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THE BURMA CAMPAIGN
DEC 1941 – AUG 1945
AIM
• TO ACQUAINT WITH THE BURMA
CAMPAIGN (1941-1945) & ANALYSE THE
LESSONS LEARNT.
PREVIEW
• BURMA : GEOGRAPHY & PEOPLE.
• JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA & THE ALLIED
RETREAT.
• PLANNING & CONDUCT OF THE ALLIED OFFN.
• NAVAL & AIR ASPECTS.
• PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS LEARNT.
BURMA
GEOGRAPHY & PEOPLE
• LOC & CLIMATE.
• POPULATION.
• MAJ RIVERS & COMN NW.
• TRN IMPERATIVES.
LOC & CLIMATE
LONGITUDE92° E TO 100 ° E
LATITUDE10 ° N TO 30 °N
AREA 262732 SQ MILES
MTN RGSNAGA HILLS
CHIN HILLS
ARAKAN YOMAS
SHAN HILLS
KAREN HILLS
DAWNA RANGE
IRRAWADDY
CHINDWIN
SITTANG
SALWEEN
MAJ RIVERSMAJ RIVERS
COMN NWRANGOON-MANDALAY RLY
NO RDS TO INDIA
COMNS WITH SIAM RESTD
RIVER TFC ON THEIRRAWADDY
AIR SERVICE
AIRFIELDS
LG
POPULATION
BURMESE
SHANS
KARENS
CHINS
KACHINS
TRN IMPERATIVES
TRN IMPERATIVES
• AREAS OF SOUTHERN SHAN STATES & THE
TENASSERIM TOWNS OF MOULMEIN, TAVOY,
MERGUI & VICTORIA PT VITAL FOR THE AIR
ROUTE TO SINGAPORE.
• BURMA RD SOLE LINK BETN CHINA & BURMA.
ALT ROUTE WAS BY FLYING THE 'HUMP'
ROUTE, AN AIR-FERRY SERVICE WHICH
CLEARED THE HIMALAYAS AT AN ALTITUDE
OF 23,000 FEET.
• TRN IN GEN WAS INFESTED WITH THICK
IMPENETRABLE JUNGLES & POOR RDS
• LAY OF THE LAND ; NORTH TO SOUTH
• DIFFICULT TO CUT ACROSS THE GRAIN
OF THE COUNTRY
• RANGOON WAS STRATEGICALLY IMP
TOWN
TRN IMPERATIVES
• GRAIN OF THE COUNTRY FROM NORTH TO SOUTH
WITH HIGH MTNS IN THE NORTH & GRADUALLY
DECLINING IN HT AT THE SOUTHERN END OF
TENASSERIM.
• LACK OF ADEQUATE COMN ROUTES.
• THICK IMPENETRABLE JUNGLES & POOR RDS.
• TROPICAL MONSOONS FROM MAY TO OCT.
• TROPICAL MONSOONS INCR THE DEGREE OF
DIFFICULTY
• AVENUE OF APCH FROM SOUTH
• IMP OF AIR ROUTE TO SINGAPORE & BURMA ROAD
• HUMP ROUTE
JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA & THE
ALLIED RETREAT
• WHY BURMA ?
• JAPANESE CAPTURE OF BURMA.
• EARLY ALLIED REACTIONS.
IMPORTANCE OF BURMA
• CUT OVERLAND AXIS TO CHINA FROM BURMA
VIA THE FAMED BURMA RD.
• CAPTURE OF BURMA WOULD HAVE PLACE
THE JAPANESE AT THE GATE OF INDIA.
• RAW MATERIALS.
• PROTECT THE FLK OF THEIR MAIN ATTK
AGAINST MALAYA.
FORCED INVOLVED
• JAPANESE
– 33 INF DIV.
– 55 INF DIV.
– 56 INF DIV.
• ALLIED
– 17 INF DIV.
– 1 BURMA DIV (LATER RENAMED 39TH INF DIV).
– CHINESE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CONSISTING OF 5TH,
6TH & 66TH ARMIES EACH WITH STR EQUIVALENT TO A
BRITISH DIV.
CONDUCT OF JAPANESE OFFN
• CAPTURE OF SITTANG BR.
• FALL OF RANGOON.
• JAPANESE ADV TO THE INDIAN FRONTIER.
• ALLIED RETREAT.
• THAI ARMY ENTERS BURMA.
JAPANESE ADV
LESSONS LEARNT
• CONFLICTING GOALS.
• UNITY OF PURPOSE & UNITY OF COMD.
