Chapter 1 Moral Studies Module 2009

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL CONCEPT

1.1 The definition of moral, ethics, akhlak and norms

1.1.1 MoralityWhat is morality? Most people pay only cursory attention to the somewhat intimidating philosophical concept called Morality. They erroneously presume that a precise examination of morality is the domain of philosophers. Most people acquire a somewhat vague sense of morality, a sense of how we should or should not behave, from their parents, their social group, their political environment or their religious affiliation. They believe that they have a sufficiently clear understanding of morality to meet their needs and they do not try to analyze a subject that is seemingly fraught with contradictions.

Why should we analyze the concept of morality if every human being knows that it is immoral to kill other people or to steal the property of other people, except under special circumstances. As adults, we act intuitively with regard to morality. We absorbed fundamental aspects of morality during the early days of our youth. Do we really need to know more about morality? Most persons have acquired the basic tenets of their morality from others and have accepted them as true and valid, without further questioning. However, how will we know if an unexamined idea, imposed on us by others, is actually true and beneficial to our well-being? Can we improve our lifestyle, including our interactions with others, if we enhance our understanding of the nature of morality? Knowledge is power and the extent of our knowledge of Objective Reality directly determines our standard of living and our happiness. Our happiness is determined by our degree of alignment with Objective Reality, with truth, The more facts we have at our disposition, the more closely we can align ourselves with reality, the fewer conflicts we will have in dealing with reality and thus, the more happiness we will reap. How does morality really work?

The term Morality covers the vast arena of human conduct that examines our interaction with other human beings. Morality touches every aspect of our life, every moment of our life. Our morality governs all of our contacts with members of our family, with our co-workers, with our church, and with all aspects of our government. Morality determines our attitude to politics, to war and peace, to our children, to our parents and to spiritual questions such as life after death. Morality (from the Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper behavior") has three principal meanings. In its first descriptive usage, morality means a code of conduct held to be authoritative in matters of

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right and wrong, morals are created by and define society, philosophy, religion, or individual conscience. In its second, normative and universal sense, morality refers to an ideal code of conduct, one which would be espoused in preference to alternatives by all rational people, under specified conditions. To deny 'morality' in this sense is a position known as moral skepticism. In its third usage, 'morality' is synonymous with ethics, the systematic philosophical study of the moral domain.

1.1.2 Moral CodeCodified morality (moral code) is generally distinguished from custom, another way for a community to define appropriate activity, by the former's derivation from natural or universal principles. In certain religious communities, the Divine is said to provide these principles through revelation, sometimes in great detail. Such codes may be called laws, as in the Law of Moses, or community morality may be defined through commentary on the texts of revelation, as in Islamic law. Such codes are distinguished from legal or judicial right, including civil rights, which are based on the accumulated traditions, decrees and legislation of a political authority, though these latter often invoke the authority of the moral law.

Morality can also be seen as the collection of beliefs as to what constitutes a good life. Since throughout most of human history, religions have provided both visions and regulations for an ideal life, morality is often confused with religious precepts. In secular communities, lifestyle choices, which represent an individual's conception of the good life, are often discussed in terms of "morality". Individuals sometimes feel that making an appropriate lifestyle choice invokes a true morality, and that accepted codes of conduct within their chosen community are fundamentally moral, even when such codes deviate from more general social principles.

Moral codes are often complex definitions of right and wrong that are based upon well-defined value systems. Although some people might think that a moral code is simple, rarely is there anything simple about one's values, ethics, etc. or, for that matter, the judgment of those of others. The difficulty lies in the fact that morals are often part of a religion and more often than not about culture codes. Sometimes, moral codes give way to legal codes, which couple penalties or corrective actions with particular practices. Note that while many legal codes are merely built on a foundation of religious and/or cultural moral codes, ofttimes they are one and the same.

Examples of moral codes include the Golden Rule; the Noble Eightfold Path of Buddhism; the ancient Egyptian code of Ma'at ;the ten commandments of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the yamas and niyama of the Hindu scriptures; the ten Indian commandments; and the principle of the Dessek. Another related concept is the moral core which is assumed to be innate in each individual, to those who accept

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that differences between individuals are more important than posited Creators or their rules. This, in some religious systems and beliefs (e.g. Taoism, Moralism and Gnosticism), is assumed to be the basis of all aesthetics and thus moral choice. Moral codes as such are therefore seen as coercive — part of human politics.

1.1.3 EthicsEthics is a major branch of philosophy, encompassing right conduct and good life. It is significantly broader than the common conception of analyzing right and wrong. A central aspect of ethics is "the good life", the life worth living or life that is simply not satisfying, which is held by many philosophers to be more important than moral conduct. Ethics seeks to address questions such as how a moral outcome can be achieved in a specific situation (applied ethics), how moral values should be determined (normative ethics), what morals people actually abide by (descriptive ethics), what the fundamental nature of ethics or morality is, including whether it has any objective justification (meta-ethics), and how moral capacity or moral agency develops and what its nature is (moral psychology). In applied ethics, for example, the prohibition against taking human life is controversial with respect to capital punishment, abortion and wars of invasion. In normative ethics, a typical question might be whether a lie told for the sake of protecting someone from harm is justified. In meta-ethics, a key issue is the meaning of the terms "right" or "wrong". Moral realism would hold that there are true moral statements which report objective moral facts, whereas moral anti-realism would hold that morality is derived from any one of the norms prevalent in society (cultural relativism); the edicts of a god (divine command theory); is merely an expression of the speakers' sentiments (emotivism); an implied imperative (prescriptive); falsely presupposes that there are objective moral facts (error theory). Some thinkers hold that there is no correct definition of right behavior, that morality can only be judged with respect to particular situations, within the standards of particular belief systems and socio-historical contexts. This position, known as moral relativism, often cites empirical evidence from anthropology as evidence to support its claims. The opposite view, that there are universal, eternal moral truths is known as moral absolutism. Moral absolutists might concede that forces of social conformity significantly shape moral decisions, but deny that cultural norms and customs define morally right behavior.

1.1.4 Islamic Ethics (Akhlak)Islamic ethics (akhlāq), defined as "good character," historically took shape gradually from the 7th century and was finally established by the 11th century. It was eventually shaped as a successful amalgamation of the Qur'anic teachings, the teachings of the Sunnah

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of Muhammad, the precedents of Islamic jurists (Sharia and Fiqh), the pre-Islamic Arabian tradition, and non-Arabic elements (including Persian and Greek ideas) embedded in or integrated with a generally Islamic structure. Although Muhammad's preaching produced a "radical change in moral values based on the sanctions of the new religion and the present religion, and fear of God and of the Last Judgment", the tribal practice of Arabs did not completely die out. Later Muslim scholars expanded the religious ethic of the Qur'an and Hadith in immense detail. The difference between Islamic akhlak and Greek ethics is the very source by which they are derived from. Islamic akhlak comes from divine sources (the Qur'an and the Sunnah) whereas Greek ethics rely only on the human intellect which is subject to error and change.

