Changing Politics of State ion

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The Changing Politics of States'Reorganization

Akhtar MajeedHamd ard University

This essay highlights the change in altitude, among the Indian ruling elite, in no longer treatingstates' reorganization as the emergence ofparochial identities. Different regions established their identityon the basis of anguage, culture, administrative coherence, economic development, or lack of it. Gradually,it has been recognized that the reorganization of states leads to good governance if such reorganizationstems rom administrative convenience, economic viability, similarity in developmental needs of a subregion,

and cultural-linguistic affinity.

In di a is not only large but also incredibly diverse. In religion, while it ispredominantly H indu, th ere are sizeable num bers ofSikhs, Jain s,Buddhists,Christians, and Muslims scattered thro ugh out the land. In language, Hind iis predominant but is spoken by only nearly one-half of the population.There a re nearly a score of official languages. Yet this broad brush does n otconvey the diversity present in most of India's states, regions, and localities.

After independence, the Union government's main concernwas to avoidanything like the partition that led to the creation of East andWest Pakistan.There was no question that India had to be a federation, if only foradministrative convenience. However, the hope of Jawaharlal Nehr u andhis colleagueswas that the various states would be large and hetero -geneous.Such "composite" states would discourage the emergence of parochialidentities. However, itwas not to be. As early as 1956, because of po pul arpressure, the 27 states were reorganized as 14 states that took account ofthe country's linguistic diversity. States' reorganization has co ntin ued .India is in constant flux as it creates new states in response to new de ma ndsfor autonomy.

Many countries have had difficulty in maintaining their national identityin the face of dem ands for autonomy and even secession. The Unit edKingdom has still not resolved what used to be called "the Irish Question."Canada remains unsure about the future of Quebec. Former federationssuch as the USSR and Yugoslavia collapsed. Nigeria's federation is un de rsiege. Western Europeans are moving toward a loose form of confederation,

but are worried about the integration of Eastern Europe, and still moreabout Muslim Turkey as a potential EU m ember.

How, then, has hetero geneo us India managed to remain intact? On eexplanation lies in what Indians call "states' reorgan ization ." This involvesboth the adjustment of state boundaries and the creation of new states,

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33:4 (Fall 2003)83


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both of which are the prerogative of the union go vernm ent ("the Cen ter").In the last decade, as Indiahas beco me less centralized, the politics ofstates'reorganization have changed.

Dur ing the first half a century of indepe nde nce, there weretwo opposingviews. One, held by the Center, was that states should be economicallyviable and administratively conven ient. The other, held by emerg inggroups, was that w here there is a sense of comm unity, or consciousness ofa separa te identity, the n, if feasible, that com munity should form a separatestate. The two views clashed, but over time, and often after violentconfrontations, the second view prevailed, and once the centralized

Congress party lost power, to be replaced by coalitions containingrepresentatives of the states, th e trad itional hostility of the Govern ment ofIndia to states' reorganization weakened.

TH E RELUCTANCE T O REORGANIZE:NATIONAL UNITY OR FEDERALISM?

In 2003, ther e were 28 states in the Indian union , togeth er with seven u nionterritories. In 1951, there had been 27 states, but the States' ReorganizationAct of 1956 reduced these to14. The number of states slowly increased, thelast thre e states being created in 2000. But whereas previous dem ands forstatehood had metwith hostility from the G overnm ent of India, these thr eestates were created without the usual fuss.

Throughout the world, there have been numerous arguments in favorof the formation or reorganization ofstates. Among them are geographicalproximity, a common language, similar usages and customs, comparablesocioeconomic and political stages of development, common historicaltraditions and experiences, a common way of living, administrativeexpediency, and , m ore than any thing else, a widely prevalent sentim ent of"togethern ess," that is, a sense of shared identity.

Until recently, the Government of India did not favor arguments basedon a common identity. Its preference was for administrative expediency. Itwas willing to establish large (50-100 millio n peo ple) heterogen eous (or"composite") states with no particular sense of identity, the aim beingadministrative decentralization, nor were those groups concerned withdev elop m ent any mo re receptive to argu me nts stressing identity. Th edemand that a region become a state was until recently treated as a threatto nationa l integr ation and co her enc e. A positive role was rarelyacknowledged for these demands, even though they generated politicalpartic ipatio n. At on e time or ano ther, all the national political partiesopp ose d the formation of new states. Wh enever the dem ands wereconceded, considerable struggle and much violence accompanied theprocess. There were charges of exploitation and counter-charges that themotives of those ma king the deman ds were pa rochial, fissiparous, and evenanti-national. There was much resistance from the union government.


