CFC Thematic Report - Mali's Stabilisation Project: Political, Security and Humanitarian...

7/28/2019 CFC Thematic Report - Mali's Stabilisation Project: Political, Security and Humanitarian Assessments, 05 June 13

1/9

The Allied Command Operations (ACO) Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information and knowledge management organisation focused on

improving civil-military interaction, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness through theCimicWebportal and our weekly

and monthly publications. CFC products are based upon and link to open-source information from a wide variety of organisations, research centres and

media sources. However, the CFC does not endorse and cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. CFC publications areindependently produced by Desk Officers and do not reflect NATO policies or positions of any other organisation.

This report traces the political, security and humanitarian situation in Mali since the 2012 coup dtat that un-

seated the countrys democratic government and resulted in months of insurgent violence. It examines the fluiddynamic of major armed groups and the ongoing political process aimed at stabilising the country, achieving na-

tional reconciliation and re-establishing Malis territorial integrity. Finally, it summarises the humanitarian situ-

ation by outlining the work of civil society to address food insecurity, development priorities and population dis-placement. Related information is available atwww.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted

in blue and underlined in the text.

Introduction

In March 2012,disaffected soldiersoverthrew Malis democratically elected government in a mutiny that upended the

countrys military structure and disrupted civilian rule. Following the coup dtat, military leaders lost control ofnorth-

ern Malis expansive territory to an affiliation of armed Islamists groups and Tuareg separatists that staked claims on a

newAzawad state. Within a matter of months, extremists introduced a campaign to occupy the countrysungoverned

spacesand impose strict interpretations of sharia law. A swarm of local and international groups, most of them armed,

flooded into the power vacuum, introducing various political, religious and social objectives. The Economic Communi-

ty of West African States (ECOWAS) opened a dialogue with stakehold-

ers in March 2012 to initiate a political settlement. Dioncounda Traor

was installed asinterim presidentin April 2012. By August 2012, an inter-

im government was established in Bamako with support from ECOWAS

and the United Nations. In December 2012, the UN Security Council

(UNSC)authorisedthe African-led International Support Mission in Mali

(AFISMA). On 11 January 2013, France launched Operation Serval, an

international intervention, with the goal of eliminating the growing insur-

gency in northern Mali. Tensions in the region escalated as troops de-

ployedfrom nearly a dozen West African countries including Chad, Gha-

na, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, among others.

Between January and March 2013, militants abandoned strategic towns

such as Timbuktu andretreatedto key fortifications, according toReuters.

Intermittent battles in the north, especially in the rugged Adrar des Ifoghas

region, continued as insurgent groups vied with French, Malian and other

international security forces. By April 2013, the insurgency was largely

contained. Foreign troops, including the large French and Chadian contin-gents, began to withdraw from the country. Simultaneously, an African-

led peacekeeping operation also started its transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Additionally, a donor

conference in May 2013 raisedUSD 4 billionand outlined development goals supporting political efforts designed to

reintroduce democratic governance and strengthen Malian state institutions. Finally, the humanitarian situation remains

critical for millions of residents. Thousands face food insecurity as farms and cattle areravagedby on-going violence,

June 2013Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues

Malis Stabilisation Project:

Political, Security and Humanitarian Assessments

C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E P R E S E N T S

Foard Copeland

Desk Officer

[email protected]

Source:University of Texas
https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttp://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/23/mali-coup-draws-condemnation-ecowashttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/23/mali-coup-draws-condemnation-ecowashttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/23/mali-coup-draws-condemnation-ecowashttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-mali-an-islamic-extremist-haven-takes-shape/2012/06/06/gJQAIKNlKV_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-mali-an-islamic-extremist-haven-takes-shape/2012/06/06/gJQAIKNlKV_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-mali-an-islamic-extremist-haven-takes-shape/2012/06/06/gJQAIKNlKV_story.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124917549965212.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124917549965212.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124917549965212.htmlhttp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130311/key-dates-french-led-mali-interventionhttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130311/key-dates-french-led-mali-interventionhttp://en.apa.az/news_int_l_support_mission_for_mali_to_begin__186169.htmlhttp://en.apa.az/news_int_l_support_mission_for_mali_to_begin__186169.htmlhttp://en.apa.az/news_int_l_support_mission_for_mali_to_begin__186169.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90O0C720130127http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90O0C720130127http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90O0C720130127http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/2013226221846648835.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/2013226221846648835.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/2013226221846648835.htmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/may/16/mali-aid-eu-donor-conferencehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/may/16/mali-aid-eu-donor-conferencehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/may/16/mali-aid-eu-donor-conferencehttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralistshttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralistshttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralistsmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia12/mali_sm_2012.gifhttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia12/mali_sm_2012.gifhttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia12/mali_sm_2012.gifhttp://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia12/mali_sm_2012.gifmailto:[email protected]://www.irinnews.org/Report/97799/Mounting-crisis-for-conflict-hit-northern-Mali-pastoralistshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/may/16/mali-aid-eu-donor-conferencehttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/2013226221846648835.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90O0C720130127http://en.apa.az/news_int_l_support_mission_for_mali_to_begin__186169.htmlhttp://en.apa.az/news_int_l_support_mission_for_mali_to_begin__186169.htmlhttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130311/key-dates-french-led-mali-interventionhttp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124917549965212.htmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtmlhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htmhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-mali-an-islamic-extremist-haven-takes-shape/2012/06/06/gJQAIKNlKV_story.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/23/mali-coup-draws-condemnation-ecowashttp://www.cimicweb.org/https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspx


2/9

June 2013 Page 2

M a l i : P o l i t i c a l , S e c u r i t y a n d H u m a n i t a r i a n A s s e s s m e n t s

according toIntegrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN).Poverty rates, as high as 44 per cent in 2010, continued

to climb as fighting disrupted business, trade, and even education for many youth, according to the World Bank. In the

past year,displaced populationsmoved into neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. To date, over 300,000

refugeesfled the country and 175,000 are internally displaced.

Country Background

Mali, alandlockedcountry of 1.2 million square kilometres, is home to a heterogeneous population of 16 million. Nota-

ble for its arid Saharan and Sahel1 climates, over ninety per cent of the population is Muslim, most of whom are Sunni

and practice localSufi traditions. Ethnic diversity is a trademark. Approximately eighty per cent of Malians identify as

Mande (fifty per cent) Peul (seventeen per cent) or Voltaic (twelve per cent). Songhai, Tuareg and Moorish populations

constitute another sixteen per cent, with a small percentage of Arab and other groups. Over two million people reside in

the capital Bamako, defined largely by theNiger River, which is as wide as one kilometre and irrigates much of the city.

Southern Malibenefits from a milder climate and higher agricultural output than the north. It also serves as the coun-

trys de facto political centre due to its access to the capital. Key northern cities include Gao and Kidal, as well as the

ancient city ofTimbuktu.

AfterSoudan Francais (French Sudan) gainedindependencefrom the French Republic in 1960, military rule persisted

until 1992 when democratic elections ushered in President Alpha Oumar Konar. Since that time, Mali was often toutedas a democratic success story, regularly holding local, presidential and legislative elections for nearly two decades.