Akhlak in Islam is classified into primarily 5 categories: (1) Akhlak towards Allah, (2) Akhlak towards self, (3) Akhlak towards others, (4) Akhlak towards the environment and , (5) Akhlak towards time. Displaying good akhlak towards Allah can be done through the following ways:a. Believing strongly in the existence and the monotheistic nature of Allahb. Total submission to His orders and shunning away everything that He dislikesc. Carrying out His orders without hoping for anything in return, except His graced. Khusyuk, that is, putting in full concentration when carrying out our ibadahe. Thinking positively of Allah's actions and the fate that has been ordained for usf. Tawakkal or having faith in Allah such that He knows best in all that we dog. Syukur or displaying gratitude in all the bounties that He has given to ush. Tasbih, that is, saying out the words "Subhanallah" means “Glorious is Allah”i. Istighfar, that is, seeking for His forgiveness for our sins and salvation from hellfirej. Takbir, that is, saying out the words "Allahuakbar" – “Allah is Great” and glorifying His name and attributesk. Never failing to raise our hands in doa', because such an act proves of our weakness and our dependence in Allah s.w.t

Good akhlak towards self can be carried out through displaying these various attributes:a. Amanah, that is, carrying out duties responsiblyb. Siddiq, that is, being true to our wordsc. ‘Adl, that is, being just in our daily dealings

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d. Al-Ifafah, that is, purifying our thoughts and hearts from mazmumahe. Al-Haya, that is, displaying a sense of shame and regret for our sins to Allahf. As-Syaja‘ah, that is, displaying courage in our actions and against any form of injusticeg. Al-Quwwah, that is, displaying physical, mental and emotional strength against adversitiesh. As-Sabar, that is, displaying patience when faced with difficultiesi. Ar-Rahman, that is, displaying love and affection towards all and having a sense of community spiritj. Al-Iqtisad, that is, being in a state of saving money, time and energy for more useful purposes

Good akhlak towards others can be displayed via the following:a. Displaying good akhlak towards parents: Submissive to their orders, displaying ihsan or goodness throughout their lives, being humble before them, always in a state of gratitude for their love towards us and pray for them as well as ask for their prayers.b. Displaying good akhlak towards spousec. Displaying good akhlak towards sons and daughtersd. Displaying good akhlak towards our neighbours, relatives and friends

Good akhlak towards the environment is inherent in the teachings of our Prophet S.A.W. Having a sense of responsibility towards the environment is in line with the encouraged state of rahmatan lil alamin (love towards the environment and its contents) just as the Qur'an says (meaning): (O people! Worship your Lord, Who hath created you and those before you, so that you may ward off (evil). Who hath appointed the earth a resting-place for you, and the sky a canopy; and causeth water to pour down from the sky, thereby producing fruits as food for you. And do not set up rivals to Allah when ye know (better).) (Al-Baqarah 2: 21-22)

Good akhlak towards time, meaning to say, is our attitude towards time. Are we conscious about the fact that every second that passes by every now and then, we cannot get back that very second? And when time passes us by, are we prepared for our final destination? Which is why time is very important, such that even Allah s.w.t proclaims its importance in the Qur'an (meaning): “By (the Token of) Time (through the ages), Verily Man is in loss, Except such as have Faith, and do righteous deeds, and (join together) in the mutual teaching of Truth, and of Patience and Constancy. (Al-Asr: 1-3).

1.1.5 NormsNorms are sentences or sentence meanings with practical, i. e. action-oriented (rather than descriptive, explanatory, or expressive) import,

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the most common of which are commands, permissions, and prohibitions. Another popular account of norms describes them as reasons to act, believe or feel.

a. Some kinds of norms; Orders and permissions express norms. Such norm sentences do not describe how the world is, they rather prescribe how the world should be. Imperative sentences are the most obvious way to express norms, but declarative sentences also do it very often, as is the case with many laws. Generally, whether an expression is a norm does not depend on its form, on the type of sentence it is expressed with, but only on the meaning of the expression. Those norms purporting to create obligations (or duties) and permissions are called deontic norms (see also deontic logic). The concept of deontic norm is already an extension of a previous concept of norm, which would only include imperatives, that is, norms purporting to create duties. The understanding that permissions are norms in the same way was an important step in ethics and philosophy of law.

In addition to deontic norms, many other varieties have been identified. For instance, some constitutions establish the national anthem. These norms do not directly create any duty or permission. They create a "national symbol". Other norms create nations themselves or political and administrative regions within a nation. The action orientation of such norms is less obvious than in the case of a command or permission, but is essential for understanding the relevance of issuing such norms: When a folk song becomes a "national anthem" the meaning of singing one and the same song changes; likewise, when a piece of land becomes an administrative region, this has legal consequences for many activities taking place on that territory; and without these consequences concerning action, the norms would be irrelevant. A more obviously action-oriented variety of such constitutive norms (as opposed to deontic or regulatory norms) establishes social institutions which give rise to new, previously inexistent types of actions or activities (a standard example is the institution of marriage without which "getting married" would not be a feasible action; another is the rules constituting a game: without the norms of soccer, there would not exist such an action as executing an indirect free kick).

Any convention can create a norm, although the relation between both is not settled. There is a significant discussion about (legal) norms that give someone the power to create other norms. They are called power-conferring norms or norms of competence. Some authors argue that they are still deontic norms, while others argue for a close connection between them and institutional facts (see Raz 1975, Ruiter 1993). Linguistic conventions, for example, the convention in English that "cat" means cat or the convention in

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Portuguese that "gato" means cat, are among the most important norms. Games completely depend on norms. The fundamental norm of many games is the norm establishing who wins and loses. In other games, it is the norm establishing how to score points.

b. Major characteristics of Norms;One major characteristic of norms is that, unlike propositions, they are not descriptively true or false, since norms do not purport to describe anything, but to prescribe, create or change something. Some people say they are "prescriptively true" or false. Whereas the truth of a descriptive statement is purportedly based on its correspondence to reality, some philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, assert that the (prescriptive) truth of a prescriptive statement is based on its correspondence to right desire. Other philosophers maintain that norms are ultimately neither true or false, but only successful or unsuccessful (valid or invalid), as their propositional content obtains or not (see also John Searle and speech act).

There is an important difference between norms and normative propositions, although they are often expressed by identical sentences. "You may go out." usually expresses a norm if it is uttered by the teacher to one of the students, but it usually expresses a normative proposition if it is uttered to one of the students by one of his or her classmates. Some ethical theories reject that there can be normative propositions, but these are accepted by cognitivism. One can also think of propositional norms; assertions and questions arguably express propositional norms (they set a proposition as asserted or questioned).

Another purported feature of norms, it is often argued, is that they never regard only natural properties or entities. Norms always bring something artificial, conventional, institutional or "unworldly". This might be related to Hume's assertion that it is not possible to derive ought from is and to G.E. Moore's claim that there is a naturalistic fallacy when one tries to analyse "good" and "bad" in terms of a natural concept. In aesthetics, it has also been argued that it is impossible to derive an aesthetical predicate from a non-aesthetical one. The acceptability of non-natural properties, however, is strongly debated in present day philosophy. Some authors deny their existence, some others try to reduce them to natural ones, on which the former supervene.

Other thinkers (Adler, 1986) assert that norms can be natural in a different sense than that of "corresponding to something proceeding from the object of the prescription as a strictly internal source of action". Rather, those who assert the existence of natural prescriptions say norms can suit a natural need on the part of the prescribed entity. More to the point, however, is the putting forward of the notion that just as descriptive statements being considered true are conditioned upon certain self-evident descriptive truths suiting the nature of reality

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(such as: it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time and in the same manner), a prescriptive truth can suit the nature of the will through the authority of it being based upon self-evident prescriptive truths (such as: one ought to desire what is really good for one and nothing else). Recent works maintain that normativity has an important role in several different philosophical subjects, not only in ethics and philosophy of law (see Dancy, 2000).

1.2 The concept of personal, universal and absolute moralityPersonal morality has to do with narrating values that would best help each of us make sense of our lives, to be good persons, realise a valuable selfhood and/or live a good life. The values at stake in personal morality need not be strictly moral. The goodness of our lives could be measured in terms of our being happy, worthwhile or successful as well as the traditional, moral, sense of the word. Defining what it is to be a good person, and to live a good life, is one of the questions that personal morality must address. The function of personal morality is to help each of us realise the meaning of our life in the world through being a person and living the personal life of a self in the world. All persons can do and must input values just in the process of being persons. Meaning is an output value 'pointed at' by input values. So persons realise a meaning from those values. That is why there are values in this and any other world containing persons. And that is why what persons do in a world just is the whole and only meaning of that world. Because we do and must live by values, our lives do and must have meaning. And, because our personal morality just is the sum of our input values, the meaning of our lives just is a function of our personal morality in our personal circumstances.

