sole goal of policy.
These two sayings were later relocated to Book 5 in order to legitimate that later material by giving it aKautilyan presence. They are there preceded by a long passage which at its end is ascribed toKautilya, and it is this advice to which the saying of Bharadvaja is nominally addressed in refutation.That Kautilya replies, in 5/6:32f, with a second method of securing an orderly rulership transition, hasbeen recognized as a difficulty. Nowhere else in ArS does a Kautilya saying occur otherwise than at theend of any other sayings which are cited on the same subject. We assume that 5/6:1-23 are aninvention of the later compiler of Book 5, and that the Bharadvaja saying did not originally begin withthe present text's "No," which we have accordingly removed. It is possible that a preceding saying by adifferent ancient authority was lost in the transfer from Book 1; if so, the preceding authority was either"The Teachers" (as in ArS 8/1:5) or unattributed (as in ArS 8/3:1-7). The material now preceding theBharadvaja saying contains several references to other parts of the ArS, which we interpret as a lateorganizing gesture, and it involves much more elaborate secret agent subterfuges than the Kautilyapassage above, whose use of agents is consistent with that in Maxim #6.
We have omitted the folksaying 5/6:30 and the following verse summation 5/6:31 from the end of theBharadvaja saying. Both folk material and intrusive slokas seem to be characteristic of later material. Wehave also ended the Kautilya maxim at 5/6:36. The subsequent material deals with events occurringafter the rulership transition itself, and we interpret them as an expansion by the later compiler.
Bharadvaja: [The ruler] should make his fellow-students his ministers, since their character andability are known to him, and they will have his confidence.
Visalaksha. No. Having been his intimates, they will treat him with disrespect. He should choosethose who resemble him in personal qualities. Since they have the same foibles and vices, they will fearthat he knows their secrets, and so will not dare offend him.
Followers of Parasara: But this works the other way also: fearing that they know his secrets, hewill acquiesce in what they do or do not do. He should choose those who have aided him in danger,since their loyalty has been proved.
Pisuna. No; this is mere devotion, not intelligence. He should choose those who have shown theirability by bringing in the expected income, or more, from assigned projects.
Kaunapadanta. No; these will not necessarily possess other qualities which are necessary in aminister. He should choose those inherited from his father and grandfather, since their reliability isknown. Being kindred, they will not desert him even if he behaves badly. This principle may be seeneven among animals, for cattle, passing by a herd of unrelated cattle, will abide rather with those thatare their kin.
Vartavyadhi. No; these will take charge of everything, and act as though they were the masters. Heshould choose new men, versed in politics. New men, looking on the wielder of the rod of punishmentas though he were the God of the Underworld, will not cause problems.
Bahudantiputra. No; one familiar with principles but inexperienced in affairs might fail in practice.He should choose those of noble birth, intellect, integrity, courage, and loyalty, these being thesupremely important qualities.
Kautilya: All these criteria are justifiable, for ability is best judged from performance. Assigning rankin accordance with their ability, and giving them suitable assignments, he should appoint all of them asministers - but not as counsellors.
Each criterion offers grounds for a favorable expectation of future performance. Note the distinctionbetween those appointed for skill in execution (ministers) and for advice in planning (counsellors). The"ministers" at this time included some who were merely managers (the criterion of Pisuna envisionsexactly that sort of responsibility) and not high policy advisors, as would be typical of a relatively simpleand early governmental structure, in which specialization of function has begun to occur, but has not yetbeen formalized in named offices. See further Kautilya's advice on advising, given in the next fewmaxims.
We have removed the interruptive sloka 1/8:9. On the other hand, 1/8:29, the Kautilya saying, is notsuspect even though it is in verse, since it occurs at the end of the chapter, where material previously inthe text may have been later versified. As for the selection criteria mentioned by the various authorities,it is notable that birth is not the only one; it is not even very common. The idea that performance countsmore than background may be expected to occur at times of social broadening. For Chinese examplesof advice offered in such conditions, see LY 6:6 (c0460) and, even more reminiscent of the presentKautilya saying, LY 6:8. Choosing staff according to ability was a typical recommendation of the 04cChinese statecraft writers; see for example MZ 8 (c0360) and GZ 3:17 (c0340), with an echo in the
The Teachers: He should appoint ministers who have passed tests of their intentions, and the trial byfear, to duties appropriate to their integrity.
