Case Digest for General Principles and Policies

7/23/2019 Case Digest for General Principles and Policies

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WEEK 1

ARTICLE I. NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises of the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embracedtherein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of

its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domain, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insularshelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of thearchipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of thePhilippines.

MAGALLONA v ERMITA

Facts:In 191, !ongress passed "A #$% demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as anarchipelagic &tate. This law followed the framing of the !onvention on the Territorial &ea and the!ontiguous 'one in 19() *+!-& I/, codifying, among others, the sovereign right of &tates parties overtheir territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void duringthe second round of negotiations in 0eneva in 19$ *+!-& II/ proved futile. Thus, domestically, "A#$% remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 19) *"A (%%/

correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around &abah in orth orneo.In 2arch 3$$9, !ongress amended "A #$% by enacting "A 9(33, the statute now under scrutiny. Thechange was prompted by the need to ma4e "A #$% compliant with the terms of the +nited ations!onvention on the -aw of the &ea *+!-& III/, which the Philippines ratified on 35 6ebruary 19)%.

Among others, +!-& III prescribes the water7land ratio, length, and contour of baselines ofarchipelagic &tates li4e the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the e8tendedcontinental shelf.)!omplying with these reuirements, "A 9(33 shortened one baseline, optimi:ed thelocation of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,the ;alayaan Island 0roup *;I0/ and the &carborough &hoal, as regimes of islands whose islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime :ones.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of "A 9(33 on two principal grounds, namely< *1/ "A 9(33 reduces

Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state=s sovereign power, in violationof Article 1 of the 19)5 !onstitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and*3/ "A 9(33 opens the country=s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels andaircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country=s nuclear7free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.In addition, petitioners contend that "A 9(33s treatment of the ;I0 as regime of islands not only results inthe loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.1%To buttresstheir argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attac4 "A 9(33 for what it e8cluded andincluded its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or &abah and its use of +!-& IIIs framewor4of regime of islands to determine the maritime :ones of the ;I0 and the &carborough &hoal.Issue: >hether or not "A 9(33, an act which is adjusting the country=s archipelagic baselines and

classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories, is constitutional.

Held: "A 9(33 is constitutional.

It is a &tatutory Tool to ?emarcate the !ountry=s 2aritime 'ones and !ontinental &helf +nder +!-&III, not to ?elineate Philippine Territory+!-& III has nothing to do with the acuisition *or loss/ of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,among others, sea7use rights over maritime :ones *i.e., the territorial waters @13 nautical miles from thebaselines, contiguous :one @3% nautical miles from the baselines, e8clusive economic :one @3$$ nautical
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WEEK 1miles from the baselines/, and continental shelves that +!-& III delimits. +!-& III was theculmination of decades7long negotiations among + members to codify norms regulating the conduct of&tates in the world=s oceans and submarine areas, recogni:ing coastal and archipelagic &tates graduatedauthority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.n the other hand, baselines laws such as "A 9(33 are enacted by +!-& III &tates parties to mar47

out specific base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, toserve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime :ones and continental shelf.

Article %) of +!-& III on archipelagic &tates li4e ours could not be any clearerhether or not the municipal ordinance is constitutional.

Held:The municipal ordinance is constitutional.Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thin4ing to the juristic concept ofsovereignty, (eople v. )cierto, and "eagan v. *ommissioner of #nternal "evenue. As was so emphaticallyset forth by Gustice Tuason in Acierto< Hy the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine 0overnmentmerely consents that the +nited &tates e8ercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was givenpurely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or e8pediency. The Philippine 0overnment has not abdicated itssovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdictionover offenses committed therein. +nder the terms of the treaty, the +nited &tates 0overnment has prior orpreferential but not e8clusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine 0overnment retains not only

jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the +nited &tates 2ilitary authorities forreasons of their own decline to ma4e use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippinesovereignty over the basesF the second from the e8press provisions of the treaty.H There was a reiteration


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WEEK 1of such a view in "eagan. Thus< Hothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent andsovereign, its authority may be e8ercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyondits power. >ithin its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the e8tent of its jurisdiction, bothterritorial and personal. ecessarily, li4ewise, it has to be e8clusive. If it were not thus, there is adiminution of sovereignty.H Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto7limitation< HIt is to

be admitted any state may, by its consent, e8press or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereignrights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is theconcept of sovereignty as auto7limitation, which, in the succinct language of Gelline4, His the property of astate7force due to which it has the e8clusive capacity of legal self7determination and self7restriction.H Astate then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the e8ercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.H Theopinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictionalrights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow< HIts laws may as to some persons found withinits territory no longer control. or does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing anotherpower to participate in the e8ercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, itby no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their statusas native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does notdisappear. &o it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military basesagreement of 19%5. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.H

