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Chapter 4

Economic Structure and Making of the Crisis-II

Generally speaking, Industry can be segregated into two parts: the relatively

capital intensive large scale industry, and the relatively labour intensive small scale

industry. Examples of large scale industry are cotton spinning and weaving mills.

Examples of small scale industry included handloom textiles, leather manufactures, metal

utensils, pottery, food processing, wood work, carpet shawls. A large part of labour

intensive industry consisted of handicrafts. Whereas the former is largely machinery-

based, the latter is mostly tool-based; also the latter is located in small wage workshops

and family enterprise.1

The industries in Dogra-ruled Kashmir can be placed in the second category, i.e.,

relatively labour intensive small scale industries. By defining industrialization to mean

substitution of labour intensive by capital intensive products, however, instead of

explaining the various dimensions of industrialization, here the focus will be on the state

of industrialization in Kashmir during the period of our study.

4.1. Inherent Industrial Potential of the State

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir very few industries existed, despite the state

being rich in mineral resources.2 Many surveys were carried out during the period, which

leave no room for doubt that there were immense potentialities of mineral development.3

Prior to the establishment of the Dogra Rule, Kashmir was known for its arts and crafts

apparently receiving great impetus under Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin who not only revived the

industries which had either disappeared or declined, but also introduced new ones.4 The

great interest which the king took in the development of arts and crafts is further evident

from the fact, that if he came to know of any artist or a craftsman from Iraq, Khurasan, or

Turkistan was on a visit to the valley, he would induce him to teach his people whatever

he knew. In fact the Sultan wouldn’t permit him to leave Kashmir until he had done so. It

1 Tirthankar Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India Labour and Livelihood, Routledge, 2005, p. 105. 2 Ganga Nath Report, p. 36. 3 Ibid., p. 30. 4 Hassan, Kashmir under Sultans, p. 92.

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was in this way that the sultan introduced for the first time in Kashmir the use of the

weavers brush and loom and the weaving of silk cloth.5

The arts and crafts earned Kashmir worldwide fame. The only industries of major

importance were the Kashmir and Jammu silk industry, Karan Singh woolen mills,

Kashmir Pharmaceutical works, Resin and Turpentine factory and Kashmir Match

Factory. In addition there were some medium sized industries like Kashmir willows,

Jammu Tannery, Silk weaving concerns, Indianite Factory at Miransahib, and Santonine

Factories at Baramulla.6

In general, industrial enterprise was spread over forest exploitation, sericulture,

weaving of textiles, wood-working, flour milling, oil milling, basket making, dairy

farming, tanning, manufacture of paper machie, silver wares, carpets, pharmaceutical

preparations, poultry farming, building and the exploitation of mineral deposits. But up to

late 1940’s there was no modern organization of industrial workers exists except a trade

union of the silk industry nor had rules yet been framed to enforce the Factories Act

which regulate labour in these industries, the associations of industrial workers, their

working hours, compensation for accidents or non-employment of particular class of

people. Owing to the delay of enforcing this legislation we have no doubt that there was a

great deal of sweated labour employed in these industries particularly the smaller ones.

The condition of industrial organization was also unsatisfactory. Only industries

connected with forest exploitation, sericulture, matches, extraction of indianite and one or

two of the carpet factories were independently financed. The forest industries and

sericulture were owned, controlled and financed by the state while match-works and

santonine factories were privately financed and controlled. The carpet factories, most of

which were owned by private financiers, obtained subsides from the state during years of

depression, but the great bulk of the smaller industries particularly those which deal with

luxury articles, worked on a system entirely out of tune with modern conditions of

industrial organization. The old institution of crafts and middlemen financiers who

generally call the tune in regard to design, wages, and purchase of raw material, sale of

5 Ibid. 6 Ganga Nath Report, p. 97.

88

finished and by products was prevalent. Cooperative sale and purchase of articles were

practically nonexistent.7

Kashmir during the period of our study was in possession of over 153 industrial

establishments.8 All these establishments were nourished mostly under the “protecting

care” of the state and the private enterprise in the industrial concerns of the major

importance has not been prominent to an extent that it should have been.9

4.2. Shawl Industry

Kashmir has since early times enjoyed a worldwide fame for its beautiful shawls.

Kashmiri shawl developed over last three hundred years, through four different periods of

foreign political rule, that is, the Mughals, the Afghans, the Sikhs and the Dogras.10

However, it is impossible to speak of one ‘great period’ in the development of the

Kashmiri shawl. Each culture brought with it its own unique contribution. The

development of the Kashmiri shawl was influenced directly by changing historical

circumstances; it reflects times of peace and of war, of famine and prosperity as well as

changes in royal patronage.11

The early Mughal period represents an important and prosperous moment for the

Kashmiri shawl. Though the origin of the shawl goes to much earlier times, but it was not

until the Mughal period that the industry achieved its full potential.12

Authentic records

are available which point towards a large scale of trade in shawls in the time of Akbar.

Abul Fazl makes a special mention of Kashmiri shawl; while describing the industries of

Kashmir, says, ‘woolen fabrics are made in high perfection, especially shawls which are

sent as valuable gifts to every clime.13

He also records that, ‘His Majesty is very fond of

shawls. By the attention of his Majesty the manufacture of shawls in Kashmir is in a very

flourishing state.’ Moreover, according to him a shawl in Akbar’s time could cost

anything from Rs. 200 to Rs. 1200 and they were always greatly valued as presents and

7 Ibid., p.98. 8 Kashmir Industries, The Times of India, February, 15, 1924, p. 21. 9 Ganga Nath Report, p. 97. 10 Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl & its Indo French Influence, Timeline Books, New Delhi, 2004, p. 15. 11 Ibid. 12 Ames, The Kashmir Shawl and its Indo-French Influence, p.18. 13 Abul Fazl, Ain-i-Akbari, trans, Colonel H.S. Jarret, Vol. 2, p. 353.

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of course, as bribes.14

Bernier who visited Kashmir in 1665 with Aurangzeb says, ‘what

may be considered peculiar to Kashmir, and the staple commodity which particularly

promotes the trade of the country and fills it wealth is the prodigious quantity of shawls

which they manufacture and which gives occupation even to the little children.’15

Bernier

explains the size of an average shawl as being about five feet long two and half feet wide

and with decorated borders less than one foot deep.

As the Mughal kingdom began to collapse and Kashmir came under the rule of

the Afghans, the Kashmiri shawl industry began to focus increasingly on the west, while

the export to the Indian market showed signs of decline. In spite of this change, the

government of Hyderabad in the Deccan, under the rule of Nizam-ul-Mulk, continued to

be a rich outlet for the Kashmiri shawl where it remained the conventional dress of the

nobles at court.16

During the rule of the Afghans Kashmir was reduced to the lowest depths of

penury and degradation, a slavery lasting for sixty seven years. Their cruelty threatened

the life and property of all foreigners who had been residing in Kashmir; about ninety

firms established by Hindu businessmen were closed down as their owners returned to

their home land, while nearly half the population of Kashmir left the terror stricken land

permanently. Nevertheless, shawl weaving continued during these difficult times and

accounted for a significant portion of Kashmir’s revenue. The shawl industry of Kashmir

seems to have received an impetus again during the Afghan rule under governor Sardar

Aziz Khan in whose time the income from shawls was four lakhs of rupees.17

The

popularity of shawls resulted in a brisk trade.18

Nadir Shah the Persian ruler apparently

considered Kashmiri shawls quite prestigious and valuable enough to be included in the

14 Brigid Keenan, Travels in Kashmir, Permanent Black, 2006, p. 189. 15A. Mitra, Notes On the Arts and Industries in Kashmir, Honorary Curator, Sri Pratap Singh Museum,

Srinagar, 1906, p. 1. 16 Ames, The Kashmir Shawl and its indo French influence, p. 24. 17 Mitra, Notes on the Arts and Industries in Kashmir, p. 2. 18 Ames, The Kashmir Shawl and its indo French Influence, pp. 24-5.

