bulent aras

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Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiersof a new geographic

imagination

Blent ArasHakan Fidan

Abstracturkey has adopted a new course in oreign policy toward Eurasia.his article employs the notion o geographic imagination to analyzehow urkish policy-makers have developed a new political rhetoric andoreign policy towards the Eurasian region, speciically Central Asia, theCaucasus and Russia. urkish policy-makers aim to urther urkeysinterests ranging rom security, over regional trade, to energy issues inthis geography, in addition to creating an environment o cooperation

and eliminating regional power constellations. We conclude that urkeysrenewed activism has opened new horizons or its relations in this regionand that this new oreign policy orientation is linked to reorm andchange in urkeys domestic landscape.

Keywords: Critical geopolitics, Turkey, Eurasia, Russian Federation,Caucasus

Te literature on critical geopolitics questions the relationship betweenspace and place, as well as the cultural and political dimensions that enterinto close interaction with them.1 It especially ocuses on how the geo-

Blent Aras, Department of International Relations, Ik University, Kumbaba Mevkii, 34980, ile, [email protected].

Hakan Fidan, Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry of Turkey, [email protected] Note: The views expressed here reect the views of the two authors alone and do not those of

the Turkish government.

1 For a sample of works in the tradition of the new geopolitics, see, John A. Agnew, Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics (London: Routledge, 1998), Simon Dalby and Gearid . Tuathail, The CriticalGeopolitics Constellation: Problematizing Fusions of Geographical Knowledge and Power, PoliticalGeography 15, no. 6-7 (1998), Gearid . Tuathail, Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998),Gearid . Tuathail, Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarityin the Critical Study of Geopolitics, in Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns, Bison

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graphic imagination shapes the cognitive maps o political elites and thuspaves the way or naming regions (i.e., Middle East), constructing mentalzones (i.e., East and West), and the making o a culture o geopolitics.Geographic imagination is based on (and leads to) a number o attribu-tions and categorizations, shaping the rhetoric and practices o policy-makers. For example, there is a certain kind o understanding and percep-tion about a region i it is located in the West. Tis conceptualization issocially constructed through historical experiences and interactions. Telanguage and rhetoric used to describe such a region rom policy or-mulation to the perception o its trafc order are inuenced by thelong-standing image and interpretation o the West. Tese attributions,categorizations, and perceptions lead to the emergence o a culture o

geopolitics, which inuences the making o regional oreign policy.Te creation o new geopolitical images o threat plays an impor-

tant role in the determination o oreign policy preerences. Geographicimagination may also re-dene potential enemies as potential allies anda previous zone o conict as a potential area o inuence. Such changesreect a distinct orm o relationship between power and geography.2raditionally, geopolitics has been considered a concrete science deal-ing with natural, objective and static realities vis--vis the vague bound-

aries o oreign policy analysis. Te premise o critical geopolitics haschallenged this traditional view with the idea that geographical spaceis a product o social construction.Tis new approach is concerned asmuch with maps o meaning as it is with maps o states. Te boundary-drawing practices [] are conceptual and cartographic, imaginary andactual, social and aesthetic.3 Imaginative creativity plays an importantrole in constructing and interpreting geography. In this process, concepts(such as identity, perception, and bias) are as important as material ac-

tors (such as proximity, territory, and spatial borders).In this article, we argue that geographic imagination provides aramework o assumptions and representations or policy-makers.Tese assumptions and representations are the practical implicationso interactions between knowledge, power, and spatiality in shapingthe relationship between politics and geography. We analyze the role ogeographic imagination as determinant o political language and rheto-

paper 4, ed. L. Tchantouridze (Winnipeg: Centre for Defense and Security Studies, 2003), . Gearid

Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1996).2 As Said noted, just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free fromthe struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only aboutsoldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings. Edward Said,Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 7.

3 Dalby and Tuathail, The Critical Geopolitics Constellation, 4.

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ric, which nds its expression in oreign policy behavior. In this sense,the geographic imagination integrates both agent- and structure-levelactors into regional oreign policy analysis. We argue that the role ogeographic imagination in determining regional policy provides a useultool or understanding urkish oreign policy towards Eurasia. We holdthe idea that urkey adopted a new course in oreign policy due to po-litical transormations at home, which resulted in a reconstruction o theprevious geographic imagination in policy-making circles. Te exibilityand adaptability o the new geographic imagination seems greater con-sidering the dynamic harmonization process with the EU oreign policyline. urkeys adoption o a zero-problem policy towards its neighbors,in connection with this new understanding o geography, has resolved

previously contentious issues to a considerable degree. Te urkish pol-icy-makers new geographic imagination o bordering regions cast asidethe ormer bad neighborhood atmosphere and made urkey a moreactive regional participant and partner. urkeys zero-problem policy, asan imitation o the EUs neighborhood policy, has allowed urkey toreach beyond its immediate borders.

In the ollowing sections, we will use the notion o urkish policy-makers geographic imagination in order to analyze the development o

the new political discourse and oreign policy currently applied to theEurasian region, specically Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. Wewill conclude the article with a general assessment o the new policy ap-proach and its implications or urkeys uture role in the region.

The origins of Turkeys new geographic imaginationTe geographic imagination o urkish policy-makers has been stronglyinuenced by urkeys recent domestic political transormation and, to

a lesser extent, by changes in regional and international politics. Te oldgeographic imagination regarded urkeys neighborhood as a geographyo chaos and a source o instability. Tis resulted in urkeys consciousalienation and limited involvement in the region. urkeys domestictransormation, a avorable international environment, and the advento a new geographic imagination changed this old pattern in regionalpolicy. Te meaning o the nations geography has changed; territoriallimitations to involvement in the region have been eliminated in theminds o the policy-makers; domestic security has been tied to regional

security; social sectors have increased their role in policy-making; andde-securitization has changed the security-rst approach to oreign pol-icy-making. As a result, the altered geographic imagination has created anew ramework or urkish policy in neighboring regions and beyond.

