OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs CA and MACABULOS Case Digest

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and DR. MERCEDITA J. MACABULOSG.R. No. 159395, 07 May 2008, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved.

FACTS: Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who was then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil Service Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by the latter to produce dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices.

Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr. Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist, who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of her claim, she attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said purchase using the cash advance of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance by improperly spending it and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice in conformity with the amount of the cash advance.

Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the contents of the first page were entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her counteraffidavit. A new memorandum by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer investigate the complaint since the acts complained of were committed one year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not immediately executory.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not CAs interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is correct2. Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the private respondent is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary casesHELD: The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention filed by the Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power.

The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the complaint since it was filed more than one year from the occurrence of the complained act. The Court found this interpretation by the appellate court unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided under the Constitution to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

The use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word may, when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word may in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.

The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs PADERANGA Case Digest

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al.464 SCRA 481 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and the recommendation of the commissioners is given weight and consideration if the same is reasonable and just.

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project.

A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.

The RTC issued an order granting NPCs motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines.

The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation

HELD: In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.

Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.

From the Commissioners report it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.

The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the commissioners recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

MMDA vs VIRON TRANSPORTATION Case Digest

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al.530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system.

FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public.

The project provided for under this E.O. was called Greater Manila Transport System (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project.

The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional.

The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional

HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Greater Manila Transport System, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires

Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications.

The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution.

Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.

In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system.

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.

Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites.

Engineer Paredes, the general manager of MCWD, filed Certificate of Public Convenience by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), which permitted the company to operate and maintain waterworks supply services. MCWD alleged that the Board of Directors of MCWD did not give consent to the issuance of the franchise applied for.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 47 of Presidential Decree 198 grants exclusive franchise to publicutilities

HELD: MWCDs position that an overly strict construction of the term franchise as used in Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this context, were strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly from the legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot issue franchises for operating waterworks systems without the water districts consent, the NWRB may keep on issuing CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not only would the NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory.

While the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 - the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973.

That the legislative authority - in this instance, then President Marcos - intended to delegate its power to issue franchises in the case of water districts is clear from the fact that, pursuant to the procedure outlined in P.D. 198, it no longer plays a direct role in authorizing the formation and maintenance of water districts, it having vested the same to local legislative bodies and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL v. JAC LINER Case Digest

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals

HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.

Raymond V. Palatino, representative of Kabataan Party-list assailed the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seeks declaration of its nullity. Palatino contends that this would be considered an encroachment of the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996. It was prayed that Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void and to extend the registration until January 9, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of voter registration to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15, 2009, is null and void

HELD: Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.

In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189, Sec. 8 - daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.

COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010.

EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before it.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.

Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their extremely detailed character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court

HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails.

The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO vs ROGELIO S. SOLUTA Case Digest

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO v. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA et al.482 SCRA 660 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

To constitute waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it.

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the union office located at the hotel basement. The same is with the permission of union officer Henry Babay. Babay was apprised about the suspected illegal activities. During the search they discovered marijuana flowering tops in the union office.

An Information indicting the union officers was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the accused on the ground that the marijuana tops are inadmissible as evidence.

Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union thereafter filed before the RTC a complaint against Silahis, Panlilio and those who cooperated for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC granted such petition. It ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis and Panlilio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the constitutional right of Soluta et al.

HELD: As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against.

The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

In the present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay.

The course taken by Silahis and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Silahis and Panlilios violation of individual Soluta et al.s constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

As for Silahis et al.s contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Neither does Silahis et al.s claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babays account of why Silahis and company went to the union office - to consider Panlilios suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search warrant.

While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.

ROMONAFE CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Case Digest

ROMONAFE CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al.513 SCRA 424 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first.

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled corporation filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Romonafe Corporation (Romonafe) and Vine Development Corporation (Vine). The complaint covered 48, 103.12 square meters of property to Romonafe and 96,963.38 square meters of property belonging to Vine.

RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC and the trial court designated commissioners to determine the just compensation for the properties. The trial court ordered the fair market value of the property at 3,500.00 per square meter for Romonafe and Vine.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioned the agreement to pay Romonafe on the basis of the 1997 valuation of its property at 3,500.00 per square meter as contrary to decisional law.

In lieu thereof, it further decreed by the Court that the fair market value of the fair market value of the land be fixed at 1,500.00 per square meter. Thus, this present petition filed by Romonafe.

ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between NPC and Romonafe is valid considering the compensation given to Romonafe by NPC

HELD: Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at bar, just compensation should be determined as of July 12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed before the trial court.