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fifteen elephant loads of lavish gifts that he presented to the sultan of Constantinople in

1739.19

Under the Sikhs the industry was in a flourishing state during the governorship of

Dewan Kripa Ram.20

The export from Kashmir into British territory in 1805, for

example, was valued at only Rs 141,757, and shawls constituted 91% of it.21

Though

great pestilence and famine of 1819 decimated the number of the shawl manufacturers

yet Moorcroft observed in 1824 that the whole value of shawl goods manufactured in

Kashmir may be estimated at about thirty five lakhs of rupees per anum or say three

hundred thousand pounds.22

A good quantity of articles of shawl stuff was still

manufactured in Kashmir.23

During the nineteenth century shawl industry developed the features of capitalistic

production. Earlier, it was the master craftsmen who invested money and organized

production under their own guidance.24

But then, the persons traditionally belonging to

family connected with shawl trade and not necessarily master craftsmen, organized shawl

production by investing money and employing master craftsmen on wages.25

The

production was organized in, what are called, karkhanas [factories]. The karkhandar [the

owner] employed 300 to 400 weavers.26

It led to the subsential growth of the industry

both in terms of the number of operational looms and the workers employed.27

The value

of shawls exported in 1862 was £171,709 to £491,441.28

Again, the non-availability of sufficient statistical data pertaining to the said

period prevents us from saying anything certainly regarding the condition of the shawl

19 Keenan, Travels in Kashmir, p. 189 Keenan argues that Nadir Shah may very well have acquired the

shawls that he gave to the sultan when his army sacked Delhi, earlier that same year. And when the British

sold Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh, they wrote in to the Treaty that every year he [Gulab Singh] must

present them three pairs of Kashmir Shawls. 20 Mitra, Notes on the Arts and Industries in Kashmir, p. 2. 21 Dharma Kumar and Tapan Ray Chaudhuri (ed.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 2,

Cambridge, 2008, p. 245. 22 William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Province of Hindustan and the

Punjab, p. 194. 23 Ibid., p. 186. 24 Dhar, Kashmir A Kaleidoscopic View, p. 40. 25 Ibid. 26 Diwan Chand Sharma, Kashmir under Sikhs, Jammu, 1983, p. 176. 27 Dhar, Kashmir A Kaleidoscopic View, p. 40. 28 Census of India, 1921, vol. xxii, 1921, pp. 180-2.

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industry. One assertion, however, may be deduced from the available data, however

meager, and the descriptions provided by travelers—that the shawl industry occupied a

key position in the non-agrarian economic setup of Kashmir, and that its condition was

relatively better during the Sikh period than during the subsequent years when the Dogras

ascended the throne. That the shawl industry and its decline had a direct bearing on the

people of Kashmir needs to be probed. That is what has been attempted in the subsequent

pages.

The shawl manufacture had to undergo a long apprentice before acquiring the

shape of a finished product. First the women would pick the coarse hairs from the

imported wool. In this process ⅓ of the weight of the wool was lost and the remainder

was packed in layers with rice flour slightly moistened with oil and was subjected to a

pressure under stone for about forty eight hours, whereby it was cleaned and spun into

thread by women.29

After the process of cleaning and spinning of raw material was

overtaken, it was taken to Karkhanas or workshops where the weavers used to weave it

into shawl on wooden looms.30

The workshops for manufacturing shawls were found in

many parts of the valley but mostly they existed in the city of Srinagar with primitive

technology.

Shawls were of two types: loom-made and handmade.31

In the loom system a

karkhandar [shawl manufacturer] employed a number of shawl bafs (shawl weavers) in

his karkhana. This number ranged from twenty or thirty to three hundred.32

The

karkhandar used to buy spun thread from the pui-woin or dealer, to whom it was

disposed off by the spinners, and got it dyed of different colures before it was distributed

among workmen.33

There were about hundred karkhandars in Kashmir in 1873.34

The

shawl weavers were put under the complete control of the master workmen (ustad). There

was usually one ustad every twenty five or thirty shawl bafs.35

At the end of each month,

the ustad took to karkhandar ‘an account of the work performed in that time by each of

29 Foreign and Political-A, File Nos. 66-70, March 31, 1848, NAI. 30 Charles Girdlestone, Memorandum on Cashmere and Some Adjacent Countries, p. 28. 31 Thorpe, Cashmere Misgovernment, p. 27. 32 Ibid., p. 27. Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, p. 53. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., p. 28. 35 Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, p. 53. Thorpe, Cashmere Misgovernment, p. 28.

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the men under him’ and drew so much pay for each, which was regulated by the amount

of the work done.36

Usually the sum realized by the shawl bafs from the karkhandar was

from three to five chilki rupees a month,37

inclusive of the amount deducted by the

government for rice, which was sold to the shawl bafs. Such a paltry amount was not

sufficient to support the family of a shawl baf,38

with any approach to comfort, even in so

fertile a country like as Kashmir.

4.3. Taxation

The Gazetteer of Kashmir (1873) notes that ‘a larger revenue than that which is

obtained from the land is realized from the shawl manufacture, every shawl being

stamped and the stamp duty being 26% upon the estimated value.’39

The whole

functioning of the shawl industry right from the collection of the wool from the bushes

and other sources, till the finished product reached customer generated tremendous

economic activity so much so that this industry became an inseparable part of the

economic and cultural ethos of Kashmir.40

Almost all the households in the city of

Srinagar and other areas were fully or partially, directly or indirectly, involved in this

industry and derived some kind of economic advantage. Of course, the industry formed

the considerable source of revenue to the government, but it went beyond limits in taxing

the industry.41

The Afghans had no taxation policy; they devastated Kashmir without any

rules of the game. The Sikhs did have a taxation policy, which was tough and harsh in

nature.42

The Afghan governor Karim Dad Khan, introduced the institution of Dagshawl;

yet it were the Sikhs and Dogras who firmly rooted this institution in the soil of Kashmir

and enjoyed its fruits at the cost of the weaver.43

The shawl weaver was in continuous bondage due to exorbitant rate looms taken

from the contractor, inherited from father to son, as the payment of money was a pittance,

and the part of payment compulsively paid in the form of rice, their staple food. Both

36 Ibid., p. 54. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, p. 101. 40 Dhar, Kashmir A Kaleidoscopic view, p. 41. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

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Maharaja Gulab Singh and Maharaja Ranbir Singh had a monopoly of sale of rice in the

valley, which has already been mentioned. Large quantity of rice was yearly stored in

state granaries in Srinagar where it was being distributed among the city population, the

majority of whom were the shawl weavers and other artisan classes.44

Thousands, of

these men and of other artisans in the city who just keep body and soul together.45

The intrinsic worth of a shawl depended upon the fineness of its threads, general

harmony of colour and perfection of workmanship, but to this must be added the factious

elements of taxes levied on raw material and on the manufacture at various stages. To

such a degree of fineness was embroidery carried on the loom that weavers occasionally

lost their sight over the work.46

The annual tax levied by the Maharaja on each shawl

weaver was Rs 47-8 chilki rupees47

though the condition of the shawl weaver was not

good during the Sikh period. Von Schonberg, a traveler to Kashmir, has given a

comparative description of the conditions of the people associated with shawl-making.

He notes that:48

‘They will never allow the workmen the ready money, the government provides

clothes, firing and other household necessities, charging as usual a hundred %

profit. This is managed very skillfully and so arranged that the poor artisan is

always in debt and I will add that the shawl weavers seem to be most

unfortunate…the childhood of the weavers children ceased abruptly at the age of

five, when they were considered old enough to work on the looms and contribute

to the family’s meager budget and thus another human being enters on a career of

wretchedness and rears children, who in turn, become heirs to his misery… Later

under Maharaja Gulab Singh their lives became even more intolerable. Shawl

weavers were required to pay still more tax and a new law was introduced

forbidding any weaver whether ill or half blind or old and tired, to abandon his

loom unless he could find someone to replace him. They were also forbidden to

44 D.N. Dhar, Artisans of the Paradise, Art and Artisans of Kashmir From Ancient times to Modern Times,

New Delhi, 1999, pp. 45-6. 45 ‘Note by Walter Lawrence on the Position of the Cultivating Classes in Kashmir.’ 46 Charles Girdlestone, Memorandum on Cashmere and Some Adjacent Countries, p. 28. 47 A chilki rupee worth eight to ten annas of the British Indian rupee was introduced by Maharaja Ranbir

Singh. Khan, History of Srinagar, p. 84. 48 Keenan, Travels in Kashmir, p. 197. John Irwin, The Kashmir Shawl, London, 1955, p. 9.