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Te shit rom bad neighborhood to zero-problem zone in less thana decade is very telling about the transormation o urkeys geographicimagination. Domestic changes in urkey, primarily the consolidationo stability and the deepening o democracy, are the main drivers behindthe recent change in policy-makers geographic imagination. Tere is adirect connection between domestic stability and regional security, andeven domestic stability should be considered a precondition or positiveattitudes toward regional security. urkey has undergone a process oserious reorms and political transormation, which have accelerated a-ter urkeys ofcial recognition as a candidate country by the EuropeanUnion (EU) at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Te membership pros-pect provided urkey with a common goal around which dierent elite

groups came together. Te coalition government o the time adoptedstructural reorms in the economy and started a major democratizationprogram. In the elections o November 2002, the Justice and Develop-ment Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP) won a landslide victoryby running a pro-EU campaign. Te reorm process has continued un-der this new government.

Tis domestic reorm process has contributed to the emergence o anew geographic imagination, with signicant implications or urkeys

oreign policy. Te result o relative domestic stability was not only theprevention o trans-border destabilization, but also a bolstered sel-condence in oreign policy, the emergence o a new sense o neighbor-hood, and the re-evaluation o the merits o peace and stability in re-gional terms. urkeys peaceul transormation led to its emergence asa peace-promoter in neighboring regions. As a result o these domestictransormations, various social groups increased their role in the mak-ing o oreign policy. Business organizations, civil society, intellectuals,

think-tanks, and other actors now provide input into the oreign pol-icy-making process. Te new role o these institutions is part o thisgeographical imagination, in contrast to a past when these regions wereimagined in such a way that there was no room or these actors in theoreign policy-making process.

urkish politicians have also promised to contribute to the security,stability and prosperity in a wide range o territories beyond urkeysimmediate neighborhood, such as Central and South Asia. urkeys re-newed interest in these territories is the result o putting its internal

aairs in order, gaining sel-condence in international relations, devel-oping a broader perspective in oreign policy, and seeking an inuentialrole in world politics. As argued by Ahmet Davutolu, the chie advisorto the Prime Minister and the intellectual architect o the oreign policy



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o the ruling Justice and Development Party, urkey is a country witha close land basin, the epicenter o the Balkans, the Middle East and theCaucasus, the center o Eurasia in general and is in the middle o theRimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacic. 4

Although the distances remain the same, the perception o these geo-graphic regions has signicantly changed through the lens o a new geo-graphic imagination. Te imaginative creativity is the product o bothofcial and societal actors. Support and resistance at the societal level isan important determinant o the rontiers o this geographic imagina-tion. Te physical distance and prior difculties o involvement in theseregions no longer make sense to policy-makers or the public. urkey hasdiscovered the proximity o these geographic regions and their availabil-

ity or involvement by remembering past relations, unolding culturaland civilizational afnities, and exploring opportunities or engagement.In the perspective o policy-makers, the new oreign policy places urkeywithin various regions in such a way that it occupies not only an impor-tant geo-political position, but that it also would be able to emerge as ameaningul player in political and economic settings. Te urkish PrimeMinister Recep ayyip Erdoan exemplied this rhetoric when he said:Istanbul is not only a center combining the continents but also a central

symbol combining and synthesizing the civilizations.5

He places Istan-bul at the center o a vast landscape, and urkeys geography gains newmeaning rom this wider territorial context. As underlined by Kirii,according to urkish policy-makers, the political development, eco-nomic capabilities, dynamic social orces, and ability to reconcile Islamand democracy at home are the qualities that oer urkey the possibilityto develop and implement such active and inuential policies in distantgeographic regions, rom Arica to the Far East, in the same context.6

Te new geographical imagination gave rise to novel interpretationso the Eurasian region in the minds o oreign policy-makers. Many se-curity challenges emerging in Eurasia continue to occupy the agenda ointernational and global security. Eurasian countries and their neighborsare acutely sensitive to regional dynamics, and a number o actors such as the changing regional security structure, the emergence o newrepublics, increasing outside intererence, regional power rivalries, the

4 The World of Business Now Spearheads Foreign Policy: An Interview with Ahmet Davutolu, Turk-

ishTime, 15 April 15 May 2004.5 Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Speech to 38th Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian De-velopment Bank, 5 May 2005, http://www.adb.org/annualmeeting/2005/Speeches/prime-minister-speech.html.

6 Kemal Kirii, Turkeys Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times, in Chaillot Paper 92 (Paris: EU-ISS, 2006),96.

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operations o international terrorist networks, and the integration o theCaspian region into global energy geopolitics have orced the regionscountries to restructure their policies towards Eurasia. urkeys proleis rising in the region, at a time when Eurasian actors ace increasinglycomplex challenges. Tis region has been considered by urkish pol-icy-makers as a potential area o inuence and opportunity since thecollapse o the Soviet Union in 1991.7 Te new regional discourse andpolicy aims to pursue an active oreign policy, in order to achieve the goalo a zero-problem policy in its relations with countries o the region.urkeys new approach seeks to benet rom closer economic and politi-cal relations in order to make urkey an energy hub through regionalenergy projects, to acilitate solutions to regional problems, and to en-

gage with international actors and institutions with the aim to ensureregional stability and security.