However, the country was marred bywidespread corruption, rampant trafficking, and low levels of economic develop-

ment. General Amadou Toumani Tour (commonly referred to as ATT) was elected president in 2002. The United

States Institute of Peace (USIP) notes that although Tour was initially popular, he was unable to stymy high-levelcor-

ruptionin the central government. He was re-elected in 2007 only to beoverthrownby the military in early 2012. The

conditions that left Mali ripe for a coup and which resulted in the collapse of central government in the north, further

outlined below, include: a history ofTuareg nationalism(calls for an Azawad homeland); the rise ofIslamism; a prolif-

eration ofweapons and fightersfrom Libya; endemic high-level government corruption; andchronic underdevelopment.

Military Coup, Tuareg Rebellion

The military coup took place on 22 March 2012

when soldiers, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo,

swept into Bamako, forcing then-President Tour to

flee the country, according to the Washington Post.

Sanogo suspended the constitution and the interna-

tional community quickly imposed sanctions or sus-

pended aid packages. Northern Mali, always loosely

governed,collapsed into a protracted battle between

radical Islamists and ethno-political minorities. After

the coup, ECOWAS brokered an emergency accord

that saw the instalment of Traor as interim presi-

dent. Traor welcomed the French intervention and

promised to uphold the constitution. However, gov-

erning from Bamako, the influence of his administra-

tion has been limited to the countrys south, a recur-

ring problem that weakens the authority of the cen-tral government.

Small numbers of Tuaregs, particularly in the Sahelian north, sought to establish an independentTuareg homelandfor

decades. Dissident Tuareg activities preceded the mutiny led by Sanogo. The military coup then provided an opportuni-

ty forethnic Tuaregsto capitalise on long-standing grievances with the Malian government in Bamako and assert au-

tonomous demands for statehood. The disintegration of Moammar Gaddafis Libyan dictatorship also complicated the

1 TheSaharais the worlds largest desert measuring 9.1 million square kilometres. It covers ten per cent of the African continent and re ceives between

0 and 25 mm of rainfall per year. Nearly all of its two million inhabitants are nomads who make a living from herding and trade. TheSahelconstitutesa narrow ecological band south of the Sahara desert marked by low average rainfall and an arid climate. It spans Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Sene-

gal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (sometimes Ethiopia and Somalia are also characterised as having Sahel climates). The majority

of the population subsists on livestock herding and small-scale agriculture.

Source:BBC
http://data.worldbank.org/country/malihttp://data.worldbank.org/country/malihttp://data.worldbank.org/country/malihttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-humanitarian-snapshot-23-may-2013http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-humanitarian-snapshot-23-may-2013https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.htmlhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A4A705D1-1AB7-47C2-9772-8B7EA7D339FC/0/KeyFactsonMali.pdfhttp://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A4A705D1-1AB7-47C2-9772-8B7EA7D339FC/0/KeyFactsonMali.pdfhttp://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A4A705D1-1AB7-47C2-9772-8B7EA7D339FC/0/KeyFactsonMali.pdfhttp://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/what-you-need-to-know-about-mali-20130114http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/what-you-need-to-know-about-mali-20130114http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6071EF6355C16738DDDA80894DC405B808AF1D3http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6071EF6355C16738DDDA80894DC405B808AF1D3http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6071EF6355C16738DDDA80894DC405B808AF1D3http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://www.ibtimes.com/aftermath-mali-things-we-forgot-about-humanitarian-aid-1189251http://www.ibtimes.com/aftermath-mali-things-we-forgot-about-humanitarian-aid-1189251http://www.ibtimes.com/aftermath-mali-things-we-forgot-about-humanitarian-aid-1189251http://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120409-malis-toure-steps-down-paving-way-return-democracyhttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120409-malis-toure-steps-down-paving-way-return-democracyhttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120409-malis-toure-steps-down-paving-way-return-democracyhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635#previewhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635#previewhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635#previewhttp://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ECOWAS_Report_2_-_ENG.pdfhttp://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ECOWAS_Report_2_-_ENG.pdfhttp://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ECOWAS_Report_2_-_ENG.pdfhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leader-of-mali-military-coup-trained-in-us/2012/03/23/gIQAS7Q6WS_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leader-of-mali-military-coup-trained-in-us/2012/03/23/gIQAS7Q6WS_story.htmlhttp://www.france24.com/en/20130116-mali-captain-amadou-sanogo-army-coup-power-france-interventionhttp://www.france24.com/en/20130116-mali-captain-amadou-sanogo-army-coup-power-france-interventionhttp://www.france24.com/en/20120404-mali-militant-islamist-timbuktu-bamako-tuareg-aqim-al-qaeda-toure-africahttp://www.france24.com/en/20120404-mali-militant-islamist-timbuktu-bamako-tuareg-aqim-al-qaeda-toure-africahttp://www.france24.com/en/20120404-mali-militant-islamist-timbuktu-bamako-tuareg-aqim-al-qaeda-toure-africahttp://www.france24.com/en/20120412-mali-ecowas-bamako-traore-military-coup-transitional-governmenthttp://www.france24.com/en/20120412-mali-ecowas-bamako-traore-military-coup-transitional-governmenthttp://www.france24.com/en/20120412-mali-ecowas-bamako-traore-military-coup-transitional-governmenthttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130202-hollande-given-heros-welcome-timbuktuhttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130202-hollande-given-heros-welcome-timbuktuhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592319808423221#.UZYqJis4XV0http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592319808423221#.UZYqJis4XV0http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592319808423221#.UZYqJis4XV0http://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/pa1327http://worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/pa1327http://worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/pa1327https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&sqi=2&ved=0CGYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ce.utexas.edu%2Fprof%2Fmckinney%2Fce397%2FTopics%2FAfrica%2FSahel%2FSahel.doc&ei=azWmUdnQFcr54AOx-4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFWYe56Hew4cLdRC7ZT2ygUCQ998g&sig2=cjfJCXoVb-A66Ihbb56dUA&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmg&cad=rjahttps://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&sqi=2&ved=0CGYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ce.utexas.edu%2Fprof%2Fmckinney%2Fce397%2FTopics%2FAfrica%2FSahel%2FSahel.doc&ei=azWmUdnQFcr54AOx-4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFWYe56Hew4cLdRC7ZT2ygUCQ998g&sig2=cjfJCXoVb-A66Ihbb56dUA&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmg&cad=rjahttps://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&sqi=2&ved=0CGYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ce.utexas.edu%2Fprof%2Fmckinney%2Fce397%2FTopics%2FAfrica%2FSahel%2FSahel.doc&ei=azWmUdnQFcr54AOx-4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFWYe56Hew4cLdRC7ZT2ygUCQ998g&sig2=cjfJCXoVb-A66Ihbb56dUA&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmg&cad=rjahttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&sqi=2&ved=0CGYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ce.utexas.edu%2Fprof%2Fmckinney%2Fce397%2FTopics%2FAfrica%2FSahel%2FSahel.doc&ei=azWmUdnQFcr54AOx-4DoBg&usg=AFQjCNFWYe56Hew4cLdRC7ZT2ygUCQ998g&sig2=cjfJCXoVb-A66Ihbb56dUA&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmg&cad=rjahttp://worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/pa1327http://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592319808423221#.UZYqJis4XV0http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130202-hollande-given-heros-welcome-timbuktuhttp://www.france24.com/en/20120412-mali-ecowas-bamako-traore-military-coup-transitional-governmenthttp://www.france24.com/en/20120412-mali-ecowas-bamako-traore-military-coup-transitional-governmenthttp://www.france24.com/en/20120404-mali-militant-islamist-timbuktu-bamako-tuareg-aqim-al-qaeda-toure-africahttp://www.france24.com/en/20130116-mali-captain-amadou-sanogo-army-coup-power-france-interventionhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leader-of-mali-military-coup-trained-in-us/2012/03/23/gIQAS7Q6WS_story.htmlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/ECOWAS_Report_2_-_ENG.pdfhttp://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635#previewhttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20120409-malis-toure-steps-down-paving-way-return-democracyhttp://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.usip.org/publications/democratization-mali-putting-history-workhttp://www.ibtimes.com/aftermath-mali-things-we-forgot-about-humanitarian-aid-1189251http://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://thinkafricapress.com/mali/restoring-democracy-mali-never-hadhttp://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F6071EF6355C16738DDDA80894DC405B808AF1D3http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/what-you-need-to-know-about-mali-20130114http://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/A4A705D1-1AB7-47C2-9772-8B7EA7D339FC/0/KeyFactsonMali.pdfhttp://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.htmlhttp://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-humanitarian-snapshot-23-may-2013http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/mali-tuareg-rebellion-coup-terrorism-AQIM-french-military-timbuktu-background-peter-chilson-gwinhttp://data.worldbank.org/country/mali