• JAPANESE AIR SUPERIORITY.
• UNPREPAREDNESS.
• BLOCKADE OF CHINA.
ALLIED REACTIONS
• OPS IN 1942-43.
– FIRST ARAKAN CAMPAIGN.
– THE FIRST CHINDIT EXPEDITION.
FIRST ARAKAN CAMPAIGN
LESSONS LEARNT
• FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE TPS.
• THE CDRS & THE STAFF MUST HAVE
INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNTRY.
• ALLIED TAC & EQPT WERE NOT SUITED TO
THE JUNGLE COV HILLS.
• SURPRISE.
FIRST CHINDIT OP
SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS
• THE CHINDITS PROVED THAT BRITISH &
INDIAN SDRS COULD LIVE, MOV & FIGHT AS
EFFECTIVELY AS THE JAPANESE IN THE
JUNGLE.
• SAVAGE BLOW TO THE LEGEND OF THE
JAPANESE SUPERMAN
• THIS HAD A TREMENDOUS EFFECT ON THE
MORALE OF TPS IN INDIA.
• IN AUG 1943, THE ALLIES CREATED SE ASIA
COMD (SEAC), A NEW COMBINED COMD
RESP FOR THE SE ASIAN THEATRE, UNDER
ADM LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN.
CREATION OF SEAC
SEAC
• NCAC.
• CHINDIT FORCE.
OTHER FORCES
• THE CAPACITY OF THE BENGAL – ASSAM RLY.
• THE PORT CAPACITY OF CHITTAGONG.
• IT WAS DECIDED TO CONSTRUCT A 15 CM OIL
PIPELINE FROM CALCUTTA TO TINSUKHIA & A 10 CM
PIPELINE FROM THERE ACROSS BURMA INTO CHINA.
• IT WAS DECIDED TO EXTEND RDS TO SITTAUNG &
KALEMYO IN BURMA TO FACILITATE PROG OF OFFN.
ADM PREP BY SEAC
JAPANESE PLANS
• MUTAGACHI’s CONCEPT WAS TO CAPTURE IMPHAL & ADV
TO BRAHMAPUTRA VALLEY THEREBY CUT OFF ALLIED SUP
LINES & AIR SUP TO CHINESE TPS ON THE NORTHERN
FRONT.
• SUBHASH CHANDRA BOSE PERSUADED MUTAGUCHI THAT A
VICTORY COULD LEAD TO COLLAPSE OF BRITISH RULE IN
INDIA.
• OP U-GO OR OPERATION C GOT A GO AHEAD AGAINST A
PASSIVE DEF OF BURMA, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE AS MANY
RFTS AS ATTK ON IMPHAL.
OPS 1943-45 : ALLIED PLANS TO
RECAPTURE BURMA
• CAPTURE OF ANDAMAN ISLANDS BY AMPHIBIOUS ASLT
(BUCCANEER) BY 33 CORPS.
• ADV ON THE ARAKAN COAST UPTO THE MAUNGDAW –
BUTHIDUANG RD BY 15 CORPS SUPPORTED BY 224 GP RAF & NAVAL
FORCES.
• ADV BY 4 CORPS SUPPORTED BY 221 GP RAF ACROSS THE
CHINDWIN R.
• ADV BY STILWELL’S CHINESE ARMY IN INDIA SUPPORTED BY THE
NORTHERN AIR SECT FORCE DOWN THE HUKAWNG VALLEY TO
THE MYTIKYINA – MOGAUNG AREA TO SECURE THE ALIGNMENT
OF THE LEDO RD TO CHINA.
• THE OPS ON THE NORTHERN COMBAT COMD AREA
(NCAC) SUPPLEMENTED BY :-
– ADV BY THE CHINESE EF FROM YUNAN SUPPORTED BY THE
14TH US AF TO SECURE THE CHINA END OF THE LEDO RD.
– OPS IN SP BY WINGATE’S SPECIAL FORCE NO 1 AIR CDO &
THE THIRD TAC FORCE.
– CAPTURE OF THE AIRFD AT RAIL INDAW BY 50 INDIAN PARA
BDE WITH SUBSEQUENT FLY IN BY TP CARRIER COMD OF 26
INDIAN DIV TO HOLD THE TOWN TILL STILWELL’S FORCES
REACHED MOGAUNG.
OPS 1943-45 : ALLIED PLANS TO
RECAPTURE BURMA
• OPS IN 1943-45.
– NORTHERN FRONT.
– YUNAN FRONT.