Central Asiaurkey was among the rst countries to recognize the independence othe Central Asian republics in the early 1990s. Te emergence o sisterstates, sometimes called urkic (or urkish) republics, including ajik-istan, precipitated an outbreak o excitement in almost all political wings

in urkey. Te potential or a urkish world stretching rom the Adriaticto the Great Wall o China became a new topic o discussion in urk-ish policy circles and the media. Tere were many reasons behind theinterest caused by the reunion with Central Asian peoples, rom whomAnatolian urks had long been separated. Ater the dissolution o theSoviet Union, the immediate perception among urkish policy-makerswas that urkeys strategic value or the US was in decline. Moreover,urkeys ull membership application to the EU had been rejected. Te

Organization o the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and a re-newed ocus on the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) werepart o urkeys search or a new oreign policy.8

As an attempt to counter Irans potential role, the new urkish Mod-el was touted by the West and presented to the Central Asian states.Te idea behind the promotion o this model was that urkeys secularand democratic political structure and its ree market economy wouldset an example or the newly emerging republics.9 Within this paradigm,

7 Blent Aras, Turkeys Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options, Turkish Studies 1, no.1 (2000).

8 Kemal Kirii, The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior, ForeignPolicy 17, no. 3-4 (1993).

9 dris Bal, Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics, Perceptions 3, no. 3 (September-November



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and as a result o the late President urgut zals dynamic approach tourkeys oreign policy, political and economic relations were establishedwith the Central Asian republics. Te Wests proering o urkey as anew model meant the recognition o urkeys Western identity in the a-termath o the Cold War era. But the great enthusiasm generated by theproximity to the sister states led to promises that urkey would proveunable to keep. urkeys economic crises in the 1990s and in 2001 pre-vented the country rom strengthening its economic ties to the region.urkeys interest in the Central Asian countries also declined rapidly be-ginning in the late 1990s. Te role ascribed to urkey as a model andbridge country ailed. Te circles that had put orward the thesis o apower gap to be lled by urkey began to claim that the Russian Federa-

tion was the only country with real inuence in the region.As urkey makes progress on the path towards the EU, its relations

with other regions have gained depth and inuence. Te changes in itsunderstanding o national security, new patterns in civil-military rela-tions, the new dynamic role o civil society in oreign policy-making,and the emerging civil-economic role in regional aairs exempliy theimpact o domestic transormation a result o the reorms within theEU membership process on oreign policy behavior. While moving

towards the West, urkey is generating new areas o engagement in theEast. Although urkeys borders have remained the same, urkish poli-cy-makers new geographic imagination and new-ound sel-condencehave created momentum in extending urkeys sphere o inuence tothe Middle East, the Gul region, Central Asia, and beyond. In theminds o urkish politicians, urkey has started acting according to itsnew identity as a central country, leaving the bridge country rhetoricbehind.10 With its new geographical aspirations and in the context o

this new strategy the Central Asian region and the Caspian Basin standout as potential spheres o inuence in which urkey seeks an activerole. urkeys policy towards Central Asia reects the new characteris-tics o the geographical imagination and its maniestation in a dierentoreign policy approach. Prime Minister Erdoan visited Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan once, ajikistan twice, and urkmenistanthree times since October o 2003. President Abdullah Gl visitedurkmenistan once and Kazakhstan twice.11 Te shit rom enthusias-tic and sentimental policy attitudes to a more realistic and constructive

policy line towards Central Asia is not likely to be smooth and easy,

1998).10 Ahmet Davutolu, Turkeys New Foreign Policy Vision, Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008).11 For details of these visists, see http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr and http://www.cankaya.gov.tr.

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but it is an ongoing project under the assertion o the new geographicimagination.

urkeys other priority regarding Central Asia is to make sure that itsnew states acquire the capacity to establish stability and security at homeand that they develop the capability to eectively cope with regional anddomestic problems. In this regard, the urkish International Coopera-tion and Development Agency (IKA), as an ofcial development aidorganization, has played a crucial role.12 Trough IKA, urkey hasprovided unds to Central Asian countries since their independence, andIKAs role has only grown under the auspices o urkeys new oreignpolicy vision. Its substantial development aid and diverse activities invarious elds are important in terms o demonstrating urkeys vision

o sharing its gains with its sister states and communities. Sixty percento IKAs USD 702 million in development aid in 2007 went to Cen-tral Asia and the Caucasus. Tese unds sponsored projects in economicand industrial inrastructure development, the health and educationsectors, academic cooperation between urkish and Eurasian universi-ties, internship programs in urkey or Central Asian and Caucasianuniversity students, urkish language programs, and the promotion obusiness and trade.13

urkeys new policy is also backed by civil society activities. Te im-pact o the new policy is visible in the overall perormance o civil andofcial activities in Central Asia. urkish businesspeople, contractors,and civil society organizations have launched numerous initiatives andprojects in Central Asian states. President Abdullah Gl, or instance,was accompanied by representatives o the urkish Union o Chambersand Commodity Exchanges (OBB) and a large number o business-people during his visit to urkmenistan in December o 2007.14 IKA

also supports civil society organizations, research centers, and universi-ties pursuing relevant projects in this region. Businesspeople and civilsociety organizations are seen as essential or urkeys commitment tothe stability and welare o the region. Te Conederation o Business-men and Industrialists o urkey (USKON) has established a rame-work, entitled the urkey-Eurasia Foreign rade Bridge, to acilitateurkeys business relations in Eurasia. USKON represents 150 asso-

12 Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, Turkeys Role in the Global Development Assistance Community:the Case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency).Journal of SouthernEurope and the Balkans 10, no. 1 (2008).

