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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
POLICY REPORT 2015 “The Forgotten Crisis”
Abstract: To what extent has the religious cleavage shaped
the ongoing Seleka – Anti-Balaka conflict in the Central
African Republic?
Rachel Freeborn and Joshua Dolman
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 1
Contents
i. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 3
ii. Introduction: The Forgotten Crisis ................................................................................................. 6
1.0 The Formation of the Seleka: Extractive by Design ....................................................................... 10
2.0. The Anti-Balaka Formation: Nearly “never again” ...................................................................... 14
3.0. The contemporary analysis: Institutions, Institutions, Institutions Error! Bookmark not defined.
4.0 Summary and Conclusion – A state building roadmap is urgently needed ........................................ 24
5.0 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 26
5.1 Electoral Reform .......................................................................................................................... 26
5.2 Security ........................................................................................................................................ 27
5.3 Judiciary ....................................................................................................................................... 28
5.4 Constitutional ............................................................................................................................... 29
Reference List ....................................................................................................................................... 31
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 2
Acronyms
_____________________________________________________________
AFISM-CAR International Support Mission in the Central African
Republic
ANE National Election Authority
CAR Central African Republic
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
FACA Central African Armed Forces
FIDH The International Federation for Human Rights
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICG International Crisis Group
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
LRA Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army
MICOPAX Mission of the Economic Community of Central African
States for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African
Republic
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic
MPI Migration Policy Institute
MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres
UN United Nations
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 3
i. Executive Summary
On a general level, the authors argue that popular analysis of the ‘Muslim Seleka’ and
‘Christian Anti-Balaka’ conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) as sectarian is
oversimplified. Not only do many of the country’s population not share this view but it only
portrays a ‘media ready’ narrative of the crisis.
More specifically, the authors claim that the religious dimension has served as a key
mobilisation tool for the current conflict but, to re-iterate, the conflict is not intrinsically
systemic to religion (Kane 2014). Having established a basis for this argument, the real
questions answered in this report are therefore: Why religion? And. What have people who
share in religious identities been mobilising against and for?
It is argued that inequality along ethno-religious lines (horizontal inequalities) has been
exacerbated due to a multiplex of factors, most pertinently the political divide of the Muslim
north and Christian South (Gatestone Institute 2014; Kane 2014), an abundance of and
dependency on natural resources (Lindner 2014), and the Christian/Southerner dominance
over national government since colonial independence (Arieff 2014). But there is a clear
commonality in these issues; they all pivot around decisions made at an institutional level
(figure 1). A politics of extraction, exclusionary behaviour and marginalisation over a range of
public policies from the Bozize government created conditions for the motivation to take up
arms. In other words, institutional conditions have caused horizontal inequalities (Stewart
2012) between the country’s two main religions, leading to the formation of the Muslim
dominated Seleka rebels, who overthrew the Christian dominated Bozize government in the
Coup d’état of 2013.
Additionally, the authors find that lack of state strength transformed the conflict once it had
reached the height of violence in the capital. From August 2013, violence continued despite
the Seleka successfully overthrowing the Bozize administration and having been officially
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 4
disbanded by former leader Michel Djotodia. Specifically, through qualitative analysis and
humanitarian reports the authors find that due to the escalation of violence, pre-existing
fragile institutions collapsed altogether (figure 1): reports confirm that violence was not so
much driven by a religious or political standpoint but by chaos. Therefore, on a fundamental
level, weak institutions additionally served to create the conditions for the transformation of
the crisis in CAR from an ideologically driven cleavage to diffuse, vigilante-style violence.
Particularly in the capital, this has given rise to unorganised violence that capitalised on the
breakdown of public services. Although there has been de-escalation of the violence at
present (April 2015), this contemporary analysis remains the most significant challenge.
In depth analysis of these issues are complex; therefore a range of techniques have been
deployed (figure 2). The report has been sectioned in a linear structure and the authors have
attempted to mitigate for artificial partitioning. Section 1.0 maps the Seleka’s formation, their
ideology and trajectory towards Bangui. It focuses on how institutional conditions have
negatively impacted on the northern region where the Seleka were formed and discusses
how these have led to inequality between CAR’s Muslim-north and Christian-south. To
illustrate this point a range of policy decisions are discussed, consolidated with the
theoretical literature on horizontal inequalities, the grievances mechanism and institutional
approaches to conflict. Section 2.0 considers the formation of the Christian Anti-Balaka group
and assesses the crisis at the height of violence through qualitative data. It argues that in
addition state breakdown, the escalation of violence can be based on the perception of
national identity change and that retaliatory violence can in part be attributed to Wood’s
(2008) theory of social navigation and Tilly’s analysis of the ‘repertoires of violence’ (2003).
