Central African Republic Crisis Corporate Response ......Central African Republic Crisis Corporate...

aa

Central African Republic Crisis Corporate Response

December 2013 – June 2015

LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE

Summary Report: Lessons from WFP Personnel, Partners, and Beneficiaries May 2016

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Operational Overview June 2015

i

Central African Republic Crisis Corporate Response 2013–2015 Lessons Learned Exercise

Foreword

WFP’s Lessons Learned Exercises are a corporate tool used to identify best practices and areas for improvement in corporate emergency operations. This is the eighth corporate Lessons Learned Exercise commissioned by the Director of Emergencies, and the first to actively involve communities affected by the crisis in the feedback process. It represents a shift towards enriching the corporate knowledge base by including the views and experiences of the beneficiaries we serve.

Since 2013, the Central African Republic has experienced the worst humanitarian crisis of its history. In December 2013, the deteriorating situation in the country warranted the declaration of a Level 3 Corporate Response, which was quickly followed by a System-wide Level 3 response. Organizational resources were mobilized to reach those affected by the conflict with life-saving assistance, and to ensure that the unfolding emergency did not become a ‘forgotten crisis’.

The Central African Republic Corporate Response took place within the context of an unprecedented number of simultaneous large-scale humanitarian emergencies worldwide. In 2014 alone WFP was called to respond to six Level 3 emergencies.

The conflict in the Central African Republic has had a significant regional impact, causing mass internal displacement and the flight of hundreds of thousands of people to neighbouring countries. At the peak of the crisis in January 2015, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo together hosted more than 400,000 refugees. To address this challenge, in that same month WFP scaled up its operations and consolidated response into a Regional Emergency Operation to provide life-saving assistance to over 1.5 million people.

The humanitarian scale-up, however, faced critical challenges. Sporadic outbursts of violence impeded operations, at times placing WFP beneficiaries, and staff as well as assets at great risk. The supply chain environment was complex and demanded close coordination across several Regional Bureaux. In the face of multiple humanitarian crises across the globe, funding was neither timely nor adequate. WFP staff are to be commended for having been able to manage these challenges

ii

Foreword

while reaching those affected by the conflict always using the best means available.

The L3 Corporate Response, which lasted 18 months, was deactivated in June 2015. However, the Central African Republic Crisis and its challenges persist and the Regional Emergency Operation continues. It is an imperative that we ensure that the wealth of experience captured in this report benefits staff who may be called to respond to similar future emergencies.

Today, violence affects more than 1.5 billion people globally, impeding the achievement of food security. We must therefore continually strive to identify ever-more suitable and effective ways to deliver assistance to people in complex crises. By acting collectively upon this report’s recommendations, WFP commits to building on our successes and learnings, while continuously strengthening our ability to deliver life-saving assistance.

Ertharin Cousin

Executive Director, World Food Programme

iii


Acronyms

AAP Accountability to Affected Populations

C&V Cash and Voucher

CO Country Office

COOPI Cooperazione Italiana, Italian Cooperation

CRD Corporate Response Director

EFSA Emergency Food Security Assessment

EMOP Emergency Operation

ETC Emergency Telecommunications Cluster

FITTEST Fast IT Telecommunications Emergency and Support

Team

HQ Headquarters (WFP)

ICT Information and Communications Technology

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IMC International Medical Corps

L3 Level 3 Corporate Response

LLE Lessons Learned Exercise

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

Mission in the Central African Republic

MIRA Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment

OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OIM Operational Information Management

OSE Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division

OSZPH Emergencies and Transitions Unit

OTF Operational Task Force

PREP Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme

RB Regional Bureau

iv

Acronyms

RBC Regional Bureau Cairo

RBD Regional Bureau Dakar

RBJ Regional Bureau Johannesburg

RBN Regional Bureau Nairobi

SCWG Supply Chain Working Group

STF Strategic Task Force

TDY Temporary Duty Assignment

TDYer Person deployed on TDY

UN United Nations

UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USD United States Dollars

VAM Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

WFP World Food Programme

v


Table of ContentsForeword i

Acronyms iii

Executive Summary 1

Timeline of major events, March 2013 - September 2015 2

Context of the Lessons Learned Exercise 3

The Situation in the Central African Republic and the Region 7

The Political and Economic Situation 7

The Humanitarian Situation 8

The Findings of the Lessons Learned Team 9

Major Emerging Themes 9

i) The Benefits of Strong Regional Management and Response Capacity 10

ii) The Need to Develop Inter-regional Bureau Coordination Mechanisms 11

iii) The Need to Augment L3 Activation and Deactivation Criteria 12

iv) Leveraging the Skills-strengthening Potential of L3 Reponses 13

The Report of the Lessons Learned Team 15

The WFP Corporate Response 17

Corporate Response Management 17

i) Headquarters Support 17

ii) Regional Support 18

iii) In-country Response Management and Coordination 19

Functional Areas 20

Programme 20

Logistics 23

Resource Management and Procurement 25

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 26

Finance and Administration 27

Human Resources 29

Security 31

Donors 32

Operational Information Management (OIM) and Reporting 32

Communications 35

vi

Table of ContentsTable of Contents

Cross Cutting (Right Way) Considerations 36

Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) 37

Protection 39

Gender 40

Inter-Agency Cooperation 42

Inter-Agency Coordination Protocols (Transformative Agenda) 43

Clusters 44

i) Food Security Cluster 44

ii) Emergency Telecommunications Cluster 45

iii) Logistics Cluster 46

Emergency Preparedness 47

Conclusions, and the Way Forward to Apply Identified Lessons 48

Appendices 49

Appendix 1. Compendium of issues and recommendations 51

Appendix 2. Level 3 Corporate Emergency Response Activation Memorandum: the Central African Republic 58

Appendix 3. Concept Note: Central African Republic Corporate Emergency Response LLE 64

Appendix 4. List of Interviewees 70

Appendix 5. Photo Credits 74

Note to readers of the electronic edition

• To navigate to a section in the document, click or tap the corresponding item in the Table of Contents.