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Th e Changing Politics of States' Reorganization 85

Even changes to state borders (one form of states' reorganization) toaccommodate people of the same language were granted very reluctantly.As early as 1947, the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, opposed theformation of states based on linguistic lines. He t hou ght it would lead tothe development of subnationalities that would ultimately agitate to becomesovereign states.1 This reluctance to accept th e linguistic basis of regionalism,for fear of generatin g radical mass upsurges, was understan dable . After all,in the 1920s, mass mobilization was precisely the purpose for which thenationalist elite had proposed reorganization of the provinces, as a tacticagainst foreign rule. Equating nationalism with the status quowas therefore

nothing new.The half-hearted reorganization of states in 1956 created the impression

of a reluctant Center bowing to the p ressures of "fissiparous tendencies" inthe regions of various states. The reorganization was "half-hearted" in thesense that it was almost forced upon a reluctant Center, and thereorganization was also not complete because all the linguistic areas werenot given territorial recognition. These regions were often not treate d aspolitically coherent units reflecting the aspirations of their inhabitants tomanage their own affairs. In this comp etition for resources, the regionsused several benc hmarks to establish their identity. They were language,culture, economic advancement, administrative coherence, and even thesocioeconomic backwardness of the region (due to its being part of a bigger

regional unit). Regional movements sparked demands for the formationof new states, and for t he reorganization of existingstates. These demandsdid not usually go beyond claiming resource sharing within the broadernatio nal context. In this, language was often the symbol giving expressionto these aspirations.

TH E RATIONALE O F THE DEMAND FOR REORGANIZATION

With 30 demands for new states being made currently, it may be time torethink In dia's federal structur e. The traditional view of the Cente r thatthe creation ofnew states encourages parochial and anti-national tendenciesneeds to be reconsidered because reorganization may serve goodgovernance if four requirements are met: (1) administrative convenience,(2) economic viability, (3) similarity in the developmental needs of a sub-region, and (4) cultural-linguistic affinity. Therefore, theview of the Ce nterthat the creation of new states encourages parochial and anti-nationaltendencie s needs to be modified, if not discarded. The arg um entis not forthe subdivision of larger states, even for administrative convenience.However, a demand for reorganization need not necessarily threaten theunity of the country. At the same time, it should be rem em bere d that

'R. D. King has discussed this at length in his Nehru and the language Politics of India (New Delhi :Oxford University Press, 1997). See also Selig Harrison,India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Pr inceton, NJ:Pr inceton Univers ity Press , 1960) .


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historically, states' reorganization has occurred for various reasons. Thesehave not necessari ly met the Center 's preference for "rationalreorganiza tion," nor have they always advanced good governance .

Whether the demand for a new state succeeds depends on much morethan rationality. Th e people must have becom e emotionally involved inthe process. They musthave developed a distinct sociocultural geographicalidentity. Th ere must be the perception of systemic neglect of the region(i.e., a sense of "internal colonialism"). There has to be a popular movementin favor of a new state. Finally, there have to be leaders able to ign ite andsustain such a movement.

A number ofstates (among them Assam, West Bengal, An dhra Pradesh,Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh) have witnessed demands for separate statesfrom identifiable re gions. Such regionalism has often eme rged as aconseque nce of "mal-development" and th e fear of some that they are beingleft out. When some ethnic groups move ahead more rapidly than others,parts of a region or state may not develop, leading to a distinguishableundevelo ped region. Such a region may cover a small area within a state,and may, for economic-geographical, linguistic, and social reasons, possessa distinct identity. Durin g the linguistic-regional agitations in An dhraPradesh and Maharashtra, for example, the claims and significance ofregional problems resulted from historical and econom ic factors. Theseenco urag ed the growth of political subcultures in unity of language, cultu re,and caste th at were ultimately represe nted by the new power elite.

Generally speaking, the national leadership never took into account theevolution of social, econom ic, and historical imbalances between historicallydefined region s in a state. Rather, the re was a slur red, rom anticunderstanding of India's historical ethos, and it is understandable, thoughregrettable, tha t those in powerwere reluctant to relinquish control to thosethey considered inferior.

Parts of India are inhabited by "tribals" and so-called "hill people" whooften are not par t of the m ainstream. They may live in particular reg ions ofspecific states. Such regions may dem and a separa te state if they feeldiscriminated against and deprived of development, and also if theyfeel thatthrough resource transfers, others are prospering at their expense. This iswhat has happened in regions such as Marathawada, Vidarbha, and Konkam(in M aharashtra), Jhark hand (in Bihar), and Chhattisgarh (in MadhyaPrad esh). The d eman ds for statehood by tribal people in Jhark and, an d byhill people in Uttaran chal, have been based on th e percep tion that they havebeen victims of internal colonialism by other regional and cultural groups.

Th ere are oth er p arts of India that are quite prosperous. Here , a relativelyrich region (in terms of resources or agricultural and industrial output)may resent having to support a backward region. An example of such aregion is one in the more developed western part of the state of UttarPradesh, on e that calls itself "Harit Pradesh."


