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Certification Review Project

Reviewing the Draft Certification Model: A Case Study in the Philippines

15 August 2014

Report prepared by Philip Tamminga and Marybeth Redheffer

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 3

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 4

2. Background and objectives for the field research ................................................................................ 5

3. The humanitarian context in the Philippines ........................................................................................ 8

4. Application of humanitarian principles and quality and accountability standards in the response ... 10

5. Approaches to principles, accountability and quality in the Caritas network .................................... 12

6. Integrating quality and accountability into partnership relationships................................................ 17

7. Compatibility with the Government of Philippines’ approach to quality and accountability............. 21

8. Compatibility with the Philippines Council for NGO Certification process ......................................... 22

9. Other stakeholders’ views of certification .......................................................................................... 23

10. Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................................................ 25

Annex 1. List of Interviewees ...................................................................................................................... 29

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Acknowledgements

Seven months after Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) struck, organisations in the Philippines were still

heavily engaged in relief operations and the transition to recovery activities, and barraged by constant

evaluations and external visits. The research team expresses their deep gratitude to the people from

dozens of organisations that took the time to meet and share their views and experiences with us. Very

special thanks are due to Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Caritas Switzerland and teams in Tacloban and

Cebu and Caritas Philippines (referred locally as NASSA) for hosting the study and facilitating field visits

and contacts with other stakeholders. We would like to acknowledge the special role of CAFOD for its

early and continual commitment and support for the case study as a means to increase knowledge and

learning in the sector. This was reflected in its efforts to ensure participation of their partners in the

Philippines, and through seconding an additional consultant, Robert Schofield, to support organising the

field research and interviews. Finally, we offer a special thanks to the many barangay leaders and

community members who met with the team and shared first-hand their experiences recovering from

the devastation of Haiyan and their relationships with aid agencies.

Philip Tamminga and Marybeth Redheffer

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1. Introduction

How can certification of humanitarian organisations contribute to greater effectiveness and accountability in humanitarian action? The Certification Review Project, sponsored by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), has been researching what a relevant, sustainable certification model might look like and how to achieve it. The project aims to learn from, and improve on current approaches to monitoring, reporting, verification and certification mechanisms in the sector, and identify the key elements that would ensure that any potential certification model for the sector is sustainable and clearly demonstrates how it adds value to humanitarian action.

The project developed a draft verification and certification model based on research and wide stakeholder consultations. The model has been used as a framework to facilitate a more structured and focused debate amongst stakeholders’ around the role of external verification and certification. Between March and June, four country case studies (Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Philippines) were conducted to assess the core assumptions behind the draft certification model. The case studies sought to determine if and where certification could add value to an organisation’s work in the context of different crisis responses, and how any model could be made sustainable. The case studies also serve to understand the practical implications of certification for organisations, how it could potentially reinforce their own quality and accountability systems and generate more information on how certification could or could not contribute to improving humanitarian action.

This Philippines case study is the fourth and final country report. The case study aimed to understand how the draft model would apply within a partnership network – in this case, the Caritas Internationalis network - with a focus on programming funding and/or implemented by CAFOD, CRS, Caritas Switzerland and Caritas Philippines (NASSA). Research was carried out between June 9th to June 20th in Manila, Tacloban, Cebu City and communities in Tabon-Tabon, Burauen and Bantayan.

The research team was comprised of Philip Tamminga, SCHR Certification Review Project Coordinator and Marybeth Redheffer, an independent consultant, with additional support provided by Robert Schofield, a consultant for CAFOD. The team interviewed key staff in each of the participating organisations, as well as representatives of national government and local authorities, UN agencies, donor governments, and other national and international NGOs engaged in the response.

The case study findings have provided a better understanding of how NGO partners and their stakeholders view the potential relevance, costs and benefits of external verification and certification. The project also gained more understanding of the relevance and usability of proposed core assessment criteria for participating NGOs; and of the implications, including in terms of perceived risks and benefits of certification, for a variety of humanitarian NGOs and their stakeholders in a context like the Philippines.

Structure of the report

The report covers the findings from the field research in the Philippines, and offers conclusions and recommendations around the potential role of certification mechanisms and the feasibility of the proposed model. Section 2 explains the background to the field research, as well as the objectives, methodology and limitations. Section 3 describes the humanitarian context in the Philippines, including the mechanisms used for coordination of the response to Typhoon Haiyan. Section 4 provides some general observation around how humanitarian principles, accountability and quality are reflected in the response to Haiyan, while Section 5 analyses how different Caritas members working in the Philippines

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address the main areas of proposed certification model in their humanitarian programming, as well as their views of the model. Section 6 offers observations on quality and accountability in partnership relationships such as those in the Caritas network, and what this implies for the proposed models. Section 7 explains the Philippine government’s approach to disaster management and regulation of NGOs in addition to government views of certification. Section 8 describes the Philippines Council for NGO Certification and its views on the proposed model. Section 9 other stakeholders’ views of the model, and finally, Section 10 offers conclusions and recommendations from the field research.

2. Background and objectives for the field research

The project consulted widely with stakeholders to develop a draft certification model with proposed assessment criteria and core requirements to describe a principled, accountable and effective organisation. The proposed core requirements are grounded in existing commitments, standards and good practices adopted by the humanitarian community, including the current draft version of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS). The proposed process for assessing and validating an organisation and granting certification involves organisations making a commitment to reflect the core requirements in their policies and practices, submit evidence on how these requirements are being applied, and, if relevant and appropriate to the organisation, undergo a third party external verification process to certify that the core requirements are being applied in practice.

Objectives of Philippines field research

The objective of the field research was to increase understanding of how organisations apply, measure and promote humanitarian principles, quality and effectiveness, and accountability in their humanitarian work, and the potential role and contribution of external verification and certification in support of those efforts. The field research aimed to test and validate the draft certification model’s key assumption that external reporting, verification and certification mechanisms can contribute to improved humanitarian actions. Research in the Philippines also explored the issue of partnership in terms of how organisations attempt to ensure that partner organisations comply with humanitarian principles and quality and accountability standards. The field research also analysed the most useful, relevant, appropriate approach for certification for the humanitarian sector, and aims to contribute this learning to other ongoing processes, such as the CHS process.

This Philippines case study is one of four case studies designed to review the main elements of the proposed certification model from the perspective of actors in different crisis contexts. Other countries include Ethiopia, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The countries were selected to assess the relevance, usefulness and feasibility of the model in a mix of different types of crises and responses. Countries were also selected in order to assess the model for alignment against national legislation or other certification-like systems for NGOs. The Philippines case study benefits from the lessons learned from previous case studies. The overall results from the case studies will be used to revise the core assumptions behind the model and develop recommendations on the most relevant and appropriate certification model might look like for the sector.

Participating Organisations

The participating organisations were selected to ensure a balance between international and national NGOs, currently certified (under HAP or a national level certification system, for example) and non-

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certified, members of wider networks, and SCHR members. For the Philippines case study, the main focus was on members of the Caritas Internationalis, a network of 162 organisations affiliated with the Catholic Church.

Specifically, the field research looked at the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)’s National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice and Peace (NASSA)1 and three of its partners: CAFOD (the official Catholic aid agency in the UK and Wales), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and Caritas Switzerland. NASSA coordinates programmes in partnership with over a dozen different Caritas members and other partners, and is heavily engaged in the response to Typhoon Haiyan and other emergencies.

CAFOD initially volunteered to participate in the case study based partly on its own interest in certification - CAFOD is both HAP and People In Aid certified. For Typhoon Haiyan, CAFOD has seconded staff to NASSA and funds relief, recovery and capacity support programmes implemented by NASSA, as well as programmes managed and implemented through US-based Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Caritas Switzerland. 2

CRS has a long-standing history of humanitarian and development programming in the country going back many decades.3 Its current humanitarian programme has a budget of approximately $70 million for the next three years covering shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and livelihood needs. For the Haiyan response, CRS is implementing directly with community-based organisations (CBO) and local government, though it normally it would work through local Caritas or Church partners. This decision was based on discussions with NASSA, where the initial assessment was that the scale and scope of programming proposed was greater than NASSA’s capacity to implement.

Caritas Switzerland has had development projects in the country since 1972, and is working through four main partners for the response to Haiyan, not all associated with the NASSA or the church network, and again in part based on an assessment of NASSA’s capacity for implementation. Initially, they provided around two million Swiss francs for emergency relief (food, materials to build temporary shelters, cooking supplies, water containers, flashlights and hygiene kits), with an additional 6 million Swiss francs destined for school reconstruction.4

Methodology

The case study methodology consisted of document reviews, key informant interviews, focus groups and direct observation to compare and contrast NASSA, CAFOD, CRS and Caritas Switzerland´s current policies and partnership practices around the three main pillars of the proposed model: humanitarian principles, accountability and quality and effectiveness. Staff members were interviewed for their experiences and perspectives around the use and application of quality and technical standards, accountability mechanisms and the role of external evaluation and verification processes, as well as the their views on the proposed certification model. When possible, the team crosschecked this with direct observations and other stakeholders and also traveled to the field to observe the projects and engage with local communities and local authorities in Tacloban and Bantayan.

