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Caste, Skill, and Training: The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the Middle

Ages to the Sixteenth CenturyAuthor(s): Dennis E. ShowalterSource: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 407-430Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2943986 .

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Caste, Skill, nd Training:The Evolution f Cohesion inEuropean Armiesfrom he MiddleAgesto the Sixteenth entury

Dennis E. Showalter

THE Middle Ages were characterizedby growing nstitutionalsophistication, nd nowhere was this more apparent than the craftof war. The image made familiarby Ferdinand Lot and Sir CharlesOman, ofmedieval warfare s featuringimiteddiscipline, imple tactics,and no strategy t all, has given wayto a growing ppreciation ofthecomplexityofmilitary perationsbetween theeighth nd the sixteenthcenturies.1 More and more medieval leaders are emergingfrom theshadows of romance as solid, competent captains. Even Richard theLion-Hearted is now presented as a strategist omparable to BernardLaw Montgomery-a juxtapositionnot necessarily favoring helatter!2The parallel reflects he high cost of medieval armies relativeto agivenpolitical ystem'smobilizableresources.Like the twentieth-centuryBritish marshal, no medieval commander could afford o lose menheedlessly.Large-scale battles were exceptional because oftheirrisk-ariskenhanced by the high development ofthe science of fortification.Anenemy defeated nthe fieldwas ikely o escape decisiveconsequences

1. ThebestrecentgeneraltreatmentsPhilippeContamine,War n theMiddleAges, r.MichaelJones Oxford:Blackwell, 984).2. JohnGillingham, Richard and theScience ofWar n theMiddleAges," nWarand Government n the MiddleAges:Essays in Honour ofJ. 0. Prestwick,ed. J.Gillingham nd J. C. Holt (Totowa,N.J.: Barnesand Noble, 1984), 78-91;and Richard theLionheart (London: Weidenfeld, 978), passim.The Journal ofMilitaryHistory57 (July 993): 407-30 i SocietyforMilitary istory * 407


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERby withdrawing ehind defenses whose reduction involved massiveexpenses of time and effort.Medieval warfare herefore ended towardsa process of small-scalemaneuvers, raids, and skirmishes ased on regional networksof forti-fications.This attritionalmodel in turnhighlighted he familiar imita-tions of feudal evies: short ervice and organizational entropy.Warfarehad become too complex, too sophisticated, and too low-keyto besustainedeffectivelyy temporarily ssembled bands of gonisticheroes.High evels ofpatience, cunning, and disciplinewere requiredto achieveeven limited ends-not least to preventoperations fromdegeneratinginto mutual self-destructionhroughmutual plundering.3Tactical considerations reinforced trategicfactors n making highdemands on the solidarity and flexibility f field forces. Medievalcommanders were by no means indifferent o the problems andopportunitiesposed by flanks.They were correspondingly oncernedwithbeing able to move formedbodies of men fromplace to place in ahurry. he risks fdisorganized ursuitwere lso frequently emonstratedalike by Magyar and Muslim horsemen, Welsh and Prussian peasants.4Cohesion, in short,became an increasingly mportantelement ofmedieval armed forces. Yet the techniques for chievingthiscohesionhave been relatively gnored by militaryhistoriansmore concernedwithoperational results.This essay proposes to examine the structureofmedieval Europe's militaryystems-and the factors hatheld medievalarmed forcestogether n battleand on campaign.

IMedieval Europe was a society organized forwar,whosefocalpointwas the armored horseman, the knight.Expensive technical improve-ments in armor and in horsebreeding,combined with hedifficultyfmobilizing capital resources in a subsistence economy, set knightsincreasingly part from therfighters.o thepriceofknightlyquipmentwere added the costs, material and psychological,of knightly rofes-sionalism. The horsemanship necessary to manage a stallionin battle;theability o use sword,mace, or lance effectively,hethermountedoron foot-these skills reflectedearly training nd a lifetime'spractice.3. Theory nd practice alike counseled caution in the faceof an enemy.SeeparticularlyWalterGoffart,The Date and PurposeofVetegius'De Re Militari,"Traditio33 (1977): 65-100; and JohnBeeler'stwovolumes,Warfaren England,1066-1189 (Ithaca: CornellUniversityress, 966); and Warfare nFeudal Europe(Ithaca: CornellUniversityress,1971).4. J.F.Verbruggen, he ArtofWarfare n Western urope During theMiddleAges, r.S. Willard, . C. M. SouthernAmsterdam:NorthHolland,1977), 82 ff.

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Caste, Skill, and TrainingThey were specialized enough to be essentially ncompatible withthemundane concerns of earning a living.5Caste position reflectedpride of craft. f heavy cavalry ncreasinglydominated the high-medievalmilitary cene, thisreflected ts flexibilityand adaptabilityas well as its social pretensions.The knightwas not aberserker. deally, his belligerence was focused and controlled. He wasmaster of himself as well as of his horse and arms. As early as theCarolingian era, armored horsemen could execute complex tacticalmaneuvers.They could fight ffectivelyn foot s wellas on horseback.6Their successors demonstrated, from the marshes of Ireland to theforestsof Prussia to the deserts of Outre-Mer, significant bility toadjust their tactics to their opposition. This developingsophisticationchallenged traditionalwaysoforganizingWesternEurope's nobilityforwar. The patterns of militarygrouping among the German peoples,whosepolitical organizations grewout ofthe Roman Empire,had beenanthropological, based on tribal and clan affinities.Chieftains alsoincreasinglytried to maintain bands of pledged warriors s a personalfollowing,maintaining them from heirown resources and the spoilsofwar. These Gefolgschaften ncreasingly formed the core of auxiliaryand federateunits n the late Roman army,blending personal oaths totheir eader with nstitutional llegiance to the Empire.7The concept of fealty at two levels endured long after WesternEurope's disappearance. But while bonds of blood and oath couldgenerate social cohesion, linkages based on personal loyaltydid notalways guarantee enough solidarity nd self-sacrificeo withstand he

5. R. Allen Brown, The Status f he NormanKnight,"n War and Governmentin theMiddleAges, 8-32, is at once convincing n ts rguments nd comprehensivein its surveyof French and British iterature.A. Borst, ed., Das Rittertum mMittelalterDarmstadt:Wissenschaftliche uchgesellschaft,976), has more of acentral European focus. Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charles Martel,MountedShockCombat, the Stirrup, nd Feudalism," Studies in Medieval and RenaissanceHistory7 (1970): 49-75, critiques he assumption f direct inkbetweenmilitarytechnology nd social structure.Cf. also G. Duby, The Three Orders: FeudalSociety magined, tr.A. Goldhammer Chicago:UniversityfChicago Press, 981),293 ff.; nd Claude Gaier, "La cavalerie ourde en Europe occidentale du XIIe auXIVe iecle: unproblemede mentalite,"Revue nternationaled'HistoireMilitaire34 (1971): 385-96.6. Charles R. Bowlus, "Two Carolingian CampaignsReconsidered,"MilitaryAffairs48 (1984): 121-25; and Bernard S. Bachrach,"Charlemagne's Cavalry:Myth nd Reality," bid.,47 (1983): 181-87.7. WalterGoffart, arbarians and Romans, A.D. 418-584: TheTechniquesofAccommodation (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityress, 1980), includes anexcellentgeneral survey f the iterature n this ubject. Cf.also E. A. Thompson,"EarlyGermanicWarfare," ast and Present 14 (1958): 2-29; and C. H. Hermann,Deutsche Militargeschichte. ine Einfiihrung, d. rev. Frankfurt: ernard undGraefe, 968), 15 ff.MILITARY HISTORY * 409