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Th e Changing Politics of States' Reorga nization 87

T H E H I ST O R I C A L C O N T E X T:T H E E V O L U T I O N O F I N D I A N F E D E R A LI SM

With hindsight, these problems might not have cropped up if , instead ofthe linguistic states ' reorganization of 1956, the "rational reorganization"recommended by the Dar Commission's 1948Report on the Linguistic Provinceshad bee n widely accep ted. Th at rep ort stated:

Administrative convenience, history, geography, economy, culture andmany oth er m atters will have to be given du e weight. It may be th at theprovinces thus formed will also show homogeneity of language and, in a

way, might resemb le linguistic provinces. But, in forming the prov inces,the emphasis should be primarily on administrative convenience, andhom ogeneity of langua ge will ent er into consid eration only as a ma tter ofadministrative convenience and n ot by its own indepen dent forceE. [TheProvince] has to be financially self-supporting so as not to be a drag onthe Centre for its subsistence. . .A new province cannot be forced by amajority upon a substantial minority of the people speaking the samelanguage.2

To be fair, even the States' Reorganization Commission was in 1955 torec om m en d th e creation of "sizeable-compo site" states, with a self-sustainingeconom y. Right from th e start, the empha sis was on polit ical-economicviabili ty rather than on linguistic homogeneity.3 In 2000, Un ion Ho meMin ister L. K. Advani said t hat the

Creation of new states was not the prescription for development, butexperience showed that manageability and administrative viability wereindeed 'big factors' in ensuring better governance and meeting aspirationsof the people. . . The resolution by the State Assembly and economicviability were touchs tones for crea ting new states. Tho ugh there was noconstitutional bar on the Centre on creating new States, the go vernmen thad decided to go ahead only if the State Assembly recommended andforwarded such proposal.4

The Union government d id no t wi l l ing ly agree wi th the o r ig ina lreorga nization of states on linguistic lines that took place in 1956. Th eappointment of the States ' Reorganizat ion Commission had come aboutonly after muc h agitatio n. Even the comm ission itself did no t ma ke a veryconvincing case for l inguistic reorganization, and the recommendationsthat i t ma de app eare d h alf-hearted. Many of the linguistic claims were n otconsid ered. In some instances, such as Punjab, prop osals of the comm issionwere no t acce pted . However, beca use of pressu res f rom below, the

2B. Shiva Rao, The Framing ofIndia's Constitution: Select Documents (NewDelhi : Indian Ins t i tu te of Publ icAdministration, 1968), pp. 443 and 475.

H'he Nehru Committee Report,1928;Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission (Dar Rep ort), 1948;White Paper on Indian States, 1950; States' Reorganization Commission, 1955.

'"Chaltisgarh Bill Okayed,"The Hindu, 10 August 2000, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/08/10/sto ries/Ol 10000b.htm


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reorganization of states on a linguistic basis was adopted and continueduntil the 1970s.

After the linguistic reorganization,it did not take much time for dem andsto em erg e from minorities in various regions for the creation of addition alsmall states. Th e demands came from Andh ra Pradesh (Teleng ana),Mah arashtra (Vidharba and Marathwad a), Assam (Bodoland), West Bengal(G ork hala nd) , Jam m u and Kashmir (Jammu and Lada kh), Guajrat(Saurashtra and Kutch), and Uttar Pradesh (H arit Prade sh). However,because of the emphasis on economic viability, not until 2000 were regionsgrante d stateh ood because of their econom ic backwardness. That year sawthe creation of Chhattisgarh, Jha rkh and , and U ttaranchal.

HOW SIGNIFICANT HAS BEEN "INTERNAL COLONIALISM?"

Many of the demands for the formation of new states emanated from aperceived neglect, or what has been termed "internal colonialism." Theessence of this argum entis that the relationship between the dominant socialgroup in a region and the peripheral groups-particularly those living in anidentifiable territor ial entity-was character ized by exploitation . Th edominant group had acquired advantages over peripheral groups in theperiod of state-building, and then used this political-economic advantage tomaintain and en hanc e its dominant position. The demand for a separateTelengana was a classic example of the argum ent against internal colonialism.

Such an argument is more cogent if the ethnic group is not dispersedterritorially. It can then readily perceive greate r economic and politicalgains if it obtains grea ter regional autonomy. The deman ds for a separateMaharashtra out of greater Gujarat, and of Vidharba out of Maharashtra,reflect that phen om eno n. Where greater regional autonomy, in the formof a separate state, is not a viable strategy oris perceived as not imm ediatelypossible, dem and s have been mad e for prefere ntial treatm ent. TheTelenganites in Andhra Pradesh and the Shiv Sena, claiming to safeguardthe interests of th e M aharashtrans in the erstwhile Bombay, did just that.In both of these cases, there were fears among the native population ofshrinking jo b markets (for Telengana's working and lower middle classes)and elsewhere of threats to the status of the middle classes (theMaharash trans). The demand for a reorganization of the state of Assamwas no t based on language. Since the 1960s, the non-Assamese elite hadperceived a direct status threat from the Assamese elite's attempts to makeothe r ethn ic grou ps accept the Assamese language . Similarly, the dem andsfor Vidarbha, Marathawada, and Telengana were not based on language.The grievances expressed were economic in nature.