Moral universalism (also called universal morality) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals", regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexuality, or other distinguishing feature. Moral universalism is opposed to moral nihilism and moral relativism. However, not all forms of moral universalism are absolutist, nor are they necessarily value monist; many forms of universalism, such as utilitarianism, are non-absolutist, and some forms, such as that of Isaiah Berlin, may be value pluralist. Noam Chomsky states that, “... if we adopt the principle of universality : if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the standards they apply to others -- more stringent ones, in fact -- plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil… In fact, one of the, maybe the most, elementary of moral principles is that of universality,

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that is, If something's right for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for me. Any moral code that is even worth looking at has that at its core somehow.”

The source or justification of a universal ethic may be thought to be, for instance, human nature, shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal reason, what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of religion (although it can be said that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may distinguish between gods and mortals). As such, models of moral universalism may be atheistic or agnostic, deistic (in the case of several Enlightenment philosophers), monotheistic (in the case of the Abrahamic religions), or polytheistic (in the case of Hinduism). Various systems of moral universalism may differ in various ways on the meta-ethical question of the nature of the morality, as well as in their substantial normative content, but all agree on its universality.

Moral absolutism is the meta-ethical view that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, devoid of the context of the act. Thus lying, for instance, might be considered to be always immoral, even if done to promote some other good (e.g., saving a life). Moral absolutism stands in contrast to categories of ethical theories such as consequentialism and situational ethics, which holds that the morality of an act depends on the consequences or the context of the act. Ethical theories which place strong emphasis on rights, such as the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant, are often forms of moral absolutism, as are many religious moral codes, particularly those of the Abrahamic religions.

Moral absolutism should not be confused with moral universalism (also variously called moral objectivism, moderate moral realism, or minimalist moral realism), which holds that the same things are right and wrong for all similarly-situated people, regardless of anyone's opinions, though not necessarily regardless of context. Moral universalism is in turn opposed to moral relativism (which holds that moral truths are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal preferences), and to moral nihilism (which holds that nothing is right or wrong in any sense at all). L.P. Pojman gives the following definitions to distinguish the two positions: (1) "Moral absolutism: There is at least one principle that ought never to be violated." (2) "Moral objectivism: There is a fact of the matter as to whether any given action is morally permissible or impermissible: a fact of the matter that does not depend solely on social custom or individual acceptance."

Moral absolutism may be understood in a strictly secular context, as in many forms of deontological moral rationalism. However, many religions have morally absolutist positions as well, regarding their system of morality as deriving from the commands of deity. Therefore, they regard such a moral system as absolute, (usually) perfect, and unchangeable. Many secular philosophies also take a morally absolutist

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stance, arguing that absolute laws of morality are inherent in the nature of human beings, the nature of life in general, or the universe itself. For example, someone who believes absolutely in nonviolence considers it wrong to use violence even in self-defense. For another example, under some religious moral absolutist beliefs, homosexual behavior is considered fundamentally wrong, even in a consensual relationship.

The historical character of religious belief is seen by some as grounds for criticism of religious moral absolutism. In Deuteronomy 15:12-15; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1; & I Timothy 6:1-2 the Bible recognizes and regulates the practice of keeping slaves. These passages have been historically interpreted as providing an endorsement of slavery. For example Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America remarked in a speech before the U.S. Senate that: "[Slavery] was established by decree of Almighty God...it is sanctioned in the Bible, in both Testaments, from Genesis to Revelation...it has existed in all ages, has been found among the people of the highest civilization, and in nations of the highest proficiency in the arts."

1.3 Factors for developing good moralityWhilst much work on moral reasoning has sought to identify the relatively abstract conceptual structures which underpin moral judgements, relatively little has sought to examine the ways in which moral judgements and decisions are made in real life. There are, however, good reasons for examining the ways in which these more “everyday” judgements are made. Not only is it important to learn something more of the social and cultural context in which moral thought is embedded. It is also crucial to explore moral decision-making in real life to understand better the links between more hypothetical moral reasoning and moral action. The discussion presents research that seeks to identify factors that influence the decisions that individuals make in response to real life moral dilemmas. Its empirical focus will form two, inter-related strands. An initial strand considers how social contextual factors (internalised notions of gender role and more externalised notions of gender) relate to moral orientation. A second strand explores how different types of dilemmas may entail different consequences for individuals that, in turn, relate to the sorts of justifications and explanations they give for particular courses of action.

1.3.1 Moral decision-making in real life A famous example of the difference between hypothetical reasoning and justification of experienced behaviour is given by Milgram’s (1963) study of obedience. When participants are faced with a hypothetical dilemma of either harming an innocent stranger or disobeying an

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authority figure they frequently choose the latter. However, the study showed that whilst more than sixty five percent of those who were faced with the dilemma in reality chose to harm an innocent stranger, few felt such behaviour would be morally acceptable when asked about an imaginary scenario. Moreover when Milgram’s adult participants were asked about their actions they justified their behaviour with reasons equivalent to stage one on Kohlberg’s (1969, 1984) model – for example, the status of the experimenter. It would seem unlikely that all of Milgram’s participants were stage one reasoners. Rather, something about the experimental situation and their perceived roles within it influenced their moral decisions, judgements and ultimately their behaviour.

Dominant models of moral development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) have focused theoretical attention on age-related shifts in moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s methodology involved presenting individuals with various hypothetical moral dilemmas which were either discussed with the participants by means of an interview or reflected upon using a questionnaire. Responses are then scored according to a specific manual devised by Kohlberg and his colleagues. Yet although the value and influence of this work on moral development is clear, a consistent criticism of, for instance, Kohlberg’s theory has been that he failed adequately to consider what we might term “real life” moral decision-making (Krebs, Denton & Wark, 1997; Leman, 2001). Research on real life dilemmas (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale & Bush, 1991; Carpendale & Krebs 1995; Wark & Krebs 1996, 1997) found that once participants are asked to judge moral conflicts that they have experienced in their life, moral stage tends to be lower, and stage consistency of judgements diminishes across different types of moral dilemmas. A further point of criticism highlighted the difference between moral judgement competency and moral judgement in practice.

Studies that compare moral behaviour (action) and moral reasoning have highlighted the problem of how stages of reasoning (derived from hypothetical problems) are related to real life moral behaviour. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that despite people’s acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of impaired driving they still drove home while having high blood alcohol level; Carpendale and Krebs (1995) showed that a monetary incentive also affected moral choices. And Walker (1984) has claimed that Kohlberg’s stage theory has a self-limiting scope in that it does not deal directly with the issues of moral emotions and behaviour – rather, it deals with the adequacy of justifications for solutions to moral conflicts. Wark and Krebs (1996) summarise a position common to many in arguing that whilst there are numerous studies on moral judgement only a few have investigated the important and socially pertinent question of how people make moral decisions in their everyday lives.

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1.3.2 Gender and moral orientationAnother critic of Kohlberg’s emphasis on abstract aspects of moral thought was Carol Gilligan. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg’s theory is insensitive to the way females view morality and that there are sex related (but not sex-specific) differences in an individual’s orientation to life. These differences become particularly visible in terms of moral reasoning. On one hand, men have a justice orientation which involves an emphasis on autonomy, separateness and noninterference with abstract rights. On the other women hold a care orientation involving more emphasis on a concern for the well being of others and a view of the self as connected and interdependent with others in concrete situations (Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987).