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERshock of a major battle, to say nothing of the stress of long-termcampaigning.8 The situation was further omplicated because anincreasing numberof men at arms did notbelong to the feudalityt all.In Spain and Italy, "commoner knights"were a major element ofmilitary trength y the eleventhcentury. n Germany thegrowth ftheministeriales, class of ervile dministrators,ut even unfreemen intoarmor and on horseback.And everywhere he fully rmed horsemanwas increasingly supplemented by a class of mounted "sergeants."These men, of ess exalted birth nd less complete equipment than thechivalry roper, ftendepended for heirhorses nd armoron a wealthierpatronor sponsor,whom they ogically followed n the field.9The noble man-at-arms,far from being an isolated individual,increasinglybecame the focalpoint of a small administrative nit andcombat team,the ance. Beginning nformally,ncorporating he knightand a fewpersonal attendants, the lance evolved in France by themiddleofthe fifteenthentury nto a man-at-arms, squire,a page, twoor three mounted archers, and a servant.A Burgundianlance couldinclude as many as nine men,each with specificoperational function.On campaign, lances weregrouped intoconroys, usuallyoftwenty-fiveto eightymen-more or less permanentbodies.

The size ofthese variedconsiderably.They might nclude onlytheretainersofa single lord. They might onsistofseveralsmallergroups,or even ofisolated individualsassembled ad hoc.10Conroysmost fre-quently incorporated men fromthe same neighborhood, who hadexercised together nd tested each others'mettleforyears.Such unitswere perfectly apable offollowing heir eader's standardin coherentmaneuvers-even in a maneuveras risky s pretended flight, hichwasan element ofNormanwarfare s earlyas the eleventhcentury.-"Conroys mightalso be formed nto largerunits several hundredstrong,as in the French army that marched against the Flemish in1328. At this evel,once the imits fpersonalconnectionswerereached,8. Verbruggen, rtof Warfare, 2.9.J.Bumke, tudien umRitterbegriffm 12. und 13.Jahrhundert Heidelberg:Winter, 964), is a literary-intellectualurvey. f. lso BenjaminArnold,GermanKnighthood,1050-1300 (New York:OxfordUniversity ress, 1985); E. Lourie,"Medieval Spain: A Society Organized forWar," Past and Present35(1966):

54-76; and J. F. Powers, "The Originsand Developmentof MunicipalMilitaryService n theLeonese and CastilianReconquest,800-1250," Traditio 26 (1970):91-111.10. Contamine,War n the MiddleAges,228 ff., ffersn excellentoverview fmedievalorganizationnd tactics.11. On thiscontroversialubject,cf. Beeler, Warfare n Feudal Europe, 84,94-95; Verbruggen,rt f Warfare, 9-90; and as a case study, ernard . Bachrach,"The FeignedRetreat t Hastings,"Medieval Studies 33 (1971): 264-67.410 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill, and Traininga logical and familiarnext step involved groupingsbased on languageand place oforigin. Even the religious military rders,with heirdirect,principled commitment to the serviceof a universal God, were unableto submerge regional identitiesamong their members. The resultingriskof ntrigue nd rivalry, articularlywell illustratedn the history fthe Teutonic Knights,was considered balanced by administrative ndoperational considerations. 2The importanceof these structuresmustnot be overstated.Medievalarmies lacked anything ikea comprehensivecommand structure bleto evokegeneral, conditioned responses. Coherence in even the ance,to say nothing of larger formations, epended on mutual loyaltiesfarmorethanon discipline, drill, r fearofpunishment.The heavycavalryoffeudal Europe was neverthelessreasonably successful n developingfunctionalpatternsof internalcohesion that combined personal andinstitutional lements.This process was significantlynfluenced by a growing awarenessthat rmored horsemencouldbe vulnerableevenon theirhomeground:the well-watered, elativelyopen terrain of northwestern urope. Asearlyas the twelfthentury,the cities of Flanders and northern talywerebeginning to produce footsoldiers able to defeat thebest ofthemounted chivalry. n 1176, it was the infantryfthe Lombard Leaguethatbroke the charge ofFrederickBarbarossa's knights, hen counter-attacked to drive the Germans from he fieldofLegnano. Throughthethirteenth entury, the footmenof the Low Countries enabled theircities tomaintain and enhance theirpower vis-a-vishe ocal nobility,process culminatingwiththe destructionof a Frenchknightly rmyatCourtrai n 1303.13At theirbest, however, hecivic militiasofurban Europewerepart-time fightingmen. Their tactical skillswere correspondingly imited.Their operational effectiveness epended on levels of involvement nwar that were contraryto the medieval city's purpose. Unlike the

12. MichaelBurleigh, russian Society nd the German Order:AnAristocraticCorporation in Crisis c. 1410-1466 (Cambridge: Cambridge University ress,1984), 111 ff.; nd E. Mascheke, Die inneren Wandlungendes DeutschenRitter-ordens," n Geschichteund Gegenwartsbewusstsein. estschriftffurans Rothfelszum 70. Geburtstag, d. W. Besson, F. Frh. Hiller von GartringenG6ttingen:Vandenhoek, 963), 249-77.13. Verbruggen, rtof Warfare, 25 passim, s a brief omprehensiveurvey fthe ommunal nfantries. etailed tudies nclude Claude Gaier,Art torganisationmilitaires dans la principaute de LiQge t dans le comtede Looz au MoyenAge(Brussels: alais des Academies,1968); and 0. P. Waley, The Army f heFlorentineRepublicfrom he Twelftho theFourteenth entury,"n Florentine tudies,ed. V.Rubenstein Evanston ll.: Northwestern niversity ress, 1968), 70-108. Waley'sThe talian CityRepublics London: Weidenfeld, 969), incorporatesmuchgeneralinformationn respectivemilitaryystems.

MILITARY HISTORY * 411


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERRoman Republic or the city-states fclassical Greece, themedieval citywas a commercial, not a political, institution.Civic pride and civicidentityultimatelydepended on the community's successfulfosteringof prosperity.And medieval wars could be ruinously xpensive even forthe victors. The Lombard League virtually ankrupteditself heckingthepretensionsofBarbarossa.The FourthCrusade cost theRepublicofVenice farmore than any immediate gains in loot or improvedtradenetworks.A related nternal actorworking gainstthe evolution fthe medievaltownsman ntoa hoplitewas the growing pecialization of aborwithinthe commune. Ifeach taskhad itsspecific kill, aught nd supportedbyspecific guilds and craft brotherhoods,was it not correspondinglyreasonable to divide up the labor of military ervice, and to providespecialists in this craftas in all the others? From a fewexperiencedcaptains and armorersheldon retainer, hepermanentarmedforces fEurope's cities and city-states ended to increase duringthefourteenthcentury to fairly ubstantial sizes-and to include correspondinglyfewer itizens in their anks.14