Thus , demands for separate states have emerged in areas that haveexperienced a rapid growth in the educational opportunities for the lowermiddle classes, enh anci ng their aspirations and expectations. However,


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The Changing Politics of States' Reorganization 89

these have not been fulfilled. Instead, thereis a high level of unemploym entamo ng the indigenous m iddle classes. M oreover, migrantswho are culturallyalien may hold a substantial number of middle-classjobs. In such areas,the magnifying of cultural differences becomes a political technique, awayof defining cultural (and consequently, political) identity. The strategy hasbeen to convert cultural differences into cultural, and thereby political,conflicts, thus em phasizing a distinct cultural identity that n eeds a separateterrito rial identity. Before articulating feelings of depr ivation, a region hasfirst to acquire an identity. Itis the role of the political elite in such areas toconstruct a regional identity and then to point out the neglect and

deprivation of the region because of being part of a bigger state. Thesegroups, in almost all such demands for separate states, have tried to usepoli t ical power to overcome economic subjugation and culturalsubordination by the territorially dominant group.

It is a fact that most of the demands for constituting new states havebeen based primarily on an allegedly unfair and unequal distribution ofdevelopment benefits an d ex penditures in multi-lingual "composite" states.If peop le have to live in the territory of the others, they may feel dominated.5

The success of their demands is related to the success of the elite inmarketing the perception of deprivation and in making what BenedictAnderson has termed an "imagined community" into a natural one.6

Because numbers count in a democratic process, the forging of severalidentities into a com mon identity is politically exped ient.

Jharkhand presents the best example ofthis phen om enon . H ere, tribalcultural identities, combined with the backward developmental profile ofthe reg ion, helpe d to forge a single distinct political identity. Over a periodof more than a century, the movement for social and political equality wastransformed into the movem ent for political freedom and, instead of a pan-tribal nature of ethnic identity, became a regional movement of tribalnationalism. By asserting that all tribals were mem bers of the Jhar kan dparty from birth , the Jha rkh an di elite was successful in constr ucting ageographical identity that encompassed various cultural identities. However,it became clear that by geographically including all the residents of thisregion as Jharkhandis, the non-tribal people would benefit more, due totheir educational and social advancement. The arg um ent that was earliergiven against a Jha rkh and state was based on the minority status of thetribals spread over Bihar's neighboring states of Orissa, West Bengal, andMadhya Prad esh. Consequen tly, the move to bro ade n th e base wasaban done d by the Jha rkh and elite. Even the dem and for a separate statewas put on the back burner. The flexible approach of the Jhark hand politicalelite became ap par ent when the Jhar kha nd party gave its supp ort to the

5Javed AJam, India: Living With Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 160.6B en ed i c t Ande r s on , Imagined Communities: Reflections on the O rigin and S pread of Nationalism ( L o n d o n :

Verso, 1983).


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government of Bihar, led by the Rashtriyajanta Dal (RJD) party, in returnfor that party's support for a Jhark hand state. Earlier, the RJD and its allieswere perceived as exploiters of the Jharkhand region. Now they were offeringtheir support for the new state. Of course, it helped that in the process theRJD government acquired the support it needed to remain in office.

ACHIEVING A SENSE OF REGIONAL IDENTITY

IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

Just as federal India is a composite, plural entity, so many states are basedon plural iden tities. In European nation-states, linguistic homogeneity has

often bee n t he const ituti onal an d legal basis of state formation andreorganizat ion. But in India, the states are often simply cohesive politicaland administrative entities, based not on one identity but on a synthesis ofdifferent identities.

Among the states that do claim to have their own distinctive culturalidentity are Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura, toge ther with the threenew states of Chhattisgarh, Uttaranchal, and Jha rkh and . Each has its owntraditions, dialects, and tribal and ethnic peculiarities. They are ecologicallydistinctive states.

There also are states that claim to be ethnically distinctive. Among theseare Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and Karnataka, based on language and dialect.Dravidian nationalism emanated from Tamil language and culture, andmade Tamil Nadu a good example of an ethnically exclusive state.

In an other group of states, including West Bengal, Gujarat, Karnataka,Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh, regional identities have been subsumedunder the dominant language, namely, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Marathi,and Telegu. In other words, minorities in the regions remained "imaginedcommunities," unable to create a common "we" in their region.

All of these states are what may be called "single-identity states." It is inthe large "composite" states like Bihar (with its tribals) and Uttar Pradesh(with its hill people in the Himalayan foothills) that the most dem andshave bee n ma de for new states. In the Jharkand region of Bihar, an at temptwas made to create a distinctive cultural and linguistic identity for the regionby creat ing a collective tribal consciousness of the Santhals, Mundaris, Hos,and Oraons. 7 However, because their contribution to a "Jharkhand identity"

was not enough, non-tribal (Sadan) communities were included.Among the hill people in Uttar Pradesh are the Garhwalis and Kumaonis.

These formed two distinct hill communities un til a new regional identity ofhill people was developed, making possible the new state of Uttarancha l. Itremains to be seen whether this merger of identities will sustain the state asa cohesive political entity. Wherever there is non-congruence of the peopleand the state, there is cause for apprehension.

