Chapter 21
Comparing young peoples’ beliefs and perception of gender equality across 28
different countries
Bryony Hoskins
Jan Germen Janmaat*
Key words: gender equality, political participation, perceptions, young people, IEA Civic
Education Study
* Both authors contributed equally to this chapter.
Abstract
This chapter explores young peoples’ perceptions of and beliefs in gender equality across 28
countries and the relationship between these 2 phenomena. The findings show that while the
levels of young people’s beliefs in gender equality follow patterns of economic development
(GDP) and are associated with actual measures of gender equality (Gender Empowerment
Measure), nevertheless, young peoples’ perceptions of gender inequalities are found to be
independent of beliefs in gender equality, actual levels of gender equality and economic
development. Sweden is found to be the only country where more than 50% of young people
combine beliefs in equality with perceptions of inequality. In our analysis, we also find that the
willingness to engage in political action is stronger amongst those young people who believe in
gender equality and at the same time perceive reality not to be in accordance with this ideal.
These findings suggest that political action is premised on the combination of not only believing
in gender equality but also perceiving gender inequality.
Introduction
Beliefs in gender equality are said to be increasing along with economic development and
modernization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). At the same time the
existence of gender discrimination has been found to be frequently and continuously “denied,
played down and ignored” in higher education and more broadly across advanced post-industrial
states (Morrison, Bourke, & Kelley, 2005, p. 151). At first glance, these results appear to be
inconsistent. However, both claims could be correct. A conviction that women should be treated
equally need not necessarily be accompanied by a perception that they are treated unequally
even in situations where gender discrimination is overt. People may well underestimate structural
processes of exclusion because of their inclination to see gender inequality as resulting from
individual differences in effort, talent and determination and not as a result of institutional
structures (Morrison et al., 2005; David & Robinson, 1991). Thus, the perception is that women
who do not attain the same social positions as men are themselves to blame, not society at large.
It has been argued that people have a psychological need to believe that the world is just
(Lerner, 1980). This conviction that society is fair might prevent people from seeing and
recognizing gender discrimination. It is quite possible that people perceive society to be coherent
with their beliefs of gender equality, even if society is treating women unequally and their
perception is thus incorrect. Such a combination of perceptions and belief we would posit
reduces the desire to act politically to improve the levels of gender equality. If we reformulate
this argument in a positive direction we would expect that for people to engage in political action
it is necessary that endorsement of the principle of gender equality needs to be accompanied by a
perception of gender discrimination (in other words a perception that reality is not in accordance
with the ideal).
These reflections lead us to formulate 2 hypotheses. First, although socio-economic
development may indeed generate a strong belief in the principle of gender equality as suggested
by Inglehart and Norris (2003), we do not expect perceptions of gender equality to be strongly
related to either real gender inequality or to a belief in gender equality. In other words, believing
in gender equality need not lead to a heightened awareness of gender discrimination, and an
awareness of gender discrimination may not reflect actual gender inequality. Second, we posit
that believing in gender equality is not sufficient to create social change; for people to engage in
political action it is necessary that they both believe in gender equality and perceive gender
inequality to occur. We believe that by investigating these hypotheses we begin to unravel the
mystery of persistent political passivity in contexts combining strong support for gender equality
with continued actual gender inequality or discrimination. By addressing this major omission and
enigma in gender research we hope to develop the field significantly further.
The paper starts by discussing the theories informing the links between socio-economic
development, gender attitudes and civic participation in greater detail. Subsequently it describes
the data sources and indicators used to measure the concepts of interest. Next, descriptive
statistics will be provided on participation, on beliefs and perceptions of gender equality, and on
socio-economic development and actual gender inequality. Thereafter we correlate perceptions
and beliefs with indicators of socio-economic development and actual gender equality. Lastly we
explore whether believing in gender equality and perceiving the actual inequalities that woman
face increases positive attitudes towards participation in civic and political action.
Theories on people’s beliefs and perceptions of gender equality
Prominent political scientists have argued that beliefs in gender equality have been growing
stronger across the world and are part of a modernization process associated with changes in
improved social conditions (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). They see such
beliefs as a component of a more comprehensive set of values (so-called self-expression values)
that have become more salient in the post-war decades. Proceeding from Maslow’s (1943)
“pyramid of needs” idea, they argue that self-expression values are developed by people who
have had a secure and affluent childhood (i.e., values emphasizing self-fulfillment, freedom,
autonomy, gender equality, tolerance). By contrast, people who have grown up under conditions
of scarcity and insecurity will tend to develop survival values (i.e., values stressing economic
and physical security), which underpin citizen identities particularly in poorer authoritarian states
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). As new generations have grown up under ever more prosperous
circumstances in the Western world from World War II onwards, young generations with self-
expression values have steadily replaced older cohorts who still experienced scarcity in their
childhood years and who therefore tended to endorse survival values. The result of this process
of generation replacement has been a gradual cultural shift away from survival towards self-
expression values, including the belief in gender equality.
Modernization theory further suggests that the change towards greater security and
prosperity is combined with less physically demanding work, the move towards the knowledge
based economy, and greater education and employment opportunities for women, leading to
higher levels of actual gender equality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). This change of circumstance
for women is also said to strengthen beliefs in gender equality among both women and men.
Thus, according to modernization theory, socio-economic development has not only produced
higher levels of gender equality in reality but has also led to a stronger belief in the value of
gender equality, both as a component of a wider process towards self-expression and as a side
effect of enhanced opportunities for women.