IIDespite their imitations, he communal infantrieschieved enoughsuccesses to highlight an increasingly obvious fact. The armoredhorseman was a generalized weapons system, not a comprehensiveone. The knightsngeneral, however,were soldiersenough to recognizetheir own limitations.This self-knowledgewas enhanced as medievalwarfare pread to itsfrontiers. pain or Palestine, Prussiaorthe ScottishMarches-each region outside the feudal heartland of northwesternEurope posed its ownsetofoperational challenges. Each also producedfightingmen familiar with local conditions. As guides, scouts, andauxiliaries, theywere indispensable. For threecenturiesthe TeutonicKnights depended heavilyforsuccess, and oftenforsurvival,on thenative Prussians and Lithuanians who knewtheirswamps and forestsbetter hananyalien from wabia orBrandenburg.5Turcopoles, nativetroopsand Europeans usingnative equipment and local tactics,were14. R.-H. Bautier,TheEconomic DevelopmentofMedieval Europe (London:

Thames,1971), is a usefuloverviewwith n excellentbibliography. f. also YvesRenouard, es hommesd'affaires taliens du MoyenAge Paris:Colin,1968); andHenriPirenne,Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society andPolitical Conflict n theMiddle Ages and theRenaissance, tr. J.V. Saunders,Torched. (NewYork:Harper, 963).15. For the importance of local forcesand local knowledgeon the Balticfrontier,ee EricChristiansen, heNorthern rusades: The Baltic and theCatholicFrontier, 100-1525 (Minneapolis:UniversityfMinnesotaPress,1980). ForPal-412 * THE JOURNAL OF


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERspectrum of skills nd interests equired n specialized military ctivitycommonly failed to develop a cultural matrix trongenough to survivein the absence of a level of social control unsustainableby any medievalstate.8The difficulties urrounding systematic skill transference helpedgenerate a logical step, fromutilizing egional specialists ocally and ona more or less ad hoc basis to engaging themin organized bodies forcampaigns wagedoutside theirhomelands. The marchesofnorthWalesprovided mercenariesfor he Englishcrown from he eleventhcentury.Welsh footmen were the hard core of the small expeditionary forcesthat onquered Ireland. Welsh rchers et the patternfor nglish nfantrytactics during the Scottish Wars. The spread of the longbow into thenorth and west of England, which increasinglybecame the preferredrecruiting round for rchers,was facilitated nd sustained by prospectsof mployment nd profit n the Celtic Fringe,nFrance,orincreasingly,in England itself.19 panish light nfantry, ighting n terrain imilar toits home ground, played a major role in the Sicilian Vespers, andcontributedmuch to the military erformance fthe Catalan mercenarycompanies in theAegean basin.20What were the internal dynamics of these regionally recruitedcommoner forces?JohnKeegan suggeststhatviolence in medieval lifewas sufficiently amiliar to make battle less of a shock than in con-temporarywesternsocieties, whichmake substantial effortso isolatetheirmembersfrom hysical ombat and physicalrisk.JohannHuizingamakes a similarpoint, arguing that the later Middle Ageswere a periodofviolent contrasts, foscillation between extremesofdespairand joy,cruelty and tenderness. Huizinga's image of a life lived in primarycolorsreinforces heconcept ofsoldiering s essentially n a continuumwitheveryday xperiences, as opposed to a drasticdeparturefrom henorm.

18. Robert Hardy, Longbow: A Social and MilitaryHistory (Cambridge:Stephens,1976); and JimBradbury, heMedievalArcher New York: t.Martin's,1985), 71 ff.; re useful opular urveyswith ood bibliographies.19. Cf.JohnE. Morris, he WelshWarsofEdward I, reprint f 1901 ed. (NewYork:Haskell, 1969); E. Miller,War in theNorth:TheAnglo-ScottishWarsof theMiddleAges Hull: UniversityfHullPublications, 960); R. G. Nicholson, dwardIIand theScots: TheFormative Years of MilitaryCareer, 132 7-1335 (London:OxfordUniversityress, 1968); A. D. Carr, "Welshmen nd the Hundred Years'War,"WelshHistoryReview 4 (1968): 21-46.20. C. Carrere, Auxoriginesdes grandescompagnies: a compagnie catalanede 1301," nRecrutement,mentalites,ocietes. Colloque internationaled'histoiremilitaire,1974 (Montpellier:Universite aul-Valery, 975), 1-7; RogerSablonier,Krieg und Kriegertum n der Cr6nica des Ramn Muntaner. Eine Studie zumsp&tmittelalterlichenriegswesen ufgrund katalanischer Quellen Bern: Lang,1971).414 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill, and TrainingThis approach, both provocative and debatable, is useful forexplaining individualpugnacity.Medieval societywas also familiarwithcollective violence at grass-roots evels. Men, both free and servile,

could be summoned to warin the feudal evy,or to defendtheirhomeareas from rganized military ormations, andits, and evenmaraudingwolfpacks. Possession of effectiveweapons, fromknives nd daggers tobows and billhooks, was widespread even though their primaryandnormal functionswere those of peace, fromcuttingbread to reapinggrain.Medieval Europe, nshort, ffered romisingwhen not fertile roundfor militaryrecruiters.Young men reaching maturity n deferential,patriarchial societies could find a soldier's career attractivesimplybecause it promisedchange from he knownand the familiar. regnantgirlfriends,egal disputes, and domestic quarrels drove young menfromparentalfiresides n the twelfth enturyust as in the twentieth.21Ambitionplayed a certainrole as well,particularlys the contractualelement ofmilitary ervice increased. M. M. Poston's conclusion thatEngland's village and marketremained uninfluenced n theaggregateby the purchases of common soldiers returningfromthe HundredYears' War s likely o applyanywhere, nd at any time, n thehistory fmedieval and earlymodernEurope.Yetmen tend to think fthemselvesin termsofexceptionsrather hanaggregates.Non-noble soldiers werehardly ikelyto aspire to the wealth of which an aristocraticcaptainmightdream, and even less likelyto collect the proceeds iftheydidmanage tocapturea richprisoner.Nevertheless, ome commonlybornfightingmen did enrich themselvesrelativeto theirstation by loot orransom. Othersdid manage to set themselvesup as tavernkeepers rsmallholders on the proceeds of their campaigns. Such stories lostnothingnthetelling. heymayhave been rendered ven more attractiveifHuizinga's interpretation fthe late-medievalmind-set s accepted.The concept oftakinghighrisks orhighgainswouldpresumably ppeal

21. JohnKeegan, The Face of Battle,Vintageed. (NewYork:RandomHouse,1977), 115-16, and JohannHuizinga,TheWaning oftheMiddleAges,Anchor d.(NewYork:Doubleday,1954), 9 ff. f. lso GeorgesDuby, The EarlyGrowthof heEuropean Economy: Warriorsand Peasants from the Seventhto the TwelfthCentury, r. H. B. Clarke Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress,1973); J. R. Hale,"Violence nthe Late MiddleAges:A Background,"n Violence nd CivilDisorderin Italian Cities 1200-1500, ed. L. Martines Berkeley:Universityalifornia ress,1971), 19-37; andB. A. Hanawalt, ViolentDeath n Fourteenth-nd Early ifteenth-Century ngland," Comparative Studies in Societyand History18 (1976): 297-320, for urtherreatments f aggressive, iolentbehaviorduring hisperiodat allsocial levels.MILITARY HISTORY * 415