13 2007 TKA Faaliyet Raporu, (Ankara: TKA Yaynlar, 2008), 2007 Trkiye Kalknma Yardmlar Raporu,(Ankara: TKA Yaynlar, 2008).

14 Sabah, 8 December 2008.



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ciations o businesspeople and their 12,000 members, which operate in80 provinces o urkey. In December o 2007, USKON organized itssecond convention, during which 500 businesspeople rom twelve Eur-asian countries met with 1,200 urkish colleagues to explore joint busi-ness opportunities. Tis convention also hosted 72 high-level economicbureaucrats rom Eurasian countries. USKONs Eurasian rameworkaims to connect the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Caspian Searegions and to transorm this region into a ree trade zone.15 In Mayo 2008, the Marmara Foundation organized a similar event, called theEurasia Economic Summit, with the aim to oster economic relationsbetween urkey and Eurasian countries.16 Tese initiatives target Cen-tral Asian countries and provide societal support or more active state

policies in this region.urkeys other priority is to transport the regions rich energy resourc-

es to world markets via its own territory, thereby transorming urkeyinto an energy hub. urkeys new policy thus aims to secure and diver-siy oil and gas transportation to Europe. urkey is an important actorin bringing about the East-West Energy Corridor, which was initiallychampioned by the US and later appropriated by the European Union.Tis project aims to connect Caspian resources to Western markets.

Te US supports these alternate routes in order to bolster Azerbaijansand Georgias economic development and independence rom Russiassphere o inuence.

Te major development to date is the 1,768-kilometer-long Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline, which was signed ater years o negotia-tion and rivalry between Azerbaijan, Russia, urkey, and several multi-national companies. Te BC has a capacity o 1 million barrels perday and 50 million tons o oil per year. But urkey has other ambitious

gas pipeline projects in mind, such as Nabucco and the rans-Adriaticpipeline, or transporting Caspian and other gas reserves through thecountry to European markets. During his visit to India in February o2008, the urkish oreign minister Ali Babacan even proposed a projectto transport Caspian oil rom urkey to India via Israel.17 Tis proposalgained more strength during Prime Minister Erdoans visit to Indiain November o 2008.18 Tere are agreements and ongoing easibilitystudies under way or the transportation o oil and gas reserves romAzerbaijan, urkmenistan and Kazakhstan to world markets.

15 For more information see TUSKON web site at http://www.tuskoneurasia.com.16 For more information see, Marmara Foundation web site at http://www.marmaragrubu.org/aez.htm17 Milliyet, 2 August 2008.18 Hrriyet, 24 November 2008.

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South Caucasusurkey pursues a special relationship with Azerbaijan, which has beeninuential in urkeys regional policy and bilateral relations with Cauca-sian countries. Teir common ethnic, cultural, and religious ties, and theAzerbaijani governments warm attitude toward urkey have strength-ened relations between the two states. Tere is also strong support inurkeys nationalist circles and society at large in avor o close relationswith Azerbaijan. Te new geographical imagination has strengthenedthis perception with an additional emphasis on the need or a solutionto the Karabakh question, a region disputed between Azerbaijan andArmenia. urkish politicians support existing international settlementmechanisms, pursue a dual-track policy o normalization with Armenia

while bridging the gap between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Kara-bakh question, and try to create a region-wide platorm to acilitate asolution to the problem. urkey also hopes to nd guaranteed access tovital energy resources, such as the lucrative oil transport revenues in theCaspian basin, especially in Azerbaijan, and achieved a certain degreeo success when the Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline was nishedand became a main export pipeline in 2006. Te Baku-bilisi-Erzurum(BE) pipeline has been established in parallel with BC and carries

Azerbaijani gas to urkey. Te BE has the potential to supply Caspiangas to Europe through additional planned projects.19

Alongside these benets, however, urkeys close relationship withAzerbaijan has certain drawbacks. It is a major actor preventing thenormalization o relations between urkey and Armenia. Armenia hasoccupied Nagorno-Karabakh and one-th o the Azerbaijani territoryand disregards UN Security Council decisions against the occupation.Ankara has close ties to Baku and benets rom energy cooperation deals.

Azerbaijan is urkeys major partner and likely to remain the most im-portant country in the region. For its part, the Armenian state considersurkey and Azerbaijan to be serious threats to its national security andterritorial integrity.20 Te Armenian administration thereore pursues abalancing policy through the maintenance o close relations with Russiaand Iran. Russia has military bases in Armenia, and Russian soldiersprovide security or Armenian borders. In the eyes o the Armenian ad-ministration, Russia is a strategic partner and protector against poten-tial Azerbaijani and urkish aggression. Armenias balancing policy has

19 Emre eri, Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the Eurasian Heartland, in The Politics of Oil ed.Bulent Gkay (London: Routledge, 2006).

20 Taline Papazian, From Ter-Petrossian to Kocharian: Explaining Continuity in Armenian Foreign Poli-cy, 1991-2003, Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 2 (2006).



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remained a major tenet o its oreign policy in the post-independenceperiod.

urkish-Armenian relations are shaped by the wider ramework ourkeys Caucasian policy and the impact o the Armenian Diaspora. Aear o encirclement lurks in the background o Armenias domestic poli-tics and oreign policy. Te immediate eect o this ear is an inward-ori-ented domestic policy and an insecure oreign policy line. Armenia hasproblems with all o its neighbors except or Iran. Energy supply linesand new transportation networks in the region have excluded Armenia,while generating considerable oreign income or Azerbaijan as an en-ergy-rich country and or Georgia and urkey as the hosts o pipelinesextending to world markets. Armenias difculties with Georgia stem

rom the ormers close ties to Russia; its clashes with Azerbaijan stemrom the occupation and the Karabakh question; and its relations withurkey are uneasy due to territorial demands and genocide allegations.In addition to this tense regional situation, Armenia also eels the eectso an unstable domestic political environment, economic difculties, andrising levels o unemployment. Armenian oreign trade is overwhelm-ingly dependent on Georgian ports, and the Russian bombing o theGeorgian port o Poti during the crisis in August o 2008 only worsened

the countrys economic situation. Armenia thus eels an urgent need toreconsider its regional relations. Its economic and political alienation inthe region creates an impetus to normalize relations with urkey.