The field research also included collecting inputs and perspectives on the usefulness and relevance of the proposed model from various stakeholders, including government, UN agencies, and national and

1 http://nassa.org.ph/

2 http://www.cafod.org.uk/About-Us/Where-we-work/Asia/Philippines

3 http://crs.org/typhoon-haiyan/

4 https://www.caritas.ch/en/what-we-do/worldwide/disaster-aid/philippines-help-for-haiyan-victims/

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international NGOs, and NGO umbrella, coordination or certification bodies. To the extent possible, the research team also gathered information on the costs of different approaches to monitoring and assessment in order to generate a clearer understanding of the costs and benefits of a potential external verification and/or certification model.

Over fifty people participated in interviews and group discussions. This included representatives from CRS senior management, programme and field-based project staff in Tacloban and Caritas Switzerland staff in Cebu City (Bantayan), as well as local partners and stakeholders. Senior representative from the federal government’s National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the Office of the President for Recovery and Reconstruction (OPARR) were interviewed, as well as local government representatives in Tacloban and Santa Fe. The research team also met representatives of several national and international NGOs working in the Philippines, including other members of the Caritas Internationalis network, the Philippines International NGO Network (PINGON), and the IFRC. UN agencies interviewed included OCHA, UNICEF and WHO in Manila and in the field offices, including several cluster leads at the field level. Representatives from DFID and Swiss Development Cooperation were also interviewed (For a complete list of interviewees, see Annex 1).

Limitations

Part of the field research was conducted in Manila, mainly focusing on gathering the views of key donor and UN stakeholders from the policy perspective. The bulk of the field research took place in Tacloban and Bantayan, with field trips to various project sites and interviews with actors based in Manila. One limitation was that NASSA’s full capacity was mobilised for the response to Haiyan, and as such, was not able to fully participate in the field research process, though they did support the research and participated in several interviews. Indeed, most actors, including other Caritas partners, still considered the response to be in an emergency relief phase, only now slowly entering to recovery activities. As such, it was extremely difficult for key stakeholders to dedicate time to what they often considered yet another “evaluation” from external consultants. Nevertheless, the research team was able to meet a high number of staff from the main organisations engaged in the response, as well as people from several affected communities.

The research team originally intended to use the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) as a framework to discuss assessment criteria with participating organisations; however, a revised draft was not ready at the time of the research. The research team decided not to conduct a full assessment of the model’s proposed indicators as it was felt this could be counterproductive to the CHS process, which was about to begin shortly after. Nevertheless, there is a good level of alignment with the model’s proposed criteria and the CHS, as both projects have been continually sharing information and learning as they go.

In addition, the research team was not able to access several relevant evaluations that were either underway or recently completed and other tools. This includes the latest version of Caritas Internationalis internal minimum standards and assessment system, which is under development. Finally, due to scheduling conflicts, the team was unable to immediately meet with CAFOD headquarters and programme staff in London to discuss the model in relation to its Philippines programme. This work is pending, and will be integrated into the final version of this report.

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3. The humanitarian context in the Philippines

The Philippines is exposed to numerous natural hazards due to its location on the Pacific Rim of Fire. Between 1980 and 2010, on average six typhoons hit the Philippines per year, with natural disasters affecting around 3.7 million people per year.5 Typhoon Haiyan was one of the worst to hit the Philippines in history, affecting 14 million people, killing 6,200 and displacing 4 million.6

The Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan requested US$781 million to respond to the needs of three million affected people.7 To date, 58 per cent of the total amount has been committed.8 The clusters with the greatest needs were food security and agriculture (currently funded at 76.2 per cent), emergency shelter (currently funded at 41.8 per cent), early recovery and livelihoods (currently funded at 27.7 per cent), WASH (currently funded at 76.0 per cent) and health (currently funded at 62.4 per cent). At the time of the field research, the response was slowly making the transition to recovery activities, although it was evident that in many areas there were still significant needs, particularly in shelter and food security.

Coordination mechanisms

The government has been praised internationally for its disaster risk management legislation and for its role in promoting more coherent approaches to disaster management and risk reduction. Republic Act 10121, or the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, lays the foundation for disaster management in the Philippines. One of its main objectives is to “uphold the people’s constitutional rights to life and property by addressing the root causes of vulnerabilities to disasters, strengthening the country’s institutional capacity for disaster risk reduction and management and building the resilience of local communities to disasters including climate change impacts.”9 It emphasizes the importance of local participation and strengthening capacity for disaster risk management at all levels of government. Many elements of the IFRC’s model disaster law are integrated into draft legislation, and the cluster system is specifically referenced in national law.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) has overall oversight of all disaster-related programmes and activities.10 The council includes representation from various government ministries, which also take the lead with the various clusters. The NDRRMC has established many tools and guidelines to facilitate the work of international actors who want to engage in the response, and NGOs are strongly encouraged to participate in the clusters and share information with national and local authorities.

The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Division (a department of the Department for Social Welfare and Development) is responsible for registering NGOs to work in different thematic areas.11 NGOs are expected to register with the DSWD before undertaking disaster management activities, though DSWD officials reported that this is not universally the case. Registered NGOs are required to submit their qualifications and annual reports to DSWD for review, and an “accreditation” process, which entails a more detailed assessment of the NGO’s capacity and performance, including, when possible,

5 http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=135

6 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PHL131Rev1_Hayan.pdf

7 https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/SRP_2013-2014_Philippines_Typhoon_Haiyan.pdf

8 http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A1043___3_July_2014_%2803_02%29.pdf

9 http://www.gov.ph/2010/05/27/republic-act-no-10121/ 10

http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/index.php 11

http://www.dswd.gov.ph/

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field visits and interviews with beneficiaries. However, DSWD’s assessment and monitoring capacity is limited and was quickly overwhelmed by Haiyan. “Before Haiyan there was better oversight of NGOs. They look at the NGO’s capability of handling large scale disasters and resources,” reported a government official.

The research team spoke to organisations that had been accredited. They noted that DSWD asks for financial reports, annual reports and speaks to beneficiaries. “They talk to the beneficiaries to make sure we are actually working there, but not about the quality. It could be stronger. It’s not really a standard. They don’t have anything on accountability to beneficiaries. You can do whatever you want as long as you report what you are doing,” said one interviewee. That said, a new process for licensing and accreditation is reportedly underway with more stringent requirements.

The frequent exposure to natural disasters and the corresponding engagement with the international humanitarian system (over the past three years, OCHA has opened and closed eight sub-offices to support the response to various typhoons) means that the Philippines government is very familiar with current international policy debates and approaches to disaster management. Similar to other mega-disasters, coordination was a significant challenge. However, as in other mega-disasters, the scale and scope of damages by Haiyan showed a gap in terms of legislation and policies on paper and actual capacity to implement and coordinate relief and recovery programmes.

The influx of international medical teams, militaries, UN agencies and multitude of NGOs, some of which were new to humanitarian situations, presented difficulties for the NDRRMC and DSWD to carry out their roles. In practice, there were (and continue to be) many actors acting outside of established coordination mechanisms, and difficulties in ensuring adequate coordination between the national, regional and local levels.

Part of the difficulties may have been due to the fact that established national coordination protocols appeared to be circumvented in favour of other mechanisms. For example, the Department of Finance was designated to lead overall response efforts, when it would normally be the NDRRMC and relevant Cabinet Secretaries along with the DSWD. Another contributing factor may have been that the UN declared the emergency as an L3 emergency (the first time for a natural disaster), which in theory meant a significant surge in capacity from UN agencies to support the government’s response and more streamlined procedures.

In practice, there were multiple coordination fora – government coordination, military coordination and the international humanitarian actors, and it is doubtful that the L3 designation simplified coordination. For the cluster leads, particularly shelter, the sheer volume of participating organisations (reported at over 100 NGOs) limited opportunities for basic information sharing, much less effective coordination and quality assurance. Frequent complaints were heard about the L3 designation, meaning that organisations were “feeding the machinery” rather than contributing to genuine information sharing and coordination. Local organisations were often not involved in coordination. “Clusters are an exclusive club. Local organisations aren’t participating because they aren´t accessible. It´s hard to find out where they´re meeting,” maintained one interviewee. Although the meeting schedules are published on the internet by OCHA, many people felt that they didn’t know how to access them.

Within the Caritas network, NASSA and its partners held regular planning and coordination meetings, as do other networks, such as the Red Cross Red Crescent, ACT Alliance members or the Philippines International NGO group, PINGO. Humanitarian Country Team meetings continue to take place, chaired by OCHA, with the participation of UN agencies, and INGOs such as CRS, Plan and Save the Children, but

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with little representation of local and national NGOs. A similar set-up exists within the government - a council for humanitarian policy-making, which grants four seats to international NGOs.

Many interviewees, including government officials, reported that they simply did not have the staff resources to send someone to each forum to share information and plans. Many interviewees reported that the government did not have the capacity – or was not actively encouraged - to participate in national and provincial level clusters. The research team heard claims from many aid agencies that they did not know what the government was doing, with similar complaints raised by government officials and cluster leads about NGOs. As one interviewee said, “Communication and coordination was the biggest key element missing in the early response right after Yolanda hit.”