– SOUTHERN FRONT.
– CENT FRONT.
– RACE TO RANGOON.
OPS IN 1943-45
• OPS BY NCAC.
• ADV OF 38 CHINESE DIV IN OCT 1943 FROM
LEDO.
• THE SEC CHINDIT EXPEDITION.
NORTHERN FRONT
OPS IN NORTHERN FRONT
THE SEC CHINDIT EXPEDITION
• EFFICACY OF INFILT.
• THE CHINDITS ACHIEVED THEIR LTD OBJ .
• COORD OF LONG RG FORCES WITH THE MAIN
GRND FORCES.
• THE CONCEPT OF EMP THE CHINDITS IN
BLOCKING & MOV.
• ACTUAL DIVIDENDS.
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC CHINDITS
EXPEDITION
YUNAN FRONT
• CHINESE ATTK STARTING IN THE SEC
HALF OF APR ON THE JAPANESE 56TH DIV.
• CAPTURE OF LUNGLING.
• HALT OF THE CHINESE ADV BY JAPANESE
RFT.
SOUTHERN FRONT
• IN 1944 GEN SLIM ORDERED 15 INDIAN
CORPS IN THE ARAKAN TO CLEAR THE
MAYU PENINSULA, WHICH COMPRISED OF
:-
THE SEC ARAKAN CAMPAIGN
LESSONS LEARNT
• ALLIED FORCES NO LONGER REACTED IN
PANIC TO THEIR L OF C BEING CUT BUT
INSTEAD THEY FOUGHT WHERE EVER THEY
WERE, LEAVING THE CLEARING OF THE
REARS TO THE DEPTH & RES FMNS.
• THE ADDN OF THIRD DIMENSION FOR AIR SUP.
CENT FRONT
• BACKGROUND
– NEW BURMA AREA ARMY (BAA) CREATED
UNDER LT GEN KAWABE IN 1943.
– 15TH ARMY OF BAA UNDER LT GEN MUTAGUCHI
RESP FOR CENTRAL FRONT.
STRAT IMP
• SECURE MOST SUITABLE BASE FOR FUTURE OPS INTO
INDIA.
• CUT OFF MAINT OF COMNS OF ALL ALLIED FORCES IN
NE ASSAM.
• FALL OF IMPHAL WOULD MAKE IT EASY TO OVERRUN
AIR FDS & THUS CUT AIR SUP ROUTES TO CHINA.
• CONC OF WAR MTRL WAS A PRIZE FOR A FORCE
WHICH WAS SHORT ON EVERY RESOURCE.
JAPANESE PLAN
• ALLIED UNITS FAR SPREAD.
• MUTAGACHI’s PLAN:-
– 33 INF DIV WOULD DESTR INDIAN 17 DIV AT TIDDIM FROM
THE SOUTH.
– YAMOMOTO FORCE (TPS FROM 33 & 15 INF DIVS) WOULD
DESTR INDIAN 20 DIV AT TAMU & ATTK IMPHAL FROM EAST.
– 15 INF DIV WOULD ENVLP IMPHAL FROM NORTH.
– 14 TK REGT & 3 HY ARTY REGTS WERE IN SP.
– A SDY OPS BY 31 INF DIV TO ISOLATE KOHIMA & EXPLOIT
TOWARDS DIMAPUR.
ALLIED FORCES
• 4 CORPS CONSISTED OF:-
– 20 DIV AT TAMU.
– 17 DIV (TWO BDES) AT TIDDIM.
– 23 DIV IN RES AT IMPHAL.
– 50 PARA BDE LOC NORTH OF IMPHAL.
– 254 INDIAN ARMD BDE NEAR IMPHAL.
• ALLIED PLAN.
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE
• JAPANESE COMMENCED OFFN ACROSS
CHINDWIN R ON 08 MAR 44.
• WITHDRAWAL OF 20 INDIAN INF DIV.
• 17 INDIAN DIV CUT OFF BY 33 JAPANESE
DIV.
• 31 JAPANESE DIV CUT OFF 4 CORPS.
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE
• ADV OF 33 JAPANESE DIV.
• YAMOMOTO FORCE & INA’s GANDHI REGT
COULD NOT BREAK THROUGH 20 INDIAN DIV
DEFS.
• 15 JAPANESE DIV ENCIRCILED IMPHAL, &
NUNSHIGUM (OVERLOOKING IMPHAL
AIRSTRIP) WAS CAPTURED BY 51 REGT.
• ALLIED CA.