• To return to the Table of Contents, click or tap a WFP logo in the header of any text page.

11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2

Timeline of major events March 2013 - September 2015

6/5/15

WFP L3 deactivated; L2 activated for C.A.R.

9/9/15LLE launched

12/11/13

WFP L3 activation for C.A.R.

Michel Djotodia sworn in as interim President8/19/13

Michel Djotodiadissolves Seleke 9/12/13

Anti-balaka militias launch attack againstformer Seleka forces 12/5/13

1/20/14

IASC L3 activation for C.A.R.12/8/13

MINUSCA deployed4/10/14

IASC L3 deactivated for C.A.R.5/13/15

Elections cancelled after clashes break out in Bangui9/29/15

MISCA deployed12/5/13

Seleke rebelstake control of Bangui3/24/13

L2 activation for C.A.R.5/13/13

2013 2014 2014 2015

Catherine Samba-Panzatakes over asinterim leader

1/1/14

EMOP 200650 launched

12/27/13

PRC waiver approved for EMOP 200650

12/25/13

1st OTF meeting

5/21/14

WFP L3 activated for Cameroon C.A.R. refugee response

8/21/14

WFP L3 deactivated for CameroonC.A.R. refugee response

1/1/15

Regional EMOP 200799 launched

12/17/13

1st Supply Chain Working Group

TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS MARCH 2013 - SEPTEMBER 2015

3


6/5/15


9/9/15LLE launched

12/11/13





1/20/14








2013 2014 2014 2015


1/1/14


12/27/13


12/25/13

1st OTF meeting

5/21/14


8/21/14


1/1/15


12/17/13


6/5/15


9/9/15LLE launched

12/11/13





1/20/14








2013 2014 2014 2015


1/1/14


12/27/13


12/25/13

1st OTF meeting

5/21/14


8/21/14


1/1/15


12/17/13


44

5


Executive Summary

CONTEXT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE

1. On 11 December 2013, WFP’s Executive Director declared a Level 3 Corporate Response (L3) to step up WFP’s capacity to cope with the humanitarian effects of the deteriorating political situation in the Central African Republic. This was in anticipation of a system-wide Level 3 Response that was declared shortly afterwards, on 12 December 2013. Prompted by persistent attacks on the population by different armed groups, hundreds of thousands of people had fled their homes, most of them in need of humanitarian assistance.

2. With the L3 declaration and subsequent launch of Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200650, Saving Lives and Protecting Livelihoods in the Central African Republic, WFP targeted 1,250,000 people in two phases.

3. The crisis also had a regional dimension, with people fleeing across the borders of Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo. In January 2015, WFP consolidated separate emergency responses into one Regional EMOP 200799, Critical Support to Populations Affected by the Ongoing Crisis in Central African Republic and its Regional Impact. The Regional EMOP targeted 1.5 million people in the Central African Republic and the surrounding region.

4. The L3 response to the Central African Republic emergency was the third L3 under WFP’s revised Activation Protocol, and was initially declared for three months. Following four budget revisions and four extensions, the L3 was finally deactivated on June 5, 2015, having spanned almost 19 months. The system-wide L3 response was deactivated on 13 May 2015.

5. In August 2015, the Director of Emergencies – in close consultation with the Corporate Response Director and the Emergency Coordinator – launched a Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE). As prescribed in the Corporate Response deactivation protocols, the LLE was commissioned to identify operational successes, best practices and constraints – at field,

6

Executive Summary

regional, and Headquarters levels – and translate them into lessons and recommendations for future emergencies.

6. A four-person team, consisting of two staff members of the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division (OSE) and two external consultants, carried out the LLE. They undertook a desk review of over 95 key corporate and inter-agency documents. They also conducted eight focus group discussions and forty-nine individual interviews at WFP headquarters, and Country and Field Offices in Cameroon and the Central African Republic. Telephone interviews were carried out with the Regional Bureau, Country Offices and Emergency Coordinators in the region. Interviews focused on staff who were deployed during the L3 stage of the response. In all, the team interacted with more than a hundred WFP staff.

7. For the first time in a WFP LLE, the team sought to include the views and experiences of those directly affected by the crisis. Introducing ‘the Listening Project’ approach enabled the team to augment its findings and recommendations using the insights from those directly served by WFP’s programmes. It also contributed to WFP’s core commitment of ensuring Accountability to Affected Populations. Through household visits and focus group sessions with 114 beneficiaries (53 men and 61 women) the team was able to gather perspectives from people of different ages and diverse social standings.1

8. The LLE also incorporated the views and recommendations from external operational and implementing partners, namely: Cooperazione Internazionale (International Cooperation, COOPI), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Medical Corps (IMC), the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as partners from the Ministry of Health in the Central African Republic.

9. This report sets out the findings of the Lessons Learned Team and is the eighth Corporate Response LLE.

1 The Lessons Learned Team travelled to Bambari, the Central African Republic to conduct focus group discussions at one of the country’s established IDP camps. They also travelled to Bertoua, Cameroon to conduct focus group discussions at an established refugee camp.

7


THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND THE REGION

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

10. Over the past five decades, the Central African Republic has faced recurrent social and political instability marked by rebellions, coups d’état, and sectarian violence. In 2012, instability spiked, when Seleka rebel forces from the mainly Muslim north moved through the country, eventually seizing power in March 2013. The Seleka forces were disbanded by the new president, but in response to their violence, animists and Christians established self-defence ‘anti-Balaka’ militias. The conflict, originally politically motivated, gained a religious dimension and escalated. In late September, revenge attacks by anti-Balaka groups against Muslim civilians prompted former Seleka members to launch counterattacks. These sectarian clashes led to violence throughout the country and mass internal displacements.