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERto such men, as itdid to the Spanish picaros who set so much ofthetone in thearmyof Philip 1.22To describeforces fregional pecialists s includingdisproportionatenumbers frestlessyoung men is not necessarily o affirmontemporaryaristocratic descriptions of these bodies as composed of masterlesssocial outcasts. Initially,men from he same geographicdistrict, ftenrelated by blood or marriage,foughtfor obvious reasons. The northcountry rchertaking hefield gainsta Scottish nvader, r theCastiliantownsmanriding raid intoMoorishterritory,eeded little ncourage-menttoguardeach others' acks. Patterns f ocal recruitmentrequentlyremainedthe same after hepurposes changed. Englisharchersduringthe Hundred Years' War, for example, were normally enlisted andgrouped by counties, and when possible by smaller politicaldivisions swell. Within ndividualcompanies theywere organized into twentiesand hundreds,commanded by the equivalent of Rome's centurions:senior,experiencedmen from heir wn ranks.The cohesion generatedby this process was a significantfactor n the bowmen's long roll ofsuccesses undera widevariety f circumstances.23

IIIThe developing coherence and complexity of medieval armiesreflected general pattern of professionalization n European warfareduring the twelfth nd thirteenth enturies. More and more armedforceswere built around men with ong-term ommitmentsto militaryactivities, who drew increasing amounts of their dentityfrom thesecommitments.At highersocial levels the process was closely involvedwith henatureofknighthood.To some degree thisreflectedpersonalchoice. Some noblemen, whetherfrom mbition, desire,or necessity,soughtwideropportunitiesto use their swords than the feudal systemprovided. Others correspondingly preferreddomesticity, piked withoccasional local belligerence. Economics also complicated the feudalorder. Subinfeudation, dividinga knight'sfee of land among three orfourpeople, none of them specificallyobligated to performpersonalservice,rendered the concept of a fief s a privilegium earned andmaintained with one's own body increasingly vestigial.At the same

time,subinfeudation contributed to the creation of a class ofknights22. M. M. Poston, TheCosts of he HundredYears'War,"nEssays inMedievalAgriculturend General Problemsof the Medieval Economy (Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityress,1973), 63-80, and Geoffreyarker, he Army fFlandersand the Spanish Road (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1972), 179 ff.23. Morris,WelshWars,92-93.

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Caste, Skill, and Traininglacking the resources to maintaintheir tatus. Selling one's sword-andone's skills-was an obvious response.24The growing umber of knightswho made war for livingdevelopednew attitudes as well. They internalized less and less of the chivalriccode thatguided theirmore sedentaryor more prosperous fellows.Forsuch fortunate nes war remaineda significant ocial occasion, sharingmany features with tournamentsand jousts. Color, pageantry,andritualwerepart nd parcel ofthe military xperience for ome noblemen.For others heywere becoming fringemanifestations-pleasant enoughbutultimately ispensable for he sake of victory nd profit.25Opportunities for the latter, at least, flourished. Everywhere nEurope, rulersby the end of the twelfth enturywere consideringandallowing exemptions from service in lieu of cash payments.HenryIIintroduced scutage to England in 1159. Philip Augustus of Franceadopted similar taxes. The monarchs in turn used the money to hirefightingmen. This development was by no means unwelcome from nadministrativeperspective. Mercenaries from all social levels couldreasonably be trusted o be loyal to theirpaymasterwhile funds asted.Mercenaries could reasonablybe assumed to have some ability t theirchosen craft.And mercenarieswere presumably willingto fightmoreor less when and where theywere told-an importantpoint in an erawhen governments were ultimately ncapable of applying sanctionsstrong nough tocompel anykindofbehavior outsideofvery estrictedparameters 6The paid fightingman was no newphenomenon in Europe.Williamof Normandy had depended heavilyforthe conquest of England onsoldiers engaged forpromises of rewardsaftervictory.The Normans

24. J.M.W.Bean, The Decline ofEnglishFeudalism, 1215-1540 (Manchester:ManchesterUniversity ress,1968), is an excellent case study n thecompetinglegalisms hatdenatured o many hivalricdeals. Cf. lso BryceLyon,FromFief oIndenture: The Transitionfrom Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in WesternEurope (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityress,1957).25. A good case study fthisprocess n the ast stagesof he HundredYears'Waris A. J. Pollard,John Talbot and theWar in France, 1427-1453 (London: RHS,1983), 18-101. MauriceKeen, Chivalry NewHaven,Conn.: YaleUniversityress,1984), argues fortheessentially ecular,military haracterof the knight t thisperiod. Cf.Keen, "Brotherhood n Arms,"History57 (1962): 1-17; and M. G. A.Vale, War and Chivalry:Warfare nd AristocraticCulture n England, Franceand Burgundy t theEnd oftheMiddle Ages Athens:UniversityfGeorgia Press,1981).26. Cf. C. WarrenHollister, he MilitaryOrganisation of Norman England(Oxford: larendon, 965); S. Harvey, TheKnight ndthe Knight's ee in England,"Past and Present49 (1970): 3-43; andJohn chlight,Monarchsand Mercenaries:A Reappraisal of the Importance of KnightService ofNorman and AngevinEngland (Bridgeport, onn.: UniversityfBridgeport ress,1968).MILITARY HISTORY * 417


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERinitially stablishedthemselves n southern taly as mercenaries in theemployment of local lords. Nor were Christian Spaniards averse toenlisting under the banners of Islam. Ummayids,Almoravids,andAlmohads shared a common reputationas reliable paymasters, nd acommon willingness o hire Christianwarriors.27Earlymercenarieswere, s a rule,hired ingly or specific perationorcampaign.This,however, osed problemsfor he employer. ndividualrecruitment nvolvedsignificant utlaysoftime and money. Once inthe field, moreover, individual fightersdid not automatically sortthemselves nto the smoothlyfunctioning ombat teams requiredbymedieval warfare.Mercenary footmen,as individuals, were no moreuseful han theaverage feudal evy.Mercenaryknightsmight e formallyintegrated nto the familiar tructure f conroys and battles,but theywere bound to that structure y neitherties ofblood nor ties of fealty.Whether an individual's sense of honor and his interpretationof hispledge of service would translate into effective attle discipline wascorrespondingly uestionable.From theemployer's erspective, sensibleresponse to this ituationwas to hire already-formed odies of men. On the other side of thebargain, it was clear thatgroups ofwarriorswere oftenbetterable thanisolated individualsto make more profitable rrangementsfor them-selves.The typicalmercenary,knight rcommoner,desperatelyneededemploymentto survive.A famoushero like England's William Marshalmightbe able to fixhis price, but for lesser men prosperity ay innumbers. By the twelfthentury,footsoldiers in central Europe weregroupingthemselves n bands, fiftyr a hundred strong, nd offeringtheir ervicesto towns ncreasinglynterested n recruiting rofessionalsoldiers to supplementor replace theirmilitias.More significantn thelong run were the knightswho signed agreements of service withagreater ord,coveringfixedperiodsof time. Bytheend ofthethirteenthcentury,these had evolved into retainer contracts. The partyof thesecond partpledged not onlyhisownpresence,but the availability f aspecifiednumber of men with pecifiedkindsofequipment.28Similar contractual relationshipsdid not necessarily produce acommunityof attitudes n themercenarycommunity. n principle,the