Kautilya: However, under no circumstances must the King make himself or the Queen a target inorder to ascertain the probity of ministers.
Some tests, like the one laid out in ArS 1/10:3, evidently envisioned temptations, suggested by secretagents, to seize power from the King. Kautilya issues a warning against this kind of jeopardy. Comparethe same stance in Maxim #6, on testing the heir apparent.
Apart from the tail of Maxim #8, this is the only ArS Kautilya maxim in sloka form. It is part of a seriesof slokas at the end of ArS 1/10, and we assume that, with the following 1/10:18-20, it is originalmaterial later versified, and not a later verse interpolation. See our separate textual Argument.
Bharadvaja: Divulging confidential counsel is fatal to the security and well-being of the King and hisofficers. Hence he should deliberate alone about sensitive matters. Counselors have others they consultwith, and these in turn still others, leading eventually to disclosure.
Visalaksha: There is no advantage in deliberating alone. The King's affairs include the known, theunknown, and the inferred. Finding out the unknown, adding to the known, resolving contradictions inwhat is known, and learning more about the imperfectly known, can only be done with the aid ofministers. Rather, he should consult those of mature intellect.
Followers of Parasara: This is how to get greater certainty from counsel, not how to make itsecure. He should consult about a matter like the one he has in mind ("We did it this way," or "If thishappened, what should be done?"). He should then apply their advice to the actual case. Thus advicecan be had while still maintaining secrecy.
Pisuna: No. Counselors who are asked about a remote affair, whether it has taken place or not, willgive their opinion casually or disclose it; that is the flaw. He should instead deliberate with those whoare qualified for the specific undertaking. Consulting with these only, he achieves effectiveness indeliberation and also maintains secrecy.
Kautilya: No; this is a situation with no fixed rule. He should in general take counsel with three orfour, since if he confers with one only, he may not be able to reach a decision in difficult matters. Also,a single counselor is unchecked, and if he consults with two, he will be controlled by them if they agreeand ruined by them if they disagree. With three or four, this is less likely to happen, though there is stillgreat danger if it should happen. With more than three or four, it may be difficult to reach decisions ormaintain security. As appropriate to the time, the place, and the matter under consideration, he mayconsult with one or two, or deliberate by himself, according to his and their special competence.
Here again, Kautilya takes a pragmatic and eclectic stance, combining what is workable in the imperfecttheories of his predecessors. A judgement of appropriateness in context, rather than a rule mechanicallyapplied, seems to be his hallmark in these matters. His sense of the dynamics of group decision-makingagrees with that of modern masters such as Parkinson, for whom five people is the maximum effectivecommittee (p34).
We have eliminated two interpolated slokas, 1/15:17 (after the Bharadvaja maxim) and 1/15:22 (afterthe Visalaksha maxim). The latter includes a seeming folk saying. It is the association of folk materialand sloka form in this and other passages which inclines us to suspect all folk material as laterembellishments of the text (see our notes to Maxim #7 and Maxim #8). For the concept "resolvingcontradictions," in an ethical context but still with judicial or perhaps anti-judicial overtones, see LY12:10.
Followers of Manu: He should appoint a council of twelve ministers.
Followers of Brhaspati: Sixteen.
Followers of Usanas: Twenty.
Kautilya: According to their capacity.
Remembering Maxim #10, these prescriptions are apparently meant for a pool of expert managers, fromthree or four of whom advice is sought on a particular occasions. Kautilya avoids a fixed rule andfocuses on the practical issue, which is the amount of relevant expertise available for inclusion.
The previous authorities seem to reflect the usual course of an expanding early bureaucracy, with itsneed for ever more precise expertise. The drift toward governmental expertise is resisted in LY 13:4(c0322). The classic statement of the expansion principle is Parkinson 33f.