3/9

June 2013 Page 3


political and security climate, flooding the region with weapons and combatants. A coterie of Tuareg fighters and mili-

tant Islamists, many of them emerging from Libyas civil war,convergedon northern Mali. Certain Tuareg fighters held

the goal of establishing an Azawad state while other rebels, many of them non-Tuaregs, maintained an Islamist agenda

that sought to impose sharia law across the Sahel. Some fighters found resonance with both aims. The outcome left var-

ious militias asserting control over different regions of Malis ungoverned northern territory. Conflict dynamics were

fluid and allegiances between rebel groups fluctuated with time. Nevertheless, several battles in key cities quickly erod-ed the Malian state as the military retreated, local government collapsed and Azawad flags were raised throughout the

north. On 17 January 2012, Malian security forces in Kidal wereattackedby militants fleeing Libya. By early February,

militants overran the sparsely populated but strategic region of Kidal, instigating the first large-scale population dis-

placements were underway. The toppling of Kidal was followed shortly by thefall of Gao. With a population of 90,000,

Gao was one of the largest and most heavily fortified cities in the north. By 01 April 2012, rebels controlledTimbuktu,

a historically rich centre of commerce and culture, and the last major stronghold before Bamako.

Overview of Militant Groups Operating in Mali

Ansar Dine

Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) is ahome-grownTuareg insurgency headed byIyad Ag Ghaly(known by close

peers as the lion of the desert). Described as a godfather figure who enjoys a cult following, Ghaly wasradicalised

by Pakistani Salafists that arrived in Mali during the mid-2000s. He also travelled to Pakistan and served as anenvoytoSaudi Arabia before being expelled from Jeddah because of his jihadist links. He established his militia in late 2011, but

had long antagonised the central government and its predominantly southern leadership. Many Ansar Dine members are

seasoned veterans from the Libyan civil war, including Ghaly who served as a mercenary for Gaddafi. Ansar Dine goals

incorporate streaks of Tuareg nationalism and a hardline imposition of sharia law. In the summer of 2012, its members

destroyedUNESCO World Heritage sites and other cultural property in and around Timbuktu. Ansar Dine entered an

official alliance with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in late 2011 which strengthened both groups. The

AQIM connection provided Ansar Dine fighters with weapons and cash reserves, and Ansar Dine, with its deep-rooted

network in the Sahel, legitimised the Arab fighters transplanted from al Qaedas global netwo rk. Djallil Lounnas, an

expert on insurgencies in North Africa, said that Ansar Dine was central tograssroots supportfor AQIM in Mali and the

Sahel. According to Lounnas, AQIM had not managed over a period of ten years to recruit a lot of people from the

local populationGetting the support from Ansar Dine was the key forthem. By 02 April 2012,Foreign Affairs notes

that Ansar Dine establishedsharia lawin the most prominent cities in northern Mali Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.

MNLA

The Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a Tuareg group led byBilal al Chrif. It espouses the

chief goal of establishing an independentstate for Tuaregs. The group is secular and claims to support the West in its

rejection of terrorist organisations. Despite its primary objective of achieving Tuareg independence, the MNLA repre-

sentedheterogeneous groupswhose secondary goals were not always in harmony with one another. After the March

2012 coup, the group quickly asserted control over the north, taking the towns of Gao and Kidal before proclaiming the

establishment of theAzawad state. However, the groups relative decentralisation, coupled with limited funds, hindered

its ability to expel radical jihadists from the countrys north. After losing major territorial claims to Islamists, and short

on funds, it declared an end to military operations and announced support of the French intervention. In May 2012,

MNLA and Ansar Dine declared the two groups had entered apact. Previously, MNLA resisted Ansar Dines Islamism,

instead adopting a secular agenda. It gavesupportto Ansar Dine only after the latter group abandoned some of its hard-

line Islamist, particularly Salafist, demands. Similarly, Ansar Dine rejected the MNLA goal of a secular Azawad state

and insisted on establishing its version of sharia law.

MNLA wasdiscreditedby some journalists in 2013 due in part to financial constraints and its decision to endmilitary

operations in April 2012. However, as Al Jazeera notes, the groups primary goal of Tuareg autonomy remains un-

addressed in a political process. MNLA still enjoys support for its autonomous goals domestically and abroad. It cur-

rently occupies theKidal regionwith relative impunity. When French and Chadian forces began to withdraw forces in

mid-2013, MNLA took over the tasks of administering Kidal. On 13 May 2013, the Malian armydeployedtroops to the

area to take control of the region. Reuters reported the town is under an awkward joint occupation by MNLA and

French troops on 19 May. MNLA appears to maintain its secular position, with the chief goal of establishing a Tuareg

state in the north, or at least carving out space for Tuaregs to participate in Malis political sphere. Additionally, its sup-

port abroad is notable. Traors twitter account denounced the group, but French President Franois Hollande com-

mendedthem for fighting alongside French and Malian troops. Since April 2013, MNLA hasrefused to disarm. The

