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L1. ABAKADA PARTY LIST v PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251

Facts: This petit ion for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from

implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the

constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by

establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transforms the officials

and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as

they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of

rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally

mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which is under Section of Article XI of

the Constitution (Accountability of Public Officers).

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and

incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for

classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and

employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix

revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.

While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be

dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at

least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.

Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without

sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic

and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on

the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the

legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment

and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee

permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 9335 which was enacted to optimize the revenue-

generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the

Bureau of Customs (BOC) is constitutional.

Held: Petition has no merit. RA 9335 is Constitutional.

Rationale: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9335, the Attrition

Act of 2005 on the following basis:

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial

controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act,

petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to

demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show

a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this

account, their petition is procedurally infirm.

On the issue on Accountability of Public Officers, Public officers enjoy the

presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption

necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335

operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards

and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR

and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation

capability and collection. Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will

turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is

not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To

justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.To invalidate RA 9335 based on

petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the

legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

Public Accountability-Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers

may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of

incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to

the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication

to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government

personnel.

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L2. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE:

The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has

a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually

provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in

office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and

qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon

the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume

it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and

qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.

NATURE: Review of Sandiganbayan Decision

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,

Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing

chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz,

and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of

Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red

won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by

then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz

representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red

that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of

Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his

appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not

allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the

approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year.

Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration

after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper

from President Marcos. Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino

Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to

the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from

the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral

representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the

Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public

documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par.

(e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor

alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all

counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019,

The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied

their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme

Court.

ISSUES:

1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation

President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes;

NO. Red had not validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation

President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27

September 1985. Under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force,

members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths.

It was only after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of

Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer

oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a

member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was

invalid and amounted to no oath at all.

2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his

coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired;

If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the office despite the vacancy therein, in

a holdover capacity;

The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of

office as KB representative to the SB had expired. However, Lenlie could occupy the

office as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB

representative to the SB in a holdover capacity. The concept of holdover when

applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent

is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers

elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term

but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is

found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is

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no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will

carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the

term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified

for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit

in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de

facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to

the position.

3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of

the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative

circulars, accused Lenlie was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in

office in a holdover capacity; if not WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and

committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent;

The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG

Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and

maintain their positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the

Interior Ministry.

4) WON the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the

contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the

crime of estafa of which they had been convicted required criminal intent and

malice as essential elements.

Prudence and good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to

verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.

HELD:

Petition is meritorious.

The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted both petitioners of all the

thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. The court a

quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the

payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son and as a consequence

thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally accepted indicia, for

they were the very same acts alleged in the informations as constituting the crime

of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of

criminal intent.

L3. CUENCO v FERNAN 158 SCRA 29

Facts: Complainant Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former Member of the House of

Representatives from the province of Cebu, prayed for judgment ordering the

disbarment of Mr. Justice Fernan, Chairman of the Third Division of this Court.

Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo

intestate estate proceeding, makes the ff. allegations in his complaint for

disbarment:

1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, appeared as counsel for the three (3) institutedheirs and despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate

Justice of the Court, continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs.

2. Influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings.3. Has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star-Chamber to fabricate fake

and fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo.

4. Practically abolished and crippled the legitimate functions of the Court ofAppeals.

5. Collecting big sums of money in payment of his legal services rendered tohis clients.

6. Had willfully, persistently, stubbornly and systematically violated his Oathof Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him the duty not to delay any

man for money or malice.

Issue: WON complainants charges against Mr. Justice Fernan provide a factual

basis.

Held: Complaint for disbarment must be dismissed for totally lack of merit and

failure to provide evidences for the complaints against the respondent.

Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present

administrative complaint against Mr. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have

been "misunderstood" by the Court. Complainant, however, has failed to present a

shred of evidence to support the very serious charges he has made against Mr.

Justice Fernan. In his untitled pleading, complainant Cuenco has not only declined

to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan but has also

chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly

uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume that

complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he

has made against Mr. Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support

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with anything but his own bare assertion, the Court is compelled to conclude that

those accusations were made in bad faith.

Rationale: Members of the SC may be removed from office only by impeachment

for conviction of certain offenses. (Art. XI (2), Constitution). To grant a complaint for

disbarment of a Member of the Court would in effect be so circumvent and hence

to run afoul of the constitutional mandate. The Ombudsman and his deputies,

majority of the members of the COMELEC and COA who are not certified public

accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the

Philippine Bar.