Section 3.0 looks at the contemporary situation and challenges the capital faces. It focuses on
how a set of weak institutions created the conditions for the continuation of violence and the
breakdown of law and order.
Consistently, this report finds that institutional conditions have been the overriding factor in
the cause and continuation of the conflict, not sectarian hatred. Where anti-religious
sentiment has existed, it is only indicative of the weak underlying institutional structures and
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 5
not a characterization of the violence overall. To this extent, policy recommendations focus
on providing a road map to political and institutional reform.
Figure 1
Figure 2
Weak institutions
Horizontal inequalities
Conflict
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 6
ii. Introduction: The Forgotten Crisis
CAR is a country is crisis, locked in a bloody civil war caused by a coup d’état that took place
26 months ago (figure 3). According to the MSF, in August 2014 there were almost 400,000
internally displaced people and over 50% of the population were in need of humanitarian
assistance (ICG 2013). In the capital Bangui (figure 4), in May 2014 there were reported to be
nearly 130,000 IDPs located at 43 sites in the city (MPI 2014).
The seeds for the country’s ongoing Civil War were sown in the “largely neglected” (Lombard
2013) and resource rich north of the country in 2011 with the formation of the ‘Seleka’
coalition. They were an alliance of three rebel groups united against the perceived
marginalisation of the north, as a result of increasingly ethnically bias and ‘extractive’
decisions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) from the Bozize government. After undergoing a
journey of recruitment en route to the capital and seizing power from the government once
there, a massacre ensued between the Seleka and the recently established Christian/Animist
force ‘Anti-Balaka’. Over 1000 people died in the first three weeks of 2014 (Covington 2015;
Boas 2014).
As a country that has suffered from a lack of state strength and regular domestic fighting for
decades (Conciliation Resources 2013), CAR is no stranger to fragility. After independence
from France in 1960, the country continued to be run by a series of autocratic regimes until
1993, when elections were held and Ange-Felix Patasse became president. Patasse was
overthrown in 2003 by rebel leader General François Bozize, supported by neighbouring
country Chad. Throughout Bozize’s rule, a number of institutional decisions served to isolate
the northern population, increasing Christian dominance within national government and
exacerbating inequality between the Muslim north and Christian south. This resulted in
numerous ‘bush wars’ between 2004 and 2007.
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 7
At present, CAR has installed a transitional government, with Catherine Samba-Panza as the
interim president. Violence has de-escalated, but CAR still remains extremely volatile, with
kidnappings and killings on a regular basis (Reuters 2015; Oberti 2013).
Much is currently being written of the current conflict in CAR; much of which oversimplifies
its narrative. More so than any other aspect, the conflict is portrayed as sectarian. Yet CAR
does not have a history of religious or ethnic conflict (Kane 2014). People of different faiths
have long lived in the same communities together and inter-religious marriage is common
(Oberti 2013). Instead, it seems that religion was a mobilising factor for the onset of violence
due to horizontal equalities, which formed between the Muslim-north and the Christian-
South. To a significant degree, these inequalities do not pivot around ethno-religious tensions
but political representation and national identity issues. Moreover, once violence had been
established in the capital, a pre-existing and now incredibly fragile state perpetuated societal
conditions for the continuation of violence, turning what was initially an armed struggle
motivated by grievances into a disparate set of atrocities (Guichaoua 2010).
This brief presents an in-depth and accurate report of the causes and events of the conflict in
CAR, from 2011 – April 2015. Given the pinnacle of violence occurred in the capital, much of
the contemporary analysis of the conflict will be specific to Bangui, as will policy
recommendations. Most importantly, given the country’s upcoming elections in July/August,
mass displacement, and that we find the existence of underlying institutional failures on a
fundamental level, we believe it is essential to ascertain what institutional conditions are
likely to repair the damage so that it’s possible to plot a realistic time frame on when and
how these can be achieved. The time is now to build institutional reform.
Figure 3
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1.0 The Formation of the Seleka: Extractive by Design
Circa 2011 – January 2013
If policy can hope to further the de-escalation of violence in CAR, analysts must assess what
caused its escalation in the first place. To this effect the preconditions of the north-eastern
region, where the ‘Seleka’ were formed, are vitally important in understanding what
motivated this demographic to take up arms.