The Teachers: If one with a small income makes large expenditures, he is using revenues thatbelong to the state. In the reverse case, when he spends in conformity with his income, he is not doingthis.
Kautilya: This can only be detected by spies.
Spending in excess of income is still the standard indication of peculation. It can however take an auditto uncover it.
This and Maxim #13 are now located in a long section (ArS 2) describing the duties of the bureaucratsin great detail. Except for these two passages, ArS 2 contains no Kautilya maxims, and that book isbest regarded as a later expansion, beyond the limits of Kautilya's own thought and experience. Maxims#12-13 do not use the word "officer," and it may be presumed that in Kautilya's time bureaucrats werenot yet distinguished from the lower ministers.
[Unattributed]: And he should have their activities watched by spies.
Followers of Manu: For . . . loss of revenue, the fine is as much as the sum lost, and as muchagain for each successive instance . . .
Followers of Parasara: In all cases it shall be eight times.
Followers of Brhaspati: Ten times.
Followers of Usanas: Twenty times.
Kautilya: According to the offense.
Again the earlier authorities show a steady escalation, and again Kautilya invokes a canon of localappropriateness. Among other things, he may want to keep the structure going. Escalating penalties isnot always an efficient way to do this.
The unattributed comment at the beginning has the merit of linking up verbally with Maxim #12 (whichfollows rather than precedes it in the present text). ArS 2/7:10, which now follows that unattributedcomment, is untypically long for a single numbered ArS segment, and may have undergone expansionafter the numbering of the text was fixed. If so, the wording of the "Followers of Manu" maxim mayhave been adjusted to suit that expansion. We have left ellipses at the places where those adjustmentsseem to have been made. The core saying seems plausible as a canon of watchfulness over ministerialconduct. We should remember that ministers in Kautilya's time seem to have been, not the heads ofbureaucratic departments, but staff specialists less formally charged with certain functions. Thebureaucracy is here enduring growing pains.
[Previous Discussion]: The wife is liable to a fine if she leaves the house of her husband.
The Teachers: In cases of ill-treatment by a husband, there is no offense in a wife going to thehouse of her husband's kinsman, or a guarantor, or the village headman, or a guardian, or a femalemendicant, or to that of her own kinsman, provided there are no [unmarried] males in it.
Kautilya: Or even if there are males in it. How can there be any impropriety, in the case of a chastewoman? This is not something that is difficult to understand.
The impatience of Kautilya with the pettifogging of his predecessors is manifest.
It is logically tempting to transfer Maxim #18 (on witnesses) to the head of this section. In that samelogical spirit, the ArS author has begun his Book 3 with general guidelines for court procedure (includingsome of his own remarks on witnesses, not based on citations from Kautilya). But the later Laws ofManu introduce what might be called family law before the civil and criminal sections with which therules of witnesses are largely associated, and the Kautilya maxims in ArS 3 (as distinct from theirframing structure) seem to represent an early version of that tradition. We conclude that the order ofKautilya sayings as we have it in ArS represents a genuine tradition, and we have tried to leave thattradition intact.
It is notable that this comment addresses the case of separation under special conditions. There is nomatching Kautilya prescription for regular divorce, or, for that matter, for regular marriage. It might bethought that these parts of his legal thinking are simply not preserved in ArS. But ArS 3/2-3 doesprovide for more standard cases of marriage and divorce; it simply does so without citing the opinion ofKautilya or any other authority. We think it likely that the ArS framing text is later than Kautilya, andreflects a more advanced stage of legal evolution. In Kautilya we seem to be witnessing an earlierphase: the emergence of law as a public provision limited to special cases not already dealt with byreligious prescription or general custom. The maxims represent the residue, and not the totality, ofstandard procedure. Similarly, the Laws of Gortyn (Crete, 05c; see Willetts) treat of marriage andinheritance only in special situations that were presumably not covered by the common practice of thetime (Sealey Justice 69, 79). The extension of law to normal cases, in fact, the incorporation of thewhole range of common-practice rights and duties into formal law, would appear to be a laterdevelopment, in which local traditions are wholly subsumed in central traditions..