11. Violence intensified in December 2013 when clashes broke out in Bangui, killing hundreds. By the end of the month 640,000 people were displaced. In January 2014, the president and his cabinet resigned and a transitional government was put in place.

12. At the time of writing,2 the situation in the country has yet to be resolved. Tensions remain high, and periodically erupt into violence. Elections planned for October 2015 were cancelled following clashes in Bangui that killed 41 people and displaced over 40,000.3

13. The conflict in the Central African Republic has also had a heavy and enduring regional impact, with mass population movements into surrounding countries. At the end of September 2015, there were 253,000 refugees in Cameroon; 84,000 in Chad; 97,000 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and some 30,000 in the Republic of the Congo.

2 Late 2015.

3 As of 1 October 2015.

8

Executive Summary

THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

14. Over the last decade, the Central African Republic has been gripped by a complex and continuous crisis. The sparse socio-economic infrastructure has degraded further; redeployment of state and engineering services in the prefectures has been weak; and social cohesion has crumbled as a result of a series of violent crises. The humanitarian consequences have been considerable: thousands of people have been killed; thousands more have lost their homes, livelihoods, access to health care services, and access to food.

15. Since the beginning of the crisis, approximately 1 million people have been internally displaced. Hundreds of thousands have fled to neighbouring countries, with significant impacts on the host populations.

16. The October 2013 Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) found that, as a result of conflicts, nearly a third of the population – or 1.3 million people – was moderately (24 percent) to severely (4 percent) food insecure. The remaining 72 percent was considered to be mildly food insecure. No portion of the surveyed population was found to be completely food secure.

17. Outside the Central African Republic, as of January 2015, more than 420,000 refugees, returnees, and third country nationals had taken refuge in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo.

18. Those arriving in Cameroon came with no belongings. After a long journey without food, water, or shelter, many people arrived sick and injured, and many were suffering from malnutrition.

19. In Chad, the population profile was mixed, including both refugees and a large proportion of persons the Chadian government considered to be returnees.

20. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, refugees settled in remote territories, in host areas with an already precarious food security situation. Once there, they lacked reliable livelihoods or coping mechanisms to meet basic food needs.

21. In the Republic of the Congo, arriving refugees, many of whom showed signs of moderate and acute malnutrition, were settled in two sites.

9


THE FINDINGS OF THE LESSONS LEARNED TEAM

22. This report reflects WFP’s Corporate Response Lessons Learned methodology; utilizes WFP’s corporate Listening Project methodology; and is aligned with the ongoing inter-agency humanitarian evaluation. Focusing on WFP’s L3 Corporate Response between 11 December 2013 and 5 June 2015, it documents the successes, best practices and challenges reported by those involved. It also identifies areas for further refinement in the Central African Republic refugee response, and makes a series of recommendations for consideration in future L3 emergency operations.

23. The following findings are drawn from various primary and secondary sources.

MAJOR EMERGING THEMES

24. WFP’s response to the Central African Republic regional crisis coincided with operational and strategic transitions at country, regional and corporate levels. WFP had restructured and decentralized its operations and functions to support the shift from food aid to food assistance. The major themes, findings, and recommendations that follow reflect a situation in which small country programmes – operating in the wake of a decade-long cycle of conflict and unrest – found themselves simultaneously catching up with corporate-wide innovations in preparedness and response modalities, and scaling up to respond to an ever-evolving complex crisis.

25. The two most affected Country Offices (COs), Cameroon and Central African Republic, rapidly – and, in some areas, successfully – pivoted from country programmes to a large-scale, regional emergency response that required corporate- and system-wide attention.

26. Operational growing pains that ensued were eased by a regional structure. It is important to note, though, that this structure was itself transitioning into a role of greater authority and oversight, all the while contending with other major crises within and across several regions in Africa.

27. At the same time, at corporate level WFP was midway through the Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme (PREP). This initiative, which took place between 2011 and 2014, sought to strengthen

10

Executive Summary

corporate response capacities to support emergency response, in order to enhance functional areas’ fitness for purpose.4

28. The major emerging themes and recommendations presented below stem from the impact of these intersecting transitions on the L3 Corporate Response.

i) The Benefits of Strong Regional Management and Response Capacity

29. The Regional Bureau (RB) was commended for its responsiveness, reliability, and quick action during the crisis. Many respondents attributed these successes to the decentralization of authority from Headquarters (HQ) to the RB. Decentralization provided the Regional Director with:

• full oversight of the first wave of deployments;

• the necessary leeway to deploy senior regional officers immediately; and

• direct control over the length of deployments, without having to negotiate with other Country Directors for surge staff.

It was also noted that the RB fully supported operations in the Central African Republic, and that the Emergency Coordinator was involved in ensuring that strategic guidance was provided to the Central African Republic CO staff on a priority basis.

30. In these senses, the Central African Republic response demonstrated the benefits of WFP’s corporate policy of strengthening RB capacity and delegating management responsibility closer to the field.

31. At the same time, future Corporate Responses that adopt this more decentralized, regional approach may have to contend with issues that emerged in the Central African Republic crisis. Specifically, it may be necessary to:

4 WFP (2015) WFP’s Preparedness and Response Enhancement Programme: A Strategic Evaluation (2011–2014). Online at: https://www.wfp.org/content/strategic-evaluation-wfps-preparedness-and-response-enhancement-programme-terms-reference

11


• review the relevance of some HQ processes, including the role of the Strategic Task Force (STF) and the Operational Task Force (OTF);

• build a regional surge capacity as part of an integrated Emergency Response Roster system; and

• ensure adequate regional capacity to manage the emergency response.