Political will to normalization is reected in the urkish policy-mak-ers search or a zero-problem policy in its neighborhood and urkeysdesire to stabilize the Caucasus through a region-wide inclusive plat-orm. In such a ragile regional environment, Armenia has begun to takeon new meaning in the minds o policy-makers, and this new attitude

has created an impetus to normalize relations. Davutolu has pointedout that [w]e want to have the best relations with Armenia. [] We donot see Armenia as a threat or enemy.21 Te vulnerability o Georgianterritory has also caused worry in Ankara in terms o the sustainabil-ity o the BC pipeline and uture pipeline projects. Te normaliza-tion o relations with Armenia and a solution to the Karabakh problemmay create chances or new venues or uture regional pipeline projects.Despite historically strained relations between urks and Armenians,urkey recognized Armenia earlier than many other states and invited

Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization asa ounding member in 1993, despite the act that Armenia has no shore-

21 Davutolundan Ermenistana Net Mesajlar, Star, 29 September 2008.

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line on the Black Sea. Yerevan-Istanbul ights are operational despitethe closure o the land borders between Armenia and urkey, and ur-key tolerates thousands o illegal Armenian workers within its borders.

Tere is a notable sotening towards Armenia among urkish policy-makers and within urkish society.22urkish authorities have renovatedseveral Armenian cultural and historic monuments in dierent places inurkey.23 In December o 2008, a group o 200 urkish intellectuals is-sued an apology or what they call the Great Catastrophe that the Otto-man Armenians were subjected to in 1915. Te apology stated that theyshare in the eelings and pain o [their] Armenian brothers, and apolo-gize to them.24 Te urkish President Gl considered this declarationas an opportune sign or the beginnings o a democratic discussion in

urkey about this chapter in its history.25 Te ofcial statement o theurkish Ministry o Foreign Aairs was similar to Gls response andunderlined the possibility o alternative voices in a democratic environ-ment.26Although this declaration was not supported by Prime MinisterErdoan and criticized by nationalist circles in urkey, it touched theArmenian taboo and demonstrated that attitudes toward the Armenianissue are changing.27

Although urkey and Armenia do not have ofcial diplomatic re-

lations, behind-the-scenes diplomacy continues. urkeys response toIrans oer o mediation we are already talking to Armenia re-vealed this hidden diplomacy.28 Te developments in 2008 have shownthat there are possibilities or closer ties. In a historic gesture, the Arme-nian President Serge Sarkisian invited President Abdullah Gl to watchthe World Cup-qualiying ootball match between the national teams othe two countries. Tis invitation came amidst hopes or a breakthroughin relations between urkey and Armenia. President Gl did in act vis-

it Armenia to watch the match as a goodwill gesture on 6 September2008.29

Te Armenian as well as the urkish public harbor mixed eelingsabout President Gls visit to Armenia and the normalization o rela-

22 The Armenian historian Ara Sarafian has pointed out this recent softening and added that the Turk-ish public has openly started to discuss Armenian history, culture and cuisine. See, APdeki ErmeniKonferans, (2008), http://www.abhaber.com/ozelhaber.php?id=1940.

23 The renovated artifacts include, among others, the Church of Akhtamar, the Armenian CatholicChurch in Diyarbakr, historical Armenian houses in Beykoz, and the Armenian Church in Ordu.

24 The apology was made through an online campaign, which is available at http://ozurdiliyoruz.com.25 smet Berkan, Kiisel Bir ey, Radikal, 19 December 2008.26 Kampanya Ak Toplumun Gstergesi, Taraf, 18 December 2008.27 Cengiz andar, Genelkurmay, Sivil Bireyler ve Ermeni Tabusu... Radikal, 20 December 2008.28 Milliyet, 20 July 2008.29 Hrriyet, 7 September 2008.



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tions in general. In Armenia, the opposition avors normalization, whilethe asnaksutyun Party opposes any rapprochement.30 Te latter hasstrong economic and political links with the Armenian Diaspora andacts as a strong anti-urkish group in Armenia. In urkey, both ma-

jor opposition parties namely, the Republican Peoples Party and theNationalist Action Party criticized President Gls visit to Armenia.urkeys Prime Minister Erdoan backed the visit, considering it a con-structive step towards a normalization o relations.31 For its part, theAzerbaijani government rerains rom commenting on urkish-Arme-nian relations, although some weak voices express hope that urkeysdeveloping relations with Armenia may serve as a prelude or reeingthe Azeri territories under occupation. At the same time, there is strong

criticism among the Azerbaijani opposition against any progress inurkish-Armenian relations.32

urkish politicians also pursue trilateral talks among urkey, Arme-nia, and Azerbaijan or the normalization o urkish-Armenian rela-tions and a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conict. Te urkishMinister o Foreign Aairs Ali Babacan met with both the ArmenianForeign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and the Azerbaijani Foreign Min-ister Elmar Mammadyarov in September in New York and then later

separately in December o 2008 in Helsinki. Te new imagination opolicy-makers has created a strong political will to pursue an active poli-cy in the Caucasus or the solution o regional problems. As Babacan hasargued, I can say that things are going well both in the process betweenAzerbaijan and Armenia as well as between urkey and Armenia andI hope that the talks would yield the desired result, which is the totalnormalization o relations.33 urkish policy-makers also pursue shuttlediplomacy in the region to prepare the regional actors or their involve-

ment in regional aairs. For example, Babacan and Erdoan visited Geor-gia, Russia, and Azerbaijan ater the Russian-Georgian crisis. PresidentGl and Babacan again visited Azerbaijan to address the concerns inthe country and pursue talks among urkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijansimultaneously. Tere is increasing contact on the ministerial level be-tween Armenia and urkey.34 urkish policy-makers also continue to

30 Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, Fair Dialogue, the Best Way Forward, Turkish Daily News, 26 August2008..