END OF THE BATTLE
• MUTAGACHI FINALLY BROKE OFF ON 03 JUL.
• JAPANESE WERE REDUCED TO RABBLE AND FELL BACK TO
CHINDWIN R ABANDONING THEIR ARTY, TPT & SDRS.
• THIS WAS GREATEST DEFEAT SUFFERED BY THE JAPANESE
TILL DATE IN THEIR HISTORY.
• THEY SUFFERED 55,000 CAS INCL 13500 DEAD, MOST OF
THEM BY STARVATION, DISEASE & EXHAUSTION.
• ALLIED SUFFERED 17,500 CAS.
LESSONS LEARNT
• SURPRISE.
• RIGIDITY OF PLANS.
• LGS RISK.
• QUICK RFTS BY ALLIES.
• AIR SUP.
BATTLE OF KOHIMA
• TURNING PT OF U GO OFFN.
• FOUGHT FROM 04 APR TO 22 JUN 44.
• BATTLE CAN BE STUDIED IN TWO STGS:
– STG 1. FROM 03 APR TO 16 APR , THE JAPANESE
ATMT TO CAPTURE KOHIMA RIDGE.
– STG 2. FROM 18 APR TO 22 JUN, CA BY ALLIED
FORCES.
JAPANESE PLAN
• AS PART OF U-GO OFFN, 31 JAPANESE DIV
COMPRISING OF FOLLOWING WERE TO
CAPTURE KOHIMA & THUS CUT OFF IMPHAL
& THEN EXPLOIT TOWARDS DIMAPUR:-
– 58 REGT.
– 138 REGT.
– INDEP MTN ARTY BN.
PROG OF OPS
• JAPANESE CROSSED THE CHINDWIN R ON 15
MAR.
• CAPTURE OF SANGSHAK (UKHRUL), WHERE
PARA BDE LOST NEARLY 600 MEN & THE
JAPANESE APPROX 400.
• THIS ACTION HOWEVER DELAYED THE
JAPANESE BY SEVEN CRUCIAL DAYS ON THE
SHORTEST ROUTE TO KOHIMA.
ALLIED ACTIONS
• GEN SLIM WAS DELAYED IN ASSESSING
JAPANESE STR & REINFORCED THE IMPHAL
FRONT BY FLYING IN 5 INDIAN DIV FROM THE
ARAKAN FRONT.
• 2 BRITISH DIV, 23 LONG RANGE PENETRATION
GP & HQ 33 CORPS WAS ALSO ORDERED TO
MOV BY RAIL & RD.
SIEGE OF KOHIMA
• KOHIMA WAS ADM BASE OF NAGALAND.
• STR OF DEFENDERS
• THE SIEGE COMMENCED ON 06 APR & BY 17 APR
THE DEFENDERS SIT WAS DESPERATE.
• BATTLE OF THE TENNIS COURT.
• DEFENDERS DRIVEN INTO A SMALL PERIMETER
CALLED THE GRN HILL.
RELIEF OF KOHIMA
• BY 11 APR, 2 DIV HAD BULILD UP IN DIMAPUR FROM SOUTH
INDIA.
• BRITISH 5 BDR BROKE THROUGH TO 161 BDE IN JOTSOMA
ON 15 APR.
• 161 BDE NOW FOUGHT BITTERLY AND FINALLY REACHED
THE DESPERATE DEFENDERS AT KOHIMA ON 18 APR.
• ON 20 APR 6 INF BDE FROM 2 DIV RELIEVED THE GRN
AFTER BITTER FIGHTING WEST OF KOHIMA TOWN.
ALLIED CA
• COUNTER OFFN COULD NOT MATERIALISE
DUE TO HY OUTBREAK OF MONSOONS.
• IT WAS ONLY ON 13 MAY THAT KOHIMA
RIDGE COULD BE CLEARED OF JAPANESE.
JAPANESE RETREAT
• LACK OF SUPS WITH JAPANESE.
• 23 LRP BDE WAS PRIMARILY RESP FOR
CUTTING OFF OF JAPANESE Ls OF C.
• INDIAN 4 & 33 CORPS PUSHED SOUTHWARDS
ALONG THE RD.
• ON 22 JUN TPS OF 2 DIV MET TPS OF 5 INDIAN
DIV AT MILESTONE 109, APPROX 30 MILES
SOUTH OF KOHIMA.
AFTERMATH
• THE JAPANESE LOST MORE THAN 5,000 MEN IN
KOHIMA.
• BRITISH & INDIAN FORCES LOST AROUND
4,000 MEN; DEAD, MISSING & WOUNDED.