Another example of the difficulties of establishing appropriate coordination mechanisms for the nature of the disaster was the establishment of the Office of the Presidential Assistance on Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR). OPARR is charged to manage and coordinate the transition from the cluster system (supported through OCHA) to a new nationally driven sectoral approach (supported through UNDP). Under the OPARR approach, the 11 existing clusters would be merged into five sectors, with very little clarity on where the management authority would lie in terms of government ministries, or how the existing portfolio of cluster relief work would be transferred to OPARR. Several respondents expressed concerns about handing over cluster coordination to OPARR, including local authorities who worried that local priorities might be neglected in favour of national level priorities. However, in regional consultation meetings, OPARR officials assured stakeholders that the approach was aimed to facilitate the work of all agencies and that these details would be worked out.

4. Application of humanitarian principles and quality and accountability standards in the response

General Observations

Principled humanitarian action

Several of the core criteria of the proposed model (consistent with the CHS) centre on ensuring aid efforts are impartial and independent from political or other objectives. In the context of Typhoon Haiyan, there were challenges to apply the principle of impartiality, where aid is defined and delivered in proportion to needs.

The research team heard of numerous examples where organisations (including foreign governments) focused only on easy to access locations, at the expense of communities away from the urban areas of Tacloban or Cebu City. Several stakeholders reported organisations spending too much time staking out and defending their “territory” or beneficiary communities, or worse, media attention, at the expense of rapid and high quality assistance. One strategy used by WHO and the government to minimise this was to provide subtle incentives such as access to fuel – a scarcity in the early days of the response – to shift the focus of foreign medical teams to harder to reach areas where needs were greater.

Similarly, the use of more comprehensive needs assessments with sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) and strategies to include gender analysis into assessments and programme designs appeared weak in the relief phase. For several stakeholders consulted, particularly local authorities, recovery planning and livelihoods programmes often failed to fully assess and understand the local context and

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economic drivers in urban areas like Tacloban. Instead, many aid agencies had preconceived ideas of fisheries or agriculture or micro-business programmes that did not match the reality of the context.

With regard to the independence of aid efforts, many stakeholders, including representatives from governments, commented that while aid was not overtly politicized, partisan power struggles at the national, regional and local level influenced aid decisions. Similarly, foreign governments were equally singled out for sometimes putting their own political priorities over the needs and priorities of affected people and the government, with the example given of government-sponsored foreign medical teams.

Corruption was often mentioned as another issue that affected applying needs-based approaches. Many stakeholders interviewed mentioned “suitcase” NGOs (local and international) with limited transparency on their plans, experience or competency. Nevertheless, most of the NGOs interviewed had processes in place to minimize these risks to principled approaches.

Accountability toward affected populations

Pillar Two of the proposed model includes several criteria around an organisation’s accountability to affected people, including opportunities to participate in defining programme design, transparent communications, and mechanisms for feedback and complaint. For the research team, this was clearly an area of consistent weakness in the overall response.

Seven months after the typhoon, very few of the aid organisations interviewed had fully integrated strategies for beneficiary engagement and participation or feedback and complaints mechanisms in programmes. As a crosscutting issue, accountability had only recently been integrated into the work plans of the different clusters. The IASC’s Accountability to Affected People (AAP) framework – an integral part of the “Transformative Agenda”- was not well known to many UN or other stakeholders interviewed, though INGO representatives were generally more aware of accountability initiatives in the sector and within their own organisations. Most organisations interviewed acknowledged that this was a weakness, but justified the lack of progress based on the urgency of meeting immediate needs. The argument, however, seemed difficult to sustain seven months into the response.

Community members interviewed, while expressing gratitude for the aid provided, also highlighted many examples of where they felt that aid agencies did not listen to and respond to their needs, concerns and complaints. Several felt that some aid actors –including well-known and very experienced INGOs - were disrespectful, unprofessional and not transparent in the way they related to affected populations.

Quality, effectiveness and continuous learning

This was another area were the research team felt the overall response did not meet many of the criteria set out in the proposed model, or other quality standards established in the sector. The research team readily observed huge disparities in the quality, consistency and coherence of relief supplies provided, often in the same community. In some places, community members in one barangay received Sphere compliant typhoon resistant shelters, while in neighbouring barangays; some NGOs built small, poor quality shelters. In other cases, people were given materials and training to rebuild, others received materials and no training, while many others continue to live in tents. Interviewees reported that some organisations simply handed out emergency aid to whomever they met, with no assessment of needs. Another organisation paid such a high rates for its cash for work programme that people reportedly quit

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their jobs to participate. Several stakeholders provided examples of aid organisations using poor or out-dated practices, including ones that were potentially dangerous to affected populations.

In terms of effectiveness, multiple organisations reported arriving at an area to carry out a project to find that another organisation was already implementing similar projects, without informing or coordinating through local authorities or clusters. There were cases of some people receiving the same emergency assistance from several organisations while people in rural areas received much less assistance. Also, as noted above, in some cases needs assessments were incomplete, or set out priorities that did not match the local context, leading to poorly designed interventions that are unlikely to effectively meet the needs of the population.

It was also evident to the team that the issue of quality control and quality assurance was generally lacking overall. For many organisations, the main priority was a rapid response with as wide coverage as possible, at the expense of quality. To their credit, cluster leads attempted to ensure as much coherence as possible in terms of programme implementation, but the sheer volume of actors participating in clusters, and the lack of a specific mandate for monitoring quality meant their role was limited. This was similar for their government counterparts.

In terms of learning, there appeared to be few opportunities or mechanisms for knowledge sharing or learning, unless integrated as a regular part of an organisation’s internal monitoring and evaluation processes. It also seems unlikely that the record number of evaluations (including this case study) undertaken to review the response to Haiyan will make a significant impact on how current activities are carried today, much less influence practices in future disasters. In fact, this was one of the most consistent complaints and requests made by organisations, who saw little added value from official visits and evaluations that came to the country.

5. Approaches to principles, accountability and quality in the Caritas network

General framework

Over the past few years, the Caritas Internationalis network has been developing a set of internal minimum standards to guide the humanitarian work of its members. The standards are based on Church canon, international standards such as Sphere, and other standards around good financial and management practices, organised into four blocks: Law and Ethical Codes; Governance and Organisation; Finance and Accountability; and, Stakeholder Involvement. The standards are still in progress, but the intention is that as of 2015, all Caritas members must demonstrate that they are working towards meeting the requirements in the coming years.

A previous focus group discussion in Rome with Caritas Internationalis and several member agencies showed a high degree of compatibility between the proposed model and the Caritas minimum standards. Where the proposed model differs slightly is in the increased emphasis on accountability to affected people and performance and learning and the focus on field-based verification.

Individual Caritas members, particularly larger northern and European based members like CAFOD and CRS, have well developed programme management processes in place, including accountability and performance management systems. Several southern members are also engaged in initiatives to

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improve quality, accountability and effectiveness of their humanitarian programmes, or have otherwise demonstrated conformity with rigorous donor requirements. NASSA itself follows many examples of good practices in the sector, such as participatory needs assessments; however, the team was unable to verify in detail the extent to which these are embedded in policies and practices.

CAFOD, for example, is both HAP and People in Aid certified, and participates in the DEC.

CRS is a full member of InterAction and other bodies engaged in quality and accountability issues. CRS has well established resources and standards to which they refer when designing and implementing programs. The Good Enough Guide, Sphere, cluster standards, USAID standards and approximately 30 internal policies and procedures are some of these reference materials. CRS is working towards standardizing monitoring and evaluation and will require audits of its field programmes by headquarters starting in late 2015.

At the Tacloban field office, four staff were dedicated to quality and accountability, monitoring and evaluation and protection issues, with at least 12 more staff anticipated (of a total staff projected at 250) as recovery activities scale up). The role of these staff is to support programme managers in ensuring that humanitarian principles, quality and accountability standards are met. All staff at all levels receive comprehensive training in CRS’s Code of Conduct, which provides clear guidance and examples in the local language of what is expected in terms of actions and behaviours (including issues around corruption, abuse of power and exploitation).

At the headquarters level, Caritas Switzerland has an Internal Desk for Quality, Standards, and Donor Requirements at its headquarters, which is tasked with liaising with the field. There are also two staff working on an internal knowledge management system. Caritas Switzerland indicated that some internal standards exist, such as a code of conduct and disaster risk reduction and gender standards. They are available on an internal intranet for knowledge management, though headquarters representatives admitted that these are not as accessible as they could be given that some are only available in German. They are currently working to make everything available in English. The research team did not have access to these internal standards.

Caritas Switzerland headquarters also referred to HAP and Caritas International´s minimum standards as references for their work. However, one of the main references appears to be Caritas Switzerland compliance with ZEWO requirements. ZEWO Is an NGO that certifies that Swiss non-profit organisations meet mainly governance and financial management standards as a means to assure donors that the funds are raised appropriately and ethically, and that money is spent as it was intended: “The ZEWO seal of approval certifies that the donations will be used economically, effectively and for their designated purpose. It stands for organisations which offer transparent information and true and fair financial reporting, have independent and appropriate control mechanisms, provide open communications and which procure their funds in a fair manner.”12

At the field level, Caritas Switzerland has a very limited presence. Staff reported that the main reference for programme standards was not based on internal standards, but mostly on donor reporting requirements, especially those of their major donor, Swiss Solidarity. Swiss Solidarity requires recipient organisations to be certified (normally through ZEWO) to apply for funding from Swiss Solidarity and must explain how they meet Swiss their requirements in every project. Their requirements include technical standards for specific sectors, such as construction, as well as general good practice like beneficiary participation. Caritas’ field office also considered international standards like the Red Cross

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http://www.zewo.ch/ueber_uns/about-us

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Code of Conduct and Sphere important references. Field staff indicated that they were not aware of the implications of ZEWO certification in the field, perhaps beyond some work required from financial and administrative staff.