Recommendations

1. A shift towards empowering Regional Bureaux will require that each RB undertakes stocktaking and inventory of capacity and expertise available in the region. Regional Bureau Dakar is currently reviewing and auditing each CO’s capacity to meet programming commitments — a process that should be replicated across all regions.

ii) The Need to Develop Inter-regional Bureau Coordination Mechanisms

32. To date, the corporate systems, processes, and mechanisms that are in place to react to L3 emergencies have been geared either towards single-country crises (e.g. the 2013 South Sudan Conflict or the 2014 Philippines Typhoon) or to a single region (e.g. the 2012 Syria Crisis).

33. However, the crisis in the Central African Republic called for the operational involvement of four distinct Regional Bureaux. Dakar (RBD) managed the day-to-day oversight of the emergency in Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad. Johannesburg (RBJ) supported the Central African Republic refugee caseloads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo, as well as logistics operations where supply corridors crossed countries. Nairobi (RBN) coordinated closely because: preliminary population flow estimates predicted that refugees from the Central African Republic would be streaming towards South Sudan; and several WFP key partners and donors covered Cameroon and the Central African Republic from Nairobi rather than Dakar. Lastly, in 2014 the Cairo Bureau (RBC) was called upon to explore alternative supply chain corridors through which assistance to the Central African Republic might be provided from South Darfur (Sudan).

12

Executive Summary

34. Informal standard operating procedures to facilitate inter-regional coordination were developed when needed, and discussions were held to ensure clarity regarding division of labour. This worked well. However, for future trans-regional responses, the organization should consider more formal mechanisms for inter-regional coordination. Respondents suggested that such flexibility be reflected in the existing Activation Protocols and managed by the STF membership.

Recommendations

1. Include inter-regional coordination mechanisms in the corporate activation protocols.

2. Explore ways in which existing coordination mechanisms (for example the OTF and STF) may be revised to accommodate inter-regional coordination, when a crisis has implications for multiple Regional Bureaux.

iii) The Need to Augment L3 Activation and Deactivation Criteria

35. Spanning almost 19 months, the Central African Republic L3 Response ran concurrently with six other L3 Corporate Emergencies, albeit at different stages.5 As a result, regional and in-country capacity, as well as surge deployments, ebbed and flowed according to shifting global needs.

36. Unprecedented level of demand for technical and leadership/management capacity from ‘competing’ Corporate Responses made it increasingly challenging to prioritize global operational needs at all levels of the organization, and in almost all functional areas.

37. While virtually all respondents understood the political and reputational implications of the L3 designation, it was noted by many that in the face of so many concurrent, yet disparate L3 responses, it became difficult to define specific priorities for operational support.

5 In sequence: Syria and sub-region (December 2012), the Philippines (November 2013), [the Central African Republic (December 2013)], South Sudan (December 2013), Cameroon (May 2014), the Ebola Disease Virus Outbreak in West Africa (August 2014), and Iraq (August 2014).

13


38. In the case of the Central African Republic and its neighbours, it was evident that, in addition to the activation criteria (scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk), clearer operational benchmarks would have helped to define the specific type and level of corporate support needed to meet operational needs. Furthermore, if concrete operational benchmarks had been bound to the activation criteria, it would have been easier to link strategic decisions towards the deactivation of the response.

Recommendations

1. Particularly for complex and protracted crises, there is a need to develop operational benchmarks for the five activation criteria. Clear operational profiles of emergencies (logistics, capacity, funding, etc.) would:

• help differentiate between the levels/types of corporate support to be deployed to concurrent L3 responses;

• allow a more focused, no-regrets approach to augmenting Country Office capacity based on present operational needs;

• aid decisions, thanks to associated benchmarks, on whether to deactivate an emergency; and

• help focus the work of the Strategic Task Force on a review process that is linked to benchmarks and works towards deactivation from the outset.

iv) Leveraging the Skills-strengthening Potential of L3 Reponses

39. The Central African Republic response was characterized by heavy staff turnover, especially in its early stages. It was noted that while the primary purpose of an L3 activation is to boost, support and augment CO capacity, there is further scope and opportunity, especially in protracted crises, for transferring knowledge and skills to CO staff.

40. In almost all functional areas it was felt that systematically capturing and sharing staff knowledge and experience as they surged in and transitioned out would have ensured continuity in programming. Concrete Terms

14

Executive Summary

of Reference and operational objectives during surge, and consistent handover reports would have aided this process.

41. As such, it was found that in the early stages of the response, opportunities were missed to leverage the experience of international staff in strengthening the emergency-response skills and technical expertise of national officers. Moreover, the Level 2 response phase that preceded was a missed opportunity to prepare national officers for escalation of the response to Level 3.

42. The later stages of the response provided the CO the opportunity to adopt a ‘twinning’ strategy that ensured that each international staff member would be paired with a capable national one and transfer key technical skills. As a result, many national staff emerged from the L3 response with transferable operational knowledge. This illustrates both the benefits of such an approach and the potential for staff development, even during L3 responses.

Recommendations

1. Formal L2, and where feasible L3 responses, should be leveraged to focus not only on surge and support but also on transferring skills to local staff – especially those who usually work on small country programmes and must quickly adapt to a large-scale protracted crisis.

2. In protracted crises, consider using a twinning strategy, whereby local staff members are selected to shadow and learn key skills from surge deployments. Twinning would:

• ensure continuity when surge staff are absent;

• leave the CO L3-ready after deactivation; and

• produce a cohort of capable national staff who, in turn, can be deployed in the region.

1515

APPENDICES

16

Appendix 1. Compendium of Recommendations


MAJOR EMERGING THEMES

1. The Benefits of Strong Regional Management and Response

1.1 A shift towards empowering Regional Bureaux will require that each RB undertakes stocktaking and inventory of capacity and expertise available in the region. Regional Bureau Dakar is currently reviewing and auditing each CO’s capacity to meet programming commitments — a process that should be replicated across all regions.