The north east of CAR had gained somewhat of a reputation under Bozize’s rule for being
"remote, neglected, and largely Muslim", as stated by Lombard, 2013. Other researchers
confirm that the region is lawless and without the provision of basic public services and
infrastructure (MSF 2014b; ICG 2013). This is no coincidence. Although the north of the
country has long been under-developed compared to the south, since Bozize’s inauguration it
has suffered from an increasing set of ‘extractive institutions’. A term borrowed from
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), extractive institutions are ruled by a narrow elite, who adopt
policies with short-term considerations and/or for their own gains. It is a theory which says
that poor countries are not poor because of their geographies or cultures. Instead, prosperity
is determined by the incentives created by institutions. Extractive institutions generate
deterioration in almost every society in the western Common Era, however, in our case we
shall let the unfolding events in this section speak as case in point.
The decision was made by Bozize to maintain a small army, ironically, given his paranoia that
he risked being overthrown by military forces (ICG 2013). As a result, the concentration of
the country’s military power was based some 200 miles down south. Strategically, this left
the northern region open to the foreign looting of natural resources and general instability,
such as the LRA looting raid in 2008. This was also evident in the longstanding intrusion of
Sudanese poachers, armed Chadian groups and militants escaping from Darfur (ICG 2013;
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“The Forgotten Crisis” 11
Covington 2015). With no military protection these events practically necessitated the
creation of armed groups.
Perhaps the most single illustrative issue of how extractive institutional conditions
mechanised inequality between the Muslim north and Christian south are decisions
pertaining to natural resource extraction. The north – or the ‘grey zone’ - is rich in timber,
diamonds, and oil. However, its inhabitants receive little benefit from the presence of the
extraction industry. In Birao (figure 3), Bozize’s administration permitted the exploitation of
petroleum resources without including or informing the local stakeholders (Bollen 2013). The
rebel groups hoped to gain control of some of these natural resources. At the height of
violence in 2013, the Ministry of Forestry launched a bidding process for five forest
concessions covering an area of over a million hectares. The action raises concerns over
whether the outbreak of war was providing welcomed cover for some to gain further control
over natural resources (EU Forest Watch 2014).
As the ICG summarises at this point, “[Over] ten years, the [CAR] government did not
promote development” (ICG 2013 p.2) and instead took extractive decisions which
marginalised and isolated the north from the rest of the country, not to mention exposed a
significant number of the Muslim minority to a severe lack of national security.
Indeed, although the Seleka’s trajectory to the capital and their formal ideology is ill-
understood (due to a severe lack of empirical evidence), their political aspirations are broadly
reflective of these Muslim-north and Christian-south inequalities. Their demands of the
Bozize government are reactive to the extractive institutions of the Bozize government, such
as calling for greater state investment and representation for the northeast (ICG 2013).
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“The Forgotten Crisis” 12
Interestingly, some testimonies further support the existence of horizontal inequalities
between the north and south. Whilst many testimonies state that CAR is not a country with
entrenched religious division, on deeper investigation some testimonies do exist accepting
historic tension between Muslims and Christians. However, the testimonies below which
accept religious division are from Muslim citizens of the north and the testimonies that deny
are from Muslims and Christians in or near the capital:
Inequality from institutional failings further served to benefit the Seleka when mobilising
recruits along religious lines. To this effect, perhaps it is unsurprising that the group’s
ideology is so imprecise given their alliance was so notably diverse. Policies of neglect and a
tolerance for porous borders facilitated the amalgamation of foreign militants and guerilla
groups in the region and the Seleka. A notable amount of Seleka members were not CAR
citizens, but Sudanese and Chadian nationals (ICG 2013). Many joined in the hope of
benefitting from the financial gains of the rebellion (ICG 2013). ‘Foreign blood’ within the
Seleka was to later have great importance in the coming challenges and perceived threats to
national identity once in the capital. Additionally, the Bozize government’s unwillingness to
maintain a strong army impacted upon the security forces that Bozize did employ. The
military suffered long-standing mismanagement, most prominently lack of pay (ICG 2013).
Once again, poor policy-making set to further diversify the Seleka, leading ex-members of the
presidential guard and military to join with rebels in the north and eventually, the Seleka (ICG
2013).
“Muslims and Christians have lived in harmony in this country for generations,”
Public Official; UN Africa (2014).
“We grew up together, people have intermarried. Here, you can find a child with a Muslim
name in a Christian home because the father is Muslim.”