Gilligan’s evaluation of responses to real life dilemmas by men and women revealed that although the majority of people used both care and justice orientations, the majority of women (75%) used a predominantly care orientation whereas the majority of men (79%) used a predominantly justice orientation. Also, 36% of women did not involve any consideration of justice in their report and 36% of men did not present any consideration of care. These findings led Gilligan to conclude that individuals use one predominating orientation related to their gender when discussing real life moral conflicts. Gilligan claimed that males gain higher moral maturity scores on Kohlberg’s test because they tend to make justice oriented judgments which are captured at higher stages (4-5). Females, on the other hand, tend to make care oriented judgments which are captured at a lower stage (3). Although some studies supported this assumption (e.g. Bussey & Maughan, 1982) a large number of studies refuted the claim for significant sex differences in moral maturity (see Walker, 1984 for a review of the literature). Moreover, research on moral orientation revealed that studies that found that women use higher percentage of care oriented terms in real life dilemmas than men were methodologically flawed by not controlling for type of dilemma (e.g. Ford & Lowery 1986; Walker et al. 1987; Gilligan & Attanucci 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson 1988; Wark & Krebs 1996).

1.3.3 Moral reasoning: considering the consequences of actionFollowing many studies that compared Kohlberg’s philosophical dilemmas with real life dilemmas, Krebs and his colleagues have argued that the highest stages of moral reasoning rarely exist outside the Western academic context (within which Kohlberg’s philosophical dilemmas were typically tested). In attempting to explore factors that may explain the variance between judgments (measured by stages in Kohlberg’s model) of philosophical dilemmas and judgments of real life dilemmas they found an interaction between moral judgment competency and various performance factors (detailed in Krebs et.al.,

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1997). Individuals’ ability to retain lower stages of moral judgment and use them in response to real life dilemmas does not follow Kohlberg’s theoretical assumption regarding stage replacement, but is more in line with other models of moral judgment such as Rest’s “layer-cake” model and Levine’s “additive – inclusive” model. Both these models suggest that new stages are built on old stages, which are retained and may be used in various circumstances.

Despite this important outcome of recent research, the remaining question is why there is such discrepancy between judgment of philosophical dilemmas and judgment of real life dilemmas. Krebs et al. (1997) attempted to explain some aspects in real life decision making, which may serve future research in clarifying how people make moral decisions in their everyday lives. Two elements are central to the position. One is the distinction between a third person perspective (which is implied in philosophical dilemmas) and a first person perspective (which is implied in personal, real life dilemmas). When people come across moral conflicts in their life the question they are faced with is: “ what should I do?” which is different to “what should one do?”. Reasoning in real life situations involves decisions, which are much more practical, self serving, and less rational than reasoning of hypothetical characters. The second aspect relates to the first in suggesting that factors that people consider when they make decisions in real life are influenced by functional concerns such as advancing self-interest or social harmony, and by motivational and affective processes.

One of the most important pragmatic concerns is the consequences of moral decisions. Krebs et al. (1997) provide a detailed account of the various types of consequences people consider, which will not be repeated here. However, their explanation of the distinction between consequences to others and consequences to the self is a central focus of this study. Although people believe hypothetical characters should act in a certain way and although they provide reasoning to support that belief, they themselves would have not made that decision in real life due to the consequences of their decision. For example, despite people’s belief that Heinz should steal the drug (cf. Kohlberg, 1984, p.640), they themselves would not steal it as they would not be willing to suffer the consequences (Krebs, Vermeulen, Denton & Carpendale, 1994). It seems possible that an inconsistency between what one should and would do in these situations leads to a dissonance that can be partly resolved by changing one’s mind about a particular course of action (Krebs et al. 1997). Krebs et al. (1997) not only provide a potential explanation for the inconsistency between reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life moral conflicts. They also point to a direction for future research into the underlying mechanisms involved in moral judgment, decision, and action.

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The present study explored two aspects in relation to moral decision-making. The first part (moral orientation) examined Gilligan’s theory of moral orientation and its relationship to dilemma type, gender and gender role. The second part (moral reasoning) explored a new aspect in recent research: consideration of consequences, focusing on whether consequences to the self differ from consequences to other people in the influence they have on decision making.

1.3.4 Moral OrientationThe results of this study are not consistent with Gilligan’s hypothesis about moral orientation. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) acknowledged that individuals can employ both justice and care orientations but they also claim that only one (either justice or care) prevails across an individual’s thinking. This study however, failed to find a prevailing orientation across all four dilemmas. Not only do participants include both care and justice judgements in their dilemmas, but the majority (all but three) were inconsistent with the orientation they presented to address each dilemma. This outcome supports Wark and Krebs’s (1997) study, in which they claim to have found poor consistency of moral orientation across four personel dilemmas.

Gilligan (1982) also proposed that the type of orientation is related to gender, assuming that males tend to focus on the justice orientation whereas females tend to focus on the care orientation. Like previous research (e.g. Walker et al.. 1987) this study fails to support this claim. On average, females focused on care-based judgements more than males did but this did not result in a statistically significant difference between the two gender groups. However, the overall mean (57%) for orientation suggests that all participants (regardless of gender) expressed slightly more care judgements than justice judgements. Furthermore, the consistency measure did not yield gender differences, which suggests that males were as inconsistent in their moral orientation as females were. In a similar vein gender did not produce a significant main effect or significant interactions, which leaves one to conclude that as far as this study was able to show moral orientation was not related to gender.

This study, nevertheless, produced significant results regarding type of dilemma and gender role. A main effect for dilemma type qualified by an interaction between dilemma and gender role was found. A post-hoc analysis revealed the exact location of these significant differences: between the (a) prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas and (b) the prosocial and impersonal dilemmas at the femininity level and at the androgyny level. Similar to previous studies which included gender role as a factor (Sochting, Skoe, & Marcia, 1994) this study supports the claim that gender role may serve as a better predictor of moral orientation than gender alone. Moreover Ford

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and Lowery (1986) found the significant results to be at the femininity level, which has been replicated by this study.

Unlike Ford and Lowery (1986), this finding was not related to gender and extends to generalise gender role as an important factor by finding significant comparisons at the androgyny level as well. Both androgyny and femininity gender roles were defined by a high score on the feminine scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). The fact that dilemma type reached significance at these levels only (only for the ‘androgynous’ and ‘feminine’ people) may provide the answer for the distinction between the significant results of those scales and the non-significant results of the masculine and the undifferentiated scales, which were both low at femininity. In other words, one may need to have high level of femininity in order to show significant differences between some types of moral dilemma (e.g. prosocial-antisocial & prosocial-impersonal).

The overall pattern of results regarding type of dilemma is similar to earlier findings by Wark and Krebs (1997). Wark and Krebs (1997) compared three types of dilemma (2 Kohlbergian, 2 real life-prosocial, & 2 real life- antisocial). They reported that the Kohlbergian dilemmas pulled for justice orientation, the prosocial tended towards care orientation, and the antisocial towards justice orientation. In the present study, results were in a similar direction. There is, however, a marked difference between the means of the Kohlbergian dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1997) and the impersonal dilemmas (the present study). The notion that Kohlberg’s (philosophical) dilemmas evoke justice-based judgements is not new. Indeed, it was one of the main criticisms against Kohlberg’s model (Gilligan 1982). However, the use of impersonal dilemmas in the past has led to some interesting outcomes. Wark and Krebs (1996) reported that the philosophical impersonal dilemmas evoked a similar level of justice to that evoked by Kohlberg’s dilemmas, and that they evoked a significantly lower level of care than the antisocial impersonal dilemmas. These findings appear inconsistent with the outcomes of the present study but this inconsistency may reflect different tendencies in the scoring procedure. The means of the prosocial impersonal dilemmas and the antisocial impersonal dilemmas are fairly similar to the means of the personal prosocial and antisocial dilemmas, and share similar locations on the moral orientation scale (antisocial towards justice and prosocial towards care). The overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas seems to reflect the grouping of the various types of impersonal dilemmas (prosocial, antisocial, & philosophical). However, the statistical analyses suggest that there was no particular influence from any type of dilemma on the overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas. There was no significant difference between the impersonal dilemmas on moral orientation scores.