ACCFA v. C2GCO

Facts:A !A, which was to be effective for a period of one *1/ year from Guly 1, 191, was entered intoby and between the +nions and the A!!6A. A few months thereafter, the +nions started protestingagainst alleged violations and non7implementation of said agreement. 6inally, on ctober 3(, 193 the+nions declared a stri4e, which was ended when the stri4ers voluntarily returned to wor4 on ovember3, 193.

n ctober #$, 193 the +nions, together with its mother union, the !onfederation of +nions in0overnment !orporations and ffices *!+0!/, filed a complaint with the !ourt of Industrial "elationsagainst the A!!6A *!ase o. #%($7+-P/ for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice,namely< violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the+nions in the e8ercise of their right to self7organi:ation, discrimination against said members in the matterof promotions, and refusal to bargain. The A!!6A denied the charges and interposed as affirmative andspecial defenses lac4 of jurisdiction of the !I" over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract,e8piration of said contract and lac4 of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefitsprovided for therein. rushing aside the foregoing defenses, the !I" in its decision dated 2arch 3(, 19#ordered the A!!6Ahether or not the !I" has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on whether or notA!!6A e8ercised governmental or proprietary functions.

Held:o.

+nder &ection # of the Agricultural -and "eform !ode the A!A was established, among othergovernmental agencies, to e8tend credit and similar assistance to agriculture, in pursuance of the policyenunciated in &ection 3 as followsheat., 3%F 6leming vs.Page, 9 Doward, $#F ?ownes vs.idwell, 1)3 +. &., #%(./ The formation of the"epublic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Gapan to delude the 6ilipino people into believing

in the apparent magnanimity of the Gapanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights ofgovernment into the hands of 6ilipinos. It was established under the mista4en belief that by doing so,Gapan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the 6ilipino people in her war against the+nited &tates and other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the "epublic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the 6ilipino who,ta4ing advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof bythe Gapanese forces of invasion, had organi:ed an independent government under the name with thesupport and bac4ing of Gapan, such government would have been considered as one established by the6ilipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the +nited &tates. And as such, it wouldhave been a de factogovernment similar to that organi:ed by the confederate states during the war ofsecession and recogni:ed as such by the by the &upreme !ourt of the +nited &tates in numerous cases,notably those of Thorington vs.&mith, >illiams vs.ruffy, and adly vs.Dunter, above uoted. That is tosay, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellionagainst the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile armyof an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.

The governments by the Philippine B8ecutive !ommission and the "epublic of the Philippines during theGapanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts andproceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political comple8ion, weregood and valid, and, by virtue of the well74nown principle of postliminy *postliminium/ in international law,remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and6ilipino forces under the leadership of 0eneral ?ouglas 2acArthur. According to that well74nown principlein international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into thepower of its legitimate government of sovereignty, Hdoes not, e8cept in a very few cases, wipe out theeffects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus

judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political comple8ion, administrative acts so

done, to the e8tent that they ta4e effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts doneduring the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. >ere itotherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paraly:ed by an invasionF and as between thestate and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for e8ample that payment ofta8es made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that thesentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government .H

And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in thepresent case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conueror and for the time


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WEEK 1substituted his own sovereignty as the Gapanese intended to do apparently in granting independence tothe Philippines and establishing the so7called "epublic of the Philippines.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a politicalcomple8ion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, isconfirmed by the Proclamation issued by 0eneral ?ouglas 2acArthur on ctober 3#, 19%%, which

declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in thePhilippines during the Gapanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation toabrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

IN RE LETTER OF A00OCIATE 420TICE REYNATO )2NO

Facts:M Petitioner Assoc. Gustice Puno, a member of the !ourt of Appeals *!A/, wrote a letter dated ov. 1%,

199$ addressed to the &! uestioning the seniority ran4ing in the !A.M ac4groundhether the present !ourt of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim toprecedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the !ourt of Appeals and Intermediate

Appellate !ourt e8isting prior to B8ecutive rder o. ## or whether the present !ourt of Appeals ismerely a continuation of the !ourt of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate !ourt e8isting prior to saidB8ecutive rder o. ##.