Principled humanitarian action

All members of the Caritas network subscribe to humanitarian principles in their relief work, as outlined in the draft Caritas Internationalis minimum requirements. Although Caritas is a faith-based organisation guided by Catholic Church canon and teaching, there is a strong commitment to the principle of impartiality – with aid based on needs and provided without discrimination based on religion or other factors. In a predominantly Catholic country, Caritas is well situated to draw on the strong Church network at the local level to reach people in need. Yet it also is a trusted and respected actor in regions like Mindanao, with a long-running conflict and a significant Muslim population.

NASSA, CRS and Caritas Switzerland staff interviewed all agreed that humanitarian principles are considered important for their work. However, there were few mechanisms to ensure they are included in programming. “A project wouldn’t be accepted if it didn’t comply with humanitarian principles, but there is nothing formalized to check for them,” reported one staff member. The proposal writing process and final evaluations were highlighted as key moments when humanitarian principles are referenced, but there is little follow up in monitoring or reporting how they are being applied.

One area where principled approaches are reflected in programmes is the extensive use of needs assessments to define programme priorities and target beneficiaries. NASSA, CRS and Caritas Switzerland all used adequate mechanisms at the community level to assess needs and ensure project beneficiaries were selected and prioritised based on the degree of vulnerability. However, there were stark differences in approaches, determined in part to the financial and technical resources and experience available to each organisation. As an example, at the time of the field research, CRS was training staff on the use of tablets and other ICT tools to carry out assessments and monitoring. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring community NASSA used more traditional approaches such as a massive wall mural with detailed handwritten information and pictographs depicting family members and needs in each household in the barangay.

Accountability toward affected populations

CRS

According to several CRS staff interviewed, despite its strong internal accountability policy framework and procedures, project beneficiaries could have been more involved in the early response. However, the need to respond quickly coupled with limited staff resources superseded more participatory approaches. Once the initial emergency phase passed, this seems to have improved, and the research team saw ample evidence of how CRS’s accountability commitments were translated into specific actions aimed at ensuring affected populations could exercise their rights. In fact, CRS stood out compared to the majority of other actors working in the Tacloban area for the depth and quality of its accountability mechanisms.

As an example, in the shelter programmes, beneficiaries were given a menu of options from which to choose. They also work with the affected community to develop indicators for success and other project indicators. Program staff goes to the field at least quarterly to do focus groups, surveys, and discussions with beneficiaries and report back to them on the results. Based on beneficiaries’ preferences, the

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programme has begun to include cash transfer. The second phase of their livelihood programme was in the design stage at the time of the field research, following a month long study on what the community considers suitable.

Field visits to CRS projects and discussions with community members showed widespread appreciation with the quality of the response, the opportunities for feedback, and the attitude of CRS staff and volunteers, especially compared to other NGOs and government officials working in the same area. This is an area where CRS has made improvements following a real time evaluation that revealed that people did not know how to give feedback and were afraid to do so. In an effort to address this, a staff member was hired to specifically work on protection and accountability issues. Since then, more feedback has been received, and stronger mechanisms are in place to monitor and act on complaints. The most common complaint received has been in reference to beneficiary selection. They are also working to expand the range of people who provide feedback and are piloting a Facebook page to see if it is an appropriate means of receiving feedback from younger people.

Caritas Switzerland

Caritas Switzerland made an effort to include beneficiaries in the planning and programme design, however, the need to respond quickly sometimes limits participation. “There is a dilemma between pressure from donors and media to act quickly and participatory means. They are sometimes sacrificed,” noted a staff member. Another echoed this sentiment. “In terms of beneficiary accountability, we try to do planning with them and with the local authorities. Sometimes the deadlines are too tight though, so we have to come up with something and then go back to them and either try to convince them or adapt it if we can.”

The research team did not see evidence of formal mechanisms to ensure accountability, but there does seem to be an internal knowledge of what they consider best practice and would like to see included in programmes. For example, Caritas Switzerland staff report that they generally develop beneficiary selection criteria with the community, but if the community does not mention certain things, they will suggest it. They also report always having complaint mechanisms available in their programmes and check for beneficiary satisfaction in evaluations. They also report including non-beneficiaries in their consultations.

Quality, effectiveness and continuous learning

CRS

CRS has a well-developed approach to continuous learning and improvement. The organisation develops a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation binder for each program, following extensive discussions internally, as well as consultations with affected populations. Once developed, they use the indicators, regular monitoring and real time evaluations, to assess progress and take corrective actions. In fact, it was the real time evaluation that was used to pinpoint the need to improve communication with affected populations. Following the evaluation, they made changes to ensure beneficiaries knew how to provide suggestions, as well as to make them feel more comfortable doing so. They also involve key staff members in self-assessment exercises to review the indicators that may need closer attention.

In terms of the quality of the response, CRS appears to have successfully applied the most relevant technical standards into its programmes. Indeed, field observations of projects showed CRS projects were often significantly better quality than projects implemented by other INGOs in the same area. Field

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staff at the community level demonstrated a good understanding of technical standards and how they were applied in accordance to the specificities of the local context.

Following the response, CRS produces lessons learned documents. Regional headquarters centralize these documents and share them with other country programmes to foster learning among the countries of the region. Staff report using these documents when designing new programs, although several staff identified the need for a formalized tool to facilitate incorporating lessons learned from previous programs in the design of new programmes. Plans are reportedly underway to create this tool. Staff turnover appears to be quite low compared to other organisations, which helps to maintain institutional knowledge. Nevertheless, their use of formalized tools to capture lessons would help to avoid making the same mistakes should staff leave the organisation.

Caritas Switzerland

As with accountability, internal practices for quality and learning do not appear to have been formalized. Each project creates a list of issues to be included in project monitoring for quality and effectiveness. Normally, this comes from donor requirements, according to staff. These requirements are used as the foundation to develop a monitoring and evaluation system for each project. Progress is then monitored on this basis. “We write the proposal based on donor requirements and that will be the focus in the monitoring of course, because it will be checked.” Other standards mentioned in project proposals, such as Sphere, are reportedly also used. It is up to the discretion of the field sector experts to implement the project in line with the standards. Again, staff recognized that this is an area for improvement: “Our quality management is probably addressing the right topics but could improve by formalizing it more through templates. It would help to keep it in discussion.”

Caritas Switzerland headquarters does have a scorecard that is developed based on the country strategy, but can vary somewhat from country to country. It is used to self-assess progress toward the annual plan. In addition, they recently started doing long term evaluations to learn from the impact of their work from five to more than 15 years ago. The evaluations look at how their programmes have affected beneficiaries several years later. The aim is to capture lessons that could influence future programme design. Other lessons learned documents are also available on the intranet.

Both headquarters and field staff felt that they are likely covering the most important issues, but could benefit from formalizing their quality procedures: “We have internal standards but they are not written. We just kind of know them. It would be good as an institution to have a common policy on good practice.” Current practice for developing proposals may be an area that could be improved to increase use of standards at the field level. At present, the field office is responsible for writing the technical component of the project and headquarters for adding the narrative to explain how best practice and quality standards will be incorporated. This could risk creating a divide in which standards remain only a policy on paper at the headquarters level rather than something that is integrated in implementation in the field. However, one staff member felt that the proposal process helped to raise the right issues in internal discussions and another mentioned that issues included in proposals become part of their monitoring.

Views on the proposed certification model

The majority of staff interviewed from different Caritas organisations were generally supportive of the proposed certification model, though raised questions about how it would be implemented and the degree of support from external stakeholders like donors. Several questioned how the model differed

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from the Caritas Internationalis minimum requirements, but on explanation, saw that the two approaches could be complementary and compatible with each.

Most CRS staff interviewed were positive regarding certification and the model. They considered that a common standard and assessment framework would be useful for the sector and for their own work. Some envisioned the model as a checklist to refer to throughout programming, and also appreciated the idea of an objective external verification mechanism to assess the quality of CRS’s accountability mechanisms and performance.

Notwithstanding the general support, a few failed to see the added value of certifying NGOs and raised numerous questions regarding its utility. In natural disasters situations like Haiyan, some staff maintained that the government would not have time to filter organisations based on those that are certified, and politically would not refuse to grant them access. Several doubted that their major donors would adopt a common standard for reporting while smaller and medium sized donors were already considered very flexible in their requirements. Several suggested that based on the experience in the Philippines, organisations that are not following good practice are unlikely to participate in certification: “So what´s the point for these organisations?” asked one. “Even organisations who would undergo certification are not immune from individual stupidity. They could be certified and have a few bad people.” Staff also offered several suggestions to improve the model, specifically that UN agencies be included in certification, and that the model integrate organisations’ use of sex and age disaggregated data (SADD).

Caritas Switzerland staff would appreciate if certification led to having one set of standards, adding that it would benefit those affected by crises if quality improves. They also thought donors would be happy to use it. “They are already making arbitrary decisions, so let´s make them base it on something,” said one respondent. Some staff members were fearful of duplicating existing standards and creating additional work. They stressed the amount of time they spend on administrative requirements and had difficulty believing that all donors would adopt a common standard for reporting, as some donors had highly specific requirements.