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leave the valley…and those who succeeded joined other expatriate weavers in the

Punjab.’

The exaction and extortion forced artisans to fall back on land which led to de-

industrialization and peasantization.49

John Irwin figures out that 25% of the value of a

shawl was charged on each shawl and its assessment and collection were formed out to

corrupt body of officials, whose illegal exactions were said to have amounted to further

25% of the value.50

Before 1833, the duty on shawls was levied at three annas per rupee

of value. After words a tax of rupees 96 per annum per shop was fixed and extended to

one thousand shops. Subsequently, the duty was raised to rupees 120 per shop. The shawl

weavers were greatly underpaid. On 6th

June 1847, they struck work, and about 4,000

shawl weavers set out for Lahore. They were working under the system of indenture.51

The occupation of shawl weaving was hereditary more from compulsion than

choice, for the son seems to had no option but to follow in his father’s steps.52

About the

shawl weavers called khandawao Dr. Elmslie says, ‘there were 23,013 in the valley of

Kashmir, all Mohammedans, and are most miserable portion of the population, both

physically and morally. Crowded together in small and badly ventilated workshops,

earning a mere pittance, and insufficiently nourished, they suffer from chest infection,

rheumatism and scrofula. When a woman wishes her neighbour ill, she says may you get

a shawl weaver for a husband!’53

The shawl weavers continued to remain steeped in poverty during Maharaja

Ranbir Singh’s reign.54

A booklet Kashmeer and its Shawls written by an anonymous

gentleman was brought out in England in 1875 to celebrate the visit that the Prince of

Wales was to make to Kashmir, and to educate the public on the now extremely meddled

subject of the Kashmir shawl, The book was written as a series of questions and answers

between a fictitious mother named Lady Ann and her daughter Lily. The gist of the

49 Roy, Rethinking Economic Change, p. 94. 50 Irwin, The Kashmir Shawl, p. 9. Wakefield records that the manufacture of shawls being under

government control, a duty was imposed on every pair made, heavy penalties being also inflicted if a

genuine article is not produced. See Wakefield, The Happy Valley, p. 145. 51 A Handbook of Jammu and Kashmir State, 1927, NAI, p. 23. 52 Charles Girdlestone, Memorandum on Cashmere and Some Adjacent Countries, p. 28. 53 Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, p. 33. 54 Khan, History of Srinagar, p. 63.

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question answer interaction clearly points out the sad conditions through which the shawl

manufacturing was going on in Kashmir during the reign of Maharaja Ranbir Singh,55

although, Lawrence records that best shawls ever made in Kashmir were manufactured in

the time of Maharaja Ranbir Singh [1865-1872].56

Andrew Wilson who visited Kashmir

during the time of Maharaja Ranbir Singh mentions that, ‘the shawl weavers get

miserable wages and are allowed neither to leave Kashmir nor change their employment,

so that they are nearly in the position of slaves, and their average wage is only about three

half pence a day.57

Some external factors are also believed to be responsible for the

decline of the industry. The French and German war of 1870 no doubt gave a great

setback to the international market of the industry, but at the domestic sphere no

readymade solution seems to have been provided for its recovery. The census report of

1921 refers to the situation in which the government derived from the shawl industry ‘an

income of about seven lakhs per annum during 1846-69; it, however, doesn’t say

anything about the years that followed 1869, except for lamenting the loss of the industry

after that period. This too points to the fact that there were many unfavorable factors that

were undermining the industry since a long time before the Franco-German war of

1870.58

It was the harsh taxation and high custom duty that the industry was unable to

flourish.59

The adverse effects of heavy taxation were not felt so long as there was an

increasing demand; as the demand declined suddenly after the fall of France, the heavy

taxation served as an important factor speeding up the collapse of the industry.60

Although, as already mentioned, the shawl trade received a deadly blow from the

impoverishment caused by the French and German war, and afterwards by the change of

fashion which expelled these fabrics from the French and American markets, yet it was

always a marvel how the industry could have outlived the impositions to which it was

subjected, nor indeed, could it have survived but for the cruel regulations which forbade a

55 Keenan, Travels in Kashmir, p. 193. 56 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 376. 57 Andrew Wilson, The Abode of Snow, p. 366. 58 M.S. Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, 1945, p. 50. 59 Trotter Capitan Lionel J., The Life of Hodson of Hodson’s Horse, p. 86. 60 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 51.

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weaver to relinquish.61

The wool was taxed as it entered Kashmir,62

which was brought

from writes Andrew Wilson, ‘the finest of the goats…from Tufran, in the Yarkand

territory and it [wa]s only on the wind swept steppes of Central Asia that animals [we]re

found to produce so fine a wool.63

Besides wool the manufacturer was taxed for every

workman he employed; again, he was taxed at various stages of the process according to

the value of the fabric, and lastly the merchant was taxed before he could export the

goods,64

and an export on shawls was raised up to 25% ad valorem.65

Foreign competition, which began to make its appearance during the second

quarter of the 19th

century and became stronger as the years rolled by, was another factor

responsible for the decline.66

The East India Company was anxious to shift the industry

from Kashmir to Paisley, and they spared no pains to do so. Pashm and shawl patterns

were sent to England and the Scottish weavers at Paisley began to imitate and compete

with Kashmir.67

The use of aniline dyes in place of vegetable dyes proved one of the

causes for the decline. By the use of these dyes in Kashmir the popularity of its shawls in

Europe declined. The adoption of the foreign designs in place of the indigenous designs

stuck a blow to the industry.68

There was no major state in India which was suffering so

much from lack of regulated marketing facilities as the state of Jammu and Kashmir.69

The whole Kashmir province was not having a single market worth the name where the

producer and buyer could meet and do competitive business.70

In the Jammu city, on the

other hand, there were one or two markets which were neither controlled nor regulated.71

It goes on to show that there was absence of an initiative to develop industries and to

standardize them.72

61 ‘Henvey’s Note on the Famine in Kashmir, 1877-80’, Foreign Department (Secret), File No. 86, March,

1883, NAI. 62 Ibid. 63 Andrew Wilson, The Abode of Snow, p. 366.

64 ‘Henvey’s Note on the Famine in Kashmir, 1877-80’, Foreign Department (Secret), File No. 86, March,

1883, NAI. 65 Ibid. 66 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 51. 67 Ibid. 68 Lawrence, the Valley of Kashmir, p. 376. 69 Political Department, File No. 292, year, 1938, JKA-J. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Political Department, File No. 100/c, 1938.

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On the other hand, very low wages were given to weavers which were calculated

according to the number of sticks of pashm thread prepared by each one who could work

the stick in woof and warf one thousand times was reckoned to have performed work

worth one stick. The daily wages of weavers averaged between two and six annas.73

It

was a poor industry for the weavers, though a lucrative industry for the state who took

rupees 30 per annum from employers of shawl weavers per head, an import duty of 20%

on the manufactured article and an export duty of rupees 7.15 on a long shawl, and Rs

5.13 on a square shawl.74

The raw materials were increasingly scare and hardly any guidance about designs

or quality control or commercial intelligence was available to craftsmen.75

They were

obliged to wait for months, if they order any special pattern. This was partly due to a

want of capital, but the chief cause was the utter absence of enterprise and energy.76

That

apart, ubiquitous middleman would grab the profits and further impoverish the

community. That was one of the main reasons why the children of craftsmen were

disillusioned and inclined to give up traditional vocations.77

O’ Connor while visiting the

valley in 1920 picturizes the working places of shawl weavers as: ‘A narrow and

widening stair that suggests the middle ages climbs through the interior of the houses to

the lighted rooms, in which the workers are busy over delicate embroideries, no less than

seventy five men and boys in a space that would be cramped for half a dozen

Englishmen.’78

It was against this backdrop that the shawl weavers in Kashmir revolted several

time against the oppressive regime. Labour is a dynamic process through which the

labourer shapes and moulds the world; he lives and stimulates himself to create and

innovate—a trait which remained absent in the labourer class of Kashmir during the

period. When labour is destructive, not creative, when it is undertaken under coercion and

not as the free play of process, when it means withering not the flowering of man’s

73 Lala Ganeshi Lal, Siyahat-i-Kashmir, translated into English and Annotated by Vidya Sagar Suri,

Monograph No. 4, Punjab Government Record Office Publication, Simla, 1955, p. 33. 74 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 375. 75 Janak Singh, Woes of Kashmiri Craftsmen, Menace of Middlemen, The Times of India, Nov. 29, 1975. 76 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 374. 77 Janak Singh, Woes of Kashmiri Crafts Men Menace of Middlemen, p. 375. 78 O’ Connor, The Charm of Kashmir, p. 40.