‘Bash’, Muslim resident of Bangui, aged 28; France 24 (2013)
“How many Christian holidays are national holidays in this country? Many. How many
Muslims holidays have the same status? None.”
CAR Civil Servant; UN Africa (2014).
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
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Another example of religion as a mobilising factor is the recruitment of the Fulani ethnic
group of pastoralists. Before the CAR crisis began, pastoralism had been a source of violence
in rural areas between pastoralist and farming communities. The Fulani pastoralists were
Muslim, and had suffered hardship and conflict for decades (ICG 2014b). Loss of livestock and
the resulting impoverishment had led some pastoralists to turn to banditry in order to survive
(ICG 2014b). Young Fulani, often impoverished and alienated from traditional structures were
sympathetic towards the Seleka’s political struggle. Religion was again the quality to unite
this demographic with the Seleka.
With ex-members of the military, former critics, opportunistic foreigners, and of course
Muslim northerners, the Seleka was a diverse alliance from the get go. As the ICG (2013: 23)
aptly summarises: “the Seleka is a heterogeneous coalition of Central African and foreign
combatants who have nothing in common except being Muslims”.
A politics of extraction, exclusionary decision making and actions which served to increasingly
marginalised the north are articulated through a range of institutional and public policies
above. But to a significant degree, the inequality created from these institutional conditions
did not pivot intrinsically around ethno-religious tensions. Rather, grievances stemmed from
political representation and national identity issues. To this end, whilst religion was a
mobilising factor for the subsequent violence in the capital, it is too broad a conclusion to
surmise that the violence is therefore motivated by religious hatred.
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 14
2.0. The Anti-Balaka Formation: Nearly “never again”
March 2013 – January 2014
Some short while after the month of March 2013 the International Community narrowly
missed repeating the words “never again”, as violence erupted into genocidal proportions
reminiscent of Rwanda, in Bangui. Having quickly overthrown president Bozize on March 24th
(due to poor military defence), Seleka leader Michel Djotodia installed himself as president
and became the country’s first ever Muslim leader. This was not to mark the end of the
group’s grievance reprisals and the Seleka continued to loot, rape and kill; targeting mainly
Christian civilians.
Through qualitative analysis of testimonies, it’s apparent that the rate in which institutional
structures collapsed created a void within the conflict which could be filled by other activists,
rebels, vigilantes, anybody, in addition to the main parties of the political cleavage. With a
virtually non-existent military and the pre-emptive withdrawal of international troops after
an earlier botched peace agreement between the Seleka and the Bozize government, the
state’s collapse created conditions in which it was extremely difficult for Djotodia to control
the group and they quickly became radicalised, opportunist, and diffuse.
HRW (2013) have reported that more than 1000 houses were burnt by Seleka forces during
this period (figure 5, figure 6) and FIDH (2014) gathered testimonies for specific instances of
crimes. A source from FIDH recorded 82 cases of rape in the first month following the arrival
of the Seleka in the capital; a number which is likely to have grown considerably. Cases of
kidnappings, extortion and the forced recruitment have also been reported.
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 15
The country’s public and private assets were systematically looted in the weeks following the
coup for rogue rebels’ and war lords’ gain and the FACA and Bangui gendarmes were able to
offer no protection to the civilian population. One specific example was on 20th August 2013
when many Seleka combatants ignored direct orders from Djotodia and MICOPAX and
launched a punitive raid under the cover of a disarmament operation on Boy Rabe, an
allegedly pro-Bozizé residential district in Bangui. Many people were killed and homes looted
(ICG 2013). In the capital’s provinces where the Seleka held absolute power, humanitarian
assistance and law and order were entirely absent. FIDH (2014) reported that In Bangui, at
the time of their fact-finding mission (April 2013), only sixteen detention warrants had been
confirmed by the state prosecutor. Seleka elements actually arrested were for the most part
confined to centres for disciplinary training but escaped all forms of judicial process. In such
circumstances, the MICOPAX forces and mandate were manifestly inadequate to ensure the
population’s protection.
In this respect, the failed state did not only contribute to societal disparity but internal
splintering within the Seleka. Indeed, as some more conservative Seleka leaders have
admitted, they had been unable to ensure security and order (ICG 2013). These additional
rationales due to the state’s collapse transformed the crisis in the capital from predominantly
“They would arrive in a village and publicly kill all the men, targeting the Christians in
particular”
Journalist, Radio Centrafique; UN Africa (2014)
“They are slaughtering us like chickens”.