The Provincial Appraisal Committee has established the fair market value on the subject parcels of land a value which is not too high on the part of the government and not too low on the part of property owners.

The Court notes that the appellate court failed to pass on NPCs appeal with respect to the property of Vine. And, as NPV and even Romonafe manifest, the appellate court failed to consider the Partial Compromise Agreement between NPC and Vine in its assailed Decision. A remand of the case to the appellate court is thus in order.

LEE vs COMELEC Case Digest

SALLY A. LEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA405 SCRA 363 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go behind them and investigate election irregularities presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.

FACTS: Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were candidates for Mayor of Sorsogon City. During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries were made for the position of congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns.

The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the questioned election return was clear and regular on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then filed a petition to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lees proclamation and the exclusion of the questioned election return.

The COMELEC Second Division granted Dionedas petition and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lees proclamation and excluded the questioned election return

HELD: Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularities, citing the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections.

The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face. Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

LECAYCO vs COA Case Digest

MANUEL LECAYCO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT482 SCRA 215 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

While a person, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated by law, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Lecayco, Jr. (Lecayco) was the Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro and at the same time an appointed member of Inspectorate Team of the Provincial School Board (PSB). The Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office allegedly found deficiencies on the checks issued by the PSB of Oriental Mindoro. The funds are covered by the Special Educations Fund (SEF). The COA then issued Notices of Disallowance holding Lecayco and other members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan liable for signing the Certificates of Inspection and falsely attesting to its 100% completion.

Lecayco appealed to the COA maintaining that he is not liable, since as a member of the Inspectorate Team, his duty is limited to "monitoring the progress of PSB projects". However, the COA denied such appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA has the authority to hold Lecayco liable as a member of the Inspectorate Team

HELD: In light of this function of the Inspectorate Team, its members may be held liable by the COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF if their participation in such irregularity can be established. While Lecayno, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated in Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government. In addition, the authority of the COA to hold Lecayno liable is also implied in its duty to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

Since, as earlier noted, payment should not be made to a contractor without the prior inspection of the project by the Inspectorate Team, the members thereof who sign the certificate of inspection participate in the use and application of local government funds (in this case, the Special Education Fund of the Province of Oriental Mindoro). Thus, if there is an irregularity in the performance of this duty, they may be held liable for any loss that is incurred by the government as a consequence thereof. In this case, there was such irregularity when Lecayco and other members of the Team attested to the 100% completion of the projects notwithstanding their undisputed deficiencies.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIM Case Digest

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZ LIM AND PURITA LIM CABOCHAN529 SCRA 129 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired lands owned by Luz Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed the value of the property. Lim however rejected Land Banks valuation. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the property. Dissatisfied with the PARADs decision, Lim and Cabochan filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court.

The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then reconsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation.

Landbank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for fixing the valuation of Lims property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR

HELD: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, the Court underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94 which provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

When Jose de Venecia, Jr., assumed position as the new Speaker of the House, he appointed Emmanuel A. Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID on temporary status. On even date, Mayor Belmonte again requested for the detail of Loanzon to his office. Loanzon sought clarification from the Civil Service Commission about the status of her appointment in light of Albanos appointment to her position.

The CSC holds that Loanzon was a rightful holder of the position of Deputy Secretary General up to July 31, 2001 and is entitled to the payment of her salaries and other benefits up to that period only. Accordingly, when Speaker De Venecia appointed Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID, on July 25, 2001, Loanzon was still detailed at the Office of Mayor Belmonte. Thus, Albanos appointment on July 25, 2001 is legally infirm because there was no vacancy yet at that time.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found that the position of Deputy Secretary General, PRID pertains to the non-career service; Loanzon held a primarily confidential position and her tenure was thus coterminous with and subject to the pleasure of the appointing authority, and her termination could be justified only on the ground of loss of confidence. It declared the removal of Loanzon and the appointment of Albano in her place null and void.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service2. Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void

HELD:

1. Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service

Clearly, the position of Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives belongs to the career service which is, so the Civil Service Law provides, characterized, among other things, by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications and security of tenure. The holder of the position can only enjoy security of tenure if he or she possesses the qualifications and eligibility prescribed for it.

In Loanzons case, although Loanzons appointment was denominated as "permanent," it having been "proposed as permanent," it was in reality temporary for, so her CSC appointment paper clearly stated, she did not enjoy security tenure as she lacked the eligibility requirement for the position.

In fine, Loanzons appointment was merely temporary, not to exceed twelve months. Since she was appointed on March 8, 1999, it was effective only for one year or up to March 8, 2000. Having continued, however, to hold on to her position up to July 25, 2001 when Albano was appointed by Speaker de Venecia, she did so in a hold-over capacity.

2. Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void

Even if Albano then did not possess the required eligibility, his appointment was not legally infirm. As correctly pleaded by House of Representatives before the appellate court, when Nazareno approved Mayor Belmontes request for Loanzons detail until July 31, 2001, Speaker de Venecia had not yet been elected and assumed office as speaker. With Speaker de Venecias subsequent election and assumption of office as speaker, Nazarenos action as secretary-general became subject to supervision and control, hence, it could be revoked anytime.

By thus appointing Albano on July 25, 2001, Speaker de Venecia impliedly revoked or modified Nazarenos action by shortening the period of the approved detail. As for the Speakers approval on October 25, 2001 of Mayor Belmontes second request for Loanzons detail to his office effective August 1, 2001, the same may be taken as mere oversight on the part of the Speaker.

HILADO vs REYES Case Digest

ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES496 SCRA 282(2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict.

FACTS: Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto.

For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilados counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the record of the Hilados case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely access.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper

RULING: The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.

Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."

COJUANGCO vs SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.586 SCRA 790 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses which have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication Corporation (PLDT). Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently impleaded. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT shares. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court, and the same issued a favorable ruling.

The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime Holdings and the annotation of the change of ownership on PTICs Stock and Transfer Book. The Republic further prayed for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock dividends declared by PLDT in favor of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded interests. The Sandiganbayan granted the same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends.

The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which the Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SCs decision did not include in its dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares adjudicated in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares despite its non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision

HELD: The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SCs Decision, excluding the dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being accounted for and remitted.

The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned by PTIC in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and, necessarily, the dividends and interests accruing thereto.

Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. Its traditional elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it produces.

Contrary to the Cojuangcos contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Courts Decision, it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the whole block of shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the Marcoses illgotten wealth, and therefore, public money.

GMMSWMC vs JANCOM Case Digest

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA494 SCRA 280 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.)

If the contract provides that it shall be effective until and unless it is approved by the President, the same shall first be approved to be valid and enforceable.

FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.

JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending the approval by the President.

JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties. JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not contract is ineffective and unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the President

HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.

In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.

ESTRELLA vs COMELEC Case Digest

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealths request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS).

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOHs petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper

HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified Khos resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and accordingly modified the penalty to suspension of one year. Luzviminda filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgement, but the same has been denied. Hence, Luzviminda filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari.

The CA reversed the CSC decision and ordered the reinstatement of Luzviminda. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to hold Maniago guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service

HELD: It bears noting that an audit team, Luzviminda herself, following which it confirmed that the amount of loan granted, formed part of the "cash shortage" of the Municipal Treasurer. And that the decision of Kho, was based not only on the Fraud Audit Report, but also on Luzvimindas Answer to the complaint wherein she did not deny having secured a loan, her only defense being that the loan did not involve public funds, which defense does not deserve consideration in the absence of any iota of proof thereof.

The absence of a hearing did not deprive Luzviminda of due process. She was given the opportunity to file, and she did file, an Answer to complaint against her. She was also afforded the opportunity to appeal to the CSC from the September 20, 2000 Resolution of Acting Mayor Kho.

Luzviminda having obtained a loan for her personal use out of municipal funds, through the active intercession of the Municipal Treasurer, cannot be countenanced. Although already paid in full, said loan resulted in the diversion of municipal funds for purposes other than what the amount was supposed to be appropriated for in the municipality. Thus, public service was prejudiced.

CORDIA vs MONFORTE Case Digest

ALDO B. CORDIA v. JOEL G. MONFORTE AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS380 SCRA 588 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

When the intention of the voter cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC.

FACTS: Petitioner Aldo B. Cordia (Cordia) and respondent Joel G. Monforte (Monforte) were the official candidates for Punong Barangay in Legazpi City, Albay in the 2002 Elections. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed Cordia as the winner. Monforte filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC) for lack of familiarity with the Rules on Appreciation of ballots.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of Monforte therefore annulling and setting aside the proclamation of Cordia. On appeal, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of MTCC. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division.

Cordia questioned such decision and mentioned the alleged mistake in applying the principle of idem sonans when it counted the vote Mantete appearing in the questioned ballot which was written on the space for the position of a kagawad and the ballot with a hole in it caused by a cigarette which Cordia alleged to be a marked ballot.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC made a mistake in the application of the Rules on Appreciation ofBallots

HELD: The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, in crediting to respondent the vote for Mantete in Exhibit A, following the idem sonans rule, the Court finds no grave abuse discretion.