• THIS BATTLE WAS ULTIMATELY TO PROVE
THE TURNING PT OF THE BURMA CAMPAIGN.
• “PROBABLY ONE OF THE GREATEST BATTLES
IN HISTORY... IN EFFECT THE BATTLE OF
BURMA... NAKED UNPARALLELED HEROISM...”
- LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN
BATTLE OF MEIKTILA &
MANDALAY
• BACKGROUND
– 15TH ARMY HAD SUFERED DISASTEROUS DEFEAT AT IMPHAL
& KOHIMA.
– MOST JAPANESE DIVS NUMBERED 10,000 AS AGAINST AUTH
25,000 & WERE IN POOR HEALTH.
– THEY LACKED A TK WPNS & HAD FEW ARTY PIECES.
– JAPANESE 5 AIR DIV WAS LEFT WITH FEW DOZEN AC & 14 TK
REGT POSSESSED ONLY 20 TKS.
• REVISION OF PLANS.
JAPANESE PLAN
• GEN KIMURA WAS APPT NEW CDR OF BAA.
• KIMURA’s DPLY :-
– 28TH ARMY IN THE ARAKAN PROVINCE.
– 33RD ARMY TO FIGHT REARGUARD ACTIONS.
– 15TH ARMY TO WITHDRAW BEHIND IRRAWADY R.
• HE HOPED TO OVER STREACH ALLIES TO
OVERCOME IRRAWADY R & LATER EVEN ATMT A
CA.
ALLIED SIT
• SEAC HAD STARTED PLG RECAPTURE OF BURMA AS EARLY AS JUN
44 DURING THE BATTLE OF IMPHAL.
• OPTIONS FOR RECAPTURE OF BURMA WERE AS UNDER:-
– OPTION 1.
• CAPTURE NORTHERN BURMA, ALLOW LEDO RD TO BE COMPLETED. THIS WAS
REJECTED BEING AN OUTDATED STRAT PLAN.
– OPTION2.
• CAPTURE RANGOON BY A SEABORNE INVASION, BUT WAS REJECTED DUE TO LACK
OF LDG CRAFT OWING TO INVASION IN EUROPE.
– OPTION 3.
• OFFN INTO CENTRAL BURMA BY 14TH ARMY TO RECAPTURE BURMA FROM THE
NORTH CODENAMED OP EXTENDED CAPITAL TO ENCOMPASS A PURSUIT TO
RANGOON. THIS WAS THE PLAN ADOPTED BY THE ALLIED FORCES.
ALLIED FORCES
• 14TH ARMY.
– 4 CORPS.
– 33 CORPS.
• 15TH ARMY.
– TO LAUNCH DIVERSIONARY OFFN ALONG THE COAST ,
SIEZE AIRFD TO FORM BASES TO RESUP 14TH ARMY.
• AMERICAN NCAC.
– TO LAUNCH DIVERSIONARY OFFN FROM THE NORTH.
INT
• LACK OF INT.
• ALLIED SPL UNITS FORCE 136 & V FORCE
PASSED VITAL INFO, HOWEVER NOT DETL.
• JAPANESE ON THE OTHER HAND WERE
TOTALLY BLIND. LOCAL POPULATION WAS
BECOMING RESTIVE & DISILLUSIONED.
PROG OF BATTLE
• 33 CORPS.
• 4 CORPS.
• DUMMY HQ AT SITTAUNG.
• OPS BY 4 CORPS.
– 17TH DIV & 255 TK BDE HAVING CROSSED THE BR H ON 19TH FEB, MOV TO
NYANGU , TAUNGTHA (HALF WAY TO MEKTILA) BY 24 FEB.
– ABOUT 4000 TPS OF THE JAPANESE 168 REGT FROM 49 DIV WERE
DEFENDING MEIKTILA.
– WHEN THE JAPANESE THREW THEIR COMPLETE STR TO BEAT BACK OFFN
BY XXXIII CORPS IN NORTH THINKING IT TO BE COMPLETE IV & XXXIII
CORPS OFFN, IV CORPS LAUNCHED ITS OPS TOWADRS MEIKTILA.
– ON 01 MAR 45, 17 DIV ATTK MEIKTILA FROM ALL SIDES(DOUBLE ENVP) SP BY
ARTY & AIR. THE TOWN FELL AFTER FOUR DAYS OF HARD FIGHTING.
– HOWEVER 17 DIV WAS SIEGED IN MEIKTILA BY JAPANESE RFTS .