Held:The present !ourt of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the !ourt of Appeals or theIntermediate Appellate !ourt e8isting prior to B8ecutive rder o. ##, for it was created in the wa4e of the


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WEEK 1massive reorgani:ation launched by the revolutionary government of !ora:on !. Auino in the aftermathof the people power *B?&A/ revolution in 19).

The !ourt holds that the !ourt of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate !ourt e8isting prior to B8ecutiverder o. ## phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the !ourt of

Appeals established under B8ecutive rder o. ## was an entirely new court with appointments thereto

having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence inran4 contained in the last sentence of &ec. 3, P lg. o. 139 as amended by B8ecutive rder o. ##refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.

ut even assuming, arguendo, that B8ecutive rder o. ## did not abolish the precedence or seniorityran4ing resulting from previous appointment to the !ourt of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate !ourte8isting prior to the 19) revolution, it is believed that President Auino as head of then revolutionarygovernment, could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ran4ing when she made herappointments to the reorgani:ed !ourt of Appeals in 19).

RE)25LIC v 0AN/IGAN5AYAN 67889 ;'#t su!e $" th$s $s the c#!!ect case


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WEEK 1business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,directly or through nominees, by ta4ing undue advantage of their public office andJ orusing their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.*b/ The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign tothe !ommission from time to time.

M The P!00, through the A6P oard,

M can only investigate the une8plained wealth and corrupt practices of A6P personnel whofall under either of the two categories mentioned in &ection 3 of B o. 1.

M 1. A6P personnel who have accumulated ill7gotten wealth during the administrationof former President 2arcos by being the latter=s immediate family, relative, subordinate orclose associate, ta4ing undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence8 8 8F or

*3/ A6P personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided thePresident assigns their cases to the P!00.

M Therefore, "amas= case should fall under the first category of A6P personnel before the P!00 coulde8ercise its jurisdiction over him.

M Petitioner argues that "amas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President 2arcos because of hisposition as the !ommanding 0eneral of the Philippine Army.

M Petitioner claims that "amas= position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander7in7chief,

undeniably ma4ing him a subordinate of former President 2arcos.M >e hold that "amas was not a HsubordinateH of former President 2arcos in the sense contemplated

under B o. 1 and its amendments.M 2ere position held by a military officer does not automatically ma4e him a HsubordinateH as this term is

used in B os. 1, 3, 1% and 1%7A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with formerPresident 2arcos. 2igrino discussed this issue in this wisehereas !lauses of B o. 1 e8press the urgent need to recover the ill7gotten wealth amassed by former President 6erdinand B. 2arcos, his immediate family, relatives, andclose associates both here and abroad.

M It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee duringthe administration of former President 2arcos.

M There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his

close association or relation with former Pres. 2arcos andJor his wife.M "amas= position alone as !ommanding 0eneral of the Philippine Army with the ran4 of 2ajor 0eneraldoes not suffice to ma4e him a HsubordinateH of former President 2arcos for purposes of B o. 1 and itsamendments.

M The P!00 has to provide a prima facie showing that "amas was a close associate of former President2arcos

M in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of formerPresident 2arcos were close to him.

M &uch close association is manifested either by "amas= complicity with former President2arcos in the accumulation of ill7gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President2arcos= acuiescence in "amas= own accumulation of ill7gotten wealth if any.

M Thus, the uestioned "esolutions of the &andiganbayan remanding the records of this case to thembudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the!ommissioner of the ureau of Internal "evenue for a determination of any ta8 liability of respondentBli:abeth ?imaano, are A66I"2B?.

&ection 1. The &tate shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthfulecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

O)O0A v FACTORAN 4R.


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WEEK 1

Facts:M This petition bears upon the right of 6ilipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners

dramatically associate with the twin concepts of Hinter7generational responsibilityH and Hinter7generationaljustice.H

M ac4groundhether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the 2anilaay.