They were also concerned about certification possibly excluding national and local NGOs: “It would be sad if some organisations are excluded because some partners really do good work. Who is to say that our standards will be better? Maybe the local organisations are doing it better.” They felt that cost of certification could be an issue for local organisations. Staff highlighted that in order for certification to have value it needs to go beyond headquarters and the policy level to look at actual implementation in the field. They also felt that organisations should have to reapply for certification regularly.

6. Integrating quality and accountability into partnership relationships

General observations

One of the key questions guiding the field research in the Philippines is how the draft model would apply to organisations working through partnerships arrangements or networks. One immediate challenge faced by many INGOs and UN agencies arriving in the country was finding local implementing partners. As a middle-income country with strong capacity, many INGOs and UN agencies do not have a large or continual programming presence in the country, making this a new experience for some. Several organisations reported fierce competition for local partners. In some cases, partners selected were

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based on expediency and availability, not on complementarity or a shared commitment to an equitable partnership. In other cases, direct implementation of programming activities by international actors supplanted local capacities, with the assumption that there was insufficient capacity or experience for local actors to implement.

Another difficulty is that many INGOs have focused their work in the Philippines on poverty reduction and development activities. For many, when Haiyan struck, the logical decision was to use existing partnership relationships to shift their work to relief and recovery. This also created challenges, however, as their development partners were often unfamiliar with how the humanitarian sector works and had little experience implementing relief programmes. One INGO reported the philosophical difficulties for its partners, a micro-finance organisation, to shift to a mind-set where aid is a provided freely to those in need.

According to many respondents, despite the frequency of disasters, there are few national NGOs that have dedicated humanitarian programming. An exception is the Philippines Red Cross, which has strong capacity and a national network, and has been supported by the IFRC, ICRC and other Red Cross Red Crescent partners over a long period, and the partnership relationships appeared to work very effectively.

Approaches to partnerships in the Caritas network

Specifically looking at the CARITAS network and partnership relations, CRS had significantly more resources and experience around quality and accountability than other CARITAS members operating in the Philippines, which was clearly demonstrated in their systems and processes. Indeed, CRS stands out compared to many INGOs for the quality of their programmes and their accountability mechanisms.

However, in this context, CRS was directly implementing projects in part because their local CARITAS counterpart, NASSA, felt it didn’t have the capacity to undertake the large-scale shelter and WASH programmes proposed by CRS. Instead, NASSA coordinated with CRS, but managed its own programmes, using its own approaches and building on its existing relationships with communities. The contrast between the two approaches was stark – CRS used Ipads for needs assessment, for example, while NASSA used traditional paper-based murals to map out needs in communities – but the results appeared to be similar, and both organisations might be able to meet many of the core requirements. In contrast, CARITAS Switzerland worked with local partners, but an assessment of their systems, processes and overall approach suggests that it might find it difficult to meet several of the proposed criteria. This raises questions about the degree to which skills can be transferred between partners, and how to build long-term capacities, and whether or not the model’s assessment process can fairly distinguish between different levels of capacities.

The research team was not able to explore in depth how CRS works to ensure its partners follow quality standards as CRS is implementing directly. Nevertheless, staff who had worked with CRS in other countries reported that CRS normally does this well, in part due to their connection to local churches. “They never work with a partner without training them and will then continue to work with them. They don’t drop the bad ones but give them more training,” said one staff member. It is generally the responsibility of the program manager to hold partners accountable for adhering to standards.

Caritas Switzerland selects its partners using a partner assessment tool. The tool covers issues of financial management, which is one of the most important, the mission and vision of the organisation, how they monitor and implement projects, how decisions are made, coordination, learning and their

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political orientation. The partners first assess themselves based on how well they believe they are doing in each area, Caritas then assesses the partner, and this is used as the basis for discussion. The organisation also has the opportunity to rate Caritas. They undergo this exercise annually. Staff upholds that Caritas will work to build the capacity of partners, as this is one of their objectives, but also looks for partners that already have capacity. In the case of Haiyan, Caritas Switzerland selected four local organisations as partners. Caritas Philippines, or the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines´ National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice (CBCP-NASSA), was not among those selected, as Caritas Switzerland did not feel that they could reach the required level in time, but report trying to build their capacity nevertheless.

In order to ensure that their partners’ work meets their standards, Caritas Switzerland adopts several techniques. They share their donor requirements with the partner, follow up on their reporting, monitor their work in the field and usually have a staff member accompany them throughout the entire project. Admittedly, this person tends to come from a technical background, such as a construction expert, “so he probably checks more for technical things than accountability and humanitarian principles,” reported Caritas. Furthermore, in the Caritas network, one international Caritas is responsible for one Philippine diocese. In the case of Caritas Switzerland, the Cebu diocese is their responsibility.

Asking CAFOD about whether an agreed assessment framework could be helpful for selecting partners or for guiding capacity-building, CAFOD outlined that their approach is to start from where the partner is at, and design interventions together on those areas that the partner is able to work with. This may well mean that all of the requirements within an assessment framework cannot immediately be achieved, but, using the principle of continuous improvement, could be realised over time. Anything that the partner feels is being imposed would jeopardise its commitment and buy-in and create an imbalance in the power dynamic.

All CAFOD partners receiving over 20,000 GBP a year must do a MANGO ‘Financial Health Check’, and put together an action plan to address any problem areas. NASSA are currently working on that as a condition for further funding. CAFOD project appraisals have questions and guidance referring to SPHERE, HAP and accountability (but this does require the staff member to be familiar with these standards). CAFOD also require regular (every 3-6 months) narrative and financial reporting (including transaction listings) and external audits (for most projects and carry out regular monitoring visits to see projects and discuss progress and challenges with partner staff.

CAFOD regularly monitors its humanitarian programmes and is adaptive in its approach, taking into account the changes in context and its partners changing capacity over time. They are developing recovery projects with other NNGOs in the Philippines (one a new partner, one a previous partner), so contribute to sustainable local capacity, alongside commitment to support NASSA, CRS and Caritas Switzerland.

From the CAFOD head quarter’s perspective, there were a number of factors in the decision to work with their three partners. The scale of the natural disaster was almost unprecedented. It was clear that no one agency would be able to deliver a comprehensive and robust humanitarian response at the scale required. The other factor was around the ability to absorb funding. The DEC appeal raised £95 million, one of its most successful appeals in terms of funds raised in recent years, and CAFOD’s allocation as a member agency was significant. In addition CAFOD raised its significant own funds. In order to ensure appropriate response at scale, to the expected levels of quality and to ensure accountability to donors and requirements as a DEC member, CAFOD decided to work with a number of partners. NASSA was selected because there was a history and proven track record of partnership, which provided significant

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reach through diocesan social action centres in affected communities. CRS and Caritas Switzerland had also been partners before in other parts of the world and there is confidence in their ability to deliver a quality response (in a timely manner and scale) as well as meeting the compliance requirements of some of CAFOD’s donors. CRS were present and responding in Leyte and East Samar, and Caritas Switzerland had strong local partners in northern Cebu, with staff in place managing their projects. Following discussions with CAFOD staff they submitted project proposals which were approved for support. All three CAFOD partners are Caritas agencies. As such, they subscribe to the same principles that inform CAFOD’s approach towards quality, accountability and effectiveness. Both NASSA and CRS have significant accountability requirements to donors, which need to be understood, appreciated and factored into the partnership engagement. The challenges that have arisen have not come from a misalignment of views on quality, accountability and effectiveness which are well aligned, but rather from the operational challenges of responding to devastation caused by the worst typhoon in living memory.

Local partners’ views of certification

The research team had the opportunity to meet with several of partner organisations working with Caritas members or other INGOs to capture their perspectives. One organisation utilized beneficiary satisfaction surveys, suggestion boxes, monitoring and evaluation in order to monitor quality, accountability and effectiveness. Another organisation had developed a number of tools, such as feedback mechanisms, transparency boards, SMS messages and a mood meter for workers, but attributed this to their experience working as a partner of another international NGO. The other organisation “gave us inputs for Q&A. We had two people working with us on this since the start, so Q&A was integrated in the design. They asked us to mainstream Q&A in the manual of operations. They gave us a template but we needed to think about it according to our needs.”

However, for many local organisations, their international partners did not assess or trust their capacity as a partner and they would have liked to have been trained: “They also can´t assume we are experts in humanitarian aid. They should have trained us and engaged us. That was needed at the start. They didn´t do this because they said it was an emergency.” Partner organisations in general also missed greater transparency from their international partners. In several cases, local partners reported requesting to see project documents and the budget, but this was not shared until the end. “Are INGOs willing to treat INGOs in the same way they are requiring LNGOs to do this?” Overall, the organisations did feel that their capacity for humanitarian response had improved following Haiyan, though it is perhaps too early to tell.