Traor administration said it is open tonegotiationswith MNLA, but only if the group first disarms. Chief negotiator
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorismhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libyahttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libyahttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libyahttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/20122416445129368.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-mali-idUSBRE82U05U20120331http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-mali-idUSBRE82U05U20120331http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17576725http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17576725http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17576725http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htmhttp://www.france24.com/en/20120612-northern-mali-peace-dealer-or-wrecker-nine-lives-ansar-dine-chief-iyad-ag-ghalihttp://www.france24.com/en/20120612-northern-mali-peace-dealer-or-wrecker-nine-lives-ansar-dine-chief-iyad-ag-ghalihttp://www.france24.com/en/20120612-northern-mali-peace-dealer-or-wrecker-nine-lives-ansar-dine-chief-iyad-ag-ghalihttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/the_man_who_brought_the_black_flag_to_timbuktu?page=0,0http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/the_man_who_brought_the_black_flag_to_timbuktu?page=0,0http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/the_man_who_brought_the_black_flag_to_timbuktu?page=0,0http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2E5T3FzSZKJ-OhCpfHOdsoA0idA?docId=CNG.479d25a6bbe0d8ec222921f745502da0.1f1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2E5T3FzSZKJ-OhCpfHOdsoA0idA?docId=CNG.479d25a6bbe0d8ec222921f745502da0.1f1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2E5T3FzSZKJ-OhCpfHOdsoA0idA?docId=CNG.479d25a6bbe0d8ec222921f745502da0.1f1http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/world/africa/mali-shrine-attack/index.htmlhttp://www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/world/africa/mali-shrine-attack/index.htmlhttp://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137398/susanna-wing/the-coup-in-mali-is-only-the-beginninghttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137398/susanna-wing/the-coup-in-mali-is-only-the-beginninghttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137398/susanna-wing/the-coup-in-mali-is-only-the-beginninghttp://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/25/dans-le-nord-du-mali-les-touareg-du-mnla-lancent-un-nouveau-defi-arme-a-l-etat_1634378_3212.htmlhttp://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/25/dans-le-nord-du-mali-les-touareg-du-mnla-lancent-un-nouveau-defi-arme-a-l-etat_1634378_3212.htmlhttp://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=_EgBZOWs8VA%3D&tabid=66http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=_EgBZOWs8VA%3D&tabid=66http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=_EgBZOWs8VA%3D&tabid=66http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/04/mil-120423-irin01.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/04/mil-120423-irin01.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/04/mil-120423-irin01.htmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18224004http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18224004http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18224004http://www.ihs.com/products/Global-Insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?ID=1065968128http://www.ihs.com/products/Global-Insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?ID=1065968128http://www.ihs.com/products/Global-Insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?ID=1065968128http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE94B0FL20130512http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE94B0FL20130512http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE94B0FL20130512http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/uk-mali-crisis-idUKBRE94I06320130519http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/uk-mali-crisis-idUKBRE94I06320130519http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/uk-mali-crisis-idUKBRE94I06320130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE94I06420130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE94I06420130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE94I06420130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-15/news/sns-rt-us-mali-rebelsbre92e10c-20130315_1_mnla-tuareg-rebels-interim-president-dioncounda-traorehttp://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-15/news/sns-rt-us-mali-rebelsbre92e10c-20130315_1_mnla-tuareg-rebels-interim-president-dioncounda-traorehttp://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-15/news/sns-rt-us-mali-rebelsbre92e10c-20130315_1_mnla-tuareg-rebels-interim-president-dioncounda-traorehttp://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-15/news/sns-rt-us-mali-rebelsbre92e10c-20130315_1_mnla-tuareg-rebels-interim-president-dioncounda-traorehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE94I06420130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE94I06420130519http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/uk-mali-crisis-idUKBRE94I06320130519http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE94B0FL20130512http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE83408B20120405http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.htmlhttp://www.ihs.com/products/Global-Insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?ID=1065968128http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18224004http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/04/mil-120423-irin01.htmhttp://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=_EgBZOWs8VA%3D&tabid=66http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/01/25/dans-le-nord-du-mali-les-touareg-du-mnla-lancent-un-nouveau-defi-arme-a-l-etat_1634378_3212.htmlhttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137398/susanna-wing/the-coup-in-mali-is-only-the-beginninghttp://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/world/africa/mali-shrine-attack/index.htmlhttp://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2E5T3FzSZKJ-OhCpfHOdsoA0idA?docId=CNG.479d25a6bbe0d8ec222921f745502da0.1f1http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/the_man_who_brought_the_black_flag_to_timbuktu?page=0,0http://www.france24.com/en/20120612-northern-mali-peace-dealer-or-wrecker-nine-lives-ansar-dine-chief-iyad-ag-ghalihttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17576725http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-mali-idUSBRE82U05U20120331http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/02/20122416445129368.htmlhttp://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libyahttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/timbuktu-al-qaeda-mali-libya-tuareg-Qaddafi-mercenaries-obama-arab-spring-economy-tourism-terrorism


4/9

June 2013 Page 4


for MNLA, Mahamadou Djeri Maiga, rejected the precondition, saying, Have you ever seen a group disarm before

negotiations take place?.

AQIM

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a Salafi-jihadist organisation led by Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known as

Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud). Its roots can be traced to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Calland Combat (GSPC2), armed militias that resisted the secular Algerian government in the 1990s. According to the

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), both groupsstrengthenedties with al Qaeda operatives in the early 2000s as their

campaigns became increasingly irrelevant in Algeria. A 2006 announcement by Ayman al-Zawihiri, a top leader for al

Qaeda, made the offers of allegiance official. As the CFR explains, The merger, and the new moniker underscoring the

Islamic Maghreb, symbolised the groups efforts to move beyond the Algerian conflict and focus on jihadist aspira-

tions in the broader region. AQIM senior leadership comprised mostly of Arabs, many of whomtrainedin Afghanistan

during the Soviet war. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that most, if not all, of the senior leaders are

Algerian-born. The mujahidin transplants,

although not often popular with Tuaregs

and other ethnic groups indigenous to the

Sahara, proved formidable opponents for

theunder-equippedMalian army. Neverthe-

less, prior to 2011, the insurgency struggledto gain widespread support across Mali and

the Sahel, a region whose inhabitants tradi-

tionally practice moderate forms of Islam.By early 2012, AQIM lent support to Ansar

Dine, primarily in the form of fighters and

finances. In return, Ansar Dine, the Tuareg

militia whose leaders maintain roots with

communities across Mali and the Sahel, lent

AQIM legitimacy with local populations

that it had previously been unable to win

over.

As the loose coalition of Tuareg fighters

moved across northern Mali, AQIM co-

opted elements of the insurgency, providing

funds, weapons and guidance to various

factions before eventually emerging as one

of the strongest armed cells in the region.

By April 2012, AQIM or its proxies were

believed tocontrolTimbuktu. According to

the AP, senior leaders like Mokhtar Bel-

mokhtar, whomastermindedthe attacks against the Algerian In Amenas gas plant in January 2013, carried out military

and kidnapping operations throughout the Sahara under the orders of al Qaeda central. US Africa Command General

Carter Ham and former UN envoy Robert Fowler, attest to the continental goals of the insurgency and its ability to op-

erateacross much of the Sahara and North Africa, providing funds and directives to groups like al Shabaab in Somalia

andBoko Haramin Nigeria. To date, AQIM has suffered dramatic setbacks from Operation Serval but still poses dy-

namic, if latent, threats. Documents dubbed AQIMs Sahara Playbook,uncoveredby the AP in February 2013, re-

vealed schisms in the group over how quickly to implement sharia law and how best to manipulate local populations.