Held: es. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the !ourt wishes to emphasi:e the

e8treme necessity for all concerned e8ecutive departments and agencies to immediately act anddischarge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essenceF hence, there is aneed to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tas4s, some of them as defined for themby law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.The importance of the 2anila ay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmar4 cannot beoveremphasi:ed. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the 2anila ay to its former splendor and bringbac4 the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. ut the tas4s ahead, daunting as theymay be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic7mindedindividuals, would put their minds to these tas4s and ta4e responsibility. This means that the &tate,through petitioners, has to ta4e the lead in the preservation and protection of the 2anila ay.The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their

limitations, real or imaginary, and buc4le down to wor4 before the problem at hand becomesunmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannotshir4 from their mandatesF they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the2anila ay. >e are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims< *1/ that there ought to bea specific pollution incident before they are reuired to actF and *3/ that the cleanup of the bay is adiscretionary duty."A 9$$# is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve wastemanagement. It implements &ec. 1, Art. II of the 19)5 !onstitution, which e8plicitly provides that the&tate shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord withthe rhythm and harmony of nature.&o it was that in Oposa v. actoran, r.the !ourt stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology

need not even be written in the !onstitution for it is assumed, li4e other civil and political rightsguaranteed in the ill of "ights, to e8ist from the inception of man4ind and it is an issue of transcendentalimportance with intergenerational implications. Bven assuming the absence of a categorical legalprovision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representingthem cannot escape their obligation to future generations of 6ilipinos to 4eep the waters of the 2anila ayclean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.


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WEEK 1

&ection 19. The &tate shall develop a self7reliant and independent national economy effectivelycontrolled by 6ilipinos.

GARCIA v 5OAR/ OF IN3E0TMENT0

Facts:M This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the IJ ?TI approving the transfer of the site of

the proposed petrochemical plant from ataan to atangas and the shift of feedstoc4 for that plant fromnaphtha only to naphtha andJor -P0

N ac4groundhether petitioner is estopped from uestioning the sale of the shares to "enong erhad, a foreigncorporation.

Deld


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WEEK 1

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,the &tate shall give preference to ualified 6ilipinos.

The &tate shall regulate and e8ercise authority over foreign investments within its nationaljurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

M A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 19)5 !onstitution, isusually not self7e8ecuting. ut a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without theaid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which theright it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self7e8ecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self7e8ecuting if the nature and e8tent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fi8ed by theconstitution itself, so that they can be determined by an e8amination and construction of its terms, andthere is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

M In self7e8ecuting constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate thee8ercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribea practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rightssecured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the e8ercise of the right.The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self7

e8ecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of suchlegislation.N 6irst and third paragraphs are not self7e8ecuting because !ongress is still to enact measures to

encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by 6ilipinos, and the &tate still needslegislation to regulate and e8ercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,

N +T as to the 3nd paragraph, it is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and whichneeds no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. 6rom its very words theprovision does not reuire any legislation to put it in operation.

3/ B&. the term patrimony pertains to heritage. >hen the !onstitution spea4s of nationalpatrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the !onstitution couldhave very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritageof the 6ilipinos#/ (1E of the euity of the 2D! comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for itcomprises the majority and controlling stoc4, so that anyone who acuires or owns the (1E willhave actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, (1E of the 2D! cannot bedisassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.%/In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerningthe grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,thereby e8ceeding the bid of a 6ilipino, there is no uestion that the 6ilipino will have to beallowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the 6ilipino matches the bid of a foreign firmthe award should go to the 6ilipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the ilipinoirst (olicyprovision of the 19)5 !onstitution. 6or, while this may neither be e8pressly stated norcontemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded.To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous s4irting of the basic law.(/The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from uestioning the sale to"enong erhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner couldparticipate in the bidding is meritless. +ndoubtedly, 6ilipinos and foreigners ali4e were invited tothe bidding. ut foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no 6ilipino ualifies, or if the ualified

6ilipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. &ince petitioner has alreadymatched the bid price tendered by "enong erhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent0&I& is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the bloc4 of shares of 2D! and toe8ecute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only withthe bidding guidelines and procedures but with the !onstitution as well. The refusal of respondent0&I& to e8ecute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rulesafter the latter has matched the bid of the 2alaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse ofdiscretion.


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WEEK 1

&ection 3. The &tate shall guarantee eual access to opportunities for public service, and prohibitpolitical dynasties as may be defined by law.