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[Previous Discussion]: Abandonment by the husband in a consummated marriage.
[Unattributed]: After a lawful marriage, the woman shall wait for a husband who has left withoutinforming her for seven [menstrual] periods if no news is heard of him, or for a year if news is heard. Ifhe has left after informing her, she shall wait for five periods when no news is heard, or ten if news isheard. If he had paid only part of the dowry, she shall wait for three periods if there is no news, orseven periods if there is news of him. If he had paid the full dowry, then five periods if there is no news,or ten if there is news. She may then, with the permission of the judges, remarry as she wishes.
Kautilya: For the neglect of the period is the violation of a lawful duty.
The husband's neglect of conjugal duty creates a ground of action by the wife. The rules on whichKautilya comments are designed to establish the legal presumption of abandonment in variouscircumstances. Knowledge of the husband's intention to return naturally prolongs the process. Thisrecognition of the rightful expectation of a wife contrasts with the later, more restrictive position reflectedin the Laws of Manu (9:76f), which entirely forbid remarriage (9:65f). The gradual reduction of actionspermitted for women is a social process. In that process, the position of Kautilya (and the prior opinionwhich, in effect, he approves) represents a still relatively early stage.
Here again, as in Maxim #14, is a special situation where the woman is not represented by a parent orhusband, and must seek her rights herself. We suspect that such cases, which were not provided for inreligion or custom, and thus of their nature required adjudication by some other authority, were thegermination point for the beginning of formal law, both in India and in the Mediterranean.
[Previous Discussion]: Division of the inheritance.
The Teachers: Those without property shall divide even the pottery water-vessels.
Kautilya: This is mere verbiage. Only what exists can be divided, not what does not exist.
This (compare Maxim #14) is the second impatient comment of Kautilya on the formulations of thejurists of his time. He seems to be a severe judge of judges.
Usanas: Among sons of the same wife, the share of the eldest is goats in the case of Brahmins,horses in the case of the ruling caste, cattle in the case of Vaisyas, and sheep in the case of Sudras.The one-eyed or lame are the share of the middle son, and those of mixed colors are the share of theyoungest. If there are no animals, the eldest shall receive one of every ten articles with the exception ofjewels, since he bears the obligation of maintaining sacrifices. This is the division recommended byUsanas.
ArS here adds no comment by Kautilya. The rule laid down in ArS 15/1:41 (see Kangle 2/211) is that insuch cases Kautilya should be imagined as agreeing with earlier opinion. One difficulty with applyingthat rule in the present case is that in his comments on administrative and judicial precedents, Kautilyaoften dispenses with minute and rigid rules of just this sort, and prefers to judge according tocircumstances. We also note that Kautilya's pronouncements do not normally consider castedifferences, which are the main burden of the Usanas rule. We thus don't feel justified in including thisrule among those either stated or approved by Kautilya. We include it, as a background item, merely forcompleteness.
The low value of the mixed-color animals is perhaps due to their unsuitability for sacrificial purposes;compare LY 6:6, which uses the metaphor of a parti-colored sacrificial animal precisely to protestagainst intrinsic social distinctions.
The Teachers: Seed, dropped on another's land, belongs to the owner of the land.
Others: The mother is only a seed-pouch; the child belongs to him who owns the seed.
Kautilya: Both types occur.
The issue here is whether the legitimacy of a son as an heir is derived from the status of the father orthat of the mother. Previous judgements were extrapolations from the law of ownership, suggesting thatthis area of law was older and more developed than family law as such. Here, as often, Kautilya seemsto reserve the right to judge according to particular circumstances, and not by rule. He is consistentlymore sensitive than his predecessors to the novelty of the family situation.
Followers of Usanas: In cases of conflicting testimony due to the stupidity of the witnesses, thewitnesses shall be fined the lowest, middle, and highest fines according as the question concerns place,time, or fact.
Followers of Manu: False witnesses, whether they create a figment or deny a reality, shall be finedten times the amount at issue.
Followers of Brhaspati: If witnesses through their stupidity invalidate a court proceeding, they shallbe tortured to death.