'A . K. Singh, "Jharkhand Movement ,"Rethinking Indian Federalism, ed., R. Khan (Shimla: HAS, 1997),pp. 241-252.


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The Changing Politics of States'R eorga nization 91

The reorganization of a state, or the formation of a new one, resultsfrom the political assertion of a regional community. In India, itis explainedby a triangular relationship between the people, the territory, and the state.8

The re are num erous "eco-cultural" comm unities that have been identified9

as having distinct identities within the 28 states and seven union territories.Some of these are identifiable sociocultural regions tha tmay be , or in someinstances already are, the start ing point of demands for furtherreorganization ofstates. On the basis of "maximum homo geneities withinand maximum identity without," such regions reflect a set of variables:10

language or dialect, social composition of communities, ethnic regions,

demographic features, area contiguity, cultural pattern, economy andeconomic l ife, historical antecedents, poli t ical background, andpsychological make-up or felt consciousness of gro up identity. However,because the boun daries of these eco-cultural zones do not co rrespond withthe administrative boundaries of states, there is always the possibility offorming new states and/or reorganizing the existing state. Some attemptsto create commonalties of linguistic and political identities have notsucceeded in erasing historical ethnic-regional identities, for example inAn dhra Pradesh and Maharash tra. States may have been created, bu t"imagined communities" have yet to emerge.

Despite the claims of many states to be distinctive, only nine are culturallyand administrativelyso compact that there are no demands for the creationof new states. These states are Arunachal P radesh, Goa, Haryana, Him achalPradesh, Kerala, Punjab, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura . By contrast,there are six large "composite" states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, MadhyaPradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and U ttar Prad esh). In these six states,there are 28 regional groups demanding new states."

These six are big, artificially created states, based on an imagined senseof identity; yet they lack the aforementioned variables of homogeneity. Thei rheterogeneity is presumed to have contrib uted to the lack of identificationbetween the people and their state. It has led to demand s for mor e statesby people who question the legitimacy of composite states. A comm onlanguage may not be eno ugh. Linguistic identity in West Bengal alone hasnot precluded demands for separate states in Darjeeling-hills, Cooch-Bihar,Jalpa igur i, and Denajpur. Similarly, the recogni tion of linguistic states in

the 1950s was not able to forestall the demand for a separate state ofTelengana in Andhra Pradesh, or Vidharba-Marathwada in Maharashtra.8Ajay Kumar Singh, "Sub Regions,"Constitutional Nation Building: Half a Century of India's Success,ed. ,

Akhtar M ajeed (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2001), p . 121.9K. S. Singh, "Introduction,"National Series Vol. IV: India's Communities (New Delhi: Oxford University

Press, 1998), mentions 96 such zones.'"Rasheeduddin Khan, Federal India: A Design For Change (New Delhi: Vikas, 1992), p. 109."Demands for creation of more states out of these six states are/have been: (1) Andhra Pradesh:

Telengana, Andhra , Rayal Seema; (2) Bihar:Jha rkhand (dem and achiev ed), Mithila, Magadh; (3) MadhyaPradesh: Chhattisgarh (dem and achieved), Malwa, Dandkarnia, Bhilistan, Baghelkhand; (4) M aharashtra:Konkan, Khandesh, Marathwada, Vidharba; (5) Rajasthan: Mewar, Marwar, Mewat Aravallis; and (6) UttarPradesh: Uttaranchal (demand achieved), Bundelkhand,Braj, Oudh, Harit Pradesh, Rohilkhand, Bhojpur,Poorvanchal.


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WHY STATES' REORGANIZATION IS NOT UTOPIA

We have noted that dem ands for separate states develop when p eople of aregion have the perception that they are deprived, discriminated against,and exp loited by peop le from outside the region. However, it cann ot beargued that such "discrimination" or "exploitation" disappears once a regionbecomes a state. Statehood may not lead to any perceptible difference inthe condition of everyone, including those who may well have been thefoot soldiers in the ba ttle for a new state. Th e reorganization of states orthe creation of a new state in the name of inequality or identity has oftenbeen driven by a regional elite th at has hop ed to displace the existing elite.On ce successful in achieving the primary goal of coming to power, this elitemay not necessarily be successful (or interested) in improving the co nditionof the peop le generally, in providing a viable economy, or in pro mo ting amore representative government. Wh at has often happen ed has been simplythe repla cem ent of on e elite by another. It is usually the better off a mon gthe "backwards" (as they are often called) who corner the advantages ofdevelopment in the name of the other backwards and tribals.

It is questiona ble whether all sections and all groups within a state (evenone ostensibly constituted as a uniform ethnic-linguistic entity) share thesame values and the same concer ns. The assumption of a new exclusiveidentity may exclude some peripheral identities, and this can make somepeople feel m arginalized and deprived. This pheno me non is visible evenin the recently formed states of Jha rkh and and Chhattisgarh, where varioustribes (Mundas, Santhals, Horos, and Orans) are not on the best of terms.Not everyone shares the dominant culture; therefore, there is always thepossibility that such groups as Bengalis, Biharis, Marwaris, non-Santhals,and Christian tribals may feel discriminated against.