)AMATONG v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner "ev. Blly Kele: Pamatong filed his *ertificate of *andidacyfor President on ?ecember15, 3$$#. "espondent !ommission on Blections *!2B-B!/ refused to give due course to petitioner=s*ertificate of *andidacyin its "esolution %o. 4556 dated Ganuary 15, 3$$%. The decision, however, wasnot unanimous since !ommissioners -u:viminda 0. Tancangco and 2ehol ;. &adain voted to includepetitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to bac4 up his candidacy.

n Ganuary 1(, 3$$%, petitioner moved for reconsideration of "esolution %o. 4556. The !2B-B!denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus "esolution %o. 4478 dated 6ebruary 11, 3$$%. The!2B-B! declared petitioner and thirty7five *#(/ others nuisance candidates who could not wage anationwide campaign andJor are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registeredpolitical party with a national constituency. !ommissioner &adain maintained his vote for petitioner. ythen, !ommissioner Tancangco had retired.

Issue: >hether or not the resolutions were rendered in violation of his right to Heual access toopportunities for public serviceH under &ection 3, Article II of the 19)5.

Held: o. Implicit in the petitioner=s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring Heual access toopportunities for public officeH is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public officeand, particularly in his case, to see4 the presidency. There is none. >hat is recogni:ed is merely aprivilege subject to limitations imposed by law. &ection 3, Article II of the !onstitution neither bestowssuch a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plainlanguage of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The Heual accessH provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the !onstitution, entitled H?eclaration ofPrinciples and &tate Policies.H The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self7

e8ecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the Heual accessHprovision. -i4e the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judiciallyenforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or e8ecutive action. Thedisregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inuiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self7e8ecutory. The provision is not intended to compel the &tate to enact positive measures that wouldaccommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the H?avide amendmentHindicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policyobjective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear &tate burden.

M ?avide Amendment< I changed the word HbroadenH to HB&+"B B+A- A!!B&& TH because what isimportant would be eual access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that thegovernment would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as manypeople as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. &o, in

order that we should not mandate the &tate to ma4e the government the number one employer and tolimit offices only to what may be necessary and e8pedient yet offering eual opportunities to access to it, Ichange the word Hbroaden.H

2oreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source ofpositive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since itseffective means and reach are not properly defined. roadly written, the myriad of claims that can besubsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open7ended. >ords and phrases such as Heualaccess,H Hopportunities,H and Hpublic serviceH are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their


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WEEK 1inherent impreciseness. !ertainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people anoperative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of eual access to opportunities to public office may be subjected tolimitations. &ome valid limitations specifically on the privilege to see4 elective office are found in theprovisions of the mnibus Blection !ode on Huisance !andidatesH and !2B-B! "esolution o. %(3

dated ?ecember 1$, 3$$3 outlining the instances wherein the !2B-B! may motu proprio refuse to givedue course to or cancel a *ertificate of *andidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody eually without discrimination, however, the eual accessclause is not violated. Buality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations aremeant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there isno showing that any person is e8empt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

&ignificantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of &ection 9 of the mnibusBlection !ode and !2B-B! "esolution o. %(3 dated 1$ ?ecember 3$$#. Thus, their presumedvalidity stands and has to be accorded due weight.

!learly, therefore, petitioner=s reliance on the eual access clause in &ection 3, Article II of the

!onstitution is misplaced.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disualification of candidateswho have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The &tate has a compellinginterest to ensure that its electoral e8ercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the&tate ta4es into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater thenumber of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increasedallocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, ofcourse, never e8empt the &tate from the conduct of a mandated electoral e8ercise. At the same time,remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary andproper. +ltimately, a disorderly election is not merely a te8tboo4 e8ample of inefficiency, but a rot thaterodes faith in our democratic institutions.

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for nationalpositions because the election process becomes a moc4ery even if those who cannot clearly wage anational campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the !ertified -ist of!andidates, Koters Information &heet and the fficial allots. These would entail additional costs to thegovernment. 6or the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional pagewould amount to more or less 6+" D+?"B? 6I6T 2I--I PB&& *P%($,$$$,$$$.$$/. It servesno practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaignenough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of Hnuisance candidatesHto run in the elections. ur election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, suchas watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoralcontributions. 2oreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependenton the number of candidates in a given election.

0iven these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling.The organi:ation of an election with bona fidecandidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mi8candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair theelectoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitutea one7note jo4e. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of theelectoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be asenseless sacrifice on the part of the &tate.


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WEEK 1

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Case Digest for General Principles and Policies

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