31 brahim Kaln, From History to Realpolitik in Armenian-Turkish Relations, Todays Zaman, 11 Sep-tember 2008.32 Semih diz, Azerbaycan da Geni Adan Bakabilmeli, Milliyet, 8 September 2008.33 Babacan Azeri ve Ermeni Bakanlarla Helsinkideydi, Taraf, 5 December 2008.34 aban Karda, Armenian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, Rearms Determination for Dialogue,

Eurasia Daily Monitor5, no. 228 (2008).

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cers also developed a joint military program to protect pipelines. Geor-gian soldiers operated under urkish command in Kosovo as part oUN-led peace operations.38 urkish companies modernized the Batumairport, which was opened or joint use by urkey and Georgia. As ex-pressed by Erdoan in February o 2006, urkish politicians aimed toincrease urkish-Georgian trade to two billion dollars by 2009.39 PrimeMinister Erdoan visited Georgia three times since August o 2004, andthese visits also brought a number o railway projects between urkey,Georgia, and Azerbaijan to the agenda. One is the Kars-bilisi-Bakurailway project, which was approved by the three heads o state in Geor-gia in July o 2007.40 Te volume o trade was more than one billiondollars in 2008, until the Georgia-Russia conict. urkey immediately

took action to support Georgia by sending 100,000 tons o ood aidand started a project to build 100 houses or reugees in Gori, close toSouth Ossetia. Te urkish company AV did not stop the operationo bilisi airport during this military conict.41

As a product o urkeys new regional policy, in the wake o theGeorgia-Russia crisis, Ankara has conceived o a multilateral diplomat-ic initiative, the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platorm, whichwill consist o Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and urkey.Tis

platorm aims to develop a shared regional perspective and policy in-struments to deal with issues such as regional peace and security, en-ergy security, and economic cooperation. Te urkish Prime MinisterErdoan pointed out that this platorm should appropriate the prin-ciples and norms o the OSCE and urther argued that [t]he ailure othe Minsk group to produce any results is a act that makes us think [...]Te Caucasian Cooperation and Stability Platorm will contribute tothe eorts or the establishment o peace and stability in the region.42

urkeys attitude indicates Ankaras preerence or an inclusive approachto the regional context. Armenia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan,and Georgia have responded positively to the oer and have praised theproposed project as a constructive attempt.43 urkeys resh approachthat includes both Azerbaijan and Armenia in regional peace eortsaims to end the hegemony o Cold War-style binary oppositions. Andthe Armenian administration recognizes the need to put an end to the

38 Georgia: Hopeful President Pays First Ocial Visit to Turkey, RFE/RL Report, 20 May 2004.39 Altay Atl, Turkey and Georgia: Opening the Roads for Trade, Eurasianet, 8 February 2006.40 Kars-Tiis-Bak Demiryolu Projesi ve Beklentiler, Hrriyet, 21 September 2007..41 2008de Trkiye-Grcistan likileri, Hrriyet, 19 December 2009.42 Kafkasya birliine Aliyev Destei, Radikal, 20 August 2008.43 Turkey Spearheads Creation of Caucasian Union, Global Insight, 18 August 2008.

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inimical patterns that create cycles o violence in the region.44 Ofcialsrom the ve countries met in Helsinki to discuss the aims, principles,and mechanisms o the Stability Platorm ater the OSCE meeting inHelsinki in December o 2008.45

Te armed conict and escalation o tension between Russia andGeorgia have given urkey a heavier burden in the region. rying to me-diate among dierent parties in the area, urkey aced a critical test o itsneutral stance when US warships passed through the urkish straits todeliver aid to Georgia. As a member o NAO, and also as a neighbor,urkey has always supported Georgia both economically and politicallysince the collapse o the Soviet Union. urkeys dilemma is the act thatRussia is an important trade partner or urkey and a major supplier o

natural gas, while Georgia has been a key partner or urkeys pipelineand transit railway connection projects in Eurasia.

The Russian FederationTe new geographic imagination o urkish policy-makers has instilledthe political will to develop relations with Russia. urkish policy-mak-ers geographic imagination o Russia is part o their general priority toadopt good neighborhood and zero-problem policies in the bordering

regions. urkish politicians have made developing bilateral political andeconomic relations with Russia a priority, and they also consider Russiaa necessary partner or regional peace and stability in Eurasia. PrimeMinister Erdoan mentions Russia as an important country rom theperspectives o trade, investment, tourism, and energy security.46 His-torically, there were many wars between Russia and the Ottoman Em-pire until the end o World War I. Both countries have imperial legaciesand have experienced post-imperial trauma. Great imperial legacies and

eelings o isolation ollowing the collapse o the respective empires areimportant actors shaping the national memory o both countries. Tenew attitude o urkish policy-makers has had a positive impact on or-eign policy, allowing them to consider better relations with Russia andthe possibility o cooperation to solve regional issues.

urkeys then-Prime Minister Blent Ecevits visit to Moscow inNovember o 1999 was a turning point in the relations between ur-key and Russia. Ecevits visit resulted in urkeys change o attitude onthe Chechen question as an internal problem o Russia, in exchange or

Russias acceptance o a policy o non-involvement in the Kurdish prob-

44 Glle Sarkisyan Kafkaslar Grt, Dnya, 7 September 2008.45 Hrriyet, 5 December 2008.46 Mensur Akgn, Rusyann nemi, Referans, 1 September 2008.