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Methodologically, the need to control types of moral dilemma (for both personal & impersonal dilemmas) cannot be over emphasised. Wark and Krebs (1996) found that females tend to report more prosocial dilemmas whereas males tend to report more antisocial dilemmas. These tendencies affect moral orientation scores – the present study demonstrated that prosocial dilemmas evoke more care judgements whereas antisocial dilemmas evoke more justice judgements. These gender-related patterns of reporting have not been demonstrated by this study, yet they may explain the outcome of Gilligan and Attanucci’s (1988) study in which type of dilemma was not held constant. Moreover, Wark and Krebs (2000) found that women report more prosocial real life dilemmas, perhaps because women consider prosocial dilemmas to be more significant as these dilemmas elicit most guilt (Wark, 1998), whereas men experience more antisocial (transgression) types of conflict in real life. Thus, Gilligan’s notion of moral orientation may be embedded in life experience rather than to any particular gender group per se.

1.3.5 Moral Reasoning – consideration of consequencesThe results concerning the second part of this study support to some extent some theoretical assumptions based on research by Krebs and his colleagues (in particular Krebs et.al., 1997). The statistical analysis revealed a significant difference between consideration of consequences to the self and consideration of consequences to others but only as far as antisocial dilemmas were concerned. When type of dilemma was held constant for both the personal and the impersonal dilemmas, the prosocial dilemmas did not yield a significant difference. In fact both impersonal-prosocial and personal-prosocial dilemmas had identical means, which suggests that people tend to consider the outcome of their decisions and actions as important with regard to themselves and others equally when discussing moral dilemmas concerning prosocial issues.

The difference in the results between the prosocial dilemmas and the antisocial dilemmas implies that people tend to regard consequences to themselves as highly important compared to consequences to others when discussing antisocial issues. By way of a contrast, consequences of prosocial dilemmas are regarded as important whether they relate to the self or to others. Perhaps this is not such a great surprise bearing in mind that antisocial issues are closely related to law and punishment whereas prosocial issues are to a large extent related to one’s willingness to help another. Krebs et al. (1997) provide a constructive distinction between moral conflicts in terms of their anticipated consequences: (a) approach – approach conflicts (“should I spend more time with my boyfriend or my friends?”), (b) approach – avoidance conflicts (“should I lend money to my friend or avoid taking responsibility for him?”), and (c) avoidance –

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avoidance conflicts (“should I lie to my landlord or face eviction from my flat?”). The conflicts discussed in our antisocial dilemmas involved at least one avoidance aspect (e.g. underage drinking versus getting caught, facing condemnation versus feeling guilty, etc). It would be valid to assume that decisions, which involve consequences to the self that one is trying to avoid, will have more effect on one’s moral decision than decisions entailing consequences that others may try to avoid. This last point brings us back to potential dissonance between should and would that was described by Krebs et al. (1997). In the same way that this distinction explains the inconsistency between reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life dilemmas, it may explain the inconsistency between justification of others’ reasoning (when one is an observer) and the justification of one’s own reasoning. The outcomes of antisocial conflicts (e.g. law breaking, being unfair or unjust) often contrast one’s own morality standard. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that people tend to consider themselves to be more moral than other people, a phenomenon they named ‘the self-righteous bias’. This phenomenon ties in with the current findings. According to Krebs et al. (1997) people invest in their moral identities, which in return affect their moral decisions. In situations where people behave inconsistently with their moral identities (e.g. antisocial type situation) they are faced with negative outcome (physical or mental) and negative reputation, which motivate them to reduce the inconsistency between their belief about their own moral identity and how they have been perceived by society (judicial system, family relatives, friends, etc). This attempt to reduce negative reputation of one’s moral identity is manifested in moral dilemmas in the form of justification of behaviour, which as research showed, involves low stage moral structures (Denton & Krebs 1990; Krebs et al, 1991; Wark & Krebs 1997; Krebs et al. 1997).

This is a crucial observation for research on moral decision-making as it can only be explored by real life personal dilemmas where participants are asked to justify their own experiences. It follows then that in the present study participants may have felt the need to justify their own behaviour and reduce the inconsistency of their own moral identity, which led them to consider the consequences of their decisions/actions in a way that affected their decisions. In other words, participants regretted acting in a certain way and therefore justified their behaviour by considering the consequences of their actions in order to avoid similar outcomes in the future. However, when asked to discuss others’ moral decisions in antisocial situations the need to justify others’ behaviour in terms of its consequences was less important3. On the contrary, prosocial behaviour educes a positive moral reputation that is more consistent with people’s moral identity (the ‘self righteous’ bias), and may validate or even improve one’s perception of oneself (Krebs et al. 1997).

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These findings do not corroborate Gilligan’s theory of moral orientation. Participants rarely held one orientation across all dilemmas. Moreover gender was related to neither justice nor care orientations. Significant comparisons were found between the prosocial and the impersonal dilemmas and between the prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas for both feminine and androgynous gender role groups. This outcome suggests that although people, in general, do not hold a particular moral orientation, ‘feminine’ and ‘androgynous’ people score 3 Although it must be remembered that our definition of “personal” dilemmas were those which directly involved an individual and made that individual take some form of action. Thus it may be true that when an individual makes a decision not to act prosocially (although not necessarily antisocially) there may be some justification in terms of the potential consequences for the self. Significantly higher percentages of care-based responses when discussing prosocial dilemmas compared with impersonal or antisocial dilemmas. The latter focuses the attention on the effect of external sources (e.g. type of dilemma) on moral decision-making. The acknowledgement of such interaction between external and internal (e.g. gender role) sources of variation on moral decision-making is crucial to the understanding of how people judge real life moral conflicts. Results also indicate, as might have been anticipated, that people consider the consequences of their decisions when they discuss moral conflicts. Furthermore, the consequences of moral decisions seem to have more influence when people discuss personal antisocial conflicts rather than impersonal-antisocial conflicts. This difference was not evident between the prosocial-personal/impersonal dilemmas. It may be that when people discuss personal-antisocial (e.g. violations of rules, laws, or fairness) dilemmas they seek to resist adopting a negative reputation. The therefore justify their own behaviour with a higher percentage of consideration of consequences in their attempt to view themselves more positively (and enhance their moral identity). This pressure disappears when people discuss impersonal-antisocial dilemmas because the need to justify other people’s behaviour in a positive way is less strong and has less influence on judgements and reasoning. More so, it is not apparent in prosocial dilemmas because this type of behaviour has a positive reputation and entails a positive moral identity. Consequently, the outcomes of people’s prosocial behaviour have less influence on their reasoning.

It is also possible to see some ways in which the current findings might inform work in moral education. For instance, we see in the results of the current study a link between internal (gender role) and external (dilemma type) factors in making moral judgements. There is also now strong evidence to suggest that the underlying motivations for moral judgements differ according to the type of dilemma under consideration. In view of this, educators need to consider whether it

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might be appropriate to employ different strategies for encouraging mature moral reasoning with respect to pro- and antisocial behaviour. Moreover, the influence of internal factors such as gender role points to a need to gear any educational interventions to the needs of specific individuals.