Appolinaire Donoboy, Christian; Telegraph (2013)
"What we see here reminds us of what we experienced in Rwanda in 1994, and we are
absolutely determined not to let 1994 happen again."
A commander of Rwandan troops representing the AU; Independent (2014)
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 16
an ideologically driven civil war into to diffuse, non-formal violence, as can be heard in
various testimonies:
As a direct response the overwhelming majority of the population had grown hateful and
fearful (ICG 2013). With the absence of state protection the Christian and Animist Bangui
citizens formed the Anti-Balaka (“invincible”) and quickly launched what were initially
‘defence’ missions, but what were swiftly understood as retribution. Only several months
after the coup, the Seleka were pushed out of the capital by the Anti-Balaka. The Anti-Balaka
continued to launch an all-out assault on the Muslim population of Bangui: from 5th
December 2013 – 26th over 1000 Muslims civilians were killed (FIDH 2014) and by the end of
mid-January the number of IDPs and refugees reportedly peaked at 958,000 (MPI 2014):
"Some military and political leaders have promoted the view that the conflict is linked to
religious differences because it furthers their aims, whether by forcing the partitioning of
the country or by helping them gain influence."
Omar Ahmed, Field Coordinator for MSF; MSF (2014a)
"Widespread poverty, inequality, exclusion and a weak State in a country with high
economic potential: these are the ingredients of the crisis in the Central African Republic,"
Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Head of the Africa bureau at UNDP; UNDP (2015)
“The government has an obligation to control the rebels who brought it to power…without
security, the government will not be able to govern effectively or protect civilians.”
Daniel Bekele, Africa director for HRW; HRW (2014)
“They are our brothers. We are together against the Seleka.”
FACA soldiers in Bangui; IRIN (2014)
“Whether the anti-balaka (…) are pursuing a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing or
exacting abusive collective punishment against the Muslim population [in response to the
Seleka’s atrocities], the end result is clear: the disappearance of longstanding Muslim
communities.” Peter Bouckaert: IRIN (2014)
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 17
This ‘Christian’ response to ‘Muslim violence’ and the quickness in which the conflict became
so violent have understandably been glossed as markedly ‘religious’. Instead, it seems that on
a fundamental, empirical level, the formation of the Anti-Balaka was, predominantly due to
the absence of a military or police force for protection:
The binary partitioning of the Seleka as Muslim and the Anti-Balaka as Christian is only half
the narrative, as in addition to the state’s collapse creating mass insecurity, it also created
the sustained conditions for more opportunistic members to commit violent acts such as
looting, rioting, kidnapping, and capitalising on the breakdown of vital public services. This
will be discussed further in the next section.
Figure 5
“No one helped us when the Seleka came to power. If someone comes and puts a boot on
your head and knife to your neck, what do you do? You defend yourself.”
Dieudonné, one of the founders of the Anti-Balaka; The New Yorker (2014)
“They killed our people and left our parents to be eaten by dogs. We balanced things out”
Anon, Anti-Balaka; The New Yorker (2014)
“There is no State. The national army has melted away…it’s anarchy.”
Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye; FIDH (2013)
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3.0. The contemporary analysis: Institutions, Institutions, Institutions
January 2014 – February 2015
Following the Anti-Balaka’s violent retribution in Bangui throughout December 2013,
Djotodia resigned and went into exile. By the end of January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza
became the interim president for the new transitional government.
Over the last sixteen months, violence has deescalated in the capital. There are signs that
Bangui is on the road to recovery: inter-faith forums have been held by religious leaders and
peace agreements have been made in Brazzaville and in Nairobi. However, although the
violence has deescalated, the situation remains extremely fragile, with ongoing violence and
a lack of state control. Some Muslims are slowly returning to their homes in Bangui (Yahoo
2015), but the situation is fraught with tension. In January 2015, 15 people (including a
government minister and a UN employee) were kidnapped (IRIN 2015a). In February 2015,
elections were postponed until later this year due to the instability of the country.
The nature of the violence and the continuation of the violence can in part be attributed to
Wood’s (2008) theory of social navigation and Tilly’s analysis of ‘repertoires of violence’
(2008). Wood asserts that irregular war leads to reshaped social networks. According to
Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), irregular wars are those in which non-state combatants mingle
with civilians and rarely mass in significant numbers.
This has certainly been the case in Bangui, where violence has become diffuse and non-
formal, and it difficult to determine who is a combatant and who is a civilian. In the endless
tit-for-tat, perpetrators become victims and vice versa.