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physical and intellectual potential then labour is a denial of its own principle of man. It

was such a kind of labour in Kashmir where after working from dawn to dusk, their

earnings hardly touched their subsistence level. After working from dawn to dusk a shawl

weaver could get no more than four pence in a wage per day. He could earn seven or

eight rupees per month out of which he paid five rupees in tax which left him three

rupees to live on. Dr. Allama Iqbal was mortified at their miserable condition. After

visiting the valley in 1921 he left behind a subversive couplet which spread around the

whole of Kashmir…79

‘Ba resham qaba Khawaja az mehnat-e-oo

Naseeb-e-tanash jama-e-taarey’

‘While you are destined to cover your body with rags’

The khwaja’s silken robes are the fruit of your labour’

The labour class of Kashmir associated with the shawl weaving manifested a

spirit of revolt against the intolerable conditions. Their historic revolt on 29th

April 186580

was an event of far reaching significance. On this date the weavers marched in a

procession towards Zaldagar (name of a place in Srinagar) to present their grievances to

the governor at his residence and ‘in bittered despairing mood, the shawl bafs made a

wooden bier such as the Muslims use to carry their dead to the place of internment.

Placing a cover over the coffin, they carried it to and from the procession, exclaiming,

Raj Kak (head of the Dagshawl department) is dead who will give him grave’?81

Raj Kak

maneuvered a myth and wrongly reported to the governor wrongly that they would attack

his house and kill him. Unnerved, he hastily rushed a large force under the command of

Colonel Bije Singh who pushed the unarmed hungry multitude towards the narrow Haji

Rather bridge and most of the processionists, after having pursed by the soldiers, fell into

the marshy canal and got drowned. Hundreds of workers suffered minor and major

injuries and at least twenty eight dead bodies were returned to the people by the army.82

On the next day the victims were paraded in a procession with the declared intention of

placing them before Ranbir Singh to seek his justice. They were stopped in the way and

79 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Flames of Chinar, Srinagar, 2006, p. 4. 80 Thorpe, Cashmere Misgovernment, p. 30. 81 Ibid., p. 32. 82 Ibid. Nab Shah, Wajeed-ul-Taarikh, p. 201, cited in Dhar, Kashmir the Land and its Management, p. 140.

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forced to bury the dead without being provided an opportunity of representing their

grievances to their ruler.83

Their ring leaders were ruthlessly beaten and two of them,

Abli Baba and Sheikh Rasool, lost their lives in the procession and Sona Shah and Qud

Lala were sent to the Bahu fort in Jammu.84

The nature and character of the revolt implies that it was likely the first organized

voice for freedom of the artisan classes of Kashmir against the deteriorated economic

conditions. Of course, the shawl weavers had revolted during the Maharaja Gulab Singh’s

time. In 1847 the weavers assembled and demanded that the maharaja give them

permission to emigrate to Punjab or change working conditions in Srinagar. Gulab Singh

conceded that the weaver was to be paid only according to actual work on the loom and

he could change his employer if he so choose.85

However, these promises were put into

practice and gradually the centers of the industry shifted from Srinagar to Amritsar as the

weavers migrated to the Punjab in the hope of better working conditions.86

These type of

revolts remained localized and fizzled out after some time.

The harsh taxation policy of the government appears to have given due allowance

to its decline and the condition of the weavers.87

The state monopoly prevented the

growth of competition and private enterprise. In order to retain the monopoly, large

advances, sometimes two or three years before delivery of the wool, were made by

Maharaja to the Shepherds of Changhthan, to have the monopoly of their supply.88

Commenting upon the decline of the shawl industry in Kashmir Prem Nath Bazaz says,

‘it is a sad commentary on the economic progress of Kashmir during the reign of the

Dogras that such a gigantic industry which supported lakhs of poor people and

supplemented the meager income of a large part of the peasantry by keeping them

employed during idle months of winter, became almost extinct in 1925. The charkha

which was a prominent part of the household property in Kashmir lost its vigor and

importance too.’89

83 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for freedom, p. 291. 84 Ibid. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 79-80. 85 Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl & its Indo-French Influence, p. 42. 86 Ibid., p. 40. Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir, p. 53; Thorpe, Cashmere Misgovernment, p. 30;

K.M. Panikkar, The Founding of the Kashmir State, p. 134. 87 Hangloo, Agrarian System of Kashmir, p. 137. 88 Charles Girdlestone, Memorandum on Cashmere and Some Adjacent Countries, p. 30. 89 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 7-8.

100

The decline of shawl industry and shawl trade proved decisive in changing the

course of the history of Kashmir. The shawl merchants, who were a powerful class, in the

Kashmir valley were mostly residing in the city of Srinagar, were trading in a commodity

that brought Darbar thousands of rupees as revenue; they also determined the Darbar’s

relationship with the outside world.90

The decline of the powerful class of shawl

merchants had far-reaching significance for the evolution of the social and political

landscape of late ninetieth and early twentieth century Kashmir.91

4.4. Silk Industry

History is absolutely silent with regard to the origin of silk industry in Kashmir

beyond the fact that it is very ancient, and it is intimately connected with that of Bukhara

with which it has always had interchange of ‘seed and silk.’92

For centuries, perhaps

progress in the silk culture was stifled by the continuous political changes in the

country.93

After the decline in Hindu ascendency, the rulers failed to realize the benefit of

fostering a profitable industry.94

During the fifteenth century king Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-1470) the great king of

Kashmir is said to have been the first to give his attention to the cultivation of Silk in

Kashmir.95

The sultan introduced first time in Kashmir the use of weavers brush and

loom, and the weaving of the silk cloth. The patterns on the silk cloth were so exquisitely

made that the valley became famous for it.96

After the death of Zain-ul- Abdeen the

industry fell in disarray and, it is believed that by the time of the Mughal conquest

sericulture in Kashmir had declined to a considerable extent. The Mughals tried to bring

about a revival, but it is not known how far their earlier efforts succeeded.97

Abul-ul-

90 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 84. 91 Ibid p. 87. 92 Lawrence, The valley of Kashmir, p. 367. 93 Rattan C. Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry: A Study in Industry Organization, Westminster, 1919,

p. 21. 94 Ibid. 95 Charles Girdlestone, Memorandum on Cashmere and Some Adjacent Countries, p. 35. 96 Hassan, Kashmir under Sultans, p. 92. 97 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 21. Mirza Haider Dughlat in his book Tarikh-i-Rashidi refers

to the large number of mulberry trees cultivated for feeding the silkworms among the wonders of Kashmir.

Mirza Haider Dughlat states that the people wouldn’t allow the leaves to be used for any purpose other than

that of food for silkworms. See, Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 367.

101

Fazal records that, ‘the mulberry is little eaten. Its leaves are reserved for the silkworm.

The eggs are brought from Gilgit and little Tibet.98

Therefore, it can safely be assumed that during the 16th

century Kashmir

possessed a silk producing industry deriving its raw silk from within the country.99

The

famous Kashmiri shawls and woven silks were exceedingly popular in Akbar’s court,

where frequent exhibitions were given of the artistic productions of the weavers of the

Mughal Empire. Yusuf Khan, the feudatory chief of Kashmir under Akbar, realized the

importance of these exhibitions and, under the imperial injection, passed regulations by

which the rearers and the spinners were brought together. By these immense measures the

silk industry in Kashmir was given a fresh impetus and it continued to flourish.100

Silk cultivation flourished in Kashmir during Afghan period.101

During the Sikh

period, William Moorcroft wrote in 1824, the silk produced was ‘insufficient for

domestic purpose’. G.T Vinge’s account of 1835 is reassuring. Vinge records that

considerable quantity of silk was produced and that the same was taken by the Sikh

Governor Mian Singh who used to pay producers in rice and that 2/3rd

of the total

produce was exported to the Punjab.102

By the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century

there started a gradual decline in the silk production of Bengal. But the silk industry in

Kashmir was reorganized on commercial basis before the last decade of the nineteenth

century. So the loss incurred by the Indian silk industry in Bengal was more than

regained by the development of sericulture in Kashmir. The latter became an important

source of raw silk and was likely to play an important part in the European silk

markets103

…which unfortunately it couldn’t because of some development at home and

abroad.