Kautilya: No. Witnesses have a duty to respect the truth. If they do not, they shall be fined 24 panas.If they fail to testify, half that.
As in Maxim #17, Kautilya declines to recognize an earlier attempt to extrapolate from the law ofproperty. He thus avoids the "consequences" trap (relating the penalty to the amount at issue in thetrial), and derives his rule from the primary obligation of the witness to tell the truth. Their duty is not tothe matter being decided, but to the process of decision itself. False testimony is twice as serious,because it is twice as disruptive of a just outcome, as a refusal to testify. This is a step ingeneralization: the rule for severity derives not from the details of the case, but from a generalizedconcept of legal process.
With Maxim #18 we family law and take up civil law. It is at this point that Kautilya, whose sequence oftopics is respected by the arranger of the ArS core sayings, and by the later compendium of "Manu"after him, introduces the main technicalities pertaining to witnesses. The order in which previousauthorities are cited is different here than in other cases; the usual order would put "followers of Manu"first. See our summary of these sequence questions on the Order page. We may note that the"followers of Usanas" pronouncement has the same precise, even quiddling, quality that we noted inMaxim #16a.
[Previous Discussion]: Enforcement of agreements concerning work for wages.
The Teachers: If the employer fails to provide work when the laborer has presented himself, the workshall be considered as done.
Kautilya: No. A wage is for work done, not for work not done. But if the employer allows even a littlework to be done, and then forbids more, the whole shall be considered as done.
A contract is an offer, and not a situation in being. Thus, an agreement to provide work is not operativeuntil the work has begun. It is with the acceptance of the offer (the provision of work for the laborer whoshows up pursuant to the contract) that the contract comes alive. But once alive, the contract has fullforce, even if the employer then attempts to arrest or limit the agreed work. The laborer has fulfilled hisobligation as far as he was able to. Kautilya is saying that one party cannot rewrite a contract once it isin effect. There is also the implication that the contract binds both parties, even though they may be ofdifferent castes. It creates functional equivalance before the law. We may have here a faint precursor ofsome of the social policies of the later Maurya ruler Ashoka.
[Previous Discussion]: Direct and forcible seizure is called robbery; indirect or fraudulent seizure iscalled theft.
Followers of Manu: For robbery of jewels, or of forest products whether of high or low value, thefine shall be equal to their value.
Followers of Usanas: Double the value.
Kautilya: In accordance with the offense.
Again Kautilya reserves the right to weigh circumstances in passing sentence. The value of the thingstolen does not exhaust the list of relevant circumstances.
Mention of "forest products of high value" cannot but remind Chinese readers of the luxury bambooarticles exported, probably in boutique-size packloads, from southwest China to India in the 02c (formere local bamboo, see Maxim #20a). The discovery that such articles were turning up as far away asthe northwest Indian markets led the Han emperor to attempt to punch a highway through to India bythe southwestern route. This would have avoided the dangers which at the time attended the routethrough the northern deserts to the entrepot of Bactria and beyond. But it was beyond the engineeringresources of the time, and the "Burma Road" came into being only much later.
The Teachers: For articles of small value such as flowers, fruits, vegetables, roots, turnips, cookedrice, leather goods, bamboo, and earthenware, the fine is a minimum of twelve panas and a maximumof twenty-four. For articles of greater value such as iron, wood and rope, small animals, and cloth, aminimum of twenty-four panas and a maximum of forty-eight. For articles of still greater value such ascopper, steel, bronze, glass, and ivory, the lowest fine for violence: a minimum of forty-eight panas anda maximum of ninety-six. For large animals, human beings, fields, houses, gold, gold coins, and finefabrics, the middle fine for violence: a minimum of two hundred and a maximum of five hundred. Forone who forcibly binds or releases from bondage a man or woman, the highest fine for violence: aminimum of five hundred and a maximum of one thousand.
Compare Maxim #16a, another detailed statement that Kautilya does not personally address. This list bycategory is presumably invoked when the value of the thing stolen (as required by Maxim #20) cannotreadily be determined. Each category contains a range of fines in the ratio of 2:1. This corresponds tothe range sanctioned by Kautilya in Maxim #20, and it may perhaps be assumed that this rule was anacceptable supplement in the eyes of Kautilya or of the early codifiers of his thought.