Also drawing on the same principles of macro-economic modernization theory,
Lundmark (2004) distinguishes between perceptions and beliefs in gender equality. She
examined data from the Eurobarometer survey to understand changes in “feminist values” (a
belief in gender equality and a perception of gender inequalities) across the time period 1975 to
1983. She tested the modernization hypothesis developed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and
Inglehart and Norris (2003), suggesting that general improvements for the position of women in
society will have changed people’s attitudes towards gender equality. Although she found that
beliefs in gender equality (as proxied by attitudes towards women’s participation in politics) had
indeed become more salient, she also found that perceptions of women not having the same
chances as men had decreased significantly between 1975 and 1983. Her interpretation was that
inequality was becoming more hidden and complex during this period, making people become
less aware of existing inequalities. She also observed a link between perceptions of inequalities
and actual inequalities cross-nationally, noting that countries with relatively high levels of actual
gender inequality (Italy and Greece) showed a stronger awareness of inequalities. These findings
can be said to be consistent with Sen’s (2000) theory of social justice, which assumes that
perceptions of inequality are an accurate reflection of objective inequalities.
However, we question if perceptions of gender equality really mirror or reflect reality.
There is a significant body of nationally based feminist research suggesting that women and men
are in denial of the continued forms of exclusion that exist (Rhode, 1997; Morrison et al., 2005;
Figes, 1994). As noted earlier, this denial may well be related to the idea that inequalities are the
result of individual failure (Morrison et al., 2005), which in turn could well reflect a belief in a
just world (Lerner, 1980).
The Just World Theory according to Lerner (1980) suggests that people have a need to
believe that the world is fair and that people get what they deserve. In this process the individual
constructs psychological mechanisms that prevent the individual from considering a situation to
be unjust either for themselves or for others in order to reduce stress. Using the Just World
Theory in the context of gender equality, we would expect that both men and women perceive
that, for example, a women’s lack of success or failure to get equal pay has its roots in individual
failings or lack of effort. This has been described by feminist research as the “denial of continued
discrimination against women” (Morrison et al., 2005, p.151) or the holding of a “romantic
vision of a meritocracy” (Titus, 2000, p. 27). This position has been described as some form of
protection against the uncomfortable feeling that females should need to contest this situation
against their fellow male friends and colleagues (Morrison et al., 2005). At this point it is
important to highlight that we see Inglehart’s theory on value change and Lerner’s Just World
Theory as compatible. Self-expressionism, in fact, can be said to contain an element of Just
World thinking as it has been argued that people with self-expression values also strongly
believe in self-efficacy — i.e., the idea that individuals have the ability to shape their own life
course (Janmaat & Braun, 2009). In other words, they tend to ignore or downplay the role of
social and institutional factors in constraining the life chances of people in disadvantaged
positions.
Lerner (1980) has tested the Just World Theory and has concluded that people are
successfully convincing themselves that the more privileged groups justifiably enjoy their
benefits. Rubin and Peplau (1975) take this argument one step further by arguing that believing
in the just world reduces the feeling of need to engage in activities to change society or to
alleviate the plight of social victims. This takes us to the second question of this chapter: the link
between beliefs, perceptions and action.
Lundmark (2004) found that women or men who held feminist positions (where beliefs in
equality are matched by perceptions of inequality) were more interested in politics than those
who did not believe or see inequalities. David and Robinson’s (1991) study of gender attitudes in
the UK, US, West Germany and Austria also showed that it is the combination of believing in
gender equality and being aware of unequal treatment that motivates people to take action. The
idea that beliefs in social justice are not sufficient and need to be complemented by an awareness
of social injustice for political mobilization to take place is well established in the literature (e.g.,
Rhode, 1997; Giddens, 1973).
The problem that we thus discern for achieving gender equality is that perceptions of
gender equality may not reflect the reality, making it difficult to mobilize both women and men
who believe in gender equality towards transformative action. In the following we thus examine
our 2 hypotheses. First, perceptions of gender equality are not assumed to be strongly related to
either real gender inequality or to a belief in gender equality. Second, believing in gender
equality is not sufficient to create social change; for people to engage in political action it is
necessary that they both believe in gender equality and perceive gender inequality to occur.
Data and indicators
In this paper we use data from the 1999 Civic Education Study (CIVED), which measures the
civic knowledge, skills, values and behaviors of 14 year olds. The data for this study were
collected in April 1999 by means of a large scale test and questionnaire survey among a sample
of 90,000 Grade 8 students in 28 countries worldwide (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, &
Schulz, 2001).* A major advantage of the CIVED study, in addition to the large national samples
(3,000 students and more) and the low non-response rates, is the inclusion of ready-made
composite scales in the database, which have been tested for conceptual equivalence cross-
nationally (Schulz, 2004). This means that the items composing the scales have been understood
in the same way across countries and that the data are thus comparable internationally. Given the
nested character of the national samples, with all the students of 1 classroom per school being
selected in each of the 150-200 sampled schools, the CIVED study further allows researchers to
explore both contextual effects pertaining to classrooms and schools and individual-level factors.
Moreover, CIVED is the only existing international data source collected from nationally
representative samples that measures both beliefs and perceptions of gender inequality and
includes attitudes towards civic participation.1As such, it offers a unique opportunity to
investigate how groups of individuals with different perceptions and beliefs of gender equality
engage in active citizenship.