Munshi Ganesh Lal, a tourist who visited Kashmir in 1846 records in his ‘Tuhfa-i-

Kashmir’ [wonders of Kashmir] that silk producing industry was scattered through

villages in remote corners of the valley and didn’t form a combination. The production of

98 Ain-i-Akbari, tr. Jarrett, vol. 2, p. 349. 99 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 22. 100 Ibid. 101 Sufi, Kashir, vol. 2, p. 574. 102 Ibid., p. 575. 103 Ibid., p. 28.

102

raw silk was limited to certain areas where the rears worked up the indigenous silkworm

and woe the raw silk into cloth privately in their own cottages. The inefficiency of

organization in the industry was due partly to the absence of commercial enterprise and

partly to the difficulties of transport. But in spite of all these flaws the state derived

revenue of about £2,000 a year from silk culture. Munshi Ganesh Lal argues that if there

were proper organization the state could obtain revenue of about £ 10,000 a year from the

silk industry alone.104

This was the period of the Sikhs and the beginning of the Dogra

Rule.

Maharaja Gulab Singh during his reign entrusted the charge of Silk industry to his

court physician, Hakim Azim, but a period of decay set in due to the destruction of the

crop, all over the world by a pebrine disease105

and the industry remained in unorganized

state till the year 1869 when Maharaja Ranbir Singh took up the task of its revival with

the spirit of modern industrial reformer.106

The need was to reorganize the industry on

scientific and commercial lines in order to with stand foreign competition.

Being a keen and enthusiastic reformer he took steps to modernize the silk

industry of Kashmir. At the very outset the Maharaja got one hundred twenty seven

rearing houses built in different parts of the Kashmir valley.107

Reeling appliances and

machinery were imported from Europe and a large department was formed for the

purpose of developing of silk.108

Every possible effort was made to increase the standard

of efficiency of the rearers, and new guilds were instituted to carry out the directions of

the authorities. The basic aim was to establish the silk industry on purely business lines

and to extend its export trade.109

Not only this, a guild of laboring class was formed out

called Kiram Kush or silk worm rearers, with certain privileges like the exemption from

104 Sufi, Kashir, vol. 2, p. 575; Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 30.

105 Sufi, Kashir, vol. 2, p. 575. It was thought that this epidemic, which had already spread all over Europe,

would prove fatal to the silk industry and in order to avoid a disastrous industrial depression among the silk

producing countries, the European government sent expedition to different parts of the world to obtain the

silk worm eggs. Consequently, two Italian ‘graineurs’ producers of the silkworm eggs for purpose of

reproduction’ set out for Calcutta in 1860 and then proceeded to Kashmir. They sent a large quantity of

seed (eggs) back to Italy. From their revealing account one may safely assume that sericulture in Kashmir

was practiced on a considerable scale in the middle of the nineteenth century and there were great prospects

of extending the production of silk in Kashmir on a commercial basis. See Rawlley, Economics of the Silk

Industry, p. 32; Sufi, Kashir, vol. 2, p. 575. 106 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 32. 107 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 154. 108 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 367. 109 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, pp. 32-33.

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begar.110

They could use the houses of the villagers for breeding and rearing purposes

and were also to act as informers for any damage done to the mulberry trees by villagers.

In this way the industry was organized almost as a state monopoly.

To ensure effective implementation of the policy the chief justice of Kashmir Mr.

N. Mukherjee personally superintended the operations, but the only improvement he was

able to effect from 1869-1871 was in the quality of the silk reeled, which he did by

specially organizing a body of reelers and taught them better methods of reeling, than

those which had been in practice and a striking improvement took place in the samples of

raw silk which were sent through the government of India to Her Majesty’s secretary of

state.111

The silk brokers in London to whom samples were presented gave a positive

response and report. According to their findings, the reeling’s methods had been slightly

improved and the quality of the silk produced was better than that of the Bengal silk, but

much attention had not been paid to the rearing of the Silkworms.112

Through the efforts

of the chief justice the authorities also turned ambitious to develop the industry on proper

lines; subsequently some development is visible in the industry and the income of the

industry raised to as much as five lakhs rupees a year.113

The year 1878 proved a turning

point for the future of the industry. In the year plague, which subsequently made its

appearance all over the world, made its appearance in Kashmir in 1879 and became so

virulent that the industry had to be abandoned and nothing was done for its revival till

1888.114

The sudden downfall of the industry has been attributed to the aforesaid

occurrences, but only one cause can’t be sufficient for the absolute abandonment of the

industry. There might be other economic reasons which in collaboration with other

causes ruined the industry. One can’t deny the possibility of the decrease due to the

destroying of the whole of the cocoon harvest, but at the same time other causes can’t be

excluded as well. It was quite evident that the task of revival was undertaken on too large

a scale to ensure success especially when Kashmir was not fully ripe for it both from the

110 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 154.

111 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 33.

112 Ibid.

113 Report on Administration of Jammu and Kashmir State 1889-90, p. 63.

114 Lawrence, The valley of Kashmir, p. 367.

104

financial as well as from industrial point of view.115

The Kiram Kashs (silk worm rearers)

had become a privileged class of people; they abused their power, annoyed and oppressed

the villagers that the latter didn’t take much interest in the rearing of worms. The other

official staff authorized by the state to carry out its orders overstepped their authority in

many cases, and it was natural that the industry should have become unpopular among

the villagers.116

The state had no clear plan about the industry. It is believed that the silk

worm disease in 1878 was due to the importation of foreign seed, which should have

been first well inspected. The cost of buildings and machinery was enormous, more than

it should have been. The rearing huts were scattered in all parts of the valley, which

rendered proper supervision impracticable. Those who were not interested in silk worm

rearing were forced to do so, the consequence being loss of seed.117

The investment was done in haste, at a time, when there was scarcity of capital in

Kashmir.118

It can be said that the silk industry in Kashmir became a victim partly to

inefficiency, lack of organization and partly to the aforesaid disease.

Again in 1889 to revive the industry the services of a Bengali expert Mr. Rishibar

Mukherjee were taken who conducted the operations successfully from 1890 to the

beginning of 1894 in carrying out a healthy local seed.119

In 1889 Sir Thomas Wardle,

then the president of the Silk Association of Great Britain, wrote to the British Resident

stationed in Kashmir about the prospects of sericulture in Kashmir and in 1891 there was

an exhibition of silk in London. Sir Thomas Wardle ‘wished to see Kashmir well

represented as a silk producing country.’ This was a great event in the sericulture history

of Kashmir.120

The samples were sent to England for microscopic examination. After the

examination of these samples Kashmir administration was advised to adopt an improved

method of cocoon reeling. The state was told, ‘there is not the slightest doubt that it might

be the foundation of a large remunerative industry, and with such a beautiful climate, as

Kashmir is favored, and it would add to the immense useful ness both to Kashmir as well

115 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 37. 116 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 157. 117 Ibid. 118 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 37 119 Ibid., p. 39. 120 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 158.

105

as to India.’121

But did it really happen? As before the partition of India into two

dominions we find the absence of full-fledged type of industry in the modern sense of the

term, despite the immense natural resources. Importantly the Dogras were against the

industrialization of the state because of their fear that growth of economic prosperity

would further the political awakening.122

Though the state tried to modernize the industry, it seems that it could not

improve to the extent to which it was expected. This might be because the improvements

which were introduced up to the year 1895 were more or less on an experimental basis.

The further extension of the industry which involved establishment of the filatures, and

by the end of 1910, ten filatures were in full working order.123

However, the

improvements and extension of the industry were mainly technical in character124

and the

industry from 1900 to 1942 witnessed many phases of growth and decline.125

The reforms

carried out during the period of Maharaja Ranbir Singh couldn’t achieve much popularity

as the reforms were conducted on purely official lines in which coercion likely played a

great role.126

There was no real skilled supervision, disease attacked the silkworms and

the enterprise languished.127

But in spite of mistake and failure, it was proved that

Kashmir could produce a silk of high quality.128

The decline of both the shawl and silk

industries played a significant role in the evolution of the political landscape of Kashmir.