Som ething similar hap pened in northeast India after the division of Assaminto seven new states. Dissatisfaction continued among the Bodos, Deuris,and Misings in Assam; the Meitis and Kukis in Manipur; theMizos, Chakmas,and Hm ars in Mizoram; and th e Garos, Khasis, andjayantias in M eghalaya.In Sikkim, the Nepalis compe te with the Lepcha-Bhotias. The expressionof dissatisfaction by some groups often leads to similar reactions anddema nds by other s, who may not even be in contiguous territories. The

movem ent for separate states of Gorkha land and Kamtapur in West Bengalgot a boost from the formation of the three new states in 2000.There is no reason to believe that the creation of a large number of

small states will threa ten the integrity and viability of the country. Whenthe States' Reorganization Commission was constituted in the 1950s to findan acceptable basis for forming new states, it gave vent to the growingdemands for regional autonomy from different parts ofIndia. Although itaccepted language as a basis, itwas unable to provide an exclusive zone forevery linguistic group.


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A successful working of India's federal nation would involve administrativesubdivision of the largest states on the principles of regional auton omy andregional identity. The large, composite states face problem s of governance,and their very size may ham per econ omic develop men t. Today's UttarPradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan provide examples of stateswith problems. When the people are made partners in governance, thenation as such is stren gthen ed. Evidence that political m anage men t,governance, and economic development are managed better in a smallerstate is provided by the example of the state of Haryana, which until itscreation in 1966 was a backward region of Punjab. Comparable developmentis possible elsewhere with the decentralization of power, and may lessenthe demand s for separate states. One should not rush to assume thatgranting more administrative and fiscal powers to the states, or creating alarge num ber ofstates, would weaken th e country.

RECENT NEW STATES: LINGUISTIC HOM OGEN EITYVERSUS POLITICAL FACTORS

Even after the reo rgan ization of states on a linguistic basis, further dem andsfor linguistic homogeneity emerg ed. These strengthened regionalism, bothin terms of strength in unity and throu gh em otional frenzy. On on e ha ndare the positive examples of the creation of Maharashtra, P unjab, Haryana,and various states in the Northe ast. On the o ther h and, t here ar e the very

different experiences of Telengana and Vidharba, where economicgrievances and dem ands trium phed over linguistic homogeneity. Theemotional com mitm ent to languag e in a large state may get sidelined whenit is perceived that the demographic, cultural, and economic balance isbeing upset by an ailing regional economy. Th e assertion of a regionalidentity may be based on a comm on history of grievances em anatin g froman underdeveloped regional economy.

A num ber of regions have identities based not on language bu t on dialect.Among them are Bundelkhand,Braj, Bhojpur, Oudh, and Rohilkhand inUttar Pradesh; Malwa and Mahakoshal in Madhya Pradesh; Mai thai in B ihar;and Konkan in Maharashtra. All of them have an identity based on dialect,and yet they are economically and administratively viable. These regions

now have the same grievances, and the same aspirations, which th e earlierregions based on linguistic identities had shown. However, the targ et oftheir grievances is not so much the C enter as the state of which they are apart. In some cases, as in Uttaran chal, the Ce nter may even be perceived assympathetic because it was instrum ental in the creation of the state.

It would be interesting to find outwho is dema nding the reorganizationof big states, like Uttar Pradesh. The reis a view that such demands em anatefrom "outside" forces apprehensive of the large num ber of mem bers tha t abig state sends to P arliame nt.


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Ind ia's states were con stituted for various reason s, only on e of which wasl inguist ic homo genei ty. As pointed ou t by Rash eedud din Khan:

Together with language, many variables and critical factors like ethnic-cum-economic considerations (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur andTripu ra); religion-script and sentiments (Haryana and Punjab); language-cum-culture (Maharashtra and Gujarat); historical and political factors(Uttar Pradesh and Bihar); integration of princely states and the need forviable groupings (Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan); and, of course,language-cum-social distinctiveness (Tamil Na du, Kerala, Mysore, Bengaland Orissa) have played a decisive role in the composition of the Indianfederation.12

Th e exp erie nce of the three new states is interes ting. Th e dem an d for asepara te state of Chhattisgarh started in the 1950s. T he r egion is culturallydistinctive. However, the people who started and sustained the demand fora sep ara te state were the rich peasants, those who had long m ana ged thelocal affa i rs of the former rulers , f rom the Marathas to the Bri t ish .Traditionally, this group supported the Congress party, and it was theCongress party that first came to power in the new state.