Nor does the Court find grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs not rejecting Exhibit C17 or the ballot with a hole, as a marked ballot, there being no indication that the blot therein was deliberately placed to identify the voter.

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO and FILIPINA M. ORELLANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO and FILIPINA M. ORELLANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES509 SCRA 302 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Written incriminatory statements made not in the course of custodial investigation are admissible in a criminal case filed against the confessant.

FACTS: Rosario Astudillo and Filipina Orellana were hired by Western Marketing Corporation (Western), as salespersons, while Roberto Benitez and Flormarie Robel were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively. In the course of preparing the monthly sales report of the branch, the Branch Accountant noticed discrepancies in the monthly sales report. The case of the missing invoices and the shortage of cash sales collection were then reported to Westerns branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily). In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having brought home some appliances while Benitez made a written admission asking for apology.

In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of Western, several other appliances were found missing. On the basis of the complaint of Western, Astudillo and Orellana were collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with Flormarie Robel and Roberto Benitez. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Astudillo and Orellana guilty of Qualified Theft. The Court of Appeals affirmed affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this petitions for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not the employees extra-judicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against them

HELD: It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, the Court answers the issue in the affirmative.

The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation; that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.

The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that Astudillo and Orellana were not under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.

Astudillo and Orellana at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on record, however, buttressing Astudillo and Orellanas claim other than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved thus stands.

CSC vs TAHANLANGIT Case Digest

CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION v. NELI O. TAHANLANGIT594 SCRA 124 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value.

FACTS: As a consequence of the reorganization of the Bureau of Patents and Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT), pursuant to R.A. 8293, into what is now known as the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), 137 incumbents therein, including respondent Nelia Tahanlangit, were appointed to new positions in the approved staffing pattern of the IPO. Under the BPTTT plantilla, Tahanlangit occupied the position of Trademark Principal Exmaniner I, a position said to be comparable to the item of Intellectual Property Rights Specialist I (IPRS-I) under the new IPO plantilla to which said Tahanlangit was appointed.

Petitioner Civil Service Commissions (CSC) NCR Office, however, disapproved Tahanlangits permanent appointment on the ground that the latter, for lack of the requisite educational qualifications, did not qualify to the above-mentioned position to which she had been appointed. DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II appealed the NCR Office decision before the Civil Service Commission which it, however, affirmed. Insofar as Tahanlangit is concerned, CSC ruled that her appointment as IPRS-I was correctly disapproved by the NCR Office.

Tahanlangit thereafter filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Pending resolution, however, she opted to retire optionally under R.A. 8291, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997.

The CA thus held that the challenged resolutions had been rendered moot and academic by Tahanlangits retirement from the government service pending resolution of her appeal. Further, the CA held that the ends of substantial justice will be better served if herein respondent be allowed to retire from the service upholding that her permanent appointment be considered valid and subsisting at the time of her retirement. To this ruling of the CA, CSC moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tahanlangits optional retirement mooted the disapproval of her appointment as IPRS-I

HELD: When Tahanlangit retired from the service on August 31, 2003, CSCs Resolution No. 03-0237 of July 30, 2003 had not attained finality, as it was pending appeal before the appellate court. Section 80 of CSCs Resolution No. 99-1936, The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provide that a decision of the CSC or its Regional Office shall be immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.

Thus, when Tahanlangit was allowed to avail herself of optional retirement under R.A. 8291, CSCs assailed resolutions have thus become moot and academic, at least, with respect to the formers case.

Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value.

In the present case, when Tahanlangits appointment was disapproved by the CSC, Tahanlangit would still have been able to retire under the applicable law, R.A. 8291, as the said law only requires that the employee concerned must have rendered at least 15 years of service and must not have been receiving disability benefits at the time of retirement. Tahanlangit, having retired on August 31, 2003, the position of IPRS I is presumed to have been already filled up and to be now occupied by one bearing the requisite qualifications. Hence, passing on the disapproval of Tahanlangits appointment no longer has any practical value.

BIENVENIDO A. CERBO, JR., et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.516 SCRA 51 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

COMELEC exercises jurisdiction over petitions for correction of manifest errors only if the same pertains to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence.

FACTS: Bienvenido A. Cerbo, Jr., Angelo O. Montilla, and Geronimo P. Arzagon were candidates for representative, governor and vice-governor, respectively of Sultan Kudarat in the May 10, 2004 elections. Suharto T. Mangudadatu, Datu Pax S. Mangudadatu and Donato A. Ligo, on the other hand, were petitioners respective opponents for the same positions.

Cerbo et al. filed Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and/or to Exclude Certificates of Canvass of the Municipalities of Palimbang and Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat before the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC). The PBOC overruled the objection thus, Cerbo et al. filed with the PBOC a notice of appeal, but the appeal was not pursued.