One frequent suggestion coming from field consultations was that international partners (mainly funding partners) should be required to invest in building their local partners’ capacities so they can gradually work towards meeting and standards or certification requirements if they want to

Partners were afraid that certification would exclude and alienate small organisations that are not interested in participating. “We discussed this as a team and have nothing against certification but could it exclude some organisations from engaging in humanitarian assistance? This may be unfair if they can’t complete the certification due to financial or time constraints and you need local participation of partners in humanitarian assistance.” One partner noted that “humanitarian work should be given freely and it is the local people who are always the first to respond,” which seemed to imply concern that certification could hinder this local response. Should the model be adopted, they suggested checking to

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see if partners have been trained in HAP and Sphere, as well as providing capacity building for small organisations to participate.

From a head quarter’s perspective, CAFOD believe that they have to be mindful of the partner’s capacity to engage in capacity development activities versus humanitarian relief activities and strike an appropriate balance. Their partners are not always incentivised to work towards certification. The time and investment needed to become certified could outweigh the perceived benefits of certification, particularly for a church-based organisation that doesn’t have an INGO-style way of working. For some of their other partners who are already working to high standards and comply with the Caritas Internationalis (CI) Management standards as verified by CI, there are questions around the necessity to be further certified.

7. Compatibility with the Government of Philippines’ approach to quality and accountability

The proposed model is compatible with the government’s approach to quality and accountability, and government representatives at all levels (local and national were very supportive of the idea of certifying NGOs). From the perspective of many government officials, there was simply not enough capacity to assess, coordinate and manage the number of actors given the large influx of groups following disasters like Haiyan.

Currently, the main emphasis for the government in terms of quality and accountability is focused on government ministries themselves, with several initiatives to improve transparency and accountability to citizens. A national Commission on Audit monitors the work of government agencies, although there is a push from some within the government to also include NGOs, either through the same mechanism or the development of something similar. The Commission of Audit primarily focusing on whether the actions fulfilled the purpose and followed procedures, especially financial procedures, with little mention of accountability to affected populations or quality. However, the guidelines are being revised and may include more elements around quality and accountability according to some representatives interviewed. In this sense, the proposed model’s focus on NGOs was seen a very complementary to government efforts as it meets a gap identified by all government and local authorities interviewed.

Government representatives seemed especially positive about the idea of certifying international NGOs or NGOs with which they are not familiar. “It’s hard to figure out who people are when they arrive. Certification would come in handy because there would be no need to verify as long as they’re certified,” said one official. Many officials complained about the competency and capacity of some NGOs. In the words of one official “Sorry, but let’s face it; lots of NGOs that came simply aren’t in the same league as the Red Cross and others.” The same official went on to propose that smaller, less experienced NGOs should work in partnership under the umbrella of a more experienced NGO. Another government official echoed the sentiment: “Certification should help to know if organisations have capacity. The only potential problems from this are for individuals who don’t know what they’re doing,” citing the example of an informal group of volunteers who set up an NGO. “Certification would have helped.”

The lack of information and transparency of organisations coming into the country was frustrating for government officials. At the national level, the government was unaware of many organisations that went directly to affected areas. At the local level, government officials also complained about a lack of information about plans and strategies discussed at the national level, with little information sharing or

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participation of local officials. “With the designation as an L3 disaster, it meant that many of our long-term interlocutors were not there, and new people and new organisations came in,” explained one. “These people didn’t know our systems, didn’t know the context, and they way they communicated with people raised unrealistic expectations that we have to deal with later.” Another representative suggested that NGOs should coordinate and police themselves rather than tie up resources of the government: “Instead of 100 voices in coordination meetings, one single coordinated voice would be better.”

Municipalities offered similar complaints regarding information sharing with NGOs, adding that a lack of coordination had led to duplicating efforts in some areas and leaving gaps in more isolated areas. One government official stated, “Very few NGOs informed us of their projects and their progress. We need this information to coordinate and give feedback when other organisations come to us. For example there was a boat repair project and they gave people the same boat they had before but the coral reef near the island was damaged so the fish were depleted. They will need to go out further and get bigger boats. If there were proper coordination this would not have happened because we would have discussed it earlier.” Similarly, another municipality reported, “I gave a list of affected families to one NGO and they gave the list to another organisation, which gave it to another. The other organisations should have checked with us because it was no longer updated and that meant that some neighbours received assistance three times and others received nothing. The NGOs do not coordinate with us.”

Government representatives interviewed stressed the importance of preparedness work in anticipation of future crises, where NGOs and their counterparts in civil society and government would have the time to build relationships and trust, and agree on ways of working. In the absence of this, a registry of NGOs that agreed to common set of standards, combined with an external verification mechanism on their competencies and experience was seen as a very positive step towards more coherence and a way of allowing government officials at all levels to better distinguish who to work with.

Not all government officials offered complaints or criticisms. One reported that they had all the information they need from the organisations and that they met to share ideas. Another felt that they did not have a right to complain as they organisations had come to help their constituents, also adding that despite the disparities in the assistance provided, the government did not have a clear standard to which it could refer to be able to say that certain projects did not comply.

8. Compatibility with the Philippines Council for NGO Certification process

The research team also met representatives from the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) to discuss alignment and compatibility with the existing certification system in country. The PCNC has previously engaged in the project sharing information and participating in a consultation and learning event in Bangkok, Thailand prior to Haiyan, so this was an opportunity to follow up directly on the issue of certification. The PCNC was formed in 1995 after concerns by the government that it would not be able to regulate the growing number of NGOs effectively. After engaging in dialogue with national NGOs, the government suggested that an alternative would be for the NGO sector to develop a body to self-regulate and certify NGOs, in return making donations to certified NGOs tax deductible.

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PCNC certification is based on assessment of an organisation’s vision, mission, and goals; governance; administration; program operations; financial management; and networking.13 There are three levels of certification depending on the size and experience of the organisation. The PCNC certification criteria focus on governance, internal management issues and mission and vision, but do not mention requirements in terms of programming or accountability.14 PCNC has certified more than 300 Philippine NGOs at a cost of approximately US$ 200.15

The PCNC “Seal of Good Housekeeping” does not directly target organisations engaged in humanitarian response activities. Nevertheless, representatives interviewed agreed that given the frequency of natural disasters in the Philippines, specific standards and clear examples of good practices would benefit those organisations wanting to contribute to a response. An international certification system would therefore not be incompatible with the PCNC approach, and in fact could act as an incentive for local and national organisations, including businesses, to work towards applying good practices.

The research team spoke to several organisations that were certified by PCNC, applying for certification or considering applying and their opinions varied. One noted, “It’s about branding. It shows that we are following a set of standards.” Others mentioned the emergence of fake NGOs and that certification helped to show that they were legitimate and professional. Another reported, “We were certified and haven´t seen much benefits. It’s expensive for us. It did improve our administration system though.”

This is an area for further research and discussions if an international model is agreed and implemented, with potential to work with the PCNC on ensuring complementarity and affordability.

9. Other stakeholders’ views of certification

The research team consulted numerous other stakeholders from the UN, INGOs, national NGOs and donor governments to capture their perspectives regarding the certification model. Overall, most were supportive of the idea, several were undecided and a few were more critical. For those supportive of certification, many pointed to numerous potential benefits that could result from moving forward with the model. They highly appreciated the idea of having a common standard against which organisations could be assessed and reported on. According to one interviewee, “We have lots of standards and it’s not clear what is actually being implemented. If there were a common standard, it wouldn´t duplicate them. It would just take it to the next level and could help us achieve our goals. It would be an advantage for the communities we are serving and will drive people to do better, leading to better value for money both for donors and for beneficiaries.”

Some noted that it would also be useful when working with partners that may be less familiar with best practice. “If we have common standards, it’s something that everyone can relate to and comply with. It would be a big help not only for NGOs. We are engaging more with the private sector and trying to build their capacity,” said one interviewee. They also found the three pillars of the model to cover the most important issues, and generally overlapped with different standards they were already using. Beyond the common standards, they stressed the importance of monitoring and verifying compliance with the standard: “If you don´t have a monitoring mechanism, then what´s the point? There is a need for verification.” On a similar note, another interviewee reported being highly surprised over the quality of

13

http://www.pcnc.com.ph/related-literature.php 14

http://www.pcnc.com.ph/related-literature.php 15

http://www.pcnc.com.ph/ngo-list.php?a=A

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work done by some renowned international NGOs: “They should know better. Certification could be good to get everyone on the same page.”

Finally, several proponents of certification felt that it would help to improve the reputation of the humanitarian sector, as well as make it more professional. Several Philippine NGOs raised the issue of fake NGOs who do not actually implement projects and are only used to raise money for the founders, damaging the broader image of NGOs in the Philippines. “There are some fake NGOs in the Philippines and they are giving a bad name to NGOs overall. Certification could help to give us more prestige,” maintained one interviewee.

Various concerns were also raised regarding the proposed certification model. A few had basic questions about its added value. “Is it really necessary given that we already have HAP and Sphere?” said one interviewee, “It’s not clear what the added value is. It feels like a decision has been made and I’m still at the ‘so what?’ stage,” said another. A Philippine organisation described PCNC and DSWD requirements, adding, “If there are so many accreditation agencies, what would be the added value?”

Some also feared that this would add additional reporting and administrative requirements, inferring that donor harmonization was not likely. “There is a danger that if a critical mass says yes to certification, the others will have to as well because donors will start to require it. It could become another box to check unless donors harmonize their requirements,” affirmed one interviewee. Some organisations complained of the many different reporting requirements for different donors and were hesitant to have to add more administrative work. “I am concerned about possible duplication of certification. I don’t want it to be an additional burden. I am happy with the mechanism we have,” maintained another interviewee. Another representative suggested “There is a risk that as donors will tend to only fund organisations with certification, and that they use this as an excuse to not follow up with their partners and say that they need less staff. Capitals are already not listening and acting on what it going in the field,” asserted the interviewee.