Droukdel, believed to be the primary author of the documents, rightly predicted that territorial gains by AQIM might

incite a foreign intervention. The manifesto3 provides clear instructions for group members in the event of a foreign

operation, and asserts that insurgents will flee into the desert with intentions to return. The document details foreign

policies and encourages group members to attract local allies, adopt moderate rhetoric, and integrate qualified indi-

viduals into the broader insurgent network.

2 The group is known commonly cited by its French name and acronym: Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat(GSPC).3 Themanifestowas published by theAPand remains invaluable open source document researchers, analysts and policymakers.

Source:PolGeonow
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r025%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(03-JAN-13).pdfhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r025%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(03-JAN-13).pdfhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r025%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(03-JAN-13).pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/aqmi/doc/09Dec_Hajji.pdfhttp://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/aqmi/doc/09Dec_Hajji.pdfhttp://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/aqmi/doc/09Dec_Hajji.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdfhttp://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/02/201321984743627825.htmhttp://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/02/201321984743627825.htmhttp://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/02/201321984743627825.htmhttp://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/primer-on-jihadi-players-in-algeria-mali/http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/primer-on-jihadi-players-in-algeria-mali/http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/primer-on-jihadi-players-in-algeria-mali/http://www.france24.com/en/20130116-foreigners-kidnapped-militants-bp-algeria-japan-francehttp://www.france24.com/en/20130116-foreigners-kidnapped-militants-bp-algeria-japan-francehttp://www.france24.com/en/20130116-foreigners-kidnapped-militants-bp-algeria-japan-francehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r028%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(21-FEB-13).pdfhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r028%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(21-FEB-13).pdfhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r028%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(21-FEB-13).pdfhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/timbuktu-al-qaida-left-behind-strategic-planshttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/timbuktu-al-qaida-left-behind-strategic-planshttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/timbuktu-al-qaida-left-behind-strategic-planshttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/salafist.asphttp://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/salafist.asphttp://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/salafist.asphttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/mali-conflict-map-update-may-2013.htmlhttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/salafist.asphttp://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdfhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/timbuktu-al-qaida-left-behind-strategic-planshttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r028%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(21-FEB-13).pdfhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-security-qaeda-idUSBRE86408D20120705http://www.france24.com/en/20130116-foreigners-kidnapped-militants-bp-algeria-japan-francehttp://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/primer-on-jihadi-players-in-algeria-mali/http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TRANSCRIPT-ACSS-Roundtable-1-%E2%80%93-Clarifying-the-Forces-of-Instability-in-Mali.pdfhttp://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/02/201321984743627825.htmhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdfhttp://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/aqmi/doc/09Dec_Hajji.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder/Documents/r025%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(03-JAN-13).pdfhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-mali-reconciliation-idUSBRE93N13P20130424


5/9

June 2013 Page 5


MUJAO

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) splintered from AQIMin 2011, led by militants disen-

franchised by a perceived lack of recognition from the larger al Qaeda apparatus. Initially the group carried out its cam-

paign in Algeria, where the majority of its attacks took place until April 2012. In general, MUJAO fighters lack the

training and sophistication of AQIM jihadists. Its goals and objectives are incoherent, but its treatment of both Western

forces and Malian residents has been marked by brutality. Similar to Ansar Dine, the group shares strong ties withAQIM. Its fighters hail from Morocco, Mauritania, and Western Sahara and comprise a range of ethnic groups.Son-

ghais represent the majority of the militia and interact with locals in an effort to brand MUJAO members as black,

southern Malians. After taking the city of Gao and surrounding territory, which emerged as their stronghold, the group

implemented an intolerant form ofsharia lawto include flogging, amputating and enslaving many residents.Local citi-

zens were quick to support Western efforts that routed the much-despised militia after the French intervention. The

group was largely defeated by January 2013. However, Foreign Policy (FP) suggested in March 2013 that MUJAO

might pose agreater securitychallenge than AQIM in the coming months and years. According toFP, It is Mujao that

may prove to be the most durable and destructive group going forward. Amply funded and guided by a subversive mix

of ideology and illicit economic interests, Mujao has come to embody one of the most disquieting truths about militant

Islam here. Andrew Lebovich, a researcher and Sahel expert, supports the claimthat MUJAO could entrench itself as a

long-time counterinsurgency. With speculated ties to illicit cocaine, he suggests the group uses jihadism as a cover for

itsdrug trade.

Current Status of Governance and Security

Political Roadmap and July 2013 Elections

In January 2013, the Malian government released a roadmap for political stabilisation. The document was adopted

unanimously by the National Assembly. On 14 February, it agreed to hold presidential and legislative elections and

complete the transition processby 31 July 2013. The two major objectives of the roadmap are elections and the re-

establishment of territorial integrity across the entire Malian state. Members of the interim government are ineligible to

run for office. President Traor has repeatedly stated the country will be prepared to host elections inJuly 2013. On 19

April, hereassuredrepresentatives from the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and ECOWAS that a presiden-

tial vote is planned for 07 July with legislative elections to follow on 21 July. On 14 May, he amendedthe presidential

election date to 28 July, days before the 31 July deadline for transition. UN special envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi,

warnedthat elections were difficult, but possible. Despite the cautious optimism, critics point to severalfactorslikely

to preventcredible electionsfrom taking place in July: nearly half a million Malians remain displaced, security condi-

tions are tenuous and state institutions lack the infrastructure to organise polls. Additionally, July is a crucial agricultur-

al month for Mali, and voter turnout could be affected by flooding and impassable roads.

In late 2012, a four-partyworking group, the Support and Follow-up Group (SFG), was established between the UN,

AU, ECOWAS and EU to coordinate details associated with the roadmap. In addition to monitoring developments and

coordinating interagency efforts aimed at achieving political goals, the SFG undertakes a range of activities to motivate

government administrators to return to local offices, re-establish basic services such as health centres and schools, and

build public confidence in the police, gendarmerie and judiciary. Additionally, the government established a Dialogue

and Reconciliation Commission (DRC) in March 2013. Former ambassador Mohamed Salia Sokona chairs the thirty-

member commission that seek[s] reconciliation between all the Malian communities through dialogue. The group will

addresslong-held grievancesbetween northern and southern Malians. It will alsomonitorhuman rights in the country,

assess various social movements, attempt to include former combatants in social and political dialogue, and propose

programmes that assist victims of war. The DRC was welcomedby the AU andpraisedby the UN for appointing a

woman, Traor Umou Tour and a Tuareg, Meti Ag Mohamed, as its two vice-presidents. The two individuals representparticularly vulnerable groups. In the wake of the coup, women have experiencedsexual violenceand Tuareg minorities

have been victims of reprisal attacks by other ethnic groups who blame them for the March rebellion.

