Challenges in Radar ESM Processing
R. Cassels
Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences
27th March 2013
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Overview
What is ESM?
Radar Systems
• Basics
• Improving Performance
• Trends
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Systems
Selected Problems
Questions
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What is ESM?
Electronic Warfare (EW)
• Use the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum to increase survivability of friendly forces
whilst denying its use to an adversary
• Electronic Support (ES)
– Use EM spectrum to give situational awareness
– Used to be called Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
• Electronic Attack (EA)
– Prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum
• Electronic Protection (EP)
– Preventing others’ EA from affecting friendly systems
Radar ESM
• Detect radar emissions to provide situational awareness
– Types, behaviour, location
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Radar in the Airborne Environment
Other uses for radar too
• Shipping
• Ground penetrating
Surveillance
• Civilian
• Military
Air Defence
• Tracking
• Illumination
• Control & Communications
Airborne
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Radar Basics
Need to determine:
• Location (Range, Bearing, Elevation)
• Velocity (Radial & Tangential)
Send out a pulse of radio energy and “listens”
for the echo
Location:
• Beam width (azimuth, elevation)
• Time of flight
Velocity:
• Doppler
• Tracking
c
Rt f
2
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Pulse Width (PW)
Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI)
Peak Pulse Amplitude
General Pulse Characteristics
Envelope of the pulse train
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Radar Performance
Range
Impact of PRI
Measurement Resolution
• Angle
• Range
• Velocity (radial)
Number of targets
Update rate
Search time
min
2
22 444S
G
RR
GPt
min
3
224
4 S
GPR t
100μs
15km
Blue Transmitted
Green 15km Return
Red 60km Return
t
rSc
2
PW
D
kBW
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Improving Radar Performance
Desirable to
• Increase range
• Reduce power
• Improve resolution
• Update more often
• Search faster
Other considerations
• EP: how to protect against jammers?
– Prevent detection
– Agility
• Imaging
– Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
Bursts
• Increased integration time
• Staggers
Intrapulse modulation
• Phase modulation
• Frequency modulation
min
3
224
4 S
GPR t
rSc
BW2
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Miscellaneous Radar Topics
Modes
• Multi-mode radars
• Track-while-scan
Operating Frequency
• Stealth
• Interference
Missile Guidance
CW Radar
Monopulse
Su
rve
illa
nce
Ra
da
rs
(Acq
uis
itio
n)
Counter Stealth
Surveillance Radars
(Early Warning and Acquisition)
B C D E F G H I J K L M
Older
FSU SAM FS
U S
AM
(G
uid
an
ce)
Air Defence
(Acquisition,
Tracking,
Guidance)
AI
FS
U A
I
SHOR-
ADS
Futu
re A
ir
De
fence
Future
Seekers
0.25 0.5 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 20 40 60 100 GHz
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ESM System
Aim?
• Detect
• Identify
• Locate
• Track Behaviour
Problems?
• Bandwidth
• Timing
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ESM Receivers
To Processing
Analogue
Front End
(Frequency
Selective)
Envelope
Extraction
Pulse Parameter
Measurement
Frequency
Measurement
Analogue
Front End
Analogue
Front End
(Frequency
Selective)
Envelope
Extraction
Pulse Parameter
Measurement
Frequency
Measurement
To Processing
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ESM Receivers
Envelope
Extraction
Pulse Parameter
Measurement
Frequency
Measurement
Analogue
Front End
Analogue
Front End
(Frequency
Selective)
Pulse Parameter
Measurement FFT Digitisation
To Processing
To Processing
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ESM Receivers
Analogue
Front End FFT
Pulse Parameter
Measurement Digitisation To Processing
To Processing
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ESM Receivers
Features
• Limited resolution in time and frequency
• Limited number of simultaneous pulse measurements
• Possibly limited bandwidth
“Dumb” systems
• Not capable of distinguishing between signal types
– e.g. GSM burst vs. radar pulse
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Deinterleaving
Resolving multiple signals
• Some easily separated
– By frequency
– By angle of arrival
• Some still mixed
– Must be separated
Gets harder
• Bursts – intermittent
• Multiple similar emitters
• Receiver has limited granularity
• Staggers, Jitters
• Agile emitters
AOA
RF Data Clusters
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Historic Technique
Identifies pulse trains from easiest to hardest
• Stable Trains are found first
• Staggered Trains next
• Jittered Trains next
• Finally, complex trains
Based on basic statistical techniques
• Histogramming
• Very opaque
• Tuned over time to each set of receiver hardware
Works well in low density pulse environments
Naïve – Only basic “models” included
No uncertainty measure exported
• Try to report only very certain conclusions
• Much data discarded
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Tracking and Classification
Identified pulse trains (Intercept Reports) checked against library of emitters
• Gathered from intelligence work
• Updated regularly
• Effectively these are pulse train templates
Intercept reports used to update previous tracks first
• If no match, a new track is formed
• Stable tracks will be presented to the pilot
Problems
• Ambiguity in models
• Difficult to assign confidence as the intercept reports have no uncertainty information
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Geolocation
Desire to locate threat systems
• To avoid missile engagements
Currently
• Use interferometry to get successive angles
– Use these to triangulate
• Use time difference and/or phase difference to get angle/range
Problem
• Many types of emitter are very similar
– e.g. maritime radar
• Hard to associate pulses correctly
• Some pulse types will not get complete information
Historic approach
• Kalman filter based
• Assumes that good track association has been done
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Changing World
Software defined radar becoming more widespread
• Pulse train characteristics can more easily be changed
• Intelligence information easily outdated
Merging of the radar and communications bands
• Current systems cannot distinguish between signals
• More detailed processing needed
More emitters with intrapulse modulation
• Low SNR
• Harder for older receivers to detect
Longer range threats
• Also Low SNR
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What Does This Mean?
Historic techniques likely to become even less effective over time
• Classification might no longer be possible
– Still want to know the behaviour, however
• All data likely to be uncertain to some extent
– Need rigorous methods of modelling uncertainty
New techniques and analyses needed for analysis of raw sample data
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Possible Solutions
More complex “generic” models
• Choose models and parameters
Multi-hypothesis analysis
• To deal with ambiguity
Thresholding still needed
• To reduce data presented to the pilot
• Should be done as late as possible
– Improved performance
Slow-time detailed analysis of raw sample data
• Look for very low SNR (likely negative SNR) signals
• Needs ways to inform standard processing
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Conclusions
Historic techniques are insufficient for future systems and current systems in the future
Due to receiver technology, only incomplete, noisy, coarsely measured data is available
More powerful mathematical tools must be brought to bear
• Particularly those based on sufficiently rich models
• Must deal with the noisiness of the data
There are many more such problems in EW
Close work between industry and academia needed to solve these