2. The Need to Develop Inter-regional Bureau Coordination Mechanisms

2.1 Include inter-regional coordination mechanisms in the corporate activation protocols.

2.2 Explore ways in which existing coordination mechanisms (for example the OTF and STF) may be revised to accommodate inter-regional coordination, when a crisis has implications for multiple Regional Bureaux.

3. The Need to Augment L3 Activation and Deactivation Criteria

3.1 Particularly for complex and protracted crises, there is a need to develop operational benchmarks for the five activation criteria. Clear operational profiles of emergencies (logistics, capacity, funding, etc.) would:

• help differentiate between the levels/types of corporate support to be deployed to concurrent L3 responses;

• allow a more focused, no-regrets approach to augmenting Country Office capacity based on present operational needs;

• aid decisions, thanks to associated benchmarks, on whether to deactivate an emergency; and

• help focus the work of the Strategic Task Force on a review process that is linked to benchmarks and works towards deactivation from the outset.

4. Leveraging the Skills-strengthening Potential of L3 Reponses

4.1 L2, and where feasible L3 responses, should be leveraged to focus not only on surge and support but also on transferring skills to local staff – especially those who usually work on small country programmes and must quickly adapt to a large-scale protracted crisis.

4.2 In protracted crises, consider using a twinning strategy, whereby local staff members are selected to shadow and learn key skills from surge deployments. Twinning would:

• ensure continuity when surge staff are absent;

• leave the CO L3-ready after deactivation; and

• produce a cohort of capable national staff who, in turn, can be deployed in the region.

17


THE WFP CORPORATE RESPONSE: CORPORATE RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

1. Headquarters support

1.1 At Operational Task Force meetings, functional areas should be consistently represented at the Director or Deputy Director level to ensure that swift decisions can be made when needed.

1.2 There should be clear division of labour between the Operational Task Force and the Strategic Task Force, and formal processes and links between the two entities towards achieving strategic benchmarks.

2. Regional support

2.1 Continue the good practice of designating the Regional Director as Corporate Response Director for an emergency. Complement this by ensuring adequate capacity of Regional Bureaux to take on the responsibilities associated with the Corporate Response Director function.

2.2 Undertake regional capacity assessment, and use the results to inform the creation of an Emergency Response Roster that integrates regional rosters and better facilitates appropriate deployment.

3. In-country Response Management and Coordination

3.1 In high security risk environments, such as in the Central African Republic, it is essential for CO senior management positions to be staffed with longer-term personnel. There must also be clear designations regarding the criticality of CO staff, for the purposes of evacuation, strategic planning, and deployment.

18


FUNCTIONAL AREAS

1. Programme

1.1 There should be a corporate mechanism or platform that allows good/best practices to be shared across the organization. This would save valuable time and provide access to tested technology, processes, and procedures.

1.2 Future responses should consider a phased approach of introducing – if conditions are appropriate – a combination of cash and vouchers and in-kind commodities as one of the first-line response modalities.

1.3 Corporate-level review should be undertaken of minimum preparedness activities in at-risk countries, to ensure that:

• market assessments are done systematically; and

• COs are up-to-date on the requirements of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Package.

2. Logistics

2.1 As a preparedness measure, identify a list of trucks and equipment suitable for the terrain.

2.2 Ensure harmonization of trucking fleets to ease procurement of repair parts.

2.3 Upon the activation of an L3, hold high-level briefings with relevant customs and government officials in the region to discuss operational requirements on behalf of the humanitarian community – either through bilateral engagement, or through the Humanitarian Coordinator or WFP’s Executive Director (WFP being the Logistics Cluster Lead).

3. Resource Management and Procurement

3.1 Continue to ensure that the Advance Funding and commodity access innovations and systems are fully integrated as part of the overall resource access supply chain. The systems work well on a stand-alone basis, but they also have a multiplier effect when used in tandem and are integrated into the overall response.

4. Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

4.1 As a preparedness measure in high-risk countries, ensure the availability of, and access to, contingency stocks of IT equipment by keeping supplies in nearby, more stable, neighbouring CO depots.

4.2 Ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to meet ICT requirements.

4.3 When planning staffing, recognize the critical support role of ICT, not only for WFP operations but for the wider humanitarian community. Ensure that there is enough capacity in-country to meet needs.

4.4 Consider co-location of ICT and ETC staff to ensure a mutually-reinforced response capacity that meets the needs of both WFP and the wider humanitarian community.

19


5. Finance and Administration

5.1 At the onset of an emergency, ensure sufficient capacity for Finance and Administration support functions. It is important to note that this finding has emerged in earlier LLEs.

5.2 When considering surge support, augment Finance and Administration functions at the Sub-Office level. This will alleviate pressure on CO staff who must contend with a dramatic increase in staff and their numerous support needs (travel, rest and recuperation, daily subsistence allowance, etc.).

5.3 In regional emergencies, mired by political instability and unstable financial institutions, identify standby COs that can provide business continuity support for finance functions.

6. Human Resources

6.1 Continue to enhance and expand the Emergency Response Roster through dedicated corporate funding, with the objective of providing choice and flexibility in Corporate Response staff deployment. As part of this process:

• Create and integrate regional rosters within the Corporate Emergency Response Roster system in order to facilitate the deployment of regionally-based staff who are familiar with the language and local context. At the same time, balance the wider human resource requirements, globally and within each region.

• Create a Leadership Roster as part of the Corporate Emergency Response Roster with clear incentives, especially P5 and higher. (This might be achieved through linkages with the Humanitarian Coordinator pool).

• Create an online Emergency Response Roster system that allows Human Resource Officers in-country to view and select staff in real time.

6.2 Especially for a protracted emergency:

• Ensure that regular staffing structures are in place as soon as possible to avoid constant turnover.

• Consider developing a Standby Roster to fill longer-term staffing needs.

6.3 Develop more specific, and more technical Terms of Reference for incoming TDY staff to ensure suitability for operational needs.