L4. IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALES 160 SCRA 771

Facts: Honorable Gonzales forwarded a letter-complaint to Mr. Fernan which

brought to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications

of policy raised by said Indorsement. It has two (2) attachments. First, an

anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to

Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez (as Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor) referring to charges for

disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan

and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a

copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez,

where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed with the Supreme Court in

Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B.

Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by

complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan. The Court treated this pleading as a

Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Should a fiscal or other prosecuting officer forthwith and dismiss any charges

brought against a Member of this Court? The remedy of a person with a legitimate

grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

Ratio: There is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed

before such liability may be determined and enforced. A public officer who under

the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification

for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by

impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such

public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be

charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence

which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of

which would amount to removal from office.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or

the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from

liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial

Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a

fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability

may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be

removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2

and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court

Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either

criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or

misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and

separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is

important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court

would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other

parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial

authority by the Court.

L5. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 415 SCRA 44

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,

superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th

Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,

which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of

legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,

former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first

impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven

Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,

betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by

House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5

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August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The

House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment

complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October

2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the

filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee

on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the

Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiryinitiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment

complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"

signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various

petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme

Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend

that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it

violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than

once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from

impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the

government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The

"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the

different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along

constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the

judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in

Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of

the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary

principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of

government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the

people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in

our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual

division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive

cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate

and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and

independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system

of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various

departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court

as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its

power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts

void if violative of the Constitution.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court

and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only

impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that

granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for

in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an

expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion

on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring

distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with

respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment

proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to

the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in

the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,

provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in

Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner

of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of

one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the

above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution

did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of

Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially

discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such

discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases

in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of

judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks

and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one

section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of

the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no

branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

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L6. GUTIERREZ v HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTTEE ON JUSTICE

Doctrine: We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta

movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated

when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,

because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is

already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the

proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred tothe Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the

series of steps that follow.

Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al.

(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3,

2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another

impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by

different Party-List Representatives.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of

the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to

include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by

their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of

Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both

complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred

to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th

Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September

1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the

motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice

for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of

her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the

two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and

betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency

of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically

the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to

impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7,

2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.

Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment

complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution

reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first

impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the

opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from

July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to

public respondent.

Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the

endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would

already initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the

Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular

tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution

goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged

and plural sense.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment

complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment

proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a

matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle,

unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the

complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a

simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted

matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there

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should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle

starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that

shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to

the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion

to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the

merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect tocomplaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a

subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official

records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the

same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the

one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a

constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being

mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the

House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within

which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment

proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that *a+ verified

complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of

Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any

Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten

session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days

thereafter.

We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As

pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the

House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because

something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a

further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the

proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to

the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the

series of steps that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral

allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own

respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the

Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of

one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or

the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the

House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or

the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless

of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these

scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposedone-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps

operating in unison under one proceeding.

L7. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The

Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the

Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.

On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the

Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with

the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of

allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private

respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-

Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden

Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in

benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for

release.

Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and

thereport was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers

which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for

purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the

Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman

that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable

through impeachment.

On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term

of

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office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the

grounds of

public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.

Thus, OMB's

appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable2. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or

administratively liable

HELD: Order of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case

No. OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are

REINSTATED

and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation

relative to the

above cases.

Ombudsman's Deputies Not Impeachable

The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution states that The President, the Vice- President, the members of the

Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the

Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,

culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other

high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may

be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment . Records of

the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in

Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not

including his Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their

opinion as to whether or

not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the

enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution,

is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.

How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited

in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep.

Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella which reads: To grant a

complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members

incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the

constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office

only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of

the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman

and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Ar ticle XI *2+) all of whom are

constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar?

A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the

court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta

are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The succeeding cases of In Re:

Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a

Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v.

Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously

mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the

herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v.

Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits. Thus, where the

issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by

the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis

of the question presented.

Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not

the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held

criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of

the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted

for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his

continuance in office.

Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or

permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.

Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against

the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers

retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections

12 and 13 f the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

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L8. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Efren L.

Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts

entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the

Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company

which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.Sandiganbayan ruled that the PPSB was a private corporation and its officers like

Alas, did not fall under its jurisdiction. Dissatisfied the people through the Office of

the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed this petition.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or

trustees, or managers of government- owned or controlled corporations organized

and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA

3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

HELD: Petition Granted, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

RATIO: The Philippines Postal Savings Bank PPSB is a government owned or

controlled corporation organized and incorporated under the corporation Code as a

subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the

authorized capital stocks of PPSB belongs to the government while the rest is

nominally held by its incorporators who are themselves officers of the PHILPOST.