MINUSMA

The UN also established the UN Office in Mali (UNOM) to support the AFISMA operation and assist the long-term

political transitionoutlined by UN Security Council Resolution 2085. On 01 July 2013, the UN Multidimensional Inte-

grated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) will subsumeboth AFISMA and UNOM. MINUSMA will be the

third largest UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) currently deployed,comprising11,200 military troops and 1,440 po-

lice. The robust MINUSMA mandate charges the mission with: i) stabilising the Malian state; ii) opening a national

political dialogue; iii) holding elections; iv) protecting civilians; v) promoting human rights; vi) supporting humanitar i-

an assistance; vii) protecting cultural heritage; and viii) upholding justice. Additionally, aFrench contingentof 1,000
http://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://world.time.com/2013/05/08/the-day-the-music-died-malis-musicians-still-struggle-to-be-heard/http://world.time.com/2013/05/08/the-day-the-music-died-malis-musicians-still-struggle-to-be-heard/http://world.time.com/2013/05/08/the-day-the-music-died-malis-musicians-still-struggle-to-be-heard/http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gaohttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gaohttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gaohttp://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/08/22/trying-to-understand-mujwa/http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/08/22/trying-to-understand-mujwa/http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/08/22/trying-to-understand-mujwa/http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali-224/events-2627/article/mali-adoption-of-the-road-map-andhttp://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali-224/events-2627/article/mali-adoption-of-the-road-map-andhttp://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Mali%20-Transitional%20Support%20Strategy%202013-14.pdfhttp://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Mali%20-Transitional%20Support%20Strategy%202013-14.pdfhttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mali-leader-presidential-election-set-july-28-19176602#.UZoiySs4XV0http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mali-leader-presidential-election-set-july-28-19176602#.UZoiySs4XV0http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mali-leader-presidential-election-set-july-28-19176602#.UZoiySs4XV0http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130515-705453.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130515-705453.htmlhttp://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/04/30/july-elections-in-mali/http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/04/30/july-elections-in-mali/http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/04/30/july-elections-in-mali/http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Christopher_Fomunyoh_Testimony.pdfhttp://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Christopher_Fomunyoh_Testimony.pdfhttp://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Christopher_Fomunyoh_Testimony.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://ps.au.int/en/content/fourth-meeting-support-and-follow-group-situation-mali-19-april-2013http://ps.au.int/en/content/fourth-meeting-support-and-follow-group-situation-mali-19-april-2013http://ps.au.int/en/content/fourth-meeting-support-and-follow-group-situation-mali-19-april-2013http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130330/ex-diplomat-head-mali-reconciliation-commissionhttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130330/ex-diplomat-head-mali-reconciliation-commissionhttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130330/ex-diplomat-head-mali-reconciliation-commissionhttp://www.voanews.com/content/mail-launches-dialogue-construction-commission/1648866.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/mail-launches-dialogue-construction-commission/1648866.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/mail-launches-dialogue-construction-commission/1648866.htmlhttp://wadr.org/en/site/news_en/4522/Mali-chairman-of-the-dialogue-and-reconciliation-commission-appointed.htmhttp://wadr.org/en/site/news_en/4522/Mali-chairman-of-the-dialogue-and-reconciliation-commission-appointed.htmhttp://wadr.org/en/site/news_en/4522/Mali-chairman-of-the-dialogue-and-reconciliation-commission-appointed.htmhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201304180400.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201304180400.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201304180400.htmlhttp://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/speeches/Malihttp://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/speeches/Malihttp://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/speeches/Malihttp://www.dw.de/malis-sexual-violence-victims-left-to-themselves/a-16597380http://www.dw.de/malis-sexual-violence-victims-left-to-themselves/a-16597380http://www.dw.de/malis-sexual-violence-victims-left-to-themselves/a-16597380http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/pid/24203http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/pid/24203http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/pid/24203http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htmhttp://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-send-peacekeepers-risky-mali-conflicthttp://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-send-peacekeepers-risky-mali-conflicthttp://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-send-peacekeepers-risky-mali-conflicthttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22296705http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22296705http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22296705http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/04/26/un-security-council-unanimously-authorizes-un-mission-in-mali/http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/04/26/un-security-council-unanimously-authorizes-un-mission-in-mali/http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/04/26/un-security-council-unanimously-authorizes-un-mission-in-mali/http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/04/26/un-security-council-unanimously-authorizes-un-mission-in-mali/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22296705http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-send-peacekeepers-risky-mali-conflicthttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/pid/24203http://www.dw.de/malis-sexual-violence-victims-left-to-themselves/a-16597380http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/speeches/Malihttp://allafrica.com/stories/201304180400.htmlhttp://wadr.org/en/site/news_en/4522/Mali-chairman-of-the-dialogue-and-reconciliation-commission-appointed.htmhttp://www.voanews.com/content/mail-launches-dialogue-construction-commission/1648866.htmlhttp://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130330/ex-diplomat-head-mali-reconciliation-commissionhttp://ps.au.int/en/content/fourth-meeting-support-and-follow-group-situation-mali-19-april-2013http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Christopher_Fomunyoh_Testimony.pdfhttp://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/04/30/july-elections-in-mali/http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130515-705453.htmlhttp://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mali-leader-presidential-election-set-july-28-19176602#.UZoiySs4XV0http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malis-interim-president-says-country-will-be-ready-to-hold-elections-in-july-despite-doubts/2013/04/19/4e41260a-a8f9-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.htmlhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://www.ndi.org/malihttp://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Mali%20-Transitional%20Support%20Strategy%202013-14.pdfhttp://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali-224/events-2627/article/mali-adoption-of-the-road-map-andhttp://thewasat.wordpress.com/2012/08/22/trying-to-understand-mujwa/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gaohttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://world.time.com/2013/05/08/the-day-the-music-died-malis-musicians-still-struggle-to-be-heard/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/jihad_mali_al_qaeda_gao?page=0,1http://africacenter.org/2013/02/acss-panels-discuss-priorities-for-restoring-stability-in-mali/


6/9

June 2013 Page 6


troops will remain in the country with the authority to rapidly deploy on counterinsurgency missions if MINUSMA per-

sonnel come under imminent and serious threat. The parallel unit is modelled after French troops that remained in

Cote dIvoire after a UN PKO was deployed to the country in 2011. On 17 May, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon ap-

pointed Albert Gerard (Bert)Koendersof the Netherlands as head of MINUSMA. A West African expert, Koenders has

led the UN mission in Cte dIvoire since 2011. Additional preparations for the deployment are underway, with many

of the AFISMA troops expecting to transfer into the MINUSMA operation. However, US officials already expressedconcerns about their capabilities. According to theNew York Times, a high-ranking official from the Department of De-

fensetoldUS lawmakers that 6,000 AFISMA troops expected to be the core of the new mission are completely inca-

pable. Soldiers from Niger, Senegal and Togo currently operate in Gao and troops from Burkina Faso are in Timbuktu.

Meanwhile, risk consultant groups like Global Observatory warn againstprotracted military operationsthat undermine

long-term counterinsurgency goals by inflicting civilian casualties and disenfranchising indigenous populations.