In terms of content the survey focused on 3 domains: (1) Democracy/citizenship, (2)
National identity/international relations, and (3) Social cohesion and identity. Within the 3
domains information was gathered on knowledge of the content, skills in interpretation and
concepts, attitudes and expected actions in the future. Knowledge of the content and skills in
interpretation were tapped with a test using items with 1correct answer. Attitudes and future
actions were measured with a questionnaire containing items with Likert-type answer scales (for
more information on the test and the questionnaire, see Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz, 2004)
* The International Civics and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) conducted in 2009 is the formal successor of CIVED. Crucially, however, ICCS lacks items on perceptions of gender equality, which makes it unfit to use for this study.
(for examples of these items, see Appendix 21.1). We used questionnaire items to measure our
dependent variable and one of our explanatory variables. We furthermore used a construct based
on test items as a control variable (see subsequent section).
In addition to the CIVED study we drew on data from the World Bank and UNDP to find
measurements for socio-economic development, the other variable of interest of this paper.
Dependent variable: Participation
The dependent variable in our analysis is positive attitudes towards civic and political
participation. The assessment of these attitudes was based on one dimension of the Civic
Competence Composite Indicator (CCCI) developed by Hoskins, Barber, Van Nijlen and
Villalba (2011): participatory attitudes (henceforth participation). The dimension Participation
is a measure of participatory attitudes assessing self-efficacy as well as the disposition towards
involvement in actions that can create change. It is formed as the linear combination of 5 Item
Response Theory (IRT) scales*: Internal political efficacy, expectation of social movement
related participation, expected participation in political activities, self-confident participation in
schools, and expectations associated with voting (see Appendix 21.1 for the items that these IRT
scales comprise). Participation includes items mainly related to attitudes towards future
participation in different contexts: community, politics or school, as well as interests in
participating in political discussion in a school context. It has a satisfactory internal consistency
in view of the number of scales that it comprises; the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.652. The
scale was created by the CIVED methodological experts (see Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz,
2004; Husfeldt, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2006) and by researchers at the Centre for Research on
*
Item response theory (IRT) refers to the way the scales have been built modeling responses to the items, as opposed to classical test theory that models a whole test.
Lifelong Learning (CRELL) at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The
dimension has the advantage of summarizing a complex phenomenon in a single number,
ranging between 0 [minimum participation] to 100 [maximum participation] making its
exploration easier.
Explanatory variables 1: perception and belief categories
In this section we define perceptions and beliefs in gender equality as our key explanatory
variables and then explain how we build our categories of respondents. The terminology in the
field of inequalities is varied and inconsistent. David and Robinson (1991) use the word
“consciousness” to refer to “first perceiving that inequality exists, and then decide that this
inequality is sufficiently unfair that some corrective action is warranted” (p.72). Gurin (1985)
uses the terminology “gender consciousness” to refer to an individual’s believing in the need for
“collective action geared to change” (p.146). Lundmark (2004), alternatively, uses the words
“feminist orientation” to encompass the perception of gender inequality that she refers to as
“feminist cognition,” a “gender perspective” that highlights the belief in gender equality and
finally a strategy towards creating social change (p. 255). Both Lundmark (2004) and David and
Robinson (1991) state that a “feminist orientation” or “gender consciousness” can be a position
held by both men and women. In this article, we also take the position that both girls and boys
can hold similar perceptions and beliefs. However, the terminology we use is perceptions of
inequalities rather than “feminist cognition” in order to highlight the fact that we are measuring
subjective perceptions of reality, which may not be an accurate reflection of reality. Thus the
notion of perceptions of inequalities refers to the individual’s subjective
observations/perceptions of everyday reality of inequalities. Perceptions are assumed to be based
on own experiences and observing experiences of others in the immediate social context. Thus
within everyday experience individuals build their own understanding of the social world based
on their own reflection of social action and their own internalized beliefs.
In addition, we use the terminology of values or beliefs in gender equality referring this
time to how individuals believe the world should actually be. A belief in gender equality is, in
contrast to our understanding of perceptions, referring to an abstract and ideal situation. Our
hypothesis is that both perceptions of inequality and beliefs in equality are needed to achieve
political mobilization.
Following Bergman (2001) and Bergman & El-Khouri (2003) we used a person-centered
approach for our analysis as this enabled us to explore how perceptions and beliefs combine
within individuals. Key to this approach is the identification of 4 categories of respondents to
capture the distinction between perceptions and beliefs and to make it possible to assess the
effect of both on participation, our outcome. The 4 categories were formed by combining the
individuals’ responses to 2 items: “Women should have the same rights as men” and “women
have fewer chances than men.” The first item captures beliefs in gender equality while the
second item is a proxy for perceptions of inequality / unequal treatment. Both items were
assessed with a Likert response scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “strongly
agree.” The following categories identifying 4 gender attitude groups were created for both girls
and boys:
1) The egalitarian-satisfied group combining a belief in gender equality (“agree” and
“strongly agree”) with a perception that there is no unequal treatment (“disagree” and
“strongly disagree”).
2) The egalitarian-dissatisfied group combining a belief in gender equality (“agree” and
“strongly agree”) with a perception that there is unequal treatment (“agree” and “strongly
agree”).
3) The traditionalist-satisfied group combining a belief in gender inequality (“disagree” and
“strongly disagree”) with a perception that there is unequal treatment (“agree” and
“strongly agree”).
4) The traditionalist-dissatisfied group combining a belief in gender inequality (“disagree”
and “strongly disagree”) with a perception that there is no unequal treatment (“agree” and
“strongly agree”).