For U ttaran chal, i t was the region's ecology-based eth nic identity, definedin terms of lack of dev elop me nt in the hills, which bec am e th e basis of thedemand for a separate state. The successive governments of Uttar Pradesh,of various polit ical parties, were blamed for the dev elopm ental neglect of

the Uttaran cha l region . W hen the new state was forme d, the gov ernm ent ofUttar Pr ad esh was of th e Bhartiya Jan ata party (BJP). Since at tha t time theBJP's government in the state was identified with the economic backwardnessof Uttaranchal, i t was the Congress party that succeeded in forming thegov ernm ent. Caste also played a part . In the unified Uttar Prade sh, theup pe r castes did not constitute a numerical majority, whereas in Uttara nchalthey did. They formed a traditional sup po rt grou p of the Congress party,which benefited electorally from the formation of the new state.

In Jh ar k ha nd , th e thi rd new sta te , the pol i t ical e l ite was for lo ngmarg inalized a nd h ad tried to align with different polit ical parties. Th eleaders then decided to disrupt the Jha rka nd economy. At this point , thenational political parties started taking them seriously. Because the BhartiyaJan ata party threw its weight beh ind the dem an d for a separate state, sup por tfor that optio n grew steadily in the Jh ar kh an d reg ion. Th e BJP ado pte dthe earlier position of die Jhar kh and party and forged a geographical identityencom passing b oth the tribal and non-tribal grou ps of the region. It assertedthat th e large size of a state l ike Bihar was detr ime ntal to its dev elop me ntprosp ects, and was successful in argu ing tha t the backwardn ess of the reg ionwas the result of po or gov ernan ce. Th e BJP's electoral platform prom isedq u a l i t y g o v e r n a n c e i n p l a c e o f p o o r m a n a g e m e n t a n d i n e f f ic i e n t

"Rashe eduddin Khan, "Territorial R eorganization,"Seminar 137 (January 1971): 28-32.


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Th e Changing Politics of States' Reorganization 95

implem enta tion of policies. It forcefully asserted its plea: "you have triedothers, now try us."

Many of the demands for new states have been due to disagreementsamo ng the undivided state's ruling elite. The regional elite has asserteditself against the state elite, claiming that eco nom ic backwardness is a resultof the region's political underr epre senta tion . The dem and for new statesin many undivided states has reflected dissatisfaction with the ruling elite.A similar situation has occurred in the No rtheast: the dem and for B odolandin Assam, for Goroland in Meghalaya, for Kukiland in Nagaland, and for aHamar state in Mizoram. All of them reflect the dissatisfaction of theregional elite with the existing power-distribution structure. The regionalleaders have dema nded a framework whereby powers are divided betweenstate and region.

Political factors rather than rationality often determine the nature ofanew state. In Uttarancha l, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or historicalhomogeneity was not taken into ac count when the district of Udh am SinghNagar was made par t of the state. T he districtwas a predominantly Punjabi-speaking Sikh area that wanted to remain in Uttar Pradesh to further Sikhbusiness interests. However, in order to make the new state economicallyviable, this region was incorp orated into U ttarancha l, thus creating am ongthe Sikhs a feeling of being exploited by the "others."

Such a perceptio n was not peculiar to Uttaranc hal. In all three of the

new states, the principle of natural and social hom ogeneity was not adh eredto fully. Perceptions persist that the re rem ained some territories, in adjacentstates, that should have been transferred to the new states on the principlesof compactness and hom ogeneity. Consequently, itwas perceived that stateformation was based not on objective considerations but because of politicaland electoral compulsions. Such a perception is not altogether unfou nded.In the creation ofnew states, there been no uniform principle and no clearand open practice.

During the 1950s, the appro achwas to accept the linguistic demands forseparate states and therefore speakers of languages such as Assamese,Bengali, Gujarati, K ashmiri, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Punjabi, Telugu,and Tamil were awarded sep arate states. At that tim e, similar claims bysmaller communities, such as those who spoke Konkani, Bhojpuri, andMaithili, were not recognized. At a later stage, the administrative an dfinancial viability of the new entity becam e the decisive criteria. Theseconsiderations were, however, disregarded when the Northeast wasreorganized, creating seven states on the basis of ethnic considerations.But ethnic considerations were not taken into account when large"composite" states were formed, such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,Rajasthan, and Bihar. Her e, the basis of a presumed "homogeneity" wassought in the interaction of history and the regio n's resources. Ifwe consider


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the size of these fourstates (together with Andh ra Pradesh and M aharashtra)and comp are them withtiny Goa, Sikkim, and Tripura,we find no uniformity.In Mizoram and Meghalaya, the district councils evolved into new states,but not elsewhere. In different situations, different factors have played thedecisive role in state formation. In some, the political elite and governingparties have not been in favor of, or have been opposed to, the formationof new states. They have acted according to their own interests.13 Elsewhereethnic minorities have established a territorial identity (as in Assam,Mah arashtra, Telegana, Punjab, Jha rkh and , and Naga land). Culture hasbeen m ade no t jus t an instrum ent for, but also a source of, revivalism and

chauvinism. In all of these situations, the elite has attem pted mobilizationof peop le fearful of threats to "our" culture from "them." This percep tionof a thr eat to culture has been used as a political weapon by the ent ren che delite to defend its privileges. In all the movements asking for the creationof new states, the underprivileged have been in the vanguard, fighting streetbattles. What are actually being defended are the privileges of the elite.