Wood (2008) states that irregular war “relies on the ongoing support of civilians...the
frequent contact with civilians implies that everyday social processes may be reshaped by
conflict (p543)”.
These social processes and networks have been dramatically altered: in a country with little
history of religious conflict, to suddenly a perceived sectarian war, the very fabric of
communities has been altered. Although the conflict has deescalated, the changed social
identities cause the violence to continue. As Wood states; “the polarisation of political
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“The Forgotten Crisis” 21
identities that frequently occurs during civil war breaks apart prewar networks, as former
neighbours are shunned and coloyalists favoured” (p549).
These changes to social networks have subsequently led to a shift in national identity. The
country risks being divided along religious lines. For CAR to move forward, Christians and
Muslims must be united once more and characterize themselves as citizens of CAR, rather
than by their religion.
As has been found throughout our analysis, the transformation of social networks and
identities has been enabled by the weak institutions of Bangui. The Bangui gendarmes are
drastically underfunded and understaffed. With the little government funds pillaged, Samba-
Panza’s transitional government has very little autonomy beyond her international support
(ICC p6). Yet this international backing has not been supportive enough. Only 67 percent of
the funding requirements for 2015 have been met. The UN agency says it will require at least
$300 million to cater to the violence (Chinafrica, 2015).
The perceived sectarian nature of the conflict by Anti-Balaka and by civilians led to
retribution against all Muslims. However, testimonies show that attacks actually tend to be
motivated by greed, not religion. In Bangui, many Muslims were previously traders and shop
owners, controlling much of the CAR's financial system (TBFF 2015). The ongoing extortion
and looting committed by the Anti-Balaka supports Hoeffler and Collier’s (2007: 589) theory
that economic variables are linked to the viability of rebellion. As they state, “opportunity as
an explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as
"[Of the Bangui gendarmes] they don't have any weapons. With what should they then
defend themselves - or the citizens of Bangui?"
‘Chris’, former resident of Bangui, displaced person in Ghana; Deutsche Welle (2015)
“French Sangaris troops often seem reluctant to intervene and told me they cannot take
sides”.
Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director at Human Rights Watch; HRW (2014)
“International engagement to help CAR does not go far enough”.
French political scientist Roland Marchal; Deutsche Welle (2015)
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 22
greed-motivated”. In Bangui, with almost non-existent institutions and long-standing poverty,
some Anti-Balaka use religion and retribution as an opportunity for financial gain.
“Many unemployed youths participated in the looting in the wake of the Seleka but then
joined the Anti-Balaka”. Report from ICG; (2014a)
"The ultimate cause of our instability is not religious but political, because whoever comes to
power makes his entourage commit abuses to stay in power”.
Pastor Koudougeret, a Baptist priest in the capital; HRW (2014)
This rebel-greed mechanism of course links back to weak institutions. The unemployed
youths who participated where failed by a “failed state”.
The breakdown of social networks and identities have shaped the diffuse nature of the
contemporary conflict in CAR, yet its continuation and ‘tit-for-tat’ nature can also be
attributed to Tilly’s ‘repertoires of violence’(2008). CAR, with its second transitional
government in two years, and history of despotic leaders, is caught in a cycle of violence. As
Hoover (2007, cited in Wood 2008: 547) states, the widening of repertoires of violence over
the course of conflict likely reflects “the ongoing effects of underlying mechanisms;
dehumanisation, diffusion of responsibility, habituation, and deindividuation, all of which are
likely to undermine constraints on violence”. Violence has become normalised in an
environment when civilians cannot rely on state judiciary or security forces.
To summarise, we have illustrated that micro foundational factors have shaped the nature of
the ongoing conflict in Bangui. Changes to social networks and identities have broken down
community bonds and caught civilians and combatants alike in brutal repertoires of violence,
where communities are pitted against one another. The ineffective transitional government,
and the largely neutral and delayed international support has not been conducive to
rebuilding the core institutions of the country. This has enabled the conflict to continue.
Without established gendarmes, FACA, the breakdown of society and lack of infrastructure
and state governance, the conflict is fragmented and localised, centred around social identity
change and on a broader level, national identity change. This has torn the fabric of society,
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 23
but steps are being made to mend it. It is imperative that these steps focus on strengthening
institutions.
Central African Republic Policy Report 2015
“The Forgotten Crisis” 24
4.0 Summary and Conclusion – A state building roadmap is urgently
needed
Overall, it has been found that the popular depiction of the crisis in CAR as sectarian is
oversimplified. Whilst it is true that violence has existed along religious lines during key
moments of the conflict, the authors have found on an empirical level, that this is indicative
of the fact that religion has been used as a mobilisation tool and not indicative of violence
motivated by religious hatred.