20


7. Security

7.1 In highly insecure environments, it is important to have an early and robust WFP security presence that is familiar with the context, the language and programme criticality – particularly in cases where national staff are directly impacted by the crisis and need support and protection.

8. Donors

8.1 When possible, leverage use of WFP transportation assets to bring the work of WFP and the humanitarian community closer to those considering funding operations, thereby increasing the possibility of support.

9. Operational Information Management (OIM) and Reporting

9.1 At the onset of an emergency, establish an in-country information coordination system – perhaps similar to that used by the Supply Chain Working Group – to ensure that all relevant focal points (i.e. Donor Relations, Information Management and Communications Officers, etc.) use consistent information and figures.

9.2 While appreciating the standardized reporting templates and schedules, at the outset of a fast-paced and complex emergency response HQ, the RB and the CO should work closely together to ensure that reporting requirements are appropriate, feasible and well understood.

9.3 To alleviate the burden of information-sharing on COs (particularly those with low capacity), explore the possibility of having the CO produce one reporting product at realistic intervals, that HQ can then transform as needed, depending on the audience.

9.4 As part of emergency preparedness measures, use the Reporting and OIM training to build the capacities of Operational Information Management Officers and establish rapport among focal points at all levels of the organization.

10. Communications

10.1 In complex emergencies with high reputational risks, it is important to deploy an experienced Communications Officer from the onset.

10.2 Communications Officers with video and photo skills (and equipment, if necessary) should be deployed for emergencies with limited media access.

10.3 Explore developing financial and pipeline thresholds that would trigger a ‘forgotten emergency’ campaign strategy along the lines of ‘C.A.R. can’t wait’.

21


CROSS CUTTING (RIGHT WAY) CONSIDERATIONS

1. Create a regional Humanitarian Policy Advisor role that supports Country Offices in addressing Accountability to Affected Populations, Protection, Conflict-Sensitive Programming, Principled Humanitarian Action, and Gender.

2. Include these themes as standing items on Operational Task Force meeting agendas, and include reporting on the issues in internal sit reps so that gaps can be identified more easily and support can be provided accordingly.

1. Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)

1.1 Work closely with partners to augment existing camp feedback and complaints mechanisms. Add structures and mechanisms (e.g. a referral mechanism) that ensure that WFP-related issues are systematically captured and acted upon, and that beneficiaries receive responses in a timely manner and have multiple ways to give feedback.

1.2 In camped settings where other agencies lead camp management, conduct early analysis to discern whether:

• food security- and WFP-related issues are adequately captured through formal and informal camp feedback and communication mechanisms; and that

• beneficiaries trust and can access such mechanisms.

1.3 Ensure that beneficiaries have direct recourse to WFP regarding operations – through feedback, complaints and consultations.

1.4 Ask beneficiaries for advice as to which means would be the most effective for disseminating information to and communicating with affected communities. Pay particular attention to differences between men’s and women’s access to information.

2. Protection

2.1 Ensure that a Protection Officer is deployed rapidly at the onset of an L3 emergency with an integrated mission – particularly in the case of a protection crisis. The Protection Officer should help WFP staff understand the protection dimensions and their impacts on beneficiaries, and capacitate staff to integrate Protection in programming.

3. Gender

3.1 To ensure that gender-sensitive programming is implemented, more gender analysis is needed to fully understand the non-nutrition-related impacts of food insecurity.

3.2 It is recommended that more gender-specific questions should be added to assessment and monitoring forms, and that more emphasis be placed on qualitative information from periodic focus group discussions.

3.3 Refine the gender indicators in the Strategic Results Framework, ensuring that they capture issues more effectively and will better inform the impacts of WFP activities on gender dynamics.

3.4 Integrate Gender and Protection analysis into Cash and Voucher feasibility studies as a preparedness measure, and then further refine at the onset of a crisis.

22


INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

1. Inter-Agency Coordination Protocols (Transformative Agenda)

1.1 Advocate for WFP’s role as technical lead for the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) in system-wide L3 responses. Given WFP’s recognized capacity in the area of emergency needs assessments, and learning from the organization’s experience in providing technical leadership during recent system-wide L3s, WFP should clarify whether it will regularly put itself forward for this role.

1.2 WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit must ensure that they participate in all Integrated Food Security Phase Classification processes, especially in the analysis and review process, and consistently seek to take the lead.

1.3 High-level WFP management and VAM staff should be involved in all of the data assessment and analysis systems – to demonstrate strong inter-agency engagement and presence, and to ensure that the food security information is sufficiently detailed and reflects different levels of need.

2. Clusters

i. Food Security Cluster

2.1 Invest in long-term deployment for the position of Food Security Cluster Coordinator so that he or she can fully capacitate and engage the Cluster to participate in the technical assessment and coordination processes.

ii. Emergency Telecommunications Cluster

2.2 When possible, co-locate Emergency Telecommunications Cluster and Information and Communications Technology staff in order to foster knowledge sharing and capacity strengthening.

2.3 Invest in technologies, such as remote radio rooms, that are detached from physical facilities. Explore the potential for installing radio rooms in alternative, non-UN buildings, such as NGO premises.

iii. Logistics Cluster

2.4 To avoid reputational risk, regular surveys should be conducted with partners to measure their level of satisfaction with cluster management/coordination.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

1 Beyond providing information on political events, WFP Early Warning Analysis should consider the implications of these events on WFP operations.

2 Establish clear triggers for early action, and accountability lines to ensure that Country Offices are supported and are able to:

• make an objective assessment of a crisis situation in which they are embedded; and

• identify and implement relevant preparedness and early action activities.