In economic history terms, it is notable that the silver pana coin is the only one relied on in theTeachers' maxim. No higher-valued gold coin seems to have been in regular circulation at the time,even though gold coins are mentioned as among items that may be stolen. As has been suggested forthe ancient Near East and for Greece (see Robinson), gold coins may have been used not in ordinaryexchange, but on rarer occasions for the transfer of capital. The mention of "gold and gold coins" tendsto confirm this suggestion. Gold coin would have been a minted, that is, a certified, form of gold bullion.
Followers of Brhaspati: One who induces another to commit robbery and says "I accept theresponsibility [for the intended crime]" shall pay double the prescribed fine. One who says "I will furnishany money required" shall pay four times the fine. One who offers [to his fellow conspirators] an exactamount, saying "I shall give so much," shall pay that sum plus the fine.
Kautilya: But if he should [successfully] plead anger, intoxication, or mental confusion, he shall payonly the prescribed fine.
Kautilya does not object to the distinctions made in the earlier opinion, but as before, he wants acertain situational leeway - a sliding scale - for judges in particular cases. This implies a sense ofproportionality to the offense, not a mere whim on the part of the judge. Of the robbery itself, we maynote its entrepreneurial nature. As here glimpsed, it not only has a planning process, but one or moreassociates or backers who invest money in its outcome. Robbery is a business.
The situational leeway or discretion accorded a Chinese official, in judging cases or in applying policy, iscalled chywaen. The word is etymologically related to the sliding weight on a steelyard balance. An earlyexample is in LY 9:30a (c0405), where it means "exercise of discretion" or judgement in recommendingpolicy alternatives. A crux in 04c Chinese military theory is how much discretion is allowed to acommander in the field, in implementing the details or the general intent of the ruler's orders. Earlylayers of the Sundz text (before c0320) assert such a right, but later layers (after c0315) reverse thisposition by revoking it. The ruler has grown stronger in the meantime.
[Previous Discussion]: Individual and group assault.
The Teachers: An old case of assault or criminal trespass is not actionable.
Kautilya: There should be no release of an offender from responsibility.
That is, there should be no rule of limitations on crimes against the person. We might generalize theprinciple here implied by saying that an injury is a continuing fact, and remains always actionable.Compare Kautilya's treatment of the abandoned wife, where the restoration of her right to marriage andfamily has a fairly rapid timetable (Maxim #15). We might then formulate another implied Kautilyaprinciple: Some rights become worthless if not promptly exercised. In accountancy terms, Kautilya'sjudgements often have the effect of preserving ledger value, whether positive or (as in this case)negative.
The larger context is the practice of governmental amnesty. One concludes that, like the historicalConfucius (see LY 4:11), Kautilya would not have approved of amnesty.
The Teachers: In a case of assault, the one who first comes to court wins, since only one unable tobear the injury will seek redress.
Kautilya: No matter which party is the first to approach the court, the case shall be decided by thetestimony of witnesses. If there are no witnesses, the injury or other evidence shall be decisive.
Kautilya grants no bonus to the litigious person per se. The previous rule is a presumption in favor ofthe first complainant as being the injured party. This is psychologically intelligible, though it ignores thepossibility of pre-emptive counter-claims. In Roman law, there was an advantage in being the accuserrather than the defendant. Here, we infer that this advantage had been exploited by unscrupulouspersons. Kautilya's rule is designed to eliminate that advantage, and, as so often, to judge according tothe circumstances.
Implicit in Kautilya's willingness to rely on wounds as evidence of injury is the existence of some sort offorensic medicine. For the way a parallel tradition treats the description and legal interpretation ofwounds, including the detection of self-inflicted and thus juridically fraudulent wounds, see the 0217Chin law codes of Shweihudi (Hulsewé Ch'in 192).