Specifically, religion was used successfully as a recruitment strategy by both the Seleka and
the Anti-Balaka rebel groups due to systemic institutional failures: Weak institutions created
inequality on a range of issues, most pertinently regional inequality and a lack of (human)
security. Because of this, the authors conclude that weak institutional conditions and the
subsequent collapse of the state have been the presiding factors over this ‘religious
narrative’.
To summarise:
- Religion was a mobilising factor for the onset of violence in the north of CAR due to
horizontal equalities, which formed between the Muslim-north and the Christian-South. To a
significant degree, these inequalities do not pivot around ethno-religious tensions but
political representation and national identity issues.
- Religion continued to be mobilising factor for the escalation of violence in the capital,
Bangui. To a significant degree, the diffusion of ideology within the Seleka and the formation
of the Anti-Balaka is due to the implosion of the state and its institutional structures.
- The collapse of the state has created the conditions for sustained violence, with some
still using religious tensions to mobilise, but others capitalising on the breakdown of law and
order in other ways.
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Given the authors’ analysis, major institutional reform should be the goal in CAR. And how to
get there should be the priority. To repeat, having found the degree to which institutional
failings have permeated the conflict, it is imperative to re-build the state with the authors’
findings in mind. This focus need not, and should not, undermine the immediate
peacebuilding processes that are needed - such as humanitarian assistance, agricultural
infrastructure, community reconciliation programme, to name but a few - but compliment
them. That is to say, in pursuing the achievement of negative peace in CAR, particular
attention should be given to what is likely to create conditions for long-term, meaningful
institutional and political reform, as well as what will enable the democratic process of
elections in the shortest possible time.
The following recommendations are specific guidelines for how to achieve this.
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5.0 Policy Recommendations
A long-standing set of weak institutions have consistently been identified as a structural
causal mechanism for the conflict in CAR. Given the upcoming elections, mass displacement
of the population, and a lack of accountable justice, the time to address these issues is now.
Building the capacities of institutions at a time when violence is still high may seem self-
serving given our analysis, but there is a real necessity in addressing the above issues
immediately, alongside addressing the negative peace.
5.1 Electoral Reform
1. Postpone elections. Many international bodies are calling for the country’s parliamentary
and presidential elections to go ahead as scheduled for this July and August (The Guardian
2015). We see this as unrealistic (owing to a tendency for the international community to
place more faith in the electoral process as a marker of stability than is always the reality)
(Deutsche Welle 2015). In addition to reform in the remits of the judiciary, security, and
constitutionality outlined below, we recommend the following be ensured prior to voting:
2. A credible peace accord needs to be signed between the Seleka and Anti-Balaka, and it is
essential that the transitional government are involved in the negotiations. In recent peace
negotiations in Nairobi, the transitional government were excluded (one government
minister termed the Nairobi accord a 'non-event' (Bloomberg 2015). For any peace
agreement to have legitimacy in CAR, all three actors must be involved and have
international backing
3. As soon as possible, and with support of the international community, implement the
measures required to establish the required documents for a pluralist, free, transparent
election process, in particular recreating civil registry records and reliable electoral lists (IRIN
2015c).
4. Ensure participation of refugees and displaced persons in the elections.
5. Propose to the political parties a charter on principles and responsible conduct for the
elections (FIDH 2013).
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6. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support the electoral process. The National
Election Authority (ANE) had a 20 billion CFA deficit as of February 2015. Urge the European
Union to fulfil their pledge of 20 million euros in January 2015 as soon as possible.
5.2 Security Reform
1. National security must be prioritised over the current short-termism electoral process. The
collapse of the state and security (real and perceived) created the conditions for sustained
violence and will continue to do so if unresolved, undermining the democratic process of
voting and increasing the likelihood of the re-escalation of violence. In particular, we
recommend the following actions:
2. Urgently bolster the number of peacekeeping troops by implementing the African Union
Peace and Security Council’s July 19, 2013, decision to protect civilians, restore security and
public order, and create the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian
assistance and electoral process (IRIN 2015c).
3. Deploy the additional 1030 MINUSCA soldiers and police, as outlined in a letter from the UN
Secretary General, as soon as possible (VOA 2015).
4. Ensure that the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
(AFISM-CAR) has the logistical and financial support to fulfil a mandate for achieving the pre-
conditions for the country’s electoral process outline above.