As the current study has demonstrated, another important factor in making moral decisions is a consideration of the consequences of actions. Such consideration appears at its most influential when reasoning about one’s own response to antisocial dilemmas (having done or doing something wrong). As has already been indicated, the motivation to maintain a reputation or positive moral identity not least, one might imagine, amongst one’s peers, could explain findings here. However, it was not the case that participants in this study were motivated to gain a positive (prosocial) self-identity but rather that they were motivated to defend themselves against acquiring a negative (antisocial) one. This is an issue that is less to do with moral education and more to do with the values we encourage as a society; behaving “morally” is less about prosocial behaviour and more about not committing antisocial behaviour. But a greater emphasis, in the schoolroom and beyond, on the social merits of prosocial behaviour might just encourage more of it.

Finally, when considering antisocial dilemmas from an “abstract”, impersonal perspective people imagine the consequences of an action as less important than when they consider a similar event from a first personal perspective. There is, it would seem, a separation of the actual from the theoretical here (at least in the reports of our participants). Further studies from an educational perspective could help to identify whether encouraging a child or adult to reflect on their own experiences and past, real-life moral decisions might trigger forms of reasoning that are better suited to helping individuals make more mature decisions in future, real-life moral dilemmas.

Altogether this study overcomes methodological problems in earlier studies and confirms previous findings in terms of the effect of dilemma type and gender role on moral orientation. It also points to the importance of individuals’ consideration of consequences of their actions in judging real life moral dilemmas. Further investigations are needed to clarify the role of this new aspect of moral reasoning that appears to be important in moral decision making. Such investigations could help in the development of interactional models of moral reasoning that account for the interplay between internal (e.g. gender role) and external (e.g. dilemma type) influences on everyday moral reasoning.

1.4 Religious Morality, Environmental Morality, Individual and Social Morality.

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1.4.1 Religious MoralityIn the scientific literature, the degree of religiosity is generally found to be associated with higher ethical attitudes. Although a recent study by Paul Pierce published in the Journal of Religion and Society argues for a positive correlation between the degree of public religiosity in a society and certain measures of dysfunction, an analysis published later in the same journal contends that a number of methodological problems undermine any findings or conclusions to be taken from the research. In a response to the study by Paul, Pierce. Jensen builds on and refines Paul's study. His conclusion, after carrying out elaborate multivariate statistical studies, is that there is a correlation (and perhaps a causal relationship) of higher homicide rates, not with Christianity, but with dualism in Christianity, that is to say with the proportion of the population who believe the devil and hell exist. Excerpt: "A multiple regression analysis reveals a complex relationship with some dimensions of religiosity encouraging homicide and other dimensions discouraging it." Meanwhile, other studies seem to show positive links in the relationship between religiosity and moral behavior - for example, surveys suggesting a positive connection between faith and altruism. Modern research in criminology also acknowledges an inverse relationship between religion and crime, with many studies establishing this beneficial connection (though some claim it is a modest one). Indeed, a meta-analysis of 60 studies on religion and crime concluded, “religious behaviors and beliefs exert a moderate deterrent effect on individuals’ criminal behavior”. Religious belief systems usually include the idea of divine will and divine judgment and usually correspond to a moral code of conduct.

Religious persons try to find the answer to moral right or wrong, evil and goodness, in the bible or other religious texts. Where do these scriptures come from? In reviewing the origins of many different religions, it appears that scholars attribute religious texts to mysterious or mystical writers in the distant past. The element of time has shrouded all such scriptures in extreme mystery or factual haziness. There is never any clear, objective, historical chain that might clarify and establish the authenticity of the authorship of religious texts. These writings have been copied innumerable times and have become less and less focused with each copying process. As a result, religious writings have become so ambiguous and nebulous that it is often necessary to substantially re-interpret or re-phrase their meaning. The translation of these texts from archaic languages provides ample room for misconstructions or misinterpretations. Such translations and interpretations will vary with each translator and interpreter, depending on their personal beliefs, opinions, preconceived notions and their comprehension of the original language. As the result of this multi-faceted, compounded obfuscation, there are many conflicting interpretations dealing with the concept of

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good and evil in the Bible, the Koran, the Torah or any of the multitudes of other scriptures. All of these texts proclaim to be the only definitive arbiter of morality. Each religious authority implies that a person acts moral if he follows its prescriptions or its dogma. Christians have no moral problem eating pork; Muslims and Jews have strict moral prohibitions against eating pork. It is moral for Jews and Christians to drink alcoholic beverages, Muslims can get their heads chopped off if they imbibe alcohol.

How can we determine which of the many contradictory revelations described in different religious writings are correct so that we may all act in a moral manner? Since all of these scriptures contradict each other, how can we know which one is really the true one and which ones are false? Is the Torah correct or is the New Testament more truthful? How can we reconcile the Bible with the Koran? Do all of the one billion Muslims follow an erroneous doctrine or does the Koran more truthfully reflect the nature of true morality than the Bible? Religious person face the difficult task of selecting a suitable morality because their search is made more complicated by the large number of religious sects, cults, churches and denominations from which he can choose. He faces constant contradictions because each of these belief systems claims to be the only true and authoritative source of morality. These contradictory claims appear to be absurd because they can obviously not all be correct

One of the universal contradictions in the theological approach to morality involves a dilemma posed by all religions. What is the relationship of good and evil to a benevolent and omnipotent god? Regardless of the ambivalent and unreliable nature of religious texts setting forth the moral teachings of a particular religion, the ultimate source for the moral code imbedded in a religion always rests in a god or gods. A god is the central, authoritative and controlling power that is the backbone of all religions. By definition, all religions must have an omnipotent god, a supreme being and creator of the universe. This god must be specific to a particular religion. Different religions cannot have the same god. Thus, all religions derive their morality from the authority of the god they worship, usually through an intermediary in the nature of a messenger or affiliate, such as Jesus or Mohammed or Joseph Smith.

A system of morality that relies on the existence of gods or godlike beings is irrational because no god or godlike beings have ever manifested themselves in an objective manner to human beings. There is no evidence whatsoever that a god exists or has ever existed, anywhere, at any time. In fact, all objective evidence available to man precludes and contradicts the existence of a god or gods. Thus, an attempt to seek morality as a derivative of non-existing gods is difficult to justify. In all religions, faith and fairytales replace and supersede factual evidence. The faith-based acceptance of a theological doctrine

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of morality reflects merely illusions or delusions: Faith is necessary only for the acceptance as true of a statement that objective evidence has already proven false. Faith is only necessary if religious dogma is in direct conflict with Objective Reality.

No matter which one of the many religious text we might adapt as the basis for our own morality, we are making such choice based on our individual preferences and convictions. We are choosing our own morality from a variety of religious moralities. Again, we choose our own morality. We are not considering if we should follow an absolute, universal, objective religious morality, but we are considering which one of many relative, subjective morality systems we should select from a smorgasbord of religious morality systems. Thus, by making a personal choice from many contradictory religious morality systems, we end up with a personal, relative morality, rather than an absolute, objective, universal morality.

1.4.2 Enviromental Ethics and Morality Environmental ethics is the part of environmental philosophy which considers extending the traditional boundaries of ethics from solely including humans to including the non-human world. It exerts influence on a large range of disciplines including law, sociology, theology, economics, ecology and geography. There are many ethical decisions that human beings make with respect to the environment. For example: Should we continue to clear cut forests for the sake of human consumption? Should we continue to propagate? Should we continue to make gasoline powered vehicles? What environmental obligations do we need to keep for future generations? Is it right for humans to knowingly cause the extinction of a species for the convenience of humanity?