The chief obstacles which prevented the ultimate growth and development of the industry

have been discussed below.

The state took various steps with regard to the growth and development of the

industry and appointed an expert as director of sericulture, which somewhat changed the

conditions prevailing in the silk industry.129

Machinery was imported from foreign

countries and rearing houses were established; samples were sent to England which

greatly increased the quality of silk production. But on the other hand state’s approach in

121 Sir Thomas Wardle, Silk in Kashmir, first pub.1904, reprint Srinagar, 2000, p. 15. 122 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, pp. 24-5. 123 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 40. 124 Ibid., p. 40. 125 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 189. 126 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol.XV, p. 128. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 45.

106

various aspects of the industry proved detrimental and obstructed the progress of

industry.

No effort was done by the state to develop an indigenous seed production which is

directly linked by the ‘cost of production’ which includes the price paid for the

silkworms’ eggs, and therefore the part of the circulating capital which is invested in the

purchase of the raw material is an important item of the net cost. Items of seed cause a

proportional increase in the cost of production of raw silk, and thus, leave a

proportionally smaller margin of profit to the producer.130

Secondly the price paid for the

imported seed was nearly 4s per oz. If the total amount of the seed used in a year on the

average, about 40,000 oz’s, the capital invested in the purchase of the raw material from a

foreign country amounted to £ 8,000. If during the same year, the labour charges amount

to £30,000, the ratio between these two items of the cost of production is only to 3 ⅓. The

difference between the labour charges and the charges for the raw material becomes less

as the price of the seed rises. On other hand, the lower price of the seed grown in

Kashmir [which is only 1/3 of the price paid for the foreign seed] causes a proportionate

reduction in the charges for the raw material and thereby again leaves a large margin of

profit in the long run in the coffins of the state.131

The seed and silkworm are extremely sensitive to climatic changes. Indigenous

silkworm could stand changes in climate much better than foreign races, and the silk

produced in Kashmir before the introduction of foreign races has been declared better in

respect of thread than the silk produced from foreign races.132

From an economic point of

view localized production could have developed another subsidiary industry. Foreign

seed acted a great barrier in the development of the industry in respect of dependence on

the mercy of foreign ‘graineurs’ and prevented the home industry to become practically

self-sufficient. Following the aforesaid advantages of the development of local seed one

is justified in assuming that the indigenous seed having been acclimatized in Kashmir for

centuries, gives a better quality of thread than the product of the imported seed.133

130 Ibid., p. 82. 131 Ibid., p. 83. 132 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 199. 133 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 84.

107

Most of the peasants who were associated with the silk rearing were

simultaneously associated with the agriculture. In both the methods of production

scientific methods were absent. With the result whereas the yield of about 100 lbs per

ounce of seed was not uncommon in France and 120 lbs was not considered exceptional

in Italy, the yield per ounce of seed in Kashmir never went beyond 80 lbs for most part of

its manufacture, and was as low as 30 lbs in 1940- 41.134

Sometimes there used to be

higher temperature in the rearing room, and sometimes it fell below the required limit,

and many worms would die. Overfeeding, less space, less care, wet leaf and excessive

humidity were some of the defects which ultimately rendered the industry in great loss.135

4.5. Fluctuation in Prices

Fluctuation in prices played a vital role in the future progress of the industry

which never remained progressive for the peasant. The average income of the rearer

varied from 15 rupees 4 annas and 5 rupees 4 annas a month. This income was inclusive

of the cost of leaf; adding this, the rearer’s income was reduced to below the subsistence

level.136

7/8th

of the total number of mulberry trees stand on private holdings,7/8th

total

quantity of cocoons reared in the state, the supply of leaf was coming from the private

holdings. In Mysore the cost leaf per lb. of cocoons raised, works out at 3-7 rupees 12

annas. The price circulated by the Kashmir government was annas 8 per lb. of cocoons,

the figures of which were even not accepted by Tariff Board according to the board it was

‘very much less than necessary elsewhere’137

because of the government’s monopoly

there was no any competition, the state was the sole dealer and buyer of the produce. In

1916 H. Maxwell-Lefroy while presenting his report on an inquiry in to silk industry in

India states that ‘in Kashmir the mulberry trees were a state monopoly. The rearer was

not allowed to keep cocoons, reel them or produce seed.’138

In the monopolized system of labour the labour sells his labour to the employer

for a certain fixed sum and general increase in the profits of the production, due to a rise

134 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 200. 135 Ibid., p. 201. 136 Ibid., p. 219. 137 Indian Tariff Board Sericulture Industry, vol. 1, p. 47. 138 H. Maxwell-Lefroy, Report on an Inquiry into the Silk Industry in India, Vol.1, Calcutta, 1917, p. 42.

108

in prices, makes no difference in the share of the individual rearer.139

R.C. Rawlley, an

expert on the field concerned, argues that, ‘the Kashmir silk industry is a state monopoly

and owing to a complete control of the sources of production and labour supply there is

no room for a competition in the labour market’140

the presence of which from the

industrial point of view is very important.

The results of the aforesaid discussion show that there was a general absence of

any well thought policy for the expansion and consolidation of the industry. While

realizing the pith of the aforesaid discussion one may argue also that the under-discussed

causes partially acted as important factors for the overall extinction of the industry. The

problem of wages, which galvanized the whole structure, gave birth to new social forces

in the form of the labour strike of 1924 which acted as a step forward in the maturing of

political consciousness of the fleeced masses of Kashmir.

4.6. Wages

The question of wages assumes paramount significance when one talks about the

growth and development both of the labouring class and silk industry of Kashmir. Both

are interconnected and reciprocal to each other. This is a question which has seldom

received the attention it deserves in the industrial set up of Kashmir during the period of

our study.

The nature of wages may differ from territory to territory because of the variance

in the socio-economic setups. The efficiency of wage mechanism has a direct bearing on

the output of the industry. The prevalent wage system during the period can be described

as ‘price-cum-piece-wages’.141

Under this type of the system of wages the rearer enters in

to a contract and binds himself to rear the seed [which remains state property] in his own

house, and with his own appliances and to obtain mulberry leaves from his own trees, if

he has any, or otherwise to secure them from the trees nearby his house and village and to

handle the seed according to government instructions and to deliver the cocoons, this

prepared at a place and in return for a sum decided upon by the government in

139 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, p. 110. 140 Ibid., p. 114. 141 Piece rate wages can be defined as when an employee is paid a fixed rate for each unit of production or

in other words, he or she is paid by results or payments by results. Time rate wages are based on per period

of work time on the job. See, Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 217.

109

advance.142

The irony of the fact is that there was a difference of output of production in

the silk industry of Srinagar as compared to the silk industry of Jammu although Kashmir

was the hub of its production in the earlier periods. The reason was the unequal

distribution of seed; Jammu was provided with more seed than what was given to the

rearers from the valley of Kashmir.143

From the table one can infer that Jammu was in a better position than Kashmir.144

As compared to the nature of the work the rate of remuneration was very low. The scale

of wages allowed bare subsistence to the workers who as a rule couldn’t afford to enjoy

the comforts of life. They had not only to feed themselves against the vagaries of nature

and unskillfulness of their work but their families as well.145

Apparently, it seems the challenges of bare subsistence, unequal distribution, and

low wage rate forced the silk worm rearers to raise the banner of revolt and they sent

telegrams to both Lord Reading and the Punjab Press. This was one of the major

developments of the first quarter of the twentieth century Kashmir that in 1924 the

workers in the state owned silk factory resorted to strike,146

though the strike didn’t last

long due to the oppression unleashed by the Maharaja administration.147

Martial Law was

imposed on the silk factory workers who instead of persuading the maharaja to redress

their grievances, sent telegrams to British Indian Governor General Lord Reading.148

The problem of wages, least availability of raw materials labour and financial

conditions on the one hand and the absence of ready markets, on the other, proved

destructive for the progress of the industry.149

With the passage of the time the silk-

rearers and workers switched over to competing crops. ‘There was a general falling off of

the enthusiasm for silk worm rearing [in Jammu and Kashmir state] on the part of the

rears as a whole’, writes T.C. Wazir, the chief director of sericulture in his report on the

142 Ibid., p. 218. 143 Ibid., p. 219. 144 Ibid. 145 Rawlley, Economics of the Silk Industry, pp. 115-16. 146 Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, p. 87. The details about the strike are given in chapter 5 of this

thesis. 147 Ibid. 148 The original text of the telegrams is reproduced in chapter five, pp. 128-29. 149 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 226.