5. Continue to re-claim areas controlled by Seleka strongholds; especially in the east and the
north of the country. Seleka troops have prevented the National Election Authority (ANE)
from setting up offices in those areas (and in one case even briefly abducted officials who
were trying to raise public awareness of the election process.) In all, the ANE has opened 83
of a planned 141 offices across the country. Creating conditions to allow for the opening of
the additional 58 ANE offices should be a priority of peacekeeping forces in these areas (IRIN
2015c).
6. Work alongside the judicial process to continue a thorough vetting process of the national
military and police forces, excluding individuals who have committed human rights abuses.
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7. Put in place measures to prevent harassment or intimidation by Seleka and Anti-Balaka
members of any potential witnesses in future investigations at the ‘hybrid’ court, outlined
below.
8. Ensure all police and soldiers are receiving a regular and adequate salary, and enforce a zero
tolerance policy on looting (HRW 2013).
9. With logistical and financial backing from the International Community, increase the
number of police personnel being trained - particularly on the basic rules of international
humanitarian law - from 300 - 600; currently being facilitated by the ICRC (2014).
5.3 Judiciary Reform
1. Justice and Accountability should be prioritised in tandem with the above security proposals
in order to ensure credibility of any future administrations and restore community relations.
In particular, we recommend the following actions:
2. Establish the creation of a ‘hybrid’ tribunal as soon as possible, compromising of both CAR
citizens and international partners, as recommended by Amnesty International and backed by
the UN. This court would not prevent cases being prosecuted by the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which has already conducted a preliminary examination of the situation on the
ground. AU and ICC do not hold the strongest relationship, though there appears to be a
great deal of promise in establishing such a tailored, country-specific response to mass
violence in CAR, combining the strengths of the ad hoc tribunals with the benefits of local
prosecutions. Without the ICC’s direct involvement, financial assistance would be required.
3. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support judicial reformation and processes,
in particular the aforementioned hybrid court.
4. The hybrid court and the ICC should work with peacekeeping forces to ensure that Seleka
and Anti-Balaka fighters found responsible for serious human rights abuses are not
reintegrated into (or allowed to join) the national army and are not given other official
positions within the government.
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5. The hybrid court and the ICC should assist MINUSCA in implementing and coordinating the
proposed community based DDR programme.
6. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support the IOM’s cash-for-work
programme in Bangui and encourage cross-communication between the IOM’s programme
team and the UNDP’s work based project team. According to Colonel Kalle Seppala of the EU
force, the former has helped reduce violence in the capital (IRIN 2015b).
7. Issue a public broadcast via radio that the government will not tolerate attacks on civilians
and will hold accountable anyone found responsible for murder, rape, pillage, and other
serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
9. The government of Chad should investigate and publish findings into allegations of Chadian
involvement with and/or support to the Seleka. If evidence of Chadian involvement is
discovered, ensure this activity ceases immediately (HRW 2013).
5.4 Constitutional Reform
1. Long-term vision when achieving negative peace should also focus on major constitutional
reform, as well as electoral. In working towards this, the following are recommended in
particular:
2. Examine the responsibilities of the former Bozize government and the ex-Seleka political and
military leaders with regard to their alleged responsibility for war crimes committed, starting
with ex-president Michel Djotodia and François Bozizé.
3. The transitional government and international agencies should work with the International
Organization for Migration to conduct a nationwide IDP return intention survey, especially in
the northern regions. Whilst 60% of IDPs in the capital indicated their intention to return to
their place of origin, the number and intention of IDP’s outside of the capital remains largely
unknown (FIDH 2014).
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4. Humanitarian assistance should be provided to enable IDPs in CAR to return to their
communities, once the above security conditions have been achieved. This could include
guarded convoys and safe routes for the IDPs to return.
3. Regional and ethnic representation should be ensured at the legislative and national level:
Following an initial peace agreement, a road-map to political reform should be drafted by the
transitional government, key political figures and overseen by the UN. Inter-faith dialogue in
relation to political transformation should form a key composition of these discussions.
4. Constitutional amendments made by Bozize in 2003 should, where necessary, be re-
considered during the above political discussions.
5. Peacekeepers and international bodies must continue to limit themselves to law and order
operations, encouraging political dialogue and reconciliation where it is considered objective to
do so.
6. Undertaking an electoral process should remain the priority over long-term constitutional
reform, however a cross-party consensus should be reached considering a referendum on
whether to become a semi-federal state by the next parliamentary and presidential elections.
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