These groupings are visualized in Figure 21.1. Based on the Just World Theory discussed
previously, our hypothesis is that people who believe in gender equality do not necessarily
perceive much inequality. We thus expect more students in the egalitarian-satisfied category than
in the egalitarian-dissatisfied category. In addition, we expect the egalitarian dissatisfied group to
be the most motivated to participate politically.
> Fig. 21.1 Here<
Explanatory variables 2: socio-economic development and gender inequality
The first hypothesis introduced the concepts of socio-economic development and gender
equality. To tap into the former we used we used GDP per capita (purchasing power parity)
following the assumption that more developed states are characterized by higher levels of
prosperity. The GDP data that we used pertain to the year 1999 and are drawn from the World
Bank 2000-2001 Development Report. Many scholars, including Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
and Delhey and Newton (2005) have used GDP per capita as indicator of development and
modernization more broadly.
There are furthermore 2 well-known indices available to assess actual gender equality,
the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). We
decided to select the latter. Unlike the GDI, which only measures the expansion of opportunities
and rights, the GEM focuses on the degree to which women have actually been able to use these
opportunities and rights (UNDP, 2012a; for the debate on the use of these and other indicators of
gender equality, see Klasen, 2006; Klasen & Schuler 2011). It thus provides a more precise
picture of the positions that women have attained in a society. The GEM is a composite index
comprised of 4 indicators: (1) the percentage of seats in parliament held by women; (2) the
percentage of legislators, senior officials and managers who are women; (3) the percentage of
professional and technical workers who are women; (4) the ratio of estimated female to male
earned income (UNDP, 2012b). A high score on this index demonstrates a high level of equality.
No country has a score of 100% indicating absolute gender parity. We selected the GEM data of
2001, as the data available for other years was not as complete or close to the CIVED data of
1999.
Control variables
We included a number of control variables in the models explaining participation (see the
penultimate section). All of these variables, except GEM, were based on CIVED data. They
concern social background (based on an item assessing the number of books at home*), ethnicity
(identified through an item on language spoken at home), academic achievement (measured with
TOTCGMLE, a ready-made composite index in the CIVED database representing performance
on a civic knowledge and skills test), educational motivation (indicated by an item on expected
further education), as well as peer effect (tapped with the classroom average of the number of
books at home). The influence of all these variables on participatory intentions and on civic
attitudes more broadly has been well documented in the literature (for the effects of social
background and academic performance, see Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Galston, 2001;
Campbell, 2006; for that of ethnicity, see Rice & Feldman, 1997; Janmaat, 2008; for that of
educational motivation, see Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz, Ainly, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito,
2010; for that of peer effects, see Van der Werfhorst, 2007; Janmaat, 2011).
Descriptive statistics
In this section we provide basic descriptive statistics of the outcome of interest and the key
explanatory variables. To begin with the former, we can see that there is a marked variation in
participation both within and between countries (see Table 21.1 which ranks the countries on
mean values). The country with the largest internal variation is the United States with 68% of
respondents having participation scores ranging between 37.30 and 69.30 (i.e. the mean value of
53.30 -/+ 1SD of 16.00). All the remaining countries have slightly lower within-country
variability (see the SDs which range between 12.41 and 15.96). The between country variation is
also striking. While several Latin American and Southern European countries display relatively
high mean levels of participation hovering around the value of 60 (Cyprus, Colombia, Greece
* Measuring social background solely with number of books at home may seem a bit thin. However, the many missing values on parental education level, another well-known indicator of SES, prevented us from developing a more encompassing construct of social background.
and Chile), many North-West European states trail the ranking order with scores lower than 50
(Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, England, Denmark, French Belgium and Norway).
Eastern European countries do not show a particular pattern as they can be found both amongst
the top performers (Romania, Poland and Slovakia) and amongst the countries trailing the league
(Estonia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria). The good performance of Latin countries both in
Europe and in the Americas could be an indication of strong norms of participation reflecting a
republican tradition of nation- and statehood (Lovett, 2010; Green & Janmaat, 2011).
>Table 21.1 Here<
Turning now to the 4 gender attitude groups, Table 21.2 shows that, as predicted, almost
all of the young people believe in gender equality, as the 2 egalitarian groups constitute more
than 85% of all respondents. Moreover, girls and boys appear to hold similar attitudes, with just
slightly fewer boys who believe in gender equality than girls (Table 21.1). As expected, the
results show that for both boys and girls more than 60% of respondents are in the egalitarian-
satisfied group, suggesting that the belief in a just world without gender discrimination is indeed
widespread. The second largest group is the egalitarian-dissatisfied group of boys and girls
comprising together a bit less than 30% of the respondents. These respondents may be said to
represent critical feminists as they combine a strong belief in gender equality with a perception
that reality does not live up to this standard. As noted before, we expect this group to show the
strongest inclination to participate in political action. Only a very small number of girls and boys
reject the principle of gender equality altogether, as shown by the small percentages in the
traditionalist categories (4.4% of girls and 12.8% of boys). Among these traditionalists the
dissatisfied groups are slightly larger than the satisfied groups for both boys and girls, indicating
that among those who do not believe in gender equality there are more who perceive that women
do actually have equal chances in reality than those who perceive that reality is in accordance
with their beliefs.