The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Sec. 32 of the Postal Service Act

of 1992.

Article IX Sec. 4 of the 1987Constitution, which provides that the present anti-graft

court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its

jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law, in effect retained the

jurisdiction of the anti-graft court a s d efined under Art. XII I, Section 5 of the 1973

Constitution.

It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors,

or trustees, or managers of GOCCs with original charters whenever charges of Graft

and corruption are involved. However , a question arises whether the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in GOCCS organized and

incorporated under the Corporation code. Article XI , Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution

which provides that the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall

continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be

provided by law . This provision in effect retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft

court as defined under Art XIII Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated

its creation thus: Sec. 5 . The batasang Pambansa shall create a special court known

as the sandiganbayan , which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases

involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense commited by publicofficers and employees including those in GOCCS in relation to their office as may be

determined by law.

The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors, or

trustees , or managers in GOCCs within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has

consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of

their creation clearly reveals its intention to include such officials of GOCCS with

original charters and those organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code

within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft

and corruption.

When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

L9. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Facts: It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the meantime conferred

with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6,

2003.Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by Resolution No. 02-03

dated August 18, 2003 including Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified

to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. The Ombudsman thereupon

requested the approval of the proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified

positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution

Officer III position, the Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft

Investigation Officer III.Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of

August 28, 2003, changed the status o f Carandangs and Clementes appointments

to permanent effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the

ground that he has not met the eligibility requirements.

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Issue: Wether or not that there are independent offices specifically authorized by

the constitution to appoint their officials ,does this imply that their appointment

will not be subject to civil service law and rules?

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 030919 of

the Civil Service Commission dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The

appointment of Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr., as well as those of Melchor Arthur H.Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente, is hereby ordered made permanent effective

December 18, 2002.

L10. UY v SANDIGANBAYAN 312 SCRA 77

Facts: George Uy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme

Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which denied his motion to

quash the six informations charging him with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as

amended. He argued, among others, that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over

the person of the petitioner accused because his rank of Lieutenant Commander of

the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains and all officers of higher

rank as prescribed under sub par. (d) of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law (RA

8249). Hence, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner was vested in the regular courts.

Held: Resolution of the Sandigan is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.

Doctrine/Rationale: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the

time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. Republic Act

No. 8249, the latest amendment to PD1606 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise

known as the Sandiganbayan Law), provides the

prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

The pertinent portions of the Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read: Sec. 4.

Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all

cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and

Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more

of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,

whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission

of the offense: (d) Philippine army and air force colonel, naval captains, and all

officers of higher rank; It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the

nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine

qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. The

Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners position did not fall within the rank

requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in

the regular courts. The Supreme Court then went further to clarify that it is the

prosecutor, not the ombudsman, who has the authority to file the correspondinginformation/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The ombudsman

exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. On

Motion for Clarification by the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court categorically

declared:

The Officers of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor seem to suggest that they

still retain the power to re-file the information and prosecute the petitioner before

the regional trial court despite our finding that it is the regional trial court which has

jurisdiction over the case. The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize

the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutor under the

Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the

jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecuto rial powers of the

ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770, (An Act Providing for the

Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for

other purposes) which vests upon the ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan

L11. CASTRO v DELORIA 577 SCRA 20

Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public

funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who

misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment.

On Aug 31, 2001,Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of

jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary

investigation and file the Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade --a

material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.

Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with

salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be

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investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the

Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan.

The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not

depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the

offense charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman

since in the cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatoryresolution. Finally, it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule

117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the Information.

Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 until May 20,

2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable

by the RT and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted

by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999Decision in Uy

was applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20,

2001Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at

that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the

case.

Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also

dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of the

ruling in the First "Uy vs.Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the

prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited tocases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan.2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan casecan be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision

on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.

RULING:

YES to BOTH.

In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and

the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases

within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the

regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted bylaw to the Ombudsman is

plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or

employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or

inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that theclause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace

any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,

particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4)granting the Special Prosecutor

the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the

scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated

with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merelya component of the Office of the

Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon

authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to

prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutor

power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by

law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and

to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the

evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the

personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the

government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the

investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to

assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to

direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans

jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA6770.

In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20,

2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable

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by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when

its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

L12. DOJ V. LIWAG

FACTS:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized

Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics

Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP

General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, officials of the PNP,

and several private individuals.

Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses

imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-

affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance. It required the respondents

to file counter-affidavits on the charges. Respondents submitted counter-affidavits

and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI. NBI

Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,

recommended the investigation of the respondents:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang,

James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.

A panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to the

respondents. Subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and

controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint

filed. Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter that the DOJ panel of prosecutors

should dismiss the complaint filed.

The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and deny the dismissal of the

cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not

allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]

Respondents rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the

determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation

of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or]

Bribery,nor are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties;

Offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts

shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City

Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;

DOJ issued Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition

filed by respondents before the RTC of Manila. --> Lacson and Aquino maintained

that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation. They argued

that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the

Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to

investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Judge Liwag issued the Order prohibiting the Department of Justice from

conducting the preliminary investigation. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was

likewise issued by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation

despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same

accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second

proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against

the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts

alleged.

HELD:

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to

reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do

so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice, considering that this involves

the high-ranking officers of the PNP.

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Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be

the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb, but also the rights of the

respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the

accusations.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the

provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide

the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel

and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with

the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,

prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department

shall have the following powers and functions: (2) Investigate the commission of

crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;

Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275 provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of

the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National

Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice,

to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice

and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City

Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for

the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases

filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of

Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine

in Uy v. Sandiganbayan.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have

the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its

own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or

employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,

unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,

at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of

such cases

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the

Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or

non-feasance of public officers or employees. The Office of the Ombudsman waslikewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and primary

complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic

maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers

given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints

against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal

complaint lodged before it.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary

investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general

jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the

Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers

and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In

contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the

constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While

the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the

same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes

cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the

others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman

and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to

be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be

viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the

investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint

was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary

investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary

investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an

orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial,

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it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding

for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a

well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is

probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to

be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote

multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent

who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body

where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss asto where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is the distinct possibility

that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with

conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents. The second

investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use

of valuable and limited resources of Government, in aduplication of proceedings

already started with the Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse

of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the

respondent Judge.

Petition is DISMISSED.

L13. TAPIADOR V. OMBUDSMAN

Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman

in dismissing the petitioner from the government service for grave misconduct and

denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit by Walter H.

Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID SpecialInvestigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate

Commissioner.

Complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received

from Walter Beck P10,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of

registration which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite

repeated demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of

P7,000.00. Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a certain

Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of

P10,000.00).

The petitioner denied in his counter-affidavit that he demanded nor received any

amount of money from Walter Beck. Petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife,

Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila on to follow-up his visa application.

When the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for

a visa application, Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the

petitioner with having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the

petitioner to file a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the

City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioners allegations were corroborated byRosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee.

BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for

violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus,

recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the

petitioner.

Criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence but

Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative

aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government

service. Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:

I. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE

MISCONDUCT DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

II. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION

ONLY AFTER ALMOST 3 YEARS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY

TRIAL.

III. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION

WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING INVIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES, THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF

PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

IV. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE

TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF

EVIDENCE.

V. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF

DISMISSAL AGAINST PETITIONER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST

OFFENSE IN HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

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HELD:

The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due

process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed and furnished a copy of the

complaint against him as evidenced by his letters addressed to the investigating

officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his

defense. T

There was no undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since

the preliminary investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was

filed and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved, the administrative

proceeding was conducted shortly thereafter. That no preliminary conference had

been conducted, primarily due to the petitioners manifestation to dispense thereof

and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his

memorandum of evidence. Ombudsman opined that the petitioner was absolved of

criminal liability during the preliminary investigation. However, the Ombudsman

asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck and his witness, Purisima

Terencio, substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for

grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of money in

exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR and for that offense, peti tioner should

be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. In dismissing the petitioner

from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned out, as

follows:

Evidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador

unlawfully received the amount of P10,000.00 from spouses Walter and MonicaBecker, which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness, Purisima C.

Terencio. Witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of

P10,000.00 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with

the promise for the immediate release of the same. The said declaration of

Terencio was aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker, a foreigner, who in

his desire to stay permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such

irregularity.

The only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the

petitioner from the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of

Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.

Review of the records showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were

not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation.

Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their

respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the investigating officerwho subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the

charge against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence. Becks affidavit

is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis, Ombudsman should have

dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.

Although Beck claimed to have paid P10,000.00, his affidavit is silent as to the

identity of the person who actually received the said amount. The pertinent portion

of his affidavit reads, thus: (1.) That a certain Terencio informed us that I could be

granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr.

Tapiador and Mr. Angeles and the fees was agreed. (2.)After completing all the

requirements and the amount of P10,000.00 was given I waited but no ACR was

given. (3.) My wife went to see Mr. Tapiador and was informed that he will hold my

passport while I have my ACR, which I refused. (4.) We transferred our residence to

Negros Occidental we arranged with Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will

leave and when my wife went again to pick up the ACR he was not in the office.