23


Appendix 2. Level 3 Corporate Emergency Response Activation Memorandum: the Central African Republic

24

Appendix 2. Level 3 Corporate Emergency Response Activation Memorandum

25


26

Appendix 2. Level 3 Corporate Emergency Response Activation Memorandum

27


28

Appendix 3. Concept Note: Central African Republic Corporate Emergency Response LLE


July 2015

Scope and Purpose

WFP is about to embark on a corporate Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) to identify key lessons based on the experience of its Corporate Emergency Response to the Central African Republic crisis. As per the WFP Emergency Response Activation Protocol, OED2012/012, the exercise will be conducted within 60 days of the Level 3 (L3) emergency deactivation. This Lessons Learned Exercise will cover the period from the activation of the L3 in Central African Republic on 11 December 2013 until its reclassification as a Level 2 emergency on 5 June 2015.

The deteriorating situation in the country led to the mass displacement of civilians either internally or in neighbouring countries. More than 420,000 refugees have fled into Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo. In early 2015, WFP consolidated earlier country-specific response plans into one regional operational response, managed by the Dakar Regional Bureau, to increase coherence in objectives and programmes and to ensure a flexible response able to adapt to the evolving crisis. In coherence, this LLE will address both WFP’s response in the Central African Republic and in neighbouring countries Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of the Congo.

By May 2014 Cameroon was receiving up to 2,500 people each week, increasing the pressure on the limited resources of its vulnerable populations. WFP declared an L3 emergency for Cameroon on 21 May 2014 to respond to the increased scale and complexity of the operation. It was subsequently deactivated on 21 August 2014, merging under the Central African Republic Level 3 Emergency Response and structure. As the Cameroon-Central African Republic refugee response was still ongoing under the broader Central African Republic regional response, a decision was made to undertake a single LLE for both emergency responses upon the deactivation of the L3 in the Central African Republic. Therefore, this eighth Lessons Learned Exercise will consider both Level 3 emergency operations.

29


For the first time, this LLE will introduce a new approach (the Listening Project) to include the viewpoints and experiences of those directly affected by the crises. While LLEs have been successful in identifying strengths and key areas for improvement through consultation with WFP staff and partners, there is a gap: The Listening Project seeks the inclusion and participation of affected communities in the LLE process to better ensure that WFP is accountable to the affected-populations it assists. As part of the LLE process WFP beneficiaries will be interviewed about their viewpoints and experiences as they relate to WFP’s emergency response. Feedback from WFP beneficiaries and WFP staff will be triangulated for a more in-depth appreciation of the successes and challenges that emerged from WFP’s L3 operation in the Central African Republic and surrounding regions.

The findings of this LLE may be used to inform the next revision of the Activation Protocol, as well as the updating and revision of existing corporate tools and systems (e.g. the Emergency Response Roster).

Outputs

1) A detailed internal report, including a matrix of recommendations.6

2) A formal report of the Executive Summary will be shared with external audiences, including the Executive Board.

3) The findings and recommendations of the LLE will be used to further improve WFP’s emergency response capability by proactively engaging key players from different functional areas in WFP’s emergency response.

4) As new crises emerge, the Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division (OSE) compiles and disseminates findings from previous LLEs so that WFP can continually improve the way it responds.

6 These recommendations will be entered into the OPweb Lessons Learned database and used to track the level of implementation and compare findings from other emergencies.

30


Methodology

The standard methodology of these exercises will be followed, namely:

(a) Desk Review and Context Analysis (project documents, Sitreps, Task Force Notes for the Record [NFRs], etc.);

(b) Written feedback;

(c) One-on-one interviews with key players (WFP staff and management, Cooperating partners, WFP beneficiaries);

(d) Focus group discussions (Country Office, Regional Bureau, HQ, WFP beneficiaries).

For one-on-one interviews a template will be developed for each context as a guide for the Project Team to focus the interview and gather themed information from different perspectives -before opening the session to general discussion. Feedback gained during this process will be used to guide the focus group sessions.

Preliminary List of Key Individuals to be Interviewed

Headquarters

• Amir Abdulla, Deputy Executive Director and former Corporate Response Director

• Ramiro Lopes da Silva, Assistant Executive Director

• Stefano Porretti, Director of Emergencies

• Giancarlo Cirri, Deputy Director of Emergencies

• David Kaatrud, former Director of Emergencies

• Claudia Von Roehl, Director, Government Partnerships Division

• Stanlake Samkange, Director Policy and Programme

• Wolfgang Herbinger, Director of Logistics

31


• Annalisa Conte, Deputy Director of Programme Innovations Service; Former Chief of Cash and Voucher

• Corinne Fleischer, Director of Procurement

• Jakob Kern, Director of Information and Communication Technology

• Devica Nystedt, Chief of Human Resources

• Sonsoles Ruedas, Chief of Gender

• Cluster Leads

• Strategic Taskforce Members

Regional Bureau Dakar

• Denise Brown, Regional Director, Emergency Coordinator/Emergency Response Director

• Mustapha Darboe, Emergency Coordinator

• Carlos Veloso, Deputy Emergency Coordinator

Country Offices

• Bienvenu Djossa, Country Director, the Central African Republic

• Lauren Landis, Country Director, Chad

• Jacques Roy, Country Director Cameroon

• Felix Gomez, Country Director, a.i. Cameroon

• Pablo Recalde, Country Director, Democratic Republic of the Congo

• David Bulman, Country Director, Republic of the Congo

32


WFP Beneficiaries

• Key informants/beneficiary groups to be identified.

Focus groups

• Staff in the Country Offices, Sub-offices, Regional Emergency Coordination.

• Members of the Strategic and Operational Task Forces.

Project team

George Aelion, Team Leader

Michelle Berg, Team Member

Kwame Poku, Team Member

Sydney Herndon, Team Member

Gaby Duffy, OSE (Management of Lessons Learned)

33


Expected timeline

Date Event

July 2015 Drafting of Concept Note, questionnaire design, selection of LLE team, confirmation of the Listening Project strategy, e-mail to the Regional Bureau (RB)/Country Offices (COs) with proposed timeline including mission dates. Assign focal point in RB/COs for mission.