The academic field of environmental ethics grew up in response to the work of scientists such as Rachel Carson and events such as the first Earth Day in 1970, when environmentalists started urging philosophers to consider the philosophical aspects of environmental problems. Two papers published in Science had a crucial impact: Lynn White's "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" (March 1967) and Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (December 1968). Also influential was Garett Hardin's later essay called "Exploring New Ethics for Survival", as well as an essay by Aldo Leopold in his A Sand County Almanac, called "The Land Ethic," in which Leopold explicitly claimed that the roots of the ecological crisis were philosophical (1949).

The first international academic journals in this field emerged from North America in the late 1970s and early 1980s – the US-based journal, Environmental Ethics in 1979 and the Canadian based journal

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The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy in 1983. The first British based journal of this kind, Environmental Values, was launched in 1992.

Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required? Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And what is the value of a humanly restored environment compared with the originally natural environment? It is often said to be morally wrong for human beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and to consume a huge proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to (present and future) human well-being? Or is such behaviour also wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be respected and protected in any case? These are among the questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are specific questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components.

In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic value (meaning “non-instrumental value”) has been of considerable importance. The former is the value of things as means to further some other ends, whereas the latter is the value of things as ends in themselves regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value, i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically valuable is that which is good as an end in

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itself, it is commonly agreed that something's possession of intrinsic value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to protect it or at least refrain from damaging it (see O'Neil 1992 and Jameson 2002 for detailed accounts of intrinsic value).

Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a strong sense) or they assign a significantly greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such that the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that “nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man” and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment of nonhuman animals, except to the extent that such treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings. Immanuel Kant (“Duties to Animals and Spirits”, in Lectures on Ethics), for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment (see Passmore 1974, Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and Maple (eds.) 1995).

When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural environment and its nonhuman contents.

It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories. Instead, they advocate what may be called enlightened anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its human inhabitants. The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds for social policies aimed at protecting the earth's environment and remedying environmental

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degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the nonhuman environment has intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996). Furthermore, some prudential anthropocentrists may hold what might be called cynical anthropocentrism, which says that we have a higher-level anthropocentric reason to be non-anthropocentric in our day-to-day thinking. Suppose that a day-to-day non-anthropocentrist tends to act more benignly towards the nonhuman environment on which human well-being depends. This would provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking, even to those who find the idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value hard to swallow. In order for such a strategy to be effective one may need to hide one's cynical anthropocentrism from others and even from oneself.

1.4.3 Individual Morality (Individualism)Individualism is the moral stance, political philosophy, or social outlook that stresses independence and self-reliance. Individualists promote the exercise of one's goals and desires, while opposing most external interference upon one's choices, whether by society, or any other group or institution. Individualism is opposed to collectivism, which stress that communal, community, group, societal, or national goals should take priority over individual goals. Individualism is also opposed to any tradition or other form of external moral standard being used to limit an individual's choice of actions.

The concept of "individualism" was first used by the French Saint-Simonian socialists (the opposite of individualism), to describe what they believed was the cause of the disintegration of French society after the 1789 Revolution. The term was however already used (pejoratively) by reactionary thinkers of the French Theocratic School, such as Joseph de Maistre, in their opposition to political liberalism. The Saint-Simonians did not see political liberalism as the problem though, but saw in "individualism" a form of "egoism" or "anarchy," the "ruthless exploitation of man by man in modern industry." While the conservative anti-individualists attacked the political egalitarianism brought about by the Revolution, the Saint-Simonians criticized laissez-faire (economic liberalism), for its perceived failure to cope with the increasing inequality between rich and poor. Socialism, a word introduced by the Saint-Simonians, was to bring about "social harmony."

In the English language, the word "individualism" was first introduced, as a pejorative, by the Owenites in the 1830s, although it is unclear if they were influenced by Saint-Simonianism or came up with

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it independently. A more positive use of the term in Britain came to be used with the writings of James Elishama Smith, who was a millenarian and a Christian Israelite. Although an early Owenite socialist, he eventually rejected its collective idea of property, and found in individualism a "universalism" that allowed for the development of the "original genius." Without individualism, Smith argued, individuals cannot amass property to increase one's happiness. William Maccall, another Unitarian preacher, and probably an acquaintance of Smith, came somewhat later, although influenced by John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, and German Romanticism, to the same positive conclusions, in his 1847 work "Elements of Individualism".

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "social contract" maintains that each individual is under implicit contract to submit his or her own will to the "general will." This advocacy of subordinating the individual will to a collective will is in fundamental opposition to the individualist philosophy. An individualist enters into society to further his or her own interests, or at least demands the right to serve his or her own interests, without taking the interests of society into consideration (an individualist need not be an egoist). The individualist does not lend credence to any philosophy that requires the sacrifice of the self-interest of the individual for any higher social causes. Rousseau would argue, however, that his concept of "general will" is not the simple collection of individual wills and precisely furthers the interests of the individual (the constraint of law itself would be beneficial for the individual, as the lack of respect for the law necessarily entails, in Rousseau's eyes, a form of ignorance and submission to one's passions instead of the preferred autonomy of reason).

Societies and groups can differ, in the extent to which they are based upon predominantly "self-regarding" (individualistic, and arguably self-interested) rather than "other-regarding" (group-oriented, and group, or society-minded) behaviour. Ruth Benedict argued that there is also a distinction, relevant in this context, between "guilt" societies (e.g., medieval Europe) with an "internal reference standard", and "shame" societies (e.g., Japan, "bringing shame upon one's ancestors") with an "external reference standard", where people look to their peers for feedback on whether an action is "acceptable" or not (also known as "group-think").

The extent to which society, or groups are "individualistic" can vary from time to time, and from country to country. For example, Japanese society is more group-oriented (e.g., decisions tend to be taken by consensus among groups, rather than by individuals), and it has been argued that "personalities are less developed" (than is usual in the West). The USA is usually thought of as being at the individualistic (its detractors would say "atomistic") end of the spectrum (the term "Rugged Individualism" is a cultural imprint of being the essence of Americanism), whereas European societies are

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more inclined to believe in "public-spiritedness", state "socialistic" spending, and in "public" initiatives.

John Kenneth Galbraith made a classic distinction between "private affluence and public squalor" in the USA, and private squalor and public affluence in, for example, Europe, and there is a correlation between individualism and degrees of public sector intervention and taxation.

Individualism is often contrasted with either totalitarianism or collectivism, but in fact there is a spectrum of behaviors ranging at the societal level from highly individualistic societies (e.g., the USA) through mixed societies (a term the UK has used in the post-World War II period) to collectivist. Also, many collectivists (particularly supporters of collectivist anarchism or libertarian socialism) point to the enormous differences between liberty-minded collectivism and totalitarian practices.

Individualism, sometimes closely associated with certain variants of individualist anarchism, libertarianism or classical liberalism, typically takes it for granted that individuals know best and that public authority or society has the right to interfere in the person's decision-making process only when a very compelling need to do so arises (and maybe not even in those circumstances). This type of argument is often observed in relation to policy debates regarding regulation of industries, as well as in relation to personal choice of lifestyle.

1.4.4 Social MoralitySocial morality is more concerned with how we would collectively do well to live as citizens of a society. It has to do with narrating sets of shared/mutual rules and values that would best enable folk to rub along with each other, to be reasonably safe in each other's company, to have enough freedom and power to live as we want to live, and generally enjoy the kind of society that we variously find congenial and valuable. A derivative function of social morality is to narrate valuable relations between persons and other species and/or impersonal integrities such as eco-systems, works of art and so on.

Morality does not apply to individual human beings when they are alone. A shipwrecked survivor on an island need not concern himself with morality because it does not apply to him in his isolation. This illustration emphasizes the fact that gods or extraterrestrials did not imbed the concept of morality in individual human beings but that morality is applicable to an individual only when he interacts with other persons. Morality is a societal phenomenon and, since man creates societies, all morality is a concept created by man. It follows, that morality is relative to our environment and does not apply to all persons at all times. Morality can only be relative and subjective; instead of objective, universal and absolute.