>Table 21.2 Here<
In the next step, we examined the size of the 4 attitude groups across different countries
(see Table 21.3 which ranks the countries on the percentage of egalitarian-dissatisfied for both
boys and girls). We found that the patterns in the pooled data were largely replicated in the
individual countries, as the egalitarian-satisfied group constituted the largest and the egalitarian-
dissatisfied group the second largest group everywhere. The notable exception to this pattern was
Sweden where the egalitarian-dissatisfied group was the largest for both girls (64%) and boys
(48%). Russia on the other hand had the least egalitarian-dissatisfied girls (17%) and Hungary
the least egalitarian-dissatisfied boys (16%) of all countries.
It is tempting to read regional patterns in these findings, but a closer look at the data
shows that the countries topping and trailing the ranking order are very diverse. Thus, former
communist countries are both amongst the top group in terms of size of the egalitarian-
dissatisfied group (Lithuania, Czech and Slovak Republics for girls and Lithuania, Poland and
Romania for boys) and amongst the bottom group (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Russia for girls
and Slovenia, Estonia, Russia and Hungary for boys). Similarly, Western European countries can
be found both topping (Sweden, Finland and Germany for girls and Sweden, Cyprus and Greece
for boys) and trailing the league table (Switzerland, French Belgium, Italy for both genders).
Lastly, it can be seen that the countries with a relatively small group of egalitarian-dissatisfied
individuals also have a relatively large group of egalitarian-satisfied, particularly for girls. Thus,
small numbers of egalitarian-dissatisfied do not indicate lack of support for the principle of
gender equality.
>Table 21.3 Here<
Our data on socio-economic development and gender equality show that we have
information on all but 3 countries (Colombia, Cyprus and Hong Kong) that participated in
CIVED (see Table 21.4 which ranks the countries on GDP per capita and GEM). We can see that
a country’s place in the ranking order on GDP per capita is a very good predictor of that
country’s position in the league table on gender equality. In other words, the more prosperous a
country is, the better its score on gender equality. These results confirm the claim of
modernization theorists that the position of women in a society is closely linked to level of socio-
economic development. Indeed, a bivariate correlation between the data of Table 21.4 produces a
strong positive relationship (r = .86; p < .001; N = 24). The data also reveal quite a variation
across countries in gender equality. While some Scandinavian countries are not that far from
total gender parity with scores of over 80% (Norway and Sweden), some countries in Latin
America and in Southern and Eastern Europe have scores of 50% or less (Greece, Hungary,
Lithuania, Romania, Chile, and Russia).
>Table 21.4 Here<
Results
Hypothesis 1
Having explored the background data, we now test the first hypothesis: Are perceptions of
gender inequality indeed different from normative beliefs, i.e., are they not related to objective
conditions, and are they not linked to beliefs in gender equality either? Table 21.5 shows
correlations at the country level between GDP per capita and GEM on the one hand and
aggregate data on gender attitudes on the other. There appears to be strong endorsement for the
first hypothesis. While beliefs of gender equality grow stronger at higher levels of socio-
economic development and gender equality (see the strong positive relationships between GDP
and GEM and between GDP and beliefs in gender equality), perceptions of gender inequality are
not related to either the 2 indicators of objective conditions (GDP or GEM) or to beliefs of
gender equality. In other words, the more prosperous and more gender equal countries also show
high levels of support for the principle of gender equality, but perceptions of gender inequalities
are not necessarily more salient. Thus the thesis of socio-economic development indeed applies
for beliefs but not for perceptions. Perceptions appear to lead a life of their own in our analysis,
which contrasts sharply with the findings of Lundmark (2004) and refutes Sen’s (2000)
aforementioned proposition that they are shaped by the actual degree of inequality in a country.
>Table 21.5 Here<
Hypothesis 2
Do the findings also support the second hypothesis? In other words, are people only inclined to
participate in civic and political action if they both believe in gender equality and perceive reality
not to concur with that ideal? We explored this question by analyzing the determinants of
participation with multilevel analysis (MLA) on the pooled CIVED data (see Snijders & Bosker,
1999 for an extensive explanation of this method of analysis). The explanatory variables
included in the MLA models are the 4 gender attitude groups (with the egalitarian-satisfied group
being the reference category), the control variables mentioned before and the GEM index to
capture potential environmental influences on our outcome of interest. MLA is necessary as the
data that we use is nested (students in classrooms — in schools — in countries) and our model
includes explanatory variables at various levels: 5 variables at the individual level peer effect at
the classroom and GEM at the country level. With MLA we can accurately assess the effects of
these higher-level variables (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Using OLS regression would
overestimate their effects. The only difference between MLA and OLS regression is that the
former splits the variation in the dependent variable up in several levels. We performed separate
analyses for girls and boys. Variables were standardized to facilitate interpretation.
>Table 21.6 Here<
For both girls and boys we find a significant positive relationship between the egalitarian-
dissatisfied groups and participatory attitudes in addition to and above the influence of the
control variables (see Table 21.6). This association is slightly stronger for boys than girls.
Compared to those in the egalitarian-satisfied group (the reference group), the egalitarian-
dissatisfied girls have on average a .28 and the egalitarian-dissatisfied boys a .38 higher level of
participatory attitudes on a scale ranging from -3.5 to 3.3 (that is a 4.1% and 5.6% higher level of
participatory attitudes). In addition, there are significant negative associations between the
traditionalist categories and participatory attitudes, again for both genders but most particularly
for boys. By comparison to the reference group, these categories have between .24 and .61 lower
scores on participatory attitudes.
Together these results lend support for our hypothesis that it is the combination of a
strong belief in gender equality and a perception of inequality that really motivates people to
engage in civic and political action. Nonetheless, the results for boys also show that those who
believe in gender equality (whether they perceive inequality or not) have higher participatory
intentions than who reject it, which somewhat diminishes the argument that both conviction and
awareness are needed for participation.