27. JosephF. O'Callaghan,A Historyof Medieval Spain (Ithaca,N.Y: CornellUniversityress,1975), 148-49, 280-81.28. H. Grundman,"Rotten und Brabanzonen. Soidner-Heere m 12. Jahr-hundert," eutschesArchivfiir rforschung es Mittelalters (1941-42): 419-92;and J. Boussard, "Les mercenairesau XIIe siecle. Henri II Plantagenet et lesorigines e l'armee de metier," ibliothequede l'Ecole des Chartes 106 (1945-46):189-224, remainexcellent for he origins nd dynamicofthe earlymercenaries.Usefultoo is Paul Schmitthenner, as freie Soidnertumim abendlandischenImperiumdes MittelaltersMunich:Beck, 1934).418 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill,and Trainingknightly lite still nsisted on an essential distinctionbetween itself s aprivilegedwarrior aste and the rest of secular society. Legal restraintson the social rise of baseborn soldiers existed everywhere n feudalEurope. In principle, commoners were not supposed to fight t all.Whentheydid, theywere outside the protectionof the aws of war.29 ntheory, nd often npractice as well, commonerswho riskedtheir kinson the battlefield ould be slaughtered t will-a process facilitated ythe fact that no ransoms could be expected from uch men.Pragmatism ed to certain modificationsof this harsh code. At notime did medieval armies become the bands ofbrothers elebrated bythe King's speech on the eve ofAgincourt n Shakespeare's Henry V.Indeed, at Agincourt he Englishknights efused o execute theirFrenchfellows t the battle's climax, leaving that gnoble task to the archers.Even among crusaders or within mercenary companies, birth andsocial distinctionspersisted. n the military imension, however, s thethirteenthenturywaxed, the contract systemflourished. he overseascampaigns of England's Angevin monarchs depended essentiallyonarmies raised by captains undertaking o enlist an agreed number andmix of men for a given period. On the other side of Europe, theTeutonic Order relied heavily on mercenary companies, both forcampaigns against heheathenand for nternal ecurity gainstrebellioustowns and vassals.30The mercenary company became a usefulmodel operationally aswell as administratively.Well before the Peace of Bretigny, hebrunt ofthe Hundred Years' War was being borne by small combined-armsteams of horse and foot,archers and spearmen, tending to sustainthemselves s permanentbodies underthesame leader. With hetruce,these forces ssumed an independent existence as "freecompanions,"held togetherby a blend of economic and psychological factors.A freecompany was a business enterprise,pooling its gains and runningonshares, withthe captain responsible forfeeding,arming, employing,and disciplininghis subordinates.The companies supportedthemselvesby hiringout to feudal magnates able to afford mporting utsiders tosettle local disputes. They also sold protection. Open banditry wasusually a last recourse ratherthan a first hoice. Free companies wereled not by pirates, but by buccaneers whose most common ambition

29. Maurice Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London:Routledge, 965), 19 and passim.30. Cf.MichaelPrestwich,he ThreeEdwards: Warand theStateinEngland,1272-1377 (New York: t.Martin's, 980); H. J.Hewitt, heOrganization ofWarunder Edward III, 1338-62 (Manchester:ManchesterUniversity ress,1966);J.W.Sherborne, IndenturedRetinues nd EnglishExpeditions o France,1369-1380," English Historical Review 79(1964): 718-46; and Burleigh,PrussianSociety, 2-73, 134 passim.MILITARY HISTORY * 419


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERwas to earn or purchase respectability.The rank and file also soughtlegitimacy, fno more than a believable assertion thattheywerefightingin just and lawfulcauses. The mercenary companies mightskirttheedgesofcustomnnd law,but were neitherphysically orpsychologicallystrong nough openly to defy hem.31The process ofrelocalizing Europe's driftingmercenariesbegan inItaly.A symbioticrelationshipbetween soldiers and employershadbegun developing there even before thefirst orthernfreecompaniescrossed theAlps. Hiringfightersrom utside thesystem imited trainson local social orders already rivenby class and family onflict.Thecities and citystates of northern talyfound ittlemoral or emotionaldifficultyn negotiatingbusiness contracts withsoldiers, as theydidwith so many outsiders. The companies and theircaptains in turnfoundeasy entry o societies expectingand demandingno pretenseofloyalty r allegiance beyond thetermsof thecontract.The adventurers f thefourteenth entury volved nto thegeneralsand princes of the fifteenth entury.They remained soldiers as well.The condottieripaid much attentionto technical progress nd tacticalinnovation. Condottieribattles were by no means the bloodless farcesdescribedby Machiavelli.The operationalproblem faced bycondottiericaptains involvednot mutual unwillingness o fight, ut armed forcesthatwere essentiallymirror-images feach other. Drawn from imilarmanpower pools, armed, trained, nd commanded invirtuallydenticalpatterns, condottieri armies resembled their eighteenth-centurysuccessors in thattheirvictories were likely to be either the result ofunreckonablechance factors, r theproduct ofclose-gripped ttritionalfighting hat could well make success meaningless in terms of bothlong-term nd immediatecoststo theostensibly riumphantmployer.32

31. Philippe Contamine, "Les compagnies d'aventureen France pendant laguerrede Cent ans," Melanges de l'Ecole fran~aisede Rome, MoyenAge,Tempsmodernes 87 (1975): 365-96, is a recent survey.The companies' activities representedna broad context n EdouardPerroy, he Hundred Years' War, r.W.B.Wells London: Eyre and Spottswood, 951), 154 passim. AnthonyMockler,TheMercenaries New York:Macmillan,1969), 25 ff.,s a popular ummary.32. The best overview n English s M. E. Mallett,Mercenaries and TheirMaster: Warfare n Renaissance Italy (Totowa,N.J.:Rowman,1974). G. Trease,The Condottieri,Soldiers of Fortune (New York:Holt, Reinhart, 971), is morecolorful. f. lso D. P.Waley, Condotte nd Condottierin theThirteenthentury,"Proceedings oftheBritishAcademy 61 (1976): 337-71; and thecase studiesbyW.M. Bowsky,City nd Contado, Military elationshipsnd CommunalBands nFourteenth-Centuryiena," in Renaissance Studies in Honor ofHans Baron, ed.A. Molho,J.A. Tedeschi DeKalb: NorthernllinoisUniversityress,1971), 75-98;and M. E. Mallett, Venice and ItsCondottieri, 401-54," in Renaissance Venice,ed. J. R. Hale (Totowa,N.J.: Rowan and Littlefield, 973), 121-45. W.Block,Die420 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill, and TrainingThe military ituation n late-medieval taly highlightedwar's slowpace everywheren Europe. Strategically, he existence of professionalsoldiers fighting orpay combined with he growingfinancial power of