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount

directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same,

but he did not. Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to Terencios statement that

the spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 on to Mr. Tapiador as payment. On

the assumption that there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements

against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than 30

years. On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until

proven otherwise does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had

the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for

reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman

should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of

Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer.

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The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove

the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence.

Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the

Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the

government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section

13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can

only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at

fault, to the public official concerned.

Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the

petitioner from the government service are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the

government service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation and

Deportation, Manila, without loss nor diminution in his salaries and benefits.

L14. LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Office of the Ombudsman,

Atty. Ronaldo, then Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry of

the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, was alleged to have committed the

following illegal acts: (1) irregularly granting Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs)

beyond the prescribed period; and (2) using recycled or photocopied applications

for a TRV extension without the applicants fixing their signatures anew to validate

the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. In a

joint resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes recommended for the

suspension of the petitioner for 1 year for conduct prejudicial to the interest of the

service. The Ombudsman approved the said resolution. Petitioner filed a motionfor reconsideration but was denied, instead, the period of suspension was reduced

from 1 year to 9 months without pay. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the

Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the formers suspension reducing it from9

months to only 6 months without pay. Petitioner filed an instant petition for review

with the SC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Ombudsmans finding is merely advisory or not.

2. Whether or not Ombudsmans resolution finding petitioneradministratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment into the

power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.

HELD:

Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually

mandatory. Also, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute

cases involving public officers and employees.

The petition was denied and the resolution of CA was affirmed.

RATIO/DOCTRINE:

Under Sec 13(3) of the Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the

removal of the public officer or employee found to be at fault, to the official

concerned. On the other hand, Sec 15 of RA 6770 states that, to wit:

Sec 15. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions

and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a

public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a

duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,

censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its

disciplinary authority as provided in Sec 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by

any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to

remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who

is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law

shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

The provisions of RA 6770 and Sec.13 of Art XI of the Constitution which provides

for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman qualify the order to

remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee akin

to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause,

of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring

officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, a strong indication that the

Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually

mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation

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by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned.

It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and

prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive

authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By

stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken

against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the constitution and in RA

6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper

officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

L15 Estarija vs Ranada

Facts:

Respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc.

(DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative

complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,

against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports

Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.

The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary

berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding

monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing

permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI.

On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked

money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija.

The Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and directed him to

answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal

Case No. 41,464-98, against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, petitioner vehemently

denied demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed

that Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI

had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the associations office, he was

hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the association had no pending

transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the

money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998.

On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative

case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal was

unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to

remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not

removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the

Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is

unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers

that are not provided for in the Constitution.

The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. Estarija filed a Petition for

Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and

writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of

Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the

Ombudsmans decision.

Issues:

1. Is there substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty andgrave misconduct? YES

2. Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fineor censure erring officials unconstitutional? NO

Reasoning:

1. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation. When Estarijawent to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was

indicative of his willingness to commit the crime. In an administrative

proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only

substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

2. Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organizationof the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress

deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute

offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more

active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public

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office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad

powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with

the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the

discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in

character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and

conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with

the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his

authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise

given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the

government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of

Congress and the Judiciary.

Intent of the framers of the Constitution- Based on the record of the Constitutional

Commission, they clarified that the powers of the Ombudsman are not exclusive.

They are not foreclosing the possibility that in the future, the Assembly may have to

give additional powers to theOmbudsman.3. The Constitution does not restrict the

powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987Constitution, but

allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the

Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15,

par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials

and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

Petition denied.

L16. Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera (2005)

Petitioner: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO

Respondent: ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs byPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of

office on August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001. He is in

charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.

The Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint filed by thenDirector Eduardo S. Matillano of the Philippine National Police Criminal

Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG).

Director Matillano charged respondent Valera with criminaloffenses involving violation of various provisions of Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 3019,the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines

(TCCP), Executive Order No. 38, Executive Order No. 298, andR.A. No. 6713

as well as administrative offenses of Grave

Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of

Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was

respondent Valeras brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo for violation

of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.

a. Violation of EO No. 156 & EO No. 38

A. Valera had compromised the case against the Steel Asia Manufacturing

Corporation while in the performance of his official functions without proper

authority from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and without the

approval of the President which caused undue injury to the government by having

deprived the government of its right to collect the legal interest, surcharges,

litigation expenses and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted benefits in

the total uncollected amount of P14,762,467.70 which is