What has been often overlooked, in the formation of new states, is notjust the econ omic viability of the new state (as in U ttaranchal) bu t also theoverall economic repercussions for the tru ncatedstate. For instance, whenJharkhand was created, it consisted of 18 sparsely populated districts ofBihar, tog ethe r with their m ines and comm ercial taxes. The 65 per cen t ofthe population that remained in undivided Bihar suffered a tremendousrevenue loss.

Few new states have the resources ofJhar kand. Itis not just Uttaranchalthat lacks sustaining resources; many oth er small states do nothave adequateinfrastructure for development. If the economy is neith er self-sustainingnor growth-o riented, the state is not ina position to meet the socioeconomicexpectations of the very people for whom itwas formed. Sikkim, ArunachalPradesh, Nagaland, and Tripura seem to share this situation withUttar anchal. Wh en th e viability of states like Uttaranchal a nd Chhattisgarhis questioned, the only explanation that comes to mind for their formationis the dubio us political gain for the elite of these regions. What shouldhave been done, instead ofa simple division of assets and liabilities, was thelaying down of policy guidelines for the economic development of boththe new and the truncated states.

THE CHANGE IN OUTL OOK TOWARD NEW STATES

The creation of the three new states (Chhattisgarh, Jha rkh and , andUttara nchal) in 2000 signified a chang e in the thinking of the union. For

13J. A. Schlesinger, "Party Units,"International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan,1968), Volume II, p. 430. Like Haryana and K erala, Sikkim and many other states in the N ortheast arealso small in size but not as developed or as efficient administratively. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil N adu, andKarnataka are not small in size but pretty well developed and well administered, unlike other big stateslike Uttar P radesh and Bihar. Maybe the perceived political gains had someth ing to do with this, thoughmany of the calculations of many political parties and groups misfired.


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nearly four decades, the union government and virtually all the politicalparties had resisted the creation of newstates, and these came into existenceonly after much bickering and p ressure. Sometimes, a party would sup portthe demand for a state using arguments it would reject elsewhere.Sometimes the regional leadership of a party supported a demand whilethe national party opposed it. On the whole, reorganization of states wasnot considered "normal" political activity and so debate over the issue wasgenerally avoided. The state formation in 2000 became a milestone whenthe issue became a norm al a nd permissible them e of party agendas an d ofmainstream political activity. Th e dema nd was not treated as a threa t tonational integration and security (even though one of the states was on aninternational bor der). There were no mass movements. The union didnot drag its feet. Further, these states were propose d an d created not on alinguistic basis but on the basis of regional identity enshrined in culturaland geograph ical differences. The justification for these states wasadm inistra tive efficiency. I twas argued that the parent states (Bihar, UttarPradesh, and Madhya Pradesh) were too big and hence difficult toadminister well, whereas states like Haryana could develop because theirsmall size mad e admi nistr atio n efficient. On all cou nts, the re was aqualitative shift in political attitudes (though the arguments in favor of stateformation may not have been convincing).

The re appears to have been a change in the thinking of national leaders

regarding th e territorial deman ds of linguistic identities. They recognizethat cohesive linguistic groups do aspire to political union and that it isbetter to give them some auton om ous existence in a federation. Th e aim issupposedly the development of linguistic and cultural diversity. Yet, theremay be a lurking suspicion that political identities based on languagegenerate forces that are a thr eat to national unity.As a result of this residualsuspicion, a certain bitterness persists in the newstates, even after ach ievingtheir goals. Territorial identity may have been constitutionally recog nizedin order to contain regional identities within the confines of a politicalformula. Consequen tly, any dem and for a new state, or even anymanifestation of regionalism, is suspected of being anti-system.

The reorganization of the stateswas important because it made possible

the emergen ce of a new elite. Its mem bers had enjoyed lead ership in ru ralIndia but had been de nied represen tation at the state level. Now theyentere d the political and adm inistrative structure an d, thus, got a voice anda stake in the political affairs of the state . If anything, this only str eng thenedand consolidated India as a multicultural state.

It thus appears that "durable entities" are based on commonality ofculture. In India, the emergen ce of both a state and regional identity andthe struggle for their achievement have been simultaneous.A consciousnessof being separate has motivated those in the struggle, and out of the struggle


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98 Publius/Fa ll 2003

has em erged a new consciousness. Th ere ar e now 30 mo re dem ands fornew states. It is time for the states to be reorgan ized in a ma nne r thataccomm odates and institutionalizes the various regional identities. Oneway could be to identify th e four bases for reorganization referred to earlier:administrat ive convenience, economic viabil i ty, similari ty in thedevelopmental needs ofthe region, and cu ltura l, linguistic affinity. On thisbasis, even if more states are formed, it would only be strengthening the"self-rule, shared -rule " principle of federal go vernance . Alternatively, inmany cases, formation of new states may not be rational and, therefore,some degree of regional autonomy might be a better solution, and that

might provide quality governance, as well.

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