Reprisal attacks and Ethnicity

Despite breakaway movements in the north,

the vast majority of Malis Tuaregs do not

seek independence from the state. So-called

republican Tuaregs are often torn between

national and ethnic identities, and many who

are loyal to the state now face retaliatory vio-lence. Most Tuaregs are light-skinned, making

them easilyidentifiablein contrast to the dark-

er-skinned populations in the south and other

dominant ethnic groups in the country. In the

1990s, ethnic Tuaregs who participated in sep-

aratist movements were targeted by the Malian

army in reprisal attacks. Many Tuaregs fear

they will be similarly blamed for the 2012

rebellion regardless of their involvement. Se-

curity concerns have led moderate Wahhabis4

to shave their beards and repress various reli-

gious practices. Arab, Peul and otherminority

ethnic groupsare also potential targets, reports

Al Jazeera.The Malian army has already been

accused of carrying out retaliatory attacks

against civilians in what appear to be well-

documented incidents of callous violence. The

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Hu-

man Rights (OHCHR)announceda serious escalation of retaliatory violence by government soldiers against minority

ethnic groups in March 2013. Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a scathing report in February 2013 thataccused

government soldiersof carrying out torture, summary executions, and enforced disappearances. The situation is com-

plicated by well-intentioned government efforts, such as atelephone hotlinewhere neighbours and citizen watch groups

can report suspected insurgents, according toIRIN. Unfortunately, in many instances the hotline was used to implicate

local citizens based solely on ethnicity. HRW called on the Malian government to investigate and prosecute perpetrators

of the reported assaults. To date, President Traor has said human rights abuses were committed only by foreigners,

principally AQIM-affiliated terrorists, and suggested that claims ofextrajudicial attackswere not carried out by Malian

security forces, but were imaginary, informsRFI. The issue remains a major task for MINUSMA in order to preventreprisal attacksand provide a public space for republican Tuaregs, and other ethnic minority groups, to participate in

Malian political life, according toNew Republic.

4 In Mali,Wahhabismis distinct from the more widely understood practice of Saudi-style Wahhabism. Therefore, what most Malians understand as

Wahhabism is a practice that is more socially and politically liberal than Saudi counterpart. Traditional Islam in Mali, so metimes referred to as

conservative Islam, does not advocate narrow interpretations of sharia law. It is often confused in Western media for Saudi-style Wahhabism, a

practice that has grown in popularity in the previous two decades, but by no means represents a sect practiced by the majority of the Malian popula-

tion today. In February 2013, Foreign Affairs summarised therelative temperanceof Malis religious majority stating, [Saudi-style] Wahhabism has

been on the rise, but the population has long practiced a more moderate form of Islam. Indeed, the radical influence ofreformist Islam has con-cerned moderate Muslims in Mali since at least 2001. These reformist efforts are often funded by Saudis or conservative Pakistani Salafists, as was

the case with Ansar Dine in the north and the radicalisation of its leader Ansar al Ghaly. However, fundamentalist Wahhabism remains unpopular

with most Muslims in Mali.

Source:Internal Displacement Monitoring Group
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sga1404.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sga1404.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sga1404.doc.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-aid.html?ref=global-homehttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-aid.html?ref=global-homehttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-aid.html?ref=global-homehttp://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/498-is-the-french-military-the-best-counterterrorism-response-in-mali.htmlhttp://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/498-is-the-french-military-the-best-counterterrorism-response-in-mali.htmlhttp://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/498-is-the-french-military-the-best-counterterrorism-response-in-mali.htmlhttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://books.google.com/books?id=2KFvJwi8_jwC&pg=PA255&lpg=PA255&dq=tuaregs+easily+identifiable+in+mali&source=bl&ots=gAQ_3YDiY1&sig=jJGErKBwJiLoopPZKikN62j44tI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=bACaUa29BJeq4AOluYCYBQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=tuaregs%20easily%20identifiable%20in%20mali&f=falsehttp://books.google.com/books?id=2KFvJwi8_jwC&pg=PA255&lpg=PA255&dq=tuaregs+easily+identifiable+in+mali&source=bl&ots=gAQ_3YDiY1&sig=jJGErKBwJiLoopPZKikN62j44tI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=bACaUa29BJeq4AOluYCYBQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=tuaregs%20easily%20identifiable%20in%20mali&f=falsehttp://books.google.com/books?id=2KFvJwi8_jwC&pg=PA255&lpg=PA255&dq=tuaregs+easily+identifiable+in+mali&source=bl&ots=gAQ_3YDiY1&sig=jJGErKBwJiLoopPZKikN62j44tI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=bACaUa29BJeq4AOluYCYBQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=tuaregs%20easily%20identifiable%20in%20mali&f=falsehttps://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44058#.UYQVlPJy32ohttps://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44058#.UYQVlPJy32ohttp://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44349#.UZoFZys4XV0http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44349#.UZoFZys4XV0http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44349#.UZoFZys4XV0http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97386/Killings-disappearances-in-Mali-s-climate-of-suspicionhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97386/Killings-disappearances-in-Mali-s-climate-of-suspicionhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97386/Killings-disappearances-in-Mali-s-climate-of-suspicionhttp://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/e4d25b004eded79b849a953a187502c4/Mali-defends-rights-record-against-UN-abuse-claims-20131303http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/e4d25b004eded79b849a953a187502c4/Mali-defends-rights-record-against-UN-abuse-claims-20131303http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/e4d25b004eded79b849a953a187502c4/Mali-defends-rights-record-against-UN-abuse-claims-20131303http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130313-malian-president-plays-down-un-atrocities-accusationshttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130313-malian-president-plays-down-un-atrocities-accusationshttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130313-malian-president-plays-down-un-atrocities-accusationshttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=J1Ipt5A9mLMC&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=history+of+Islam+in+Mali&ots=hsAkgUUg0Y&sig=KipkhoUNAV3CDd8dlfpmOr2pBHQ#v=onepage&q=Mali&f=falsehttp://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=J1Ipt5A9mLMC&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=history+of+Islam+in+Mali&ots=hsAkgUUg0Y&sig=KipkhoUNAV3CDd8dlfpmOr2pBHQ#v=onepage&q=Mali&f=falsehttp://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=J1Ipt5A9mLMC&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=history+of+Islam+in+Mali&ots=hsAkgUUg0Y&sig=KipkhoUNAV3CDd8dlfpmOr2pBHQ#v=onepage&q=Mali&f=falsehttp://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/making-sense-of-mali/http://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/making-sense-of-mali/http://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/making-sense-of-mali/http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://idmcnrc.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/mali-idmc-jan2013-1.jpghttp://idmcnrc.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/mali-idmc-jan2013-1.jpghttp://idmcnrc.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/mali-idmc-jan2013-1.jpghttp://idmcnrc.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/mali-idmc-jan2013-1.jpghttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/mar/21/when-jihad-came-mali/?pagination=falsehttp://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/14861/1/Democratization%20in%20Mali%20Putting%20History%20to%20Work.pdf?1http://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/27/making-sense-of-mali/http://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=J1Ipt5A9mLMC&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=history+of+Islam+in+Mali&ots=hsAkgUUg0Y&sig=KipkhoUNAV3CDd8dlfpmOr2pBHQ#v=onepage&q=Mali&f=falsehttp://www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fightinghttp://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130313-malian-president-plays-down-un-atrocities-accusationshttp://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/e4d25b004eded79b849a953a187502c4/Mali-defends-rights-record-against-UN-abuse-claims-20131303http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97386/Killings-disappearances-in-Mali-s-climate-of-suspicionhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/21/mali-prosecute-soldiers-abuseshttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44349#.UZoFZys4XV0http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/201321219391969768.htmlhttp://theafricanists.info/no-easy-solution-for-a-divided-mali/https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44058#.UYQVlPJy32ohttp://books.google.com/books?id=2KFvJwi8_jwC&pg=PA255&lpg=PA255&dq=tuaregs+easily+identifiable+in+mali&source=bl&ots=gAQ_3YDiY1&sig=jJGErKBwJiLoopPZKikN62j44tI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=bACaUa29BJeq4AOluYCYBQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=tuaregs%20easily%20identifiable%20in%20mali&f=falsehttp://www.icwa.org/ltrHA-8o.asphttp://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/498-is-the-french-military-the-best-counterterrorism-response-in-mali.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-aid.html?ref=global-homehttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sga1404.doc.htm