3 August 2015 First formal communication launching LLE to the Central African Republic emergency mailing list with feedback template attached. Banner on OPweb.

August 2015 Desk Review/Context Analysis.

September 2015 Key informant interviews (HQ).

Mission to Regional Bureau Dakar/the Central African Republic/Cameroon for interviews/focus groups with staff and beneficiaries. Conduct ‘Reality Check’ with management to modify/reject key findings.

End-September/ Briefing on key recommendations and Listening Project early October 2015 shared with Director of Emergencies.

October 2015 Drafting of LLE report; sharing with RB/CO and other stakeholders for comments.

End-October 2015 Finalized report integrating feedback sent to editor/graphic designer.

Early November Final report submitted to executive management for 2015 comments.

Mid-November 2015 Amendments to integrate executive management comments.

Mid-December 2015 Publication of final reports, following Executive Director’s signature.

34

Appendix 4. List of Interviewees


ROME: Headquarters

Amir Abdulla Deputy Executive Director

Ramiro Lopes da Silva Assistant Executive Director

Stefano Porretti Director of Emergencies

David Kaatrud Regional Direction, Regional Bureau Bangkok (Former Director of Emergencies)

Wolfgang Herbinger Director, Logistics Division

Christophe Boutonnier Director, Field Security Division

Lauren Landis Director, Nutrition Division (Former Country Director, Chad)

Gian Carlo Cirri Deputy Director of Emergencies

Joyce Luma Country Director, South Sudan (Former Deputy Director, Policy and Programme Division)

Pierre Guillaume Wielezynski Deputy Director, Information Technology Division

Zlatan Milisic Deputy Director, Direct Implementation Programme Services

Mahadevan Ramachandran Procurement Officer, Supply Chain Division

Cyril Ferrand Cluster Coordinator, global Food Security Cluster

Paul Howe Chief, Emergencies and Transitions Unit

Rocco Leone Chief, Administrative Services Branch

Sedulio Amari Chief, Treasury and Financial Risk Management Branch

Brian Lander Senior Liaison Officer, Geneva

Michiel Meerdink Regional Programme Officer, Regional Bureau Bangkok (Former Head of Partnership and Advocacy Coordination, Headquarters)

Jean-Noel Gentile Policy Officer, Asset Creations and Livelihoods

35


Jean-Martin Bauer Programme Officer, Vulnerability Analysis (VAM)

Antoine Renard Programme Officer, Market Access Programmes

Levan Tchatchua Programme Officer, Market Access Programmes

Rebecca Skovbye Policy Officer, Emergencies and Transitions Unit

Gilles Cimetiere Logistics Officer, Global Logistics Cluster

Alison Aitken Human Resources Officer, Global Services

Genevieve Wills Head of Operational Information Management and OpsCen Emergencies Preparedness and Support Response Division

Armin Wilhelm Operation Center (OpCen) Team Leader, Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division

Naouelle Djamaa Information Management Officer and Training Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division

Frances Kennedy Public Information Officer, Communications Division

Valentina Giorda Programme Officer, global Food Security Cluster

Patricia Colbert Senior Programme Adviser, Gender Office

Christine Ouellette Senior Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) Advisor, global Food Security Cluster

Donna Carter Consultant, Contracts Branch

Eden Guizaw Consultant, Commodity Procurement

Dorte Friis Consultant, Global Logistics Cluster

Alexis Ottenwaelter Secondee, Global Logistics Cluster

Regional Bureau Dakar

Denise Brown Regional Director, Regional Bureau Dakar

Carlos Veloso Former Emergency Coordinator, the Central African Republic

Willy Nyeko Security Officer, Regional Bureau Dakar

36


The Central African Republic

Bienvenu Djossa Country Director

Guy Adoua Deputy Country Director

Ingela Christiansson Reports Officer

Cameroon

Elvira Pruscini Deputy Country Director

Sofia Engdahl Consultant

Emily Doe Head of Sub office, Bertoua

Adama Doumbouya Programme Officer, Bertoua

Chad

Mary-Ellen McGroarty Country Director

DRC

Pablo Recalde Country Director

Republic of the Congo

David Bulman Country Director

37


Focus group discussion

Heads of Unit, Regional Bureau Dakar

Heads of Unit, the Central African Republic

Logistics, the Central African Republic

Programme, the Central African Republic

Information and Communication Technology, Finance, Administration, and Procurement, the Central African Republic

Bamberi Sub office, the Central African Republic

Head of Units, Cameroon

Programme and Logistics, Cameroon

Partners

United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)

International Medical Corps (IMC)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Ministry of Health, the Central African Republic

Beneficiary Discussions

Sixty-one women

Fifty-three men

38

Appendix 5. Photo Credits

Appendix 5. Photo Credits

• Cover page: WFP/Rein Skullerud (Site de l’Église des Frères Castors IDP camp in Bangui, CAR, March 2014).

• Page 4: WFP/Alexis Masciarelli (Bangui, CAR, February 2014).

• Page 16: WFP/Sylvain Cherkaou (Gbiti refugee site, Gbiti, Cameroon, May 2014).

• Page 24: WFP/Alexis Masciarelli (Bangui, CAR, January 2014).

• Page 33: WFP/Rein Skullerud (Grand Mosque, IDP camp Bangui, CAR, March 2014).

• Page 37: WFP/George Aelion (LLE team’s mission to Cameroon, October 2015).

• Page 46: WFP/Daouda Girou (Bambari, CAR, January 2015).

• Page 50: WFP/Sylvain Cherkaou (Gbiti refugee site, Gbiti, Cameroon, May 2014).



3939

4040

Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division - [email protected]

Date post:	28-Sep-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	1 times
Download:	0 times

Central African Republic Crisis Corporate Response ......Central African Republic Crisis Corporate...

Documents