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lem.47 Ecevits visit prepared the ground or better relations. Ater theRussian President Vladimir Putins visit to urkey in December o 2004,urkeys prime minister paid a one-day ofcial visit to Russia in Januaryo 2005. Te number o high-level visits has increased since then, pav-ing the way or a solid political and economic cooperation agenda. Ananalysis o the current actors determining relations between these twostates is necessary here. Domestic politics in Russia are oten the resulto the competing views o Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists,ultra-nationalists, and nostalgic communists.48 Russian oreign policyis generally determined along the lines o domestic political preerences.Tere is a symbolic pendulum in Russian oreign policy that oscillatesbetween Europe and Asia, depending on the political balances at play.

Under the current administration, Russian oreign policy is more criticalo the West and ollows a more Eurasia-oriented path.49

For Moscow, the existence o a conicted national memory and anEast-leaning geopolitical orientation makes it difcult to determine axed and well-unctioning oreign policy towards urkey. Like Russia,urkey has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and European identitiesand dierent interests at stake in all o these regions. Another signicantactor is that both countries are going through dynamic domestic and

economic transormations. Te changes that have occurred during theeight years o the current decade are dramatic at both societal and statelevels. High-level reciprocal visits in the recent period have highlighteda number o important issues o concern or bilateral relations. Ofcialson both sides have signed several agreements that are likely to acilitatethe establishment o more constructive relations. Tese include trade,investments by urkish and Russian businesspeople, tourism, naturalgas purchases, joint pipeline projects, and Russian arms sales. Te vol-

ume o bilateral trade reached USD 32 billion in 2008, and both sidesaim to increase the annual trade volume to USD 50 billion.50 urkeysconstruction sector is active in Moscow and has continually increasedits market share in Russia since 2005. urkish contractors nished 59construction projects worth USD 3.6 billion in Russia in 2007.51 Rus-sian businesspeople closely ollow urkeys privatization process and areinvolved in urkish telecommunication and energy projects.52 Another

47 Cenk Balam, Rus Doal Gazna Erteleme, Milliyet, 6 November 1999.

48 See, Andrei P. Tsygankov, Finding a Civilizational Idea: West, Eurasia, and Euro-East in RussiasForeign Policy, Geopolitics 12, no. 3 (2007).49 Ibid.50 Milliyet, 13 February 2009.51 Rusya lke Blteni, (stanbul: DEK, 2008), 39.52 For a detailed analysis, see, Hasan Seluk, Trkiye-Rusya Ekonomik likileri (stanbul: TASAM,

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major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to urkey. urkey looks toRussia or a number o military procurement projects, such as a medi-um-range anti-tank weapon system. Te Russian S-300 or S-400 missilesystems are attractive to the urkish military industrys proposed multi-billion-dollar long-range missile deense project.53 Finally, two millionRussian tourists visit urkey annually and increasingly preer urkeysMediterranean coast or their vacations. Te degree o interdependencebetween urkey and Russia is higher than ever since the establishmento the urkish Republic.

Although there is much talk about the convergence o interests be-tween urkey and Russia, contentious issues remain. In mid-August o2008, Russian customs ofcials began inspecting urkish trucks with

exceptional diligence; the trucks were taken to a red lane and checkedone by one or extensive lengths o time. Although this act was inter-preted by many as Russias punishment or urkeys decision to permitAmerican and European naval ships to pass through the Black Sea toGeorgia, this was in act the result o deadlocked customs regulationsnegotiations between the two countries, which had started earlier in theyear but coincided with the Russian-Georgian conict.54On the verge olosing its long-standing and benecial commercial relations with urkey,

the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov insisted during a joint newsconerence with his counterpart, Ali Babacan, that this is not an actiondirected against urkey. urkey is not being singled out. He added, [t]here can be no politics involved in trade.55 Te customs crisis betweenthe two countries came to an end when Russia and urkey signed anagreement on a simplied customs procedure in mid-September.56

urkish-Armenian relations, which have been and continue to bedetermined by historical enmities and urkeys pro-Azerbaijan policies

in the Caucasus, constitute another concern in bilateral relations andregional politics. Russia is currently Armenias main ally, and possibleRussian mediation between urkey and Armenia on a number o issues

2005).53 Lale Saribrahimolu, Turkey, Russia Begin to Overcome Military Distrust, Todays Zaman, 15 April

2008.54 Sinan Ogan, Rusya ile Gmrk Krizinin Gerek Sebebi ve Alnacak nlemler, Turkishforum, 2

September 2008. Also see, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Gmrk Mstearl, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Gm-rk Mstearl ile Rusya Federasyonu Federal Gmrk Servisi Arasnda Gmrk lemlerinin

Basitletirilmesine Dair Protokol Hakknda Bilgi, available at www.gumruk.gov.tr/duyurular/Rusya19EylulBasinToplants.pdf.55 Russia Denies Punishing Turkey over Georgia, The International Herald Tribune, 2 September

2008.56 Trkiye ile Rusya Arasnda Gmrk Protokol, CNN Turk(2008), http://www.cnnturk.com/Haber-

Detay/Ekonomi/4/Genel/303/Turkiye_ile_Rusya_arasinda_gumruk_protokolu/493999/0.