However, perhaps the most common concern among those interviewed related to concerns of excluding smaller or national organisations. The financial costs were stressed, as well as actual capacity to meet the standards. “The danger of any certification system is if it excludes. In order to be successful it needs to lift up the majority,” suggested one interviewee, and “It could be a problem for smaller organisations to comply. Not because of the cost or administrative burden but because of being able to comply with the standards.” “I am apprehensive of the disparity and worried about the exclusion of smaller organisations,” noted another. Some associated the perceived administrative burden with additional costs, apart from the actual cost of certification, leading some to wonder whether they would be able to afford it.

Interviewees also offered a number of suggestions regarding the best way to apply the model. One of the most common suggestions referred to expanding certification beyond NGOs to reflect the wide range of actors engaged in humanitarian action. UN agencies were generally the first to be mentioned, but interviewees also suggested including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, governments and the private sector. “We need a process to hold them accountable,” said one interviewee, a statement echoed by many. “NGOs have to work to get money from donors, while UN agencies get it far too easily. I have seen shocking things in the UN and the worst thing is that everyone knows and no one with power does anything. UN agencies often act as donors and they are not fulfilling good practice,” asserted an interviewee. Many felt that the model was applicable and relevant to all types of partners, but added that their buy-in and understanding was essential to success.

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Several expressed the need for certification to look closely at actual practices and implementation, and not simply at what is on paper, as some of the certification schemes with which they were familiar do. “It needs to be as close to the field as possible, not in capitals. It needs to check what’s being done in the field because what’s on paper can be very different. Everything looks nice,” noted an interviewee. Similarly, there were also comments suggesting that the model “should have teeth” with incentives for compliance and consequences for failure to comply.

Others felt that resources should be provided to smaller organisations to help them build their capacity and consequently, be certified. It should not be overly complicated, they stressed, but very practical with specific ways to improve their work, staff capacity and programmes. There was even a suggestion to think carefully about the terminology and possibly call it an award or prize to avoid making smaller organisations feel threatened. A few thought that it was worth considering developing different levels of certification, with more easily attainable standards for small organisations and support to help grow to the next level.

10. Conclusions and recommendations

The Philippines field research findings show perhaps the strongest degree of support for certification by all stakeholders compared to the other case studies. Overall, most of those consulted during the field research supported the idea of certification and found the model to be useful and relevant. Part of this is clearly influenced by the nature of the crisis and the response to Typhoon Haiyan, which unfortunately repeated many of the issues that led to calls for a certification system for NGOs following other major disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami or the Haiti earthquake.

Applying humanitarian principles, accountability and quality standards in large-scale disasters

In the context of Typhoon Haiyan, there were challenges to apply the principle of impartiality, where aid is defined and delivered in proportion to needs. There were numerous examples provided of where organisations (including foreign governments) focused only on easy to access locations, at the expense of communities away from the urban areas of Tacloban or Cebu City. Several stakeholders reported organisations spending too much time staking out and defending their “territory” or beneficiary communities, or worse, media attention, at the expense of rapid and high quality assistance.

Many stakeholders, including representatives from governments, commented that while aid was not overtly politicized, partisan power struggles at the national, regional and local level influenced aid decisions. Similarly, foreign governments were equally singled out for sometimes putting their own political priorities over the needs and priorities of affected people and the government. Corruption was often mentioned as another issue that affected applying needs-based approaches. Nevertheless, most of the NGOs interviewed had processes in place to minimize these risks to principled approaches.

The research team observed that INGOs –including several very experienced ones - had delivered sub-standard responses. Similarly, accountability mechanisms were in general very weak and inconsistently applied, and only now, seven months after the event, were slowly being rolled out through the clusters. Arguments offered by many that the scale and scope of the disaster precluded fully applying technical standards or accountability principles seemed somewhat disingenuous. In this sense, the model’s assessment process could potentially serve both as a check for compliance, but also as a baseline for future improvements in performance.

Compatibility with external systems and requirements

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In broad terms, the model was very much in line with national level legislation to facilitate the government’s coordination of international disaster response. Government representatives at all levels were strongly supportive of certification as a way to assist them to carry out their coordination functions. One important observation (similar to Pakistan) was that provincial and local governments wanted access to a “registry” of NGOs that would help them to navigate a complex system where they are often responsible for setting aid priorities, but are not sure who is the most appropriate partner or how to monitor NGOs’ work.

In the context of a major disaster, many INGOs and UN agencies reported difficulties in finding local NGOs to implement programmes, leading to examples of competition for partners. In this respect, the model was less useful perhaps in selecting partners, as there were simply too many needs and too few partners to make a difference. In most cases, donors and UN agencies had significant surge capacity, which could presumably been used to assess, select and monitor partners. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the model could be used as a means to pre-select potential partners (including regional and international partners), and work with them to build capacity, as reported by many actors.

Similarly, the model is not incompatible with the national NGO certification body, PCNC, approach, though it does differ in the level of specific requirements related to humanitarian work, and has a greater emphasis on field level verification. However, the PCNC is open for further discussions on the potential to collaborate with any potential international model. Indeed, PCNC has already engaged with InterAction and HAP.

Finally, the model appears also to be compatible with the Caritas Internationalis draft minimum standards, although a more thorough comparison is required once the standards are approved and adopted. This suggests that the model can be adapted to recognise existing networks quality assurance processes and add value by focusing on field level verification of quality and accountability.

From CAFOD’s perspective, the key things that any organisation engaged in humanitarian work should be able to demonstrate would be: adherence to humanitarian principles – Humanity, impartiality and independence; good communication with and participation of those affected by crisis in the design and delivery of responses; financial transparency and accountability; sufficient and appropriate capacity to deliver responses to technical and quality standards (for example shelter programmes need engineering support and donated/used medicine needs certificate of origin to assure it is genuine and efficacious); commitment to and evidence of learning; and, mechanisms for providing beneficiary feedback and addressing beneficiary grievance.

Feasibility of the model

The basic elements of the model resonate with stakeholders, who considered that it captured the most important areas of humanitarian action. At the programming level, the assessment criteria were considered relevant and appropriate, and the process was able to generate valid conclusions about how participating organisations interpret and apply key quality and accountability concepts in programmes. While most stakeholders generally preferred a model that promotes continuous learning, there was a significant number of stakeholders who felt certification should equally focus on compliance with quality and accountability standards. Indeed, it was evident very quickly that there was little consistency in the quality of assistance in several key areas like shelter and WASH, despite the massive roll-out of L3 resources into clusters and coordination, etc.

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Certification was seen as potentially very useful in helping to differentiate between actors with experience and competency, from those with less capacity to respond effectively. Many stakeholders saw external verification as an incentive for organisations to apply good practices, and a way to compensate for the limitations of coordination mechanisms like clusters or national level bodies to actively monitor and review quality and accountability of responses. One key concern expressed by many actors, including government and national NGOs, was the risk that “suitcase” NGOs were potentially diverting resources and providing inappropriate assistance from more credible and professional organisations. For some, certification potentially provided a framework that would help filter out such actors by providing government authorities with more information on an organisation’s experience. Many also reinforced the idea that the assessment framework could provide organisations clearer expectations on what is expected from them. That said, many of the complaints made about quality, accountability and performance were against INGOs with awareness and experience with existing standards. In addition, as several stakeholders pointed out, organisations that do not apply good practices are often “outside” of the system, and as such may not be aware or interested in certification.

While all stakeholders agreed on the value of a certification system, most also acknowledged that certification as such might only mitigate, not eliminate, the influx of large numbers of unprepared and inexperienced organisations in the response phase. Nevertheless, certification was seen as an important filter to distinguish more capable organisations from others, and, importantly, as a means to hold even the most experienced organizations accountable for meeting quality and accountability standards. This was especially a point of view expressed by national and local government authorities, and to a certain extent, reflected in comments from beneficiary communities interviewed.

In terms of the feasibility of applying the model to NASSA, Caritas Switzerland and CRS, the experiences varied. All three demonstrated that they attempted to apply many of the core concepts and criteria proposed in the model, though with different degrees of compliance. The resources and experience of CRS in issues of quality and accountability was evident, and the organisation was clearly recognised by other stakeholders as an example of good practices. For Caritas Switzerland, the evidence was more difficult to find, in part because the research team did not have access to complete documentation. Based on interviews with staff and stakeholders, however, it is clear that more work is needed to systematically and consistently apply core criteria in its programmes. Finally, as the national Caritas network, NASSA also demonstrated that it met many of the model’s proposed criteria, though with clear differences in the approach and resources available compared to its partners.

This reinforces the message from many stakeholders that any model must be flexible enough to acknowledge different and diverse approaches to apply quality and accountability in programming. It also suggests that a model that focuses on continuous learning and improvement, rather than a prescriptive model with a very narrow interpretation of what constitutes good practices, is more appropriate.

