Szu-ying Huang

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center

2010.08.03 Steering Committee Meeting

CASE STUDY Universal Form Clamp Co. Explosion-

Bellwood, IL, 2006

Outline

Background

Incident Description

Investigation

Lessons Learned and Conclusion

Reference

Acknowledgement

2

Background--Company Profile

--Product of the incident

3

Background

4

Company Profile

Universal Form Clamp Co. /Don De Cristo union

Now: Universal Building Product Inc.

450 employees at 11 locations

Manufacturer of steel concrete construction products

Chemical mixing area started from 2002-2003

Bellwood was the only facility mixing and heating flammable liquids.

Background

5

Chemical Mixing Product

“Super Clean and Tilt”

A solvent based, VOC compliant formula composed of

chemically reactive non-membrane forming materials that

functions as a bond breaker for tilt-up construction

It yields a panel surface ready to receive paint or other

treatments.

Step 2 of Universal's HTS Slab Therapy System.

moisture retention supply

Chemical neutral

bondbreaker

binding with free lime & calcium

carbonate

Incident Description--Procedure of the incident

--Consequence

6

Incident Description

7

Vapor Spilling Started – 9:00

am, June 14,2006

Operation: mixing and heating

a flammable mixture of

heptanes and mineral spirits

(~2:1 ratio) in a 2,200-gallon

open top tank.

A “dense fog” was observed

accumulating on the floor

below the tank.

CSB incident report of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank,

UFC. 2006

Incident Description

8

CSB incident report of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC.

2006

Vapor Cloud Explosion

Vapor cloud* spread throughout the mixing area and workspaces, filling most of the spaces in 10 minutes.

The spill formed a significant region of vapor cloud, being ignited after ~14 minutes of developing.

Pressure created by explosion blew the doors open to an adjacent area. Also smoke, ashes, and fire continued to spread.

Consequence

9

One fatality

A contracted delivery driver passed worker who were evacuating from the

area. Explosion happened right after his entering and took his life.

Two injuries

A temporary worker in adjacent area was critically suffered from burns and

another employee suffered a injury in arms.

Bellwood Fire Department battled the fire confined to a bagged resin storage

area for about 3.5 hours.

Resulted in damage to structure and interrupted operation for one month.

CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006 10

Investigation--System design problems

--OSHA Review

11

System Failure and Physical Evidence

12

Mixing Tank Temperature Control and Measurement

consisted of a liquid-filled temperature-sensing bulb and a pneumatic control unit

regulated the tank temperature by opening and closing the tank heating coil steam valves

Failures

The temperature-sensing bulb and thermowell did not conform to the manufacturer specifications.

There was a restrictive bend in the liquid-filled capillary tube connecting the sensing bulb to the temperature controller. It may cause the controller to perform sluggishly or to malfunction.

Tank was not equipped with a temperature display or high temperature alarm, and there was no backup shutoff device.

13 CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006

CSB incident figure gallery of mixing and heating flammable liquid in an open top tank, UFC. 2006 14

System Failure and Physical Evidence

15

Ventilation System

The local exhaust system included two exhaust fans connected to a main

duct.

The area ventilation system included one supply and two exhaust fans

mounted at ceiling level.

Failures

Both exhaust fan drive belts were broken before the incident.

It was not designed to capture and remove a high volume of vapors from an

open top tank.

There were no floor level exhaust registers (floor sweeps) to remove heavy

vapors that accumulated on the floor.

System Failure and Physical Evidence

16

Elimination of Ignition Source

Hazardous (Classified) Locations (29 CFR 1910.307) standard covers

the requirements for electric equipment and wiring safety in locations

where flammables and combustibles are used.

Failures

The adjacent area where the vapor cloud migrated and likely ignited

since it is not built with 1910.307.

OSHA Reviews

17

Flammable and Combustible Liquids (29 CFR 1910.106)

Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29

CFR 1910.119)

Emergency Action Plans (29 CFR 1910.38)

29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous

Chemicals

1910 CFR 1910.120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency

Response

1910.157 Portable Fire Extinguishers

Afterwards -- Similar Incident

18

CAI/Arnel Inc. Confined Vapor Cloud Explosion

(Danver, MA, Nov.22 2006)

The CAI process also involved adding a solid resin to a solvent. This time

it is the mixture of heptane and alcohol.

The CAI tank was also not equipped with an automatic shutdown system

or over-temperature alarm, and the ventilation was not working the day

of the incident.

CAI incident also led to findings about flammable liquids storage

deficiencies from facts to standards.

Lessons Learned and Conclusions

19

Conclusions

20

UFC operated the mixing and heating of flammable liquids without

adequate safety controls.

During its permit application review, the Village of Bellwood did not

ensure such compliance, and did not require UFC to utilize a

registered design professional.

UFC had no emergency action plan, employees had not received any

emergency action training or conducted an evacuation drill, and the

facility was not equipped with an employee alarm system.

Lessons Learned

21

What can be done to avoid history repeating itself?

A design professional should manage the design and construction of a

facility that uses flammable liquids.

An experienced code reviewer should thoroughly review facility design

plans submitted to the Village.

Facilities handling flammable and combustible liquids should implement

an EAP and practice evacuation drills more frequently to keep

employees prepared.

Recommendation

22

2007-08-I-IL-R1

Amend 1910.106 Flammable and Combustible Liquids to require facilities that handle flammable and combustible liquids to implement the requirements of 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans.

2007-08-I-IL-R2

Amend 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans to require employers to conduct practice evacuation drills at least annually, but more frequently if necessary to ensure employees are prepared for emergencies.

NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code 2010

Permissible Storage and Use Locations; Emergency Planning, Fire Risk Control, and Chemical Hazard Requirements for Industrial Processes

Reference

23

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board - complete

incident investigation reports: Universal Form Clamp Co. (No.

2006-08-I-IL)

CAI, Inc. and ARNEL Co., Inc. (No.2007-03-I-MA)

Product Catalog: UFC “Super Clean Tilt”

Acknowledgement

24

Dr. Sam Mannan

Dr. Maria Molnarne

Dr. Xiaodan Gao

MKOPSC Members

25