7/9

June 2013 Page 7


International Support

International donorspledgedUSD 4.2 billion for peacebuilding and stabilisation programmes in Mali on 15 May at a

much-anticipated diplomatic conference in Brussels. The dollar amount far exceeds the USD 2.5 billion the Malian

government hoped it would raise. The donor conference was hosted jointly by the EU and France and attended by Mali-

an officials and dignitaries from more than a dozen countries. President Traor told the AP, This conference was a total

success. The biggest donors included the EU, France and the United Kingdom, whichpledgedUSD 675 million, USD363 million and USD 195 million, respectively. Additionally, Germany and the United States are expected to commit

USD 128 million and USD 180 million in 2014. At the conference, Malian officials talked extensively about the need

for roads, schools and long-term investment. Although funding details were not immediately released, projects will like-

ly focus on infrastructure, agriculture and reconciliation efforts, as well as those that target the countrys ethnic minori-

ties.

Humanitarian Situation

The emergency response to the humanitarian crisis that unfolded in 2012 was largelyunder-funded, based on figures

compiled by the UN Financial Tracking Service. According to the UN, the conflict affected several million people;

747,000 required immediate food assistance and over 1.3 million were at risk of food insecurity. The situation has im-

proved, but remains volatile, particularly in the Gao and Kidal regions, according to a March 2103 report from the Se c-

retary-General. In May 2013, just sixty per cent of Gaos population had access to a clean water supply, raising con-cerns about the possibility of acholera outbreak. Oxfam, an international humanitarian and development organisation,

announced in May 2013 that the humanitarian responseremainedunder-financed and that food security would escalate

from a crisis to an emergency by July 2013 if food and nutrition levels were not improved. Currently, one in five

households lacks adequate food and the UN has received less thanthirty per centof its requested USD 410 million for

the 2013 fiscal year. The EUestimates4.2 million Malians are at risk of hunger and 585,000 require immediate assis-

tance.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported key sectors that were overlooked in-

cluded public health and water and sanitation (WASH), where only 51 per cent and 57 per cent of pledges were met,

respectively. Only six per cent of education appeals were funded in 2012, but this was likely due to the inability of stu-

dents to attend school. A shortage of teachers in the north, many of whom fled, shut down schools for 700,000 students.

Additionally, armed groups actively recruited children, according to the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF).

From the north, we have heard horrifying reports of human rights violations, recruitment of children and rising sexual

violence, said Jens Laerke, spokesperson forOCHA.

Although millions remain at risk, especially in Malis north, the humanitarian situation has stabilised in recent months.

In February 2013, World Food Programme (WFP) opened a newland routefrom Niamey, Niger, increasing the volume

of its food assistance delivery. Prior to February, it had operated land and river operations to deliver humanitarian sup-

plies, but its reach was largely limited to Timbuktu and the surrounding areas. Many groups pulled out of northern Mali,

but several international organisations operated ininsurgent-controlled zonesduring 2012 and 2013.5 Each NGO nego-

tiated with all parties, in some cases at a village-by-village level, to ensure it had humanitarian access to populations

when such access was denied to UN and government officials. According to some non-governmental organisations

(NGOs), the French-led interventionhamperedemergency humanitarian efforts because local authority structures were

disrupted. NGOs in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal are still endangered when cooperating with government entities because

of threats from armed militants and are instead attempting to coordinate with traditional authorities. Outside of these

three regions, gaining access is less of a challenge. In 2012, WFP provided over one million people with assistance dur-

ing adevastating drought. In 2013, it plans to coordinate with 15 partners6 to deliver aid to at least 500,000 Malians.

As Operation Serval drew to a close, international organisations announced thatbanditry and criminalitywere on the

rise just as avenues for aid delivery were expanding. According to IRIN, Banditry includes attacks on vehicles up and

down the Niger river valley and along certain routes, such as the main road from Gao to Kidal. Threats also include

improvised explosive devices and mines in parts of Gao. Illicit trafficking in cigarettes, drugs and other contraband are

likely to pick up again. Difficulties to deliver assistance could place populations at risk and destabilise the political

process.

5 According toIRIN, these included:Mdecins sans Frontires/Doctors Without Border (MSF), International Committee of the Red Cross ( ICRC),Mdecins du Monde (MDM), Action Against Hunger (ACF), and Solidarit International.6 CARE, Africare, Handicap International, Islamic Relief, Solidarits International, Action Contre la Faim, OXFAM, Norwegian Church Aid, M-

decins du Monde, ACTED, CSPEEDA, ADR, REACH, World Vision and AMRAD.
http://www.voanews.com/content/donors-gather-for-mali-aid-conference/1661214.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/donors-gather-for-mali-aid-conference/1661214.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/donors-gather-for-mali-aid-conference/1661214.htmlhttps://bigstory.ap.org/article/intl-community-meets-effort-rebuild-malihttps://bigstory.ap.org/article/intl-community-meets-effort-rebuild-malihttps://bigstory.ap.org/article/intl-community-meets-effort-rebuild-malihttp://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R3_A972___19_May_2013_(02_04).pdfhttp://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R3_A972___19_May_2013_(02_04).pdfhttp://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R3_A972___19_May_2013_(02_04).pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary-General%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Mali%20S%202013%20189.pdfhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45011&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.UaTs_GQ4XV0http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45011&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.UaTs_GQ4XV0http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45011&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.UaTs_GQ4XV0http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/press-release-27-may-2013.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/press-release-27-may-2013.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/press-release-27-may-2013.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01.05.13.%20Humanitarian%20External%20update%20Mali.ENG_.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01.05.13.%20Humanitarian%20External%20update%20Mali.ENG_.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01.05.13.%20Humanitarian%20External%20update%20Mali.ENG_.pdfhttp://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=985http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=985http://fts.unocha.org/pa

Date post:	03-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	nato-civil-military-fusion-centre-archive
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times