Cerbo et al. filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and Annulment of Proclamation alleging that the proclamation of Suharto T. Mangudadatu et al. was illegal because it was made despite the filing of the notice of appeal.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for correction of manifest errors prompting Cerbo et al. to file a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was erroneous to dispose the petition on purely procedural grounds and not to treat it as an original petition for correction of manifest errors. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of manifest errors

HELD: A petition for correction of manifest errors filed directly with the COMELEC should thus pertain to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner Arzagon, however, together with the other petitioners, initially filed a petition for correction of manifest errors with the PBOC, evidently showing that the errors sought to be corrected were discovered during the canvassing.

On his failure to appeal the PBOCs dismissal of his petition for correction of manifest errors, Arzagon claims that the PBOC did not indicate the reasons therefor, hence, he was prevented from appealing the same.

Even if, however, the Court may, in the interest of justice, treat the petition for correction of manifest errors filed with the COMELEC as an appeal from the PBOCs verbal ruling denying petitioners similar petition filed with the latter, its dismissal by the COMELEC is in order.

Specifically with respect to the Palimbang COC, since its exclusion had earlier been denied by the PBOC, and the denial was not appealed, it had become final. The subsequent filing of a petition for correction of manifest errors in the Palimbang COC with the PBOC appeared to be just an attempt to substitute the lost appeal, which is impermissible.

With respect to Cerbos et al. prayer before this Court for correction of manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, the same cannot be considered as an appeal from the verbal denial by the PBOC of a similar petition they earlier filed. For the petition filed with the COMELEC does not include alleged manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, hence, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to rule thereon.

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY Case Digest

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY510 SCRA 590 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Upon compliance with the requirements for a valid expropriation, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession.

FACTS: Capitol Steel Corporation (Capitol Steel) is a domestic corporation which owns 65 parcels of land located at the province of Misamis Oriental. Phividec Industrial Authority (PHIVIDEC) is a government owned and controlled corporation which is vested the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring rights of way or any property for the establishment or expansion of the PHIVIDEC areas.

PHIVIDEC filed an expropriation case for the properties of Capitol Steel because it was identified as the most ideal site for the project of PHIVIDEC.

The trial court denied PHIVIDECs issuance of a writ of possession, noting that the amount deposited was seemingly inadequate and was simply out of PHIVIDECs interpretation of the prevailing zonal valuation and was not mutually agreed upon but it was finally granted by the trial court. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of PHIVIDEC, ordering the RTC to issue a Writ of Possession. Hence, this present petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ordering the RTC to issue a writ of possession in favor of PHIVIDEC

HELD: Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.

Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case, in this case PHIVIDEC, is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974.

To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

ARADAIS vs COMELEC Case Digest

HADJA NIDA B. ARADAIS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.428 SCRA 277 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it.

FACTS: Petitioner Hadja Nida B. Aradais (Aradais) and respondent Abdusali Asmadun (Asmadun) were mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Lugus, Sulu. After canvassing was completed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect by virtue of a Certificate of Canvass (COC). Aradais was also proclaimed as mayor-elect by virtue of a second Certificate of Canvass which is the same as the first COC issued.

Asmadun took his oath of office on May 19, 2001 and subsequently assumed office. Aradais on the other hand took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. However, the Regional Election Director of Region IX advised that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should recognize only one proclamation, that of Asmadun, and Aradaiss proclamation was without any legal effect. This prompted Aradais to file before the COMELEC a Petition for the Annulment of Asmaduns proclamation.

The COMELEC then created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into cases of double proclamations wherein it directed Aradais, Asmadun, three members of the BOC, the COMELEC Regional Director, and the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sulu to submit their respective position papers or memoranda and other pertinent documents, as well as affidavits of their witnesses. In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee made recommendations and proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect. Concurring with the findings and recommendations, the COMELEC affirmed the proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional duty to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee

HELD: The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the COMELEC, especially in light of petitioners failure to present any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings and recommendations and did not go over the records of the case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the contrary then, the presumption of regular performance of an official duty stands.

It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELECs discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELECs judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Since the assailed resolution is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be considered whimsical, capricious or arbitrary warranting the Courts power of review.

ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Case Digest

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,520 SCRA 64 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The essence of due process is the opportunity to explain ones side.

FACTS: Petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (Alfonso), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable for allegedly acquiescing to the change of the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of Phil-Ville Development Corporation (Phil-Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Villes letter-complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which finds that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith recommending the filing of administrative cases against her and her conspirators. On the other han