The Teachers: In gambling cases, the lowest fine for violence shall be imposed on the winner, andthe middle fine for violence on the loser. For the loser, being foolishly desirous of winning, will not beable to stand the loss [and thus will not be inclined to repeat his offense].
Kautilya: No. If the loser is to be punished with a double fine, no one will approach the King in suchmatters, and it should be noted that most gamblers cheat.
In the Teachers' view, both the winner and loser are liable to penalties. Then gambling as such must beillegal in this period, and we are to envision court cases as based on a denunciation of the winner bythe loser. The loser would presumably have hoped to retrieve his losses, most likely by proving hisaccusation and collecting some sort of restitution from the winner, or reward from the court. TheTeachers' policy is manifestly illogical, and its framers seem to acknowledge this in giving a reason fortheir rule. They claim that their rule will discourage the loser from future gambling. Kautilya remarks thattheir rule will instead have the effect of discouraging losers from denouncing winners, with the result thatgambling will not be brought to the attention of the authorities and so penalized. He does not object tofining both parties, remarking that both are likely to be cheaters (so that question of right is in principle atoss-up). He merely objects to imposing extra penalties on the probable informant. The presumeddishonesty of both parties, if not in the instance before the court, then in general, prevents the renderingof a judgement that is materially to the advantage of either. There is no question of right in an inherentlywrongful act.
For the justification of a rule in terms of its effect on the person sentenced, compare Maxim #23.Kautilya is concerned rather to keep the legal mechanism itself in viable condition.
ArS 3 goes on to prescribe for legalized gambling (with fines for cheating, not for gambling as such).That chapter had begun (ArS 3/20:1-2) with provision for a Director of Gambling, who can impose finesfor gambling except on officially approved premises. This indicates a development between the situationKautilya addresses, where gambling was apparently prohibited, and the one implied by the post-Kautilyan parts of the ArS record, where the state asserts a monopoly on gambling, and profits from itwhile at the same time controlling it.
The co-optation by the state of previously ignored or forbidden money developments (there, principallytrade) occurred in China during the social and economic transitions of the 05th and 04th centuries.
The reader will have noticed (or can see from the Overview) that the Kautilya maxims, arranged bytheme, tend to go in pairs. It further emerges that some of the pairs can be construed as containingbetween them a rule of law which is not apparent from either in isolation. Such constitutive pairing is adevice of structure that is carried to great lengths in the Analects (see Brooks Analects Appendix 1).Against that structural tendency, we note that this particular maxim, the last in this section, standsunpaired in the ArS. An unpaired section final maxim, which we call an "envoi," is also a standardAnalects structural device, but has the character of a retrospective summation. This piece is simplyunpaired, and is not an example of the Analects-type formal device.
The Teachers: The six policy options are: peace, war, holding steady, attacking, alliance, or pursuingsome combination of these.
Vatavyadhi: There are only two: all the "six" can be derived from the two options of peace and war.
Kautilya: There are really six, because of situational differences.
Here as in Maxim #1, Kautilya resists conceptual simplification. It is easy to agree with Vatavyadhi (andwith Kangle ad loc, who finds "some truth" in his view) that war and peace are the basic situations. ButKautilya's point still holds: there are varieties and combinations which make it necessary not to limitdiscussion to just those options. Note for example the contrast between a general state of war (vigraha,option #2) and a limited military maneuver for local advantage (yâna, option #4). Note also that Kautilyaagrees with the earlier view that a peace policy does not exclude a war policy, hence the option (#6) ofsimultaneously pursuing both. Policy options are best if not reduced to their extremes.
The preceding chapter, ArS 6, expounds the schematic "mandala" theory of twelve surrounding kingsand the possible dynamic relations between them. It never cites Kautilya. The mandala chapter was inall probability a theoretical refinement added later to ArS. The first line of ArS 7 links the mandalatheory to the ensuing discussion. That ensuing discussion, constituting the bulk of ArS 7, is based atmany points on Kautilya maxims, and has a simpler theoretical basis. ArS 7/1:1 is thus a bridgingpassage, and ArS 7/1:2, with which the above passage begins, was the beginning of the originalArthashâstra treatment of policy.