the state to foster he extension of campaigning.A government ouldkeep the field as long as its money and its promises held out-evenlonger if t could carry the fight o its enemy's territory,s the Englishdemonstratedduring he Hundred Years' War.33 actically, rmies wereevolving nto defensive nstruments y choice and necessity.Taking thefight o the enemy had little o recommend it n a period wherearmieswere not only essentially alike in structure nd doctrine,but lacked agenerally effective ffensivenstrument.Heavy cavalry, long the master of the battlefield,could now bechecked as a matter of course. The Hussite Wars demonstratedthateven improvised levies could stop a mounted charge in the open.Religious enthusiasm was less a factor n the Taborites' success thantheir rmored wagons,whichprovidedboth an organizationalframeworkand a tactical rallyingpoint. The battlefieldconsequences, however,were the same.34 Further west, the municipal infantry f Italy andFlanders never developed a significant ffensive apability.Caught inthe open, as at Mons-en-Pevele (1304) and Cassel (1328), Flemishinfantrywere cut to pieces by French men-at-armswho had learnedrespect for their enemies at Courtrai. Across the English Channel,Scottish pike masses proved consistentlyunable to pushhome a chargeagainst moderatelywell-supportedongbowmen.Close rangescombinedwiththe valor of desperation to give English arrow flights n effectvirtually quivalent to machine-gunfire gainstthe owlandschiltrons,setting hevauntedfurorscoticus at naughttimeand again.In sum, the most potentially dangerous offensiveforces on abattlefield,massed armoredhorsemen and massed infantryrmedwithshock weapons, had become systematicallyvulnerable to flexiblecombined-armstactics.These tacticswereincreasinglyfeasiblefor heprofessional oldiers who filled he ranks of the mercenarycompanies.The English combination of longbowmen and dismounted men-at-arms, which proved so formidableon the defensiveagainst Frenchchivalryand Scots pikemen alike, was only a beginning. Mountedarchers, ight avalry, rossbowmenwhosequarrelscould smashthroughCondottiere. tudien uber diesogennanten unblutige chlachten" Berlin, 913)remains useful perational tudy fcondottieriwarfare.33. C. T. Allmand, "War and Profit n the Late MiddleAges," HistoryToday15 (1965): 762-69, is a useful verview. f. lso RichardBean, "War nd the Birth ftheNation State,"Journal ofEconomic History 3 (1973): 203-21.34. J. Duidik,Hussitisches Heerwesen (Berlin, 1961), is a detailed militaryanalysis.Cf.F. G. Heymann,JohnZiska and theHussite Revolution Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityress,1955), 57 ff.MILITARY HISTORY * 421


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERplate armor, hand gunners in increasing numbers-all found theirplaces in the order of battle. By the middle of the fourteenth entury,the up-to-datearmy was an interrelated structureof different rms,each increasinglypossessingits own quirks and its own vulnerabilities.As his armorgrew more complex and his horse grew arger, heheavycavalryman volved from heall-purposewarrior fthe eleventh enturyinto a roughanalog of the modernbattle tank:an important lementofa balanced army,but dependent on the cooperation of ighthorsemenand missile-firingnfantry o achieve consistentresults. On all but theroughestground,archers needed the protectionof either men at armsor heavily armed infantry, ikemenorbillmen. These in turn requiredsupportto minimize the risks f being shot down or riddenover.Late-medieval nd early Renaissance commanderscorrespondinglypreferred o assemble task forcesfor pecific campaigns: recruiting omany archers, o many hand-gunners, o many light nd heavycavalry.Thisbuilding-block pproach developed in part because its componentparts already existed. Organized bodies ofmen, and contractorswithcontacts among temporarilyunemployed soldiers, were easily foundand easily engaged even for ervicefar field.The ethnic compositionof such a formationbecame less significant han its combination ofskills. n 1417, an orderofbattlesubmittedfor he approvalof the DukeofBurgundy rescribed he deploymentof a sophisticatedcombinationof dismounted men-at-arms, rchers, and crossbowmen to take thebrunt of an enemy attack, with mounted men-at-armsand archerssecuringtheflanks nd actingas a reserve.Sixtyyears ater,CharlestheBold's Ordinance of Lausanne prescribedan evenmorecomplexbattleplan, integratingongbowmen nd crossbowmen,men-at-arms,ikemen,and gunners ntoeight"battles,"each with tsowncarefully onsideredstructure, nd withsystematicprovisionfor iaison and cooperationamong the differentrms.35It was no coincidence thatthese plans both came fromBurgundy.Choice among possible combinations of weapons systemsand theirusers to some extentreflected ersonal tasteand professionaludgment.It was also a matter f finance.Burgundy,more than any politicalentityon thecontinent, depended for ts ephemeral existenceon an efficientmilitary ystem. ts dukes were battle captains or theywerenothing.Butthewealthy ommunes thatformed he state'seconomic base preferredvotingtaxes to levyingmen. The Burgundianadministration, mong

35. Cf.J. F. Verbruggen, Un plan de bataille du duc de Bourgogne 14septembre 1417) et la tactique de l'epoque," Revue Internationale d'HistoireMilitaire20 (1959): 443-51; and G. Grosjean, Die Murtenschlacht. nalyse inesEreigenesses," n Actes du ve Centenaire de la bataille de Morat (Fribourg ndBerne,1976), 51 ff.422 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill, and Trainingthe most efficientn Europe, in turn used the money to hire or retainmilitary xperts fromeverywhere,keeping an increasing number ofthem permanently n service n itscompagnies d'ordonnance.36

Armiesraised on thisbasis wereskilled,flexible, nd at least as loyalas any of their successors before the nineteenth century, whennationalism and modern administrationcombined to leave desertersand runaways with no place to go. Fifteenth-century ungary,forexample, stood off he Turks and extended its rule over Austria andBohemia largely because of the mercenarycompanies fromthe westwho foughtforMatthiasCorvinus and his successors. The France ofCharles VII and his successors is generallycredited witha significantmilitary dvance inmovingtowards permanentstanding rmyduringthefifteenthentury.This decision, however,was not a response to theunreliability r inefficiency fmercenaries. It reflected nsteada needto restoreorder n a countryrackedby a century fwar,combined witha growing oncern for oncentratingpower at statelevels.37The new Frencharmy was a formidableforce,whose heavy cavalryin particularenjoyed a high reputation.Nevertheless,French nativetroops as a whole were considered a cut below units of specializedprofessionals,whetherhired directly r engaged as auxiliariesfurnishedand financed by an ally. England's Tudor princes as well came in-creasinglyto depend on foreign ontingentsto sustain their abortivecontinentalpolicies. This in partreflectedEngland's increasingfailureto keep pace withmilitary rogress.But it also reflected cceptance ofconventionalEuropeanwisdomon thesubjectofhiring hebest availablemen withthe newestweapons and techniques, whatevertheirethnicorigins.38

IVThe nextdevelopmentn militaryoherence began with he evolutionof a generallyeffectiveffensive orcewith regionalbase. This was thepikemen of the Swiss cantons. Paradoxically,the Swiss initially arned36. RichardVaughn,Valois Burgundy Hamden, Conn.: Archon,1975), 123ff.,s a good English urvey. f. lso C. Brusten, 'arm&ebourguignonne e 1465 a1468 (Brussels, 1963); and "L'armee bourguignonnede 1465 a 1477," Revue

internationaled'histoiremilitaire20 (1959): 452-66.37. Cf. n particular hilippeContamine's massiveGuerre, tatet societeci afindu MoyenAge.Etudes sur l'arm&edes rois de France, 1337-1454 (ParisandThe Hague: Mouton, 1972); and Paul D. Solon, "Popular Response to StandingMilitaryorces n Fifteenth-Centuryrance," tudies n theRenaissance 19 1972):78-111.38. Gilbert . Millar,Tudor Mercenaries nd Auxiliaries,1485-1547 (Charlot-tesville:UniversityressofVirginia, 980).MILITARY HISTORY * 423