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urkish business cooperation.58 Putins support is meaningul in termso showing the potential o bilateral relations, but the situation is morecomplicated at the regional and international levels. Ater receiving a ne-gotiation date or EU membership, urkey has emerged as a Europeanactor in the region. Tere is no guarantee that the urkish politiciansprojection o good relations with Russia will be possible without endan-gering its relations with the EU and the US59 Tanks to the dynamicnature o regional politics, urkeys new orientation was tested duringthe subsequent domestic transormations o Georgia and the Ukraine.urkey adopted a low-prole attitude towards Russian policies vis--visUkraine and Georgia and sensitively displayed a constructive outlookby pointing to relevant international norms and agreements as the way

to resolve the crises. Under the strong inuence o its new geographicimagination o Russia, Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any Russiaversus the West struggles, while developing its own relations with Mos-cow. urkey pursued this policy also during the Russia-Georgia crisisin August o 2008. urkish policy-makers acted careully in order tominimize tension during the crisis and put orward the idea o a regionalplatorm to settle regional problems. During the crisis, the urkish PrimeMinister Erdoan pointed out the importance o relations with Russia

in the ollowing way: America is our ally and the Russian Federation isan important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We areobtaining two-thirds o our energy rom Russia. We act in accordance toour national interests. [...] We cannot ignore Russia.60

urkish policy-makers aim to limit the Russian-Georgian crisis tothe Caucasus region and prevent its expansion to the wider Black Searegion. At present, there is a clear tendency to seek support rom outsideactors and wider regional alliances or providing security in the region.

Azerbaijan and Georgia rely on NAO and the Western powers andseek regional alliances with the Ukraine, Moldova, and urkey. Armeniarelies on Russia. Russia calls on the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO) to support the Russian cause in the Caucasus.61 In contrast,urkey has suggested a Caucasian Stability Platorm to congure a dia-logue between the three Caucasian states, Russia, and urkey in orderto contain any crises in the region. urkish policy-makers stress the need

58 Turkey-Russia Relations, EurActiv, 9 November 2006.

59 For a comprehensive discussion see, mer Tapnar and Fiona Hill, Turkey and Russia: Axis of theExcluded?, Survival 48, no. 1 (2006).60 Fikret Bila, Erdoan: Rusyay Gzardi Edemeyiz, Milliyet, 2 September 2008.61 The Russian President Medvedev briefed SCO heads of state on the Georgian crisis on 28 August

2008. The Dushanbe declaration did not extend a clear support while issuing a vague call for peacefulnegotiations of the conict. Hurriyet, 29 August 2008.



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to create a condence- and trust-building mechanism to oster a regionalunderstanding o security. Te EU gave the green light to this initiative,and the EU progress report on urkeys accession negotiations with theEU positively mentioned the project.62 NAO supported the platormas a constructive step or security in the wider Black Sea region withreerence to urkeys constructive policy line during the crisis.63

Te current developments indicate that urkish and Russian policy-makers have the political will to improve bilateral relations in the realmso politics, economy, and security. However, these relations are not reerom a number o serious problems that could threaten to derail thegrowing ties; both countries have converging and conicting interests inneighboring regions. Tis act, in combination with the high-prole sta-

tus o both countries, makes urkish-Russian relations promising, yetdifcult. urkey and Russia are two inuential actors in Eurasian geo-politics, and their relations have implications or the whole region. Forthis reason, i urkeys new approach or developing multi-dimensionalrelations with Russia succeeds, this policy may have ar-reaching posi-tive consequences or the Eurasian region.

Conclusion

We have argued that urkeys new activism towards the Russian Federa-tion, Caucasia, and Central Asia has opened new horizons in its relationswith Eurasia and that this new oreign policy orientation results rom re-orm and change in urkeys domestic landscape. We hold the view thatgeographic imagination may re-dene regional policy, re-cast enemies aspotential allies, and have a widespread impact on the cultures o nationalsecurity and geopolitics. Te result is the emergence o new attitudesin oreign policy among policy-makers. Tese attributions, categoriza-

tions, and perceptions pave the way or the emergence o new meaningsand mindscapes o geography, which inuence regional policy-making.Under the premises o a new geographic imagination, Eurasia takes onnovel signicance in the minds o urkish policy-makers, and they nowhave the sel-condence to boost their involvement in this region withcooperative approaches. Tey seek participation in regional political andeconomic groups and work to develop ties with a number o Eurasiancountries. urkish policy-makers have made it clear that their activismshould not be interpreted as a narrow regional policy, but rather as part

o a universal vision o oreign policy. From the perspective o urkish

62 See, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf.

63 Kafkasya stikrar ve birlii Platformuna Destek Var, Sabah, 19 August 2008.

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policy-makers, urkeys current policy toward Eurasia is realistic andhas attainable goals. It aims to create an environment o cooperation andeliminate regional power constellations.

Although conronted with many destabilizing actors such asgrowing nuclear activities, international terrorism, violent regional rival-ries, ethnic tensions, drug trafcking, illegal immigration, and interna-tional competition or domination urkeys policy towards Eurasiaseeks to contribute to peace and stability. Te recent Russia-Georgiacrisis has shown regional countries the importance o achieving theseconditions. Te regional status quo should change, and the new regionalorder should be based on both a novel rhetoric and the practice o eco-nomic interdependence, political cooperation, and regional stability and

prosperity. In this sense, urkeys cooperative attitude and new activeoreign policy are positive steps towards this new regional order. Tegrowing number o high-level mutual visits and the diverse activitiesdesigned or the region are strong signs that urkeys positive contribu-tions to the region will continue.

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