– JAPANESE LAUNCHED SEVERAL ATTKS FROM 12 MAR TO 22 MAR BUT WERE
BEATEN BACK WITH HY CAS.
BATTLE OF MEIKTILA
• OPS BY 33 CORPS
– BY 7 MAR , 19TH DIV HAD CROSSED IRRAWADY R & ITS LEADING TPS
COULD SEE THE MANDALAY HILL.
– 4/4 GR STORMED THE MANDALAY HILL ON 8 MAR & CAPTURED IT.
– THE DIV WAS HALTED BY FORT DUFFERIN ON WHICH HY ARTY &
BOMBERS HAD LITTLE EFFECT.
– BY 21 MAR , THE JAPANESE ABANDONED THE FORT VIA SEWERS,
BURNING THE FORT.
– ON 28 MAR THE SIEGE OF MEIKTILA TOO WAS BROKEN. WITH THE
FALL OF MANDALAY (AND OF MAYMYO TO ITS EAST), COMNS TO
THE JAPANESE FRONT IN THE NORTH OF BURMA WERE CUT.
– FURTHERMORE, WITH THE LOSS OF MANDALAY, THE BURMESE
POPULATION TURNED FINALLY AGAINST THE JAPANESE.
FALL OF MANDALAY
RACE TO RANGOON
CENTRAL BURMA TO
RANGOON
• ALLIED PLANS.
– 4 CORPS TO ADV ALONG RD MEIKTILA- TOUNGOO- PEGU
– RANGOON.
– 33 CORPS TO ADV ALONG RD MEIKTILA-PROME –
RANGOON.
– 15 CORPS TO CLEAR ARAKAN TO PREVENT JAPANESE
RFTS TO CENTRAL BURMA & CAPTURE AIR BASES TO SUP
THE MAIN THRUST.
– OP DRACULA. A SIMULTANEOUS AMPHIBIOUS OPS TO
CAPTURE RANGOON.
RACE TO RANGOON
It was a race against
two masters……the en & the
monsoonsFM Slim
RACE TO RANGOON
• VITAL TO CAPTURE RANGOON BEFORE ONSET
OF MONSOON TO AVOID A LGS CRISIS.
• PROG OF OPS.
– 33CORPS.
– 4 CORPS.
– D DAY FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS OPS WAS 02 MAY.
• JAPANESE 05 INDEP BDE.
OP DRACULA
• CONCEPT.
• LAUNCHED TO EASE SUP PROBLEMS ON 01
MAY.
• PARA DROPPING OF 50 PARA BDE.
• EVAC OF RANGOON
• LDG TPS OF 17TH & 26TH DIVS MET AT HLEGU 28
MILES NORTH OF RANGOON ON 06 MAY.
LESSONS LEARNT
• SELECTION & MAINT OF AIM.
• OFFN ACTION.
• CONC OF FORCES.
• FLEXIBILITY.
• SURPRISE & DXN
• ADM.
NAVAL & AIR ASPECTS
• NAVAL ASPECTS.
• AIR ASPECTS.
NAVAL ASPECTS
• SECURE SEA COMNS.
• MAINT OF 15 CORPS.
• SP THE ADV OF 25 INDIAN DIV.
• BLOCKING THE JAPANESE ADM SP.
• VITAL ROLE IN CAPTURE OF AKYAB &
RAMREE.
AIR ASPECTS
• OP C.
• OP THURSDAY & THE FALL OF IMPHAL.
• ADV TO RANGOON.
• STRAT BOMBING.
• PRINCIPLES OF WAR.
– SELECTION & MAINT OF AIM.
– OFFN ACTION.
– CONC OF FORCE.
– SURPRISE.
– FLEXIBILITY.
– COOP.
– ADM.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS
LEARNT
PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS
LEARNT
• BRITISH RETREAT FROM BURMA IN 1942.
– THE NECESSITY OF UNIFIED COMD.
– THE IMP OF PROPER TRG & EQPT.
– IMP OF INT & PROPAGANDA.
– NEED OF AIR SUPERIORITY.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS
LEARNT
• JAPANESE OFFN OF 1944.
– DISREGARD OF HIGHER CDR’S AIM.
– INADEQUATE ADM BACKING.
– LACK OF FLEXIBILITY & COORD.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR & LESSONS
LEARNT
• LESSONS FROM THE ALLIED RE CONQUEST
OF BURMA.
– UNIFIED COMD.
– AIR POWER.
– TRG.
– SPL FORCES.
– ADM.
CONCLUSION