We also ran the analysis across 3 groups of countries differing in their positions on the
GEM index (low; medium; high) to see if the position of women in society mattered for the
relation between the gender attitude groups and participation. The results of this analysis turned
out to be the same for each country grouping.* This indicates that the results found for the pooled
data are robust.
Control variables
As expected, the control variables are strongly related with attitudes towards participation both
for the girls and boys. Academic performance for both girls and boys has the strongest
association with positive participatory attitudes. Intended levels of education and social
background both have strong positive associations with our dependent variable for boys and
girls, suggesting that relatively privileged and academically motivated students are more in favor
of civic participation. Ethnic background does not have a significant effect for either boys or
girls. The effect of peers is rather unexpected as it shows a negative association with
participation for both girls and boys. In other words, the higher the social status of your peers,
the lower are your participatory attitudes. Finally, another unexpected finding is that the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM) has a negative impact on participation, meaning that the higher
the level of gender equality in a country, the lower the level of participatory attitudes.
Conclusion
This research confirms theories of gender equality and modernization arguing that a belief in
gender equality follows patterns of economic growth (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart &
Norris, 2003). However, and as predicted, perceptions of gender inequality appear to be * These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
independent from beliefs in gender equality. In addition, they are neither associated with actual
levels of gender equality nor with levels of economic development. We argue that this could be
due to a psychological preference to believe that the world is fair (Lerner, 1980). Such a belief
removes the anxiety that would be caused by having to challenge the privileged positions of male
partners, friends, relatives and colleagues (Morrison et al., 2005).
If we want to understand how awareness of gender equality is enhanced, it is useful to
explore the case of Sweden. Sweden was the only country that has over 50% of young people in
the egalitarian-dissatisfied group and combines this with the second highest score on the gender
equality index. Thus Sweden has achieved greater levels of gender inequality and managed to
raise awareness within young people about gender inequalities (as expressed as a high level of
perceived inequality). Sweden has been a leading country in the world in terms gender equality
policy and practice, and “it has a history of ‘social engineering’, a form of social planning
stemming from the 1930s that combines research, politics and an aesthetics of rationality in order
to create ‘the good society’ (det goda samhället) and produce a particular kind of new, aware and
socially desirable person or citizen (den nya människan; den nya medborgaren)” (Woodford-
Berger, 2009, pp. 68-69). The gender equality policies and practices that stem from the social
plans are still very present today in Swedish society and may account for the higher levels of
awareness of gender inequality in Sweden. It would be worthy of further investigation to
establish whether these policies can indeed explain why Sweden is more successful than their
fellow Nordic countries in achieving not only high levels of equality but also greater perceptions
of gender inequality.
In a final step, we found that participatory attitudes were highest among the egalitarian-
dissatisfied group, for both boys and girls. This confirms our hypothesis that to enhance the
motivation for political change it is necessary both to perceive gender inequality and believe in
gender equality. This has implications for critical pedagogy as it highlights the need for young
people not only to develop beliefs of gender equality, but, in addition, to learn to perceive real
circumstances of inequalities. Without both of these qualities failure can be blamed on the
individual rather than on systemic forms of exclusion and the motivation to engage in political
action to bring about positive social change is reduced.
We have to note however that the positive effect of an awareness of gender inequality on
the motivation to participate is not so powerful that these motivation levels are also highest in the
countries where this awareness is strongest. Evidently there are many other, and more powerful,
factors at work that influence this motivation.
References
Bergman, L. R. (2001). A person approach in research on adolescence: Some methodological
challenges. Journal of Adolescent Research, 16, 28-53.
Bergman, L. R., & El-Khouri, B. M. (2003). A person-oriented approach: Methods for today and
methods for tomorrow. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 101, 25-
38.
Campbell, D. (2006). What is education’s impact on civic and social engagement? In R.
Desjardins & T. Schuller (Eds.). Measuring the Effects of Education on Health and Civic
Engagement. Proceedings of the Copenhagen Symposium. Paris: CERI, OECD, 25-126.
David, N., & Robinson, R. (1991). Men’s and women’s consciousness of gender inequality:
Austia, West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. American Sociological
Review, 56 (1), 72-84.
Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2005). ‘Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global
Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?’ European Sociological Review, 21, 311-27.
Figes, K. (1994). Because of Her Sex: The Myth of Equality for Women in Britain. London:
MacMillan.
Galston, W. (2001). Political knowledge, political engagement and civic education. Annual
Review of Political Science, 4, 217-234.
Giddens, A. (1973). The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. New York: Barnes and
Noble.
Green, A., & Janmaat, J.G. (2011). Regimes of Social Cohesion: Societies and the Crisis of
Globalization. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gurin, P. (1985). Women’s gender consciousness. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (2), 143-
163.
Hoskins, B., Barber, C., Van Nijlen, D., & Villalba, E. (2011). Comparing civic competence
among European youth: composite and domain-specific indicators using IEA civic
education study data. Comparative Education Review, 55 (1), 82-110.
Husfeldt, V., Barber, C., & Torney-Purta, J. (2005). Students’ social attitudes and expected
political participation: New scales in the enhanced database of the IEA. CEDARS
Working Paper. Retrieved from http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~jtpurta/Original
%20Documents/CEDARS%20new%20scales%20report.pdf
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003). Rising tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The
Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Janmaat, J.G. (2008) The civic attitudes of ethnic minority youth and the impact of citizenship
education, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(1), 27-54.