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERtheirmilitary eputation na local context, nd with n entirely ifferentweapon. The victoryof Morgarten 1315) was won when Leopold ofAustriamarchedinto a narrowdefile nd saw hismen mowed down likegrainby thehalberdiersof the forest antons. The nextstepcame whenthe forest antons formed lliances withthe cantons and cities oftheSwiss owlands.Liketheir ounterpartsn Flanders and Italy, heseareasfurnished ontingentsof spearmen. The superiority f thisweapon tothehalberd was demonstratedat Laupen in 1339. Unable to keep theBurgundianheavy avalryfrom omingto close quarters, hehalberdiersofUri,Unterwalden,and Schwyz were saved fromdestructionby thelowlanders' pikes.Such tactical triumphs ould not overcome the essentialweaknessof the evolvingSwiss military ystem. The Swiss economy could notafford o keep masses of men under armsfor ny length oftime.A warof attrition meant corresponding risks of starvation as fieldswentunsown and crops ungathered.The Swiss, moveover,had littlehope ofmatching theirBurgundianrivals n operational sophistication.Swissinfantry, nable to attack in the open field,would have to depend onarchers for fire support and heavy cavalry for shock power. Thesemilitarykillswere scarce inthe Swissmountains. Nor could the cantonsafford o hirespecialists, as did the Burgundians.Pressureto transformthe Swiss nfantrymenntoan offensiveweapon was further eightenedbya human factor.Unlike oldiersfrom he richcitiesofLombardyandFlanders, few Swiss could afford defensive body armor. To survivephysically, heSwiss fightingman had to deliverblows.Throughthe fourteenth entury,Swiss cantons and Swisscaptainsdeveloped patternsofdisciplineand training nabling their nfantryoattackas well as counterattack.The men of a Swisspike column knewthat ife s well as victory epended on an ability omovequickly nd ingood order. The Swiss soldier was both a freeman and enough of awarriorto understandhis tactical systemand enjoy its implications.This was most frequentlymanifestedin the ferocitygenerally char-acterizingSwiss military ehavior.Far more thantheir ontemporariesin the mercenary companies, the Swiss tended to see themselvesasoutside existing feudal and military ystems,whetherchallenging orserving hem. Swiss out-of-battle isciplinewasproverbially ad evenbyfifteenth-centurytandards,not least because theSwiss had a tendencyto run amok en masse.At the same time, a reputationforunbridledferocitywas no meanasset to a systemdepending on aggressiveassault tactics. It not onlyintimidated enemies; it inspiredthe Swiss themselves.The Swiss firstestablishedtheirreputationas more than a locally formidableforce n1444 at St. Jacob-en-Birs, here ess thana thousandpikemenattackeda state-of-the-artrench army 15,000 strong.The Swissdied to a man,424 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste, Skill,and Trainingbut took 2,000 foes with hem.Military urope began to takenotice-and make offers.The Swiss responded by improvingtheirspecialized skills. Theyadopted an early versionofSchwerpunkttactics, strikingwhat eemedthemost vulnerablepoint n an enemypositiontwice, ometimesthreetimesin succession. Theyincreased the lengthof theirpikesto fifteen,then to eighteen feet. They enhanced the fire upportof theirassaultcolumns withcrossbows, and increasinglywith handguns. Like thelongbow n England,the handgunpenetratedSwisscivil society argelybecause of its perceived utility n war. Firearms,however, remainedsecondaryto pikes.And thepikes' effectivenessepended on battlefieldcohesion.This cohesion survived ven aftermercenary ervicereplaced homedefense as the Swissmilitarypattern.It survivedbecause the cantonsand cities went into the contractingbusiness themselves,partlyforprofit nd partly o keep control of youngmen otherwise ikely o hireout individually as free companions. Organizing what could not bestopped indicatedthe continued attractiveness fmilitary ervicewhencompared to alternative ways of making a living in Switzerland'ssubsistence economy. Martialbehavior was culturallyconditioned aswell. The Swissmale, socialized ina structure hatenforced ompulsorymilitaryservice from16 to 60, bound to canton and captain by anetworkof community-sanctionedoaths, found warfare ready andacceptable rite of passage into adulthood.39

VSwisssuccess notonly nspiredbutdemanded emulation.The Swissfilled oo largea gap in the specialized ordersofbattlethatcharacterizedlate-medieval armies to be shruggedoff s regionally limited. Swiss

39. FortheSwiss, ugenvon Frauenholz, ntwicklungsgeschichtees deutscheHeerwesens,vol. 2, Das Heerwesen der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaftn derZeitdesfreie S6ldnertums Munich:Beck, 1936); and Walther chaufelberger,er alteSchweizer und sein Kreig.Studienzur Kreigsfiihrungornehmlich m 15. Jahr-hundert, nd ed. (Zurich:Europa,1966), remain trong n themilitaryide. AlbertWinkler, The Swiss and War: The Impact on Society of the SwissMilitaryn theFourteenth nd Fifteenth enturies"Ph.D. diss.,Brigham oungUniversity,982),includes an excellent bibliography;K. W. Deutsch and H. Weillenmann, DiemilitirischeBewahrung ines sozialen Systems:Die SchweizerEidgenossenschaftim 14. Jahrhundert,"eitrage urMilitarsoziologie, olner eitschriftffuroziologieund Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 2 (1968): 38-58, is more concise. Schaufel-berger,Der Wettkampfn der alten Eidgenossenschaft. ur KulturgeschichteesSports von 13. bis ins 18. Jahrhundert Bern: Haupt, 1972), establishestheimportance fmilitary xercises t the community evel as a means ofdevelopingindividual fficiencynd group ohesion.MILITARY HISTORY * 425


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Caste, Skill, and TrainingLandsknecht officers reparingto compete with he Swiss had to thinkin thousands. Nor could these men merelybe warm bodies. The Swissdepended for heir uccess on aggressiveness nd cohesion. How couldthesebe introduced n a Landsknecht forcewhose very ize meant thatany pre-existing onds of dialect and culture would be significantlylimited. How could they be sustained among men whose choice of amilitary ifewas in large part an affirmation f theirpersonal freedom,theirright o drink nd gamble, to defend theirhon.or n duels, to wearoutrageous clothing, nd swagger t will among the women?One answer nvolved upplanting he communitywith he regiment.The process began with mustering, where prospective recruits werepassed beforetheir officers, ead the articles of service and discipline,then ceremonially sworn to their cause and their leaders. A typicalLandsknecht regiment consisted of 4,000 men divided into tencompanies, each with ts own standard as rallying-point nd symbol.These companies, or Fahnlein, were in turn subdivided into platoonsor Rotten, each offortymen. Where officers f the larger formationswereappointed by the colonel-contractor, he Rottenelected theirownleaders fromamong the veterans in their ranks. Other officials, heFuhrer, the Gemeinwaibel, the Furiere, represented the interestsofthe common Landsknechts in administrative nd operational matters,frequently cting as mediators n disputeswith he command structure.Theiradvice and recommendations werenot lightly isregardedby anycolonel hoping to exercise effective ommand over whatwas essentiallya forceoffree gents.A Landsknecht regiment was not merely a pirate band. Plunder,while still importantforthe early modern soldier, was increasinglybecoming a kind of incentive bonus. Larger armies meant morecompetition foravailable loot. Fewer wealthynoblemen now wenttowar;an aristocraticprisoner was likelytobe relatively s impecuniousas his captor. While men continued to serve forbooty only, it wasusuallywith hehope ofbeing takenon the paid strength f a formation.At least before the general European rise in prices at mid-sixteenth-century, pay for Swiss or Landsknecht compared favorablywithcraftsmen'swages, and could be over twice as highas a laborer's pay.Collecting on time and in something ike fullwas so unlikely hatriotand mutinybecame for ll practical purposes institutionalized mongthe Landsknechts earlyin theirexistence. Butto claim theirwages inthe first lace, the Landsknechts had to fightwell.Victorymightgener-ate at least partial paymentofmoney owed,while defeatusuallymeantempty pockets for everybody. Profitable employment, moreover,depended heavily n past performances.While ndividualLandsknechtscould always findservice,terms were likelyto be better as part of aformedbody. Formationsand commanderswith ad reputationsfoundMILITARY HISTORY * 427