110

sericulture industry of Kashmir.150

In the late thirties people turned paddy yielding fields

into fruit gardens, barren lands were turned into orchards, and the planting of mulberry

trees seized to continue sericulture thus lost its future in the domestic economic setup of

Kashmir. At the time of the partition the State could not boast of any industry in the

modern sense of the word.

4.7. State of Trade and Commerce

There is not much data available as far as trade is concerned which renders it

difficult to make a statistical sketch of the trading activities in Dogra-ruled Kashmir.

Therefore, here reliance has been put on the reports and contemporary accounts and

wherever possible some statistical information has also been provided. Generally

speaking, an attempt has been made to broadly assess the state of trade and commerce,

without going into the specifics, so that it could be seen that how far the conditions of the

trade and trading classes were responsible for the resentment among the people and what

role did they play in the political movement that the state witnessed during the first half

of the 20th

century.

There is a close relationship between industry and trade; both are interrelated to

each other. One can’t sustain without the well-being of the other. Kashmir from the

ancient times was having socio cultural and trade links with different regions of Central

Asia.151

In many parts of central Asia, including Kashmir, the chief cities functioned as

entrepots for the passage of merchandise in addition to serving as markets for local

produce. Srinagar in particular, the heart and present summer capital of the state, on

account of its peculiar geographical position, remained a connecting link with various

regions of central Asia. It provided the most convenient ground for the meeting of

various cultures represented by the traders of the Yarkand, Bukhara, Badakhshan,

Khotan, Kashgar, Turkistan, China, Ladakh, Tibet, Baltistan and Kashmir. In fact it was

the Srinagar’s special role in Central Asia’s commercial and cultural history that itself

provided the environment and shaped the history of Kashmir.152

150 T.C. Wazir, Report on the Investigation into Conditions of the Sericultural industry in Jammu and

Kashmir, 1942, p. 22. 151 Mohd. Ishaq Khan, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 25. 152 Ibid.

111

Although Kashmir has usually been regarded as a ‘self-supporting country’153

owing to its geographical barriers and remoteness from the outside world, there is

evidence that before the opening of the cart-road from Rawalpindi to Baramulla in 1890

some Kashmiris were also involved in private trade. They went down every winter to

work in the Punjab and carried brisk trade1 in commodities such as salt, sugar, tea,

metals, and tobacco.154

Besides this trade, a class of professional muleteers carried out

transactions with Punjab bullock drivers.155

Three trade routes were followed. Of these the most direct was the road which

crossed the Banihal pass and ran to Jammu. The most popular with the pony men was the

old imperial road which ran over the Pir Panjal and reached the railway at Gujarat and the

third was the route known as the Jhelum valley road, which ran along the river Jhelum

from Baramulla to Kohala.156

The opening of the Jhelum valley road in 1890 as an

important route brought several advantages to Kashmir. It caused economic dislocation to

a good number of Muslim trading families. A large influx of the Punjabis into Kashmir

for business or employment, not for pleasure after the improvement in the means of

communication, marked the important feature in the changing economic relations.157

Under Mughal rule Kashmir abandoned its isolation, and its natural beauty

attracted people from all over Asia. In terms of trade and commerce, during the Mughal

period Kashmir enjoyed a brisk trade as part of the great high way of central Asia.158

Trade continued to be carried out at a considerable level both during the Afghan and Sikh

rule.159

In contrast with the Afghan period, the shawl in the Sikh period, with its boldly

sweeping curves, was more ‘grandiose’ in design than ever before.160

During the time of

the Sikhs the first direct link between Persian shawl manufacturers and those of Kashmir

was achieved.161

The decline of the shawl trade is visible from the closing years of the

Sikh rule and appears to have intensified during the first three decades of the Dogra rule.

153 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. xv, p. 132; Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 383. 154 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. xv, p. 132. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Khan, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 135. 158 Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl & its Indo French Influence, p. 27. 159 Irwin, The Kashmir Shawl, p. 9. 160 Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl & its Indo French Influence, p. 33. 161 Ibid., p. 35.

112

The period of our study was marked by more rapid ways of completing a kani

shawl. Due to the large areas of design to be woven, the pattern was broken down into

fragmented parts, each woven separately, at times at separate looms.162

In fact the general

tendency, as the shawl developed through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

was towards an increasingly fragmented construction as compared with the single piece

shawls made in Mughal times.163

The shawl industry in Kashmir was so important that a

government department, named Dagshawl, had been maintained for long to deal with it.

Maharaja Gulab Singh reorganized the department.

Notwithstanding the fact that quite a number of industries existed in Kashmir, the

number of people associated with them was not very large. The 1931 census records that

trade engage only 4% of the total earners.164

The traders having no recognized union and

were mostly ignorant of the modern methods of advertising their goods living on the

profit they make in the process. The money economy was generally absent in the village

and barter system prevails which adds to the profit of the shopkeepers who in the grading

grains into different kinds generally assess their value at a lower rate.165

The usual

method was to make each product a state monopoly, and to farm out the monopoly to

some contractor [generally given to the ‘outsiders’ and ‘favourites’ of the Maharaja].166

The custom duties were annually formed out to contractors who were among the

Maharaja’s favorites, which were almost prohibitive duties levied on all merchandise

imported or exported.167

During Maharaja Gulab Singh’s time Partab shah of Rawalpindi

was the contractor for custom and paid to the state twenty thousand rupees a year.168

Silk,

saffron, chob-i-kot, violets, various kinds of forest products, hemp, tobacco, waternuts,

and paper were at different time monopolized by the state.169

Kashmir for a long time

couldn’t give birth to a strong indigenous trading class, which was prevented by the

monopolized system like Lawrence says that the selling of the unhusked rice by the

162 Frank Ames, The Kashmir Shawl & its Indo French Influence, p. 44. 163 Ibid., p. 58. 164 Rai Bahadur Pandit Anant Ram, Census of India, 1931, vol. xxiv, Jammu and Kashmir State Part 1,

Report, Ranbir Government Press, Jammu, 1933, p. 213. 165 Ibid. 166 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 417. 167 Younghusband, Kashmir, p. 93. 168 Copy of a letter from T.D. Forsyth, Commissioner and Superintendent to Government of Punjab Foreign

and Political-A, July 1863, File Nos. 73-75, NAI. 169 Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, p. 417; Younghusband, Kashmir, p. 94.

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Darbar at his own hands prevented the growth of indigenous grain merchants170

which

was the case both with the shawl and silk industries.

The monopolized system hindered the flow and growth of both the capital and

foreign enterprise.171

The people in the absence of any class of enterprising traders were

compelled to trade for themselves and beyond the barter, devoted themselves to

agriculture.172

It took a long span for the emergence of an indigenous class of traders. The

monopolized system acted as a check in the flow of money and the people associated

with the economic activities were fully at the mercy of the state which ultimately

prevented the growth of potential surplus of these classes. With the result there was a

general increase of imports over exports. For example in 1892-3 the total imports from

India were valued at 48.7 lakhs. In 1902-3 the imports reached 118 lakhs, in 1904-5 the

total value was 115 lakhs.173

In late eighties of the 19th

century a change took place in the administrative

domain of Kashmir—the establishment of the British residency in Jammu and Kashmir.

It was the time when the lucrative shawl trade was practically dead.174

Among the steps

taken to improve the means of transport and communication the major development was

the construction and opening of the Jhelum valley cart road in 1890, which laid positive

impact on the trading landscape of the valley.175

Prior to the construction of the cart road

the signs of the development of trade were there but they were primitive in character. As

a matter of fact, cash money was extremely scarce in Kashmir till late 1890s so much so

that the high officials were mostly paid in terms of kind. The opening of the vehicular

roads marked the beginning of the “modern” external trade in Kashmir,176

and possibly

the relative monetization of Kashmir economy.