Janmaat, J.G., & Braun, R. (2009). Diversity and postmaterialism as rival perspectives in
accounting for social solidarity: Evidence from international surveys, International
Journal of Comparative Sociology, 39-68.
Janmaat, J.G. (2011). Ability grouping, segregation and civic competences among adolescents,
International Sociology, 26 (4), 455-482.
Klasen, S. (2006). UNDP's gender-related measures: Some conceptual problems and possible
solutions, Journal of Human Development, 7 (2), 243-274.
Klasen, S, & Schuler, D. (2011). Reforming the gender-related development index and the
gender empowerment measure: Implementing some specific proposals, Feminist
Economics, (1), 1-30.
Lerner, M. (1980) The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. New York: Plenum
Press.
Lovett, F. (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lundmark, C. (2004) Feminist political orientations. In J. van Deth & E. Scarbrough (Eds.), The
Impact of Values. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_MaslowMaslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of motivation,
Psychological Review, 50(4), 370-96.
Morrison, Z., Bourke, M., & Kelley, C. (2005) Stop making it such a big issue: Perceptions and
experiences of gender inequality by undergraduates at a British University. Women’s
studies International Forum, 28, 150-162.
Nie, N., Junn, J. & Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996). Education and Democratic Citizenship in America.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Rhode, D (1997) The Denial of Gender Equality. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Rice, T. W. and Feldman, J. L. (1997) Civic culture and democracy from Europe to America.
The Journal of Politics, 59 (4), 1143-72.
Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. (1975) Who Believes in a Just World. Journal of Social Issues, 31(3),
pp. 65-89.
Schulz, W. (2004) Chapter 8: Scaling procedures for Likert-type items on students’ concepts,
attitudes and actions’ in W. Schulz & H. Sibberns (Eds.), IEA Civic Education Study:
Technical Report (pp. 93-126). Amsterdam: IEA.
Schulz, W., Ainly, J., Fraillon, J., Kerr, D., & Losito, B. (2010). ICCS 2009 International
Report: The Civic Knowledge, Attitudes and Engagement Among Lower Secondary
School Students in 38 Countries. Amsterdam: IEA.
Sen, A. (2000). Social Justice and the Distribution of Income. In A.B. Atkinson & F.
Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 1. Amsterdam, North-
Holland.
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R.J. (1999). Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced
Multilevel Modelling. London: Sage Publications.
Titus, J. (2000). Engaging student resistance to feminism: How is this stuff going to make us
better teachers? Gender and Education, 12(1), 21-37.
Torney-Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Oswald, H., & Schulz, W. (2001). Citizenship and Education in
Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen.
Amsterdam: IEA.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2012a). Measuring inequality: Gender-related
Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). Retrieved
October 2, 2012 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/-statistics/indices/gdi_gem/
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2012b). Gender Empowerment Measure.
Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_GEM.pdf
Van der Werfhorst, H. (2007). Vocational Education and Active Citizenship Behavior in Cross-
National Perspective. AIAS Working Paper Number 2007/62. Retrieved from www.uva-
aias.net/files/aias/WP62.pdf
Woodford-Berger, P. (2004). Gender mainstreaming: What is it (about) and should we continue
doing it? IDS Bulletin, 35, 65–72. doi: 10.1111/j.1759-5436.2004.tb00157.x
Table 21.1: Descriptive statistics for participation
Country Mean SD NCYP 61.44 12.91 2938COL 59.89 13.68 4549GRC 57.18 12.86 3192CHL 56.91 14.79 5218ROM 55.68 13.40 2686POL 55.49 14.03 2997SVK 54.09 12.41 3174PRT 53.99 12.61 2795USA 53.30 16.00 2230ITA 51.14 13.28 3383HKG 50.13 14.63 3901AUS 49.66 15.12 2640SVN 49.38 12.79 2640HUN 49.29 12.50 3082NOR 49.26 14.95 2704LVA 48.87 14.14 2180RUS 48.66 13.51 1949BFR 48.19 14.19 1744DNK 47.37 14.31 2478BGR 47.30 14.43 2232LTU 46.88 13.71 2775
CZE 46.61 12.85 3237ENG 46.38 15.37 2431SWE 46.25 15.96 2421CHE 45.68 13.99 2645DEU 45.67 14.01 3220EST 45.60 13.40 2884FIN 45.33 13.69 2285
Table 21.2: Size of the 4 gender attitude groups
Boys Girlsn % n %
Traditional-satisfied 2085 5.2 666 1.5Traditional-dissatisfied 3043 7.6 1263 2.9Egalitarian-dissatisfied 10262 25.6 13042 30.1Egalitarian-satisfied 24680 61.6 28412 65.5