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERit correspondingly ifficulto secure contracts.Discipline was also for the Landsknecht an element of survival.Landsknecht formations,recruited ad hoc, were vulnerable to thepressure of combat, when economic considerations became vagueabstractions omparedwith hevisceraldesiretosurvive. anic,however,meant higherordersof riskfor heLandsknechts thanalmost anyoneelse. Tactical orders of battle frequentlyplaced them opposite theSwiss,whobitterly espised theimitators f their echniques,and wereeven less predisposedthanusual to showmercy n victory.Cohesion,then,was both a careerfacilitatornd a survivalmechanismfor the common Landsknecht. Contraryto later myth,the Lands-knechts were not a sworn egalitarian brotherhood. Their complexstructure frights nd privilegesreflected correspondingly omplexinternal hierarchy.Yet ifLandsknecht commanders frequentlydis-mounted in battle to fightn the frontranks,thiswas only in part areflection f he growing ulnerabilityfthehorse. t wasalso a significantgestureofsolidaritywith he footmen, signof physicalcommitment oa common purpose. Should positive incentives fail, Landsknechtregimentsncorporated comprehensive isciplinarytructure,ncludinga provost nd an executioner-officials feared and detested,treatedaspariahs withouthonor, but regarded as necessary by even the mosthardened freebooters.Landsknecht captains were too wise to trust ntirely he powerofmartial ntangibleson one hand and physicalcompulsion on theother.Landsknecht rankand filemightbe self-selected, ut integration ntotheorganizationwas reinforced yearlyforms f ndividual nstructionand collective battle drill. The Landsknechts depended heavily oncrossbowmen nd arquebusiers o screenand support heirpikesquares.These "shot" were drawn ncreasingly rom heveteranDoppelsoldner,thedouble-paymen whopresumablyknewwhattheyweredoing. Thefront anks ofthe pike formationswere similarly rawnfrom he oldestand mostexperiencedsoldiers.The Landsknecht recruit, owever,wasnot left ntirely o hisown devices. Unlikethe ongbow,the handgun,orthe sword, the pike was relativelysimple in its technical demands.Anyone withreasonable strength, gility, nd good willcould learn touse it quickly. This did not mean that a coherent force of pikemencouldbe formed romn equivalentnumberof pprentices nd farmboys.Weapons trainingwas a major guarantorof morale. A man crowdedinto a pikesquaremight ind t harder orun or shirk han an arquebusieror a lighthorseman. But even a wavering ine of pikes was an openinvitation o disaster.Individual fearor even individualclumsiness inthose dense masses could generate collective panic more readilythanin, forexample, a firingine of archers,whereeveryman's attentionwas absorbed by his personal weapon and where a runawaymight428 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Caste,Skill, and Trainingcorrespondingly be disregarded as an exceptional case. The moreconfidence a man had in himself,his weapon, and his comrades, theless was it ikelyhe would consider flight,nd themore probable thathewould be able to maneuver successfully.Perhapsthe best evidence ofthe Landsknechts'growing nternal olidity s their ommanders' relativeemphasis on finesse and timing in their attacks, as opposed to thehead-down,battering harges favoredby the Swiss.40The Landsknechts exemplified and illustrated the patterns ofcohesion required by the rapidlyexpanding armies of the sixteenthcentury.This process has been describedas professionalization.41t wasthat-and something more. Free companions developed intocontractforces, hen nto standing rmies.Personal honorgavewaytoregimentalhonor in justifying avernbrawls and formalduels alike. The Spanisharmyofthe sixteenth entury, he archetypeofearlymodernmilitaryeffectiveness, epended heavily on discipline patternsand unitritualsestablished in earlier centuries to cope with a multi-ethnic ase andcomplex combined-arms tactics. The soldiers of the Spanish armyconsistentlydemonstrated,moreover, common sense of dentity nda mutual olidarity is-a-visoth their mployers nd their eniorofficers.Byno means all of the men in theranks were commoner outcastswithself-images s misfits. he disrespect f uperiorofficers ould contributeas muchto one ofthe frequentmutinies as arrears n pay.42The Spanish armyand its counterpartsweredeveloping along lineswhose antecedents can be traced as far back as the collapse of thewesternRoman Empire.Fora thousandyearsthegeneralconditionsofEuropean warfareput high premiumsnot on heroic anarchy,but oncoherence and cooperation. Beginningat one end of thesocio-militaryscale with aste identity,nd at theother withregional identitiesbased

40. For the Landsknechts' socio-economicmatrix, ee ReinhardBaumann,Das S6ldnerwesen m 16. Jahrhundertm bayerischenund siiddeutschenBei-spiel (Munich:W6lfle, 978). FritzRedlich,The German Military nterpriser ndhis WorkForce, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Steiner,1964), 14 passim, is still the bestEnglishaccount. Eugen von Frauenholz,Entwicklungsgeschichte es deutscheHeerwesens,vol. 3, Das Heerwesendes Reiches in der Landsknechtzeit Munich:Beck, 1937); Baumann, Georg von Frundsberg.Der Vater der Landsknechte(Munich:Siiddeutscher erlag, 984); andM. Nell, Die Landsknechte.Entstehungder erstendeutschen nfanterieBerlin:Ebering,1914), provide he operationaldata. G. Franz,"Von Ursprung nd Brauchtum er Landsknechte,"Mitteilungendes Institutsfur osterreichischeGeschichtsforschung 1 (1983): 79-98, is auseful eneral ntroduction.41. Most familiarlynMichaelRoberts,The Military evolution, 550-1660,"in Essays in Swedish History, d M. Roberts London: Weidenfeld nd Nicolson,1967), 195-225.42. Parker,Army fFlanders,185 ff.MILITARY HISTORY * 429


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DENNIS E. SHOWALTERon common military bilities, armies developed integrating tructuresthat ncreasingly eflected cquired skills, nd attitudeswhose desirabilitywas defined y the nstitution ather han tsmembers.From Roncesvallesto Ravenna and beyond, the studyofthe internalstructures fEurope'smilitary ystems ustains the relevance of S. L. A. Marshall's often-citeddictum that soldier knownto those around him has the best of reasonsto fightwell: fearof osingthe one thingthat he is likely o value morehighly hanlife-his standingas a man among othermen committedtoa common enterprise.

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Caste, Skill, and TrainingThe Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies from the MiddleAges до 16...

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