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A general problem, facing any moral or political narrative, is that all persons do and must live by values but that no human person actually knows what, if any, values really are valuable. This matters especially for social morality because; (1) persons can neither enjoy nor endure any kind of social integrity, co-operation or connectedness (any society, fellowship, communication or relationship) without some kind of shared morality. (2) Any shared morality, like any language or other ethic, simply will and must impose values on those who might not otherwise freely adopt them. We mightn't like the rules of language, for example, but we cannot profit from language without allowing it to impose its rules on us (after all, if we don't follow the rules then we won't be understood when we speak) - the same goes for mathematics, politics, self-realisation, or any other ethic. (3) None of us have a morally justified authority to impose our values on others if we cannot justify that our values are those that others ought to follow. And none of us have a right to impose our values on others if we cannot justify imposing on others the costs involved in either accepting or dissenting from those values.

These conditions seem impossible to meet so, just in order to have any kind of interpersonal relationship or society at all, we have to do what we have no right to do. This problem is aggravated by the fact that (a) human persons are chronically irresponsible about our imposition of values, to the extent that some of us even deny that we do impose our values on others, (b) imposing values violates the evaluating integrity of those on whom the values are imposed, and the imposition of values is god-playing [parentocentric], but (c) the only forms of social morality we know are parento-like defences against disvalue that assume a god-like superiority on our part.

Contrary to parentocentric mythology, our social, moral, political and aesthetic 'parents' are not better informed about values than are those they treat as moral children. And that so many of us think that we know what is right is evidence only that we haven't thought about it carefully enough to be aware that we don't know what is not knowable. Moral uncertainty logically justifies no more than a degree of humility (especially on the part of government). But, to the extent that we are morally insecure, we are generally fearful enough of our own uncertainty only to violate others in an effort to secure our own need for significance. The cost of this kind of logic is evident in the history of Communism, Islamic fundamentalism or 20th Century Germany. In each case, assumptions of moral superiority have given rise to an appalling history of vast and costly violence.

The dilemma, of having to do right by doing what we cannot know is right, cannot be escaped because, the attractions of pseudo-innocence notwithstanding, we simply cannot avoid imposing some values on others, and/or avoid responsibility for imposing our values on society, just because we have no moral authority to do so. To live is to

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impose one value on society, to not live is to impose another. To join in imposes our presence, to opt out imposes our absence. To vote or not vote, to speak or not speak, to mind our own business or interfere, are all values-imposing. Our choice is not to impose no values but only, and always, to choose which values we will impose, how and why.

Being responsible about the values we input into the world is, however, a behaviour which humans are generally scrupulous to avoid. We normally translate any responsibility that we have for others as according us the privilege of parent-like power over them. We protest that no one has a right to impose her or his values on us while, of necessity and in fact, vigorously imposing our values on others with a viciousness made worse [more violent] by: (1) our refusal to recognise and take responsibility for what we are doing - we deceive ourselves that it is not us who impose moral violence on others, we are just the agents of deities or forces of one kind or another, society/women/the workers, convention/tradition, fate, karma or 'historical necessity', justice and so on and on and on. And (2) our confusion of moral values with political [preference] values - we impose our preferences on others under (a) a compulsive need to confirm that we matter and (b) the assumption that our tastes and preferences are morally good because, if they are not, then there are doubts about our value as persons.

We cannot make these problems go away, but neither can we elect to have no social morality; even the denial of morality inputs a morality, and those who follow what others call 'evil' do so only because they believe it to be valuable [good]. We each and all have the power of persons, whether we want it or not, and we all use our personhood power whether we want to or not. Any use or non-use of personhood power necessarily inputs values to the world and, thereby, onto others in the world. So the only possibility, for using our power in any way that is valuable, is to follow the rules (the 'oughts') of a genuinely valuable morality.

We cannot know that any moral values are genuinely valuable but, as with all beliefs, we can know which moral beliefs are more or less justified. So what we can do (and the best that we can do) is 'shorten the odds' - we can strive for those values which are best justified by the evidence and reasoning that is available to us.

Integrity-respecting values are necessary for any relationship or society. To not impose such values on each other is to impose the values of social dis-integration. We do and must, in fact, impose integrity-respecting moral values on each other. And, if any kind of relationship is valuable then we are justified in imposing such values just as the price of our connectedness with others and theirs with us. This does not prove that an integrity-respecting morality is 'right', but it gives us better reasons for acting as if it was right than we have for acting as if integrity-violating values were justified. And, this being the

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case, we are better justified in imposing these values on each other, than we are in imposing other values, just as we are better justified in personally living by a respect for integrity (including an integrity of personal and social morality).

We are not similarly justified in imposing preference values on each other because preferences are pegged to subjects, and that any person or persons prefers something tells us nothing at all about whether or not it should or can be valued by any other person or persons. I can, for instance, compel others to hear the sounds I like, or to say what I want them to say, but I cannot make them like the sounds or believe the saying.

Some social rules are a necessity of relationship, just as linguistic rules [grammar] are a necessity of communication. And, given that some rules are inevitable, moral rules (which impartially empower everyone, and without which a society could not function) are much easier to justify than are political rules (which empower some at the expense of others and/or compel us all to realise only the values that some parentocentric elite prefers).

1.5 The importance of practicing good values in daily life

“Live by your personal code of values to get the most out of life. Life is fulfilling and free of stress when we live in accordance to our own personal values”

Your personal code of values are what's important to you; not something you want or would like to have, but something you literally need in your life to be happy. A value is a principle or quality intrinsically valuable or desirable to you. Values are personal. They are your convictions, your beliefs, and your ethics rolled into one. Your personal code of values may be identical to your family's values. Or they may be dramatically different. Living in agreement with one's values is fulfilling. Living in conflict with one's values is stressful and dissatisfying. That's why it is so important to clearly understand your own personal code of values; your happiness depends upon not only knowing your values, but living in accordance with them. Stress does not result from hard work, long hours, or multiple roles in life. Stress results from values conflicts. When put in a situation where you are unable to honor a value, you will feel stressed out. No amount of relaxation, meditation, or exercise will eliminate the stress until the values conflict is resolved.

It's important that we separate what society, culture, and family values from our individual set of values. Values are not about right and wrong as a broad, cultural construct, but about what's right and wrong

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for you as an individual, given who you are and what you want in your life. What you truly value is--by definition--right for you. What you value may not be right for those close to you and may be a source of disagreement and dissatisfaction if others attempt to enforce their code of values on you.

Determining your own personal code of values can take either of two directions. You can: (1) Start with a long list of general values, and pick those important to you, or (2) Build your list from scratch based on your life experiences. The first method, picking values from a list, may subconsciously encourage you to select values you think you should have, rather than those really important to you. The second method, though more difficult initially, will be more accurate and more rewarding. Try both and see which works best for you. To build your own list from personal experiences follow this process: (1) Think of a brief moment in your experience when life was especially satisfying and rewarding. (2) What were you doing? (3) Who was present? (4) What qualities or values were you displaying?

You respond to a frantic knock on the door and see a young girl, perhaps eight years old, with a boy about four. The boy is choking and the girl, obviously his sister, is frightened. Without thinking you pick up the boy, turn him upside down, and firmly rap him several times on the back with the palm of your hand. A whole piece of hard candy that was blocking the boy's airway pops out and the boy takes several deep, grateful breaths. In that rewarding moment you display the values of bravery, helpfulness, responsibility, and problem-solving action.

Why is it important to understand your own personal values? Values are linked to purpose in life. You might say that your purpose is to live your values. When you do, life is good.

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Date post:	13-Sep-2014
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Chapter 1 Moral Studies Module 2009

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