Table 21.3: Four gender attitude groups by country and gender _____________________________________________________________________
Girls BoysTrad-sat
Trad-dis
Egal- dis
Egal-sat
Trad-sat
Trad-dis
Egal- dis
Egal-sat
SWE 1.1 1.1 64.3 33.5 SWE 4.1 5.5 47.5 42.9HKG 2.7 2.3 41.5 53.6 HKG 6.3 5.3 32.9 55.5FIN 0.5 0.6 37.2 61.8 CHL 3.6 4.2 30.8 61.4CZE 0.7 2.0 36.5 60.9 LTU 6.1 9.6 29.7 54.5DEU 0.6 1.7 36.0 61.7 POL 5.8 7.8 29.7 56.7LTU 1.8 3.4 34.1 60.8 ROM 10.4 10.3 29.7 49.7SVK 0.6 2.1 32.9 64.4 CYP 4.3 4.5 28.8 62.4NOR 0.3 1.4 32.5 65.8 GRC 8.2 8.3 28.6 55.0USA 2.1 2.2 30.7 64.9 BGR 8.6 14.3 27.7 49.5CYP 0.5 1.0 30.3 68.2 PRT 4.0 7.0 27.0 61.9POL 1.0 2.6 30.2 66.1 COL 2.7 4.4 26.0 66.9CHL 0.6 1.2 29.2 69.0 FIN 2.7 4.2 25.2 68.0DNK 0.8 2.0 29.0 68.2 DNK 6.5 7.3 25.1 61.2PRT 1.9 5.7 29.0 63.4 DEU 5.9 6.3 25.0 62.8ROM 4.6 5.5 28.8 61.0 NOR 5.1 5.5 24.7 64.7ENG 1.2 2.1 28.6 68.0 USA 5.8 10.2 24.3 59.8GRC 1.6 2.1 28.3 68.0 LVA 7.7 13.5 24.0 54.9SVN 1.2 2.8 27.3 68.7 CZE 2.2 5.0 23.4 69.4AUS 1.6 4.0 27.2 67.3 SVK 3.1 5.7 22.1 69.0BGR 6.6 6.9 26.8 59.8 AUS 5.1 9.7 22.0 63.2COL 1.2 3.2 25.4 70.1 ENG 5.3 8.4 21.7 64.6CHE 1.4 2.1 25.1 71.3 CHE 4.3 7.1 21.3 67.3EST 1.4 3.8 23.8 71.0 BFR 8.8 8.0 21.2 62.0HUN 1.1 3.3 23.4 72.2 SVN 5.3 9.3 19.6 65.8LVA 2.1 6.0 23.3 68.6 ITA 4.8 8.7 18.9 67.6BFR 1.3 1.6 21.3 75.8 EST 4.9 9.2 18.4 67.5ITA 1.6 3.4 18.5 76.5 RUS 5.4 13.5 17.0 64.1RUS 3.3 9.3 16.8 70.5 HUN 3.9 11.4 15.6 69.2
Table 21.4: Levels of prosperity and gender equality across 25 countriesCountry GDP per
capita 1999
Country GEM
CHE 38350.00 NOR 83.60NOR 32880.00 SWE 80.90DNK 32030.00 FIN 78.30USA 30600.00 DEU 74.90DEU 25350.00 USA 73.80SWE 25040.00 AUS 73.80BFR 24510.00 DNK 70.50FIN 23780.00 CHE 69.60ENG 22640.00 BFR 69.20AUS 20050.00 ENG 67.10ITA 19710.00 PRT 62.90GRC 11770.00 SVN 57.40PRT 10600.00 EST 55.20SVN 9890.00 CZE 54.60CZE 5060.00 SVK 54.60CHL 4740.00 ITA 53.60HUN 4650.00 LVA 53.40POL 3960.00 POL 51.80SVK 3590.00 GRC 50.20EST 3480.00 HUN 49.30LTU 2620.00 LTU 47.40LVA 2470.00 ROM 44.90RUS 2270.00 CHL 44.50ROM 1520.00 RUS 43.40BGR 1380.00 BGR
Table 21.5: Correlations between GEM, GDP and attitudes on gender equality
Perception: Women have fewer chances than men
NBelief:Women should have the same rights as men
N
GEI .23 24 .57** 24GDP -.04 25 .60** 25Perception ..02 28
* P < .05; ** P < .01
Table 21.6: Determinants of participation___________________________________________________________
Girls BoysEstimate T value Estimate T value
Egalitarian satisfied (ref)Egalitarian dissatisfied .28*** 4.6 .38*** 5.73Traditional satisfied -.10 -1.63 -.30*** -4.9Traditional dissatisfied -.24*** -4.38 -.61*** -10.1Controls Educational motivation 1.80*** 18.74 1.61*** 16.31 Ethnicity -.05 -.57 -.01 -.07 Social background 1.23*** 12.63 1.32*** 12.78 Academic achievement 2.89*** 29.84 2.19*** 22.21 Peer effect -1.32*** -9.31 -1.38*** -9.0 GEM -1.62* -2.364 -2.1** -3.48
P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001
Figure 21.1: The construction of the 4 measurement categories that combine responses to the 2 variables on beliefs and perceptions of gender equality
Appendix 21.1 The Composition of the Participation scale
Internal political efficacy- I know more about politics than most people my age- When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually havesomething to say- I am able to understand most political issues easily- I am interested in politicsCategories: Very bad, somewhat bad, somewhat good, very good for democracy, disagree, agree
Expected social movement related participationWhat do you expect that you will do over the next few years?- Spray-paint protest slogans on walls- Block traffic as a form of protest- Occupy public buildings as a form of protestCategories: I will certainly not do this; I will probably not do this; I will probably do this; I will certainly do this.
Political activitiesWhen you are an adult, what do you expect that you will do?- Join a political party- Write letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns- Be a candidate for a local or city officeCategories: I will certainly not do this; I will probably not do this; I will probably do this; I will certainly do this.
Self-Confident participation at school- I am interested in participating in discussions about school problems.- When school problems are being discussed I usually have something to say.Categories: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.
Expectations associated with votingWhen you are an adult, what do you expect that you will do?- Vote in national elections- Get information about candidates before voting in an electionCategories: Very bad, somewhat bad, somewhat good, very good for democracy