Finally, in terms of partnerships, the research findings suggest that many international organisations often did not consider the capacity, experience and vision of local organisations. There was wide agreement that it is important for international partners to support their local partners in meeting accepted standards and good practices, but this was not always observed in practice. However, the approach should not be one of imposition of external approaches, but of accompanying them to finding approaches that are appropriate for the local context and culture. The nature and quality of the partner relationship should be included as part of the assessment criteria, in part, to ensure that the system as a whole is moving towards more equitable relationships between actors at all levels. CAFOD warn that any mechanisms need to take into account that smaller local NGO’s and CBO’s are usually first responders,

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and provide particular expertise in terms of understanding local need, culture and context. They should not be excluded from humanitarian participation, funding or co-ordination mechanisms.

One observation is that when there is a large concentration of NGOs working in the country, it may be more cost effective to carry out multiple organisational assessments in the same time frame. This would also allow for more accurate comparisons between the performance organisations working in the same context, and therefore identify examples of good practices and innovations that could be integrated into organisational learning.

Recommendations

Explore ways to include local organisations

One of the biggest concerns related to the possible exclusion of smaller organisations. Numerous suggestions were offered regarding ways to include them, though some may be more feasible than others. Local organisations would certainly appreciate support in being able to meet the standards for certification. One the one hand, this means capacity building in humanitarian action and programme management, as many are new to humanitarian action and do not have as many resources as CRS, for example, to dedicate to ensuring the quality of their programmes. On the other, it may mean exploring ways to help with the financial costs associated with certification. Some organisations found the national NGO certification costs to be too expensive, but the high number of participants seems to indicate that many consider it affordable. However, an international system would clearly be more expensive and some thought should be given to ways to encourage organisations to participate.

Avoid creating an additional administrative burden

Quite a few stakeholders were concerned of adding yet another set of requirements, as their organisations already spend significant time and resources fulfilling the different administrative and reporting requirements of their donors and other certification bodies. In fact, those who supported the model were often most excited about the prospect of only having one set of requirements to follow. For some, however, this does not seem probable. Some of their donors had such specific requirements that they had difficulty imagining that these would disappear if the model were implemented. Others received the bulk of their funds from large donors who they did not think would be willing to replace their requirements with those of the model. It is important to keep this in mind if the model is implemented, as some organisations will be facing requirements on many different fronts, therefore the certification process should aim to create as little administrative burden as possible.

Consider expanding the model to include other humanitarian actors

Stakeholders interviewed understand that it makes sense to begin with NGOs, but many expressed strong feelings that it should be expanded to include other humanitarian actors as soon as possible in order to have a larger impact on the quality of humanitarian action. This could include UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the private sector and even governments. The project should continue to engage with these actors to discuss the possibility of their future participation.

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Annex 1. List of Interviewees

Manila

Caritas Internationalis

members group discussion

Position Organisation Date

Parisa Karbassi Programme Director STEP – NASSA (CAFOD) 6/9/2014

Karin Uckrow Country Finance Director Caritas Germany 6/9/2014

Kelly Schut Head of Finance Caritas Czech Republic 6/9/2014

Roman Asefaha Funding Officer Caritas International Belgium 6/9/2014

Ron Langford Policy Advocacy Advisor Cordaid 6/9/2014

Joseph Chacko Country Director CAFOD, Caritas Philippines/NASSA 6/9/2014 and

6/10/2014

Julie Breen Executive Secretary Trocaire 6/9/2014

Joshua Kyller Program Manager CRS 6/9/2014

AM Leida Pacano Program Manager NASSA 6/9/2014

Aida Vidal Program Manager Development & Peace 6/9/2014

Jo Ignacio Program Manager NASSA 6/9/2014

Luke Spykes Program Manager NASSA 6/9/2014

Oliver Behn Project Officer CAFOD 6/9/2014

Mike Bonke Programme Manager Caritas Austria 6/9/2014

Marcel Raymond Chief Humanitarian Delegate Caritas Switzerland 6/9/2014

Fr. Edwin Gariguez Executive Secretary NASSA 21.06.14

Philippine International

NGO Group (PINGO)

Paul G. Del Rosario Humanitarian Programme

Coordinator

Oxfam 09.06.14

Javad Amoozegar Country Director ACF 09.06.14

Roland Roescheisen Head of Manila Office Arche Nova 09.06.14

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Ismael Wiflried Zina Emergency Response

Coordinator

ADRA 09.06.14

Carin van der Hor Country Director Plan International 09.06.14

Stephane Moissange Programme Manager Handicap International 09.06.14

Emily Beadle Programme Manager ACTED 09.06.14

Other NGOs

Teresa Bayombong Director of Programs CARE 6/10/2014

Christie Suyin Jamoralin Coordinator Citizens' Disaster Response Center 6/10/2014

Minnie Anne Calub Emergency Programme

Manager

National Council of Churches in the

Philippines

6/10/2014

Luis Morales Director Philippines Council for NGO

Certification (PCNC)

09.06.14

Sonny Carpio Managing Trustee and COO,

Aboitiz Foundation

(also PCNC Board member)

09.06.14

Brian Macdonald Head of Operations Catholic Relief Services

Marcel Fortier Head of Delegation International Federation of Red Cross

and Red Crescent (IFRC)

10.06.14

Government

representatives

Edgardo Ollet Director, Plans and Programs

Division

Office of Civil Defense-National

Disaster Risk Reduction and

Management Council

09.06.14

Vilma Cabrera Assistant Secretary Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD)

20.06.14

Priscila Ylana-Miteya NGO Standards Branch DSWD 20.06.14

JJ Duke Former INGO Coordinator Tacloban Mayor’s office 21.06.14

UN Agencies

David Carden Head of Office UN OCHA 09.06.14

Dr Julie Lyn Hall Country Representative WHO 09.06.14

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Tacloban

Name

Position Organisation Date

CRS Tacloban Office

Renee Lambert Head of Office CRS 11/06/2014

Joshua Kyller Head, Emergency Programs CRS 11/06/2014

Emily Nohner Manager, MEAL CRS 11/06/2014

Emily Reid Protection & Accountability Manager

11/06/2014

Emily Naubackeur Accountability Advisor CRS 12.06.14

Ana Ferrera Livelihoods Program Manager CRS 12.06.14

Holly Fuller Urban Shelter Program Manager CRS 12.06.14

Howard Brian Bacayana WASH Officer CRS 12.06.14

Ruel Bansali Shelter Engineer CRS 12.06.14

Idalia Amaya Program Manager, Grants & Compliance

CRS 12.06.14

Christine June Esmediana WASH Officer (Burauen) CRS 13.06.14

Marjorie Uka WASH Officer (Tabon-Tabon) CRS 13.06.14

Community member focus group discussions

Wilfredo Gerilla Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Vivien Lagario Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Liza Vigal Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Rosaly Radam Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Ester Coranes Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Lina Barera Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Felipe Cinco Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Oscar Camora Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Bernardo Dacome Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Alejandro Bantillan Community member Burauen 6/13/2014

Ereberto Coranes Community member Burauren 13/6/2014

Joey Calooy Community member Burauren 13/6/2014

Emelita Cayobit Community member Burauren 13/6/2014

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Eden Refuerzo Community member Burauren 13/6/2014

Ma. Suzzete Iroy Community member Tabon-Tabon 13/6/2014

Iriza Tonido Tabon-Tabon Barangay Tabon-Tabon 13/6/2014

Susana Cagutom Community member Tabon-Tabon 13/6/2014

Nilda Ala Community member Tabon-Tabon 13/6/2014

Other NGOs

Lex Kassenberg Country Director (outgoing) CARE

Alexa MacLean Country Director (incoming) CAREC

Joanna Watson Field Manager Save the Children

Jonathan Brigham Shelter Delegate IFRC

Ronald Abao Program Manager DSAC – NASSA

UN and Clusters

Kasper Engborg Head of Office (Tacloban) UN OCHA

Margaret Sheehan Field Coordinator UNICEF

Dave Hodgkin Shelter Cluster National Technical Coordinator

Shelter Cluster

Catherine Alcaraz Communications with Communities Officer

UN OCHA

Christie Joy Bacal Accountability to Affected Populations Officer

UN OCHA

Enrika Fatima Hidalgo Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster

UNDP

Local Authorities

Lila Aquitania Chief of Staff Tacloban Mayor’s Office 6/12/2014

Federico C. Anido Executive Assistant, CDRRMO Tacloban Mayor’s Office

Donor Government Representatives

Sallee Gregory Field Team Leader UKAid - DFID

Cebu

Caritas Switzerland staff

Yvonne Affolter Program Coordinator Caritas Switzerland

Lukas Fiechter Program Officer Caritas Switzerland

Marcel Reymond Chief Humanitarian Delegate Caritas Switzerland

Felix Ylala Project Officer Caritas Switzerland

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Other NGOs

Marivic Codinera Information Education

Communication Officer

A2D 6/13/2014

Luchie Almagro-Blanco Visayas Regional Coordinator PhilDHRRA

Local authorities

Salvador de la Fuente Mayor Madridejos

Jose Esgana Mayor Santa Fe

Albert Camay DRM Advisor Santa Fe

UN Agencies and Clusters

Brigit Vaes Shelter Cluster Lead N/A

Michel Rooijackers Deputy Country Director Save the Children

Ivan Ledesma Livelihood Cluster Lead ILO

Donor Governments

Guillaume Roux-Fouillet Construction Project Manager SDC