Although it cannot be denied that the opening up of the roads must have brought

some positive changes in trade and commerce, terminology like “modern” external trade

and “additional boost”177

seems more like an exaggeration. There is little data available

170 Ibid., p. 390. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid., p. 391. 173 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. xv, p. 132. 174 Ibid., p. 133. 175 Khan, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 136. 176 A.M. Dar, Trade and Commerce during Dogra Rule in Kashmir, Faridabad, 1999, p. 87. 177 Ibid., p. 187.

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data to show that the trade actually got a boost during the immediate post-1890 period.

The imitation of the European business techniques by Kashmiri traders appears to have

been positive sign178

but the State-initiative again seems to missing. This is apparent in

the very first decade of the 20th

century. In 1905 as a result of the Swadeshi Movement in

which foreign goods were boycotted, provided an opportunity to the shawl industry of

Kashmir to revive its old craft on a commercial scale. But the opportunity was allowed to

slip by, and nothing was done by way of supplying the demands of the Indian market.179

The chief obstructions why Kashmir couldn’t revive its flow of trade again at this time

were the lack of capital, scarcity of labour, lack of proper supervision and

standardization, absence of the proper adjustment in the demand and supply.180

But in

spite of this, the movement seems to have had a positive impact on the trade of Kashmir;

it seems that the absence of initiative and sincerity on the part of the state prevented the

development of the trade. What is significant is that the shawl industry and shawl trade

were showing the signs of revival in 1905-6, albeit this time it was in the form of

pashmina cloth and embroidered shawls rather than kani or woven pattern shawls.181

The world war first laid an optimistic impact on the trade of Kashmir as was the

case with several industries in other parts of India. There was a great demand of the

woolen items of Kashmir, but the war time boom it again showed a downward trend as

soon as the war began to come to an end.182

Due to the war there was decline in the

imports, which proved a boon to the local industry and gave it a chance to thrive. But the

opportunity was not utilized fully, and soon after the war imports again increased over

the exports. The import figures which stood at 574 maunds valued at rupees 88,236 in

1917-18 at once shot up to 951 maunds valued at rupees 1, 51,632 in the following

year,183

thus affecting adversely the balance of trade. Therefore, it may be said that the

immediate gain of the war was that the production and trade got increased, the export

trade got up and the import trade, on the other hand, came down. The decrease in the

imports meant greater internal market for the local industry than hitherto it had. So the

178 Ibid. 179 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, p. 57. 180 Ibid., p. 58. 181 Trade Report of 1909-10, p. 27. 182 Trade Report of 1918, p. 40. 183 Ibid.

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demand increased not only from outside, but from within as well, with the natural

consequence for the prosperity for the industry. But this demand and prosperity proved

short-lived, and the export in 1926-27 was less than the import after the war.184

The

opportunity provided by both the Swadeshi Movement and World War first to Kashmir to

modernize its industries and to increase the prospectus of production and trade on

scientific basis, and to capture the foreign markets permanently was not done.185

Production at both the times increased spontaneously and without any plan, with the

result that as soon as the war came to an end, foreign manufacturers again flooded

Kashmir market, and the exports began to come down.186

On the part of the state authorities there was the absence of a definite and

comprehensive set of rules and concessions applicable to all industrialists. There was an

absence of an advisory board, financing facilities and tariff board, and very heavy road

tolls and custom duties which amounted to over 14 annas per mound in each direction

irrespective of the class of material carried.187

Customs were levied on all goods entering

the state. All parcels whether sent through the posts or through northern railways or any

other agency were liable to duty.188

Separate rates of customs were followed in case of

privileged persons, state and imperial departments.189

Absence of better roads and

communication and irrational imposition of road tolls and export duties,190

absence of

protection to indigenous industries,191

and the heavy taxes levied by the government were

the greatest drawbacks on the trade having a tendency daily to thin the number of the

workmen in the country,192

and gave a setback to the trading activities.

It was not only the rank and file but also the most elite section of the Kashmiri

Muslim society which was pushed to the wall. That small section which any oppressor or

occupational force requires at local level to main its administrative apparatus was also

184 Trade Report of 1927, P. 46. 185 Ganju, Textile Industries in Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 70-1. 186 Ibid. 187 Political Department, File No. 20/C I-10 of year 1936, JKA-J. 188 ‘A Pamphlet containing Information of Visitors to Kashmir relating to Customs and Excise

Department’, Political Department, File No. 123/GC 143, 1939, JKA-J. 189 Report on the Administration of Jammu and Kashmir for Samvat 1987-88-1990, p. 21. 190 ‘A Pamphlet containing Information of Visitors to Kashmir relating to Customs and Excise

Department.’ 191 Administrative Report of 1987-1990, p. 25. 192 Lala Ganeshi Lal, Siyahat-i-Kashmir, translated into English and Annotated by Vidya Sagar Suri,

Monograph No. 4, pp. 33-4.

116

drawn from non-Muslims and non-Kashmiris like Pandits and Punjabis. Small wonder

that those groups and sections of Kashmir who during the previous regimes had acted as

instruments of oppression saw no hope under this regime; only some non-Muslim

Kashmiris were found on the other side of the fence, thus, completing the communal

divide. The majority community heard the sympathetic voices and saw the helping hand

from such a state of economic oppression where exactions and state demand made

eviction from land a relief rather than a punishment; where forests and foreign lands were

preferred over home and hearth; where death looked a lesser misfortune than begar

where men was valued lesser than a Chinese dog; the statistical definition of poverty

changed for the worse. In fact the categories of poor and prosperous became non-existent

and were replaced by oppressor and oppressed. The rack-rented peasantry and industrial

labour exclusively belonged to the majority community—the oppressed, who were

grounded under religious, racial, economic and regional oppression untold exactions and

countless disabilities.

It is further pertinent to note that the aforesaid sections of the society saw no hope

of optimism under this regime and made vital contribution to the growth of national

consciousness. Silk weavers, shawl bafs, English-educated and religious class all

discovered a convergence of interest in fighting the regime out.

Thus, the policy of economic oppression was followed in every sphere of

economy. The newly-emerged middle class of Kashmir, the high impositions on the

economic activities of these classes which throttled the growth of trade, with a favoured

policy of the maharaja towards non-Kashmiri traders aggravated resentment among the

influential Muslim merchants and traders. As already mentioned, the shawl merchants

having lost their principal source of income with the decline of the shawl trade began to

shift to other trades to maintain their standard of living and influence in society.193

During the formative stages of the national movement in Kashmir the prominent and

leading Muslim trading families like Shawls and Ashai’s played a very significant role.194

Among the Shawls Saad-ud-din Shawl was the prominent one, and one should bear in

mind that Shawl had not only played a leading role in submitting the memorandum to

193 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 87. 194 Dar, Trade and Commerce during Dogra Rule in Kashmir, p. 189.

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viceroy Lord Reading in 1924 but was also involved in the silk factory riots.195

He was

man of great political foresight, writes M.Y. Saraf and rightly deserves the honour of

being treated as the father of the modern political movement of the Jammu and Kashmir,

who was banished by the Dogra monarchy from Kashmir and spent his forced stay

abroad in building up a slow but steady movement outside the state for the cause of his

motherland Kashmir.196

Thus, the combination of causes like state monopolies, heavy burden of taxes on

trade and industry, techniqual stagnation, inefficient means of transport and

communication, absence of the promotion of the trading activities, and lack of capital all

proved detrimental to the development of trade and commerce in the state. In the thirties

of the 20th

century was the time when the old nobility was in decline, including shawl

merchants and jagirdars, while revenue officials had penetrated into the inner core of the

society and new landholding elite of the Kashmir valley had appeared on the scene. The

peasants could not prosper as a result of the settlement but were now a recognizable class

whose interests became the focal point of the movements that Kashmir witnessed in

1910s through 1930s.197

The issues which the merchant leadership highlighted among the

fleeced masses of Kashmir were the woeful condition of the peasantry, ownership of

land, forced labour and open oppression, which were first highlighted by the leadership

of Kashmir after 1931 and got merged into an organized whole under the banner of the

Muslim Conference with S.M. Abdullah as its most important leader. The policies and

programs adopted by the conference for the further awakening of the masses will be

discussed in the next chapter.

195 Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, p. 335-39. 196 Ibid. 197 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, p. 105.