University of Stavanger
uis.no
Challenges and possibilities in road tunnel safety
management:
The case of Norwegian road tunnels
Ove Njå Professor Risk Management and Societal Safety
1
Assumptions and prescriptive challenges
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2.3.4. Shelters without an exit leading to escape
routes to the open shall not be built.
Directive 2004/54/EC
Some issues
Self-evacuation and prescriptive emergency response
strategies have not been properly assessed in tunnel safety
planning
Performance assessments of risk reducing measures are weak
Knowledge based tunnel safety planning need considerations
with respect to: Emergency response principles, particularly the co-operation principle
Design principles
Knowledge criteria for various actors
5
Principles
Principium (lat)
Norwegian principles important for tunnel designs Self regulation
Self rescue
Cooperation
Universal design
Which impacts have these principles?
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Functional requirements - examples
Human capabilities/prerequisites shall be used as a basis for the tunnel designs; human capabilities in traffic, tenability related to physical forces, toxins, stress etc., and the human ability to cope with critical situations.
The Zero vision assume protection against serious consequences from errors. The tunnel must be designed with barriers against such consequences. The tunnel walls are of specific challenge.
Alarms shall be given in a way that all involved road users will understand the situation and then evacuate to safe shelter.
An efficient cooperation within and across organisations and resources able to respond to accidents, is a superior design requirement for the tunnel.
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Workshop on tunnel safety 2015 (Svela, Njå & Berg 2016)
“How do representatives from responsible road tunnel fire and rescue services express their uncertainties and expectations?”
Little knowledge about traffic conditions, road-user behaviour and contents of goods
Understanding the risk and vulnerability analyses
Comprehension of ventilation strategies
Situation awareness when meeting a tunnel with smoke coming out
The self-rescue principle balanced against fire fighting and rescue operation – ventilation strategies
Interaction between the traffic control centre and the emergency centre – lack of training
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Emergency Preparedness
Emergency response
plans
Emergency services (public and private)
Competencies
Training Equipment
Self-rescue principle
Norwegian Government (Ministry of Transport and Communications)
Directorates and Inspectorates (Directorate of Public Roads,
Directorate for Civil Protection)
Regional Authorities (County Council, County Governor)
Local Authorities (Municipality, fire department)
Company Management
(Norwegian Public Road Administration - NPRA)
Project Management
Design, Documentation
Implementation and assurance
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
SYSTEM OPERATIONS
Government Reports Lobbying Hearings and open meetings Accidents
Legislation
Regulations Standards
Certification
Legal penalties
Certification Info. Change reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Regulations Certification
Change reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Regulations Certification
Change reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Safety Policy Standards Resources
Status Reports Risk Assessments
Incident Reports
Safety Standards
Hazard Analyses Progress Reports
Safety Constraints Standards
Test Requirements
Test Reports Hazard Analyses Review Results
Norwegian Government (Ministry of Transport and Communications)
Directorates and Inspectorates (Directorate of Public Roads,
Directorate for Civil Protection)
Regional Authorities
(County Council, County Governor)
Local Authorities
(Municipality, fire department)
Government Reports Lobbying Hearings and open meetings Accidents
Legislation
Regulations Standards
Certification Legal penalties
Certification Info. Change reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Regulations Certification
Change reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Regulations Certification
Supervision Reports Whistle blowers Accidents and incidents
Company (Norwegian Public Road Administration - NPRA)
Safety Policy Standards Resources
Operations Reports
Operations Management
Work Instructions
Change requests Audit report Problem reports
Operating Process
Human Controllers (VTS)
Automated Controller
Actuatorss
Sensors
Physical
Process
Hazard Analyses Documentation Design Rationale
Maintenance and Evolution
Manufacturing Management
Manufacturing
Operating Assumptions Operating Procedures
Revised operating procedures
Revised operating procedures
Revised operating
procedures
Software revisions
Hardware replacements
Problem Reports Change Requests
Incidents Performance Audits
Hazard Analyses Safety-Related Changes
Progress Reports
Work procedures
Safety reports Audits Work logs Inspections
Policy, standards
System thinking
Fire Protection and Safety in Tunnels 2016
T=0
t
t1
Observations/statistics
DATA:
Expert judgements
Specific studies
Local knowledge
Theories/models
etc.
Risk?
Uncertainty?
( )
( )
P A
EX
P KX x
Perspectives on risk
- Probability of event A – Fire in tunnel
- Expected smoke dispersion from the fire
- Distribution of X given knowledge K
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Quality of the report systems
64
88
21
54
39
57
43
37
37
72
55
25
49
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Australia
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Reunion
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
Percent of hospital treated injuries reported in official road accident statistics
Rune Elvik & Anne B. Mysen, 1999
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Concluding remarks
Tunnel
safety
System-
perspective
Risk and uncertainty
• Relative frequency
• Propensity
• Probability theory
• Stochastic models
• Fuzzy-logic
• Prel. hazard analysis
Empiricism
Social-
constructivism
System performance
• Scenarios
• Functional requirements/
constraints
• Coherence theory
• Performance/capabilities
Critical
realism 15